sign in sign up
<<
Home , British Empire

Masao Shinozaki

Britain as the “ of the Air” －Air Power and Defence of the British Empire, 1918-68－

Masao Shinozaki

Introduction In January 1904, Halford Mackinder delivered a lecture which attached weight to land power, challenging Alfred Mahan‟s emphasis on sea power at the Royal Geographical Society. After the lecture, a young journalist rose to speak. He elaborated:

Both the sea and the railway are going in the future – it may be near, or it may be somewhat remote –

to be supplemented by the air as a means of locomotion, and when we come to that … a great deal of

this geographical distribution must lose its importance, and the successful powers will be those who

have the greatest industrial basis. It will not matter whether they are in the centre of a continent or on

an island; those people who have the industrial power of invention and of science will be able to

defeat all others1.

It was only five weeks after the first flight of the Wright brothers in December 1903. A young man by the name of made this prescient comment when he was 30 years old. He was also an imperialist. He later established a political career and climbed up to the Secretary of State for and Burma in the Churchill Cabinet during the Second . However, he depended on the aid of others with more power to get his ideas adopted. It often depended not on his official position but on the strength of non-official

86

Britain as the “Empire of the Air” relationships with friends who had the official power to do what Amery wanted, the most important being .2 The British Empire3 is often understood as the “Empire of the Sea.”4 However, Britain established the independent Air Force as the first country to recognise the importance of air power. In addition, it is impossible to discuss naval matters without aircraft carriers, which represent Britain‟s expeditionary capability after the middle of the . How did air power play a role in imperial defence? This paper describes the period when the British Empire and air power intertwined, covering the years from 1918 when the (RAF) was established to 1968 when the retreat from “East of Suez” – symbolising the abandonment of the British Empire – was declared. James S. Corum discusses the relationship between the British Empire and air power in his article, “The RAF in imperial defence, 1919-1956,” 5 which closely relates to this paper. However, his article has some inaccurate descriptions and does not mention efforts after the Second World War.6 Air Power and colonial control: The Royal Air Force 1919-19397 by David E. Omissi represents a substantial research work referring to extensive primary sources, not only the records in The National Archives, but also the private papers of RAF officials. Omissi insists that air power offered a cheap but effective means in Iraq and that air power could influence geographically marginal societies in the British Empire. One problem is that the book‟s coverage is limited to during the , which obscures the dynamism of imperial defence from the interwar period to the post Second World War era. As to the post Second World War era, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-1968 by Philip Darby is a classic work on imperial defence8, but it is not intended to highlight the role of air power. In addition, imperial defence is often referred to fragmentally in works that study British imperial history.9

87

Masao Shinozaki

What is the significance of rethinking the relationship between the British Empire and air power today? This serves to better understand how a utilised air power. Today, the utilises air power to maintain the international order as the world‟s military . Once Britain had across a number of regions around the world. How was air power utilised there? Researching Britain‟s use of air power may offer some insights valid even in the 21st century. In the first section, this paper begins by describing imperial policing by the RAF in the interwar period. The RAF contributed to imperial policing in a lower cost and effective manner; on the other hand, the role of imperial policing offered raison d‟être for the fledgling RAF. The second section explains strategic implications of decolonisation in the after the Second World War. In the early years of the , Britain prepared to attack the from the south via air bases maintained in the Middle East; however, it faced obstacles in utilising air power because these air bases were gradually lost and overflights were rejected by Arab countries. The third section explores some operations to defend the British Empire after the Second World War and reviews concepts by the (RN) and the RAF regarding imperial defence. The fourth section discusses the shrinking of imperial defence because of financial constraints, whilst the role of the emerged. Summing up these discussions, the paper will conclude by probing imperial defence and air power.

1. Imperial Policing in the Interwar Period Aircraft were used militarily in the Italo-Turkish War in 1911 and in the Balkan War the following year. Britain used aircraft mainly in attack and reconnaissance roles in the War.10 Britain became the first country in history to establish an independent Air Force in April 1918, which contrasted other countries where aircraft belonged to the army or navy.

88

Britain as the “Empire of the Air”

The British Empire expanded its territory in the Middle East as mandates, since it achieved victory in the First World War. At the same time, though, Britain‟s rule was jeopardised by the rise of in various regions across the Empire. In addition, Britain suffered from economic difficulties, causing imperial defence to become a heavy burden. These days, Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, argued that colonial and order and imperial security could be maintained more efficiently by a highly mobile air service and at a fraction of the cost than by traditional garrisons.11 What Trenchard presented was the concept of “air control.” This means using aircraft as the primary means of employing force against bandits and rebellious tribes to punish them. “Air control” would take the place of “punitive expedition” traditionally conducted by ground forces to punish tribes for banditry and small-scale rebellion by destroying their villages, corps and livestock.12 One of the touchstone cases of “air control” was Iraq.13 Iraq had just gone under the British mandate. In the Kurdish north, its authority was fragile. In Baghdad, the Sunni notables plotted against rulers who excluded them from power. In the tribal zones of the centre and south, where much of the war had been fought, the British were resented as the gatherers of tax and the breakers of custom. Under such circumstances, the revolt broke out in July 1920.14 Suppressing the revolt in Iraq was the largest British-led military campaign of the entire interwar period.15 Stationed in Iraq were only 60,200 ground troops and two RAF squadrons.16 These forces went through hard fought battles against insurgents and Baghdad was in danger. Therefore, the RAF received reinforcements rather quickly. Much of its work consisted of simple demonstration flights, “showing the flag” aerially wherever needed. On other occasions, the RAF bombed ground targets. Throughout the revolt, the RAF logged 4,000 hours of flying time and dropped 100 tons of bombs.17 After the battle, the revolt was suppressed, resulting in British losses of 1,041 killed and

89

Masao Shinozaki missing along with 1,228 wounded. The British estimated that they had killed 8,450 insurgents.18 After the revolt, the RAF emphasised the role of air power in imperial defence and suggested to the Colonial Secretary Churchill that Iraqi defence should primarily rely on the RAF.19 When Churchill proposed this plan of “air control” at a Cabinet meeting in August 1921, the Secretary of State for War strongly criticised the plan of relying on the RAF as “unsound.” However, Churchill‟s proposal was approved because of financial considerations. The new defence scheme in Iraq was to be inaugurated from 1922.20 Referring to this development, the victory of the RAF was political and financial, and it took place in Whitehall (administrative district of ), not in the mid-Euphrates.21 Iraq would be policed mainly by eight air force squadrons, backed by four battalions, three companies of armoured cars and various supporting units.22 In addition, the RAF Air Marshal took over military command in Iraq. It was the first time that an airman had been placed in control of all military operations in a country. British forces in Iraq were supported by 15,000 Iraqi troops. Throughout the and these forces were able to quell minor tribal banditry by swiftly punishing the culprits from the air.23 Another major case in which air power was utilised during the interwar period was . There was a small revolt in Somaliland from 1919 to 1920. The British had estimated that destroying the rebel forces might require over one million pounds, but, the short campaign in which the RAF had played the central role ended up costing only £77,000. This case enabled Trenchard to insist on the of the RAF.24 Also of note, to suppress the Somaliland revolt, Amery went to Churchill, then the Secretary of State for Air, and encouraged him to use the air power.25 The RAF owed much to “air control” in insisting upon its raison d'être as an independent service. The circumstances surrounding the fledgling RAF

90

Britain as the “Empire of the Air” were severe. In the interwar period, official policy stated that Britain would not be involved in a conflict at least ten years and this belief, together with the antipathy of the older services, meant that the very survival of the RAF was in question.26 Therefore, without air policing, it is almost certain that the RAF would not have survived long into the 1920s.27 One of the strategists who recognised air power at the time was Basil Liddell Hart. He emphasised the effectiveness and lower cost of air power in imperial defence in The British Way in Warfare published in 1932.28 Was this discussion appropriate? Speaking to its effectiveness, air power offered a unique degree of mobility and cutting-edge technology, meaning it worked effectively. Aircraft had the advantage of reaching the object of the “punitive expedition,” i.e. the tribal headquarters or main village, very quickly. Aircraft also possessed the capability to inflict serious harm upon rebellious natives.29 Iraq experienced violence after independence in 1932, whilst the Sunni Baghdad government remained dependent on the RAF against Kurdish insurrection.30 Besides, aircraft were used effectively to frighten tribes in the early stages.31 However, the effectiveness of air power tended to decline over time. The air strikes had an impressive psychological effect upon the population in Somaliland in 1920. However, as “air control” methods became common practice in many colonies, the initial psychological effect soon wore off. Hostile tribes in , on India‟s Northwest Frontier, and in Kurdistan learned to camouflage their camps and dig air raid shelters for their villages when trouble broke out with the British. Tribes in Kurdistan set up a primitive warning system with observers and smoke signals to warn the most likely targets when British aircraft approached.32 In 1929 the rebels had been afraid of the British aircraft and would often as soon as one or two of them appeared on the scene. By 1936, though, they had become sufficiently

91

Masao Shinozaki familiar with them to stand their ground. Often, they fired back with their rifles.33 Thus, although the effectiveness of air power tended to decline from the early stage, it was still a revolutionary means at the time. This point was reflected in the organisation of the British forces, i.e. the immense savings of manpower in imperial defence. For example, the garrison of Iraq, supported by 23 battalions in 1921, was reduced to two battalions by 1928.34 One or two aircraft could provide army and forces the same level of reconnaissance support as a cavalry battalion. A few aircraft could provide fire support equal to an artillery battery.35 Forces which mainly consisted of the RAF and small-scale land forces (sometimes local or recruited troops) were devised,36 and deployed in India, Iraq, , , Aden and by the end of the 1930s.37 As for cost, savings were possible since there was no enemy air threat to imperial policing and even obsolescent aircraft could accomplish the missions. Aircraft considered too obsolete for home defence or European operations were considered acceptable for colonial “air control,” so aircraft such as the fighter that first flew in 1917 were employed in the colonies into the late 1920s. Besides, the number of RAF units in the colonies remained relatively static during the 1920s and 1930s as the government dramatically expanded the RAF force at home in the 1920s.38 Moreover, since the aircraft of the 1920s and 1930s could take off and land on a relatively flat and dry grass or dirt surface,39 no enormous infrastructure spending was necessary. However, deploying obsolescent aircraft in the empire exposed vulnerability when the British Empire was attacked by the Axis in the Second World War. At the outbreak of the war with Italy in 1940 and with Japan in 1941, the RAF was unable to provide an adequate defence of or Singapore.40 Incidentally, one of the views advocating air power viewed it as humane. Such a view could be traced back to imperial defence during the interwar

92

Britain as the “Empire of the Air” period. The idea that the RAF bombing campaigns were far more humane than the traditional “punitive expeditions” by ground forces was popularised by airpower advocates of the 1920s and 1930s. The RAF officially announced that at times it applied minimum force and provided rebel tribesmen with warning in advance. However, in many cases, no warnings were given and hostile tribes were bombarded ruthlessly. Yet, the RAF refrained from employing poison gas in colonial warfare.41 Besides, air bombing was remote, and its effects could often be concealed from critics, both metropolitan and local.42

2. Transformation of the Middle East by Decolonisation: From Air Power’s “Base” to “Barrier” For Britain, the Second World War was a war to defend the British Empire.43 However, “paradoxically, the ultimate cost of defending the British Empire during the Second World War was the Empire itself.”44 Although Britain won the war after a great struggle, there was growing momentum towards independence in various regions in the Empire and Britain‟s power to supress it was totally exhausted. Compared with a sum of £70 million in 1938, the deficit was expected to rise as high as £750 million in 1946. More than half of the country‟s pre-war shipping tonnage and income from the overseas investment had been lost. Total external debt rose from around £476 million in 1939 to an unprecedented £3,355 million at the close of hostilities.45 Even under these circumstances, the Britain still tried to remain a world power. According to the official paper entitled “The security of the British Empire,” in June 1945, “the essentials of imperial security,” are first “to maintain the integrity of the British Empire against both external and internal threats,” and second “to keep secure the world-wide sea and air communications on which depends the cohesion of the Empire.”46

93

Masao Shinozaki

The importance of the Middle East was emphatically discussed since the last months of the Second World War. According to a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary , the Middle East was “one of the most important strategic areas in the world,” and “it is an area the defence of which is a matter of life and death to the British Empire.” In addition, the Middle East was the sole really large source of oil outside America which was available to Britain.47 The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union grew tenser regarding post-war European issues and later this tension developed into the Cold War. Although the primary focus of the Cold War was on , Britain placed less emphasis on and it planned for a possible strike against the Soviet Union using its air power at bases in the Middle East in case the Soviet Union launched a war. The arguments that Britain should maintain air bases in the Middle East and Mediterranean as grounds of strategic bombing and conduct offensive operations at the outset of a war with the Soviet Union was first mentioned by the Defence Committee in early April 1946.48 The forces that Britain expected to deploy at the bases in the Middle East were not limited to British. In April 1946, Chief of the Air Staff Arthur Tedder announced the British air bases would receive American bombers. The United States was the only country with the bombs and aircraft to mount an atomic attack in the foreseeable future.49 This proposal was well received by the during the -American defence conferences in late 1947. At the time, the newly formed USAF Strategic Air Command was looking for suitable locations in the Mediterranean and Middle East to base their heavy B-36 bombers, which were capable of carrying nuclear weapons for long distances and the offer of British bases was very welcome.50 Besides, in 1950, the Australians agreed that would use its forces to reinforce the Middle East in a future global war.51

94

Britain as the “Empire of the Air”

Britain acquired nuclear capability in 1952 and deployed bombers in the Middle East. Britain promised to base four squadrons of atomic-capable Canberra as its military contribution to the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Canberra acquired a nuclear capability in 1961.52 Two V-bomber squadrons replaced four Canberra squadrons in and another two V-bomber squadrons were deployed in Great Britain which were assigned also to the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1967.53 However, the security of Britain‟s air bases in the Middle East was endangered because of the rise of Arab nationalism. The huge base in the Egypt‟s Zone emerged as the most adaptable replacement for the garrisons formerly based in India.54 However, Egyptian nationalists initiated a campaign of attacks against the British bases and personnel in the , resulting in the British withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone in 1956. The hope to establish Palestine as a major RAF base of operations also ran into local violence and terrorism. Jewish nationalists often attacked the RAF base and destroyed aircraft and radar stations since 1946. During the insurgency in Cyprus, which began in 1955, the RAF again became a prime target for terrorist attacks by local nationalists.55 The challenge which faced the after the in 1956 was how to deploy British forces “East of Suez.”56 Britain was severely hampered by the restrictions imposed on staging facilities and overflights by Middle Eastern countries in the Suez operation. The Suez Canal Zone was out, the and Iraq were questionable areas, and there was even doubts about . The emergence of the Arab barrier had certain immediate effects on British strategic planning “East of Suez.” There were constraints on the idea that a central reserve based in the Britain would be deployed by air. It was necessary to station elements of the strategy at points “East of Suez.”57 Britain maintained its RAF base under the treaty with Iraq which had gained independence in 1932. However, the Iraqi revolution broke out in 1958,

95

Masao Shinozaki resulting in the loss of the Britain‟s RAF base. The Americans showed no enthusiasm for armed intervention with Britain to restore the old regime. Although the RAF still controlled a key airfield at Habbaniya, a large force of insurgents was nearby, and the most that the British could deliver by air was only two battalions, which would not be enough to hold the airfield against a serious attack. The Macmillan government decided that on both political and military grounds, intervention was out of the question.58 Iraq had ceased to be a member of the Baghdad Pact on 24 March 1959. The following day, the British Cabinet discussed that the RAF personnel at Habbaniya no longer served any military purpose and should now be withdrawn.59 Britain had to try to maintain its Middle Eastern interests with bases outside the Middle East, i.e., in Cyprus and in the Eastern Mediterranean.60 Thus, the strategic value of the Middle East for Britain varied significantly. The Middle East was expected to be a base of operations to attack the Soviet Union using air power in the early post-war years. However, the rise of Arab nationalism made it difficult to maintain the RAF bases there. Especially after the Suez crisis in 1956, some countries refused Britain‟s use of staging facilities or overflights. The Middle East became a “barrier” for Britain‟s air power. Britain signed the Baghdad Pact as a form of collective defence in the Middle East, which was mainly conceived as defensive in character. After Iraq seceded from the Pact and the Bagdad Pact was transformed into CENTO, it became nominally defensive and in reality a more economic and culturally based organisation. 61 Moreover, the Soviet Union exploited Britain‟s weakness to extend and consolidate their influence in the through supplying the with weapons and supporting them in the diplomatic arena by taking advantage of the Arab-Israeli conflict.62 Britain‟s military presence in the Middle East waned markedly in the early years after the Second World War.

96

Britain as the “Empire of the Air”

3. Operations “East of Suez” and Britain’s Defence Initiative Britain conducted various operations to defend the British Empire even after the Second World War. Air power often played an important role in these operations. In , Britain‟s colonial rule was restored in Malaya after Japan‟s defeat. Faced with the communist-led in June 1948, Britain imposed a “state of emergency” and conducted counter-insurgency operations. 63 Malaya was a profitable area which provided rubber and tin for Britain, which was economically exhausted after the Second World War. A Cabinet meeting in July the same year discussed the region as follows: “it is by far the most important source of dollars in the .”64. During the , RAF helicopter squadrons enabled the light infantry and police units to operate for days, and even weeks, deep in the jungle. RAF helicopters provided constant support in the form of troop lift, resupply and medical evacuation for the infantry and police. In addition to transport operations, RAF aircraft dropped millions of leaflets over the jungle urging the rebels to surrender. In a further refinement of the propaganda war, RAF transports fitted out with loudspeakers flew over areas of known rebel activity broadcasting messages from former rebels urging their comrades to accept government offers of amnesty. Indeed, the programme supported by the RAF was remarkably successful according to the many guerrillas who surrendered from 1953 onwards.65 Australia and also dispatched their air forces to the Malayan emergency.66 Another case of imperial defence by the RAF was the Kuwaiti crisis in 1961. Although gained independence on 19 June 1961 after being a British , Iraqi leader Abd al-Karim Qasim asserted that Kuwait was part of Iraq on 25 June,67 which caused concern over Kuwaiti security. As a result, the Kuwaiti ruler requested assistance from Britain under the terms of the Exchange of Notes.68 On 30 June, the Cabinet Defence

97

Masao Shinozaki

Committee gave the order to land in Kuwait and less than a day later Royal Marine from HMS Bulwark had taken control of the local airfield and port facilities. They were supported by two squadrons of RAF Hunter fighter/ground attack aircraft, one based in Kuwait and the other in . 69 Sudan and Turkey refused overflight permission at first. Eventually British diplomats persuaded them to relent, but only at the price of stringent conditions.70 Though, this permission was withdrawn after 4 July and British forces later confirmed the existence of this “barrier.” Flights into Kuwait‟s airfield were hampered by low visibility. In some cases, transport aircraft carrying reinforcement forces had to land at Bahrain. RAF fighters first operated under control of HMS Bulwark‟s radar. A full air defence capability was not available until the arrival of HMS Victorious on 10 July.71 On 8 December 1962 armed rebellion erupted in , then a British protectorate. A treaty required Britain to assist in restoring law and order in the protectorate. Britain immediately transported the Gurkhas and British units stationed in Singapore to Brunei by air.72 Brunei town was swiftly cleared and the arrival of further reinforcements enabled troops to move up country. By 10 December nearly 2,000 men had been moved into the state.73 The operational commander gave particular emphasis to the importance of air mobility using helicopters and Short-Take Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft. Helicopters allowed forces to block off escape routes into the interior, preventing a more protracted struggle. 74 By 15 December, organised resistance had collapsed.75 As shown in these cases, Britain used air power for imperial defence even after the Second World War. In order to reduce reliance on bases, the British military sought to enhance the strategic mobility of their forces given the experience where some countries refused Britain‟s use of staging facilities or overflights in the Suez crisis of 1956.76 The defence review conducted by the Defence Secretary Duncan Sandys in 1957 aimed to maintain capability for imperial defence by

98

Britain as the “Empire of the Air” reducing the British forces and enhancing their strategic mobility. Here, the focus was air transport capability. At the time, Britain deployed garrisons around the world. The idea was to reduce overseas garrisons and to create a mobile Central Strategic Reserve, which could be sent rabidly by air to any area where trouble arose. The heavy equipment for the Strategic Reserve that could not be transported by air would be stockpiled in overseas bases where they could be picked-up by troops on their arrival.77 Transporting troops by air, however, was not always practicable. Securing a point of entry was essential. For example, when Britain confronted the revolt in , the airport at Dar es Salaam was already in rebel hands, so it was not possible to use the airport to fly in troops from nearby . Therefore, a Royal Marine on board the light aircraft carrier landed.78 But once a point of entry had been seized, there were problems dispatching transport aircraft directly from Great Britain. This was because no British transport aircraft could fly direct from Great Britain to the Middle East or without passing through the air-space of other countries or landing to refuel. Even before the Suez crisis, the Ministry of Defence recognised that the neutralism of Ceylon and India, compounded with the growth of Arab nationalism, might threaten Britain‟s existing landing and overflights. These fears were justified during the Suez crisis, when Ceylon, Iraq, Libya, and were reluctant to grant staging and landing rights needed for the operation against Egypt.79 Turkey and Sudan allowed British overflights under strict conditions in the Kuwaiti crisis of 1961 as mentioned above. As decolonisation progressed and more Asian and African countries gained independence, it became uncertain that an independent government would continue to offer facilities for Britain. By 1962, only a single, very long route, going from to (island in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean), round the Cape of Good Hope, via the (,

99

Masao Shinozaki

Aden or Gan) to Singapore, was under British sovereign control across its entire length.80 In addition, the CENTO air route from Cyprus over Turkey and Iran to the area or the Far East was important for Britain.81 Thus, when overseas operations of the British forces were constrained, the Ministry of Defence considered future options for the RN and RAF assuming the loss of overseas bases. The RAF developed the concept known as the ”Island Strategy” or “Island Stance.” The RAF claimed that British interests could be supported through the application of long-range air power deployed at Britain‟s bases or those that could be available under treaty. It assumed that the enemy was small and insisted that land-based aircraft could be brought into a disputed area more quickly than aircraft carriers.82 The parachute troops would be dispatched first, then follow-on forces would only arrive if a suitable airfield could be captured and held.83 On the other hand, the Admiralty interrupted the “Island Strategy” as an attack on their plans for aircraft carriers and amphibious ships. In January 1963, the Minister of Defence was sent a report by the Admiralty which pointed out that since the “Island Strategy” was tied to static bases, worldwide military operations were not possible and changing circumstances could not be adapted to. The Admiralty also questioned the feasibility of using bases in Masirah (off the eastern coast of ), Aldabra ( part of the Indian Ocean) and . Though, this report did not intend to rule out the RAF aircraft but stressed that the RAF and RN aircraft should be complementary to each other.84 At the request of the Minister of Defence, an inter-service panel was set up to consider the effectiveness of the “Island Strategy” and necessity of a carrier replacement programme. They considered that the most likely type of intervention was the invitation of a threatened regime, in which the airfield was available and the opposition was little. Intervention in such circumstances did not require carriers nor the full network of island bases proposed in the

100

Britain as the “Empire of the Air”

“Island Strategy.” However, as the level of opposition rose, it would become more difficult for the RAF and Army to secure the airhead, and at some stage of opposition, the carrier solution would prove to be the most effective and enduring. At the same time, if Britain could not retain suitable islands, it would be necessary to make substantial improvements in long-range air transportation.85 Thus, the possession of aircraft carriers was validated and the Cabinet agreed that the aircraft carrier fleet should be maintained at a level of three ships during the 1970s and that a new aircraft carrier should be built to replace one in . The Chancellor of the Exchequer Reginald Maudling stated that “a definite decision not to build another carrier would be interpreted that we were preparing to abandon our military position east of Suez.”86

4. The Shrinking of Imperial Defence In the 1960s, both the RN and RAF championed their competing visions of how to project air power “East of Suez.” The RN planned to build a new aircraft carrier and the RAF developed the “Island Strategy.” However, Britain‟s economic decline in the 1960s required curtailment of defence spending. The struggle of the RN and RAF for global ended when the Treasury rode roughshod over both their claims.87 As for the aircraft carrier, Britain‟s aircraft carriers at the time were built during the Second World War and would go out of service in the early 1970s. The new one was required to replace them. The new aircraft carrier was code-named CVA -01. Though the specification of CVA-01 varied at the stage of design, in July 1962 when the Admiralty reported to the Minister of Defence and obtained authorisation, the displacement was 53,000 tons, with a capacity to carry 30 OR 346 aircraft and 36 Buccaneer aircraft.88 The development of CVA-01 was decided at a Cabinet meeting in July 1963 and

101

Masao Shinozaki announced in the House of Commons.89 When CVA-01 was commissioned, it would be called HMS Queen Elizabeth.90 However, the development of CVA-01 faced difficulties. These stemmed not only from the fact that much new and novel equipment had to be specified for CVA-01, but largely from the reluctance of the Treasury to authorise expenditure for research and development.91 At the time Britain‟s economy was stagnant. The Defence Secretary of the Labour Party conducted the “defence review” in which he set a financial target of a £2,000 million cut to be reached in 1969-70. This meant a reduction of 16% on the expenditure which the previous Conservative government contemplated for 1969-70.92 They decided not to build CVA-01 to realise these defence cuts. The defence review states that “only one type of operation exists for which carriers and carrier-borne aircraft would be indispensable: that is the landing or withdrawal of troops against sophisticated opposition outside the range of land-based air cover.”93 After the development of CVA-01 was cancelled, land-based aircraft emerged as an alternative. The original “Island Strategy” intended to operate the TSR-2 long-range tactical strike aircraft under development.94 However, since the cost of TSR-2 development had not proved possible to agree, the Cabinet agreed that the TSR-2 should be cancelled in April 1965.95 The TSR-2‟s possible replacement was the American F-111A aircraft. Britain opened discussion with the United States government on terms for a possible purchase of 50 F-111A aircraft in 1966. Britain needed the F-111A “in order to perform their military tasks and remain a militarily credible power with a worthwhile contribution to world stability.” The F-111A had capabilities of reconnaissance and tactical strike.96 The map shows the extent of the coverage over target areas which the aircraft could provide. A large part of “East of Suez” was within this coverage.

102

Britain as the “Empire of the Air”

● Akrotiri

● Masirah

● Gan

● ● Cocos Islands Aldabra ● Darwin

Map: Tactical strike coverage of the F-111A97

The RAF believed that the F-111A could replace aircraft carriers “East of Suez.” For example, the little 24,000-ton carrier could only carry seven Buccaneers in addition to a dozen fighters. This was the equivalent of only three F-111A in striking power. Moreover, F-111A would be able to travel to the required area faster than an aircraft carrier.98 Nevertheless, the British economy was still not performing well and the costs of overseas garrisons became a burden. In , Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons the withdrawal of all British forces from “East of Suez” by the end of 1971.99 At the same time, the cancellation of the order for 50 F-111A from the United States was announced.100 The F-111A was a symbol both of Britain‟s “East of Suez” role and of its loyalty to its overseas allies. Without the F-111A, it would be

103

Masao Shinozaki difficult for Britain to claim that it possessed a credible general capability to intervene in conflicts outside Europe.101 However, Britain‟s declaration in January 1968 to withdraw its forces was not carried out as planned. Although major units were withdrawn and servicemen were downsized by the end of 1971, Britain still maintained staging posts in various regions “East of Suez” and Britain‟s military presence did not shrink in geographical size. Whilst most of these forces were withdrawn in the middle of the 1970s,102 some British forces were still stationed in and Brunei after that. After 1968, regional security cooperation progressed in and Singapore where Britain‟s garrisons were downsized. Britain sought cooperation among five powers including Australia and New Zealand, and an agreement was reached to establish the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS). The Commander of IADS was given emergency powers to employ assigned forces of all five countries to meet a surprise attack.103 Australia provided two squadrons of Mirage fighters, which were the main forces of IADS. Britain only dispatched headquarters staff and did not offer the fighter aircraft despite a request by Singapore.104 Australia replaced Britain‟s former position at least as long as the size of the force contribution concerned. Britain‟s commitment to the world was shrinking.

Conclusions This paper discussed how Britain utilised the new means of air power to fulfil the traditional ends of imperial defence. Whilst Britain was traditionally the “Empire of the Sea,” it also used air power effectively to serve imperial defence in the period from 1918 to 1968, taking on an aspect as the “Empire of the Air.” Studying the process indicates that the recognition of air power varied in accordance with the changes in times.

104

Britain as the “Empire of the Air”

The major role of the RAF was imperial policing, or counter-insurgency against tribes in British mandates in the Middle East or in the colonies in during the interwar period. The threat to the British Empire in this period was internal, giving rise to a strong awareness of “security within the Empire.” Since the RAF confronted no enemy with air power, aircraft considered too obsolete for home defence were enough to accomplish missions in the colonies. This also resulted in lower costs. Whilst there are different remarks on the effectiveness of “air control,” it goes without saying that air control did not work in urban areas. As the British Empire was threatened in Southeast Asia and from Japan and Italy during the Second World War and the threat from the Soviet Union was recognised globally after the War, the demand for “security from outside the Empire” rose gradually. Here, it was necessary for Britain to build up modern air power such as jet aircraft or nuclear forces and these demands became a heavy burden on the weak British economy, since the opposition had modern forces. In addition, as decolonisation progressed, air bases and ports accepting aircraft carriers were lost and the operational sphere of air power was undermined. The Middle East especially experienced a significant transformation from the “base” to the “barrier” of air power. The build-up of air power in Commonwealth countries enabled them to play certain roles in imperial defence. For example, Australia and New Zealand dispatched their air forces to the Malayan emergency. Australia also provided the main forces for the air defence of Southeast Asia after the Britain‟s withdrawal. These dimensions could be expressed as “security by the Empire.” Commonwealth countries had already provided aircrew to Britain in the Second World War;105 it was only after the War when modern defence forces were built that they could provide air power. Whilst this paper analysed Britain‟s old-fashioned imperial defence as a declining and aging power, some issues have much in common with the

105

Masao Shinozaki

“New Wars” in the 21st century. These issues include, for example, the regular use of air strikes as politically less provocative means, the effectiveness and limits of air power against non-state actors, the importance of neighbouring countries which offer staging posts in a theatre, and the burden-sharing by allies. The British cases do not offer the absolute answers to these issues whilst they do provide at least helpful perspectives. The effectiveness and limits of air power against non-state actors are interesting issues since the qualitative superiority of air power does not necessarily result in victory. Insurgents that did not possess air power took measures for damage control even in a primitive manner as early as in the interwar period. Air power has been closely related with political dynamism among the services in Britain. The role of imperial defence enabled the fledgling RAF to survive and air power also helped to curtail the cost of imperial defence in the interwar period. After the aircraft carrier emerged, the RN also became an actor in air power and at times there was marked discord with the RAF over the defence programme. The RN emphasised the role “East of Suez” to maintain its aircraft carriers. The exploration of the role of air power is closely related to the motives of the services to rationalise or consolidate their stances.

1 Katherine C. Epstein, “Imperial Airs: Leo Amery, Air Power and Empire, 1873-1945,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 38, No. 4, December 2010, pp. 571-572. 2 Ibid., p. 572 3 The British Empire consisted of the formal empire (, colonies, , mandates, etc.) and the (where Britain‟s economic influence was strong). 4 See for example the research on British imperial history from such a viewpoint by Jeremy Black, The British Seaborne Empire, Yale University Press, 2004. 5 James S. Corum, “The RAF in imperial defence, 1919-1956,” in Greg Kennedy ed., Imperial Defence: The old world order 1856-1956, Routledge, 2008, pp. 152-175. 6 Ashley Jackson remarks that many imperial historians see the 1968 declaration to withdraw from “East of Suez,” rather than the Suez crisis of 1956, as a turning point of the end of empire. Ashley Jackson, “Imperial defence in the post-imperial era,” in Kennedy ed., Imperial Defence, p. 311. 7 David E. Omissi, Air Power and colonial control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939, Manchester University Press, 1990. 8 Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-1968, Oxford University Press, 1973.

106

Britain as the “Empire of the Air”

9 John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System 1830-1970, Cambridge University Press, 2009; Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis eds., The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV: The Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press, 2010; Sasaki Yuta ed., The Era of World War and the British Empire, Minervashobo, 2009 (Japanese). 10 Peter Gray, “British Air Power from Potential to Fully Fledged Service, 1914-45,” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 159, No. 4, August/ 2014, pp. 37-40. 11 Michael Paris, “Air Power and Imperial Defence,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 24, No. 2, April 1989, p. 209. 12 Corum, “The RAF in imperial defence,” p. 154. 13 The first use of aircraft for counter-insurgency work had occurred in 1916 in the Sudan when four aircraft had played a leading part in suppressing an uprising in Darfur. Anthony Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-39, The University of Georgia Press, 1986, p. 79. 14 Darwin, The Empire Project, p. 380. 15 Mark Jacobsen, “Only by the Sword: British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 1991, p. 323. 16 Ibid., pp. 326-327. 17 Ibid., p. 352. 18 Ibid., pp. 357. 19 Omissi, Air Power and colonial control, p. 25. 20 Cabinet.70(21), “Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Thursday, 18th August, 1921, at 11.30 a.m.,” CAB23/26, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter referred to as TNA). 21 Jacobsen, “Only by the Sword,” p. 359. 22 Omissi, Air Power and colonial control, p. 26. 23 Corum, “The RAF in imperial defence,” p. 155. 24 Ibid., p. 154. 25 Epstein, “Imperial Airs,” p. 579. 26 Paris, “Air Power and Imperial Defence,” p. 209. 27 Omissi, Air Power and colonial control, p. 211. 28 Basil Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare, Faber&Faber Limited, 1932, pp. 139-161. 29 Corum, “The RAF in imperial defence,” p. 155. 30 Anthony Clayton, “‟Deceptive Might‟: Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968, Brown and Louis eds., The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV, p. 292. 31 Watanabe Seishi, “The British Empire in the Middle East,” Sasaki ed., The Era of World War and the British Empire, p. 150 (Japanese). 32 Corum, “The RAF in imperial defence,” p. 156. 33 Martin Van Creveld, The Age of Airpower, Public Affairs, 2011, p. 347. 34 Clayton, “‟Deceptive Might,‟” pp. 287-290. 35 Corum, “The RAF in imperial defence,” pp. 156-157. 36 Watanabe, “The British Empire in the Middle East,” p. 150 (Japanese). 37 Clayton, “‟Deceptive Might,‟” p. 283. 38 Corum, “The RAF in imperial defence,” p. 157. 39 Ibid., p. 168. 40 Ibid., p. 159. 41 Ibid., p. 156. Spain and Italy used aircraft to drop poison gas on tribal rebels. 42 Clayton, “‟Deceptive Might,‟” pp. 287-290. 43 Sasaki Yuta, “The Era of World War and the British Empire,” Sasaki ed., The Era of World War and the British Empire, p. 12 (Japanese). 44 Keith Jeffery, “The Second World War,” in Brown and Louis eds., The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume IV, p. 327. 45 Michael Blackwell, Clinging to Grandeur: British Attitudes and Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Second

107

Masao Shinozaki

World War, Greenwood Press, 1993, pp. 3-4. 46 CAB81/46, PHP(45)29(0)Final, “The security of the British empire: report by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff for the Chiefs of Staff Committee [Extract],” 29 June 1945, British Documents on the End of Empire (BDEEP), Series A, Volume 1, Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice 1925-1945, Part I, HMSO, 1996, No. 43. 47 CAB66/65, WP(45)256, “Defence of the Middle East: War Cabinet memorandum by Mr Eden,” 13 April 1945, BDEEP, Ser. A, Vol. 1, Part I, No. 42; Hosoya Yuichi, “British Empire in the Cold War Era,” Sasaki ed., The Era of World War and the British Empire, pp. 96-97 (Japanese). 48 Simon Ball, “Bomber Bases and British Strategy in the Middle East, 1945-1949,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, December 1991, p. 519. 49 Ibid., p. 520. 50 Corum, “The RAF in imperial defence,” p. 167. 51 Richard Moore, “A Proliferation of Royal Air Force: Bombers and Bombs Down Under, 1954-63,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2014, p. 171. 52 Ball, “Bomber Bases and British Strategy in the Middle East,” p. 530. 53 Panagiotis Dimitrakis, “British Diplomacy and the Decline of CENTO,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2009, pp. 318-319. 54 Jeffrey R. Macris, The and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American hegemony and the shaping of a region, Routledge, 2010, p. 91. 55 Corum, “The RAF in imperial defence,” p. 169. 56 “East of Suez” is a region centred in the Indian Ocean where British bases were located in mainly Singapore, Hong Kong, Aden, and (eastern coast of Arica). Shibazaki Yusuke, “The Attempt to Maintain the Influence upon the World: Retreat from East of Suez and British Policy towards the Middle East,” Kibata Yoichi and Goto Harumi eds., The Long Shadow of the Empire: Transformation of the International Order in the Twentieth Century, Minervashobo, 2010, p. 71 (Japanese). 57 Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-1968, pp. 122-124. 58 David French, “Duncan Sandys and the Projection of British Power after Suez,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 24, No. 41, 2013, p. 52. 59 CC(59)20th Conclusions, “Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing street, S. W. 1, on Wednesday, 25th March, 1959, at 11.30 a.m.,” CAB128/33, TNA. 60 Cihat Goktepe, “The „Forgotten ‟? Anglo-Turkish Relations and CENTO, 1959-65,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1999, p. 106. 61 Ibid., p. 125. 62 Moshe Gat, “Anatomy of decline: Anglo-Soviet competition in the Middle East, 1956-67,” Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2013, p. 617. 63 Britain dispatched military forces and police to deal with , which continued over Malayan independence until July 1960. See Kibata Yoichi, The Twilight of the Empire: British Policy towards Japan and Malaya, 1947-1955, University of Tokyo Press, 1996, part II (Japanese). 64 C.P.(48)171, “The Situation in Malaya: Memorandum by the secretary of state for the colonies,” 1 July 1948, CAB129/28, TNA. 65 Corum, “The RAF in imperial defence,” p. 171. 66 Ibid., p. 172. 67 Nigel Ashton, “Britain and the Kuwaiti Crisis, 1961,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 9, No. 1, March 1998, p. 166. 68 Ibid., p. 168. 69 French, “Duncan Sandys and the Projection of British Power after Suez,” pp. 46-47. 70 Aircraft had to maintain radio silence. Pilots were told not to submit flight plans, to fly as high as possible, and to use the same routes as civil , so that if necessary Sudanese and Turkish could plausibly claim that they know nothing of what was happening in their air space. Ibid., pp. 48-49. 71 COS(61)378, “Report by the Commander-in-Chief Middle East on Operations in Support of the State of Kuwait in July 1961,” 18 October 1961, DEFE5/118, TNA.

108

Britain as the “Empire of the Air”

72 Chin Kin Wah, The defence of Malaysia and Singapore: The transformation of a security system, 1957-1971, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 64. 73 Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-1968, p. 233. 74 Alexander Nicholas Shaw, “British counterinsurgency in Brunei and Sarawak, 1962-1963: developing best practices in the shadow of Malaya,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2016, p. 712. 75 Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-1968, p. 233. 76 Ian Speller, “The Royal Navy, Expeditionary Operations and the End of Empire, 1956-75,” in Greg Kennedy ed., British Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900-2000: Influences and actions, Frank Cass, 2005, p. 178. 77 French, “Duncan Sandys and the Projection of British Power after Suez,” pp. 43-44. 78 Ibid., p. 47. 79 Ibid., p. 47. 80 Ibid., p. 48. 81 Goktepe, “The „Forgotten Alliance‟?,” p. 126; Dimitrakis, “British Diplomacy and the Decline of CENTO,” p. 319. 82 “A Comparison of Land-Based and Carrier-Borne Strike Force Capabilities in Limited War in 1970-1980,” February 1963, AIR8/2354, TNA. 83 Speller, “The Royal Navy,” p. 184. 84 Carrington to Minister of Defence, “The Island Strategy,” 9 January 1963, AIR20/11423, TNA. 85 “Report of Enquiry into Carrier Task Force,” 22 April 1963, AIR8/2354, TNA. 86 CC(63)50th Conclusions, “Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at Admiralty House, S. W. 1, on Tuesday, 30th July, 1963, at 11.30 a.m.,” CAB128/37, TNA. 87 Ashley Jackson, “Imperial defence in the post-imperial era,” in Kennedy ed., Imperial Defence, p. 311. 88 Anthony Gorst, “CVA-01: A case study in innovation in Royal Navy aircraft carriers, 1959-1966,” in Richard Harding ed. The Royal Navy, 1930-2000: Innovation and Defence, Frank Cass, 2005, pp. 180-182. 89 Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons, Ser. 5, Vol. 682, 30 July 1963, col. 237. 90 Chief of the Defence Staff to First Sea Lord, untitled, 6 April 1964, ADM1/29044, TNA. 91 Gorst, “CVA-01,” p. 183. 92 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966: Part I: The Defence Review, Cmnd. 2901, HMSO, 1966, p. 1. 93 Cmnd. 2901, pp. 9-10. 94 “A Comparison of Land-Based and Carrier-Borne Strike Force Capabilities in Limited War in 1970-1980,” February 1963, AIR8/2354, TNA. 95 CC(65)20th Conclusions, “Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S. W. 1, on Thursday, 1st April, 1965, at 10 a.m.,” CC(65)21st Conclusions, “Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S. W. 1, on Thursday, 1st April 1965, at 10 p.m.,” CAB128/39, TNA. 96 OPD(66)30, “The F111A Option: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence,” 8th February 1966, CAB148/27, TNA. 97 Tactical strike coverage with 10,000 lbs. of bombs (conventional weapons). Appendix 3 to Annex A to OPD(66)30, “The F111A Option: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence,” 8th February 1966, CAB148/27, TNA. 98 Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War Two, Naval Institute Press, 1987, p. 272. 99 Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons, Ser. 5, Vol. 756, 16 January 1968, col. 1580. 100 Ibid., col. 1583. 101 Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World?, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 212. 102 Shinozaki Masao, “Britain as an „Empire Detained‟: The Retreat from the Commonwealth, 1974-75, , Vol. 164, February 2011 (Japanese). 103 Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever,” Security Challenges, Vol. 3, No. 1, February 2007, p. 81. 104 MO25/2/2, “Record of official talks in Singapore on 27th July, 1970 between the Secretary of State for Defence

109

Masao Shinozaki

& Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,” DEFE25/239 (also in FCO24/645, FCO46/622), TNA. 105 Moore, “A Proliferation of Royal Air Force,” p. 170.

110