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WALLS HAVE EARS: an Analysis of Classified Syrian Security Sector Documents Walls Have Ears an Analysis of Classified Syrian Security Sector Documents

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WALLS HAVE EARS: an Analysis of Classified Syrian Security Sector Documents Walls Have Ears an Analysis of Classified Syrian Security Sector Documents WALLS HAVE EARS: An Analysis of Classified Syrian Security Sector Documents Walls Have Ears An Analysis of Classified Syrian Security Sector Documents The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) is a Syrian-led, multilaterally supported non-profit that envisions a Syria defined by justice, respect for human rights, and rule of law — where citizens from all com- ponents of Syrian society live in peace. SJAC promotes transitional justice and accountability processes in Syr- ia by collecting and preserving documentation, ana- lyzing and cataloging data, and promoting public dis- course on transitional justice — within Syria and beyond. Learn more at www.syriaaccountability.org. This report was supported by a grant from the Open Soci- ety Foundations. Cover photo provided by Lens Young Homsi. Report designed by Nada Mohamed-Aly. Syria Justice and Accountability Centre April 2019 Material from this publication may be reproduced for teaching or other non-commercial purposes, with appro- priate attribution. No part of it may be reproduced in any form for commercial purposes without the prior express permission of the copyright holders. Published April 2019 in Washington, DC. Photo by Lens Young Dimashqi Photo by Lens Young Homsi Photo by Lens Young Dimashqi Lens Young by Photo Homsi Lens Young by Dimashqi Photo Lens Young by Photo Table of Contents Forward by the Executive Director 1 Background 3 Document Analysis Methodology 4 Document Extraction from Syria 4 Sample Set Selection 5 Structure of Database and Analysis 6 Relevance of Documents 7 Relevancy to Accountability Efforts 7 Relevancy to Transitional Justice Efforts 8 Syria’s Security Sector Agencies 9 External Assessments of Syria’s Security Sector 13 Findings Derived from the Documents 15 State Surveillance 15 Detainees and Wanted Lists 16 Rules of Engagement 18 Admission to the Commission of Crimes 20 Repression of Kurds and other Minority Groups 22 Predictions and Conspiracies 23 Gaps in Information 26 Types of Gaps 26 Supplementary Data: Videos 27 Conclusion and Recommendations 28 Annexes 30 Forward by the Executive Director Growing up in a country with a massive and com- Getting in trouble required little effort in Syria. plex security apparatus was a unique experience. As Syrians say, “Walls have ears.” The threshold The average Syrian’s relationship to the security for receiving punishment was low; peacefully agencies was tainted by fear, misconceptions, voicing dissatisfaction with any of the govern- rumors, horror stories, and sometimes by dark ment’s policies was sufficient for one of the secu- humor. Many Syrians purposefully avoided any rity agencies to “talk” with you. Sometimes you contact with security agencies, refrained from would receive a call requesting that you report to working in public affairs or intervening in po- a specific security branch, or you would receive a litical issues, and expressed public loyalty to the call from an officer inviting you for a “cup of cof- government. However, that in itself was insuffi- fee.” Sometimes the security agencies would sim- cient to shield anyone from the security agencies, ply send an unmarked car to pick you up with no as they control almost every aspect of life in Syria. warning. These “meetings” often resulted in you being disappeared for some time. The security agencies exercised no consistency with regard to In 2005, Syrian President Bashar Al Assad tem- punishment – sometimes you would be released porarily placated the population by introducing the same day with no physical abuse, or you could a reform package that eliminated the need for be jailed for years with no warning. the security sector to approve certain matters in everyday life. The list of 67 reforms suddenly en- abled Syrians to open a falafel restaurant or in- I grew up in a politically active household. My fa- ternet café, purchase property, file for a replace- ther was a writer and a political opponent of the ment ID or passport, or register their marriage government, a “frequent prisoner” as we called to a foreigner without pre-approval by the secu- him. I grew up and joined the weak human rights rity agencies. movement in the country, along with my brother who was an activist at his university. All of us had our own “experiences” with the security agencies. In reality, nothing changed. Despite the reform package, Syrians were still required to receive approval for these situations, and the list of sit- My family was the subject of raids on at least five uations for which security sector approval was or six different occasions after 2000 alone, tar- required continued to expand. Though getting geting either my father, my brother, or myself. approval might sound like a simple bureaucrat- In Syria, we referred to these raids as “midnight ic task, it was a far more complicated process in visitors.” Each raid was conducted by a different Syria. You might receive approval from one se- branch, comprised of armed agents dressed in curity agency only to be punished for failing to civilian clothes. Like many Syrians, my under- receive approval from another. The only way to standing of the various agencies within the secu- ensure that you would not be punished would rity sector was initially shaped by my experiences be to seek approval from every security agency, during these raids. an impossible task considering the number of branches and sub-branches that would often re- quest separate approval. SYRIA JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY CENTRE | 1 WALLS HAVE EARS | 2 In 2005, two vehicles filled with armed agents The contents of the documents are unsurprising in civilian clothes appeared at my home at mid- for anyone who grew up in Syria familiar with the night to arrest my father. The officers had no security sector, but the documents expose clear arrest warrant, but took my father with them patterns of widespread, systematic human rights regardless. After two weeks, the court granted violations. The documents also clearly illustrate my family a visit, but I was required to receive that the security agencies operate above the law. additional approval from the Political Security Division in Damascus as final authorization for In order to achieve a more comprehensive un- the visit. Later, I requested another visit directly derstanding of the Syrian conflict and the level through the Political Security Division and was of violations that occurred, it is essential to un- granted it without ever having to go through the derstand not simply the relationship between court system. Seven months later, my father was agencies and actors as is officially documented, included in a presidential amnesty, which should but also the way that these agencies have operat- have led to his immediate release. Instead, he ed in practice. Security sector reform, including was only released from the central prison to the vetting and lustration, will be a key component Political Security Division in Damascus, which of any peace agreement with any true promise had to separately approve the process before al- of achieving long-term peace in Syria. It is my lowing my father to come home. These events hope that this analysis can serve as an initial step illustrate the reality of the power of the security toward meaningful understanding of the role of sector in Syria: the security sector had authority the security sector in Syria and its involvement over every component of government functions. in human rights and humanitarian law violations committed during the conflict, and as a step for- After the 2011 uprising, the security sector played ward in the route to justice for Syrians. a decisive role in the events that followed; the up- risings escalated quickly because of the bloody, disproportionate response to protesters by the security agencies. From the use of live ammuni- tions against peaceful protesters in 2011, to mass arrest campaigns, torture, and disappearances, the security sector remained an integral part of Mohammad Al Abdallah Bashar al Assad’s attempts to suppress dissent May 1, 2019 as the conflict evolved, and their practices are shown widely in the documents contained in this analysis. WALLS HAVE EARS | 2 Background Accurate and secure record keeping is an essential gov- As the conflict in Syria intensified, organizations like ernment function. As has been enshrined in freedom SJAC and the Commission for International Justice and of information legislation in more than 100 countries Accountability (CIJA) salvaged thousands of pages to worldwide, citizens have a general right to access these preserve this invaluable information. High quality scans records (albeit, with some limitations) to ensure greater of the pages have been loaded into SJAC’s database. government integrity, accountability, and transparency. SJAC preserves and holds these documents in trust for Since government records often reveal the nature of cit- the Syrian people, until such time that a transitional izens’ interactions with official institutions, they serve justice process is realized and the documents can be as important pieces of evidence when a government made available as a historical record of the conflict. By betrays the good faith of its population. In post-conflict analyzing the documents, they can be tagged with rele- societies, recovered government records have contribut- vant labels and made searchable and accessible to justice ed to truth-telling and the creation of a historical record, mechanisms, including the International, Impartial and as well as to prosecutions of government officials. Independent Mechanism (IIIM), prosecutors’ offices pursuing universal jurisdiction cases, and future tran- sitional justice mechanisms. For decades, the Syrian government has been surveil- ling political figures, perceived dissidents, ethnic and religious minorities, and journalists, sometimes tar- This report is the result of a pilot analysis of a 5,003-page geting them for detention, torture, or execution. Se- sample set of documents that took place from June 4 to curity sector officials have methodically documented August 17, 2018.
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