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Israeli–Palestinian Peacemaking January 2019 Middle East and North the Role of the Arab States Africa Programme
Briefing Israeli–Palestinian Peacemaking January 2019 Middle East and North The Role of the Arab States Africa Programme Yossi Mekelberg Summary and Greg Shapland • The positions of several Arab states towards Israel have evolved greatly in the past 50 years. Four of these states in particular – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and (to a lesser extent) Jordan – could be influential in shaping the course of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. • In addition to Egypt and Jordan (which have signed peace treaties with Israel), Saudi Arabia and the UAE, among other Gulf states, now have extensive – albeit discreet – dealings with Israel. • This evolution has created a new situation in the region, with these Arab states now having considerable potential influence over the Israelis and Palestinians. It also has implications for US positions and policy. So far, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Jordan have chosen not to test what this influence could achieve. • One reason for the inactivity to date may be disenchantment with the Palestinians and their cause, including the inability of Palestinian leaders to unite to promote it. However, ignoring Palestinian concerns will not bring about a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which will continue to add to instability in the region. If Arab leaders see regional stability as being in their countries’ interests, they should be trying to shape any eventual peace plan advanced by the administration of US President Donald Trump in such a way that it forms a framework for negotiations that both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships can accept. Israeli–Palestinian Peacemaking: The Role of the Arab States Introduction This briefing forms part of the Chatham House project, ‘Israel–Palestine: Beyond the Stalemate’. -
Israeli Media Self-Censorship During the Second Lebanon War
conflict & communication online, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2019 www.cco.regener-online.de ISSN 1618-0747 Sagi Elbaz & Daniel Bar-Tal Voluntary silence: Israeli media self-censorship during the Second Lebanon War Kurzfassung: Dieser Artikel beschreibt die Charakteristika der Selbstzensur im Allgemeinen, und insbesondere in den Massenmedien, im Hinblick auf Erzählungen von politischer Gewalt, einschließlich Motivation und Auswirkungen von Selbstzensur. Es präsentiert zunächst eine breite theoretische Konzeptualisierung der Selbstzensur und konzentriert sich dann auf seine mediale Praxis. Als Fallstudie wurde die Darstellung des Zweiten Libanonkrieges in den israelischen Medien untersucht. Um Selbstzensur als einen der Gründe für die Dominanz hegemonialer Erzählungen in den Medien zu untersuchen, führten die Autoren Inhaltsanalysen und Tiefeninterviews mit ehemaligen und aktuellen Journalisten durch. Die Ergebnisse der Analysen zeigen, dass israelische Journalisten die Selbstzensur weitverbreitet einsetzen, ihre Motivation, sie zu praktizieren, und die Auswirkungen ihrer Anwendung auf die Gesellschaft. Abstract: This article describes the characteristics of self-censorship in general, specifically in mass media, with regard to narratives of political violence, including motivations for and effects of practicing self-censorship. It first presents a broad theoretical conceptualization of self-censorship, and then focuses on its practice in media. The case study examined the representation of The Second Lebanon War in the Israeli national media. The authors carried out content analysis and in-depth interviews with former and current journalists in order to investigate one of the reasons for the dominance of the hegemonic narrative in the media – namely, self-censorship. Indeed, the analysis revealed widespread use of self-censorship by Israeli journalists, their motivations for practicing it, and the effects of its use on the society. -
Media Accountability Online in Israel. an Application of Bourdieu’S Field Theory
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Kniep, Ronja Article — Published Version Media Accountability Online in Israel. An application of Bourdieu’s field theory Global Media Journal: German Edition Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Kniep, Ronja (2015) : Media Accountability Online in Israel. An application of Bourdieu’s field theory, Global Media Journal: German Edition, ISSN 2196-4807, Universität Erfurt, Erfurt, Vol. 5, Iss. 2, pp. 1-32, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-201500645 , http://www.globalmediajournal.de/de/2015/12/18/media-accountability-online-in-israel-an- application-of-bourdieus-field-theory/ This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/231999 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. -
Goldhar V Haaretz.Com 2016 ONCA
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: Goidhar v. Haaretz.com, 2016 ONCA 515 DATE: 20160628 DOCKET: C60259 Simmons, Cronk and Pepall JJ.A. BETWEEN Mitchell Goldhar Plaintiff (Respondent) and Haaretz.com, Haaretz Daily Newspaper Ltd., Haaretz Group, Haaretz.Co.ll, Shiomi Barzel and David Marouani Defendants (Appellants) Paul Schabas and Emily Bala, for the appellants William McDowell, Ren Bucholz and Julian Porter, Q.C., for the respondent Heard: November 10, 2015 On appeal from the order of Justice Mario D. Faieta of the Superior Court of Justice, dated March 6, 2015, with reasons reported at 2015 ONSC 1128, 125 O.R. (3d) 619. Simmons J.A.: I. INTRODUCTION [1] The issues on appeal concern whether an internet libel action, based on a newspaper article uploaded in Israel, can and should proceed in Ontario. Page: 2 [2] In November 2011, an Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, published an article criticizing the management practices of Mitchell Goldhar, the owner of the Maccabi Tel Aviv Football Club, a soccer team based in Tel Aviv, that plays in the Israeli Premier League. [3] Goldhar is a prominent Canadian businessman and lives in Toronto. [4] In addition to being published in print, the article was available on the newspaper’s Hebrew and English-language websites. It came to the attention of some Canadian readers through the English-language website. [5] The article asserted that Goldhar imported his management model from his main business interest — a partnership with Walmart to operate shopping centers in Canada — and that he “runs his club down to every detail.” It also included a suggestion that his “managerial culture is based on overconcentration bordering on megalomania” and questioned whether “his penny pinching and lack of long term planning [could] doom the [soccer] team.” [6] In December 2011, Goldhar launched an action in Ontario, claiming damages for libel against Haaretz, its sports editor and the reporter who wrote the article (collectively “Haaretz”). -
Palestinian Peace Process As Barriers to Resolving the Conflict
Chapter 8 Strategic Decisions Taken During the Israeli- Palestinian Peace Process as Barriers to Resolving the Conflict Ephraim Lavie and Henry Fishman Mahatma Gandhi’s famous quote – “We must become the change we want to see in the world” – makes the definition of ‘strategy’ very clear. It is the comprehensive and coherent conception of the ultimate goals of the leadership in combination with the main routes to achievement of these goals. The success of negotiations in any sector – business, civil dispute resolution, or political processes – is hard to predict on the basis of one of the parties’ “correct strategy” because success depends on coordination and harmony between the “correct strategies” of both sides simultaneously, in parallel, and throughout the entire process. This condition illustrates the fragility of a strategy even when it is the correct one, but it also challenges the leader to rise above and beyond in formulating or “finding” a strategy – a “grand strategy” – that can overcome the obstacles posed by the counter-strategy. Based on our experience in following the negotiating process with the Palestinians through its various stages and derivative developments since 1993, as well as on research and analysis of writings on this issue, our starting assumption is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can indeed be resolved through negotiations between the parties, but that this will require overcoming difficult or preventative obstacles. This chapter aims to present and analyze the barriers that led to the failure of the Oslo formula for negotiations and to draw lessons in the following three key areas: 1. The strategic decision of each of the parties as a matter of substance (the “grand strategy”) that lays a firm foundation for resolution of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict through a process of negotiations towards peace; 300 2. -
Article Nontargets: Understanding the Apathy Towards the Israeli Security
Nontargets: Understanding the Apathy Article Towards the Israeli Security Agency’s COVID- 19 Surveillance Shaul A. Duke Independent Researcher [email protected] Abstract This article tackles one of the latest—but nonetheless baffling—displays of public apathy towards surveillance: that of much of the Israeli public towards the decision to recruit the Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet) to do COVID-19 contact tracing during the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. The case of a secretive state agency being authorized to do surveillance on its citizens for a strictly non-security-related matter seems to realize many of the dangers that surveillance/privacy scholars warn about with regards to surveillance expansion, function creep, and the creation of a surveillance state. I contribute to existing literature about apathy towards surveillance and the privacy paradox by offering the term “nontargets” as an explanation. This term suggests that, alongside social groups that are likely to be targeted by a given surveillance application, there are certain recognizable nontargets that most likely will not bear the brunt of the surveillance, at least not in the short- and medium-term, and thus do not fear it. In the case at hand, which is examined using a Qualitative context-bound study, I suggest that Jewish-Israelis are such a nontarget group with regards to this novel Shin Bet surveillance, which explains a significant part of their apathy towards it. Introduction On March 17, 2020, the Israeli government issued an emergency ordinance directing the Shin Bet (also known as the Israeli Security Agency, Israel’s internal secret service) to undertake coronavirus contact tracing. -
Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories
REPORT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES A Bimonthly Publication of the Foundation for Middle East Peac e Volum e 20 N umber 5 September-October 2010 BARACK OBAMA LOSES THE BATTLE FOR A SETTLEMENT FREEZE By Geoffrey Aronson struction in the West Bank to approxi - sity. In July 2009, however, the limits of mately 2,000. In view of this new con - Obama’s commitment to the freeze were President Barack Obama’s extraordi - struction, the practical value of a reim - revealed when Washington bowed nary diplomatic effort over the last two position of a settlement moratorium before Israel’s continuing settlement years has failed to contain to any signifi - becomes increasingly marginal. expansion in East Jerusalem, notably at cant and lasting degree the expansion of To the extent that there is a substan - the site of the Shepherds Hotel in Israeli settlements in the occupied West tive U.S. diplomatic agenda, it is that Sheikh Jarrah, throwing its demand for Bank and East Jerusalem. Already in its two months of direct talks are all that is a freeze into disarray and underlining first days, the Obama administration required to reach an agreement on the continuing stalemate. From this placed a settlement freeze, then defined where to place the border between Israel point onward, Washington has sought, by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as and a nascent Palestinian state. In view with little consistency or success, to “not some settlements, not outposts, not of the fact that diplomats have failed to “freeze” the freeze debate and focus its natural growth exceptions”—at the cen - draw an agreed border between Israel effort upon the achievement of a largely ter of its diplomatic effort and made it and Palestine for more than more than procedural objective—the establishment the litmus test of Prime Minister Benja- seven decades, and the chasm currently of direct negotiations between Israel and min Netanyahu’s commitment to a two separating the positions of Netanyahu the Palestine Liberation Organization state solution. -
Kalman Neuman
New Politics, No Politics, and Antipolitics: The Dilemma of the Religious Right in Israel Kalman Neuman Different explanations have been offered for the widespread phenomenon of disillusionment, disengagement, and escape from politics in general or from involvement in formal political activity in particular. These include an aversion or disinterest in the political sphere altogether as a result of a change in sense of public and civic duty, a rejection of politicians as self-serving at best or corrupt at worse, or as a result of the convergence of the policies of political parties, who offer little to choose between them (Hay 2007, 56). How do these phenomena impact on the behavior of political parties? One result is the attraction to short-lived “non-political” parties that try to benefit from the disgust from established politics. The success of the Retirees’ party in the 2006 Israeli elections was an example of this trend (Susser 2007); it was expected that in the 2009 Israeli election parties focusing on environmental issues would benefit from such antipolitics. Established parties also tried to capitalize on such perceived tendencies. They try to attract new faces, untainted with the stain of being “politicians.”1 * At the conference in December 2008, Israel was entering an election campaign that culminated on February 10, 2009. I have tried to include events leading up to the election in an epilogue to this paper. 1 For example, in the recent Israeli elections the head of the left-wing Meretz party, Haim Oron, said that his party wants to attract votes from 333 Kalman Neuman What is the relative importance of the different factors? To the extent that escape from politics is caused by policy convergence that leads to the Tweedledee-Tweedledum perception that “they are all the same,” a party that offers (as Barry Goldwater did in the US elections in 1964) “a voice, not an echo” may be less affected. -
Beer Sheva As a Growth Machine
I Jacob Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research Albert Katz International School for Desert Studies Beer Sheva as a Growth Machine Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of “Master of Arts” By: Brian Rock March 2007 II Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Jacob Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research Albert Katz International School for Desert Studies Beer Sheva as a Growth Machine Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of “Master of Arts” By Brian Rock Under the Supervision of Dr. Moshe Schwartz and Professor Isaac Meir Department of Man in the Drylands Author's Signature…………….…………………………………………Date:……… Approved by the Supervisor…………….………………………………..Date:……… Approved by the Director of the School …………………………………Date:……… III Beer Sheva as a Growth Machine Brian Rock This thesis in partial fulfillment for the degree of Master of Arts Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Jacob Blaustein Institute for Desert Research Albert Katz International School for Desert Studies 2007 2007 Abstract The growth machine theory, first proposed by Harvey Molotch in his paper The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place (1976) postulates that in American cities coalitions of local elites (land owners, politicians and bureaucrats) profit through promoting the idea that urban growth is good for everyone. They achieve this end through the manipulation of urban politics and media. The growth machine theory has also been used to explain urban growth outside the United States. In this study, through the lens of two case studies, Kanyon Ha’Negev and BIG, in Beer Sheva, Israel, an attempt is made to understand growth in Beer Sheva and whether or not the growth machine theory applies to it and helps understand it better. -
The Energy Island: Israel Deals with Its Natural Gas Discoveries
POLICY PAPER Number 35 February 2015 The Energy Island: Israel Deals with its Natural Gas Discoveries NATAN SACHS TIM BOERSMA Acknowledgements This report, and the larger project of which it is a We are also very grateful to Ibraheem Egbaria, part, benefited greatly from the insight and assis- Ilan Suliman and Firash Qawasmi, who helped tance of a large number of people. facilitate our visit to the (East) Jerusalem District Electricity Company; to Ohad Reifen who helped For generosity with their time and insights we are facilitate interviews in Israel; and to Allison Good grateful to: Yossi Abu, CEO Delek Drilling; Con- for her helpful feedback on a draft of this paper. stantine Blyuz, Deputy Director for Economic & Strategic Issues, Israeli Ministry of National Infra- We would also like to thank our Brookings col- structures, Energy and Water Resources; Yael Co- leagues: Martin Indyk and Ted Piccone for support- hen Paran, CEO, Israel Energy Forum; Ariel Ezrahi, ing our work through the Foreign Policy Program’s Infrastructure (Energy) Adviser, Office of the Quar- Director’s Strategic Initiative Fund; Charles Ebin- tet Representative, Mr. Tony Blair; Michalis Firillas, ger, for his sage feedback on drafts and, along with Deputy Head of Mission, Consul, Embassy of the Tamara Wittes, for guiding us and providing won- Republic of Cyprus in Israel; Nurit Gal, Director, derful places within Brookings in which to work; Regulation and Electricity Division, Public Utilities Kemal Kirisci and Dan Arbell for their assistance, Authority of Israel; Dr. Gabi Golan, Deputy Gov- collaboration and multiple discussions throughout ernment Secretary, Office of the Prime Minister of the duration of this project; to Khaled Elgindy for the State of Israel; Mr. -
Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure
C O R P O R A T I O N SHIRA EFRON, KAREN SCHWINDT, EMILY HASKEL Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure Security Implications for Israel and the United States For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR3176 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0435-0 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover design: Rick Penn-Kraus Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface Relations between China and Israel have expanded rapidly since the early 2000s in numerous areas, including diplomacy, trade, invest- ment, construction, educational partnerships, scientific cooperation, and tourism. -
Israel in Lebanon—Getting It Wrong: the 1982 Invasion, 2000 Withdrawal, and 2006 War
Israel in Lebanon—Getting It Wrong: The 1982 Invasion, 2000 Withdrawal, and 2006 War Charles D. Freilich Charles (Chuck) D. Freilich was Israel’s deputy national security adviser (2000–2005), a senior analyst at the Ministry of Defense, policy advisor to a cabinet minister, and a delegate at the Israeli Mission to the United Nations. Now a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, his primary areas of expertise are US Middle East policy and Israeli national security policy. Dr. Freilich recently completed a book on Israeli national security decision making processes, entitled Zion’s Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy and is now working on another on Israeli national security strategy. He teaches political science at Harvard, NYU and Tel Aviv Universities. Ever since the early 1970s, Lebanon has played a central role in the Arab–Israeli conflict, as the focus of ongoing low level hostilities, three major Israeli military operations (Litani 1978, Accountability 1993, and Grapes of Wrath 1996), two wars (the Lebanon War of 1982 and the Second Lebanon War of 2006), and a unilateral Israeli withdrawal in 2000. The outcomes of these events were far from what Israel’s decision makers had intended at the outset; Israel was repeatedly unable to achieve its objectives, or arguably only partially successful in doing so. Indeed, Israel’s difficulties in Lebanon culminated in what the Winograd Commission, the special commission established to investigate the failings of the 2006 war, called “the IDF’s almost mystical fear of the Lebanese quagmire.”1 The present study assesses the reasons for Israel’s repeated policy failures in Lebanon by comparing the decision making processes (DMPs) in the three most important cases above: the two wars and the unilateral withdrawal.