Hezbollah's Hold on Lebanon

BICOM Strategic Assessment

Hezbollah’s hold on Lebanon - implications for a third Lebanon War

July 2017 Key points: Syrian regime and which includes Hezbollah) and the March 14 Alliance (which is against the • Lebanon’s new president, Michel Aoun, Syrian regime) – failed to reach an agreement has publicly confirmed that Hezbollah plays on a consensus candidate. The agreement also, “a complementary role to the Lebanese as one journalist wrote “politically legitimises army,” an admission that constitutes a direct Hezbollah as a nationalist group with cross- violation of the demands of the international sectarian support”. community, in particular, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. • While Lebanese law reserves the presidency for a member of the Maronite Christian • Hezbollah continues to fight in the Syrian community, Aoun’s relationship with Hezbollah civil war on behalf of Bashar al-Assad and and their support for his candidacy marked increase its missile capacity. It also uses the culmination of a decade-long political aggressive rhetoric against Israel to try and alliance between Aoun and the Hezbollah- shore up its domestic legitimacy. backed March 8 Alliance. Immediately upon winning the post, Aoun gave a series of public • Members of Israel’s security establishment statements pledging support for Assad, and currently believe that in the event of a vowing to “release what is left of our lands third Lebanon war, the Lebanese army will from Israeli occupation”. participate either alongside Hezbollah, or at the very least in a supportive capacity. As • Aoun is a firm believer that Hezbollah – and a result, Israel’s emerging strategy entails its weapons – have a central role to play in widening its targets to include attacks on Lebanon. Soon after his election, in a February Lebanese infrastructure. Publicising this 2017 interview with Egyptian TV network strategy now is intended to deter Hezbollah CBC, Aoun confirmed the absence of a dividing from attacking Israel, and to encourage line between Hezbollah and the Lebanese the Lebanese government and others in government saying “As long as the Lebanese the international community to rein in army is not strong enough to battle Israel... we Hezbollah’s activities with respect to Israel. feel the need for its [Hezbollah’s] existence”. During a subsequent visit to Cairo, Aoun • Neither Israel nor Hezbollah are seeking elaborated on Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon, to end the state of mutual deterrence that telling reporters that the organisation “is a has characterised their relationship since significant part of the Lebanese people . . . August 2006, though the potential exists for As long as Israel occupies land and covets miscalculation by either side that drags the Lebanon’s natural treasures, and as long as the parties into another war. Lebanese military lacks the power to stand up to Israel, [Hezbollah’s] weapons are essential. They complement, rather than contradict, Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon the army’s activity.” According to Aoun, “Hezbollah’s weapons do not contradict the • Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanese domestic national project... and are, rather, a principal politics is growing. The election of Michel element of Lebanon’s defence”. Aoun as president of Lebanon in October 2016, following a 29-month vacuum in the country’s In the same speech, Aoun defended top leadership, represents a victory for the Hezbollah’s possession of weapons, stating pro-Iranian axis emerging in the Levant. Aoun that “Hezbollah represents the people of the assumed the presidency as part of a power- south. They are the inhabitants of the land sharing deal that named Saad Hariri, the leader who defend themselves when Israel tries to of Lebanon’s main Sunni bloc, prime minister occupy or threaten them... It is no longer an in a unity cabinet. The deal ended more than urgent matter to discuss the need to strip two years of political infighting and gridlock, Hezbollah of its weapons, because Israel during which Lebanon’s two main blocs – the continues to occupy our lands and is seeking March 8 Alliance (which is supportive of the to take over Lebanon’s waters.” 1 The mechanism that ended the Second showcased dozens of uniformed and well- Lebanon War is being further weakened armed Hezbollah fighters, represented a deliberate and calculated violation of • The Second Lebanon War was brought Resolution 1701, intended to demonstrate to an end by UN Security Council Hezbollah’s growing control over Lebanon, Resolution 1701. On 11 August 2006, the both to Israel and the international United Nations Security Council adopted community. resolution 1701, which brought the Second Lebanon War to a close. The resolution Hezbollah’s brazen violation of both UNSCR called on the government of Lebanon, with 1701 and UNIFIL prompted Lebanese Prime the support of a renewed mandate of the Minister Saad Hariri to travel to the border United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to provide assurances that the Lebanese (UNIFIL), to redeploy the Lebanese army government – rather than Hezbollah – is in to southern Lebanon, and to ensure control of the territory. Hariri’s border trip the “full implementation of the relevant was also prompted by growing calls in Israel provisions of the Taif Accords [and prior UN warning that in the next war, Israel intends to Security Council Resolutions] that require hold the government of Lebanon accountable the disarmament of all armed groups in for Hezbollah’s actions. Lebanon, so that pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006 there will • Moreover, Hezbollah continues to expand its be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other weapons arsenal: Since the Second Lebanon than that of the Lebanese state”.1 War Hezbollah has continued to expand its arsenal. Currently, Hezbollah is estimated to • Yet the resolution it is being routinely have 130,000 rockets and missiles, with far undermined. In April 2017 Hezbollah gave greater accuracy and range than the weapons a tour of the Lebanese-Israel border to they had in 2006. It is presumed that in the journalists. Their intent was to showcase the next war with Israel, Hezbollah will be able to new IDF defensive installations along Israel’s fire roughly 1,000 rockets a day – challenging northern border, while simultaneously missile defence systems such as Iron Dome openly defying the March 14 coalition, and David’s Sling, which Israel has invested and the UN. Yet the tour itself, which also in heavily over the past decade.

1 S/Res/1701 (2006) (emphasis added) 2 • The organisation has also managed to militia. Though for the moment, the pro- procure more lethal and precise weaponry – Iranian groups operating from the Golan are largely Russian and Iranian-made weapons. preoccupied with Syria, they represent an Israeli intelligence officials now believe that emerging strategic challenge for Israel. over the past year Hezbollah obtained the Russian-made Yakhont (anti-ship) missiles, • Nasrallah uses aggressive rhetoric against giving the organisation the ability to target Israel. In a rare public appearance in Israeli natural gas platforms in the Eastern February 2017, Hezbollah’s Secretary- Mediterranean, as well as endangering both General Hassan Nasrallah announced a list Israeli naval ships deployed to protect the of strategic targets within Israel that would gas platforms, and Israeli commercial vessels be targeted in a future confrontation, among utilising shipping lanes in the area. them the nuclear reactor in Dimona, the nuclear research centre in Nahal Sourek, • Hezbollah is also attempting to open an as well as the ammonia plant in Haifa. additional front against Israel from Syria. The following month, a Lebanese website In 2013, Assad declared the Golan Heights associated with Hezbollah published a list would become a new “resistance front” while consisting of what it referred to as “a bank of Nasrallah, by this point already involved in targets for the next war” which it is believed the Syrian conflict allied with Assad, pledged could be attacked using Russian-made F-300 to “liberate the Syrian Golan”. Recent missiles currently in Hezbollah’s possession. reports suggest that Hezbollah, backed by Iran, have made progress in opening a new The view from Israel front in the Golan through which to target Israel. According to Israeli Transportation • Israel believes Hezbollah is prioritising Syria, and Intelligence Minister Yisrael Katz, Iran but takes Nasrallah’s threats seriously. For is attempting to increase its influence in the moment, Hezbollah’s preoccupation Syria in order to threaten Israel, evidenced with the Syrian conflict – where it has sent by the recent establishment of the “Golan an estimated 5,000 to 8,000 fighters and Liberation Brigade,” an Iranian-backed Shi’a has suffered nearly 2,500 fighters killed

3 and another 6,000 wounded – renders it According to reports, these facilities can unlikely that the group would seek an all-out produce a range of rockets and missiles, confrontation with Israel. However, this has including land-based anti-ship missiles, not stopped the organisation from continuing anti-tank missiles as well as drones capable to transfer and stockpile weapons, or from of carrying explosives. Furthermore, it utilising bellicose rhetoric to maintain the suggests that Iran and Hezbollah may now post-2006 mutual deterrence with Israel, and have a way to circumvent over-land weapons to preserve a base of domestic support within transfers through Syria. As world powers Lebanon. Hezbollah is emerging from the are increasingly vying for influence in Syria, civil war with real battlefield experience, and the presence of Iranian weapons production all estimates suggest the organisation will facilities in southern Lebanon is an prove to be a formidable opponent in a future indication of the strengthening of the Iranian- war with Israel. Moreover, Israeli security Shia axis in Syria. officials believe that in a future confrontation, Nasrallah will attempt to follow through • A contiguous Iranian land corridor would on his periodic threats by trying to invade further facilitate such weapons transfers Israeli border towns and targeting strategic and strengthen Hezbollah and its Iranian installations, including civil infrastructure, sponsor: For Israeli intelligence services and military bases in Israel.2 closely monitoring Iranian-backed militias encroaching on the Iraqi-Syrian border, the • Israel’s policy has been to prevent advanced establishment of a contiguous land corridor weapons from reaching Hezbollah: Since from Tehran to the Mediterranean is among the start of the Syrian conflict, Israeli policy the most worrisome strategic developments has been to deter the transfer of advanced in the region. As Tzuriel noted, “The Syria- weapons to Hezbollah from Iran. To that end, Iraq border is at the moment the most the Israeli Air Force has launched periodic important place in the region. That’s where strikes in Syria, targeting what it claims were the regional picture will be determined”. convoys containing weapons en route to Israeli intelligence estimates Iran has already Hezbollah. made considerable progress advancing towards this goal. Success in this endeavour However, in March 2017, reports surfaced in would enable Iran to freely transmit and the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Jarida, claiming disperse weapons, supplies, and forces to that Iran has been building underground support the efforts of the Assad regime in facilities in Lebanon to produce advanced Syria to regain control over the country – as rockets. This development constitutes well as to support Iranian proxies throughout “a whole new kind of threat” for Israel, the region, including to Hezbollah in according to Chagai Tzuriel, Director- Lebanon – significantly tipping the strategic General of the Intelligence Ministry. In June, balance in the region in Iran’s favour. As Israeli intelligence officials confirmed these of early June 2017, Iranian-backed militias reports. According to Military Intelligence had succeeded in securing a road network Chief Maj.-Gen. Herzl Halevi, “Iran has spanning from the Iran-Iraq border to Syria’s been working for the past year to set up coastal border, making it significantly easier, indigenous infrastructures for producing and less expensive, to resupply both Assad’s precise munitions in both Lebanon and forces, Hezbollah, and other Iranian-backed Yemen”. allies. This latest development also places Iran directly on the frontline with Israel, 2 Among the many defensive preparations the IDF has effectively tightening“ the noose” around it. implemented in preparation for a future conflict with Hezbollah, in July 2017, the IDF’s Northern Command is resuming its work upgrading the border fence/wall. While this could potentially tem- • In 2006, Israeli policymakers distinguished porarily increase tensions, the IDF maintains that the route adheres between Hezbollah on the one hand and the to the international border, approved in May 2000 following Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. The new fence, in conjunction government of Lebanon and the Lebanese with other defensive preparations undertaken by the Northern state on the other: Following the outbreak of Command, is intended to impede cross-border raids, and sniper fire from Lebanon. hostilities in July 2006, Israeli policymakers 4 were faced with a dilemma: whether to respond an official confirmation of, as Assaf Orion, by solely targeting Hezbollah, or by targeting former head of IDF Policy Planning wrote, infrastructure and other sites associated “the official unveiling of a known Lebanese with the Lebanese state. While Israel had the reality diplomatic conventions in the West support of the United States in responding have long tended to blur”. The public to the provocation by Hezbollah, numerous admission by a prominent government accounts of the early phase of the war describe official of Hezbollah’s role as an integral a phone call between then-Prime Minister part of Lebanon’s defence “nullifies the Olmert and US Secretary of State Condoleezza distinction, artificial to begin with, between Rice, urging the Israeli government to refrain the ostensibly sovereign state and the from attacking Lebanese infrastructure, in Hezbollah military. In doing so, [Aoun] takes order to ensure the survival of the pro-Western full responsibility for all of Hezbollah’s government of Fouad Siniora. actions, including against Israel, and for their consequences to Lebanon and its Ultimately, Israel’s political leadership entire population.” Responding to Aoun’s opted to distinguish between Hezbollah remarks, IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot targets and Lebanese state institutions and stated that in a future war in Israel’s north, infrastructure, against the recommendation the IDF will not hesitate to strike Lebanese of IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz. infrastructure and institutions affiliated with the Lebanese state. According to Eisenkot: • Yet Israeli security officials now doubt “The recent declarations from Beirut make whether any substantive difference exists it clear that in a future war, the targets will between Lebanon and Hezbollah: Israel’s be clear: Lebanon and the organisations decision in 2006 has been derided by operating under its authority and its 3 numerous members of the Israeli security approval.” establishment over the years, with many claiming it forced the conflict to last far 3 While not a widespread view by any means, former longer than necessary, and hampered Israel’s Deputy Defence Minister Ephraim Sneh recently cautioned that threatening to strike Lebanon in response to Hezbollah aggression efforts to achieve a decisive victory. would not create the requisite level of deterrence vis-à-vis the Shia terrorist group and Israel should therefore consider hitting Iran. According to Sneh, Iran, not Nasrallah, is calling the shots, and Yet to the Israeli security establishment, because “Iran does not give a damn if Lebanon’s infrastructure is destroyed,” the IDF “should strike Iran’s infrastructure” in response the recent comments from Aoun represent to attacks perpetrated by Hezbollah, the IDF “should strike Iran’s infrastructure”. 5 • Evidence suggests that the Lebanese army as members of the international community, cooperates with Hezbollah in Southern to deter Hezbollah from attacking Israel. Lebanon. Aoun’s comments also reinforced what Israeli security officials increasingly • Operationally this new strategy might cite as evidence of Hezbollah and Lebanese also shorten any future war. Moreover, troops cooperating near the border with from an operational perspective, widening Israel, in violation of Resolution 1701. In the targets to attack in Lebanon serves light of this, Israeli security officials now several purposes. First, for Israel, a rapid believe that a future war between Israel and and aggressive early strike on Lebanon is Hezbollah would feature the Lebanese army regarded as essential in light of the fact that acting in concert with Hezbollah. Indeed at a Israel does not have a sufficientstrategy March 2017 meeting of the Knesset Foreign for Hezbollah’s rockets. Second, making Affairs and Defence Committee – nearly one Lebanese infrastructure – including army month after Aoun’s remarks to the media – bases, power stations, airports, and factories Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman claimed – a strategic target will hopefully ensure a that the Lebanese army is “a subsidiary unit shorter war, while perhaps providing less of of Hezbollah”. an incentive for Hezbollah to embed amongst the civilian population. • UNIFIL is not fully implementing its mandate. A recent impromptu assessment of UNIFIL • However, such a strategy could also have by IDF Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Aviv negative regional consequences. The Kochavi – which reportedly led to a heated utility of widening the targets to include exchange with UNIFIL commander Maj. Gen. state infrastructure is more complicated. Michael Beary in front of U.S. Ambassador to In recent years the relationship between the United Nations Nikki Haley – concluded Israel and a number of Sunni Arab states that UNIFIL has been ineffective and is has improved, largely due to the shared failing to comply with its mandate under concern over the Iranian nuclear threat Resolution 1701. In particular, Kochavi noted and increasing Iranian hegemony in the the failure of the so-called “blue hats” to region. But a war that inflicts devastating enter villages and towns in southern Lebanon consequences on Lebanese infrastructure where weapons and/or Hezbollah fighters are could stymie further cooperation. Moreover, suspected of being present. the loss of infrastructure could impede the efforts of domestic actors in Lebanon to • Israel hopes its warnings about this restrain Hezbollah following another round change of strategy may deter Hezbollah. of fighting. Moreover, inflicting heavy losses Beyond holding the Lebanese government on the Lebanese armed forces could limit its accountable for the actions of Hezbollah, ability to provide stability after the war. its failure to comply with Resolution 1701, and for what is anticipated to be the army’s The challenge for the UK and the cooperation with Hezbollah in the next war, international community many in Israel’s security establishment, including former head of the National • Whilst Britain’s leverage over the situation Security Council Maj. Gen. (res) Giora is limited, a number of principles should be Eiland, hope that putting Lebanon on adopted by the UK, to reduce the chances of notice now will have a deterrent effect on violence and the scope of any conflict that Hezbollah, by raising the projected costs for breaks out. the organisation and its allies, as well as for the international community. Moreover, it • Revisiting the distinction between is hoped that by publicly announcing their Hezbollah’s political and military wings. intent to hold Lebanon accountable for the The current UK policy makes a distinction actions of Hezbollah, the threat of a wide- between Hezbollah’s political and military scale confrontation will encourage the March wings – the latter of which was classified 14 coalition and others in Lebanon, as well 6 as a terrorist organisation in 2008. This that Hezbollah is disarmed and to maintain classification has been widely criticised quiet along the border. With its position over the years by Israeli counterterrorism as a permanent member of the Security and security analysts, as well as members Council, the UK should consider proposing of the Israeli government, who have argued that UNIFIL be granted new and explicit that it is artificial distinction. The purpose powers under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, behind labelling only the military branch as to enable it to better enforce the terms of a terrorist organisation was in part intended 1701, namely taking the requisite actions to to encourage the organisation to adopt disarm Hezbollah, and preventing southern more moderate policies over time. Aoun’s Lebanon from continuing to be used for remarks confirming Hezbollah’s role in the hostile activities. At the same time, it must defence of Lebanon, and Hezbollah’s own provide incentives for the March 14 Alliance actions within Lebanon and their violation and other actors within Lebanon to take gain of international law and norms, suggest that control of southern Lebanon and ensure that revisiting the debate over the labelling of the Lebanese army is the only armed actor Hezbollah is merited. present.

• Support the full implementation of UNSCR 1701. In the event of another round of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, * * * the international community will likely act quickly to bring about a cease-fire. However, given more than a decade of failure on the part of the international community to enforce the terms of Resolution 1701, utilising diplomacy to end the next round of fighting will likely prove more difficult. In light of this it is incumbent on the UK and others in the international community to do more to take the requisite steps to ensure 7 This Strategic Assessment was produced by BICOM’s research team.

For more information please contact: Charlotte Henry, Senior Press Officer 020 3745 3348 07879 644099 [email protected]