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Download Paper The Institute of International and European Affairs 8 North Great Georges Street, Dublin 1, Ireland Tel: (353) 1-874 6756 : Fax: (353) 1- 878 6880 www.iiea.com e-mail: [email protected] Towards an Irish Foreign Policy for Britain. © Aug 2012, The Institute of International and European Affairs. The Institute of International and European Affairs grants permission for the reproduction of quotations from this text provided such quotations do not exceed 400 words in length, that they provide the reader with a fair context, and that due acknowledgment of the source is made. As an independent forum, the Institute of International and European Affairs does not express opinions of its own. The views expressed in its publications are solely the responsibility of the authors. Publication designed by Brian Martin, Creative Director, IIEA Cover image © iStockphoto, design manipulated in production AIN OREIGN POLICY FOR BRIT TOWARDS AN IRISH F he success of Queen Elizabeth’s visit to JOINT STATEMENT OF T Ireland in May 2011 underlines the huge COOPERATION improvement in the relationship between Ireland and the United Kingdom. This relationship In March 2012, Taoiseach Enda Kenny and changed as a result of the ties that developed Prime Minister David Cameron met in London between London and Dublin as they together and issued a Joint Statement that sets out a sought to resolve the conflict in Northern programme of work to reinforce the British- Ireland. The improvement was also greatly Irish relationship over the next ten years.1 The facilitated by their common membership of the statement was a milestone because it was the first European Communities, and then the European joint British-Irish statement at Prime Ministerial Union, to which they acceded in 1973. level that was not wholly or primarily concerned with Northern Ireland. The first and longest There is now a possibility, some would say a section of the statement dealt with business and probability, that the UK will lessen its ties with trade relations and noted Ireland and Britain’s the European Union, or may even withdraw shared commitment to boosting growth in from it altogether. The euro crisis has led to order to accelerate economic recovery and job a deepening of the relationships between the creation. The flow of goods and services between members of the Eurozone, who are heading the two economies amounts to one billion euro towards a banking union to be followed by every week and the two states want to see this elements of a financial and, perhaps, a political expand and develop even further. Accordingly, union. Simply put, it looks as if the UK will the statement announced that a joint evaluation move further away from Brussels while Ireland of the depth of economic relations between the will move closer. UK and Ireland will be prepared. This evaluation – the first of its kind – will provide an up-to- The implications for Irish foreign policy of this date analysis of the complexity of the economic divergence between London and Dublin are relationship between the two states and of ‘the examined in this paper. First, the paper will opportunities for closer collaboration in support assess the current state of bilateral relations of growth to our mutual benefit’. between Britain and Ireland, as exemplified by the Taoiseach and Prime Minister’s Joint The wide range of shared interests and Statement at Downing Street on 12 March opportunities for collaboration between Britain 2012. It will then examine the UK’s position on and Ireland were acknowledged in the statement. Europe and how its place within the EU may Education, research and development, the change over the coming years. The intensity creative sectors and the construction sector were in the UK of the debate about its membership mentioned as areas in which cooperation could of the EU suggests that it will follow one of be intensified to the advantage of both countries. two paths: repatriating key competences from The need for secure, competitive and sustainable Brussels or withdrawing completely from the sources of energy was singled out as a common EU. The paper will analyse what Ireland’s long-term challenge. The Taoiseach and Prime options might be in each of these cases in Minister particularly welcomed the progress light of the Irish Government’s stated aim of achieved on the all-Ireland Single Electricity remaining a full and active member of the EU. Market and on the new East-West 1 An Taoiseach Enda Kenny and Prime Minister David Cameron, Joint Statement on British-Irish Relations – the next decade, 12 March 2012 1 interconnector, which is due to be commissioned Ireland’s approaches to Europe. As members later in 2012. They also recognised the untapped of the single currency, including Ireland, move potential in renewable energy and committed to towards deeper fiscal and political integration, promoting mutually beneficial investment and the Government in London has made it clear deployment in this area. Emphasis was placed that Britain will not be a part of this. The refusal on the agri-food sector as an area of cooperation of the British Government to sign the Fiscal that could help overcome growing uncertainty in Compact, which was signed by twenty-five of global food and commodity markets. This could the twenty-seven EU Member States, created be very beneficial for the Irish agri-food sector, further distance between the UK and the rest which currently produces sufficient food to feed of Europe and added further complexity to 36 million people and by 2020 wants to reach the UK’s position in the EU. Britain remains a point where it will be producing food for 50 an important partner for Ireland within the million people.2 The statement also committed EU, but there are as many issues at European the two countries to preserving the Common level that divide the two states as there are areas Travel Area. of agreement. Although it was overlooked by the Joint Statement, managing the divergent The statement referred to Ireland and Britain as approaches of Britain and Ireland to the EU will ‘partners in the European Union’ and committed be an increasingly significant element of their the two states to working together to encourage relationship over the next ten years. ‘an outward-facing EU, which promotes growth and jobs’. It highlighted areas of common interest, such as the single market, reducing the burden of regulation, online commerce BRITAIN AND EUROPE and trade, an internal market in energy and The debate about the UK’s approach to Europe the financial services sector. However, while is likely to be a central theme of British politics their membership of the EU is an important in the coming years. David Cameron’s veto of an dimension of the relationship for both EU-wide treaty change to resolve the Eurozone parties, the statement overlooked the different crisis in December 2011 signalled Britain’s approaches of Britain and Ireland to the EU, desire to disengage from any further European and the different paths that they have chosen to integration. Further integration would in any follow in Europe. The UK has always viewed the case be politically difficult given the passing EU primarily as a trade agreement that promotes of the European Union Bill in July 2011. This British economic interests. Support for the single piece of legislation provides for a referendum market and the enlargement of that market to be held on any proposed EU treaty or treaty has always been high in Britain, but efforts to change that would transfer powers from the UK deepen European political integration have to the EU. Since the veto in December 2011, generally been resisted. Ireland, on the other many Conservative Party MPs have become hand, has been a firm supporter of both a wider more assertive in calling for a referendum on the and deeper EU. question of continued British membership of The Eurozone crisis has highlighted and the EU. On 30 June 2012, just a few days after accentuated the differences in Britain and one-third of his MPs signed a letter urging him to legislate for a referendum on Britain’s EU 2 Simon Coveney TD, Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries membership, Prime Minister Cameron asked his and Food, “Agriculture and Fisheries: Statements, own party to have more ‘tactical and strategic Questions and Answers”, Seanad Éireann, 20 July 2011 patience’ on this issue. He argued that it is not 2 AIN OREIGN POLICY FOR BRIT TOWARDS AN IRISH F in the UK’s best interests to leave the EU and Calls for a referendum within the Labour for this reason opposed an in/out referendum on Party indicate a desire to outmanoeuvre the membership. However, he agreed that the EU Conservatives on the issue and to affirm Labour’s involves ‘too much cost, too much bureaucracy, commitment to the EU, since the party would too much meddling in issues that belong to almost certainly campaign in favour of UK nation states or civic society or individuals’ and membership of the EU if a referendum were to promised to work for ‘a more flexible and less take place.5 onerous position for Britain within the EU’. This would entail the repatriation of powers The increasingly assertive Euroscepticism within from the EU and then, perhaps, a referendum the Conservative Party, which one commentator 6 on British membership of the Union.3 has described as “Europhobia”, reflects growing distrust of Europe in British public opinion. Demands for a referendum on Europe are not Eurobarometer polls reveal that UK attitudes only to be heard in the Conservative Party. On towards the EU are the most negative of all 14 May 2012, Ed Balls, the Shadow Chancellor, twenty-seven EU Member States.
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