WEEK 8 Collaboration and Compliance: Non-German Perpetrators, Jewish Cooperation, and Bystanders Prepared by Tony Joel and Mathew Turner

Week 8 Unit Learning Outcomes ULO 1. evaluate in a reflective and critical manner the consequences of racism and prejudice

ULO 4. recognise important linkages between the Second World War and , and question Hitler’s role in these events

Introduction A complex question hovers over this learning module: could Nazi plans for the deportation and extermination of have been realised without the assistance of sympathetic régimes and individual antisemites at a local level right across Europe? Non-German perpetrators and collaborators proved critical to the success of the Nazi program of Jewish extermination throughout Europe. Admittedly, degrees of cooperation and collaboration in the killing differed markedly — for both states and individuals. Some murdered Jews on their own initiative, others willingly complied with German orders to deport Jews, while others put up little more than token resistance to such plans. This learning module raises two further vexed issues: Jewish collaboration/compliance; and the role of bystanders in the Holocaust.

Section 1 examines the role of non-German collaborators in the form of both states and, to a lesser extent, officials. Section 2 focuses on the roles that Jews played in cooperating with the Nazis to enable the destruction of their own people, particularly from the perspective of Jewish ghetto councils and . Finally, section 3 probes the role of bystanders in the Holocaust: the people who had knowledge of what was happening to Jews but took no action to prevent — and in some instances, benefited from — the deportation and killing of Jews.

In completing this learning module, you will continue to evaluate, in a reflective and critical manner, the consequences of racism and prejudice. You will also recognise linkages between the Second World War and the Holocaust, and question Hitler’s role in these events.

LEARNING MODULE 8. Section 1: Non-German Collaborators 2

Section 1. Non-German Collaborators Some of the most perplexing and problematical contributions to the implementation of the Holocaust were made by non-German collaborators and accomplices. Already in this unit, we have come across a number of countries allied to Nazi Germany who actively persecuted and murdered their own Jewish populations, often with little encouragement from Berlin. This section of the learning module examines more closely the actions of non-German states and officials who collaborated with Nazi Germany in implementing the “.”

a) Nations/Governments

Adopting typological terms coined by Raul Hilberg, collaborationist régimes included:

• the semi-autonomous collaborationist state of Vichy France;

• the “opportunistic states” allied to Germany while Axis Powers (Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) whose implementation of anti-Jewish policies was tempered by their perceptions of self-interest;

• the “satellites par excellence” including Croatia and Slovakia whose rulers, installed by the Nazis, pursued radically antisemitic policies in accordance with Nazi ideals;

• the Vatican, the closeness of whose relationship with Nazi Germany and knowledge of the Holocaust both remain contentious.

Vichy France The collaborationist state that has attracted the most controversy in Holocaust historiography is Vichy France.

READING EXCERPT: Please read the piece by Philippe Burrin entitled “No Knife was being Held to Vichy’s Throat.”

In Burrin’s view, by trying to differentiate between those in France who deserved the state’s protection and those who did not, the Vichy leadership travelled down a slippery slope to renouncing any claims to moral behaviour. Whether the régime knew that Jews were being deported to death camps essentially remains irrelevant to assessing the ethics of its actions. LEARNING MODULE 8. Section 1: Non-German Collaborators 3

Burrin also makes a critical point that is relevant to the assessment of collaboration in any form. Without collaboration, the Germans (in the case of France, specifically the SS) would not have had sufficient resources to capture and exterminate as many Jews as they did. In this sense, then, collaboration by non-Germans made a significant contribution to the Nazis’ overall implementation of the “Final Solution.”

PRESCRIBED TEXT: Please revisit Saul Friedländer’s chapter entitled “Vichy France: ‘Our’ Jews and the Rest,” pp. 570-85, which you first read in week four.

Friedländer, as you might recall, largely agrees with Burrin’s position that French complicity was essential in carrying out the deportations of “foreign” Jews residing in wartime France. Since the Nazi occupiers did not boast sufficient armed forces in France to detain and deport Jews, they had to rely on the “full participation” of the French police force to carry out this work.

Italy Italian collaboration in the Holocaust is a complex topic. Italy, under the fascist dictatorship of Hitler’s close ally Benito Mussolini, had approximately 46,000 Jews — of whom some 9,000 were “foreigners” — residing within its borders in 1938. Most Jews in Italy lived in large cities and were assimilated. In your reading for this topic, Susan Zuccotti contends that there existed a “paradox” in Italy’s treatment of Jews within its own borders, and those within German-occupied territories.

PRESCRIBED TEXT: Please read Susan Zuccotti’s chapter entitled “The Italian Paradox,” pp. 588-97.

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As you will note from Zuccotti’s reading, Italy itself was an occupying force during the Second World War. While still an Axis Power in 1941-42, argues Zuccotti, Italian military forces deliberately protected Jews within their own occupied territories in Greece and Croatia, obfuscating or ignoring German orders to take action. It was a tricky balance between saving Jewish lives, and protecting the often tenuous alliance between Germany and Italy. The fall of Mussolini’s régime in July 1943 resulted in German forces occupying Italy — a development that had deadly implications for Italian Jews as Germans seized the genocidal initiative.1

Jewish refugees escape over the Alps to Italy from the Italian-occupied zone in France following the signing of the Italian armistice with the Western Powers, September 1943. Sources: USHMM. https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa1123199 https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa1123195 [Accessed 26 April 2017]

Romania As we learnt in week five, Romania was a German ally led by the virulent antisemite Ion Antonescu. Some of the most brutal acts of violence against Jews were committed by Romanian perpetrators without any pressure or backing from Nazi Germany.

PRESCRIBED TEXT: Please read Jean Ancel’s chapter entitled “Romania: Annihilation Aborted” (from the subheading “Toward the Implementation of the Final Solution”) pp. 557-61.

1 After Mussonili’s fall in July 1943, Italy descended into civil war between pro-fascists and anti-fascists. In September 1943, Italy surrendered to the Allied forces. The following month, on 13 October 1943 Italy declared war on its erstwhile partner Nazi Germany. LEARNING MODULE 8. Section 1: Non-German Collaborators 5

Ancel, an Israeli historian, was born in Iași, Romania, to Jewish parents in 1940. He was only a year old when the Iași was conducted, but was hidden in a basement and survived (his father was sent on one of the Iași “death trains” following the pogrom, but managed to survive). In his chapter in your set text, Ancel notes on page 465 that “Romanian authorities were responsible for the disappearance of at least 400,000 Jews,” about half of whom were deported to and murdered by German mass shooting squads in the East, while many tens of thousands were murdered by fellow Romanians.

After seizing the initiative and encouraging the killing of hundreds of thousands of Jews (not only Romanian but also Hungarian, Ukrainian, and Soviet Jews suddenly trapped in Romanian-controlled territory), later in the war the Romanian government thwarted German endeavours by refusing to hand over its remaining Jewish population. Presumably this was a pragmatic move after deciding that Jews could serve as potential bargaining chips at a time when the war had turned against the Axis Powers and Romania was in line to be overrun by the advancing Red Army (indeed, like Italy before it, in August 1944 Romania switched sides and fought against Hitler’s Germany). Even so, such an about-face raises a perplexing question: if a state such as Romania was willing to protect its Jews from the Nazis when it was considered potentially expedient from a military-strategic perspective, why had it been so keen to actively participate in the extirpation of hundreds of thousands of Jews earlier in the war?

Hungary As we read in last week’s learning module, one of the last groups to be exterminated in Auschwitz-Birkenau were Hungarian Jews. As a military ally of Nazi Germany, and as was the case with both Italy and Romania, the fate of Hungarian Jews largely rested on the fortunes of the war. As the military campaign in the East began to turn against Hitler, by March 1944 the Wehrmacht had started to occupy parts of Hungary.

PRESCRIBED TEXT: Please read Randolph L. Braham’s chapter entitled “The Hungarian Paroxysm,” pp. 599-601.

While the Hungarian leader Admiral Miklós Horthy attempted to protect wealthy and assimilated Jews from deportation, as Braham observes this course became less tenable as German leaders began to exert more direct pressure for greater action against Hungarian Jews. This came at a time when demands for slave labour to complete urgently needed German war projects were becoming desperate (indeed, the lateness of LEARNING MODULE 8. Section 1: Non-German Collaborators 6 their deportation and the need for increased numbers of slave labour late in the war accounts for why such a large percentage of Auschwitz survivors were Hungarian Jews).

Though Braham acknowledges the efficiency and acquiescence of Hungarian collaboration in the deportation and ultimate extermination of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews, he stresses that such an outcome required the country’s occupation by German forces. “First and foremost responsibility for the destruction of Hungarian Jewry,” argues Braham on pages 609-10, “must rest with the Germans… [whose] plans could not have been carried out in the absence of the occupation.”

(l) Hungarian leader Miklós Horthy with Hitler during a cavalcade on the eve of war. (r) A German Panzer tank flanked by Hungarian fascist forces—known as the Arrow Cross—in the capital city Budapest in March 1944. Sources: “Hitlers ungarischer Partner wird rehabilitiert,” Die Welt. https://www.welt.de/kultur/history/article106416422/Hitlers-ungarischer-Partner-wird- rehabilitiert.html “Bundeswehr baut Hitlers Tiger-Panz nach,” Die Welt. https://www.welt.de/geschichte/zweiter-weltkrieg/article163190239/Bundeswehr-baut-Hitlers-Tiger- Panzer-nach.html [Accessed 26 April 2017]

The Vatican Signed on 20 July 1933 and known as the Reichskonkordat, the first treaty established by Nazi Germany with another sovereign state was shared with the Vatican. Several reasons may have motivated Hitler to pursue this arrangement with the papacy. Seeking international and spiritual legitimacy, hastening the dissolution of the domestic political opposition posed by the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum), silencing protests, and the assuaging of fears held by the significant minority of German Catholics that Nazi ideology may encroach on their religious beliefs, all have been cited as possible reasons.2 In practice, it meant that the Vatican, through its diplomatic representative in Berlin Cesare Orsenigo, maintained communication with the Nazi régime throughout its existence. Consequently, the Vatican became privy to knowledge of the Holocaust.

2 See, for example: Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany. (De Capo Press, 2000; first published in 1964) pp. 90-93; John S. Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches, 1933-1945. (Basic Books, New York, 1968) pp. 64-65. LEARNING MODULE 8. Section 1: Non-German Collaborators 7

PRESCRIBED TEXT: Please read Michael Phayer’s chapter entitled “Papal Priorities,” pp. 613-29.

According to Phayer, Berlin provided the papacy with numerous reports of the extermination of Jews, including specific and ostensibly credible details. He observes that this information was not passed on to other countries, including the western Allies. Even though the Vatican knew of the genocide as it was being committed, Pope Pius XII (who as Eugenio Pacelli had been a signatory of the Reichskonkordat with Nazi Germany as the Vatican’s Cardinal Secretary of State six years prior to his election to the papacy in March 1939) said nothing publicly about the atrocities, and even took certain actions to cover up or silence the spread of such knowledge. By the end of 1942, the Vatican had received evidence of the Jewish extermination carried out on an ongoing basis in no fewer than nine countries. Nonetheless, argues Phayer, even as news continued to flood in during 1943 somehow the Vatican inexplicably “avoided coming to the conclusion that genocide was occurring in Europe.” It remains unclear whether this silence was motivated by antisemitism, pro-German sentiments, fear of Soviet communism, or a desire to act as a neutral peacemaker. In any case, the muted role of Pope Pius XII and his papacy remains a controversial aspect of the Holocaust.

(l) Pope Pius XII, whose papacy (March 1939 – October 1958) covered the period of the Second World War and the Holocaust. (r) The signing of the Reichskonkordat in Rome, 20 July 1933. Seated at the head of the table is Eugenio Pacelli—the future Pope Pius XII—who was a signatory of the Reichskonkordat as the then Cardinal Secretary of State for the Vatican. Sources: “Pope Pius XXII,” Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pope_Pius_XII#/media/File:His_Holiness_Pope_Pius_XII.png “Vertrag mit dem Vatikan – Hitlers erster Triumph,” Die Welt. https://www.welt.de/kultur/article2190184/Vertrag-mit-dem-Vatikan-Hitlers-erster-Triumph.html [Accessed 26 April 2017] LEARNING MODULE 8. Section 1: Non-German Collaborators 8

b) Officials As the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) notes on its website, for many countries collaboration with Nazi Germany extended beyond the upper echelons of leadership in government. Numerous public officials outside Germany proved critical in enabling the Nazis to carry out the mass deportation and killing of Jews more efficiently. Those responsible for confiscating property, organising transportation, acting as informants in an official capacity et cetera all played their part. Local officials, such as police, were armed with knowledge of regional geography, history, and language skills not possessed by German occupying forces. These skills proved advantageous when it came to locating Jews, particularly those attempting to evade capture and deportation.3

PRESCRIBED TEXT: Please read ’s chapter entitled “Poland: the ,” pp. 532-42.

Grabowski explores the example of the notorious Polish “Blue Police” who operated under German leadership within the . The combination of intimate local knowledge and a network of informants — as well as the enticing material benefits associated with locating Jews — lent these police a deadly efficiency. The case of the “Blue Police” serves as a strong reminder that Poland, as a staunchly Catholic nation, was home to countless ethnic Poles who were more than happy to see Jews persecuted — especially if they stood to benefit.

German Order Police and Polish “Blue Police” working together in Kraków, 1941. Source: “Policja Polska Generalnego Gubernatorstwa,” Heltenic.pl. http://www.heltechnic.pl/info_Policja_Polska_Generalnego_Gubernatorstwa_(1939-1944) [Accessed 26 April 2017]

3 “Bystanders,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10008207 [Accessed 26 April 2017] LEARNING MODULE 8. Section 2: Jews 9

Section 2. Jews For some historians, perhaps the most problematic and contentious category of agents who actively contributed to the “successful” implementation of the Holocaust were Jews themselves. In the case of Jewish ghetto leaders and councils, these kinds of officials understandably viewed themselves more in the role of “saviours” of their community rather than as perpetrators. They may have claimed to have acted in the best interests of their fellow Jews residing within their respective ghetto. Though faced with impossible choices, these ghetto leaders have been viewed by some historians as having been complicit in the extermination of their own people.

a) Jewish Leadership and Police Jewish community leadership has attracted the greatest level of controversy. Jewish councils (in various guises) have been both praised and reviled by contemporaries and scholars alike. Raul Hilberg is among the most trenchant critics of their behaviour.4 Hilberg spells out his concerns in his review of Isaiah Trunk’s groundbreaking study of Jewish councils in Poland entitled . Hilberg’s attitude is partly shaped by his intimate knowledge of the behaviour of Adam Czerniaków, council leader of the until his suicide in July 1942, whose diary he edited decades after the war. Hilberg contends that, instead of thinking that their communities had long-term prospects and governing accordingly, ghetto leadership should have devised strategies to actively resist Nazi objectives to destroy European Jewry. In other words, Hilberg accuses ghetto leaders of having colluded with Germans in carrying out the “Final Solution.” While Hilberg emphasises that Jewish councils were not wilful accomplices, he nonetheless concludes that they had crossed the ethical divide between perpetrator and victim. When council leadership instituted “systemic” exploitation of the weakest ghetto inhabitants and engaged in self-deception about the significance of their actions, they became the “indispensable operatives” of the Germans.

Adam Czerniaków, leader of the Warsaw ghetto Judenrat. When German authorities ordered Czerniaków to arrange mass deportations and he realised that it meant certain death at nearby Treblinka, instead of continuing to acquiesce in Nazi demands he decided to commit suicide on 23 July 1942 — the day before the deportations from Warsaw ghetto were scheduled to commence. Sources: Holocaust Research Project. http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/ghettos/acdiary.html The Holocaust Explained. http://www.theholocaustexplained.org/ks4/the-nazi-impact-on-europe/the- warsaw-ghetto-a-case-study/the-nazis-establish-control-in-warsaw/#.WQFCYlJ0ii4 [Accessed 26 April 2017]

4 Raul Hilberg, “The Ghetto as a Form of Government,” in Michael R. Marrus (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews, vol. 6, The Victims of the Holocaust. (Meckler, Westport, 1989) LEARNING MODULE 8. Section 2: Jews 10

(top left) Chaim “King” Rumkowski, the divisive and controversial leader of the Łódż Judenrat. (top right) Rumkowski riding through the ghetto in his horse-drawn carriage. (bottom left) Stamps from the Łódż/Litzmannstadt ghetto that featured the egomaniacal Rumkowski. (bottom right) Rumkowski, surrounded by Nazi officials, meeting SS chief (seated in car) during his visit to the Łódż/Litzmannstadt ghetto. Sources: History of Sorts. https://dirkdeklein.net/2016/04/ USHMM. https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa1144673 .Thinglink Oy ”,הימלר והיינריך לודז בגטו היודנראט ראש ,רומקובסקי חיים“ . https://www.thinglink.com/scene/599151694713978881# [Accessed 26 April 2017]

PRESCRIBED TEXT: Please read Gordon J. Horwitz’s chapter entitled “Choiceless Choices,” pp. 358-69.

The term “choiceless choices” was coined by Holocaust scholar Lawrence L. Langer. It denotes a conflicted choice in which either option is equally abhorrent and so unthinkable as to leave no real choice at all.5 Horwitz details one infamous instance of this dilemma in his harrowing account of the Łódż ghetto and the decisions faced by the council leader . Tasked with handing over 20,000 ghetto inhabitants

5 Lawrence Langer, Versions of Survival: The Holocaust and the Human Spirit. (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1982) LEARNING MODULE 8. Section 2: Jews 11 to the Germans in September 1942, Rumkowski was compelled to ask parents in the ghetto to willingly volunteer their young children for deportation, knowing a certain death awaited. For Rumkowski, the “choice” was between complying with German orders to stop undue suffering and prevent the Germans from carrying out the forced (and brutal) deportation themselves, or asking parents to sacrifice their children and ensure the temporary survival of the remaining ghetto inhabitants.

As with Jewish ghetto leaders, the role of the Jewish police employed by the councils to enforce order inside ghettos is particularly sensitive and controversial. The Jewish police were notorious among fellow ghetto inhabitants for their corrupt, self-serving, and heavy-handed behaviour. As with the ghetto leaders, however, these men can be seen as having been placed in an impossible situation. Even so, they were widely feared and loathed due to their actions in the ghettos, and in the postwar period often were pursued and harassed when identified by other former ghetto inhabitants.

(t) Jewish police lining up in the Szydłowiec ghetto, Poland. (b) Jewish ghetto police in action rounding up fellow Jews on the streets for a deportation, Warsaw 1942. Sources: “The Szydłowiec Community during the Holocaust,” Yad Vashem. http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhibitions/valley/szydlowiec/german_occupation.asp Framepool. http://footage.framepool.com/it/shot/171785612-juedischer-ordnungsdienst-ghetto-di- varsavia-violazione-dei-diritti-dell%27uomo-olocausto [Accessed 26 April 2017]

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READING EXCERPT: Raul Hilberg, in “The Jewish Leaders,” takes a more descriptive approach as he gives an overview of the role of Jewish leadership throughout Europe.

Hilberg outlines the differences between the behaviour of Jewish leadership depending on where and when it operated. You will note that, although Hilberg offers a tour of various ghettos, their leaders, and ultimate fates, his generalisations and condemnations of Jewish councils are both sweeping and damning. Hilberg contrasts what he sees as the “poverty and filth” of the ghetto itself, compared to the “business-like luxury” of the councils’ offices. “From the inside,” Hilberg argues, “it seemed already quite clear that the Jewish leaders had become rulers, reigning and disposing over the ghetto community with a finality that was absolute.”6

By contrast, Michael Marrus is critical of Hilberg’s harsh, generalised views toward the actions of Jewish councils. Marrus stresses that historians are obliged to develop historical empathy: that is, to attempt to view events from the perspective of those experiencing them. Jewish leaders were often thrust, or forced, into ghetto leadership positions and were, in Marrus’ view, “utterly unprepared for the kind of catastrophic circumstances they faced.” For Marrus, it was a “normal human response” to attempt to preserve life within the ghetto to the best of a leader’s ability. Marrus, though, does acknowledge Hilberg’s argument that ghetto leaders became “increasingly dictatorial” and began to see themselves as “saviours.”7 Clearly, then, there is much complexity and contestation when tackling the subject of Jewish leaders whose actions during the Holocaust sit somewhere within the “grey zone.” Ultimately, it is up to you to judge whether their behaviour constitutes collaboration.

6 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews. (Octagon Books, University of California, 1973) p. 146. 7 “An Interview with Professor Michael Marrus,” Shoah Resource Center: The International School for , 12 December 1997. http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20- %203853.pdf [Accessed 26 April 2017] LEARNING MODULE 8. Section 3: Bystanders 13

Section 3. Bystanders For the uncompromising Hilberg, as encapsulated in the title of his influential 1993 book, those who experienced the Holocaust can be rather neatly divided into three distinct categories: perpetrators; victims; and bystanders.8 With respect to bystanders, Hilberg notes that several hundred million non-Jews lived in areas controlled by Nazi Germany. “From those places where the view of the catastrophe was close, the news reverberated throughout Europe.”9 Hilberg identifies an indifference amongst populations who were aware of what was happening to Jews and yet, for whatever reason(s), were neither prepared to take action to prevent it nor even willing to discuss it with anyone. In other countries, quite understandably, the war was the primary concern. Hilberg comments somewhat acerbically: The Dutch were worried about their bicycles, the French about shortages, the Ukrainians about food, the Germans about air raids. All of these people thought of themselves as victims, be it of war, or oppression, or “fate.”10

Hilberg’s claim to contrary notwithstanding, as we have already established implicitly throughout this and previous learning modules, the lines between what constituted being a “collaborator,” “perpetrator,” or “victim” can become very blurred. Should we consider individuals who may not have directly contributed to the deportation and extermination process, but nonetheless benefited from the demise of Jews, as mere bystanders? Or do we need to create a special sub-category of “beneficiary bystanders” to properly differentiate between the many Europeans who had nothing whatever to do with the Holocaust and the many others who were not necessarily involved but still gladly benefitted somehow? For instance, what should we make of the removal of Jewish competitors and how the liquidation of their assets enabled German bankers and businessmen to prosper? Or how, in Poland, locals were known to charge exorbitant prices for the smallest morsels of food when bartering with desperate Jews trapped inside ghettos? Or how other ethnic Poles scoured the remains of extermination camps such as Bełżec hoping to find gold fragments in the ashes? Or the many Europeans who extorted money from Jews in hiding?11 Over a million apartments previously owned and occupied by Jews were relinquished only to be “acquired” by opportunistic locals.12 None of these actions tangibly increased the threat posed to Jews, nor the efficiency of their destruction at German hands. Arguably, though, the term “bystander” implies a certain innocence and inability to

8 Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe. (Secker & Warburg, London, 1993) 9 ibid. p. 195. 10 ibid. 11 ibid. 12 ibid. p. 214. For the example of Poland, see Stanislaw Krajewski, “The Impact of the Shoah on the Thinking of Contemporary Polish Jewry,” in Joshua D. Zimmermann (ed.), Contested Memories: Poles and Jews during the Holocaust and Its Aftermath. (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick; New Jersey; London, 2003). pp. 291-303. Here p. 301. LEARNING MODULE 8. Section 3: Bystanders 14 affect an outcome, rather than individuals who evidently benefited from the mass deportation and killing of Jews.

Similar to the case of Jewish ghetto councils, in contrast to Hilberg’s hardline stance we have the more moderate Marrus urging his fellow scholars not to disregard the historical context in which bystanders acted during the Holocaust. Marrus argues:

…there is a strong tendency in historical writing on bystanders to the Holocaust to condemn, rather than to explain. And while opinions differ on the degree to which historians should exercise some form of judgment, I suggest that we shall go much further in the attempt to comprehend the behavior and activity (or inactivity) of bystanders by making a painstaking effort to enter into their minds and sensibilities.13

Marrus, then, offers us the same advice for bystanders as he does for Jewish “collaborators”: to hypothetically walk in the individual’s shoes before casting judgment.

For Tony Kushner, the role of bystanders in the Holocaust holds the most relevance for our contemporary world. Relatively few people ever become perpetrators or victims of murderous violence. Yet, as Kushner notes, all citizens are “co-presents witnessing, even if only through the media, the genocides, ethnic cleansing and other manifestations of extreme racism that besmirch the contemporary world.”14

Reflecting on the role of bystanders during the Holocaust, it was a program of mass extermination whose execution relied not only on the actions of perpetrators but also the inaction of bystanders. As Ian Kershaw famously wrote in reference to German perpetrators, bystanders, and the Holocaust: “The road to Auschwitz was built by hate, but paved with indifference.”15 Reflect on this point as you consider the role of bystanders in the Holocaust.

Furthermore, question whether it is even appropriate to search for neat categories in which we can pigeonhole Europeans as having been either perpetrators, victims, or (beneficiary) bystanders during the Holocaust. Perhaps it is far more appropriate to adopt an “as-well-as” perspective in which we recognise that, during the Second World War, it was not only common but arguably even typical for Europeans to find themselves in multiple roles. Indeed, it was quite possible to find yourself in multiple roles at the same time—guilty of committing crimes while simultaneously suffering at the hands of others, while observing the entire continent threatening to destroy itself.

13 Michael Marrus, The Holocaust in History. (Penguin, London, 1987). p. 157. 14 Tony Kushner, “‘Pissing in the Wind’? The Search for Nuance in the Study of Holocaust ‘Bystanders,’” The Journal of , vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 57-76. Here p. 60. 15 Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria, 1933-1945. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983). p. 277. LEARNING MODULE 8. Conclusion 15

Conclusion The Nazis left a trail of genocidal destruction throughout Europe. Wherever German military forces occupied, Jews within that territory suffered. Of course, it is vitally important to bear in mind that the “Final Solution” was a plan masterminded and carried out by Nazi Germany, facilitated by its military conquest of Europe. Given the scope of the “project” of extermination, however, Nazi Germany relied on the cooperation and collaboration of other nations, particularly those with which military alliances were in place, as well as individuals in official capacities, to advance certain anti-Jewish measures. The assistance provided by these nations and individuals enabled the Nazis to kill Jews far more efficiently. Moreover, historians may argue that Jews — particularly those in leadership positions — complied with Nazi genocidal plans to such a degree that they became complicit in their own destruction. This is a fascinating and challenging topic that we shall grapple with in greater detail next week under the subtitle of “resistance.”

In any case, such analysis requires us to adopt the perspective of the individuals themselves. Charged with the care of tens of thousands of people trapped in dreadful, disease-ridden conditions, Jewish ghetto leaders faced an uncertain future for themselves and their fellow ghetto inhabitants. They were put in a position that often forced them to decide who should live and perish — the “choiceless choices” that had to be made to ensure the ongoing existence of the remainder of the ghetto. Similarly, Nazi Germany relied on the overwhelming majority of the Europeans who knew of the extermination of Jews — whether through observation, news, or living in the vicinity of the destruction — to take no action to inhibit their plans. Indeed, most participant-observers who experienced the Holocaust somehow across Europe did so as a bystander. Many people “knew” about the murders or disappearances of Jews (even if only through rumours or innuendo rather than confirmed news). Faced with such incomprehensible stories, many Europeans later claimed that at the time they simply could not fathom how something so extraordinary and fanciful could be possible. Whereas many ignored the reality, others remained indifferent, and still others actively sought to benefit from Jews’ misfortunes. Nonetheless, it is crucial that we take heed of Marrus’ advice whereby he challenges us to show historical empathy by seeking to understand the (in)actions of Holocaust bystanders within a full vista of what occurred in wartime Europe. Adopting such an approach, moreover, is essential given the pertinence of this category and its manifest implications for us all in the modern world.