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Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington-Rio de Janeiro "Axis" during the World War II Era Author(s): Stanley E. Hilton Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 59, No. 2 (May, 1979), pp. 201-231 Published by: Duke University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2514412 Accessed: 30-09-2015 08:01 UTC

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This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions HispatnicAmerican Historical Review 59(2), 1979, 201-231 Copyright( 1979 by Duke UniversityPress

BrazilianDiplomacy and the Washington-Riode Janeiro"Axis" duringthe World War II Era

STANLEY E. HILTON

TmHera of the Second World War had a profoundimpact on Brazilian foreignpolicy. Relationswith Germany, Brazil's leading European trade partner,reached their twentieth-centurynadir. Britain's financial and commercial role in Brazilian affairsweakened stillfurther, continuing the decline initiated by the Depression. Among the great power rivals for influence in Brazil,the beneficiaryof wartimecircumstances was the United States. Indeed, the unprecedentedintensification of relationswith that coun- trywas one of the most significantchapters in modem Brazilian diplomacy and an historicalphenomenon pregnant with implicationsfor not only wartimebut postwarhemispheric relations. This articleseeks to contributeto an understandingof the Rio-Washington"axis" by re- assessingtwo of its key aspects: the natureof Brazilian diplomacyand the characterand objectivesof Americanpolicy toward Brazil. The major statementon wartime Brazilian-Americanrelations is FrankD. McCann'sThe Brazilian-AmericanAlliance, 1937-1945. Ac- cordingto McCann, Brazil was a somewhatpassive victimof stronger, domineeringpowers. Berlin'sgoal in Brazil was "conquest and domination to fulfillthe Fuehrer's dream of world dictatorship,"and Roo- sevelt's United States was surprisinglynot essentiallydifferent from Hitler's Reich in this regard. The New Deal trade program,for example, insofaras it concernedBrazil, was aimed at establishingAmer- ican "economic and political hegemony"over that country. During the war, moreover,Washington would play "a two-facedgame" with Rio de Janeiro,continuing to seek "domination"of Brazil at the same time that it formulatedplans for a programof postwar militaryassistance to Latin America in which the importanceof Brazil to hL-le United States "was reduced, if not eliminated."The Getulio Vargas

* The authoris AssociateProfessor of Historyat Louisiana State University. Researchfor this article was fundedby the Social Science ResearchCouncil and theFulbright-Hays Faculty Research Program.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 202 HAHR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON government,insufficiently realistic or tough-mindedin its bargaining with Washington,had placed Brazil by mid-1944"in the position of a woman who has given in to her lover and can only trustthat his in- tentionsare honorable." Americanintentions, however, were not honorable. The crowningblow in what McCann regardsas Washington's deceitfultreatment of Brazil came in the matterof representationon the SecurityCouncil of the new United Nations: "Americanfailure to obtain a securitycouncil seat for its faithfulally and Washington's general depreciation of Brazilian prestige paralleled American economic and militaryefforts to keep Brazil subservient."' If this passivity-dominationthesis is correct,the historianwould expect to findthe recordof Brazilian-Americanrelations to be one of concession and sacrifice by Rio de Janeiroin returnfor little from Washingtonthat satisfiedperceived national interests. One logically would encounter,furthermore, ample signs that key Brazilian policymakers expressed grave anxieties,at least privately,about the dan- gerous intimacyof relationswith the United States and the domineering thrustof Americanpolicy. If thatpolicy in facthad as its conscious goal the political and economic domination of Brazil, the histo- rian should also discover substantial evidence of explicit discussion of that goal in Americanpolicymaking circles. Yet neitherBrazilian nor Americanarchives, nor those of Great Britainand Germany,yield any such evidence. On the contrary,these sourcesamply documentthe Machiavellian opportunismof Brazilian leaders who skillfullyprobed the vanity, anxieties,and prejudices of counterpartsin other countries and were remarkablysuccessful in barteringgeographic accident for valuable economic, military,and political concessions from Washington. The record also shows that the Roosevelt administration eschewed domineering,deceitful diplomacy toward Brazil and never devised any programfor establishingeconomic, political, or military control over that country-a fact explicitlyappreciated not only in Brazilian circles,but by European rivals as well. Anyevaluation of the foreignpolicy behaviorof the Vargas government must underscorethe latter'scapacity for,and skill at, the diplomacy of opportunismand deception. The Machiavellian characterof Brazil's responseto one of its major prewar challenges-the intensive trade rivalrybetween Nazi Germanyand the United States-has been documented.2It is importantto stressin this regardthat while Brazil

1. Frank D. McCann, Jr., The Brazilian-AmericanAlliance, 1937-1945 (Princeton,1973), pp. 7, 81, 328-332,341, 458. 2. StanleyE. Hilton,Brazil and the Great Powers,1930-1939: The Politics

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO "AXIS" 203 traded with Germanyon a bilateral basis that contraveneda liberal agreementsigned with the United States in 1935, the Vargas govern- mentproclaimed its solidaritywith Americanpolicy, systematically ex- ploiting Washington'sgood-neighborliness and frequentlydistorting the truthin order to disguise or justifyBrazil's commercialalliance with Germany,a fact that various prominentBrazilian authoritiespri- vatelydecried.3 Vargas,heavily influenced by his financeminister, the militaryhigh command,and his own desire to diversifyexports and markets,displayed a high degree of opportunisticindependence from Washington in the trade dispute, which is not an isolated example. Indeed, the reactionof his governmentto othermajor internationalproblems, such as the Italo-Ethiopian embroglio,reflected a similarlypragmatic, in- dependent spirit. The Italo-Ethiopian conflictwas the first great challenge to the Versailles systemin the 1930s. Roosevelt and the State Department clearly sympathizedwith Ethiopia and they endeavored in vain, on the eve of the outbreakof hostilitiesin 1935, to dissuade an adamantlyisolationist congress from depriving the Presi- dent of the power to discriminatebetween aggressorand aggressee in applyinga mandatoryarms embargo in the case of war. The administration'ssubsequent famous appeal for a "moral embargo" was an effortto restrictthe flow of otherimportant materials to Italy. Vargas and his counselors,on the other hand, fromthe very be- ginningof the tensionin Italo-Ethiopian relationshad scented commercial opportunity.In mid-1935,Vargas himselfcorresponded with the governorof Rio Grande do Sul about special consignmentsof mules and frozenbeef for the Italian army,pointing with enthusiasm to the possibilityof supplyingvarious products to Italian troops on their way to East Africa. Foreign MinisterJose Carlos de Macedo Soares (1934-1937), a devout Catholic, staunch anti-Communistfrom Sao Paulo-a regionof heavy Italian immigration-andunabashed ad- mirerof Mussolini,shared Vargas' desire to maximizeprofits. Italian

of Trade Rivalry(Austin, 1975); JohnD. Wirth,The Politicsof BrazilianDevel- opment,1930-1954 (Stanford,1969). 3. AmbassadorOswaldo Aranha,for one, protestedhis govemment's"lack of integrity"and its "policyof subterfugeand inveiglement"toward Washington in the German-Americantrade struggle.Aranha (Washington)to Rubens Rosa, Feb. 18, 1935; Aranhato Getu'lioVargas, June 4, 1937, Centrode Pesquisa e Documentagcode HistoriaContemporanea (hereafter cited as CPDHC), Fundagco GetuilioVargas (Rio), Oswaldo Aranha Papers (hereaftercited as OA). Cf. ValentimBougas to Aranha,June 18, 1936, OA; AmbassadorMalio Pimentel Brandao (Washington)to Vargas,Sept. 14, 1938, CPDHC, Getu'lioVargas Papers (hereaftercited as GV).

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 204 HAHR MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON mobilization,he remindedthe finance ministerlate in August, pre- sented Brazil with an "exceptional"commercial opportunity. Early in October,after hostilities began, Macedo Soares argued in a memoran- dum to Vargas that Ethiopia meant nothingto Brazil, whereas Italy had provided immigrantsand was a ready marketfor foodstuffsand "raw materialsindispensable in war, such as cotton,rubber, etc." The followingmonth Itamarati rejected in somewhatabrupt termsan appeal fromthe League of Nations for sanctionsagainst Italy, making no mentionof Brazil's traditionalopposition to wars of conquest.4 Ambassador Oswaldo Aranha in Washingtondecried his government'sattitude, warning both Vargas and Macedo Soares of the un- favorableimpact that it had on Americanopinion. The responsefrom Rio de Janeirowas to give verbal assurances of solidaritywith U.S. policy, but simultaneouslyto intensifythe successfulpursuit of new supplycontracts with Italian authorities.5In March 1936, as Ethiopian resistancedistintegrated, Macedo Soares publiclylauded Mussolinide- claringthat Brazil was pursuingfriendship with Italy "with devotion and enthusiasm,in the certaintythat we are workingfor a common ideal of greatness." Later that year, afterconclusion of a secret commercial modus vivendi with Berlin and after assuringthe American embassythat Brazil would not negotiateany trade understandingwith Rome that would violate the liberal principlesof the Brazilian-Ameri- can treaty,the Vargas governmentsigned a confidentialclearing agree- mentwith the fascistregime.6 The pronouncedsympathy of the Vargas administrationfor fascist Italy and Franco's Nationalistforces in Spain (Vargas in 1936 even authorizedsecret donations of sugar and coffeeto Nationalisttroops7)

4. Vargasto J. A. Floresda Cunha,June 24, 1935, ArquivoNacional (Rio de Janeiro),Colegao Presidenciada Repuiblica(hereafter cited as PR), processo 1.890; June27, 1935,PR, 1.917; July17, 1935, PR, 2.074; JoseCarlos de Macedo Soares,memo [to ArturSouza Costa], n.d. [Aug. 22, 1935], PR, 12.529; Macedo Soares to Vargas, Oct. 9, 1935, PR, 7.129; Ministeriodas Relaq5es Exteriores (hereaftercited as MRE) to Aranha,Nov. 7, 1935, ArquivoHistorico do Itamarati (hereaftercited as AHI), vol. 408/3/13. Cf. Hilton,"Brazil and Great Power Trade Rivalryin South America,1934-1939" (Ph.D. Diss., Universityof Texas, 1969), pp. 154-172. 5. Aranhato Vargas,Nov. 11, Dec. 3, 1935, OA; Aranhato MRE, Nov. 12, 1935, AHI, 408/3/8; MRE to Aranha,Nov. 14, 1935, AHI, 408/3/13;Vargas to Aranha,Nov. 25, Dec. 14,1935, OA. 6. Macedo Soares, Discursos (Rio, 1937), pp. 114, 116; Hilton, "Military Influenceon BrazilianEconomic Policy, 1930-1945: A DifferentView," HAHR, 53 (Feb. 1973), 81. A Portuguesetranslation of the latter,with new evidence on the generalsubject, appears as chapter2 of Hilton,0 Brasile a Crise Inter- nacional,1930-1945 (Rio, 1977). 7. FranciscoFranco to Vargas,Oct. 29, 1936, GV.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIODE JANERO "AXIS" 205 was a disquietingsignal to observersin the United States, where ex- portcircles and governmentspokesmen were understandablydisturbed about Brazil's flauntingof the commitmentsit had assumed in the 1935 trade treaty. And when Vargas, with the backing of the army, jettisoned congress and proclaimed the Estado Novo in November 1937, a new ingredientwas added to Americanconcern over the drift ofBrazilian policy.8 One of the immediateobjectives of the Vargas regimein 1938 was thereforeto reassurethe United States,a key diplomatically, that Bra- zil had not joined the Axis-a task made even more urgentby the fact that Rio de Janeirowas at that time in the final stages of negotiations withthe Germanembassy and Krupp representativesfor a major armamentscontract, one that would mean continuedexpansion of bilateral trade withthe Reich.9 Vargas' adroituse of the 1938 crisisin German- Brazilianrelations to allay Americananxieties and divertattention from his commercialalliance with Berlin was furtherevidence of his de- votionto, and success at,realpolitik. The precipitatedeterioration in relationswith Berlin originatedin Brazil'snationalistic response to the activitiesof Nazi agentsin southem Brazil, a region of German immigration.10Extended analysis of the subject is impossiblehere, but one episode, German-Brazilianconver- sations in February-March1938, is worthyof examinationbecause it lucidly illustratesVargas' diplomatictechniques. In his view, having Washingtonbelieve that his governmentwas reacting vigorouslyto Nazi political bullyingwould be an excellentway to still speculation in the United States about his allegedly pro-Axisleanings and camou- flage the projected strengtheningof militaryand economic ties with Berlin. A visit by German ambassador Karl Ritteron February25 to discuss the anti-Nazi agitationin southernBrazil, where state authorities were closing Nazi party officesand harassingparty spokesmen, providedthe shrewdBrazilian leader with his firstopportunity and he characteristicallysought to turnit to double advantage. Accordingto Ritter,Vargas was "measuredlycordial" (freundlichgemessen)through- out theirfifty-five-minute conversation and repeatedlyassured him of

8. On the sharpreaction in the UnitedStates to the Estado Novo, see Hilton, GreatPowers, pp. 171-172. 9. German firms,with officialsupport, were selling armamentsto Brazil for compensation(blocked) marksthat Brazil earned fromextra-quota sales of primaryproducts to Germany. The firstarmaments contract had been signed with Krupp in February1977. Hilton,"Military Influence," p. 83. 10. Kiite Harms-Baltzer,Die Nationalisierungder deutschenEinwanderer undihrer Nachkommen in Brasilien[ ... ] (Cologne,1971).

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 206 HAHR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON his friendlyintentions toward German interests. Ritter welcomed Vargas' statementsas a basis foran understandingand later reported: "The President,at the end of the conversation,expressed himself-as he previouslyhad done repeatedlyin public-in veryfriendly fashion toward the German communityin Brazil.""' Having reassured the Germans and protected the armaments negotiations,Vargas, well aware of Americansensitivity to Nazi intrigue,moved quickly to im- prove his image in the United States. He called in his friendAranha, who had recentlyresigned his post in Washington,and had him trans- mit to AmbassadorJefferson Caffery a doctoredaccount of the meeting,now depicted as an angryclash, with the tellingrequest that Caf- feryrelay the news to Roosevelthimself.'2 The appointmentof Aranha to the post of foreignminister the following month was another calculated move by Vargas to assuage American concern, and Aranha immediatelyset out on the course chartedby his chief. He sent personal messages of solidarityto State

11. Karl Ritterto GermanForeign Ministry, Feb. 25, 1938, NationalArchives (Washington),Records of the GermanForeign Ministry,microfilm roll 3155, serial 69639, frames518439-442 (hereaftercited as RGFM, 3155:6939/518439- 442, forexample). 12. JeffersonCaffery to State Dept., Feb. 27, 1938, Dept. of State,Foreign Relationsof the United States,Diplomatic Papers, 1938, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1955-1956), V, 409 (hereaftercited as FRUS). The assumptionunderlying McCann'sanalysis, which is based on the adulteratedversion of the meeting(Al- liance,p. 83, n. 16), is thatBerlin had politico-territorialdesigns on SouthAmer- ica. He consequentlyviews Ritter as a truculentdefender of Nazismfrom the out- set. This generalargument overlooks the intemaldivisions and conflictsover goals and means withinthe Nazi foreignpolicy apparatus, as well as studiesbased on Germanrecords that show thatSouth America did not figureprominently in Nazi long-rangeplanning and that Berlin'saims in the regionwere commercial,not political. See Paul Seabury,The Wilhelmstrasse:A Studyof GermanDiplomats underthe Nazi Regime (Berkeley,1954); Leonidas E. Hill, "The Wilhelmstrasse in the Nazi Era," PoliticalScience Quarterly,82 (Dec. 1967), 546-570; Hilton, "Brazil and Great Power Trade Rivalry;"Harms-Baltzer, Nationalisierung. Reli- ably documentedNazi discussionsof possible acquisitionsof non-Europeanter- ritoriesfocused solely on Africa. GerhardL. Weinberg,"German Colonial Plans and Policies,1938-1942" in WaldemarBesson and FriedrichHiller v. Gaertringen, eds., Geschichteund Gegenwartsbewusstein(Gbttingen, 1963), pp. 462-491. Those who suspectBerlin of territorialgoals in South Americarecognize the ex- tremelytenuous nature of the documentarysupport for this view. See, for example,Alton Frye, Nazi Germanyand the AmericanHemisphere, 1933-1941 (New Haven, 1967), pp. 168-194. A soundrecent review of the subjectis Hans-Jurgen Schroder,"Hauptprobleme der deutschenLateinamerikapolitik 1933-1941," Jahr- buch fMrGeschichte von Staat, Wirtschaftund GesellschaftLateinamerikas, 12 (1975), 408-433. It is relevantto note thatin June1940, at the heightof Nazi power,Karl Ritterhimself, then a special economicadviser to the Wilhelmstrasse, in oudiningthe Reich's futurecolonial empire and "GreaterEconomic Sphere," specificallyexcluded Brazil fromthose areas, predicteda postwarcontraction of

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANERO "AXIS" 207 Departmentofficials and even made a special broadcast to the Amer- ican people.13 But Aranha's unquestioned sympathyfor the United States did not mean that he opposed cordial relationswith the Reich, and his opposition to bilateralismstopped short of losing an opportunityto acquire badly needed armaments.'4 He consequentlyhad been maintaininginformal contacts with Ritter,and the latterhad re- cently advised Berlin that Aranha's cooperative attitude made him hopefulof a satisfactorysettlement of the partyquestion. The firstof- ficial encounterbetween the two men took place on March 16, when Ritterraised the issue of partyactivities in the South. Separate records of the meetingby both diplomatsindicate that it was a cordial encounter. Ritter,in fact, was so encouraged by Aranha's "well-inten- tioned" remarksthat he recommendedthat Berlin preventattacks on Brazil by the Nazi press.15 Two days after that meeting,however, Aranha,following Vargas' lead, cast it in a differentlight for Ameri- can benefit,telling Cafferythat his strongstand in the face of Nazi pressurehad led Berlin to instructRitter to do what he could to sub- vertAranha's political position.'6 tradewith that country and even suggestedthat, in orderto providea labor force for the "colonial empire,"German settlers in South Americabe encouragedto movefrom that region. Ritter, memo, June 1, 1940,Documents on GermanForeign Policy,Series D (1937-1945) [hereaftercited as DGFP], 13 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1957-1964), IX, 496-500. 13. McCann,Alliance, pp. 74-75; Aranhato Secretaryof State CordellHull, Mar. 17, 1938,OA. 14. On Aranha'sinterest in annamentsand reluctantdefense of compensation tradeon the groundsthat it was at least a meansof obtainingbadly needed mili- taryhardware, see Aranhato Vargas,June 4, 1937, OA; HerbertFeis, memo,June 29, 1937, NationalArchives, Records of the Dept. of State (hereaftercited as DS), file632.6231. 15. Aranha,memo, n.d. [Mar. 22, 1938], AHI, mayo29.506; Ritterto German ForeignMinistry, Mar. 23, 1938, RGFM, 1913:3954/EO54521. 16. Cafferyto State Dept., Mar. 18, 1938, DS, 832.00/1178. Cf. McCann, Alliance,p. 87, who arguesthat the encounterbetween Aranha and Ritterwas marredby near physicalviolence and accepts Aranha'sstatements to Cafferyas accurate. McCann's authorityfor the near-fisticuffsepisode is an item in the newspapercolumn of Drew Pearson that appeared one year afterthe alleged incident.It is noteworthythat Pearsonin 1938-1939 was tryingto obtainfrom Itamaratia contractfor radio publicityand thathis articledepicting Aranha as a rough-and-readyadversary of Germanbullying was publishedjust as Aranhawas arrivingin Washingtonfor special economicand militarynegotiations. In 1940, Pearsonreceived a commissionfrom Itamarati to conductradio publicityon behalf of Brazil. Aranhato Pearson,June 14, 1938, OA; Brandaoto Vargas,Dec. 6, 1938, GV; Pearsonto Aranha,June 10, 1939, Mar. 7, Aug. 28, 1940, OA. It shouldalso be notedthat in mid-1938,when the diplomaticquarrel between Ber- lin and Rio de Janeirodid worsen,the Wilhelmstrasse,far from encouraging Rit- ter to subvertAranha's position, actually rebuked him for undiplomaticconduct

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 208 HAHR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON The tactic used by Rio de Janeirowas highlysuccessful. On the one hand, the Americanpress, fed the distortedversions of the Ger- man-Brazilianconversations, hailed Vargas' resistanceto Nazi mach- inations,while Cafferywrote of the "completechange of policy" that allegedly had occurred in Rio de Janeirosince proclamationof the Estado Novo.17 On the other hand, Berlin was sufficientlymollified by the reassuringattitude of Vargas and his foreignminister that the armamentscontract, providing in essence for the exchange of nearly 900 pieces of artilleryfor raw materials,was concluded withouthitches on March 28.18 The recordof Brazil'smaneuvering during 1939-1941, the period of hemisphericneutrality, also shows that the Vargas government,far frompassively allowing itself to be victimizedby the great powers, made shrewd use of the rivalrybetween the two blocs. Indeed, its policyduring that period continuedto be studiouslyambiguous. While systematicallyproclaiming his devotion to Pan Americanideals, Var- gas courted Axis goodwill in a number of ways. In November 1939, he wired congratulationsto Hitler forhaving escaped unhurtfrom an assassinationattempt, and monthslater he agreed to assume protection of Italian interestsin Allied countrieswhen Mussolinijoined Hitler in the war.'9 His famousspeech of June 10, 1940, reflectedhis commit- ment to opportunism and even deception. Praised by the Axis press and saluted by il Duce in a privatetelegram, Vargas, to counter the alarm produced in the United States by his apparent declaration of solidaritywith the Axis,privately assured the State Departmentof his loyaltyto the hemisphericcause and then days later met secretly with the new German ambassador to insistanew on his sympathyfor the Axis.20 Until the Battle of Britain,Vargas negotiatedsimultaneously with

towardAranha. GermanForeign Ministry to Ritter,May 30, 1938, RGFM, 3092: 6966/519410-411. 17. New YorkTimes, Mar. 22, 1938; WashingtonPost, Mar. 24, 1938; Chicago Daily Tribune,Apr. 2, 1938; Cafferyto State Dept., Mar. 28, 1938, DS, 832.00/ 1183. 18. Hilton,"Military Influence," p. 84. 19. MRE to Brazilianambassador (Berlin), Nov. 10, 1939,AHI; MRE, 0 Bra- sil e a SegundaGuerra Mundial, 2 vols. (Rio, 1943), I, 95-96. 20. Italian ambassadorto Vargas,n.d. [June13-14, 1940], GV; BerlinerBdr- sen-Zeitung,June 12, 1940; Der Angriff(Berlin), June14, 1940; unsignedmemo, June17, 1940, OA; Cafferyto State Dept., June12, 1940, FRUS, 1940, 5 vols. (Washington,D.C., 1959-1961), V, 618; Hull, memo,June 13, 1940, Manuscript Division,Library of Congress,Cordell Hull Papers, folder 192, container57; AmbassadorKurt Priifer (Rio) to GermanForeign Ministry, June 21, 1940, DGFP, IX, 659.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO "AXIS" 209 both Berlinand Washingtonfor assistance in establishinga major steel complexand, as Brazilian recordsdemonstrate, he and his counselors were well aware that German interestin the project was their major trumpcard and they judiciously displayed it to pressure the Ameri- cans.21 While holding politico-commercialtalks himselfwith t-heGer- man embassy,Vargas pushed similar negotiationswith Washington, making certain that American authoritieswere reminded of German offers.22During the period of neutrality,furthermore, Rio de Janeiro refusedto cooperate, or did so only in piecemeal fashion,in Wash- ington'shemispheric defense program"because of Americaninability to supplyBrazil witharms"23-in other words, without a quo therewas no quid as far as the calculatingBrazilian bargainerswere concerned. Vargas also demonstratedhis independenceby resistingAmerican pressure to eliminateAxis influencefrom air transportationin Brazil, tak- ing effectivesteps to do so only afterthe hemispherewas at war.24 He systematicallyrefused, moreover, to make a state visit to Washington despiterepeated American entreaties.25 The head of the Brazilian army'ssecret service noted aptly in Sep- tember1939 thatthe Germanscould have littlereason to oppose Vargas since Brazil's "foreignpolicy correspondsto their desires." This fact was amplyappreciated in Axis circles,and theirfirm conviction during 1940-1941 that Vargas was in theircamp should be consideredwhen judging the characterof Brazilian diplomacy. "We have every reason to supporthiis regime," the new German ambassador concluded early in 1940,and Berlin'sItalian allies agreed. "The Axis regardsBrazil as a futureally and [major] base of supportin all SouthAmerica ... ," wrote a Brazilianofficial in Rome laterthat year. In October,on the tenthan- niversaryof the Revolutionof 1930, the only heads of state who sent congratulationsto Vargas were Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Emperor Hirohitoof Japan,and the leaders of two Axis-controlledEastern Eu- ropean countries.By mid-1941,Wilhelmstrasse analysts were labeling the Vargas regime"the bulwark against the inclusionof South Amer-

21. Vargas to AmbassadorCarlos MartinsPereira de Souza (Washington), Dec. 1, 1940; Martinsto Vargas,Mar. 1, July2, 1940,GV. 22. Priuferto GermanForeign Ministry, June 21, 1940,DGFP, IX, 659; Aranha to Martins,Aug. 5, 1940,AHI, 408/3/16. 23. McCann,Alliance, p. 208. 24. Ibid.,pp. 216-221. 25. Rooseveltto Vargas,Jan. 4, 1941, FranklinD. RooseveltLibrary (Hyde Park), FranklinD. RooseveltPapers (hereaftercited as FDR), President'sPer- sonal File 4473 (hereaftercited as PPF); Alzira Vargas do AmaralPeixoto (for Vargas) to (Sra.) Martins,Jan. 29, 1941; (Sra.) Martinsto Vargas,Feb. 17, 1941, GV.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 210 IIAHR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON ica in Roosevelt's anti-Germanpolicy." Vargas carefullyencouraged this belief,having confidentialemissaries such as his brotherperiod- ically reassurethe German embassyas the schismbetween Berlin and Washingtonwidened in the lattermonths of 1941.26 Afterthe Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Vargas, despite pleas fromsome cabinet members,27declined to break immediatelywith the Axis and wavered until the Rio Conferencein January1942. During the interveningcritical weeks, he sent his privatesecretary, Luis Ver- gara, repeatedlyto the German embassy with protestationsof good intentionsand distortedaccounts of diplomaticpressure from Wash- ington.28At the conference,Vargas stillresisted American pleas, agree- ing finallyto sever relationswith the Axis only after securing firm guarantees of greaterAmerican militaryassistance.29 Even afterthe break with Berlin,however, Nazi authoritiescontinued to believe that Vargas was sympatheticto their cause and would resist American policyas long as possible.30 Vargas,in fact,despite obvious constraints,continued to maintaina relativelyindependent attitude vis-a-vis Washington. In mid-1942,for example,he abruptlysuspended shippingto the United States at a time when it "needed everyvessel it could get"because he thoughtAmerican naval protectionof Brazilian ships was inadequate.3' His government also persistedin its extremelycautious approachto hemispheredefense. "It becomes increasinglyapparent," Chief of Staff George Marshall complained in May 1942, "that the Brazilians are not seriouslyco- operatingwith us to secure thatvital [Northeastern]area, sea and air, against Axis aggression."Even afterBrazil's entryinto the war in Au- gust 1942, Brazilian cooperationremained somewhat halfhearted. The State Departmentin April 1943 lamentedthat Brazil's recordin meeting its shippingcommitments had been "verydisappointing," while the Americancommander of the South AtlanticForce, in a candid note to

26. [Major HenriqueHoll], Boletimde Informag6es,no. 11, n.d. [Sept.-Oct. 1939], PR, 33.470; Priiferto GermanForeign Ministry,Jan. 3, 1940, RGFM, 1302:2281/480376;Luis Sparanoto Vargas,Rome, Sept. 26, 1940, GV; MRE to Brazilianembassy (Berlin), Nov. 16, 1940; GermanForeign Ministry memo, June 10, 1941, DGFP, XII, 994; Priiferto GermanForeign Ministry, Nov. 29, 1941, DGFP, XIII, 895. 27. ActingMinister of JusticeVasco Leitao da Cunha to Vargas,Dec. 8, 1941, GV. 28. Hilton,Su&stica sobre o Brasil: Historiada EspionagemAlema no Brasil, 1939-1944 (Rio, 1977), p. 219. 29. McCann,Alliance, pp. 253-258. 30. Louis P. Lochner,ed. and trans.,The GoebbelsDiaries (New York,1948), p. 145. 31. McCann,Alliance, p. 266.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO "AXIS" 211 Vargas, underscoredthe "apparent slackening"in Brazil's militaryef- fort.32 A key reason forBrazil's reluctantparticipation in the defensepro- gramdefined by Washingtonwas a basic conflictof strategicinterests. Even before the outbreak of the war in Europe, American-Brazilian discussionshad revealed thatwhereas Washingtonwas concernedwith defense of the Northeasternhump, Rio de Janeirowas preoccupied more with the Argentinethreat than the Axis challenge.33 During 1940 and 1941, the prioritythat Brazilian leaders assigned to southeln defenseslay at the heart of the difficultiesthat Americannegotiators encounteredin joint defense talks.34As Cafferycautioned Washing- ton, the Vargas governmenthad "very little interestin Hemisphere defenseas such,"35and the problem of divergentpriorities remained a seriousone even when Brazil's break with the Axis become definitive. One of the majortasks of General Estevao Leitao de Carvalho as head of Brazil's delegationto the JointBrazil-United States Defense Com- missionwas thereforeto remindhis Americancounterparts that Bra- zil's strategicconcerns included the South as well as the Northeastand to persuade them to help bolsterBrazil's militaryposition on the Ar- gentineborder.36 An importantquestion to ask in assessingthe costs and benefitsof the wartimeBrazilian-American alliance is whetheror not Brazil itself profitedfrom it. With regard to the commercialaspects of that alliance, it should be noted that the collapse of importantEuropean marketsduring 1939-1940 created grave financialproblems for Brazil, as governmentplanners, industrial and business groups,and the press repeatedlybemoaned.37 Export expansion,by opening new markets

32. GeorgeC. Marshallto UnderSecretary of State SumnerWelles, May 10, 1942, DS, 832.20/4031/2;Caffery to Aranha,Apr. 1, 1943, AHI, Embaixada dos EE.UU., Notas Recebidas; AdmiralJonas Ingram to Vargas,Apr. 3, 1943, GV. 33. Ministerof War Eurico Dutra to Vargas,June 21, 1939, Ministerioda Guerra (Rio), Arquivodo Estado Maior do Exercito(hereafter cited as EME); LourivalCoutinho, 0 GeneralGoes Depoe (Rio, 1956), pp. 360-361. 34. GeneralPedro Goes Monteiroto Dutra,Aug. 6, 1941, EME. 35. Cafferyto State Dept., Sept. 24, 1941, DS, 810.20, Defense/1542. 36. Goes Monteiroto Gen. Estevao Leitao de Carvalho,Aug. 4, 1942; Vargas to Carvalho,Oct. 23, 1942; Goes Monteiroto Dutra, Dec. 4, 1942; Carvalhoto Aranha,Dec. 23, 1942, InstitutoHistorico e GeograficoBrasileiro (Rio), Estevao Leitao de CarvalhoPapers (hereaftercited as ELC). Carvalhorecounts his ex- periencesin A Servi9odo Brasilna Segunda GuerraMundial (Rio, 1952). 37. RobertoSimonsen et al. to Vargas,Apr. 26, 1940, PR, 9.374; "Mercados Interditos,"Correio da Manha (Rio), May 9, 1940; Souza Costa, statements, Didriode Noticias(Rio), May 22, 1940; Assis Chateaubriand,"Uma Calamidade Nacional,0 Jornal(Rio), June7, 1940; ArturTorres Filho, memo, July 26, 1940, ConselhoFederal de ComercioExterior, Anais (typewritten),Julho-Agosto 1940,

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 212 HAR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON or developingnew products,became thereforean urgentnational goal. In fact,shortly after the outbreakof hostilitiesin Europe, the Federal ForeignTrade Council, foreseeingthe "inevitableills" that the conflict would bring,had recommended,and Vargas had approved,a program forstimulating the productionof itemsfor which the war would create a ready demand.38 American mobilizationwas a godsend and Bra- zilian analystshailed for financialreasons the opportunityto develop or increaseexports of strategicmaterials to the United States.39On the otherhand, as Brazilian authoritiessubsequently competed with other allies to benefitfrom American industrialconversion, they fully ex- ploitedthe advantagesthat geographical accident gave them,frequent- ly utilizing"military necessity" as a pretextto claim equipment and industrialraw materialsthat were not, in fact, destined for the defense program-a fact that rankled harriedAmerican officials.40 Afterobtaining satisfactory guarantees of nationalsovereignty, Bra- zilian leaders regarded as a definiteboon the bases that the United States built in the Northeastat its expense. Americanactivities in that region should prove to be of "incalculable" value to Brazil, Aranha exulted in a message to Vargas in 1942. The airfieldsthemselves, he predicted,would play a "decisiverole" in Brazil'sfuture development.4 The dispatchof the famousBrazilian ExpeditionaryForce (FEB) was, of course,a calculated move to enhance Brazil's prestigeand bargaining positionin postwar councils,and Brazilian policymakersalso saw it as a means of pryingfurther shipments of war materielout of Amer- ican arsensals.42Indeed, Brazilian records reveal that the major ini- tial impulsefor the FEB was the fear thatthe Allied invasionof North Africahad so reduced the Axis threatto the Northeastthat Washing-

ArquivoNacional, Arquivo do ConselhoFederal de ComercioExterior (hereafter citedas CFCE), lata 152. 38. ConselhoFederal de ComercioExterior, minutes, Sept. 18, 1939, CFCE, lata 150. For the wartimeeffort to forcemarkets in neighboringcountries, see Hilton,"Vargas and BrazilianEconomic Development, 1930-1945: A Reappraisal of His Attitudetoward Industrialization and Planning,"Journal of EconomicHis- tory,35 (Dec. 1975), 773-776. An expandedversion of this articleappears as chapter3 ofHilton, Crise Internacional. 39. See, for example,"A Borrachana Economia Brasileira,"Diario Carioca (Rio), June 11, 1940; "Agir sem demora,"Dia'rio de Noticias,June 30, 1940; TorresFilho, memo,Aug. 3, 1940, CFCE, processo1.060, lata 81. 40. StandingLiaison Committee,minutes, Aug. 6, 1943, National Archives, RecordGroup 353; Lawrence Duggan to Edward Stettinius,Jr., Dec. 15, 1943, DS, Officeof AmelicanRepublics Affairs, Memoranda on Brazil (hereaftercited as OARA: Brazil),vol. 7, box 27. 41. Aranhato Vargas,Nov. 9, 1942, ArquivoNacional, Pedro Salgado Filho Papers. SalgadoFilho was theAir Minister. 42. McCann,Alliance, pp. 344-345.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEMO "AXIS" 213 ton would lose interestin armingBrazil if that latter could not offer the United States a greaterdividend on its investment.43 Approachingthe questionfrom the Americanside of the diplomatic equation, it is importantto note firstthat the consistencyand unityof goals implicitin the dominationthesis did not exist withinthe Amer- ican policymakingapparatus. That thesis overlooks,in other words, the well-knownconfusion and conflictsof interest,perceptions, goals, and authoritythat prevailed in the United States during the period, producing cleavages among and within the organizations,agencies, and departmentsthat vied for scarce resourcesand for influenceon foreignpolicy.44 The Treasury and State Departments,to mention a well-knowncontest, fought a runningbattle forpolicy initiativedur- ing the Rooseveltyears.45 There were also recurrentdisagreements between civilian and militaryplanners-and, indeed, among the latter themselves-over questionsof nationalpolicy. With specificregard to policy towardBrazil duringthe grimyears 1940-1943,the conflictsbe- tween the Armyand Navy on the one hand, and the Armyand State Departmenton the other,have been carefullydocumented.46 Within the State Departmentitself there were deep schismsand crosscurrents, such as thatbetween Secretaryof State Cordell Hull and Under Secre- tarySumner Welles, that stemmednot only frompersonality but from policy divergencesas well.47 Foreign observerswere struckby this competitiveconfusion prevailing in American policymakingcircles. Joao AlbertoLins de Barros,Vargas' wartimeCoordinator of Economic

43. Carvalhoto Vargas,Nov. 27, 1942; Carvalhoto Aranha,Dec. 23, 1942; Vargas to Carvalho,Mar. 29, 1943; Carvalho,Relatorio dos Trabalhosda Dele- gagaodo Brasil'a ComissaoMista, June 1943; Carvalhoto Dutra,Jan. 8, 1944,ELC. 44. For an insightfulanalysis of Americanpolicy towardArgentina during those years that takes into accountthis bureaucraticcompetition, see Ernest R. May, "The 'BureaucraticPolitics' Approach: U.S.-ArgentineRelations, 1942- 1947" in JulioCotler and RichardR. Fagen, eds., Latin Americaand the United States: The ChangingPolitical Realities (Stanford, 1974), pp. 129-163. 45. Accordingto Hull, Secretaryof the TreasuryHenry Morgenthau, Jr. "often acted as if he were clothedwith authorityto projecthimself into the field of foreignaffairs and inaugurateefforts to shape the courseof foreignpolicy. Hull, Memoirs,2 vols. (London, 1948), I, 207. Morgenthauwas particularlyanx- ious about Axis influencein South Americaand placed greatimportance on im- provingrelations with Brazil, frequentlyconducting negotiations with Brazilian agents. JohnM. Blum, From the MorgenthauDiaries, 3 vols. (Boston, 1959- 1967), I, 523-526, II, 50-58; Hilton,Great Powers, pp. 155, 164, 193-198, 201- 204, 206. 46. StetsonConn and ByronFairchild, The Frameworkof HemisphereDe- fense (Washington,D.C., 1960), pp. 285, 287-288, 291, 298-299. 47. JuliusW. Pratt,Cordell Hull, 1933-1944, 2 vols. (New York,1964), I, 13-31; Pratt,"The Ordeal of Cordell Hull," Review of Politics,28 (Jan. 1966), 76-98; Hull,Memoirs, II, 1229-1230.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 214 IAM I MAY I STANLEY E. HITON Mobilization,visited the United States in 1942 and reportedalmost in despairthat the "multiplicityof organs"involved in foreignaffairs were like "hermeticcompartments, each one strugglingto assertits suprem- acy" in policyformulation.48 The specificsof Americanbehavior toward Brazil would also seem to weaken the thesis that the United States was seeking to dominate Brazil duringthe Roosevelt-Vargasera. With regardto the argument that the trade policy of the Roosevelt administrationin the 1930s was aimed at drivingGermany out of the Brazilian marketand establish- ing "economicand political hegemony"over Brazil, certainsalient aspects of German-Americanrivalry should be emphasized. The United States ran an average annual deficitof approximately$55 million in trade with Brazil duringthe 1931-1938period, yet Americanexporters were forcedto wait indeterminateperiods forpayment of goods they sold to Brazil, an anomaly that Brazilian observersrecognized.49 At the same time,Brazil was expandingtrade with the Third Reich on a basis that violated Rio de Janeiro'streaty with Washington,a fact also privatelyadmitted by Brazilian officials. The question to ask, then,is how was it possible for the Vargas governmentto maneuver with such strikingsuccess vis-a-visthe United States if the latter,a greatpower, was determinedto dominateBrazil, a veryweak power. The answer is that Washingtondid not aspire to the economic conquest or politicalcontrol of South America,and Brazilian policymakers were well aware of thatfact. Indeed, Brazilian officialsin the mid-1930swere deeply impressed by the cordialityand spiritof fraternitythat American authorities, from Roosevelt on down, displayed in financial and commercial discussions.50In appraisingAmerican commercial diplomacy, moreover, Bra-

48. Joao Alberto Lins de Barros to Vargas, Dec. 25, 1942, GV. "Inconsistency and lack of coordination appeared . . . to be the chief defects of American meth- ods," a BritishForeign Office analyst commented aftera trip to Washington in 1944. "Small wonder, then, that the State Department find it difficult. . . and in the long run impossible to committhemselves to any consistentpolicy . R. A. Gal- lop, memo, Mar. 8, 1944, Public Records Office (London), Records of the Foreign Office,hereafter cited as FO), doc. AS 1538/901/51. 49. See, for example, Diario Carioca, Apr. 15, 1933; Diario de Nottcias, May 20, 1933. During trade discussions with Washington in 1934, Brazilian negotiators admitted among thenmselvesthat American interests were right in regarding as "absurd" Brazil's treatmentof American exporters. The United States could well impose a bilateral payments agreement,confessed the foreignminister at one point, since it wo-uLldmean "only that we are going to pay wvhatwe should pay." Conselho Federal de Comercio Exterior, memo, Aug. 10, 1934, CFCE, processo 979, lata 70; Macedo Soares to Aranha, Nov. 23, 1934, OA. 50. See, for example, Ambassador J. F. de Assis Brasil, memo, June 9, 1933,

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO "AXIS" 215 zilian analystsmade special note of Washington'scurious refusal to seek special privilegein trade with theircountry.51 Roosevelt, in fact, in 1933 instructedthe State Departmentnot to interfereon behalf of privateinterests with financial grievances against the Brazilian government. And in 1934, when Brazilian authoritiesthemselves officially proposed a clearingagreement that would have enabled Americanex- portersto "offerprices and conditionsmore advantageous than their competitors"could in the Brazilian market,52Washington, despite heavy pressure fromirate creditorsand exporters,rejected the proposal as unfairto Brazil and contraryto commercialliberalism.53 In ensuingyears a policy of moral suasion and appeals to reason, as de- finedby the State Department,rather than the aggressiveuse of Amer- ican economic strengthto secure commercialadvantage, became firm- ly entrenchedas the approach of the Rooseveltadministration to trade relationswith Brazil. This fact bewildered Britishcompetitors54 and led policymakersin Rio de Janeiroto the correctconclusion that Cor- dell Hull and his associatescould be satisfiedwith the rhetoricof good- neighborlinessand would not employ sanctionsagainst Brazil for the latter'sde factocommercial alignment with Berlin.55Ambassador Caf- fery,appraising Brazilian conductand intentionsmore realistically than the State Department,argued in May 1938 thatif Washingtonwere to adopt "retaliatorymeasures, envisaging definite economic pressure, Brazil would change her policy overnight,"but he sparkedno response in Washington.56Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau,Jr.,

AHI, mago 7.100; Minister Gilberto Amado (Montevideo) to Vargas, Dec. 27, 1933, AHI, mago 9.399; Boucas to Vargas, Mar. 7, 1934, Aranha to Vargas, Nov. 2, 1934, OA. 51. Consul Sebastiao Sampaio (New York) to MRE, Apr. 15, 1933; J. E. do Nascimento e Silva, memo, Apr. 25, 1933; AHI, mago 7.100. 52. Marcos de Souza Dantas and Aranha, memo, July 1934, DS, 810.5151, Williams Mission/44; Hilton, Great Powers, p. 51. 53. "By forcing Brazil to divert some exchange [to pay debts to Americans] it would mean forcing that Government to disturb its plans for rationing its exchange in such a way as to best serve the interestsof the country,"Feis explained to other officials. Feis, memo, Sept. 14, 1934, DS, 832.5151/430. 54. Hilton, Great Powers, pp. 50-51, 132-139 documents the British attitude. 55. Hull systematicallydeclined to protest Brazil's compensation trade with Germany in 1935 and went out of his way in 1936 to reassure the Vargas government aftererroneous reports that Washington was contemplatingreprisals. Aranha's declaration in mid-1937 that Brazil would be "very pleased if all countries treated Brazil on the same friendlyterms the United States has . . . for many years, and now more than ever" was thus not merely a public relations gesture. 0 Jornal, July 21, 1937. For a detailed discussion of Washington's "soft line" toward Bra- zil with regard to the German trade issue, see Hilton, Great Powers, passim. 56. Cafferyto State Dept., May 6, 1938, FRUS, 1938, V, 346-347. "I do not see the slightest chance of expecting any pressure," one of Caffery's aides wrote

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 216 HAHR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON thinkingprimarily of Brazil, recommendedin June that the United States utilize its financial resourcesto help Latin American govern- mentsresist Axis overtures. But even this proposal was turned down because the White House and State Department,in Roosevelt'swords, fearedthat "it would be greatlymisunderstood down thereand be re- gardedas a resumptionof dollardiplomacy."57 As authoritiesin Washingtoncontemplated what seemed to be an increasinglyaggressive Axis challenge in South America in ensuing months,they debated various policy alternatives,but the use of force was not one of them. While the United States logicallywould not regard with"equanimity" any effortby European countriesto "colonize" South America,Secretary of CommerceDaniel Roper privatelywrote, the era of the marineshad passed and Washingtonhad to treat "the South Americannations as freeand equal and . . . associate with them on that basis." Following Munich, Morgenthau again pressed Roo- seveltto allow him to devise a programof economicassistance to Latin America. "Our neighborsto the South are sorelyin need of capital and commerceto enable them to develop theirresources free from foreign intervention,"he admonished the President. "Unless we assist them they will become a helpless field for political and economic exploita- tionby the aggressornations."58 Roosevelt now authorizedhim to open talks with Brazilian authorities,but the only concrete aid extended priorto August1940 was a $20 millionloan, scornedby Morgenthauas ICmerepin money,"to permitBrazil to clear up commercialarrears.59 Resisting strong criticismand pressure from angry bondholders and exporters,the Roosevelt administrationthus steadfastlyrefused throughoutthe 1930s to attemptto coerce Brazil into adopting a par- ticularline of commercialaction. The record also reveals no irregular effortsby Americanauthorities to interferewith Brazilian politicsdur- ing that period. When leftistand ultraliberalgroups in the United States endeavored to mobilize opinion against the Vargas government forthe wave of repressionthat followed the abortiveRed uprisingof November 1935, Roosevelt assured Aranha that he regarded the mat- ter as Brazil's affairand would pay no heed to the clamor for official pessimisticallyfrom Washington. Robert Scotten to Caffery,June 9, 1938, Uni- versityof SouthwesternLouisiana (Lafayette),Southwestern Archive and Manu- scriptsCollection, Jefferson Caffery Papers. 57. Morgenthauto Roosevelt,June 7, 1938; Rooseveltto Morgenthau,June 10, 1938, RooseveltLibrary, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Papers, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 168. 58. Daniel Roperto Hull, Nov. 12, 1938, Hull Papers,folder 95, container40. 59. Hilton,Great Powers, pp. 194-206.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO 'AXIS" 217 intervention.60The launching of the Estado Novo late in 1937 was widely attacked by the responsibleAmerican press and certainlythe administrationwas dismayed by what seemed to be a blow to demo- cractic government;but the immediate officialresponse, articulated by Under SecretaryWelles, was to label the episode "purelya domestic and internalmatter." On December 6, Welles went so far as to pub- liclycriticize the Americanpress fornot havingreacted with"tolerance and with friendlysympathy" to the political crisis in Brazil, a stand that Aranha privatelyhailed as an act "of great courage, given the atmospherethat exists here [against Brazil]." As Aranha indicated, Welles had spoken for the administration,"which decided, against its normalprocedure, to challenge [public] opinion and the press in our case."6' Even withregard to an issue of greatsignificance to Washing- ton-that of Nazi activitiesin Brazil-the State Departmentdeclined an opportunityto influenceBrazilian policy. Asked by Aranhain 1938 for counsel regardingways to curb such activities,Caffery demurred and the State Departmentapproved his caution. "This would seem to be a question to be determinedsolely by the Brazilian authorities," Welles wrote.62 In the militarysphere Americanpolicy toward Brazil in the 1930s was similarlyunaggressive. One of the major goals of Brazilian policy was immediatemilitary preparedness, which meant primarilythe ac- quisition of armamentsand ships abroad. A unique opportunitywas thus created for a potentialsupplier to extend greatlyits influencein Brazil. What was Washington'sresponse to thatopportunity? Through- out the decade, the firmpolicy of the Americangovernment was to discourage the sale of armsto foreigncountries, particularly Latin Amer- ican states,since they faced severe economic problems and typically had difficultymeeting their financialobligations. The State Depart- mentspecifically argued thatpoint in 1933-1934in discouragingAmer- ican sbipbuildersfrom participatingin Brazil's naval program at a time when European diplomatic agencies were "cooperatingopenly" with firms from their countries who were seeking Brazilian contracts.63The White House laterwas inclinedto give Brazil some naval

60. Aranhato Vargas,Apr. 1936, OA. 61. State Dept., press conference,Nov. 11, 1937, DS 832.00/1081; Welles, speech,New YorkTimes, Dec. 7, 1937; Aranhato Vargas,Dec. 7, 1937, GV. 62. Cafferyto State Dept., Mar. 18, 1938; Welles to Caffery,Mar. 21, 1938, DS, 832.00/1178. 63. State Dept. memo, Dec. 6, 1933, DS, 832.34/236; State Dept. memo, Mar. 12, 1934, DS, 832.34/239;U.S. Embassy(Rio) to StateDept., June11, 1934, DS, 832.34/246;State Dept. memo,Aug. 15, 1934, DS, 832.34/249.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 218 HAMR IMAY I STANLEY E. HILTON assistance,and firstthought of selling decommissionedcruisers, but the Navy blocked the transactionin 1936. Rooseveltand the State De- partmentthen promoted a plan to lease overaged destroyersto Bra- zil, but abandoned it the followingyear in the face of strongobjections fromArgentina.64 As a result, Brazil turned to European suppliers placing orders with Italy for submarinesand with Great Britain for destroyers.Nazi Germanywas especially successfulin expanding its influence in Brazil by supplying armamentsthrough compensation trade. It was the desire to protectthese commercial-militaryrelations thatled Rio de Janeiroand Berlinto settleamicably their political clash of 1938, and during 1939-1940 the Brazilian high command exerted strongpressure on civilianleaders to guaranteethe supply of armsun- der the Krupp contracts.65 The State Department watched with dismay the increase in the "political and commercialprestige of our European rivals" as a result of arms sales, but argued curiouslythat providingarms to Brazil and other Latin American countries"would probably in the end weaken ratherthan strengthenour prestigethroughout the hemisphere."The Armyin May 1938 drew a more logical conclusionand suggestedthat the governmentpromote private sales of arms to Latin America,but the State Departmentsuccessfully opposed the idea. It was not until 1939 that the administrationrequested Congressto authorizethe sale of surplusmilitary equipment to Latin America,and Congress would not pass the necessaryresolution until the Wehrmachthad conquered France.66 The generalpattern of officialrelations between the two countries duringthe war period was one in which Washington,eager to secure Brazil'scooperation in hemisphericdefense, cultivated the latter'sgood- will witha varietyof services,demonstrating all the while a scrupulous regard for Brazilian sovereignty.In the economic sphere,Roosevelt's cabinet agreed in mid-1940 that, in order to strengthenhemisphere defense,economic assistanceshould be extended to South America to cushion the region against the financialdislocation of war and to de-

64. Welles to Aranha,May 27, 1936, GV. On the destroyers'episode, see BryceWood, "ExternalRestraints on the Good NeighborPolicy," Inter-American EconomicAffairs, 16 (Fall 1962), 3-24. Rejectinga subsequentappeal forarms by Brazil,a StateDepartment official ilnformed the Brazilianambassador that "the officersof thisGovernment abroad had standinginstructions not to engage in the promotionof the sale of militaryequipment." State Dept. memo,Sept. 16, 1938, OARA: Brazil. 65. Hilton,"Militaiy Influence," pp. 89-90. 66. Welles to Missionsin Latin America,Dec. 17, 1937, DS, 810.24/11;Conn and Fairchild,Hemisphere Defense, pp. 208-209.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO "AXIS" 219 velop "new industriesand production."67Brazil became a major tar- get of this new policy. When State Departmentadviser Herbert Feis wrotethat it was unnecessaryto "say how firmwe considerour friend- ship with Brazil and how steady is our desire to cooperate with it," he was not only using the diplomatic tone that characterizedAmerican overturesto Brazil,but was also reflectingAmerican objectives. It was because of officialAmerican intervention that the Vargas government was able to begin work on a national steel industrythat year, a fact that led a genuinelygrateful Aranha to assure Sumner Welles, after signatureof the firstVolta Redonda loan contractin September1940, "I will not forgethow much we owe you and the State Departmentfor thathappy result."68Washington subsequently made new loans, facil- itated the transferof technology,and respondedfavorably to Brazilian requestsby givingthe steel project a top-priorityclassification in 1941 forthe purpose of obtainingexport licenses for equipment. Two years later Washingtongranted Volta Redonda the same priorityas new Americansteel plants.69 Brazilian officialsfound that American authoritiesdisplayed "the best of good will" in handlingBrazilialn requests for industrial raw ma- terialsand equipment,70and what difficultiesthey did encounterwere caused, theyrealized, by wartimecircumstances beyond Washington's control.71Aside from the steel complex, Brazilian negotiatorsdis- covered that otherprojects considered important for Brazil's military- industlial development,such as a national engine factory,also met witha receptiveatmosphere in Washington.Exulting over the factthat the factoryhad received a priorityclassification equal to that of government-ownedplants in the United States,a Brazilian officerlabeled Washington'sgesture "an excellentdemonstration of efficientfriendly cooperation in Brazil's industrial development" and proudly reported to Rio de Janeirothat as a resultBrazil found itself"in a priv-

67. Secretaries of State, Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce to Roosevelt, June 20, 1940, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 274. 68. Feis to Souza Costa, July 13, 1940, Library of Congress, Manuscript Divi- sion, Herbert Feis Papers, container 26; Aranha to Welles, Oct. 15, 1940, OA. 69. Aranha (MRE) to Martins, Jan. 9, 1941, AHI; Martins to Amaral Peixoto (for Vargas), Jan. 16, 1941, Martins to Vargas, June 14, 1941, GV; Caffely to Aranha, Feb. 8, 1943, AHI, Embaixada dos EE.UU., Notas. 70. Col. Edmundo Macedo Soares e Silva to Vargas, May 26, 1941, GV. Cf. Martinsto Vargas, Dec. 16, 1941, GV. 71. Martins to Simonsen, June 30, 1941, Instituto Historico e Geografico Bra- sileiro (Rio), Jose Carlos de Macedo Soares Papers; Commercial Attache Walder Sarmanho (Washington) to Vargas, Sept. 6, 1941, PR, 31.956; Martins to MRE, Oct. 10, 1941, AHI; Conselho Federal de Comercio Exterior, minutes, May 11, 1942, PR, 15.723.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 220 HAIR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON ileged position and one very prestigiousfor us" vis-a-visother countries in the competitionfor American assistance. "We have only reasonsto believe that the 'Vargas programfor industrialization of the country'will continueto be executed with increasingAmerican aid," Aranhanoted privately in 1943.72 AuthoritativeBrazilian perceptionof Washington'sresponse to the crucial coffeequestion was overwhelminglypositive. To help prevent severe financialdislocation in Brazil and otherLatin Americancoffee- producingcountries from the closing of European markets,American expertsmade in 1940 what the Brazilian financial attach6 called "a complete,exhaustive and perfectlyimpartial" study of the matterand and worked out a special conventionthat guaranteed to those coun- triesa share of the Americanmarket at reasonableprices. The director of Brazil's National CoffeeDepartment later remarked to Finance Min- ister Artur Souza Costa that with the conventionWashington had erected"a rare monumentof great political wisdom." When a coffee- exportingfirm inquired early in 1942 about the possibilityof securing higherprices for shipments to the United States,the director'sresponse was incredulous. "It seems to us, fromall standpoints,impossible to seek a greaterprice for coffee,"he informedSouza Costa, "since the one that we obtained is a resultexclusively of the magnanimityof the Governmentof the United States ...73 In the area of Americanmilitary policy toward Brazil after1939, it is significantthat, although the Armyand Navy agreed monthsbefore the outbreakof war in Europe thatthe establishmentof militarybases in NortheastBrazil was vital to American national security,"nearly threeyears of delicate and involvedpolitical and militarynegotiations" would be necessaryto persuade Rio de Janeiroto allow the stationing of Americantroops in that region.74The diplomaticand militaryrec- ords of both countriesshow that those negotiationswere sensitiveand protractedin large part because Washingtonwas anxious to avoid of- fending Brazilian national sensibilitiesand, consequently,it moved only as fast as the Vargas governmentpermitted. "Since we are ob- viously not in a positionto use force,in pursuitof our policy in the south Americas,"General Dwight Eisenhower once aptly remarked, "we must depend upon wheedling." Reflectingon the staffdiscus-

72. Col. AntonioG. Muniz (New York) to Aranha,Sept. 19, 1941, PR, 27.583; Aranhato Dutra,Aug. 11, 1943,OA. 73. Eurico Penteadoto Aranha,Nov. 29, 1940, OA; Director,Departamento Nacional do Cafe to Souza Costa, Sept. 8, 1942, PR, 20.792, June23, 1942, PR, 5.845. 74. Connand Fairchild,Hemisphere Defense, p. 13.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO 'AXIS 221 sions of 1940-1941,ardent nationalist Pedro G6es Monteiro,then chief of staff,recalled that"happily, the Amelican officerswere veryunder- standing and sensible, strictlyaccepting the viewpointsof the [Bra- zilian] GeneralStaff."75 It should also be noted that the major bone of contentionin those negotiationswas not Americanencroachments on Brazilian sovereignty, but Washington'sinability to supply the arms that Brazil wanted. Americanpolicymakers agonized over the question, recognizingthat, as the Chief of Naval Operations put it, Brazil's importanceto the United States was "perfectlyenormous," but they could do little during 1940-1941 except express goodwill and franklyexplain to Rio de Janeirothe immensedifficulties that Washingtonfaced.76 Following Pearl Harbor,however, American military aid to Brazil would be con- siderable and, in comparisonwith assistancegiven to otherhemisphere countries,it would be both massive and preferential.77 The course of negotiationsabout specific items of militaryas- sistancewas markedon the Americanside by an obvious desire to bol- ster the Vargas regime politicallyand diplomatically,a fact that, according to Brazilian observers,elicited numerous complaints from Spanish Americangovernments.78 Over strenuousobjections from the Navy, Roosevelt,for example, ordered naval unitsturned over to Bra- zil in 1942 because, he said, "this is a matterof internationalrelations which has to be gone throughwith regardlessof the purely military desirabilities."In the critical military-economicmatter of petroleum supplies,Washington in mid-1942included Brazil in the same category as Great Britain,and followingBrazil's entryinto the war in August it agreed to meet all the petroleumrequirements of the Brazilian armed forces. This represented"absolutely exceptional treatment" of Brazil, an ebullient Brazilian general exclaimed.79 In ensuing months Bra- zilian authorities repeatedly commented among themselves about

75. DwightD. Eisenhowerto Gen. GeorgeStrong, May 16, 1942, The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: The War Years (Baltimore,1970), vol. 1, p. 306; Coutinho,General Go'es, p. 378. 76. StandingLiaison Committee,minutes, Jan. 23, 1941, RG, 353. A typically frank,apologetic communication is Marshallto Aranha,Jan. 6, 1941, OA. 77. The value of total Lend-Lease supplies to Brazil reached $366 million, which was approximatelythree-fourths of the total given to Spanish American countries.Conn and Fairchild,Hemisphere Defense, p. 329. 78. Col. Vasco Alves Secco (Washington)to Salgado Filho, Sept. 29, 1943, ArquivoNacional, Salgado Filho Papers. 79. Rooseveltto AdmiralErnest King, Aug. 22, 1942, FDR, PPF: Brazil; Cafferyto Aranha,May 4, Sept. 29, 1942, AHI; Gen. JulioHorta Barbosa (Wash- ington)to Vargas,Sept. 4, 1942,AHI, mago36.730.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 222 HAHR | MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON Americangoodwill and receptivityregarding plans and programsfor bolsteringBrazil's militaryand internationalposition.80 Roosevelt'sstopover in Natal in January1943 to see Vargas following the Casablanca meetingwith Churchill was largely a calculated gesture to enhance Brazilian prestige. In conferencewith Vargas, Rooseveltsurveyed the generalpolitico-military situation, discussed fur- therjoint militaryand economic collaborationbetween Brazil and the United States, and broached postwar problems. "President Vargas was in high good humoron the tripback fromNatal... ," Cafferylater wroteto Roosevelt. "He told Aranha that he was highlypleased with the trip,delighted with his conversationwith you, and had come back with his feeling of confidencein you even strongerthan it was before."81 A strikingexample of the Americanattitude was Washington'ssup- port for the FEB. Not only did the United States governmentequip and transportthe FEB, but it overrode strongBritish objections to Brazil's participationin the ground fightingin Europe. London had never shared Washington'senthusiasm for Brazil,82and relationsbetween Great Britainand Brazil in the early stages of the war had been far fromcordial. When the Britishseized a Brazilian ship carrying a consignmentof Krupp armamentsin 1940, a major crisis in those relationswas averted only by energeticintervention by the State De- partmentand Chief of StaffMarshall, who persuaded the Britishto release the ship.83 Washingtonalso pressed London in 1941 to allow Brazil to send militaryobservers to the Middle East; a reluctantForeign Office then asked the War Office to cooperate, emphasizingthat it made the request only because Washingtonhad "repeatedlymade it clear thatthey attach great importance for both political and economic reasons to Brazil and to the improvementof Anglo-Brazilian relations. ."84 Later in the war London stronglydisapproved of the idea

80. See, forexample, the letters to Vargasfrom Dutra, Sept. 2, 1943; Martins, Jan.18, 1944; Naval AttacheJoao P. Machado (Washington),Nov. 17, 1944, GV. 81. Cafferyto State Dept., Jan.30, 1943, FRUS, 1943, 6 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1964-1965), V, 655-656; Cafferyto Roosevelt,Feb. 9, 1943, FDR, PPF: Brazil. 82. The Board of Trade candidlyacknowledged early in the war thatBrazil was "near the bottomof the list" of countriesof politicalsignificance to Great Britain.Board of Trade to ForeignOffice, Dec. 18, 1939, FO, A8930/539/6. 83. McCann, Alliance,pp. 209-211; Conn and Fairchild,Hemisphere De- fense,p. 271. Marshallurged at one point "thatwhatever pressure we have be broughtto bear on the British."Treasury Dept. memo,Dec. 3, 1940, Morgenthau Diaries,vol. 335. 84. ForeignOffice to War Office,Oct. 4, 1941, FO, A7922/190/6.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO "AXIS" 223 of Brazil's involvementin the European theaterof war, and even after bowing to Americanpressure, Churchill endeavored to minimizeBra- zils futurerole.85 The State Department,however, believed that "im- portantpolitical stakes" were involved,"such as the strengtheningof the Brazilian voice in the postwar settlements,"and it also feared that rejectionof the FEB "mightseriously weaken PresidentVargas' position." Under Secretaryof State Edward Stettinius,Jr., cautioned by Hull that"the delay in carryingout the plan is embarrassingPresident Vargas and threatenshis prestige,"proceeded to admonishBritish leaders about "thepolitical importance [of the FEB] both withinBrazil and fromthe standpointof her prestigeas an ally,"and only then did they abandon theirresistance to the undertaking.86 American planning for postwar militaryassistance to Brazil was designed to transformthat countryinto an effectivemilitary-diplomatic partnerand to assist it "in becomingself-sufficient in a military sense, ratherthan having continuinghelp."87 joint discussionsof the matterwith Brazilian staffofficers began in 1944 and were entirely consistentwith the simultaneoussupport that Washingtonwas giving to the FEB. Brazilian planners,moreover, went along wholeheartedly withthe idea of the closestpossible militarycollaboration between the two countriesafter the war.88 The capstoneof the dominationthesis, as noted earlier,is allegedly depreciatorytreatment of Brazil by Washingtonin the matterof a seat forthat countryon the United Nations SecurityCouncil.89 According to ProfessorMcCann, the United States not only refused to support Brazil's bid, but even deceived Brazilian leaders about Americanin- tentions. Citing Hull's memoirs,McCann states that the Secretaly of State "claimed" that Washington had supported the idea of a permanentseat for Brazil duringthe Dumbarton Oaks talks in 1944, but

85. Stettiniusto Hull, May 22, 1944, FRUS, 1944, 7 vols. (Washington,D.C., 1965-1967), III, 13. 86. Hull to Stettinius,Apr. 15, 1944, DS, 7400.0011,Stettinius Mission/34D; Stettiniusto Hull,May 22, 1944,FRUS, 1944, III, 14. 87. AmbassadorAdolf Berle (Rio) to StateDept., July26, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 9 vols. (Washington,D.C., 1967-1969), IX, 607. Berle servedas ambassadorto Brazil during1945-1946, replacingCaffery who was transferredin 1944. 88. AdmiralA. R. de Vasconcellosto Vargas,Nov. 1, 1943; AdmiralHenrique Guilhemto Vargas,Mar. 22, 1944; Vargasto G6es Monteiro,Apr. 12, 1944; Var- gas to Roosevelt,Apr. 13, 1944, GV; Dutra, memo,Apr. 17, 1944, EME. 89. One additionalitem in McCann's argument-thesuggestion that Wash- ingtonwas monitoringBrazil's diplomatic correspondence, thus placing that countryat a disadvantagein negotiationswith the Americans-shouldbe clarified.The evidencehe adduces is a copy of a telegramsent by Vargas to Souza Costa on Feb. 14, 1942, while the latter was in Washingtonconducting military and

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 224 HAHR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON thatthe Britishand Russians had opposed it. "If that was indeed the case, argues McCann, "the United States owed Brazil an honest ex- planation,but it was never given." With the disappearanceof Aranha, Welles, Hull, and Roosevelt fromthe diplomaticscene by 1945, Bra- zil's cause in Washingtonwas fatallyweakened. To be sure,"the drive forAmerican domination" of Brazil intensifiedwith the advent of Tru- man. "Washingtonallowed the Brazilian governmentto continue in the expectationthat its efforts[to gain a seat] would be rewarded . . . ," McCann concludes. "Instead of greatness,however, its reward was subservience."90 The record of the Americanresponse to Brazil's desire for representationon the Seculity Council does not supportthat interpretation. Washingtonin fact raised the question of a permanentseat for Bra- zil withthe Russiansand Britishapparently even beforeRio de Janeiro seriouslyput forthits candidacy. At the verybeginning of the Dum- barton Oaks meetingsin August 1944, Hull advised Stettinius,who headed the Americannegotiating team, that"he supportedthe idea of a permanentseat for Brazil."91 Roosevelt also favored the idea, but economicnegotiations, a copy that came into the hands of SumnerWelles and which he forwardedin translationto Roosevelt. "There is no indicationthat it came froma Braziliansource," McCann states (Alliance,p. 266). The Vargas Papersshow, however, that Souza Costa himselfgave themessage to the Americans in orderto bolsterBrazil's bargaininghand. Vargas wanted militaryequipment urgentlyand to prod Washington,he sent Souza Costa on Feb. 9 an ominous reporton alleged Argentinemilitary activity on Brazil's southernborder, autho- rizinghim "to use thisinformation in a strictlysecret manner in orderto expedite delivery[of] our materiel."He renewedthe messageon Feb. 14 and two days laterreceived a wire fromSouza Costa assuringhim that "mywhole effortis di- rectedprecisely toward obtainingactual deliveryof the materielthat we need. I will have anothermeeting with SumnerWelles today and will take the opportunityto transmitthe informationthat you sentby telegramso as to reinforce my argumentabout the urgencyof satisfyingour requests." The message that Welles subsequentlysent to Rooseveltwas a translationof Vargas' telegramof Feb. 14. Vargasto Souza Costa,Feb. 9, 14, 1942, Souza Costa to Vargas,Feb. 16, 1942, GV; Welles to Roosevelt,Feb. 18, 1942, FDR, PPF: Brazil. It shouldbe noted,moreover, that whereas neither the availableAmerican nor Brazilian records indicate that Washingtonmonitored official Brazilian communications,Vargas' personalfiles disclose that Brazilian censors monitored at least the telephonictraf- fic betweenthe State Departmentand the Americanembassy in Rio. Vargasap- parentlyreceived transcripts or resumesof such conversationsas a matterof course whenthey dealt with subjects of politicalsubstance. The censorseven commented on the "tone" of the conversations.See, for example,Censura Telegraficado Brasilto Vargas,Feb. 28, July25, 1944,GV. 90. McCann,Alliance, pp. 341, 458. 91. Extractfrom Stettinius Diary, Aug. 24, 1944, FRUS, 1944, I, 732. "I my- self felt stronglyon this point,believing that Brazil's size, population,and re- sources,along withher prospectof a greatfuture and the outstandingassistance

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIMO AXIS 225 when Stettiniusraised the question,Ambassador Andrei Gromykoand Sir AlexanderCadogan, speaking for the Russian and Britishgovern- ments,expressed on at least three occasions theircandid oppositionto givingpermanent seats to any but the Big Four and possiblyFrance.92 The Brazilian governmentobviously would have welcomed a permanentseat, and its diplomaticagents argued thereafterin talks with Allied leaders thatBrazil deservedsuch recognition,but thiswas a bar- gainingmaneuver designed to increase the chances of securinga non- permanentslot on the Council. Brazilian policymakersrealized that it would be impossibleto overcomethe resistanceof at least the Eu- ropean great powers to Brazil's candidacy. Itamarati'sinstructions to AmbassadorCarlos Martinsin Washingtonearly in November1944 re- flectedRio de Janeiro'srealism: endeavor to obtain a permanentseat, said Itamarati,but if that should prove impossible,try "to ensure the electionof our country. .. to a positionof temporarymember."93 The State Departmentquickly sought to discourage insistenceon a permanentseat. A high-rankingofficial was frank with Martins, pointingout to him that countriesreceiving permanent seats would logically be those possessing the militarycapacity to assume world- wide obligations. The followingmonth Stettinius, in a telegramto the Americanembassy in Brazil intendedfor transmission to Itamaratiand in conversationwith Martins,gave the Brazilian governmentwhat can only be described as an honest expositionof Washington'sposition. "The United Statesis prepared to give strongsupport to Brazil's claim to a non-permanentseat on the SecurityCouncil," Stettiniusstated. "It is notprepared to insistupon the allocationto Brazil of a permanent seat." The "determinedopposition" from the other major powers, especially the Soviet Union, made a permanentseat for Brazil impossible. Permanentmembership, he repeated,would have to be reserved forcountries that could contributeto peace-keepingon a global scale. At a meetinglate in January1945, Martinsand otherLatin American diplomats in Washington received from the State Department an equallycandid restatement of the realitiesof internationalpolitics.94 Stettinius,in his explanationto Brazilian authorities,stressed the significanceof Russian objections,and Martins agreed that generally

she had renderedher sisterUnited Nations,warrant her receivingpermanent membership."Hull, Memoirs, II, 1678. 92. FRUS, 1944,I, 731, 737, 744. 93. MRE to Martins,Nov. 4, 1944,AHI. 94. State Dept. memo, Nov. 13, 1944, OARA: Brazil; Stettiniusto U.S. charge(Rio), Dec. 18, 1944, FRUS, 1944, I, 952; Martinsto MRE, Dec. 19, 1944, AHI; StateDept. memo,Jan. 31, 1945,FRUS, 1945,I, 41.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 226 HAHR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON deterioratingrelations among the great powers hinderedBrazil's candidacy.95 Moscow, furthermore,would hardly be disposed to accept as a partnera countrythat had not maintainedrelations with it since 1918. It was preciselyin the hope of improvingBrazil's chances of ob- tainingpostwar representationthat the State Department now took the initiativeof urgingVargas to restoreties with the Soviet Union, a factheretofore ignored. Hull in March 1944 had already informedMartins that Roosevelt was willingto serve as an intermediaryshould Brazil desire. State De- partmentanalysts at the end of the year,recognizing that "Brazil's am- bitionsto play an influentialrole in the postwar securityand peace organizationsmake it highlyimportant for her to have Russian support -or at the veryleast forher not to have Soviet oppositionto her par- ticipation,"urged friendlyintervention. Accordingly, Stettinius, with his eye on the approachingconference in San Franciscoto draw up the United Nations charter,passed throughBrazil in February 1945 and took the occasion of a meetingwith Vargas in Petropolisto admonish him that "no time should be lost by Brazil in recognizingRussia."96 Two weeks laterhe pressed ForeignMinister Pedro Ledo Velloso to act beforethe conferenceopened, and Vargas decided to heed the advice. On March 2, he instructedVelloso to establishcontacts with the Rus- sians "in accordancewith the talkwe had withStettinius in Petropolis." Velloso, thenin Mexico City as head of Brazil's delegationto the Cha- pultepec Conference,subsequently proceeded to Washingtonwhere, throughthe good officesof the State Department,Ambassadors Mar- tinsand Gromykoexchanged notes on April2 reestablishingdiplomatic relations.97 Roosevelt'sdeath thatmonth did not adverselyaffect Brazil's status in Washington or diminish American interestin shoring up Brazil as a diplomatically. Truman "on several occasions" priorto that time had indicated to Martins his convictionthat a "strengtheningof the good neighborpolicy, especially with Brazil," was needed, and after assumingthe presidencyhe had Martins informedthat he "fullyin- sisted" on giving Brazil "maximumassistance."98 At San Francisco in

95. Martinsto MRE, Dec. 19, 1944,AHI. 96. Martinsto Vargas, Mar. 4, 1944, GV; State Dept. memo, Nov. 1944, OARA: Brazil;Thomas M. Campbelland GeorgeC. Herring,eds., The Diaries of Edward Stettinius,Jr., 1943-1946 (New York,1975), p. 263. 97. Pedro Ledo Velloso (Mexico City) to Vargas, Feb. 28, 1945; Vargas to Velloso,Mar. 2, 1945, GV; State Dept. memoranda,Mar. 10, 13, 16, 1945, FRUS, 1945, IX, 223-226; Martinsto MRE, Apr.2, 1945, AHI. 98. Martinsto Vargas,Apr. 14, June15, 1945,GV.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO 'AXIS' 227 May, Americandelegates told Velloso that Truman intended to pro- pose Rio de Janeiroas the site of the firstpostwar inter-American con- ferenceand, because it would be "politicallyadvantageous" for Brazil and would avoid a cessationiof Lend-Lease supplies, they urged Rio de Janeiroto declare war on Japan.99Truman subsequentlyremarked to the new Americanambassador to Brazil, Adolf Berle, that "he was more anxious to have good relationswith Brazil than any othercoun- tryin Latin America,"a statementthat became the subject of a State Departmentcircular to the diplomaticmissions in Latin America.100 Velloso at San Francisco quickly realized the futilityof tryingto overcomeRussian and Britishobjections to a permanentseat for Bra- zil-Anthony Eden told him "with all candor" that he opposed such a move-and he also immediatelydiscovered that Brazil's case was seri- ously weakened by the lack of unanimousSpaniish American endorsement. Stettinius,however, assured the Brazilian envoyof Washington's determinationto lobby on behalf of Brazil's election to a "non- permanentseat fortwo years,"the maximumtemporary position, when- ever such electionswere held at the as yet unscheduled firstmeeting of the futureworld body.101Late that year, as plans were being for- mulatedfor the inauguralsession of the United Nations,Rio de Janeiro launched in earnesta diplomaticcampaign for a temporaryseat. Fear- ing that the pretensionsof Britainand Russia fortheir favorites might prejudice Brazil's chances, Itamarati appealed to the State Depart- ment,receiving in reply repeated assurances and proof of American support.'02 At the turnof the year,an anxious Itamaratiinstructed Martins to remind the State Departmentthat its endorsementof Brazil's claim would be interpretedas "an expressiveproof" of Americanrecognition of Brazil's contributionto the war effort.On January12, 1946, Brazil was elected to a two-yearseat by the firstGeneral Assembly,receiving the largestnumber of votes cast for a nonpermanentmember.103 An exultantVelloso in Rio de Janeiroexpressed both "officialapprecia- tion" and "personalgratification" for American support, saying that he

99. Velloso to Vargas,May 23, 1945, GV; State Dept. to U.S. charge (Rio), June6, 1945,FRUS, 1945, IX, 627. 100. State Dept. memo,June 13, 1945, DS, 711.32/6-1345; State Dept. to Missionsin Latin America,June 27, 1945, DS, 711.32/6-2745. 101. Vargas to Velloso, May 8, 1945; Velloso to Vargas, May 10, 20, 23, 1945,GV. 102. MRE to Martins,Nov. 27, 1945; Martinsto MRE, Nov. 29, Dec. 3, 1945, AHI. 103. MRE to Martins,Jan. 3, 1946, AHI; Sec. of State (London) to State Dept., Jan.12, 1946,FRUS, 1946, 11 vols. (Washington,D.C., 1969-1972), I, 157.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 228 HAHR MAY I STANLEY E. HITON realized that"it was thishelp which had put Brazil in top place of vot- ing,"while Martinsin Washingtontold the State Departmentthat he was "verypleased and particularlygrateful for the unqualifiedsupport given by the AmericanGovernment to Brazil's desires.'04 Did Washington,then, engage in a "general depreciationof Bra- zilian prestige"during the World War II era? Did the United States seek to "dominate"Brazil? The historicalrecord dictates a negative answer,showing clearly that the Roosevelt administrationat no time devised a programfor establishingpoliticoeconomic control over that country,nor did it desire to do so. It is noteworthyin this regardthat attentive,informed analysts representing prewar competitorand war- timeally GreatBritain, who were ever sensitiveto Americanmaneuvers in Latin America, saw no impulse to domination in Washington's policies. AmbassadorWilliam Seeds in the mid-1930shad suggested that it was the Americanbusiness community and not the government that pursued exclusivistaims in Brazil,'05and London's endorsement of the Good NeighborPolicy throughoutthe decade as a means of pro- tectingthe Britishposition in Brazil indicatesthat London was reason- ably satisfiedthat Americanpolicy was equitable.'06 During the war Britishauthorities in general seemed to credit the Roosevelt admin- istrationwith an enlightenedapproach to Latin America. A Foreign Office spokesman in February 1943, for example, argued that the State Department was "a restraininginfluence upon American im- perialism,"and a knowledgeable consultantagreed. Some groups in the United States would like to exclude other powers from Latin America,but "this is certainlynot the officialpolicy of the present administration,"he wrote. The embassyin Washingtonalso discounted the idea that the Roosevelt governmentwanted to dominate South America,and concluded thatAmerican economic policy in thatregion, thatis, the promotionof industrialization,would actuallybenefit Great Britainitself.'07 As forBrazil, a Britishanalyst noted the obvious early in 1943: "Brazil is being 'groomed'for the leadershipof South Amer- ica . . . ," he said in referenceto Americantreatment of that country. Indeed, reportedthe Washingtonembassy monthslater, "the settled

104. U.S. charge (Rio) to State Dept., Jan. 14, 1946, DS, 501.BC/1-1446; StateDept. memo,Jan. 16, 1946, DS, 710 Consultation(4)/1-1646. 105. Sir WilliamSeeds (Rio) to ForeignOffice, May 18, 1933 FO, A4409/ 112/6. 106. Hilton,Great Powers, p. 214. 107. ForeignOffice memo, Feb. 22, 1943, FO, A2102/520/51;Robin Hum- phreysto Gallop,Mar. 1, 1943, FO, A2213/348/51;R. I. Campbell (Washington) to VictorPerowne (Foreign Office),May 29, 1943, FO, A5359/348/51.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO "AXIS" 229 policy of the United States [has been] to increase by every possible meansthe power and importance"of Brazil.108 Even moreimportant is the conclusionreached by key Brazilian of- ficialsactively engaged in negotiationswith Washington that there was no imperialistthrust in Americanpolicy. Late in 1938, Ambassador Mario PimentalBrandao in Washingtonposed the very question: did Brazil have anythingto fearfrom American activity in South America? "The maximumthat one could admit, in the most pessimisticof hy- potheses,as being the extremepretensions of the United States with regard to Latin America, and especially Brazil," he declared, "is to establishwith us relationsas perfectas those of Canada with England and with the United States itself." His successor,Carlos Martins,argued the nextyear that a thirdterm for Roosevelt would be "the best thingthat can happen to us," and late in 1942 he exuberantlyhailed the benefitsthat the partnershipwith the United States had brought to Brazil.109A recurrenttheme of Aranha's officialand private cor- respondenceduring the 1930s was Washington'sisolationist mood and its insistenceon establishingcooperative relations with all of Latin America to the detrimentof the special relationshipwith Brazil that he wanted to forge.1"0As foreignminister (1938-1944) Aranha was not concernedthat relationsbetween the two countrieswould become too close; on the contrary,his fear was that they would not become close enough."' Writingin 1943, Aranha insisted that Brazil's best means of meetingthe challenges of an "openly and boldly imperial- istic"age was to ally itself"materially, morally and militarily"with the United States,"12 which, by implicationthen, was not a countrythat threatenedBrazilian sovereignty. ValentimBougas, one of Vargas' closestfinancial advisers and head of the wartimeAmazon rubberprogram, emphasized the contrastbe- tween Washingtonand some Americanbusiness sectors,advising Var-

108. ForeignOffice memo, Feb. 26, 1943, FO, A2230/348/51;Campbell to AnthonyEden, Oct. 22, 1943,FO, A10016/281/51. 109. PimentelBrandao to Aranha,Nov. 8, 1938, OA; Martinsto Vargas, June28, 1939,Sept. 4, 1942,GV. 110. See, for example,his dispatchto MRE, Jan. 14, 1935, AHI, 408/1/5; lettersto Vargas,Mar. 6, 1935,May 12, 1936, Nov. 24, 1937, GV; letterto Macedo Soares,May 14, 1935, OA; dispatchto MRE, Jan. 15, 1936, AHI, 408/1/9. 111. PonderingAranha's imminent arrival for economic and militarytalks in 1939, Welles aptlyremarked that "the inclinationof the BrazilianGovernment is alwaysto go considerablyfurther than we are ready to agree to go as to the formof cooperation,"Standing Liaison Committee,minutes, Jan. 21, 1939, RG, 353. 112. Aranhato Dutra,Aug. 11, 1943,OA.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 230 HAHR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON gas in 1942 that "happily for us the governmentauthorities, notably PresidentRoosevelt, the Departmentof Agricultureand that of State do not adhere to that antiquated policy of dominationand subjuga- tion." Althoughhe had been initiallyskeptical of all great powers, General Goes Monteiro'strips to the United States in 1939 and 1940- the Americans,he had written,demonstrated "maximum goodwill" toward Brazil-left him convinced by mid-1944that a wholehearted alignmentwith Washingtonwas Brazil's wisest policy. He reasoned that "the United States, endeavoringto erase foreverthe vestiges of imperialistictendencies, will not take a single step that mightseem to be interventionin the internal affairsof the nations of this hemisphere."113Brazilian members of the JointDefense Commissionin Washingtonalso looked forwardwith satisfactionto an even closer partnershipwith the United States afterthe war, and fromhis vantage point in Lisbon, AmbassadorJoao Neves da Fontoura,a futureforeign minister,saw thingsin a similarlight. The United States represented the sole hope forWestern civilization, he wrote enthusiastically,since only that countrypossessed the materialresources, creative spiritand "proven altruism"to assist othercountries in meetingthe problemsof thefuture."14 As forVargas, his private correspondenceyields no expressionsof concernabout alleged Americanimperialism. Rather, like Aranha,he had encouraged since the mid-1930sa special relationshipwith Wash- ingtonas a means of extractingmilitary and economic assistancefrom the United States and in the generalinterests of Brazilian security,and as the war drew to a close his major worry,as myriaddocuments dem- onstrate,was that the United States mightlose interestin the alliance afterthe conflicthad ended. Americanpolicy, afterall, had brought unusual benefitsto his countryat a relativelylow cost. Indeed, as a resultof his government'swartime collaboration with the United States, Brazil had been assureda positionin postwarcouncils that would make it unique among Latin Americancountries, and significantstrides had been taken toward the realizationof a long-standingnational goal- the establishmentof industrialand militarysupremacy in South Amer- ica. If the wartime"axis" did not bringthe postwarbenefits that Bra- zilian policymakersanticipated, it was not because the Americangov-

113. Bougasto Vargas,Feb. 22, 1942, GV; G6es Monteiroto Dutra,June 10, 1939, EME; Goes Monteiroto Vargas,May 28, 1944, GV. 114. Carvalhoto Aranha,Feb. 15, 1944; Carvalhoto Gen. FirmoFreire, Apr. 4, 1944, ELC; Col. Alves Secco to Salgado Filho, Apr. 24, 1944; Joao Neves da Fontourato Vargas,Oct. 7, 1943,GV.

This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO "AXIS" 231 ernmenthad played a "two-facedgame" with Rio de Janeiroduring the war, but ratherbecause unexpected Cold War challenges riveted Washington'sstrategic attentionon Europe and Asia and drained Americanresources toward those areas.

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