Stanley E. Hilton Source: the Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol
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Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington-Rio de Janeiro "Axis" during the World War II Era Author(s): Stanley E. Hilton Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 59, No. 2 (May, 1979), pp. 201-231 Published by: Duke University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2514412 Accessed: 30-09-2015 08:01 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Duke University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Hispanic American Historical Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions HispatnicAmerican Historical Review 59(2), 1979, 201-231 Copyright( 1979 by Duke UniversityPress BrazilianDiplomacy and the Washington-Riode Janeiro"Axis" duringthe World War II Era STANLEY E. HILTON TmHera of the Second World War had a profoundimpact on Brazilian foreignpolicy. Relationswith Germany, Brazil's leading European trade partner,reached their twentieth-centurynadir. Britain's financial and commercial role in Brazilian affairsweakened stillfurther, continuing the decline initiated by the Depression. Among the great power rivals for influence in Brazil,the beneficiaryof wartimecircumstances was the United States. Indeed, the unprecedentedintensification of relationswith that coun- trywas one of the most significantchapters in modem Brazilian di- plomacy and an historicalphenomenon pregnant with implicationsfor not only wartimebut postwarhemispheric relations. This articleseeks to contributeto an understandingof the Rio-Washington"axis" by re- assessingtwo of its key aspects: the natureof Brazilian diplomacyand the characterand objectivesof Americanpolicy toward Brazil. The major statementon wartime Brazilian-Americanrelations is FrankD. McCann'sThe Brazilian-AmericanAlliance, 1937-1945. Ac- cordingto McCann, Brazil was a somewhatpassive victimof stronger, domineeringpowers. Berlin'sgoal in Brazil was "conquest and domina- tion to fulfillthe Fuehrer's dream of world dictatorship,"and Roo- sevelt's United States was surprisinglynot essentiallydifferent from Hitler's Reich in this regard. The New Deal trade program,for ex- ample, insofaras it concernedBrazil, was aimed at establishingAmer- ican "economic and political hegemony"over that country. During the war, moreover,Washington would play "a two-facedgame" with Rio de Janeiro,continuing to seek "domination"of Brazil at the same time that it formulatedplans for a programof postwar militaryas- sistance to Latin America in which the importanceof Brazil to hL-le United States "was reduced, if not eliminated."The Getulio Vargas * The authoris AssociateProfessor of Historyat Louisiana State University. Researchfor this article was fundedby the Social Science ResearchCouncil and theFulbright-Hays Faculty Research Program. This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 202 HAHR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON government,insufficiently realistic or tough-mindedin its bargaining with Washington,had placed Brazil by mid-1944"in the position of a woman who has given in to her lover and can only trustthat his in- tentionsare honorable." Americanintentions, however, were not hon- orable. The crowningblow in what McCann regardsas Washington's deceitfultreatment of Brazil came in the matterof representationon the SecurityCouncil of the new United Nations: "Americanfailure to obtain a securitycouncil seat for its faithfulally and Washington's general depreciation of Brazilian prestige paralleled American eco- nomic and militaryefforts to keep Brazil subservient."' If this passivity-dominationthesis is correct,the historianwould expect to findthe recordof Brazilian-Americanrelations to be one of concession and sacrifice by Rio de Janeiroin returnfor little from Washingtonthat satisfiedperceived national interests. One logically would encounter,furthermore, ample signs that key Brazilian policy- makers expressed grave anxieties,at least privately,about the dan- gerous intimacyof relationswith the United States and the domineer- ing thrustof Americanpolicy. If thatpolicy in facthad as its conscious goal the political and economic domination of Brazil, the histo- rian should also discover substantial evidence of explicit discussion of that goal in Americanpolicymaking circles. Yet neitherBrazilian nor Americanarchives, nor those of Great Britainand Germany,yield any such evidence. On the contrary,these sourcesamply documentthe Machiavellian opportunismof Brazilian leaders who skillfullyprobed the vanity, anxieties,and prejudices of counterpartsin other coun- tries and were remarkablysuccessful in barteringgeographic acci- dent for valuable economic, military,and political concessions from Washington. The record also shows that the Roosevelt administration eschewed domineering,deceitful diplomacy toward Brazil and never devised any programfor establishingeconomic, political, or military control over that country-a fact explicitlyappreciated not only in Brazilian circles,but by European rivals as well. Anyevaluation of the foreignpolicy behaviorof the Vargas govern- ment must underscorethe latter'scapacity for,and skill at, the diplo- macy of opportunismand deception. The Machiavellian characterof Brazil's responseto one of its major prewar challenges-the intensive trade rivalrybetween Nazi Germanyand the United States-has been documented.2It is importantto stressin this regardthat while Brazil 1. Frank D. McCann, Jr., The Brazilian-AmericanAlliance, 1937-1945 (Princeton,1973), pp. 7, 81, 328-332,341, 458. 2. StanleyE. Hilton,Brazil and the Great Powers,1930-1939: The Politics This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO "AXIS" 203 traded with Germanyon a bilateral basis that contraveneda liberal agreementsigned with the United States in 1935, the Vargas govern- mentproclaimed its solidaritywith Americanpolicy, systematically ex- ploiting Washington'sgood-neighborliness and frequentlydistorting the truthin order to disguise or justifyBrazil's commercialalliance with Germany,a fact that various prominentBrazilian authoritiespri- vatelydecried.3 Vargas,heavily influenced by his financeminister, the militaryhigh command,and his own desire to diversifyexports and markets,dis- played a high degree of opportunisticindependence from Washington in the trade dispute, which is not an isolated example. Indeed, the reactionof his governmentto othermajor internationalproblems, such as the Italo-Ethiopian embroglio,reflected a similarlypragmatic, in- dependent spirit. The Italo-Ethiopian conflictwas the first great challenge to the Versailles systemin the 1930s. Roosevelt and the State Department clearly sympathizedwith Ethiopia and they en- deavored in vain, on the eve of the outbreakof hostilitiesin 1935, to dissuade an adamantlyisolationist congress from depriving the Presi- dent of the power to discriminatebetween aggressorand aggressee in applyinga mandatoryarms embargo in the case of war. The admin- istration'ssubsequent famous appeal for a "moral embargo" was an effortto restrictthe flow of otherimportant materials to Italy. Vargas and his counselors,on the other hand, fromthe very be- ginningof the tensionin Italo-Ethiopian relationshad scented com- mercial opportunity.In mid-1935,Vargas himselfcorresponded with the governorof Rio Grande do Sul about special consignmentsof mules and frozenbeef for the Italian army,pointing with enthusiasm to the possibilityof supplyingvarious products to Italian troops on their way to East Africa. Foreign MinisterJose Carlos de Macedo Soares (1934-1937), a devout Catholic, staunch anti-Communistfrom Sao Paulo-a regionof heavy Italian immigration-andunabashed ad- mirerof Mussolini,shared Vargas' desire to maximizeprofits. Italian of Trade Rivalry(Austin, 1975); JohnD. Wirth,The Politicsof BrazilianDevel- opment,1930-1954 (Stanford,1969). 3. AmbassadorOswaldo Aranha,for one, protestedhis govemment's"lack of integrity"and its "policyof subterfugeand inveiglement"toward Washington in the German-Americantrade struggle.Aranha (Washington)to Rubens Rosa, Feb. 18, 1935; Aranhato Getu'lioVargas, June 4, 1937, Centrode Pesquisa e Documentagcode HistoriaContemporanea (hereafter cited as CPDHC), Fundagco GetuilioVargas (Rio), Oswaldo Aranha Papers (hereaftercited as OA). Cf. ValentimBougas to Aranha,June 18, 1936, OA; AmbassadorMalio Pimentel Brandao (Washington)to Vargas,Sept. 14, 1938, CPDHC, Getu'lioVargas Papers (hereaftercited as GV). This content downloaded from 137.73.50.191 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 08:01:46 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 204 HAHR MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON mobilization,he remindedthe finance ministerlate in August, pre- sented Brazil with an "exceptional"commercial opportunity. Early in October,after hostilities began, Macedo Soares argued in a memoran- dum to Vargas that Ethiopia meant nothingto Brazil, whereas Italy had provided immigrantsand was a ready marketfor foodstuffsand