THRASYMACHUS AND ΠEONEIA

BY

G. J. BOTER

1. Ever since Kerferd published his articlc "The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in 's " in 19471), there has been much discussion about the question what exactly Thrasymachus is asserting in his discussion with in the first book of Plato's Republic. I do not intend to give a full evaluation of all interpreta- tions offered hitherto2), but I will sketch briefly the main features of the different lines of interpretation. The problem can be summarized as follows: 1) What is the rela- tion between Thrasymachus' two remarks a) " is the advantage of the stronger" (338c2), explained by "the advantage of the ruler" (338d7-339a4) with its corollary that "justice is obe- dience to the laws" (339b7-9) and b) "justice is another's good" (343c3)? 2) What is the character of Thrasymachus' opinions on justice? It will be clear that the first question has priority over the second. To the first question, most interpreters have answered that Thrasymachus is primarily interested in and that, there- fore, "justice is the advantage of the stronger, i.e. the ruler"

1) DUJ 40 (1947), 19-27; his article is reprinted in J. Classen, ed., Sophistik, Wege der Forschung, Band 187 (Darmstadt 1976), 545-563. Because I have not been able to see a copy of DUJ, I will quote Kerferd's article according to the page-numbers in Sophistik. 2) Kerferd 545-548 with nn. 2-15 gives a lucid summary of interpretations pub- lished before his article; these should be supplied, as W. K. C. Guthrie, History of GreekPhilosolphy III (Cambridge 1969), 91, n. 3, points out, by the article of M. Salomon, Der Begriffdes Naturrechtsbei den Sophisten,ZRG 1911, 142-147. A sum- mary which takes account of the literature up to 1974 can be found in P. P. Nicholson, Unravelling Thrasymachus'Arguments in "The Republic ", Phronesis 19 (1974), 210-232. To the studies mentioned by Kerferd and Nicholson the follow- ing can be added: T. Astrene, An analysis of Thrasymachus'true definitionof justice, Dialogue ΦΣT 20 (1977-8), no. 2-3, 57-63; G. Michaelidas-Nouaros, Une nouvelle évaluationdu dialogueentre Thrasymaqueet Socrate,PAA 53 (1978), 117-137; J. Annas, An Introductionto Plato's Republic(Oxford 1981), 34-57. 262 represents his real position 3). Others believe that "justice is an- other's good" is what Thrasymachus really means to say4). Others, again, believe that Thrasymachus is a legalist or conventionalist in the strict sense, and conclude that "justice is obedience to the laws" is Thrasymachus' basic position from which his other remarks derive 1). Most interpreters believe that Thrasymachus' utterances are in- compatible, because, at first sight, "the interest of the stronger, i.e. the ruler" and "another's good" are in flat contradiction: accord- ing to the first remark, it is argued, the ruler acts justly by pursuing his own advantage, because justice is the advantage of the stronger, i.e. the ruler; according to the second remark, on the other hand, justice consists in promoting "another's good", so that the ruler acts justly by not pursuing his own advantage, but that of another, namely his subjects. Those interpreters who regard Thrasymachus' statements as incompatible adduce several explanations for his in- consistency. Most of these scholars believe that Thrasymachus is not capable of sound reasoning, and that Plato wants to show us that people who hold opinions like those of Thrasymachus are not even able to express themselves in an intelligible way 6). Others 7)

3) For an extensive list of scholars who hold this opinion see Nicholson 211, n. 3. 4) E.g. Kerferd 559-561; Nicholson 216, 222 ff.; Annas 45. 5) See Kerferd 546-547, with nn. 8-12; to these can be added G. F. Hourani, Thrasymachus'Definition of Justice in Plato's Republic, Phronesis 7 (1962), 110-120. 6) Among others H. Sidgwick, The Philosophyof Kant and otherLectures (London 1905), 370; D. J. Allan, Plato: Republicbook I (London 1940) ad 344c7; Annas 46. 7) J. P. Maguire, Thrasymachus-or Plato? Phronesis 16 (1971), 142-163, reprinted in Sophistik (see note 1), 546-588, passim; E. L. Harrison, Plato's Manipulation of Thrasymachus,Phoenix 21 (1967), 27-39, esp. 32-35. Maguire, though making many keen observations, is obsessed by the idea that Plato tries to manipulate Thrasymachus from a political to a moral context; I shall deal with some of his views below, but for the moment I may notice that this distinction is not very helpful for the interpretation of the Republic:throughout the work, Plato stresses the basic similarity of political and moral behaviour; as E. Barker, The Political Thoughtof Plato and (London 1906), 95, n. 1, puts it: "We must not suppose for a moment any distinction of private morality and public duty, or restrict justice to the latter. The two are one; and justice is both." Cf. Annas 40. In fact, I believe that most difficulties in the interpretation of Thrasymachus' posi- tion have arisen from drawing too sharp a distinction between politics and morals. Harrison argues that Plato manipulates Thrasymachus for artistic purposes, and that that is the reason why Thrasymachus, in his speech, does not introduce the νóµoζ φυσiςantithesis: according to Harrison "Plato's answer to this doctrine