Pyrrhonian Paideia a Dissertation Submitted To

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PYRRHONIAN PAIDEIA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Matthew Darmalingum Stanford August 2012

This dissertation is online at: http://purl.stanford.edu/ms571wr3930

ii I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Christopher Bobonich, Primary Adviser

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

R. Anderson

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Andrea Nightingale

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Allen Wood

Approved for the Stanford University Committee on Graduate Studies. Patricia J. Gumport, Vice Provost Graduate Education

This signature page was generated electronically upon submission of this dissertation in electronic format. An original signed hard copy of the signature page is on file in University Archives.

iii Foreword

First, perhaps our work is an aborted conical spiral towards an asymptote. In philosophy, we dance around the thing in as orderly a fashion as we can muster, and yet, in speaking, are in danger of purporting to have captured it—or, at least, to have captured it by capturing something of it. In such speaking, we would purport to give, by completing the proposition— our account—in the full stop, a base to our story, by which it is contained… Our completing our proposition appears an affirmation of it—if not of it per se, then of it as valuable in being towards a valuable consideration.

Second, in giving a story, we purport somehow to conceive our work intact, even though perhaps by the time we reach our conclusion, the beginning of it passes away, such that it may appear somehow eroded.

To our friends, with gratitude:

v Pursue love, and earnestly desire the spiritual gifts, especially that you may prophesy. For one who speaks in a tongue speaks not to men but to God; for no one understands him, but he utters mysteries in the Spirit. On the other hand, the one who prophesies speaks to people for their upbuilding and encourage- ment and consolation. The one who speaks in a tongue builds up himself, but the one who prophesies builds up the church. Now I want you all to speak in tongues, but even more to prophesy. The one who prophesies is greater than the one who speaks in tongues—unless someone interprets, so that the church may be built up.

1 Corinthians 14:1-5

The refusal to belong to any school of thought, the repudiation of the adequacy of any body of beliefs whatever, and especially of systems, and a marked dissatisfaction with traditional philosophy as superficial, academic, and remote from life—that is the heart of existentialism.

Walter Kaufmann, Existentialism From Dostoev- sky to Sartre, p.12.

But in that exhortation this alone delighted me: that I should love and search after and pursue and grasp, and strongly embrace not this or that sect, but wisdom itself, whatever it is.

Augustine on Cicero’s lost Hortensius, Confes- sions 3.4

And what do you have, on account of which you are in anticipation? Seneca, Ep.ad Luc. 77.16

vi “Well then, tell him, Cebes,” he said, “the truth, that I composed them without wishing to rival him or his poetry—for I knew this would not be easy. But I was making trial of the meaning of some dreams, satisfying my conscience unless perhaps it often en- joined me to make this music. For they were something like this. Often the same dream would visit me throughout my life, appearing in one aspect or another, but saying the same things: ‘Socrates,’ it said, ‘make music and labor at it.’”

Phaedo 60-61a

A god can do it. But how, tell me, shall a man follow him through the narrow lyre? His mind is in discord. At the crossing of two paths of the heart stands no temple for Apollo.

Singing, as you teach it, is not desire, is not wooing of what in the end is still to be won; singing is being. For the god, an easy thing. But when are we? And when will he turn

to our being the Earth and the stars? That you love, child, this is not, if also then the voice knocks your mouth open—learn

to forget that you sang out. That passes. To sing in truth, is a different breath. A breath around void. A blowing in the god. A wind.

The Sonnets to Orpheus 1.3

In fact the very same thing befalls the skeptic as is said of Apelles, who painted from nature. For they say that when he was painting a horse and wished to represent in the picture the horse’s slaver, he was so botching the job that he gave in, and flung at the painting the sponge onto which he would wipe off the

vii colors from his brush. But the mark made the representation of the slaver of the horse.

Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.28-9

viii Table of Contents

The life, work, and acumen of Sextus Empiricus 1 A: Skeptical therapy 11 Pyrrhonism as Philosophical Therapy 12 Intent and motivation 13 The principles of Sextus’ Pyrrhonism 14 Aim 16 The tenor and aim of Sextus’ writing 18 A Pyrrhonian medical kit 21 Philosophy as therapy 38 Skepticism as purgative of belief 43 The need to cure the philosopher 48 Pyrrhonian sympathy for a vulgar allegation of philosophical sickness 51 Skeptical Diagnosis of Dogmatic Philosophy 56 Vulgar embrace of philosophy 57 Dogmatic evaluation and rejection of common values 65 Dogmatic evaluation and embrace of common values 73 Contemplative dissociation in philosophical dogmatism 76 Pyrrhonian reduction of the sickness of dogmatism to an epistemic mistake 78 Despair likes to hide 88 Concupiscence and anxiety in dogmatic inquiry 91 The dogmatist’s seeing herself be struck down 96 A rational therapy for rational therapy 102 Dogmatic Doubts about Skepticism 106 The problem of Pyrrhonism: dogmatic worries 107 Epistemic worries 111 Ethical worries 119 Methodological worries about epochē and ataraxia 127 B: Platonism as Pyrrhonism 131 Analysis of the Skeptical Dialectic 132 Characters and mechanics of the dialectic 133 Fundamentals of the dialectic: Dogmatism 135 Fundamentals of the dialectic: Skepticism 142 General methodology for a Pyrrhonian reply 145 On our reply as a form of therapy 150 Prelude to an Ethics of Wonder 152 Prelude to a Pyrrhonian ethics 153 Ataraxia as telos 154 On a Pyrrhonian taxonomy of ends 159

ix Ataraxia as euroia 166 Epicurean ataraxia and divinity 174 Pyrrhonian and Epicurean ataraxia 179 Platonic ataraxia 183 Life without belief 205 Intimations of dogmatic desire for skepticism 215 Introduction to the question of ataraxia through epochē 219 Problems in Pyrrhonian Science 234 Recapitulation of our method for vindication of Pyrrhonism 235 Pyrrhonian skepticism and scientific nihilism 239 On the possibility and aim of skeptical inquiry in the field of geometry 245 Skepticism in geometry as propaedeutic to thoroughgoing scientific suspension 247 Scientific suspension as unadulterated philosophical awareness 255 Fundamental problems of skeptical science 257 Motivation for increasing abstraction 260 Anticipation of Platonic context for skepticism in geometry 263 Platonism as Pyrrhonism 271 On our aim 272 Skepticism in geometry as propaedeutic to unadulterated philosophical awareness 277 Platonic dogmatism as target of skeptical geometry 281 On a history of skepticism in the Academy 286 On reading Plato 293 Some remarks on chronology and pedagogy 302 Platonism as skepticism 312 On an account of unity in suspension 321 Towards unity in suspension 323 Zetetic wonder 339 Mythology for the zetetic psychology 350 On having written 358 Epilogue 367

x Prologue: The life, work, and acumen of Sextus Empiricus

Sextus Empiricus is considered our main authority on ancient Pyrrhonism. We possess three works: Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH 1-3), Against the Professors (AM 1-6), and Against the Dogmatists (AM 7-11). In these works, Sextus Empiri- cus presents himself as sympathetic to Pyrrhonism. We are unclear exactly where Sextus Empiricus lived, or when. And we know little to nothing about what kind of man he was, or who his associates were. Nor do we know the extent or precise order of his writing.

All this, of course, entails that it is difficult to say what kind of influence and reception he enjoyed in his own day. However, the rediscovery of Sextus in the 15th century is thought to have deep influence on many thinkers on either side of the Reformation, and his work is thought to be a critical force in western philosophy ever since, one way or another inspiring such luminaries as Montaigne, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein—to mention but a few.1

Sextus’ work comes to us by way of five Greek manuscripts from the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries, three of which are closely related. There is also an almost complete 13th century Latin translation from an independent archetype.2 Of the works we have received, the Outlines of Pyrrhonism is probably Sextus’ best known work. In providing a synoptic view of the Pyrrhonian way, it is at any rate a convenient introduction to Pyrrhonian skepticism. The Outlines is a work of three books. The first treats of the motivation for skepticism, the way in which the skeptic manages to live his life given his skepticism, the general structural features of justification and commensurate techniques

1 For a fascinating and comprehensive intellectual history of this influence, see the work of Popkin, especially: (Popkin & Popkin, 2003), (Popkin, 1980). See also (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2004), ch. 2-5, (Floridi, 2002).

1 for inducing skepticism, and the difference between Pyrrhonian skepticism and various dogmatisms that might appear to share affinities with Pyrrhonism. The latter two treat of the standard disciplines of Hellenistic, and especially Stoic philosophical discourse.3 The second book gives a skeptical investigation of the grounding of logic. The third book does the same with regard to the grounding of physics and ethics.

The rest of the available work is, apparently by historical accident, given the single title Adversos Mathematicos. In the manuscripts, Adversos Mathematicos, or, Against the Teachers, contains eleven books. But only the first six books are said to deserve the title. The first six books (AM 1-6) attack liberal education in the arts and sciences—Against the Grammarians, Against the Rhetoricians, Against the Geometers, Against the Arithmeticians, Against the Astrologers, and Against the Musicians. The next five books (AM 7-11) attack dogmatism in a supposedly different domain altogether—philosophy. AM 7-8 go by the title Against the Logicians, and give an elaborate attack on the grounding of logic. AM 9-10 go by the title Against The Physicists, and do the same for physics. Finally, AM 11, or Against the Ethicists, does the same for ethics. Thus, the first six books are known by the title of the manuscript as Against the Teachers, the last five are gathered under the title Adversos Dogmaticos, or Against the Dogmatists.

Against the Dogmatists, then, deals with much of the same material in PH 2-3. There is a well-grounded suspicion that these five books were part of a larger

2 (Sextus Empiricus & Bury, 1955), vol. 1, p. xliii. 3 PH 2.13. Cf., e.g. Philo, Leg. alleg. 1.57, Plutarch SVF 2.35, and DL 7.39ff. For further discussion: (Ierodiakonou, 1993).

2 work, of which the first part is missing, and that this is the work Sextus refers to by the title Treatise on Skepticism in AM 1.29, 2.106, and 6.52.4 The missing first part of this work would correspond to PH 1, and cover at greater length what is discussed there. If this book existed and indeed has gone missing, it is a great shame, since we might have found in it an elaboration of what puzzles us so when we read PH 1. PH 1 gives us an outline of the motivation for Pyrrhonism, and how the Pyr- rhonist can live a satisfactory life without beliefs. But many readers find it unsatisfactory. To them, the Pyrrhonian life outlined there seems unfathomable, outrageous, or morally bankrupt. Perhaps further qualification written up in this missing book could have mitigated this kind of response. As for the order of the work, some have argued that stylistically, PH is prior to AM 7-11.5 Others have argued that PH contains a more sophisticated Pyrrhonian stance than AM 11. On the latter interpretation, AM 11 commits a dogmatism by denying that anything is good or bad by nature, while PH just suspends on whether this is so or not. This distinction is supposed to indicate a shift in Sextus’ thinking towards a more thoroughgoing Pyrrhonian stance.6 If this is correct, and if AM 7-11 are a unit, PH would seem to come later. Other interpreters, finding the arguments inconclusive, suspend judgment on the matter.7

Sextus appears keen to avoid telling us anything about himself directly. When saying anything we might expect him to be sympathetic to, he is fond of speaking either in the first person plural, or in the third person about the Pyrrhonists. We

4 (Janaček, 1963), (Blomqvist, 1974). DL 9.106 mentions that Sextus wrote ten books on Scepticism. Blomqvist argues that Diogenes Laertius has the Treatise in mind here. Thus, as we have five books of this work (M 7-11), the missing first part of this work counted five books. 5 (Janaček, 1963), p. 277. 6 (Sextus Empiricus & Bett, 1997), p. xxiv, and passim. 7 (Sextus Empiricus, Annas, & Barnes, 1994), p. xiv.

3 learn nothing of his friends,8 and little of his religious practice—none of the works contain a dedication, neither to man or god. All this, we might think, is appropriate.9 The author of a treatise sympathetic to radical skepticism might not wish to perfuse the text with I-think-thats, and personal anecdotes, as if it presented a general and inviolable point of view of the author. As we might think that Plato’s absence from the list of historical characters in his philosophical plays indicative of a reluctance to dogmatize, but present, with at least feigned non-partisanship, a dialectical space, so, too, we may think a studied avoidance of personal anecdote and the first person singular in Sextus’ work an attempt to distance the author from any particular view propounded in the exercise of breeding skepticism.

We cannot say much with certainty about where Sextus lived. He mentions Athens, Alexandria and Rome. At some point, he appears not to have lived in Alexandria (PH 3.221). In PH 2.98, and AM 8.145, he speaks of Athens being far from him to illustrate how objects, once patent, may become non-evident because of a change in the observer’s situation. Sextus might have used any old location to get his point across, but it would be strange to speak of Athens as not-present while writing in Athens. So, it seems not unlikely that at the time of writing he was not actually in Athens. Perhaps, then, it is likely that at some point he was in Athens—it would be strange if one part of the example (that he is not in Athens) would have to be true at pain of serious cognitive dissonance, but that the other part (that he was once in Athens, where things were once patent through proximity) can remain false for no good reason.

8 Diogenes Laertius, tracing the history of the skeptical tradition ends the list of skeptics with Menodotus, Herodotus of Tarsus, Sextus, and Saturninus. Perhaps the last was a student of Sextus, and Herodotus his teacher—but these men are equally obscure. DL 9.116, cf (Sextus Empiricus et al., 1994), p. xii. 9 (Sextus Empiricus et al., 1994) p. xi, (Floridi, 2002), p. 3.

4 However, it may be that Athens was a stock example, like phosophorus or London is for contemporary philosophers. Say the exemplification of some new paradox for us to scurry after was, by some malicious East Coaster, driven by accepting a condition phrased as “I am not in California.” Surely, we here, now, in California, would not have any difficulty following the vernacular. It is just a way of speaking, we’ll say. In which case, though it may initially appear unlikely that Sextus was at Ath- ens when he was giving the example, it is still in doubt whether he ever was in Athens.10

We can say a little more about when Sextus was alive. PH 1.84 mentions Tibe- rius, who died in 37 A.D. This is the latest datable person in the corpus. Gregory of Nazanius (330-390 A.D.) blames Sextus for having introduced into the church the sophistry of arguing both sides of an argument.11 So, we might say with some certainty that Sextus lived between 35 A.D. and 390 A.D. But we can try to narrow the window. PH 1.222 mentions the skeptic Menodotus, who may have lived in the early second century.12 Diogenes Laertius, who is thought to have lived in the first half of the third century, mentions Sextus, and leads us to believe that Menodotus was his senior.13 Hippolytus of Rome (who died in 235 A.D.) is thought to have copied without attribution several passages from Sextus in his Refutation of all Heresies.14 Finally, Galen (129-210) is thought to have heard of Sextus.15

10 This is Floridi’s beef with trying to determine Sextus’ whereabouts from these examples. (Floridi, 2002), p. 3. 11 (Hankinson, 2006), p. 850. 12 (Sextus Empiricus et al., 1994), p. xi. 13 DL 9.116. For further discussion: (House, 1980), p. 227-31, (Floridi, 2002), p. 3, (Caizzi, 1993), 328-30, (Sextus Empiricus et al., 1994), p. ix, (Sextus Empiricus et al., 1994), p.xi-xii. 14 (Sextus Empiricus et al., 1994), p.xi., (Mansfeld, 1992), p. 318. 15 (Sextus Empiricus et al., 1994), p. xii. This is in disagreement with House, who thinks that Galen was unaware of Sextus, and, as a result, thinks that Sextus wrote at the beginning of the third century. (House, 1980), p. 230. Floridi appears to suspend on the issue (Floridi, 2002), p.4.

5 All of these speculations may be false, of course, but a picture emerges from them in which Sextus enjoyed the prosperity of the rule of Marcus Aurelius, and the subsequent decline under Commodus, the five emperors and the Severan dynasty in the second and early third century. In our doing history, we must follow the chronology given by the technē, so this is the picture we will work with.

To begin to lay in the balance against a notion of the thoroughgoing skeptic as inactive for want of belief that could inform his decision making: Sextus appears a practical man. So either not resolute in his skepticism, or resolute and, yet, somehow active. His activity appears to extend beyond an indifferent staring at the foot, quiet philosophical contemplation, or life-sustaining public dialectic. Like Cicero’s and Seneca’s work, our main Pyrrhonian corpus appears written by an author who goes about his business in the world. Sextus appears to have been a doctor by profession. We are told he wrote a work (now lost) on medicine, Medical Mem- oirs.16 And his name ‘Empiricus’ suggests he was at some point a doctor who had sympathies with the Empiric school of medicine. We might become puzzled here, when we discover in the Outlines that Sextus, indeed in the first person singular, seems to disassociate Pyrrhonism and medical Empiricism. If Sextus is a Pyrrhonist, whence the name ‘Empiricus’? The school of Empiricism is one of three in medicine—the other two Method- ism and Rationalism. The Rationalists say that diagnosis and therapy of pathology should be made with the aid of scientific theory, where scientific theory accounts for the phenomena via underlying, non-evident, reality. This reality may include unobservables, such as atoms, invisible pores, etc. only accessible by reason in rational abstraction from the immediate phenomena in sense-perception.

6 Empiricists disagree that such analysis can lay bare any underlying reality, and positively affirm the non-apprehensibility of the non-evident. They think that all we can know comes from experience, and hence diagnosis and therapy of pathology is to be determined just by perception. This confidence in the non-apprehensibility of the non-evident, Sextus says, is a sign for distinguishing medical Empiricism from skepticism.17 Of greater affinity might be the Methodists, who claim to practice medicine by taking appearance as a guide, without affirming any metaphysics or epistemology. Their method, they say, consists in the following of certain general recurrent features whose presence or absence can be determined by sheer inspection.18 As the dog gnaws at her foot to remove a thorn, the Methodist, trained in a sensitivity to symptom and cure, recognizes and treats affliction by an empathy generated from a sensibility for what is compulsory in our affection.19 We might think that negative dogmatism is a final dogmatism. The negative dogmatist has seen himself driven to suspend on everything, and taken this as indicative of the inapprehensibility of things. The radical skeptic doubts that there are indicative signs of such inapprehensibility, and foregoes even negative dogmatism. If this is right, and it is right that Sextus gradually moved from a negative dogmatism exemplified in Against the Ethicists to suspension even on negative dogmatism, we might speculate that Sextus gained his soubriquet ‘Empiricus’ when still a negative dogmatist, but later changed his allegiances to the Methodist school on becoming the mature skeptic we encounter in PH.

16 AM 7.202 17 The remark, as we said, comes in the first person singular: “hōs emoi dokei”—“as it appears to me.” 18 (Frede, 1987), pp. 161-2. 19 PH 1.236-41

7 Sextus, then, as writing philosophy by the lamp after a day of doctoring. The worst of such hobbyists is a crank who sends off leather bound tomes to every member of departments of illustrious schools. We will see later that Sextus is unconcerned with an assessment of his intellectual standing, but nonetheless assures us that in fact it is quite superior.20 However, there is amongst our contemporary scholars a tendency to think of him as not an original thinker,21 but a copyist, perhaps even without great learning.22 These scholars say his writing is clear, but dry, and that his work consists largely in listing extensively the various dogmatic views, and then listing attacks upon these views. Of course, competitive assessment of acumen may be of little concern to Sex- tus. Sextus purports to write not from a desire for honor or correctness, but therapy. In this vein: Some have thought that Sextus’ urge for comprehensiveness tells against him as a thinker.23 Sextus will include strong as well as weak arguments in his laying out the pros and cons of a particular view, and this lack of discrimina- tion could be thought to betray a lack of philosophical sophistication. But Sextus tells us that, in accordance with the intellectual demands of his audience, the Pyrrhonist will deploy weak arguments when they suffice to serve his aim of inducing suspension.24 If the comprehensiveness is programmatic, perhaps we should not confuse it with dullness. As for whether Sextus was a man of great learning, even if Sextus were not an original thinker, and more or less a copyist, Sextus’ work treats of a wide variety

20 See discussion of the exordiun at the beginning of the first book of Against the Professors in Problems in Pyrrhonian Science. 21 (Sextus Empiricus & Bury, 1955), vol. 1, p. xlii., (Sextus Empiricus et al., 1994), p. xv, (Hankinson, 2006), p. 850, (Stough, 1969), p. 106. 22 (Sextus Empiricus et al., 1994), p. xv. 23 (Sextus Empiricus & Bury, 1955), vol. 1, p. xlii. Sextus suggestion is not as odd as it sounds, perhaps. Cf. Phaedrus 268b, 271d-272e, 273e, 277c. 24 PH 3.280.

8 of dogmatisms in a depth sufficient enough for us to think the corpus a rich and valuable source for our doxography of Greek philosophical thought. Perhaps if he carried out the work with little commitment, or understanding, he could copy out such a sizable chunk of philosophy without becoming learned. We would imagine Sextus as vain scribbler, whether hobbyist or hired synopsist. But Sextus tells us that he writes from love of humanity (PH 3.280)—and one presumes that such writing would require the wish to write well, and that this would require some sort of investment in the activity. Further, Sextus tells us that the Pyrrhonist becomes a skeptic after exasperatedly seeking for dogmatic solutions to philosophical anomaly (PH 1.12, 26). So we presume that Sextus at some point pursued with some tenacity dogmatic solutions to philosophical anomaly himself. This may tell against an appreciation of Sextus as merely a hand that holds a pen. Finally, as for whether Sextus was an original thinker: We face a difficulty in determining what Sextus may have added to Pyrrhonian thinking. He is the sole Pyrrhonian author of whom we possess complete and extensive work, and he is a source for most of what we know about skepticism. Thus, we cannot with much confidence rule out the possibility that Sextus provides original contributions to the Pyrrhonian tradition. True, a crucial part of the Outlines is made up of the Modes of Skepticism—the means for inducing skepticism, and these Modes are attributed to others—to Aenesidemus and Agrippa. And Sextus places himself within a tradition of skepticism that he sees extending back to Pyrrho of Elis and his student Timon of Phlius in the fourth and third centuries B.C. Like Socrates, Pyrrho wrote nothing, while Timon, like Plato, publicized his teacher’s way in writing.25 Sextus will quote Timon explicitly with sympathy,26 or defend him with exegesis.27 Sometimes he will echo him without attribution.28

25 For example Timon fr. 782, 783, 822, 841. See (Long & Sedley, 1987), vol. 1 pp. 18-19. 26 For example, AM 11.1, 19-20, 140. 27 M 1.305-306 provides a defense of Timon’s comparing Pyrrho to the sun. 28 On the Pyrrhonian expression “No more”: PH 1.188-191 cf. DL 9.76

9 Further, much of what Sextus writes about the Pyrrhonian way is phrased in the first person plural, or in the third person—as if Sextus is writing as, or about, a representative of a sect or school. Still, we have also seen that Sextus does use the first person singular. Perhaps we might take such instances as a marker for personal observation on the part of the author. But, as we have discussed above, Sextus’ tendency to report impersonally might just be an appropriate manner of speaking for a Pyrrhonist. If Sextus considered himself to be furthering the Pyrrhonian tradition by adding to it, perhaps he presented his contributions as an extension of a communal Pyrrhonian view without bringing attention to the fact that these contributions are his.

10 A: Skeptical therapy

11 Sketch 1: Pyrrhonism as Philosophical Therapy

12 Intent and motivation

We give a skeptical archeology. We give a sensibility for the possibility of philosophical inquiry as therapy.

13 The principles and aim of Pyrrhonism

Ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism is not just an epistemological stance. Pyrrho- nism’s epistemology is quite deliberately presented as an ethical philosophy. Early on in Book 1 of a small book called the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in a chapter titled What Skepticism Is, Sextus Empiricus tells us that Pyrrhonian skepticism is an ability or mental attitude (dunamis) by which, by opposing appearances (phainomena) and cogitations (nooumena) in whatever way, because of the equipollence (isostheneia) of the objects and the accounts in opposition, “we come first to suspension of judgment (epochē), and then to freedom from disturbance (ataraxia).”29 A little further on, in a chapter called The Principles of Skepticism, Sextus tells us that the causal principle (archēn aitiodēn) of skepticism is the hope of attaining ataraxia, while the fundamental principle (archē malista) of skeptical proofs (sustaseōs tēs skeptikēs) is the opposition of an equal account to any account, for from this the skeptic expects to end up refraining from dogmatizing (katalēgein dokoumen eis to mē dogmatizein).30 And a little further still, in a chapter called What the End of Skepticism Is, Sex- tus says that ataraxia follows epochē ‘like a shadow a body,’31 while qualifying that certain disturbances are immune to epochē:32 The skeptic is not always wholly unmoved, for at times he may be cold or thirsty, and so on. The suffering the Pyrrhonist remains moved by is of things unavoidable (ta katēnankasmena). But even in such cases, the Pyrrhonist is better off as a result of epochē than people who have opinions. For the Pyrrhonist will only experience moderate feeling (metriopatheia) as a result of unadulterated affection, while others will experience

29 PH 1.8. 30 PH 1.12. 31 PH 1.29. 32 Cf. AM 11.149: “For in the person disturbed by hunger or thirst it is not possible to produce by skeptical reasoning (ho kata tēn skepsin logos) the persuasion (peisma) that he is not disturbed, nor is it possible to produce in the person relaxed in relief from these things the persuasion that he is not relaxed about these things.”

14 the affection, as well as suffer the belief that the affection by nature has a particular value—e.g., the belief that the affection is bad.

Epochē, then, results in ataraxia in matters of opinion (en tois doxastois), and in metriopatheia in regard to the katēnankasmena. Sextus goes on to conclude the chapter with the ethical remark that according to the Pyrrhonist ataraxia and metriopatheia is the telos, that is, the overriding final end of human activity—though, Sextus adds, some notable skeptics have added epochē in inquiries (en tais zētēsesin) to this end.33 At the core of Sextus’ Pyrrhonism, then, appear a skeptical ability to induce epochē in matters of opinion via an appreciation of the isostheneia of arguments, and an ethical appreciation of this ability via a recognition of concomitance between epochē and either ataraxia or metriopatheia (depending on whether circumstances involve katēnankasmena),34 together with an endorsement of this result as our ethical telos.

33 PH 1.29-30. The remark appears to deny that the consequent to epochē—i.e., ataraxia—is the end. But the pursuit of tranquility is no less paradoxical than the pursuit of suspension—especially if by a doctrine it is agreed that these are at least different modes of presentation of the same thing. 34 “[D]epending on whether circumstances involve katēnankasmena.” We have not denied that they may always. At any rate, it would appear that the experience of Pyrrhonian ataraxia is itself metriopathetic. See discussion in Scientific suspension as unadulterated philosophical awareness, below.

15 Aim

We aim for an understanding of Pyrrhonism. But, then, if we are generous, we aim for Pyrrhonian understanding. But this could not be given by any dogmatism. Then, our only route to understanding is to perform the Pyrrhonian exercise, and attempt to undergo the Pyrrhonian therapy. Any success we recognize in our reconstruction of the therapy will be felt in its affect. Our initial position, as we are in search of Pyrrhonian understanding, is going to have to be that of the dogmatist. We want to know the facts of the matter in Pyrrhonism. So, if we are to perform the therapy, it must occur in the exercise of giving an accounting of Pyrrhonism.

In the provision of such an account, our interest lies in seeing the motivation for and, by this, the viability of mature Pyrrhonian philosophy—that is, the Hellenistic philosophy Aenesidemus may reasonably be thought to have salvaged from the Academy as it traded its skeptical affinities for Stoic ones in the last days of the Republic in the first century BC, and whose most comprehensive treatment available to us is found in the works of Sextus in the late second, early third century.

Naturally, success of an endeavor in the history of ideas may be expected to require our trying hard to suspend on the presumptions of the present state of the art and to see our way to putting ourselves in the shoes of the alien party under investigation.35 This game of philosophical dress-up is an incipient pleasure of doing history, but it also a condition on the legitimacy of the exercise. We wish to know how they thought, and the norm for charity requires that we willingly seek the possibility of seeing the world through their eyes. The more alien the philosophy strikes us, the more sensitive we should be to this demand. More may be

35 Calcei, in our case.

16 required of us than we naively think is enough. We may too soon become confident of understanding—and so eagerly dismiss, or wrongfully put to use the philosophy. The combination found in Pyrrhonism of the ethical idealization of freedom from disturbance and thoroughgoing skepticism may initially strike the present day analytic reader with one of a gamut of impressions, running from, say, ethnocentric revulsion at a retrograde nihilism, to the amusement of the tourist on an exotic holiday, or to the enthusiastic curiosity of those in search of an alternative to an impression of a culture of self-assured vanity at home. We may, given the apparent predilections of the philosophical culture in which we mature, expect that many of us will not, or no longer, find ourselves with the last impression. But whether we find ourselves not yet primed to don the Pyrrhonian garb, in whichever spirit this work is picked up, we already see that in order to appreciate Pyrrhonism, just given the brief summary of Pyrrhonism’s ethics and epistemology in the foregoing section, we must try to forgo an expectation that Pyrrhonism’s conception of philosophy’s value lies in its ability to capture the world discursively. Pyrrhonism is a philosophy of suspension. The suspensive philosophy purports to provide ethical insight without saying anything of reality that is supposed to be justifiable.

17 The tenor and aim of Sextus’ writing

Our aim becomes an appreciation of the aim and manner of Pyrrhonism’s suspensive philosophy. We may start by noticing that according to Sextus the Pyrrhonist’s evaluation of isostheneia as inducing epochē, and of epochē as inducing ataraxia or metriopatheia, and of ataraxia or metriopatheia as telos is not put forward dogmatically. Sextus says that the Pyrrhonist does not assent to any non-evident matters (adēla), and does not utter expressions (phōnē) concerning adēla as claims of assured existence (ho de skeptikos tas phōnas tithēsi tautas ouch ōs pantōs huparchousas), but merely as unopinionated reports of his impressions.36 And in the first chapter of Book 1 of the Outlines Sextus prefaces his own work with a caveat to this effect:

For the present, we will speak in outline of the skeptical way of life (agōgē), saying beforehand that of nothing of what will be said we maintain strongly that things are no doubt as we say, but that we report of each thing as a chronicler (historikōs) in accordance with the current appearance. PH 1.4

Anything said is not with an attitude of conviction of the truth or likelihood of the thing said, but is some form of impressionistic reportage. By this caveat, Sextus appears to extend Pyrrhonian reservation to Pyrrhonism’s conceiving of the telos as ataraxia and seeing the route to ataraxia through epochē, its espying isostheneia and recognizing epochē, and, indeed, its bracketing what is said by this very caveat. Yet, while Sextus might write as a chronicler of Pyrrhonism, he does not write with disinterest just for the sake of reporting a synopsis of the history, motivation, and methodology of Pyrrhonism as it appears to him.

36 PH 1.14-15.

18 First, Sextus identifies himself as a Pyrrhonist—albeit generally in the first person plural as a member of a chorus of Pyrrhonists. Consider the first instance of Sextus’ showing his colors, which can already be found in the second chapter of Book 1:

So, of the skeptical philosophy, one argument is called ‘general’, and the other ‘specific’, and the general argument is that in which we lay out (ektimetha) the distinctive nature of skepticism, stating what its general idea is, what its principles are, what its arguments, what its criterion, what its telos, what the Modes of epochē are and in what way we accept (paralambanomen) the skeptical denials (apophaseis), and what distinguishes skeptical doubt from similar philosophies. And the specific argument is that in which we speak against (antilegomen) each part of so-called philosophy (kaloumenē philosophia). Let us then first distinctly state the general argument... PH 1.537

Sextus will go on to give the general argument in Book 1, stating the aims and principles of skepticism, distinguishing it from other philosophies, and laying out the Modes of skepticism—a catalogue of abstract reasons driving skepticism, consideration of how these bear on the opinion under evaluation will bring suspension of judgment. And he will deal with the distinct parts of so-called philosophy in the specific argument in Books 2 and 3 (treating logic in Book 2, physics and ethics in Book 3).

So here, barring récherché polyvalence,38 Sextus makes himself a member of a group of speakers who are going to give an account of the general argument of

37 For good measure, see also, e.g., PH 1.9-10, 12, 13, 16-18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 32. 38 We should bear in mind that Sextus will also write in the first person plural while formally leaving it in the middle whether he is speaking as a Pyrrhonist or not. Consider, e.g., the foregoing “we come first to epochē, and then to ataraxia,” where ‘we’ reasonably could be read as referring to those in principle capable of acquiring and deploying the skeptical ability, whether they possess this ability or not. I.e., in Aristotelian terms, ‘we’ might pick out all those who possess the first potentiality for the skeptical dunamis. Cf. De Anima 417a20.

19 skepticism. They see ahead that they will include themselves in this account, and have already conceived of themselves as those who argue against so-called philosophy as accomplished Pyrrhonists who take up some sort of Pyrrhonian attitude to their own apophasis. Second, at the very end of the Outlines, Sextus tells us that the skeptic, from love of humanity, argues with the opinionated with a desire to cure (iasthai) them of opinion (oiēsis) and rashness (propeteia).39 While in an earlier section on the telos of skepticism we are told that such rashness is the source for human excess, and, consequently, suffering.40 In giving the general and specific argument as a Pyrrhonist, Sextus is writing for the sake of the psychological health of the reader. So, Sextus is not just doing doxography. He is working from an enthusiasm for the therapeutic power of Pyrrhonism—an enthusiasm, we might, in espying the difficulty of subscribing to Pyrrhonism under the aspirations of skepticism, begin to worry is difficult to rhyme with any thoroughgoing skepticism.

39 PH 3. 280-1, cf. PH 1230, 3.235-8, AM 11.118. 40 PH 1.27. Cf. AM 11.112-13.

20 A Pyrrhonian medical kit

The skeptic, because he is a philanthropist, wants, in accordance with his power, to cure by logos the self-conceit and rashness of the dogmatist. PH 3.280

In order that we may finally reach suspension by basing our argument on each sense singly, or even by disregarding the senses, we further adopt the Fourth Mode of suspension. This is the Mode based on, as we say, “circumstances”, meaning by “circumstances” conditions or dispositions. PH 1.10041

Age is another cause of difference. For the same air seems chilly to the old but mild to those in their prime… Moreover, those who differ in age are differently moved in choice and avoidance. For whereas children—to take a case—are all eagerness for balls and hoops, men in their prime choose other things, and old men yet others. PH 1.105-642

Another reason why the real objects appear different lies in motion and rest. For those objects which, when we are standing still, we see to be motionless, we imagine to be in motion when we are sailing past them.43 PH 1. 107

See how the author of a pedagogy becomes patient once more: “In order that we may finally reach suspension…” Who, then, is this ‘we’?

Well, at any rate, it may puzzle us to hear that the Pyrrhonist offers her skepticism as therapy from philanthropy. Perhaps we can imagine that love may be present without belief, but we will surely have difficulty conceiving of how a

41 Trans. Bury. 42 Bury.

21 radical (or, perhaps radix seeking) skeptic could pursue without belief a philosophical—and so, we may imagine, rational—therapy for the recipients of such love.

Over the course of what follows, we will attempt to come to some appreciation of the supposed therapeutic power of radical skepticism, both qua its efficacy, and qua its possibility. And, as it will appear that it could not come through mere understanding of theory, we will pursue such appreciation through an attempt, not just to construct, but also to undergo the therapy. And so, also, we will attempt to construct the therapy such that we might undergo it.44 We reach out: Presumably, our willingness to proceed with the therapy would come along in appreciation of our construction as towards an end we should wish to embrace. Presently, to help the reader along in this attempt at construction, and, so, also, begin her therapy, we might preface any such further therapeutic work with an indelicate sketch of the tools, mechanics, and end of the therapy. For the sake of undergoing skeptical therapy, and so, presumably, overcoming dogmatic theoriz- ing, we give a preliminary theory of the Pyrrhonian medicine. At least in word, we attempt to give an initial conception of the Pyrrhonist’s medication, its means of administration, and the intended effect.

Pyrrhonian therapy To begin: The Pyrrhonist appears to appreciate the conception among her fellow ancient colleagues that optimal well-being is conditional on optimal philosophical vision. And—if this is any different—she appears to take seriously the thought that philosophy has no value if it is not therapeutic.

43 Bury: Cf. DRN 4.388. 44 To construct the therapy with the aim of undergoing it: Must the propositional result of such a construction be in any way different from the construction of a theory about Pyrrhonian therapy without such expectation?

22 But the Pyrrhonist offers no particular propositional content as theoretical dogma in optimal philosophical vision. The Pyrrhonist affirms no ontology in scientific—or, if this is any different, theological—dialectic. Rather, rational vision—as the philosophers conceive of it—appears to the Pyrrhonist only optimized through unremitting epistemological purging. As the philosophers conceive of it: The Pyrrhonist appears to imagine herself analyst of the dogmatist, and constructs her patient ad hominem, for the sake of constructing, under norms of rationality, a picture for the patient of himself seeking to be rational—and this for the sake of therapy.

In conception of herself as skeptical therapist, the Pyrrhonist offers the figure of a doctor administering to the patient a medicine, which both purges his supposed illness in dogmatism, as well as itself. As well as itself: Any dogmatic confidence in the factuality of skeptical pro- nouncements is to be purged, too. And yet, it seems, the Pyrrhonist could not act without confidence in design- ing, or revisiting, and tinkering with, her pedagogy. Doesn’t she believe in the efficacy of her medicine, if applied in such and such a way, to bring about such and such an end—and, indeed, a desirable one?

In the skeptical therapeutic purging, for now, we may give the Modes—of which we have just quoted a fourth—as the medication of Pyrrhonism, the activity of attending to them and producing isotheneia as the means of administration, and the supposed result of epochē as the intended effect. And we should, apparently, be careful not to confound Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment with just indifference. If the philosophers are not mistaken, rational exercise may produce vision. But if the Modes appear norms for the performance of this exercise, and they appear indiscriminately to vitiate respite from inquiry, any legitimate rational exercise will not afford vision of scientific facts in dialec-

23 tic. Rather, by the Modes, suspension of judgment will result. But if philosophy under the Modes is still to be good for something, and produce vision, such vision may perhaps still obtain in suspension. And, indeed, the Pyrrhonist says that in suspension, she comes to live in accordance with appearances. Then, Pyrrhonian therapy is not to be understood as just for the sake of producing suspension, but also, in suspension, for the sake of revealing appearances. And it would perhaps be by this promise of vision of appearances through rational exercise that the Pyrrhonist sets herself among the philosophers who promise enlightenment through dogma.

The Modes The Pyrrhonian therapy may be constructed to intend, through an application of the Modes in isotheneia-producing activity, to provide the thinker in reflective equilibrium with suspensive vision of the appearances. To make a first pass at the nature of a skeptical therapy towards appearances, let us try to get a little clearer on the nature of the Modes, the activity of producing isotheneia, and any positive experience of suspension.

Let us begin with the Modes. In the first book of the Outlines, Sextus spends quite some time laying out the Modes.45 We are given three sets of general Modes which seem to involve redundancy, if not inter-dependence: the ten Modes of Aenesidemus, the five of Agrippa, and two Modes whose specific provenance is not given.46

45 See chapters 14-17 of PH 1. 46 We are also given a further eight Aenesidemean Modes against the aetiologists. These Modes against dogmatism in causal accounting appear variations upon the general Modes. (See, e.g., Sextus’ remark at PH 1.185 that possibly the five Agrippan Modes cover the same material, and at PH 1.170 that every matter of inquiry might be brought under the five Modes.)

24 Briefly, the two Modes proceed from (a) the notion that a thing must either be self-evident or apprehended through something else, and (b) a sociological or psychological observation that the controversy among physicists does not allow any dialectical participant to resolve dispute by appeal to self-evidence (for what appears self-evident to one appears mistaken to another), nor does the controversy allow dispute to be settled by appeal to something else (for if what is to be apprehended is always apprehended by something else, we will become involved in a process of circular or regressive reasoning.)

The ten Modes, we might think, give foremost the psychological constraints of the thinker in dialectic. In recognition of these constraints, we may come to recognize the conditions for dialectical activity. And through a recognition of these together, we may come to see how our condition is one of controversy. The ten Modes run on the appearance that the conditions of the observer and observable always bear upon the appearance or thought which the former produces of the latter. But, if this were so, as dialectic is an ongoing process of exchange and assessment of different views, no single subjective view will be able to offer itself as preferable resolution to dialectic. The ten Modes proceed first, in evaluation of the subjective conditions of the observer, from consideration that different species perceive differently, to consideration that different members of the same species man perceive differently, to consideration that the same individual man may perceive the same thing differently through different perceptual modalities, to the consideration that the same modality may present to the individual different perceptions of the same thing at different times and places. But not just the condition of the observer bears upon the perception of the object under investigation: The object perceived never presents itself without conditions either. For example, objects are given to us through media—e.g., in

25 vision, through the air, and through the liquid in our eyes. Or they are either given in isolation, or as constituents of compounds—e.g., shavings from the black horn appear to be white. And so the true nature of the object remains hidden. The eighth Mode goes on to consolidate these results, and make explicit that in general all things appear relative.

And this statement is twofold, implying firstly, relation to the thing which judges (for the external object which is judged appears in relation to that thing), and in a second sense, relation to the accompanying percepts, for instance the right side to the left. Indeed, we have already argued that all things are relative—for example, with respect to the thing which judges, it is in relation to some one particular animal or man or sense that each object appears, and in relation to such and such a circumstance; and with respect to the concomitant percepts, each object appears in relation to some one particular admixture or mode or combination or quantity or position. PH 1.135-647

And next, from the observation that in physics, determination is subject to conditions of subject and object, the ninth and tenth Modes conclude that the same goes for ethics: We readily value or are disturbed by matters in accordance with their rarity or mundaneness; we readily find our own customs and laws fine, but repulsive what is alien.

We see the essence of the two and ten Modes in the five of Agrippa. And, consequently, their formulation shall preoccupy us foremost throughout. We may divide the five Modes into those concerned with the structure of dialectical activity, and those concerned with subjects and objects in such activity. Of the latter: The first Mode gives the dialectical situation of the subjects: They appear in interminable disagreement with each other. The third Mode gives

47 Trans. Bury

26 the epistemological condition of the objects to be apprehended: They remain hidden, as they present themselves in relation both to the subject who makes judgments about them, as well as to further concomitant percepts. Of the former: The second Mode points out that, to a subject who takes our descriptive laws of the dialectical psychology as normative, anything adduced as proof requires further proof, and so on, regressively. The fourth Mode points out that the dogmatists, being so forced to recede ad infinitum, settle for taking as their starting-point a hypothesis they wish or imagine to be already conceded, but has not yet been. And the fifth Mode points out that no escape lies by way of circular reasoning. For if the proof that is to confirm the matter depends on the matter it is to prove, neither can be established antecedently in order to lend support to the other.

In this way, by these sets of Modes, if Pyrrhonian epistemology is concerned with the conditions of how thinkers may know, it shows itself first concerned with their fragmented dialectical situation. The dialectical thinkers are barred from knowledge as long as they are still at a remove from their dialectical partners. And isn’t such a remove a necessary condition for dialectical activity? Doesn’t it involve dispute? Then, perhaps we could not know, as long as we presented our proposition in dialectic in expectation that it will find favor everywhere. If our present interlocutor at the physical table agrees with us, still we imagine ourselves among, if we can give no criterion for their limit, an infinite number of perspectives. In dialectic we face the problem that it appears that in order to participate in it we must assert something, but that this act of assertion also seems to destroy dialectic. For in general, we have no reason to imagine ourselves any better thinkers than others in an attempt at philosophical exercise. We should be patient with anyone who comes to do philosophy, and hope for patience from them, too.

27 Any practical universal maxim we might also apply in the contemplative activity of dialectic.

The condition of the objects and subjects of dialectic vitiate determination. In a community of dissenters—different in opinion, but, presumably, at least if we are charitable and patient, equal in rational power—we may not just take for granted that our judgment forms a correct hypothesis. In a state of controversy in dialectic, we cannot just assert our judgment, but must show it correct. We must then, it seems, give further reasons. But the norms against regress and circularity vitiate any conclusive explanation of our determination. Sensitive, in one way, to both her dialectical condition as subject amongst dissenting judges and the relative condition of the objects to be judged, and, in another way, to the rules of her activity which formalize the dissent, the Pyrrhonist works towards suspension in appreciation of the dynamic, ever ongoing nature of dialectic. Dialectic is supposed to settle the appearance of anomaly in, and uncover the principles of, our variegated, fluctuating experience. In this way we started off in dialectic in hope of attaining rest from our inquiry. But dialectic is itself a fluctuating activity. Any rest we are to find in dialectic then would have to come in alignment of the psychē with this fluctuation. If we seek it anywhere else—that is, in affirmation of our dialectical proposition—we do so in the sort of blindness to our situation the dogmatist would wish to cure the naïve of.

For if a person propounds a cause, it will either be or not be in accord with all the philosophical systems and with Scepticism and with appearances. Probably, however, it is impracticable to propound a cause in accord with all of these, since all things, whether apparent or non-evident, are matters of controversy. But if, on the other hand, the cause propounded be not in accord therewith, the theorist will be asked in turn for the cause of this cause, and if he assumes an apparent

28 cause for an apparent, or a non-evident for a non- evident, he will be involved in the regress ad infinitum, or reduced to arguing in a circle if he grounds each cause in turn on another. And if at any point he makes a stand, either he will state that the cause is well grounded so far as relates to the previous admis- sions, thus introducing relativity and destroying its claim to absolute reality, or he will make some assumption ex hypothesi and will be stopped by us. PH 1.185-648

Ad hominem analysis Now, consider in the quote above, for example, the phrase: the theorist will be asked. In this sort of way, we see the Pyrrhonist, in her iterative attempts at formulation of the Modes, construct her material from attention to the behavior of the dialectician. If we ask of the Pyrrhonist: “Where do you get these Modes from?” perhaps the Pyrrhonist may point to the behavior of the dogmatist: In dialectic, the theorist will be asked for more. Anyone who refuses to comply would give up on the exercise. In so far as she so refuses, it seems anything she has to say is no longer of concern to those who would sit around and love wisdom through disagreeing about its nature. Well, we have said that the Pyrrhonist works ad hominem. For example, a conception of tranquility as end would be given ad hominem. The Pyrrhonist would analyze philosophical activity, and suffer the appearance that its end is tranquility. And, so also she might analyze towards the Modes as description of the dialectical situation. But surely, the vision of disease and therapy that is the result of this analysis cannot be given to her as true in dialectic. Any rational motivation for her therapeutic activity must come from elsewhere.

29 The skeptic’s suffering the appearance of the astuteness of the skeptical therapist, we may feel, might not require any ontological commitment on the Pyrrho- nist’s part. If the Parmenidean might pluck a thorn from his foot without giving up his monism, or the physicalist speak of her pain, or otherwise—in, apparently, all honesty—put to use indexical terminology, then perhaps the Pyrrhonist might practice in skepticism a worldly profession in medicine.49 In this profession, we are to imagine the Pyrrhonist as analyst to philosophers: Harmlessly, without committing herself—and so not even thinking that by her activity of analysis she purports to set herself above her patients—she analyzes the philosophers, to try and discover that what they ultimately aim for in doing philosophy is to enjoy the experience of the skeptic. This suggestion that the Pyrrhonist works ad hominem proceeds from, first, the impression that, since the skeptic could not be offering theories of her own, she must be giving them ad hominem.

48 Trans. Bury. 49 If the patient asks: “Do you think this medicine of yours will cure?” the doctor, sheerly qua doctor, must evaluate qua the production of the intended effect of her skill upon the patient, whether it is helpful to answer philosophically, or whether she might better put on her white coat, and speak to her patient as if in possession of some magic which is secret at least because it is difficult to communicate. Of course, if an oncologist were treating an oncologist, any attempt at obfuscation on the part of the doctor would be vain given the talents of the patient. But, then, perhaps, our present sort of question might not even get to be asked. But if it did, we would have to speak honestly. So, e.g., from philosopher to philosopher, the skeptic, if asked whether she thinks her therapy cures, will have to assess how she should reply given her therapeutic end. But here, since the medicine is in and through philosophy, it seems there are no further, secret, medical considerations to hide from the philosopher. Mustn’t the Pyrrhonist then speak in dialectic, and, since she purports to offer skepticism, say: “Perhaps,”? Then, the patient might be reluctant to continue. Still, the Pyrrhonist seeks to offer escape from assertion in rational dialectic, and yet, through rational activity towards the discovery of appearance from which to act, a continuation of philosophical activity. Between patient and doctor, something remains hidden, such that, just as when speaking qua oncologist to the commoner, it may be therapeutic to avoid involved discussion in science and ontology, so too, when talking to the philosopher, the skeptic might not need to worry when her pronouncement about the mechanics of the psychology of the thinker engaged in dialectic is still taken by her patient as expressed dogmatically. Though the Pyrrhonist’s therapy, just as any skillful activity, must be responsive to appearances, perhaps it need not proceed from a dialectical affirmation of facts.

30 Second, the analysis proceeds with attention to the ancient conception of the value of philosophical activity as lying in its supposed therapeutic power, and, also, perhaps, to the ancient conception of education as being just that: a leading out of the student. The Pyrrhonist wishes to perform therapy from philanthropy no less than her colleagues. But, therapy, we might appreciate, comes—especially if we cannot just command our patient to act and feel well—through revealing to the patient his situation. In philanthropy, the Pyrrhonist confronts the dogmatist with the Modes not from a desire to legislate, but from a desire to reveal to him his rational situation as he produces it.

Epochē through isotheneia

Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgments in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude. Now we call it an "ability" not in any subtle sense, but simply in respect of its "being able." By "appearances" we now mean the objects of sense-perception, whence we contrast them with the objects of thought or "judgments." The phrase "in any way whatsoever" can be connected either with the word "ability," to make us take the word "ability," as we said, in its simple sense, or with the phrase "opposing appearances to judgments"; for inasmuch as we oppose these in a variety of ways – appearances to appearances, or judgments to judgments, or alternando appearances to judgments, -- in order to ensure the inclusion of all these antitheses we employ the phrase "in any way whatsoever." Or, again, we join "in any way whatsoever" to "appearances and judgments" in order that we may not have to inquire how the appearances appear or

31 how the thought-objects are judged, but may take these terms in the simple sense. The phrase "opposed judgments" we do not employ in the sense of nega- tions and affirmations only but simply as equivalent to "conflicting judgments." "Equipollence" we use of equality in respect of probability and improbability, to indicate that no one of the conflicting judgments takes precedence of any other as being more probable. "Suspense" is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything. "Quietude" is an untroubled and tranquil condition of soul. PH 1.8-1050

The Modes are to remind the dogmatist of his dialectical situation. And by bringing them to his attention, the Pyrrhonist aims to facilitate his suspension. We said the medicine was the Modes, and their administration the production of equipollence. But in this administration, the patient need not be fed just the abstractions that we are, in dialectic, in a state of disunity, and that the Modes against hypothesis, regress, and circularity describe the dynamic nature of the psychē in dialectical activity, as well as, normatively, vitiate its terminal unification. Equipollence is with regard to particular content, consideration of which against a background awareness—or, if you will, in a constant revisiting—of our dialectical situation produces suspension.

The Modes, then, are to frame contemplation. Against their background, if we are presented with two or more apparently inconsistent views, we will supposedly remember our dialectical situation. In it, each view—or, perhaps, each party hypothesized as supporting a particular view— will in the end appear to disagree with another as to the criteria to be applied in the settling of dispute. But this question of criterion appears to remain—given the Modes against hypothesis, regress, and circularity—presently outstanding.

50 Bury.

32 Take for example the question of whether we are immortal or not. Say we were familiar with only two sets of arguments—those of the Phaedo for our immortality, those of the Epicureans, against. When we consider the matter, we will do so through consideration of the arguments. But in remembering our dialectical situation—by remembering we are one voice among many, and that the Modes vitiate any preference among them—we are to suspend.

The Pyrrhonist, in seeking for equilibrium between views, lays in the balance one position against another so as to produce isotheneia, and then epochē. If one view at first seems more attractive to her than another, she may, through her training, come to cast back a glance at her dialectical situation, and correct towards suspension. In the end, a difference in intricacy, economy, or rhetorical persuasiveness, etc., between different views would perhaps at best be appreciated as a difference in aesthetic features of these views. At any rate, when considered against the Modes, the presence or absence of these features would have no bearing on whether one view was correct, and the other not. In the end, then, consideration of the Modes appears productive of suspension irrespective of the particular contents. Indeed, this is so much so, that if we are presented with just a single, unop- posed view, the Pyrrhonist remains shamelessly impressed by an appearance that, still, this view is offered in open-ended dialectic. Perhaps in the future, she will discover some view to lay against it in opposition.51

51 PH 1.33-34: With a different idea we oppose things present sometimes to things present, as in the foregoing examples, and sometimes to things past or future, as, for instance, when someone propounds to us a theory which we are unable to refute, we say to him in reply, "Just as, before the birth of the founder of the school to which you belong, the theory it holds was not as yet apparent as a sound theory, although it was really in existence, so likewise it is possible that the opposite theory to that which you now propound is already existent, though not yet apparent to us, so that we ought not as yet to yield assent to this theory which at the moment seems to be valid."

33 Perhaps in the future: We have said that any persistent controversy between thinkers would seem to vitiate knowledge in the individual thinker. This might strike us as wrong-headed. For example: Couldn’t we know something, while our student still disagrees? But if by this we come to think that we know better than our student, we come to know better now than our past selves. But we are not dead yet. Our thought is ongoing. And by this sort of consideration, we might conceive of how our dialectical opponent could be ourselves somewhere else in time.

Even if we could see everyone agree right now that the world is such and such, as long as we are changing thinkers in a changing world, nothing is settled. We may discover something earth-shattering in the future. And this consideration should be enough to make us doubt. And from doubt, through the Modes, we would move to suspension. We would first consider the empirical Modes concerning the relation between subject and object, and remember our isolation in dialectic: We differ from each other with regard to the object in so far as our faculties, upbringing, and position differ. But we differ in at least one of these ways from our past selves. And then we consider how the Modes of hypothesis, regression, and circularity vitiate rest in dialectic: We may not prefer our present view over past or future views.

Appearance in epochē We are supposed to undergo a rational therapy which produces in us a particularly abstracted awareness of our dialectical situation, so that we may suspend. But what would that leave us with? But the experience of epochē is not supposed to be of a void, but of presence. In suspension, we said, the Pyrrhonist supposedly discovers appearance.

34 The skeptical activity would be valuable if it could purge us of inconsequential concern, but, also, if it could offer us vision about the things we cannot help but care about. After all, the skeptic may through suspension become tranquil in matters of philosophy, but remains metriopathetic with regard to what lies unavoidably in appearance. Perhaps a metriopathetic suspensive appearance is discovered in reflective equilibrium between opposing views. Then, appearance would be with regard to something under discussion. For example: Should we do as the tyrant says?52 Or, e.g.: Are we immortal? In laying one pertinent view against another in the balance, the Pyrrhonist would come to suspend, and so become privy to an unadulterated appearance with regard to such questions.

But we have also imagined someone who says, in response to something she continues—perhaps, even again and again—to find, as she looks back at it from having surveyed her dialectical situation, inexorable: “Yes, that is all very well, but perhaps in the future, we will find an argument we can oppose to it, and, by considering it against the background of the Modes, we will come to suspend on it. And, indeed, this consideration in itself is enough to suspend. The sheer consideration of our dialectical situation under the Modes, is enough to suspend.” What, then, would we say of the suspensive appearance of this thinker? Perhaps, first, we should consider the kind of thing that could serve as object for such a response. It would, since dispute is nigh pervasive, and opposing views obtain in nigh all domains of inquiry, have to be something special. Perhaps a seemingly basic negative dogmatism, such as: “The fundamental principle cannot be grasped,” or a seemingly basic committed skepticism: “The Modes obtain, and dialectic is ever dynamic.” Or a seemingly basic positive dogmatism: “The principle of non-contradiction obtains.”

52 Perhaps: We shall decide.

35 Whatever it is, if she manages to suspend on its initial self-evidence just by attention to the Modes, we might no less imagine the Pyrrhonist’s appearance to be profound, than we are tempted to imagine it to be shallow.

What is suspensive appearance? Epochē, then, produces vision of appearance. And this appearance would, under a norm for tranquility, be metriopathetic. With regard to a determination of the nature of such skeptical appearance: There is ever a question about whether the Pyrrhonist can have beliefs, and if so, what they are. And this issue appears of special urgency in the consideration that rational human activity in the world requires belief. Now, the Pyrrhonist tells us that she does have beliefs, in that she accepts appearances, but not in the sense that she has a position in matters of opinion about whatever generates the appearance. And the Pyrrhonist also says, in reply to the challenge that activity requires belief, that she just follows appearances in her activity. We might think that the concepts of Pyrrhonian belief with regard to appearance, of suspensive appearance, and of Pyrrhonian metriopatheia are somehow to replace the role of belief in those philosophies of agency that would bring a challenge of inactivity in skepticism. Well, if we are unclear about what metriopatheia is, or what the beliefs of the Pyrrhonist might be, we might still seek, by an attempt to undergo the skeptical therapy and administer the Modes to ourselves, rational access to this supposed ground for skeptical activity in an experience of suspension and suspensive appearance. Now, if the nature of skeptical appearance can only be appreciated in suspension, then, for example, if we see Sextus say that the skeptic does not question whether honey appears sweet, but whether it is indeed sweet, we may be in danger of allowing the Pyrrhonist beliefs about appearances such that she gets to say, e.g.: “It is true that honey appears sweet to me.”

36 But this might be a mistake. Or, at any rate, it would be a mistake to think skeptical appearance claims as of a kind with claims about scientific nature, and think that it is just the content of the claim that differentiates Pyrrhonian acceptance of appearance claims from rejection of philosophical claims. For example, the truth of the claim ‘Honey appears sweet’ would seem contingent on there being a subject—the I—and objects—honey and sweetness. But we see the Pyrrhonist also impressed by, e.g., Gorgias of Leontini’s argument against the possibility of the existence of anything. And further, acceptance of the truth of the claim ‘Honey appears sweet,’ would seem to require a belief in the existence of claims, and we will see that the Pyrrhonist even tries to suspend on whether or not there are claims. The notion of appearance by which the skeptic lives her life, then, we must imagine different from that which we would take for granted when we want to say: “See, the Pyrrhonist does think claims about her appearances are true. For it is these that she acknowledges and constructs a life upon.” And so we must expect to have to do quite some therapeutic work in order to fathom this alien Pyrrhonian appearance which supposedly provides material for tranquil living.

37 Philosophy as therapy

Sextus’ chronicle of skepticism contains the expression of his allegiance to skepticism, and is written as an exercise of skeptical therapy by which he wishes to liberate his reader from dogmatism so that she may live happily as a skeptic. Sextus’ therapeutic ambition is an expression of the ambition of Greco-Roman philosophy. Ancient philosophy, its ethics and its politics, but also its physics and metaphysics, its logic, and its epistemology, has explicit therapeutic presumptions—of offering to the individual an art of living happily, of offering a worldview that provides a context for such living, of seeing in the activity of philosophizing an opportunity for psychological perfection or katharsis, or of politically, educationally, and culturally engineering the state towards happiness.53

We may find a beginning to this intellectual tradition in fragmentary evidence that archaic philosophers were trying to emancipate themselves and their fellows by a rational account of the world from fear of gods or death. For example, Pythagoreans proselytized their metaphysics of the soul with a promise of escape from earthly misery in a better life after death.54 Empedocles, apparently a doctor by profession,55 appears to have seen in the knowledge of the general principles of reality powers to heal the sick, transcend death without fear, and restore the human soul to its status among the gods.56 And Heraclitus, thinking himself in possession of rational intelligence of the world, came to see as in vain the religious rituals that

53 As a generalization, this will have to stand here with but little elaboration. Modern loci for fuller accounts include (Nussbaum, 1994), (Sorabji, 2000), (Annas, 1993), (Jaeger, NaN), (Laín Entralgo, 1970). Also (Long, 2006), Ch. 1-2, (Harris, 2001), Ch. 14. 54 Herodotus 4.95 (DK 14, 2). 55 For example, DL 8.58. (Barnes, 1979), p. 177. 56 Empedocles, Fr. 111, DL 8, 59, Fr. 112, DL 8, 62, Inscriptiones Graecae 64, 641, 1 (DK 1B18), Clement, Strom. 4.50, 1 and 5.122, 3. See (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 1983), p. 314-6.

38 were to purify wrongdoing or elicit favor from the gods, and to recognize in the nature of reality principles for action.57 In the classical period, the therapeutic ambitions of Greek philosophy are promulgated explicitly. The fifth century atomist Democritus tells us that philosophy rids the soul of pathē as medicine rids the body of diseases.58 For Democritus, philosophy identifies our supreme good as well-being (euestō) or contentment (euthumia),59 and moderation the means to its attainment.60 Philosophy shows us that happiness does not lie in the satisfaction of a boundless desire for material wealth and preservation of our lives.61 In so far as we have true material needs, they are easily satisfied, while desire for anything more is vicious, inherently counterproductive, and enslaves and torments us.62 In fact, immoderate desire blinds us to the point where we take for granted a falsehood as an intuitive truth: That the wrongdoer may suffer less than the wronged.63 What we should instead aim for is an imperturbable wisdom in which we do not even wish for vice, but recognize our sufficiency as a fortune.64 Much of this we find of concern to Democritus’ junior contemporary Socrates, and Socrates’ philosophical descendants Plato and Aristotle. Famously, Plato’s Socrates declares his motivation to philosophize with his fellows in the Apology as a divine inspiration to urge them not to care for body or property more than the virtue of their psuchē, for from this come all good things to individual and state.65

57 Aristocritus Theosophia 68, Heraclitus, Fr. 5. Heraclitus complains that the people, unaware of the true nature of divinity, will seek to purify blood-guilt by defiling themselves with blood—as if they could wash mud with mud—and that they pray to statues as if they could talk with houses. Cf. Stobaeus Anth. 3.1.79, Heraclitus Fr. 114. For discussion of the relation between the divine logos of the cosmos and human law, (Kirk et al., 1983), p. 212. 58 Democritus, Fr. 31, in Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 1.6, cf. Fr. 288. 59 DL 9.45, Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 2.130, Cicero, De Finibus. 5.87-8, Seneca, De Tranquilitate Animi 2.3. 60 Fr. 35. 61 For the latter, especially Frr. 201-6. 62 For example, Frr. 72, 88, 174, 191, 219, 223, 224, 231, 233. 63 Fr. 45. Cf. Gorgias 474b-476a. 64 Frr. 40, 62, 187, 215-6. 65 Apol. 29d-e, 30a. Prot., passim, especially 329b-33b, 340c, 360e-61c.

39 Plato depicts Socrates as driven to dialectical activity with his conversational partner to make her alive to an insufficiently examined belief in the value of wealth and conventional honor by rational cross-examination, or elenchos.66 In this activity, the ideal philosopher is shown akin to that of a doctor,67 but where the doctor heals the body by the art of medicine, the philosopher may through Socratic elenchos push the individual to evaluate herself rationally and honestly, and purge her psuchē of unwarranted commitment.68 Both Plato and Aristotle are often understood to entertain dogmatically a eudaimonism on which our capacity for happiness is exhausted by our capacity for virtue. In so far as virtue either amounts to a psychological alignment between impetus to activity and knowledge of value, or, straightforwardly, to such knowledge tout court, their philosophy is to facilitate this ideal psychology—e.g., by the provision of paradigms for ethical investigation, by the general evaluation of the gamut of conceptions of the human end, by the particular study of the practical psychology of the sophos, and, last, but not least, by the invitation through engaged reflection upon their philosophy to actualize our most godlike and perfect of human capacities in theoretical contemplation.69 Through the eudaimonism of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, the appreciation of the therapeutic powers of philosophy becomes the singular focus of the Hellenistic schools. The schools emphatically express a sensibility that philosophy would have little worth were it not for its power to allow us to overcome our proclivity for disturbance from what is held to be immoderation—whether appetitive, speculative, or, if this is not exhaustive, emotional. For the schools, it is solely in

66 Prot. 327d ff. 67 Prot. 312c, Gorg. 477a ff, 503e ff, Rep. IV, 444d, Charm., passim, notably 156d-157a, and 155b5-6, where Critias orders his servant to call Charmides to talk with Socrates under the pretense of Charmides’ having his headache diagnosed by a doctor. On the underlying seriousness in the presumed irony at work here: (Schmid, 1998), 175, n. 29. For the symmetrical relation between health of soul and body: Tim. 87d. 68 Soph. 226d-228e, 230d, 231e. 69 For a conception of theōria as our perfect activity, e.g.: Plato: Symposium 211d, Phaedrus 247d, Rep. 517d Tim. 47b-d; Aristotle: NE 10.7, 1178b28. Aristotle tells us in Book 10 that

40 the remedy of the ailments of the psuchē—e.g., greed, boredom, restlessness, dependency, fear, hope, and pride—that philosophy is understood to find its legitimacy. So, Epicurus, conceiving of happiness as freedom from physical pain and mental distress, and—after Democritus—seeing irrational fear of death and gods as the main obstacle to its attainment,70 tells us that just as medicine that does not heal is useless, philosophical argument without therapeutic effect is empty.71 And in the age of Seneca, Epictetus gives concise expression of the Stoic motivation for philosophy: Happiness lies in virtue, and virtue is contingent on what the Stoics call orthos logos—right reason free of the erroneous judgments that they identify with emotional disturbance. And he warns that contemplation of the technical problems of philosophy is without merit if it does not contribute to virtue.72 By purging irrational fears and desires through analysis, the philosophy of Stoics and Epicureans hopes to provide therapy to the thinker. The thinker is to gain a wisdom in which rational clarity with regard to the principles of the world yields clarity about what is of significance to the human subject in the world.

We should understand Pyrrhonism, and so, Sextus’ Outlines in the context of this tradition of philosophy as therapy. However, Sextus appears to motivate the Pyrrhonist’s exchange with the opinionated for the sake of wellbeing not just by seeing, as do his rivals, in philosophy an underlying concern with therapy, but, further, by finding in opinionated philosophical activity a source for disturbance that puts us in need of therapy:

contemplation, being continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and divine, is the highest good for humankind. 70 KD 11-12. 71 Porphyry, To Marcella 31, Cf. KD 11-13, (Long & Sedley, 1987), 25B-C. 72 Cf. VS 54: The Stoic must not pretend to be a philosopher, but really do philosophy, for they do not deisre to appear healthy, but really be so.

41 We say that the quasicausal origin of skepticism is the hope of attaining tranquility (ataraktēsein). For those endowed with genius among humans, disturbed (tarassamenoi) by anomaly in matters and puzzled about which of these matters they ought to rather assent to, set out to seek after what is true and what is false in matters, in order that by settling these things they would become tranquil (ataraktēsontes). PH. 1.1273

And:

For [the skeptic] having begun to philosophize to determine and comprehend about the appearances what is true and what false, so as to attain tranquility (ataraktēsai), fell into an equipollent inconsistency the determination of which, he being unable, was closed off from. But upon his being closed off by happenstance tranquility in matters of opinion followed closely. PH 1.2674

In Pyrrhonism, the ideal of imperturbability has been abstracted as the philosopher’s telos, and a persistent looking for a foothold when drawn along by reason has been diagnosed as impediment to the attainment of this ideal.

73 Cf. Rep. 424e. 74 Cf. Metaphysics 1.2, 982b11-17, (Long, 2006), p. 46.

42 Skepticism as purgative of belief

The Pyrrhonist’s appreciation of her therapeutic aim and method is produced by an appearance in her that unnecessary psychological tarachē results from pursuit of ends with a dogmatic attitude. Conversely, epochē appears to bring ataraxia, and, given that happiness is the telos, and the telos is ataraxia, shedding dogmatism is said to make for the most happy life.75 For the Pyrrhonist there is a productive relation between dogmatism and tarachē—the Pyrrhonist says that belief produces rashness, and rashness disturbance:76

Now all unhappiness (kakadaimonia) occurs because of tarachē. But also all tarachē is a constant attribute of humans, to be sure, because of the intense pursuit of something, or also the intense flight from something. At any rate, all humans run after what is believed good for themselves, and flee what is conceived to be bad. As it seems that all unhappiness occurs at the moment of, on the one hand, pursuing good things as good, and, on the other, fleeing bad things as bad, since, now, the dogmatist has believed that this is by nature good, and this by nature bad, always on the one hand pursuing this, on the other, avoiding this, and because of this, being disturbed, he (the dogmatist) is never happy.

AM 11.112-13

The philosopher will think that pursuit of our aims is futile if by their attainment we make no progress towards the telos well-considered. By this standard, any layperson’s aims may quickly appear short-sighted to the Greco-Roman ethicist well-used to consider the possibility of satisfaction in the context of a natural teleology for humans.

75 PH 1.25-25, AM 11.1, cf. DL 9.64-65, Photius Library 169b21.

43 Therapeutic philosophy is a technē, and just like any other, its proficiency can be expected to require training. Laypeople lack this training, lack a capacity for considered ethical evaluation, or lack the philosophical sensitivity to separate out rational from impulsive considerations. Their pursuits are so suspect to the philosopher, that the greater the number of pursuants, the more readily the end is to be dismissed. Thus, the Stoic Seneca:

When it comes to the happy life, it will do no good that, after the manner of the Senate’s voting practice, you answer: “That party appears the greater.” Because for that reason it is worse. The state of human affairs is not so great that the best things please the most: Proof of the worst sort is the mob. Seneca, De Vita Beata 2.177

Once we have attained the non-philosophical aims of the layperson, we are supposed to have gained in happiness. But history bears out repeatedly by the downfall of those who gain commonly considered boons such as pleasure, physical health, wealth and power that the attainment of such aims is not sufficient for our happiness.78 The attainment of such boons is subsequently vulnerable to vicissitude or is unavoidably transitory, and will turn out devoid of fulfillment. As a result, either we are not only disturbed in pursuing such aims when we are at a

76 Cf AM 11.141-6, 156-9, PH 1.27, PH 3.235-7. For Epicurean affinity with this idea, Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.13.28, 3.15.32-33. 77 A sentiment familiar to Seneca from Epicurus, and one which he thinks is shared by all philosophical factions. Ep ad Luc. 29.10. 78 Of course, it is a bone of contention what exactly the value of commonly perceived boons such as health, wealth and power is. For example, in the Meno, Socrates expresses the idea that their value is contingent on the wisdom of their possessor (87c-89a), while in the Gorgias, we find expression of a vulgar sensibility that it would be ridiculous to hold as indifferent such commonly perceived boons just in virtue of the possibility of their misuse. Cf. Gorgias, 456c–57c, and 466e- 467a, Isocrates Nicoles 1-4, Aristotle, NE 1.3.3 and Rhetoric, 1.1.12–13. The debate subsequently is continued by Epicureans and Stoics. The Epicureans are ready to embrace any natural advantage such as health as a boon, while the Stoics, for whom strictly only virtue has value, try to mitigate the charge of being ridiculous by giving such boons the status of a preferred indifferent. See, e.g., Epicurus Ep. ad Men. 128, Cicero TD 2.5, 2.7, 2.12, Diogenes Laertius DL 7.102, Seneca De Vita Beata 22.3.

44 remove from them, but we are also disturbed when we have attained them, from fear of being pushed away from them; or the attainment of our non-philosophical aims is followed by ennui and a drive for some new aim.

In the tradition of philosophy as therapy, traditional philosophy is to save us from unhappiness by showing us what we ought to pursue, and how or with what attitude we ought to pursue it, via a determination of the nature of the world and our place in it. If before we were lost, philosophy is to reveal to us that we did not understand what we want, or that we wanted the wrong things, or wanted them in the wrong way. Philosophy is to replace our confusion with clarity, or, if it could get a hold of us early enough, it is to help shape us so that we might avoid making the mistakes of the distressed altogether.

Disagreement among the schools is, then, no trivial matter. Our happiness is at stake in getting the facts right. And making a mistake in our philosophical commitment may even add to our distress.

All, brother Gallio, want to live happily, but they are too blind to see clearly what it is that effects the happy life; so difficult is it to follow the happy life that anyone recedes the further from it the more excit- edly he is drawn towards it—if he has fallen off the road. When this leads him in the wrong direction, sheer velocity is the cause of a greater distance. De Vita Beata 1.1

The Pyrrhonist will agree that exacerbated distress results from misdirected aims, but thinks that the pursuit of happiness with opinionated fervor constitutes such misdirection. It is not the content of the particular dogmatic aim, but the structure of the activity of aiming dogmatically that produces disturbance. Any

45 philosophical determination of facts about the world and subsequent prescription of a commensurate telos to pursue makes not for a philosophical cure, but swaps one disease for another. The vulgar formulation of an aim that we must see achieved in our lives has been substituted for a philosophical formulation, and we remain expectant of its fulfillment in aiming for it:

But to say that one must not pursue this because it is base, but eagerly pursue that because it is brilliant (lamproteron), this is of men who are not undoing disturbance (tarachēn), but of those who are effecting a transference of it. For just as someone pursuing the first is disturbed (ōchleito), so also the one pursuing the second will be disturbed, so that the logos of the philosopher creates a new disease in the stead of another disease, since in diverting the person rushing after wealth or repute or health as good towards, not these, but the fine (kalon), perhaps, and virtue, he does not liberate himself from the pursuit, but substitutes a different pursuit. Just as, then, the doctor, in doing away with pleu- risy by creating inflammation of the lungs, or in re- moving phrenitis while importing lethargy instead, does not deliver [the patient] from danger, but ex- changes it, so, too, the philosopher, introducing one disturbance for another, does not help the disturbed person.

AM 11.134-137

Compare an instance of a tendency for those informed by Pyrrhonism no longer to have the patience to attribute a source in their readily quoting its philosophy:79

79 See the Preface of the Twilight of the Idols: “An expression, whose origin I deny those of a scholarly curiosity, was for long my motto: The will increases, virtue flourishes through injury.” As a tendency requires more than one instance: Cf. M. 8.481 and Tractatus 6.54.

46 Is it necessary to still point out the mistake which lay in [Socrates] belief in “reason at any cost?” It is a self-deceit on the part of philosophers and moralists thereby to step so soon out of décadence that they make war against the same thing. This stepping out is beyond their power: What they choose as means, as salvation, is once more just an expression of déca- dence—they change its expression, but they do not manage to make it go away. Socrates was a mistake...

Pyrrhonism presumes to offer an alternative to a life lived in pursuit of the naïvely opined aims of the layperson, or the subtly opined aims of the philosopher. According to Sextus, the Pyrrhonist is by the skeptical ability purified of the strictures of living under the norm of belief. In this purification he comes to live happily and free from the drive of rash pursuit to put right a perceived imperfection—whether practically or epistemically. Purged of belief, the Pyrrhonist neither indulges in the irrational excesses of the commoner, nor rejects these excesses for those of the dogmatist. Sextus tells us that the Pyrrhonist goes on to live his life without belief, just in accordance with his appearances. He engages undogmatically in human activity kata tēn biotikēn tērēsin—in accordance with the fourfold observance of the laws of common life: By inborn guiding patterns, the Pyrrhonist is innately capable of sensation and thought. By necessity of feeling, hunger, say, drives him to food. By the transmission of laws and customs, he accepts, in appreciation of the tenor of common life (biōtikōs), that pious living is good, impious bad. By what is taught in the arts (didaskalia technōn), he is not inactive in the arts he accepts.80 In this way, Sextus tells us, the Pyrrhonist lives without beliefs, calmly and gently without reaching precipitously beyond himself towards a desired end, but 81 following nature like a boy his chaperone.

80 PH 1.19-24, cf. 15, 226, 237, 3.235, AM 11.118. 81 PH 1.228-30.

47 The need to cure the philosopher

You see how the god strikes with lightning the animals that rise above the rest, and does not suffer their making a show of themselves, while the smaller do not provoke him to jealousy. And you see how likewise his bolts fall suddenly always on the highest dwellings and trees. For the god loves to prune all things that exalt themselves. Thus accordingly also an army of many men may by a few utterly destroy itself, when the god in his jealousy throws against them fear or thunder, by which they are destroyed in a manner unworthy of themselves. For the god does not allow anyone except himself to think high thoughts. Herodotus, Histories, 7.10.48-5682

A feeling that the layperson stands in need of a cure should perhaps not surprise the student of human behavior, but nor perhaps should the idea that the philosopher is no different surprise anyone who is either a reasonably self-aware philosopher herself, or privy to those biographical anecdotes of philosophers a philosopher likes to regale us with—if not just for the sake of amusement (if this is possible), then perhaps as a warning to themselves that they should not be mistaken to think that it is philosophy, if anything, that improves us; or perhaps as a form of self-flattery, from an assumption that the possibility of the philosophical genius’ suffering from insanity is a mark of the difficulty of the problems they have had the gumption to face.

The conception of the philosopher as psychologically off-kilter is at any rate not an uncommon one among the ancient philosopher’s intended audience. Dedicated to the bios theōrētikos—the life of contemplation—the philosopher gives the appearance of distraction to the point of negligence.

82 An excerpt from Artabanus’ speech warning Xerxes against invading Greece.

48 —For he does not abstain from [affairs of the city] for the sake of appearing distinguished, but because in reality only his body is located and at home in the city. But his mind, deeming all these things small and nothing, disdains them, and flies abroad in every direction, as Pindar says, “under the earth”, and, measuring the plain by geometry, practicing astronomy, “beyond heaven”, and, seeking in every way the complete nature of every whole thing from among the things that are, condescending to nothing that is near to him. —How do you mean, Socrates? —Well Theodorus, for example, they say that when Thales—while he was doing astronomy and looking up—fell into a well, some witty and comely Thracian slave-girl joked that while he eagerly sought to know the heavens, what was right in front of him by his feet escaped him. The same joke applies to all who pass life in philosophy. It really is true that the man nearby as well as his neighbor escape such a person… Theatetus, 173e-174a

The anecdote of Thales’ falling into a well from stargazing is charming enough, but behind it lurk serious concerns. To start, the philosopher appears so preoccupied with her pursuit that she comes to disdain common-sense prudence. This disdain per se might constitute enough cause for concern. But, moreover, the disdain is the product of the philosopher’s preoccupation: She has become so ardent in her pursuit of philosophical wisdom, and such a believer in her progress, that she takes the philosophical perspective she has gained as reason to radically reject both the values of the masses, and, concomitantly, to shrug off any expectations of her that the masses may have thought to be entitled to by these values. The philosopher’s disdain is a symptom of a catholicism the philosopher herself might think warranted, but others might worry is pathological.

49 Indeed, the philosopher had a reputation of being unbalanced, because he was perittos—that is, over-wise, over-curious, or, even, useless.83 The term expresses excess, which is pejorative enough. We might think that the researcher who is trading sleep for progress on the development of a vaccine is living badly, but at least the possibility of attaining her end redeems her activity. But the term expresses futility, too. The philosopher is given to excess because her end—e.g., knowledge, virtue, tranquility—lies ever beyond her reach. As a result, like a lush who says: “Just one more, and then perhaps I’m done,” and eventually loses all decorum or neighborly concern, the philosopher is in danger of being dragged away from life among her fellow animals by her unrealis- tic philosophical aspirations.

83 (Jaeger, 1933-47), Vol. 1, Ch. 9, p 154.

50 Pyrrhonian sympathy for a vulgar allegation of philosophical sickness

There is an allegation of sickness in the story of Thales. The allegation may be brought self-consciously by the philosopher against herself, and ultimately rejected, but it is construed as an allegation made from a vulgar point of view, with sympathy for the commoner. A vulgar allegation of philosophical sickness should interest us, if we remember three considerations: First, Pyrrhonism, like the dogmatisms it examines, finds its legitimacy in therapy. Second, the Pyrrhonist claims to return the philosopher towards a common life in accordance with the fourfold way. Third, the way of this common life reveals itself in appearance, while sensibility for this appearance is garnered through epochē, and so through isostheneia.

But we should be careful: Whatever the Pyrrhonist has in mind when he advocates common living, he is unlikely to mean a unreflective life of non- philosophical dogmatic pursuits. The Pyrrhonist, unlike the commoner, is philosophically inquisitive (zētētikos),84 and embraces the practice of thoroughgoing philosophical give and take. Further, as we saw, the Pyrrhonist appears to agree with the dogmatist that the commoner suffers sickness. But no less than the philosophical dogmatist—it is just that where the dogmatic philosopher rashly pursues wisdom and the good, the commoner pursues wealth or fame. For example, of dogmatic suitors of wealth, Sextus says:

Thus, the man who claims—say—that wealth is good and penury evil, is disturbed in two ways when he does not have wealth, both because he lacks the good, and because he toils for its acquisition. But when he has acquired it, he is punished in three ways, because he rejoices beyond measure, because he toils

84 PH 1.7.

51 at keeping the wealth with him, and because he is in agony and anxious about its being lost by him. M 11.146

“Thus, the man who claims—say—…” This dogmatic suitor of wealth is given as an example of a dogmatist. Again, it is the structure of aiming in accordance with dogmatic vision irrespective the content of the aim that the Pyrrhonist says is the source of tarachē.

Sextus tells us that the way of common life presents itself in appearance. But appearance is the residue of epochē. Epochē, then, is supposed to be a means of seeing, where the thing seen is brought into distinction by the subject of opposing accounts in the equipollence. For example, we would at least have a residual experience whose focus is on the sun, rather than on the tree, if what is thrown into the balance are opposing accounts whose focus is the sun, rather than the tree. Likewise, if what is thrown into the balance are opposing accounts whose focus is ethical, the focus of the residual intuition in some appreciation of purified appearance will be ethical, rather than of the sun. The movement away from both naive and philosophical dogmatism towards the Pyrrhonist’s common life would arise from this residual experience of an isostheneia among ethical sympathies. Among these sympathies one is for philosophy’s rejection of the life of the layperson as unreflective and precipitous. Another is for the layperson’s rejection of philosophy as convoluted and at odds with life. Hence:

[I]t is, I think, sufficient to live skillfully and free from opinion, in accordance with the common observations, and in suspension regarding what is said from dogmatic over-elaboration (periergia) and at a great remove (exō) from the necessities of common life. PH 2.246

52 The Pyrrhonist tries to transcend the propeteia of both naive and philosophical dogmatism. On the one hand, the Pyrrhonist is sympathetic to philosophy’s assessment of the commoner as suffering from decadence and precipitancy. On the other, the Pyrrhonist is sympathetic to the vulgar assessment that philosophy, by its stance towards the values of the commoner, no less suffers from decadence and precipitancy. On the one hand, a wish to return towards common life marks an appreciation of the dogmatic philosopher as having moved too far away from life, and this marks an affinity with the common allegation that the philosopher is off-kilter. But, on the other hand, a rejection of the unexamined life marks a rejection of the naive dogmatist. She is so embroiled in her pursuit of worldly goods like wealth, health, political standing and the flourishing of her friends and family, that she is fraught with anxiety in her struggle for them.

If we assume that, in addition to affinity with philosophy’s denigration of naive dogmatism, the Pyrrhonist has affinity with the common allegation, as the Pyrrho- nist purports to still be a philosopher, we can expect that under Pyrrhonism the common allegation gains philosophical dimension that gives insight into the motivation for Pyrrhonian antagonism to philosophical dogmatism. As the aim of Pyrrhonism is a particular kind of life—that of tranquility— without belief, any understanding of Pyrrhonism will have to come in an understanding of the nature of this life, rather than through a sympathy for some Pyrrhonian theory of such a life. Since, commensurately, the Pyrrhonist purports to give no theory of this life, any understanding of the nature of it through philosophical analysis will have to come in an understanding of how the Pyrrhonist transcends the kinds of life he puts in the balance against another in order to attain suspension, and so tranquility in a life of following appearances.

53 But then, we might do well by developing a sensibility for the kind of opposition the Pyrrhonist tries to find balance between. The one thing is laid in the balance against the other, and, by the relation of opposition, given definition. Definition—from finis, limit. What lies on the cusp of each is their point of contact, or some space between is given. Either way, in consideration of their opposition, room for an alternative to their opposition may be discovered.

Now, the Pyrrhonist as we find him in Sextus, and as we are interested in him as the philosophers we are, writes for the philosopher. Then, in the generation of an opposition between common and philosophical dogmatism for the sake of epochē, a sensibility for the rejection of our philosophical way would be foremost informative. We take it for granted that we already have in the balance a sensibility for the rejection of any purported dogmatism in the commoner. We are already supposed to be philosophers. We are supposed to have made some headway away from— shall we say, to be generous—a rather quick appeal to purported self-evidence we encounter in our conversation with those who are just out of school, or otherwise set in their ways. And accordingly, we have been drawn further away from the unquestioning into a life of reflection. We no longer see their way. Or, at least, given our supposed rejection of their way, at pain of inconsistency, we better not.

Then, for the sake of understanding Pyrrhonian therapy (and, so, perhaps, undergoing it), we should in our inquiry wish to see—and, since this seeing, if our understanding is to be Pyrrhonian, is in appearance, feel—what the vulgar worry lays in the balance against philosophical dogmatism.

54 The vulgar worry is laid in the balance. In a metaphor of the mechanics of the balance, the vulgar worry so laid is to exert force in the realm of opinion so as to come into equilibrium with what is laid in the balance against it. We weigh, and are to see that the balance is in equilibrium. Irrespective of any attention paid to a question about the ontology of the balance which is seen, we will want to know what could be laid in the balance against our philosophical dogmatism, such that we might appreciate how a dogmatic philosophical life could be in a balance at all. Then, we will first wish to see not a further investigation of the goodness of our stepping away from naive dogmatism, but what such naïveté brings against us worthy of any consideration. Let us, then, try to gain, for the sake of laying in the balance, in an exercise of understanding the therapy, and so any need for it, a further sensibility for the vulgar allegation.

55 Sketch 2: Skeptical Diagnosis of Dogmatic Philosophy

56 Vulgar embrace of philosophy

We aim to diagnose a purported disease in the dogmatic philosopher through consideration of a vulgar sensibility towards philosophy. But the vulgar appreciation of philosophy we imagine not as straightforwardly negative, but complex. The story of Thales shows the philosopher by his aspiration for the heavens brought—somehow, by a natural course of events (looking up, moving, ditch)— struck down to lie at the feet of a serving wench. But the story speaks to the historical imagination because it is told in the context of a history of common appreciation of the philosophical technē. For example, the story will have been of interest to those who regaled each other with it exactly because of the canonization of Thales as one of the Sages.85 We have a reason to presume—by the given historical datum that the story of Thales is told in a context of his canonization—not an outright common rejection of philosophy, but an ambivalence.

We might discover a flavor of this ambivalence in the commoner’s most famous condemnation of the philosopher: the death sentence of Socrates. After all, Socrates’ trial is supposedly brought from fear of his power, through our discipline of philosophy, over the young. And, especially considering Socra- tes’ reluctance to swap the manner of philosophy for the etiquette of the court room, the vote to condemn appears remarkably close.86 The violence perpetrated against philosophy at once brought out a love and admiration for it. If the execution of Socrates was to repress philosophy, the posthumous emulation of his behavior, the blossoming of the genre of Socratic dialogue, and the institution of schools by his descendants showed it a colossal mistake. The public martyring of Socrates unrepentant only served to bring home

85 DL 1.22. 86 Apology 35a-b.

57 an appreciation of the possibility for philosophical equanimity in a man condemned by the mob for his unwavering commitment to rational analysis.87 Those who condemned Socrates found his young associates wayward, and feared his pedagogy: Socrates teaches the young how to make the weaker argument the stronger, the charge goes. Socrates teaches a new, sacrilegious cosmology. Socrates, on the other hand, defended himself by claiming an inability to teach, and a sensibility of shamelessness in anyone who should.88 There would be irony in our history, then, if his execution proved crucial to the subsequent protracted flourishing of the ancient schools, and the tendency of the powerful to send their children to these for their education. The masses wished to eradicate philosophy. But by conceiving of philosophy as the teaching of a lifestyle set in opposition against naïve dogmas of honor, piety, political power, etc., and so proactively rejecting philosophy, the people became further embroiled in it.

One mark of posthumous respect for the art of Socrates would be the storied preservation of his likeness in bronze by a remorseful Athens,89 another, the education of tyrants by his more civil philosophical descendants like Aristotle,90 another, any freedom granted by those reared by such a cultured descendant to an abrasive one like Diogenes.91

87 This manner of exemplifying the rhetorical norms for our subject while we give a history of her philosophy would not be so ridiculous if we thought we might pursue an understanding of her through her customs. 88 Apology 18c-19d. 89 DL 2.43 90 For speculation that Aristotle was gratified to benefit materially from his association with tyrants, see (Grayeff, 1974), 37, 45. 91 Diogenes through Antisthenes, Aristotle through Plato. See, e.g., DL 6.6, 18, 21. On Athens’ love for Diogenes: DL 6.43. On Diogenes’ abrasiveness, DL 6, passim, especially 6.24.

58 When, as [Diogenes] returned from Sparta to Ath- ens, someone once asked: “Whither and whence?” He replied: “From the men’s quarters to the women’s.” DL 6.5992

Those who philosophize in the tradition of Socrates appear to aspire to show their audience decadent in confusing the attainment of worldly valuables with that of freedom from hope and despair, desire and fear. The anecdote of Diogenes’ abrasiveness above appears of an attempt to shame Athens for having lost sight of the ideal of the warrior facing the contingencies of the changing battlefield equanimously, no matter the peril. And if a man so forthright in his attempt escaped with his life, and was, as appears, even revered,93 we might suspect he achieved a measure of success.

As of Socrates, we are familiar with the stories of Diogenes. With brazenness when dragged in front of Philip of Macedon, and released in admiration for it. Equally brazen when he tells his son Alexander to step out of his sun. And equally admired by the young king as a consequence: “If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes.”94 By this sort of philosophical performance of indifference, the decadent are shown the liberty—the tranquility—of the ascetic as the epitome of the effects of reason’s power to loosen the grip of the love of repute, survival, and pleasure on the psuchē, and so live as free as any king might hope to. The philosopher is to be revered as a nigh mythological paradigm: Behold bold Socrates, whether unmindful without food or shoes on campaign in Thracian snow, steady in the chaotic retreat from Delium, uncompromising in front of five- hundred jurymen at the Heliaia.

92 Cf. 6.27, 6.65-6. 93 The story of Diogenes’ tub restored by the Athenians after it was vandalized (DL 6.43); of being dragged off to Philip (6.4, Plutarch Moralia 70c), of meeting Alexander (DL 6.32, 38) 94 Plutarch, Alexander 14, Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.32, DL, 6.38.

We can readily imagine the sort of admiration for these feats that made them fit for lore. A Spartan, warrior-like attitude, the Athenian may admire in her conquer- ors, and feel she should come to possess, too. Yet, this sort of steeliness is also cause for a suspicion of immoderation. We also find Socrates in deliberate pursuit of wisdom at his execution, sending his grieving women and children away lest they disturb this exercise and make a scene,95 and finding no time for a tearful farewell when his philosophical ‘children’ bid him to delay their orphanage until after sunset.96

Philosophy had managed to clear a space for itself to set up shop among politi- cians, poets, seers, and rhetoricians, but was not content to keep regular hours. We must simply under all conditions structure our lives in regard of philosophy, no matter how seemingly rarefied the result. The sort of philosopher we have been describing—Diogenes, Socrates— appears to wish that her hearers come to appreciate virtue as the end of their activity not just on the battlefield among their comrades, but in every part of their life.

Asked what advantage philosophy had brought him, [Diogenes] said: “If nothing else, to be well prepared for any fate.” DL 6.63

If we are to be prepared for any fate, we should live, as the Republic attempts to teach us,97 without undue desire that our valor will not be in vain or go unno- ticed. Indeed, we should be prepared for the possibility that we should never find

95 Phaedo 60a, 116b, 117d. 96 Phaedo 116a, 116e-117a. 97 Book 2, 363a.

60 ourselves on the battlefield. We should be prepared for any fate in any aspect of our lives. And so we should make in every endeavor our aim a liberty from disturbance in virtuous activity, not the supposed rewards of leisure and respect we may by such activity hope to secure for ourselves.

By dialectic the thinker is to gain insight that allows an advance towards such virtue and mastery over desire. Philosophy’s demand that the thinker justify herself brings up for uncompromising public evaluation accepted conceptions of value. By this evaluation what is taken for granted as private or patent is rendered doubtful. As a result, the naive sensual and honor-loving predilections of the thinker are to come to appear rash. But in a commitment to detachment through analysis in every part of his life, the philosopher would be in danger of pursuing a thoroughgoing rational evaluation which will exhaust the sensibility of her lay audience—if, as she is wont to, she arrives by this catholicity at a considered denigration of the commoner, or proceeds to run roughshod over his sensibility in accordance with this denigration. Those nearby appear to escape the philosopher not from distracted oversight, but willful impatience.

Philosophy had brought into definition the mechanisms underlying the useful powers of Odysseus and Thales. In rational analysis of the motivations of men and of the regularity of nature—the movement of water on a slope, or, even, of the bodies in the heavens—lay power over the world. By analysis of the motivations of men, it allowed us to see and then exploit the vanity of warriors, in order to blindside opponents and place the instrument of their destruction among them. By analysis of the regularity of nature, it allowed us to re-route rivers so as to make them fordable for armies. It allowed us to see when not to fear the wrath of a god

61 during an eclipse, and so, at the same time, wield Ulixean powers over those still left in the dark. By such usefulness, philosophy inserted into a culture of shame and polem- ic98—by a demand for a rational appreciation of the thing expressed—the possibility of the shame of philosophical embarrassment.99 Philosophical embarrassment reflected incompetence in the domain of the pertinent terrestrial competition; e.g., in military strategizing, in political or litigious rhetoric, in poetry and theatre, in social charm, in the composition of love-letters, in accounting for oneself.100 To the latter: We do not need to think of the embarrassment as just played out in public. Philosophy exploits the drive for justification in part through embarrassment, and this must be felt, and so internalized. By this internalized embarrassment, the medicine of Socrates is to modulate the psuchē. Philosophical challenge invites self-examination, produces awareness, and checks precipitancy. For example: Diogenes’ scornfully accosting passing cowards or lovers by asking whether they are not ashamed of their behavior provokes the question: “Why am I so afraid of the enemy?” Or: “Why do I desire the favor of this courtesan?”101

Yet, it remained important that the student not get eaten by such introspection. He should not become so consumed by philosophy that, like Socrates, he no

98 As in Protagoras’ defence of the viability of his sophistic teaching of the political art to Socrates’ challenge that such virtue cannot be taught because while Athens will recognize the expertise of tradesmen, it does not recognize experts in this political art Protagoras claims to teach. Protagoras replies that this is because all men have a share in political virtue through having a sense of shame (aidōs) and justice (dikē). Protagoras 319a-324d. 99 See (Schmid, 1998), pp. 64-72. 100 Rhetoric: Consider Athens’ supposed posthumous embarrassment and exile of Anytus and Meletus for its condemnation of Socrates. Such embarrassment would show that Socrates, by philosophizing in the law-court, had got the better of the rhetoricians after all. Poetry: Socrates’ denigration of the poets in the Apology, and the supposed repercussions hereof in the poet Meletus’ bringing charges against him. (22a-c) Social charm: The Symposium’s speechifying among intellectuals from a variety of backgrounds was under the constraints of a competition. Love-letters: Socrates’ demonstration of the inferiority of Lysias’ letter in the Phaedrus. 101 DL 6.66. Compare Alcibiades’ confession of feeling shame just from seeing Socrates, and so being reminded of previous philosophical encounters with him. Symposium 216a-c.

62 longer sees his wife an children beside him; or, like Diogenes, refuses to pay his respects to those who have political power over him; or, like Socrates’ young favorite Alcibiades, comes to disdain the customs of those around him and commits some sacrilege, and follows it up with a litany of treacheries.

If our children must go gaze at stars with Thales, let it be so that they may all the better navigate the earth—e.g., defend the city better, bring home the shipment safely. So much more prudent, then, to send one’s child to a teacher who shows himself still in touch with the world by thinking his instruction an object offered in an exchange of goods. For such a teacher, if his instruction is for sale, the art it teaches must be of a commensurate kind:

“…the money-making kind, being of the erisitic technē, of the art of disputation, of fondness for contention, of hostility, of eagerness for applause, of acquisition of property.” Sophist 226a102

For Plato at least the worst of these teachers purported to offer, by an education in speaking well, not the courage to risk embarrassment, but an inoculation against it. The sophist, whose commercialism safe-guarded instruction tailored to his students’ worldly ambitions, offered to cultivate in the speaker the skill of conjur- ing up a rational appreciation of himself through cleverness.103 While recognition of the utility of analysis and, accordingly, the possibility of philosophical embarrassment had made a philosophical education appear necessary to parents who had worldly ambitions for their children, in so far as such ambitions were motivation for the education, it did not need extend further than to

102 On the Platonic appreciation of an incommensurability which vitiates the sale of wisdom for money: Gorgias 520d; see (Nightingale, 1995), pp. 48 ff.

63 a point at which rhetoric could in the end once more be trusted to have the audience—the speaker included—nodding its head, pronouncing a verdict, and getting on with its life.104

103 Consider Hippocrates’ motivation for seeking the services of Protagoras: To become a clever speaker, and learn to speak his mind. Protagoras, 312b-d. 104 This is cause for Socrates’ annoyance with Hippocrates’ desire to become Protagoras’ student. Hippocrates runs unreflectively into the arms of sophistry just to learn how to speak cleverly. Protagoras 313a-b.

64 Dogmatic evaluation and rejection of common values

If we are interested in a common denigration of philosophy, we must see beyond any common appreciation of philosophy. Or we must see in the ground for this common appreciation a measure of the shortfall of philosophy. For the commoner, any goodness in philosophy would be found in its utility. But the philosopher appears in the end unconcerned with utility, or with a world in need of usefulness. The supposedly genuine lover of wisdom aspires to more than the provision of utility, and sees the worldly sophist in the purveyance of such usefulness as engaged in a sort of prostitution. The philosopher, in examining the value of love of honor and sensuality, presses on and evaluates for rashness any supposed particular usefulness which in turn is somehow supposed to vindicate philosophical activity.105 In advocating mastery of self given any fate, as the pursuit of utility may be taken as a sign of lack, she may evaluate the pursuit of utility tout court for rashness.

Such philosophical evaluation of values under a norm against propeteia may lead to the production of dogmatisms that fall between rejecting common values, or embracing them once more. Rejecting common values: The dogmatist who rejects common values seeks to overcome the precipitancy of the commoner through radical transformation. She pursues the experience—if this is the word—of a god in rational meditation upon the unconditional principles of reality. Or (and this is an inclusive disjunction) she pursues an asceticism for the rational animal in control over just those things

105 Of course, this does not need to result in an embrace of a positive view. For example, the Pyrrhonist’s project appears evaluative, but not theoretically constructive in any discursive way. Equally, we can think that Socrates’ project is one of re-evaluation, without saying whether he is merely engaged in destructive philosophy. For an introduction to this debate, e.g.: (Robinson, 1941), (Ryle, 1966), (Burnyeat, 1977), (Tomin, 1987).

65 which lie within our power—our desires and beliefs, rather than our body and reputation.

The philosopher catholic in these pursuits appears given to denigration of common life in theory and practice. In theory: For example, Socrates in the Republic may by his extolling of virtue manage to nudge his audience back to aspiring after the composure of the warrior. But any superficial understanding of the motivation for the warrior ideal gets denigrated in the light of philosophy: Even though the naive warrior is ready to risk life and limb and so give up the opportunity for satisfying baser pleasures of life, and so has freed herself from their hold over her, she is not yet free. Without philosophical wisdom the warrior is not complete. Rather than for virtue, she will still stand and fight just for honor and the survival of the city, fully absorbed in the cosmetic effects of her action. The value of feeding and defending ourselves only obtains by its becoming clear in our lives. There is no good in the world if we cannot act in it with appreciation of what is good. Without this, even just the actualization of a modest aspiration of the warrior—that her courage is bewailed—will not be good, nor bad that of her darkest vision—that no one will be left to honor her. Even the victory over the sensual in the moderation of the warrior remains cosmetic without this appreciation. If value obtains only in its becoming clear, then for the philosopher the route to clarity on value lies in the instrument that has bought her this much liberty from the demands of inclination so far—reason. But then, any hopes or fears of the commoner, any tragedy in her life turns out to be vanity, because she lives in a world without value. The philosopher approaches an ethical idealism. There would be little value in a world of just plants and low beasts. They are incapable of love, we say, or of understanding. By the philosopher’s singular esteem of reason as the faculty that

66 perceives value, humankind, ill-equipped with this faculty, gets readily cast among the beasts:

—Surely, then, the happiest of these, who go to the best place, are those who have pursued vulgar political virtue, which they call moderation (sophrosunē) and justice (dikaiosunē), which arises without wisdom (sophia) or reason (nous) from custom (ethos) and practice (meletē). —How are they the happiest? —Because it is likely that they return in such a political and civilized kind—e.g., either of bees, or wasps, or ants, or again in the same human kind—and that from them tolerable men arise. —Indeed. —But to accede to the kind of the gods is not allowed to those who do not philosophize and depart life entirely purified, but to those who are lovers of knowledge. Phaedo, 82a-c

In the Phaedo’s eschatology, value comes about on the condition of knowledge of the underlying principles of the world. Such knowledge is of matters hidden beyond the world, so that any value in the world cannot be discerned immediately in life, but must be found elsewhere. For example, for the Platonist, the love in friendship between individuals would be pursued not from a straightforward attraction to and caring for individuals, but because through it runs the route to love of the Good and the Beautiful beyond the terrestrial realm. And this sort of deferral of the ground for value appears to obtain not just in a Platonist metaphysics. For example, for the Epicurean, our commitment to our friends would find its value in so far as it promotes the Epicu rean end of a dogmatically idealized experience of ataraxia. Our love for the individual is just a means to the end of tranquility.

67 The particular presentation of a world that gives the commoner an object for her struggles in the face of fear and hope appears to have no value of itself, while any value in the world appears to come about only through its rational recognition. This sentiment we might have little difficulty gleaning from our above quote from the Phaedo. But—to continue our effort to extend the scope for our observation—we may also recognize it in Epicureanism, if we thought that for the Epicurean the value of our lives lies in its being ataraxic, and ataraxia obtains only through knowledge of the insignificance of what disturbs us. In general, where the philosopher succeeds in purifying herself of worldly rashness, she does so at the price of rendering empty her terrestrial life with its loves and revulsions, hopes and fears. In turn, the true value of her life she must win in the pursuit of the discipline that purified her.

In practice: For example, as a result of the denigration of common value, the philosopher’s terrestrial preoccupations are replaced with a preoccupation with philosophy. But this replacement is wont to manifest itself in the philosopher’s everyday behavior as an excess such that it gives her discipline a tincture of madness for the ancient. Plato’s rendition of a clumsy Thales, or Aristophanes’ rendition of a batty Soc- rates is far from idiosyncratic. Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers records a legion of examples of philosophers exhibiting, from some form of philosophical conviction, what the layperson would consider positively odd behavior—e.g., Empedocles’ jumping into the crater at Mt. Etna to prove he was a god, Diogenes the Cynic’s masturbating in the marketplace (“If I could still my hunger by scratching my belly, I would”), and Antigonus of Carystus’ report of Pyrrho’s steadfast scepticism requiring that his students follow him around to keep him out of the way of harm, to mention but a few.106

106 DL 8.70, 6.46, 9.62

68 We have seen that if this lore expresses a worry, it is of the philosopher in such a way engaged in her pursuit that she eventually suffers disinhibition from proper human functioning: Empedocles destroyed himself, Pyrrho made his living an autonomous life altogether impossible, Diogenes chose the shameless life of a clever animal like the dog over civilization. By reason, each said he purchased liberty from specious exigencies of common life. But each appears to have gained excessive liberty, and come to disregard what we must—if we are at all to live a good human life—still find unavoidable no matter how well-reasoned our doubt, or how fervent our desire for freedom. Upon the philosopher must remain a constraint through her sensibility to which she gets to structure her life not unlike her fellows do—if anything, with an appreciable urgency towards her projects in the world. The philosopher, in her search to know the causes of her world, may find opportunity to question whether she has taken for granted her opinions and practices, and by this questioning come to see how she has become corrupted through acculturation. But the worry is that wherever philosophical investigation produces rejection of opinion and practice, the void left by this rejection only gets filled with, if not something lesser, then nothing better—e.g., with either philosophical hubris, nihilism, or beastliness. By the presumed abandonment of the common standard, the philosopher would exhibit, by vulgar standards, excessive disdain for commonly held values and valuables—of the former she is in danger of not attaining, e.g., a modesty that safeguards recognition of socio-political affiliations such as to family, friends or state; of the latter, the concomitant valuables in such affiliation—love, friendship, health, decorum, honor, status, wealth, and power. Consequently, the life of the philosopher would show a lack that either is itself regrettable, or it is also cause for retribution. If the philosopher insists on living by principles that run rough-shod over the worldly sensitivities of common folk, first,

69 any claim she makes to happiness or propriety would be misguided, even shamefully so, and, second, she should not be surprised to meet with sanction.

To the latter, in Athens’ trial and execution of Socrates, a patent sentiment that propelled events along was outrage at Socrates’ corrupting the young and disre- specting the gods. Socrates’ single-minded adherence to the norms that produce aporia makes for a madness that does not excuse him from legal censure. Socrates is not raving, but has deliberately lost sight of propriety. Whether we find a further independent motivation for retribution against Soc- rates in his association with the Thirty, in so far as the city found self-respect in its proceedings, it found it in a feeling that the art of philosophy sets no bounds for itself, and so transgresses against the status quo with unabashed intent. His trial Socrates brought upon himself by, among other things, a philosophical immoderation whose natural result was shown in the nihilism and egomania of his most brazen young associates such as Alcibiades; he brought on his execution by the mistake of importing a philosophical demand for justification into the court of his alleged crime’s judgment. A mistake—we are led to believe—made in full cognizance. In the Theaetetus, Plato paints Socrates as fully aware of the inappropriateness of philosophizing in a law court. According to Socrates, the philosopher’s willingness to philosophize in court, even when lives are at stake, is an expression of philosophical disdain for the concerns of the commoner.107 No surprise, then, that eventually Socrates was sentenced to death for pursuing the proceedings of the gymnasium in the court of law. For too many of those who judged Socrates, honor was so dear that they could not allow Socrates’ performance to go unpunished. For the performance purported to show their judgment over his life and death to be of no significance if their deliberation could not be settled by the practice for which they had put him on trial.

70 “For all our sakes, of these strange men we ought only tolerate so much.”

Regarding the former, in a stark example of philosophical self-consciousness of the vulgus’ critique of the philosophical way, Plato’s bumbling Crito rebukes his childhood friend for forgoing from principle an opportunity to flee his execu- tioners and raise his young children: Which father in his right mind would not take this opportunity? Socrates should not have begotten children if he had no commitment to their education. He could have avoided his sentence, and, indeed, trial altogether, had he been more concerned with the virtues of parenting than philosophical posturing. And now that he is condemned he might still act bravely by fleeing, but his philosophical stubbornness gives him a lazy way out of his paternal duties.108 Socrates says in the Phaedo that suicide is wrong because it is an injury to the gods whose possession we are;109 in the Laches, Protaogras and Meno that he may not possess the knowledge of virtue to impart, that virtue cannot be taught, that good men may have bad sons. In Crito’s rebuke lies an accusation that Socrates is taking the joke in the tragi- comedy of his trial too far by finding in the folly of its outcome real license to commit “suicide by cop” and free himself from his terrestrial, mortal responsibili- ties:110 Socrates’ philosophical conviction lets him find a way out of the world without insulting the gods by depriving them of their play-thing through suicide. It lets him see that he has nothing more to do in the world—neither hope to improve his fellows in general, nor hope to love his sons and make virtuous men of them need delay him.111

107 Theatetus 172c-173c. 108 Crito 45c-e 109 Phaedo 61d-62a. 110 “About life at all times the wisest have judged the same: It is good for nothing.” Twilight of the Idols, The Problem of Socrates 1. 111 Phaedo 117a. Crito, if Socrates remarked that he is setting an example for his sons by showing them that the goodness of his soul is more important than his bodily life, would reply in exaspera-

71 By acting in accord with his philosophical vision he has come to a climatic loggerheads with the polis, and when the mob democratically cast its vote against him, his duty to his principles allowed him the convenience of letting the world take him out of the game.112 Even though a modicum of politesse would have sufficed for him to remain in the company of friends and family, nothing good in the world remained other than the pursuit of a course of action that would bring about his destruction. His philosophy saw his work find its completion in his execution. “But look, man! Your children!”

tion: “Don’t you have better ways of raising your children?” Apropos a remark by Andrea Nightingale. 112 Xenophon’s Apology 1 et seqq.; 23, 32-33.

72 Dogmatic evaluation and embrace of common values

Where the philosopher’s “patient” is prisoner to terrestrial hopes and fears, the philosopher is prisoner to her contemplative and ascetic aspirations. If the naive dogma of the layperson leads to rash pursuit of worldly valuables, the sophisticated dogma of the philosopher leads to rash rejection of them. Either character fails to hit the mean and lives immoderately. We said that dogmatic evaluation either results in a rejection or a renewed embrace of common values. Any philosopher who—alive to a common sensibility towards herself— sees the threat of the accusation of immoderation may try to find a place for herself in the world by working towards a discovery that conserves under some qualification the value of the terrestrial pursuits rejected by a more abrasive philosophy. But if the renewed embrace were with a regained naïveté—i.e., with the same pre-philosophical attitude and lack of insight into her values as the commoner’s— nothing would be gained by philosophy. In other words, strictly speaking, if philosophy has effect, there is no such thing as a renewed embrace of the values of the commoner. For example, Aristotle might be thought an example of a philosophical conformist—if he is remembered as much preoccupied with presenting virtue in a vernacular understandable to the gentlemen sons of the rich and powerful, or for teaching in luxury at court the son of a tyrant who had Diogenes dragged from his barrel to explain himself, or for fleeing the city Socrates refused to leave. But any embrace of common value we might wish to read off these cases will be superficial—for the embrace of value will properly come within the context of an elaborate philosophical account that sanctions a preoccupation with common pursuits.113

113 For Aristotle, it appears that the sanction comes in the context of finding authority in traditional virtue on account of its being (a) an optimal expression of the political nature of the human

73 Seneca’s fifth letter to Lucilius—a discussion of the philosopher’s mean—self- consciously gives a two-facedness involved in the philosopher’s conformism. Accustomed to operating in a milieu of sycophancy and luxury, yet full of admiration for Cynic forthrightness and frugality,114 Seneca is vulnerable to a charge that his philosophical affinity is at odds with his lifestyle. But, insouciantly, Seneca finds in his Stoicism’s cosmopolitanism and commitment to a life in accordance with nature the need to keep up appearances, and avoid the life of the Cynic:

Because you study unyieldingly, and, having set aside everything, pursue this sole thing, that you improve yourself daily, I both approve and rejoice, and not so much exhort that you persevere, but even demand it. I admonish you that you not do anything—in the manner of those who desire not to improve themselves, but stand out—in your way of dressing or lifestyle that would arouse comment—avoid shoddy at- tire, and an unkempt head, and a beard that is too ne- glected, and patent scorn of silver dishes, and a bed made on the ground, and whatever other ambition a perverse way pursues. Seneca, Ep. ad Luc. 5.1

For Seneca, stoic freedom must come with acceptance of the need to follow common practice. First, says Seneca, Stoicism is a philosophy for all, but living contrary to the standard of the vulgus will scare away those the Stoic is trying to improve.115 Second, the motto of Stoicism is to live in accordance with nature, but

animal (EN Book 1, 1098b10, Book 2, 1103a-b, Book 10, 1178a9 ff.), and (b) a means to the leisure that affords the optimal actualization in contemplation of what is divine and most properly human in human nature—i.e., presumably, of nous (EN Book 10, 1177b8-28, and see the historical speculation at Metaphysics Book 1, 982a23, that people engaged in the activity of contemplation only once the necessities of life were present). 114 For example, see his admiration for the Cynic Demetrius: Ep. ad Luc. 62.3. For his struggle in living simply, 87.4-5. 115 Ibid. 5.3-4.

74 our nature has affinity for modest Epicurean pleasures of cleanliness, simple elegance, and plain but honest food.116 The asceticism of the Cynic is a form of philosophical immoderation.

Just as the desire for delicacies is a thing of luxury, so, too, avoidance of what is customary and easily procured is of madness. Seneca, Ep. ad Luc. 5.5

But the philosophical motivation for living in accordance with human custom is in fact a mark of distinction between commoner and Stoic:

Within, let all things be different, but let our appearance conform to society. Seneca, Ep. ad Luc. 5.3

Accordingly, if this subtlety should escape the commoner, nonetheless the Pyrrhonist may by a continued sensibility for the vulgar allegation, discern a well- hidden illness in the well-groomed philosopher to lay in the balance against conformist philosophical dogmatism: The philosopher, though she may act just as the commoner, acts from over-elaborated reasons exō tēs biōtikēs—at a remove from common life. For example, she cannot just say that the welfare of her child is important for her, she must give an account that makes transparent her investment in her child’s welfare: “We must act naturally, and it is natural to love our children.”

116 Perhaps it is apposite to remark that Seneca’s eclecticism shows that he was no straightforward Stoic.

75 Contemplative dissociation in philosophical dogmatism

The vulgar allegation maintains that the philosopher is disassociated from the world. The philosopher fails to return to the world and govern it well. She has become so engrossed in the contemplative life, and the results she presumes to gather from reflection in this life, that she has lost sight of the world right beside her.

The philosopher is somehow to return to the world—well, unless she is such a stranger to the world that she has no estate in it. For Socrates in the Republic, the exile in contemplation, with no political affiliation with the world in which he finds himself, is free never to return. For Crito, our children are enough to tie us to this world.117 In the Republic the philosopher is supposed to be forced down from reflection upon Being into the world of becoming, by an empathy for the state that has educated her, and is expected to govern it.118 But how is this effected, and how would she return? By common lights, badly. Either in neglect of the vulgar sensibility in her practice, running roughshod over the sensibility in outward expression. Or amenably, but in the wrong spirit. The worth of the individual beside her is present to her only by an intricate filament of argument spun from some abstracted, brilliant source.

117 This remark was not intended to imply that we should reconstruct Socrates as considering himself one of these exiles. Though, if we are to think of Socrates as paradigmatic philosopher and committed Athenian, we may wonder why he appears to have had no wish to enter politics. In reply: Socrates is philosopher-king through pedagogy and exemplary living. 118 Rep. 520a.

76 For Socrates in the Republic, this worth is given through a consideration of the individual’s contribution to the philosophical state to be moulded in emulation of an otherworldly vision of Being.119

But the Pyrrhonist observes that the tension in this sort of otherworldliness is not just practical. In rational contemplation, by the demand that she have propositional objects through which to modify her attention in contemplation, the philosopher must return to the world, too; and propositionalize. But the way in which the dogmatist does this is equally at a remove from reality. She affirms her view over dialectical alternatives, running roughshod over them. The world that concerns her is the reality that obtains in dialectical space, and this space is generated under rational norms which, if, as she recommends to all comers, her life is rational, she must attend to. In her relation to other dialectical voices, she does not see the voice as of anything alive in its own right, but a mistake whose generation she can explain by her theory.

119 Likewise, for the Epicurean, as we discussed, this worth is given by a consideration of the ataraxic effect his interaction with her has on him.

77 Pyrrhonian reduction of the sickness of dogmatism to an epistemic mistake

In the philosophical denigration of the vulgus, the Pyrrhonist diagnoses ground for an ad hominem argument against philosophical dogmatism in contemplative activity.

We can imagine turning round to the conformist dogmatic philosopher who acts just like the vulgus acts and ask what the fuss was all about—the philosopher has ended up right where she started. We said that if philosophy is to be therapeutic, this could not be so: The philosopher must make progress. And the philosopher would not proselytize so, accordingly. She would realize, if she turns out no different than when she started to do philosophy, that she has no incentive to help people to start doing philosophy (if this is possible), or to continue if they are already on their way. To our observation that the dogmatist does not ever really embrace common value the Pyrrhonist would add the observation that the dogmatist is nonetheless no less precipitant in her pursuits than the commoner. The dogmatist conceives of the formulation of her aim such that there is no need to doubt it through dialectical challenge. Her attitude to her end turns out to be no different from that of the commoner she construes as her foil in need of philosophical therapy. And so the philosopher no less scurries to meet her aim like a lush after a bottle.120 The philosophical dogmatist makes the very mistake that puts the commoner at a remove from her ends. She makes herself desirous for one fate rather than another, such that the manner of her preference makes her vulnerable—for the world, and her life in this world, must be made to conform to her vision. And so, through the generation of this vulnerability, her preference feeds the engine of disturbance.

120 PH 1.228-30.

78 The Pyrrhonist turns a vulgar tu quoque into a respectable ad hominem. The commoner is vulnerable to fate because the world can take wealth, health, and renown away just like that. The philosophical dogmatist is vulnerable, because she has fragmented herself such as to allow that one part of her may, by the demand that she live up to herself, not congrue with the other. The dogmatic philosopher can assess herself for living up to her philosophical norm. She may find herself intermittently immemorious of the norm, and come to castigate herself in the evening, or renew her promise to herself to be attentive with great earnestness in the morning.121 E.g, anyone with Stoic sympathies and seeking to cure herself of violent emotion pursues a transformation wherein she comes to replace her common aims whose attraction is felt passionately with philosophical aims rationally recognized as in accordance with nature. But this is not easy.

Truly, as I consider by myself those occasions on which fortune has violently vexed me, I sometimes begin to despair at that notion of yours [that virtue suffices for happiness], and to dread the weakness and fragility of human kind. For I fear that nature, while it has given us feeble bodies, and has bound to them in- curable disease and intolerable pains, has also given us minds which are both sensitive to corporeal pains, and, separately, entangled in their own vexations and disgusts. But in this [mindset,] I castigate myself, because I judge the strength of virtue by the weakness of others, and perhaps of myself, and not by virtue itself. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.3

Acceptance of the notion that virtue is sufficient for happiness should inure the thinker to the disturbance of the passions. But the passions—e.g., for Cicero,

121 A formalized dogmatic practice. For example, Gale, On the Passions and Errors of the Soul, 5.24; Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 2.1.1. See (Hadot & Davidson, 1995), pp. 84-85, 112-13, n. 37, 44.

79 notably, grief at the pre-mature death of his daughter Tulia in the year he wrote the Disputations—are so powerful that they overwhelm him, and the end of virtue is forgotten. But then, when it is remembered once more, Cicero has new material for distress: That he let his weakness allow him to conceive of virtue as an end whose incompleteness sanctions the flood of despair in his soul. At one moment he thinks: “Complete happiness is not attainable through virtue, so there is nothing unnatural in giving into despair.” The next, he castigates himself for having been deceived into grief by the thought. The commoner seeks tranquility by making the world around her amenable to herself. She is victim to distress because she aims for something over which, as it is external to her, she has no complete control. The philosopher, on the other hand, claims to aim first just for her own psychological improvement, where what is wished to be subject for improvement is thought to lie within the philosopher’s control—her affect. She purports to determine in philosophical analysis what the ideal affect is, and then aims to mold her emotional psychology in accordance with the determination. But in such aiming within her a duality survives which gives the possibility of her continued vulnerability. The philosopher identifies with her philosophical determination, and seeks to align herself with the determination. She seeks control over the self as the commoner over the world. In the dogmatic philosopher, there is a rational experience of seeing ethical truth and of the superiority of this experience, and then there is an ongoing unfulfilled desire whose object is either, when the thinker is immemorious, still the commoner’s amenability of the world (e.g., that the thinker is healthy, that her daughter is alive), or, when it is not this, the amenability of her psychology to the determined rational end that she is in some way free from these affects of the commoner.

80 We said that the Pyrrhonist claims that dogmatic psychology produces distress irrespective of the particular dogmatism. And though we have just illustrated the complaint by looking at a Cicero’s affinity for Stoicism, the illustration should show that we can select our example randomly. For example, we could have run our example not with virtue as the envisioned end, but with Cyrenaic focus on the pleasures of the present moment. Just imagine Cicero with Cyrenaic predilections, castigating himself for forgetting to pursue pleasure in the present moment and allowing himself to conceive of his life as the commoner would—a life with a history full of tragedy from the death of his child.

The Pyrrhonist says of the dogmatist who would denigrate her dialectical partner by an act of assertion to the contrary that in her assertion, the dogmatist commits all the sins she sees in her partner. The ad hominem that the dogmatic philosopher hungers after her philosophical ends no less than the commoner after her worldly ends is abstracted from any philosophical dogmatism. It does not matter whether the dogmatic philosopher is abrasive or respectable, seeking pleasure or virtue, Platonist or Aristotelian, and so on. The abstraction we are describing, of any dogmatism’s leading to distress, can be given as an expression of dogmatism’s seeing the cause of psychological disease in epistemic vice. We are healthy if we live in all areas of life like the warrior. But we do this through attending to the expression of our rational faculty.

Pathological affect, then, is the result of an inability to attend to reason. But the dogmatist shows such affect for her opinions in wanting to plug up her ears to reason’s request for further justification for her determination of facts. She has come to embrace an ethical determination as something that must be true, as something she cannot let go of, something she must maintain.

81 The clarity of the determination appears ever in danger of becoming obscured. We have seen it in Cicero become obscured by a common affect that keeps insinuating itself, over the course of the day, into his life—grief. The determination is once more brought into focus by self-castigation: “Very well, we attend to the determination again.” And so the struggle against self-castigation may be feared to begin once more. But, as paying attention to reason reveals any ethical reality to the philosopher to a degree that she feels entitled to recognize and dismiss those who have just not thought enough about the issues as either young or vulgar, the activity of reasoning takes a prominent place in the life of the dogmatic philosopher. In this activity—in dialectic, and hence in the world—she is no less to consider the demands of reason. And so, attention to these demands defines her life.

The Pyrrhonist—in being set on the act of laying in the balance—may observe that in the dogmatist the affinity for the determination is in danger of becoming exhausted by philosophical arguments that, by exploiting the volatility of her affect, seek to change her allegiance. The dogmatist, we said, must keep affirming her determination to herself. But this solution—of reaffirming the determination in the face of such obfuscation by the intellect—is also in danger of expressing the common streak. First, e.g.: —Well, such a return to affirming the determination left you no better off. What purpose your philosophy here? —We teach. —But can you do so while no longer seeking? Then second: —But if still seeking, whence the dialectical right under the norms of reason to collapse the line, circle, and point into one? Our account of ourselves in dialectical inquiry must continue, may not be circular, must come to an end.

82 “Must come to an end,” because we feel we must interact in dialectic by saying something honest about ourselves.122 But at some point to boldly assert without further reflection would be vulgar. Surely we live in hope of advancing? Or, if not this, in fear of it? —No, we see the truth, and speak accordingly. —But, how, then, still in dialectic, and, by a vitiation of the collapse, rationally? And even if we admitted circularity of reasoning, what happens to us when we once more live in supposed ignorance while we—once we are good at this—rattle off the first premise to an argument which will conclude in our determination? Do we already know the conclusion? —We grasped the derivation somehow in one go. —But how do we get to see this derivation, rather than another, such that we say of others: “They can’t be right?” For our attention in dialectic, by sensing dialectical opposition, looks askance, and so sees the derivation in a space of possibility.

The Pyrrhonist diagnoses, by the norms that produce in the philosophical dogmatist the rejection of common life, a pathological affect in her. The epistemic distress in the dogmatist’s desire to affirm a norm to herself gives rise to practical distress in the exercise of reason. In the practice of reflection, the dogmatist wants to see her end as something she cannot be mistaken about, such that she registers her not meeting her end as transparent failure. As a result of her ethical dogmatism that we live and express ourselves rationally as aristoi, the dogmatist sets for herself a norm to which she must live up in her epistemic endeavor.

122 Cf. Protagoras 331d: In attacking Protagoras’ claim that the virtues are each different in kind, Socrates insists that Protagoras speak in accordance with his commitment, rather than just accept under hypothesis Socrates’ suggestion that justice and piety are the same kind of thing.

83 Thus facilitating the duality that maintains the possibility of her disturbance: “Here is my norm. Here is my affect: I must make my affect fit my norm.” In her activity on the battlefield, the philosopher seeks the experience of courage. In her activity of dialectic, the philosopher seeks to speak with the experience of knowledge. In the case of the philosophical dogmatist in the activity of philosophy, the norm, then, is for affirmation of the determination. The affect of tranquil satisfaction in the act of determining is supposedly generated by this affirmation. “There is nothing left to wonder about, here. Move along!”

Like the commoner who identifies with her will to leisure, and sees the world as resistant material that needs to be moulded into the fortification that will afford her this leisure, the dogmatist identifies with her philosophical norm for some sort of liberty from the world through attainment of an ideal affect, and sees her affect as resistant material that needs to be moulded accordingly. In her practical life, her cowardice must be moulded into courage, in her life of contemplation, unreflective satisfaction in any opinion must be moulded into the satisfaction of knowledge of truth. Again:

For those endowed with genius among humans, disturbed (tarassamenoi) by anomaly in matters and puzzled about which of these matters they ought to rather assent to, set out to seek after what is true and what is false in matters, in order that by settling these things they would become tranquil (ataraktēsontes). PH. 1.12

She must keep affirming her determination to herself. We noted a tension between a dogmatic vision of what the truth is, and the concomitant desire to mould the self in accordance with this truth. We said that this tension amounts to the kind of disturbance the philosopher wishes to cure.

84 But the tension exists already in the genesis and maintenance of the vision the philosopher wants to put to use as a standard to model the psuchē on. In her drive to affirm her determination, the disease expresses itself epistemically, in a hunger for inviolable insight. The dogmatist seeks to identify herself with a considered philosophical affirmation and then hold herself stable in this affirmation. She must never forget that her aim is such and such, and that she must improve for the sake of attaining it. She wishes to maintain her vision from one moment to the next while the world around her changes (just, say, by the movement required in dialectical activity). By her own standards, the dogmatist’s desire to maintain the vision derives from a mistake: that of thinking that under her standards she is entitled to just assert a condition under which the demand for justification of her practice is dissolved. In practical activity, the dogmatist finds contentment in acting from attention to her philosophical norm; distress in acting while immemorious of it. In theoretical activity, the dogmatist finds contentment in remaining in possession of insight from one moment to the other, unmoved by affect or dialectic as it comes her way; unmoved by any distress in the threat of her insight’s being taken away. We said that the commoner is vulnerable because she seeks to control what she cannot—the externalities, and that the dogmatic philosopher is vulnerable because she seeks to control what, by her identification with her dogma as norm, she has rendered alien to herself—her affect. But now we also see that she is vulnerable because she seeks to control her very next thought by wishing to maintain it, while, by the practice of dialectic she has put into place for generating thoughts, her next thought is supposed to be unconditionally under the norms of this practice. The dogmatist seeks to maintain over time in thought one single vision, while dialectic demands by an unconditional demand for explanation that she re-evaluate the vision, and so step away from it.

85 Just as any philosophical dogmatism is vulnerable to the vulgar allegation that the philosopher is at a remove from life, so it is, by having moved all that is important about life onto the board of philosophy, to the philosophical charge of epistemic precipitancy.

The commoner wishes to maintain or increase his common, terrestrial valuables from one moment to the other in the face of an intransigent world. First, as we saw in our fancies about Cicero as Stoic and Cyrenaic, the dogmatic philosopher wishes to maintain or increase, in the face of her own volatility and unruliness, philosophical valuables such as virtue or pleasure in the present moment. But further, in the face of ongoing challenge in dialectic, she wishes to maintain from one moment to the next her theoretical insight that is to guide her life towards these valuables. But if the philosopher puts stock in the demand for justification of her pursuits so as to re-evaluate them, she has taken as her mark of value the resolution to dialectic. If philosophy is not just a trick through which, by exploiting our aversion to being made a fool of, the philosopher wishes just for her own sake to gain power over her object of ressentiment,123 i.e., if philosophy is intended as genuine therapy, the philosopher must place herself amongst others, and subject her philosophical commitments—whatever they are—to the same standards of evaluation she wishes to hold up to the commitment of others. But then, as these standards appear to allow no dogma, if she were to attend to them, she would be obliged to surrender her insight. The dogmatist shows herself epistemically rash in wanting to rest in a stable and unchanging view, while the medium for presenting views—dialectic—is one that demands change in its unfolding over time.

123 For example, for Socrates, the tyranny of the libidinous and mediocre under the Thirty and the ensuing democracy

87 Despair likes to hide

In her rashness, in comparison with those she set out to cure, the dogmatist may even suffer from added complications:

For it is not possible to say that the introduced disturbance is within measure (metrios), while the one annulled more violent. For the kind of belief (doxa) the disturbed person has about the previous object of pursuit, such a kind he has about the next. But he believed that the first was good, and because of this he sped after it anxiously. Well then, believing the next also good, and in the same way speeding after it anxiously, he will suffer the same disturbance, but perhaps even more violently, in so far as he has been converted to believe that the thing now pursued by him is of greater value. M 11.137- 8

Whether dissident or conformist, if the dogmatist’s intended patients were ill, she still suffers from the same disease, But, if philosophical dogmatism is her terminus, her symptoms are in danger of being worse. Suffering the thought that she has a philosophical reason for her pursuit of truth, and, in contradistinction to the naive commoner, that in such a possession she has a mark of true value, her end appears to her all the more distinct and noble. She will run after her philosophically determined end of the philosophical life with at least as much precipitancy as the commoner after wealth, glory or health. Our philosophical effort must have pay-off. Ergo, we must try to be philosophical.124

124 “No, but it just comes naturally to me.” So?

88 But now, in the face of our diagnosis that in replying she follows the norms of reason like a lush the bottle, she will also—as long as she makes assertions and so remains a participant in dialectic, and so looks askance—still be able to entertain the possibility that she suffers an illusion in seeing the nobility of her end. By the laws that govern her diagnosis of illness in the commoner, a new realm for disturbance reveals itself to her in her rational activity. The naive patient, without the education to fathom the profundity of the charge of lacking ground for her pursuits, at least lives unaware of her mistake. We might get to denigrate her, but it is not her fault. But the dogmatic philosopher is not so innocent. He lives in bad faith, for he has readily available to him, murmuring in the shadows, the tools and occasion to reconsider the commitments he settled for when he declared himself cured or on his way to being cured.125 Assertion in the game set running by the philosopher suggests cognitive dissonance—i.e., disharmony, and so, disturbance. The disturbance, being cognitive, is crucial and profound, radiating throughout the philosopher—at least, if there is a distinction possible, qua philosopher. For philosophical value is found in the cognitive harmony that obtains in knowledge. And this philosophical value is of a higher order than the value we saw when still naive. Philosophy is supposed to makes us better by helping us trade up our aims.

125 For another calculus of the value of philosophical awareness, compare on the one hand Anti- Climacus’ remark in The Sickness unto Death, XI 154 that despair at its minimum is innocent of itself, at its maximum transparent to itself, and on the other, at 156, the Socratic remark that the person in minimal despair is worse off, since, in being further away from truth, further away from deliverance.

Cf. Kierkegaard’s argument in On the Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates that Socratic elenchos gave birth to subjectivity in his interlocutors.

If we do not buy into the calculus (say, because we find it confusing: “I am here now, and I want minimal despair, thank you very much.”), we can wonder whether Socrates harms rather than benefits his interlocutor by bestowing the gift of awareness.

89 Under the psychoanalytical commitments of the dogmatist, if she continues to engage the demand that she justify herself, there is, in her taking up an assertive position in the dialectic, an anxiety. The dogmatic philosopher’s entertaining the possibility of her suffering illusion would make her end of possessing insight transparently desirable, as the entertainment of the possibility makes clear that knowledge is still at a remove from her. In response to the ascription of anxiety, it will do no good to claim ignorance of it. For by her own art the dogmatist has provided the infrastructure to say in like manner of the commoner that his ignorance of his anxiety is the product of a lack of self-consciousness from a lack of attention to the need for and conditions of self-justification.126

Consideration of Mill’s trope that “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” is à propos. 126 The proverb gnōthi seauton exemplifies among the ancients the currency of the notion of self- delusion, especially of the kind that results in self-overestimation (Charmides 164d, Suda, γ 333). Galen sees in a failure to live up to the proverb’s admonition the possibility of our suffering emotionally without our own acknowledgment. (On the Diagnosis and Cure of the Soul's Passions, Ch. 2.)

90 Concupiscence and anxiety in dogmatic inquiry

Let us take for granted that the dialogue between the schools is a serious exercise, and not just an eristic one with no further purpose than the gratification of the vanity of the disputants. Then, when still new to a dialectic of antagonism, and raised as we are in a tradition of philosophy where the worth of the philosopher is first measured not by the manner of her life, but by the economy, elegance and pertinence of her discourse, we are wont to think of the exercise as one in which the positions expressed are expressed not as the exercise of a philosophical debating club with an affiliation somewhat arbitrarily assigned,127 but as assertions of positions genuinely held superior to those of the dialectical opposition. In extremis: When the position held appears obvious, rather than offered in organized and cooperative dialectical exercise, it would be contemplated with offhand boredom; or where it appears under threat, defended with despair. Then pervasive dogmatic disagreement between the schools can be understood as an expression of dogmatic anxiety. In the face of challenge in disagreement, if she is not bored by her own surety, the dogmatic philosopher must defend with the hope of clinging on to her rock in the flow of argument. Or, if she finds she cannot hold on, and is thrown back into the river, she will suffer the experience of confusion and the desire to once more find dry ground.

The latter, that she finds herself having to let go of a cherished position, may not be sufficient to annul dogmatism. Dogmatism, after all, is in abstraction not just the assertion of a particular stance in dialectic, other than the stance that it is imperative that the thinker arrive at at a particular stance. The dogmatist does not need to be imagined inflexible to the degree that she cannot change her mind about what to stand by. But she cannot allow that she should not with all her might seek

127 But, e.g., DL 42: Arcesilaus, when his student tells him he prefers the peripatetic philosophy, takes him to Hieronymus with the request that he take good care of his student. Yet, also, DL 43.

91 to stand by something. In contrast with Pyrrhonism, her commitments, even if they are flexible, remain under a dogmatic paradigm.

Let us consider Outlines 1.26. again:

For the skeptic having begun to philosophize to determine and comprehend about the appearances what is true and what false, so as to attain tranquility (ataraktēsai), fell into an equipollent inconsistency the determination of which, he being unable, was closed off from. But upon his being closed off by happenstance tranquility in matters of opinion followed closely.

In abstraction, the dogmatic philosopher’s disturbance amounts to a seemingly unavoidable desire to possess an object for assertion in dialectical disagreement. But, says the Pyrrhonist, if we attend to the norms of the dialectical exercise, we would fail to discern a dogmatic trajectory of ascent towards knowledge even curtailed progress along which would vindicate her efforts. The dogmatic philosopher tires herself out in a libidinous yet useless exercise.

The dogmatist has come to appreciate the ongoing demand of her practice— that we explain ourselves—as demanding that the exercise eventually be brought to a halt by an explanation that needs no further justification. The value of the practice lies in its approach towards, or arrival in this moment of indelible clarity.

92 On a conception of philosophy as necessary therapy, and with the dogmatic addendum that therapy consists in the trading up of values through rational inquiry, life, the dogmatist is convinced, cannot be lived well without explicatory philosophical insight. This conviction both creates a demand for an explanation of why the philosopher philosophizes, and provides a reply to the demand. On the one hand, philosophical inquiry, as an activity in life, cannot be pursued without reason, either. Nor can this reason be ascribed to the inquirer as motivation that provides explanation if she does not have an account of the end of her inquiry, a belief in this account, and a desire for the end. On the other, appropriately, the dogmatist is convinced that the end of her inquiry is her betterment through discursive clarity on what matters in her life. So, ultimately, any philosophical exercise—even contemplation of the heavens, of nature, paradoxes and geometric constructions—if it is to have philosophical value, is considered to have therapeutic value, and will do so by contributing to the project of philosophical determination of true value.

We will see that in the dogmatic conception of the superior agent as possessing discursive clarity that provides her with reasons for her activity lies the basis for a complaint about the Pyrrhonist’s suspending judgment in inquiry while claiming to be the only true zētētikos:128 “Surely this claim to be an inquirer must imply that the Pyrrhonist is as hungry for knowledge as the dogmatist. But then the Pyrrho- nist must have a dogmatic commitment to the attainment of clarity, otherwise he would not seek to move towards it.”129

128 PH 1.4, 1.7. 129 Compare the charge that inquiry is not possible for the Pyrrhonist, because inquiry requires commitment—e.g., to the notion of proof. PH 2.1-11, AM 8.337-336a.

93 By pointing to the possibility of living without such commitment just in accordance with appearances, the Pyrrhonist will seek to cast doubt on this model of agency. But, more pertinently here, the Pyrrhonist may throw in the balance that in her affirmation of the end of inquiry as discursive clarity, the dogmatist sets herself up for unlimited disturbance because she sets herself an end that cannot be attained in good faith. Nor, indeed, can it be set in good faith. Again, for the dogmatist, the end of inquiry is an account under the norms of inquiry. But under her norms of inquiry, nothing may be taken for granted. And so, no such account will be forthcoming. Having such an account is a condition for her giving herself the reason she needs to legitimate her philosophical pursuit. As she conceives of herself, she must have philosophical reasons for her activity. Philosophical activity, as such a reason-providing activity, is sanctioned as an activity par excellence for which she has reasons. But it is not yet clear that she has such reasons. Nor, indeed, is it clear that any capacity to philosophically account for oneself is the condition on the good life. The account pursued will need to include an explanation of the end of inquiry. But, when she sets herself the end of discovery of the account that legitimates her pursuit of this end, she does not yet possess this account.130 Nor, by the foregoing, does it appear that she will. For the dogmatist, as she conceives of philosophy as the single-most important activity in her life, and the end of philosophy the discovery of and arrival in truth,

130 Why pursue philosophical inquiry? “Because it yields a discursive account that provides ground for our activity.” If the account of reality is systematic, as it must be if it lends itself to presentation through philosophical analysis, it must be a complete account before it can provide ground for engaging in particular kinds of activities. But then, the dogmatist’s initial notion that proper philosophy is pursued only with the aim of possessing the correct object for affirmation is unwarranted. The complaint has the structure of Meno’s paradox, for which Pyrrhonists have a fondness. See the previous note, PH 2.6, and further arguments against the possibility of dogmatic teaching at PH 3.253, AM 1.9, 9.236, and (Grgic, 2008).

94 her philosophical experience has ever a dynamism she wishes herself rid of. Behind every door she opens in the dialectical exercise, truth appears to retreat to close another. The dogmatist, in having explained her inclination to do philosophy as from an ethically necessity to possess the truth, has fallen into a trap of her own making, in which she is lured ever onwards.

95 The dogmatist’s seeing herself be struck down

We have laid in the balance against each other vulgar and philosophical dogmatism, and, in light of this, reconstructed a complaint against the philosopher by and large from philosophical self-awareness of the line philosophy is crossing. She wishes by philosophy to cure the thinker of vulgar sensibility. But the philosopher turns out to suffer no less of a madness. The philosopher is propetēs—rash, but also, subject to logorhea. Her bizarre discursive sensibility has her run head-long from what matters in human life after material or emotional asceticism, after a heartless and impoverished freedom and tranquility, or after the experience of an abstracted god in contemplation of the principles of reality. And if asked to explain her commitment, all that is seen by the level-headed is a commitment whose explanation requires too few, or too many sentences—it seems to go nowhere. Philosophy, being philosophy, is well suited for giving an analysis of the complaint of madness against herself. We might expect that once the symptoms of philosophical disease are on the table, the philosopher, as she finds herself unrepentant and incorrigible, will go to work on showing that these symptoms are not of disease, but of health. After all, she purports to structure her life in accordance with her reasons, such that it would for her be a symptom of disease to deliberately pursue disease. Thus, we might expect that she would wish to show, or at least just bluntly assert, that, as she is healthy, her philosophical predilection is not of madness.

But we find that an ascription of madness to the philosopher does not just come through the view she sets up as foil to herself. For example, in the Phaedrus, Socrates admits defiantly that the desire to witness divine truth is a form of

96 madness—the philosopher pursues truth as a crazed lover at the expense of everyday prudential concern.131 To a vulgar sensibility, philosophical gumption and the threat of ensuing madness have a mark of hubris. The vulgar complaint has it that the philosopher is over-wise and over-curious because she seeks a divine intelligence of the world.132 The custom into which philosophy inserts itself has it that as the philosopher is human, for her human things are fitting:

It is necessary to seek with our mortal minds those things that are befitting from gods, knowing what is before our feet, what sort of destinies we are. Do not, dear soul, speed after the immortal life, but make the most of our practical resources. Pindar, Pytho 3.58-62

The philosopher is useless, because there is for the philosopher—just as for the Promethean hero blessed with divinity who seeks his place among the gods—a price to pay for not attending to those things proper to the fulfillment of their human role. The philosopher has succumbed to immoderation in seeking to become like a god, and forgotten her place in the world. And for this she is struck with madness. But we find Plato’s Socrates quite ready to throw caution to the wind—and not just by rejecting a metaphysics on which there are powerful gods whose psychology has the potential for jealousy, and whose justice is vindictive. Socrates operates on a pervasive philosophical faith that the philosopher must pursue her philosophical aspiration regardless of its attainability. By the lights of many an ancient philosopher the limits and aspirations of philosophy are so lofty that some philosophers explicitly check themselves, and question the attainability of their aims, or declare them aspirational. A well known

131 Phaedrus 249d-e, 256e.

97 example of a sect that does the latter is supposed to be a main target of the Pyrrhonists: The Stoics generally doubted that anyone actually mustered the virtue required for Stoic sagehood.133 Sagehood, so conceived, may be thought to be attainable only by transcending utterly our human condition. In casting the philosophical ambition as ultimately aspirational, the philosopher would acknowledge the impossibility of the completion of this task.

The ancients have a story in which Pythagoras coins the name philosophos for the philosopher as a reflection of the nature of her activity. Philosophy is the love (philia) of wisdom (sophia).134 Cicero tells us that in coining the name, Pythagoras sought a term for the person ‘of truest breeding’, who, unconcerned with the everyday pursuits of ambition or gain, closely studies the nature of things. The story reveals a recurring theme in philosophy—philosophy’s high opinion of itself. But Pythagoras was not wholly immodest. Diogenes Laertius tells us that Pythagoras called himself a philosopher, rather than a sophos, since wisdom is the preserve of the gods—a sentiment echoed by Socrates in the Phaedrus: The best of us will not be wise, like the gods, but lovers of wisdom.135

Aristotle treats at some length the consideration that unqualified success in the study of the nature of things would render us like gods. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tells us that sophia is not just a matter of mastering technical skill, but of acquiring consummate knowledge of the most exalted objects.136 Aristotle elaborates in the Metaphysics. The second chapter of Book 1 gives us a semantics

132 Whether such gods be transcendent in Platonic heaven or dwelling in some distant Epicurean Eden. 133 They might have made an exception for Socrates. 134 Cicero Tusc. 5.3. DL 1.12. 135 Phaedrus 278d. 136 Cf. NE 6.7 1141a14, 15-20.

98 of the term ‘sophia’. There, investigating the opinions (endoxa) in currency regarding the meaning of the term, Aristotle tells us that the wise person would be omniscient—not in the sense that such a person possesses knowledge of each variegated thing, but in the sense that she possesses theoretical knowledge of the first principles that are the cause of all things. Such knowledge is at the highest order of generality, and as such constitutes the most authoritative science to which all other sciences are subordinate, in virtue of the governing science’s determining the ultimate causes, and among them the ultimate final cause, for all things that are covered by the subordinate sciences. The sophos, then, would possess the science of the purpose of the world. Such knowledge, says Aristotle, is perceived as most divine, first, because it is of first causes, and God is a cause of all things. Thus the science of first principles is either the possession of God alone, or of God especially. Secondly, in being a purely theoretical science, (a) the content of the science is most determinately knowable, and so is the proper object of knowledge for those who seek knowledge just for its own sake,137 and (b) the content of the science will be of necessities, and so be exhausted by the contingent variegation of the actual world.138 This leads Aristotle to say that the perfection of the science of first principles is sought out of sheer wonder and for no further purpose than to escape from ignorance—remarking that this can be seen in the early philosophers as well as in contemporary ones who investigate celestial phenomena and the origin of everything. As such, like a man who exists just for himself and not for another is free, this science of first principles, existing just for itself, and not for any further purpose, is free. But, says Aristotle, quoting the lyric poet Simonides, possession of such freedom may be thought ‘only the privilege of god’, as, in fact, human nature is in

137 Metaphysics 2 982b1. 138 Metaphysics 2 982b4-24.

99 may ways in bondage (doulos).139 Thus, our coming to possess wisdom would amount to our coming to possess knowledge of god, or to our becoming like god.140

While Pythagoras and the Phaedrus’ Socrates say that wisdom’s divinity pro- hibits its attainment by mankind, Aristotle expresses optimism about our epistemic situation by appealing to the nature of the divine. For Aristotle, any leisure we have from bondage we should not be reluctant to spend on philosophy: Any divinity would not be the jealous sort to keep wisdom from us.141 Philosophical knowledge may be divine knowledge, but this does not rule out that we may become divine. Still, whether sympathetic to Pythagoras and Socrates or Aristotle, we may think that if a human becomes a philosopher fully, wholly, only by seriously aspiring after consummate knowledge, or, under a different mode of presentation, divinity, her ambition surpasses in obsessiveness any earthly ambition of the layperson.142 As, perhaps, shouldn’t surprise us, if, in her endeavor, she is set on seeing herself become better than the naive commoner. Again:

Well then, believing the next also good, and in the same way speeding after it anxiously, he will suffer the same disturbance, but perhaps even more violently, in so far as he has been converted to believe that the thing now pursued by him is of greater value. M 11.138

139 Presumably, because humans can be in the grip of misfortune, Cf. the analysis of Simonides’ verses to the effect that it is hard to become good, but easy to be good. Prot. 339a-346d. 140 Metaphysics 982a4-983a18. 141 Op. cit. 142 And perhaps we may even diagnose this sort of conception of the philosopher in the Epicurean, who seeks to live like a god by developing—and reminding herself of—a material science which conclusively shows that no god has any power over us, and that death is nothing to us.

100

Whether or not the ancient philosopher thinks that the road ahead has a terminus, it will be Sisyphean—long and uphill. For—witness the conditions on sophia—the gods live at some elevation. Then, the Pyrrhonian promise to take weight off her feet—perhaps (it is not yet clear) by making her give up on the journey altogether,143 or perhaps, in some other way, by allowing her the liberty to put a spring in her step—should be of some allure to the philosopher. At least if this alleviation can be effected with sufficient deference to the very philosophical methods and aims she finds inviolable ingredients of her superiority.

143 See, e.g., Aristocles apud Eusebius 14.18.1. Two extreme views: Striker thinks the Pyrrhonist forgoes the search for truth altogether, See (Striker, 2008)117-18. Bueno apparently argues for a Pyrrhonian conception of knowledge without justification which allows the Pyrrhonian an understanding through research of how the world could be (Bueno, 2003); see (Trowbridge, 2006). An overview of recent discussion can be found in (Perin, 2006).

101 A rational therapy for dogmatic therapy

But we might expect that a fundamental problem the dogmatic philosopher will have with Pyrrhonism can be traced to the question of whether Pyrrhonism can show such deference while undermining what is being deferred to. After all, the philosopher, being a philosopher, will need to be reasoned into skepticism. The philosopher seeks therapy, but reason must remain integral to this therapy—that is, it is not just that philosophy must be therapeutic, but it must be so by being rational, too. For the dogmatic philosopher straightforwardly conceived,144 rational therapy appears to be an emancipation from the misapprehension, confusion and superstition of hoi polloi by discovery through reason of objective truths—about our epistemic situation with regard to reality, and, in so far as the philosopher thinks some further reality can be known, about a body of metaphysical truths over and above such truths about our epistemic situation.

The thought is, again, that we may all the better go about living our lives if we can rationally determine what we ought to aim for, or what it is that we are actually aiming for.145 Such determination requires getting clear on our nature and place in the world. The dogmatist goes to work on this determination under the impression that there are truths about (a) the extent to which we can knowledgeably make this determination, (b) the proper content of this determination given (a), and—for those who

144 For example, including any negative dogmatism of the later skeptical Academy to the effect that nothing can be known. 145 For a difference, vide (Striker, 1991), p. 2: “[Stoics] argued that nature has set a goal for human beings that they ought to pursue, while Epicureans held that the existence of a single final aim in all our actions can be established by observation of the natural behavior of human beings. The difference would show up, for example, in different explanations of why people are not happy. While the Stoics would say that most people are miserable because they do not desire the right sort of things, and hence would be unhappy even if they got what they wanted, the Epicureans would say that unhappy people do not understand what they really desire, and hence to not get what they want.”

102 are pessimistic about (a)—finally, (c) what we should allow ourselves to be guided by absent a full grasp of what kind of being we are and world we live in.

Now, it seems that the Pyrrhonist is trying to cure the dogmatist by getting her to give all this up. But, then, as his cure runs through philosophical epochē, he can only cure her by that very thing which he appears to be trying to get her to give up—rational inquiry after the truth. At least at the beginning of her conversation with the Pyrrhonist, we imagine that the dogmatist will reject Pyrrhonism because she has no taste to give up rational truth-seeking. To her it appears that the Pyrrhonist is just offering a destructive anti-philosophy that seeks to smother a well-established faith she has in the power of rationality to bring her closer to the truth, and by this improve her life. Consider, as an example of this appreciation of the ability of philosophy to make progress, Lucretius’ famous eulogy of Epicurus in Book 1 of De Rerum Natura:

When, open to view, human life shamefully lay upon the ground, oppressed by the weight of superstition, which displayed her head looming from the regions of heaven over mortals with dreadful appearance, a man from Greece dared first to raise mortal eyes and resist her. This man neither the fables of gods, nor thunderbolts, nor heaven with its menacing roar could subdue, but as they provoked the keen virtue of his soul all the more, he desired to be the first to shatter the enclosing bars of the gates of nature. Thus, the lively force of his soul prevailed, and he travelled far beyond the flaming walls of the world, and wandered in mind and soul the entire vastness, whence as victor he reported to us what can occur and what cannot—in short, by what rational account to each thing a finite power and profound limit adheres. De Rerum Natura 1.62-77

103

Lucretius gives charged expression to a historical appreciation of philosophy as a relatively new technē by whose discoveries humankind is only now becoming emancipated from a passive and detrimental acceptance of the superstitions found in popular mythology.146 In the context of this appreciation, the Pyrrhonist would be wise to respect both the dogmatist’s aspiration to truth, as well as her faith in rationality if he wants to gain her ear. The question is whether he can, at least, give a show of mustering this respect, if Pyrrhonian skepticism has every appearance of being antithetical to such aspiration and faith.

The comprehensive variety of philosophical topics we saw Sextus intend to cover in Outlines 1.5 reveals that he does not think that the conversion to skepticism could just involve presenting the reader with an abstract set of dialectical tools to get started with the production of epochē. Therapy would also have to involve showing the reader the opportunity and legitimacy of actualizing the skeptical ability, as well as the desirability of its acquisition and actualization. For one, somewhere within the intelligent and well- schooled dogmatist, there will—as a result of some acquaintance with the epistemic difficulties the Pyrrhonist will consider in the production of epochē—be lurking about the memory of discomfort in the face of skeptical worries she feels she has already safely taken care of.

Instructing the dogmatist in the skeptical ability embodied in the Modes will constitute but part of the therapeutic work of the Pyrrhonist. To cure, he must address, in the dogmatist’s language of reason and truth-seeking, the dogmatic

146 (Jaeger, NaN), Vol. 1, Ch. 9, (Brisson, 1996).

104 rejection of skepticism that evolves from dogmatic faith in reason and the deter- minability of ethical and other natural facts.

105 Sketch 3: Dogmatic Doubts about Skepticism

106 The problem of Pyrrhonism: dogmatic worries

Earlier, we gave a rough tripartite analysis of Pyrrhonian skepticism: (1) Pyr- rhonism offers the ability to induce epochē in matters of opinion (or matters of reason, or of philosophical reason).147 And Pyrrhonism envisions that the human agent rests easy in deploying the ability because (2) ataraxia appears telos, and (3) epochē presents ataraxia. In the dialectic between Pyrrhonist and her audience, each of these three parts has come under attack:

i. The skeptical ability cannot produce epochē to the extent the Pyrrhonist envisions without making impossible the kind of life the Pyrrhonist is obviously leading, for such a life requires belief. ii. Ataraxia is not the telos, for the ataraxic fails to properly recognize valuables essential to a flourishing human life. iii. Epochē does not produce ataraxia, but even confusion, and, hence, distress.

Often, these attacks appear neither recreational, nor pursued in the Pyrrhonian fashion for the sake of producing epochē. Their intent is neither skeptical, nor esoteric. Rather, these attacks appear brought with the intent to perpetuate a dogmatism. That is, they appear brought in the manner we imagine the dialectic between the Greco-Roman schools: from a desire to defend and establish as superior a particular school, or set of schools, where this desire appears from an allegiance to a dogmatism, rather than from a conscious wish to carry out an assigned dialectical role in a collaborative attempt to bring about equipollence between the different views and attain epochē.

147 For the further qualification, (Frede, 1997), p. 133, and below.

107 In the face of attack, it is philosophical custom to either re-evaluate our offering, or to push back against the attack, and we have reason to expect that the Pyrrhonist will act accordingly. First, remember that in accordance with the fourfold way the Pyrrhonist will act in accordance with didaskalia of the technai he accepts—that is, he will behave in accordance with the traditions of the arts he practices. Hence, in so far as a response to criticism of his three claims can reasonably be expected from him under the norms of the philosophical technē, he will, as long as he is still philosophizing, wish to say more.

We can give context to this wish to perpetuate the dialectic by considering that we have been working towards a temptation to say that the Pyrrhonist, in order to effect his therapy, will have to show his prospective patient how his therapy is viable. Admittedly this, it seems, would be to grant that for the therapy to be effective, a patient must have insight into the mechanics of the therapy, and we might pause to wonder whether this has to be so. For example, contemporary Gestalt therapy’s effectiveness is said to lie in the inducement of awareness of the present experience, and this is held to be contingent on epochē of both therapist and patient regarding the mechanics and expectations of the therapeutic session. And we might recognize a precursor to this therapy in the Pyrrhonian technique of inducing epochē to reveal what lies in experience. There may be a worry on the Pyrrhonian therapist’s part, then, that giving an analysis of Pyrrhonism will not reveal its effectiveness, or will even make it obscure, and so do nothing to vindicate it. Yet, Pyrrhonian therapy is intended for the philosopher given to analysis, and we can expect her natural tendency in therapy to be one of attentive analysis of the therapeutic process through a conception of its mechanics and aims. That is just how the philosophical mind works.

108 It seems unavoidable, then, that a stage in the therapy will involve attending to the experience of doubt regarding the viability of the therapy.

Then, indeed, the Pyrrhonist may be expected to allay any worries that (a) the Pyrrhonist will not be able to induce epochē, (b) the conception of the telos as ataraxia is misguided, and (c) that there is no concomitance of epochē and ataraxia. This will not be easy. The worries (a) - (c) are worries about the role of rationality in the conception of the Pyrrhonist’s ideal life. But, according to the Pyrrho- nist, such worries about the role of rationality are an expression of the dogmatist’s pathology.

The dogmatist is worried that if the Pyrrhonist puts his rationality to work to strip himself of dogma, no further value remains in our rational capacity. If the Pyrrhonist once stripped of dogma will live intuitively, in accordance with the fourfold way, it will be just by following his emotions and desires and the rules put in place by others—like a child or a beast at best. Life would be unbearably light. The dogmatist thinks that living like a child or beast is a shortcoming, because she presumes (1) that the value of rationality lies in its capacity to give us access to discursive information about value in the world, (2) that in gaining discursive information about value in the world we mature, and (3) that in maturing in this way, we become better—more valuable.

The dogmatist’s commitment to the need for discursive information about value is analyzable into her fixation on a picture in which she is valuable through the value of her rational capacity, and her rational capacity is valuable just through its power to determine value in the world.

109 But, according to the Pyrrhonist, the disease of the dogmatist lies in her commitment to thinking that a necessary ingredient to her happiness is her rational access to discursive information about value. The commitment amounts to pathology because it leaves her no alternative but to structure her life after a presumption of her possessing such discursive information—i.e., after her opinion. But it is the structuring of a life in accordance with opinion that, according to the Pyrhrronist, constitutes rashness, and so makes for disturbance. And so her worries about (a) - (c) are an expression of her disease.

In other words, from the Pyrrhonian perspective, showing the viability of this philosophy is made difficult because it is not just a matter of resolving some factual disagreement, but of overcoming a deep-set pathology, whose expression is a demand that the Pyrrhonist prove superiority. But the Pyrrhonist aims to rid the dogmatist of the urgency of this demand. And, from the therapist’s point of view, if there is any therapy in indulging the pathological demand of the patient, it is because she hopes that the patient by being indulged will come to transcend it.

110 Epistemic worries

As we have just outlined, commensurate with the worries (a) - (c), we can give a threefold characterization of this supposedly pathological demand that we come to see the truth of the superiority of Pyrrhonism. First, regarding (a), the dogmatist has epistemic worries about the scope of suspension of judgment. First, there are worries about what this scope is supposed to be, and second, there are worries that the scope is of such an extent that the Pyrrhonian ideal appears if not impossible, then undesirable.

To the first, we have seen that the Pyrrhonist says that he seeks suspension of judgment just in matters of opinion, but lives in accordance with appearance. For example:

We say that the skeptic does not dogmatize, not in accordance with that meaning of ‘dogma’ according to which dogma, some say, more colloquially is the consenting to some matter. For the skeptic conforms (sunkatatithetai) to the unavoidable feelings and emotions (pathē) in accordance with appearance, such that he would not, e.g., say, when feeling the sensation of heat or feeling the sensation of cold, say “I do not believe (dokō mē) that I am feeling the sensation of heat or feeling the sensation of cold.” But we say he does not dogmatize where dogma, as some say, is the assent (sunkatathēsis) to some matter from among those non-evident things sought after in accordance with scientific knowledge (epistēmē). For the Pyrrhonist assents to nothing non-evident. PH 1.13

And:

111 When we seek whether the underlying object (to hupokeimenon) is as it appears, we grant that it appears, but we seek not after the appearance, but after what is said about this appearance. But this differs from seeking after the appearance itself. For example, the honey appears sweet to us. This we acquiesce in (sunchōroumen). For we are sweet- ened perceptually. But whether it is also sweet in so far as according to the account (hoson epi tōi logōi), we seek. For this is not an appearance, but something said about the appearance. And even if we argue in accordance with the accounts against the appearances, we do not expose these accounts wishing to destroy the appearances, but showing the rashness (propeteia) of the dogmatists. For if reason is such a cheat as to also well nigh snatch from the appearances from our eyes, how is it not necessary to eye it with suspicion, so as not to be rash in complying with it? PH 1.19-20.

The distinction is drawn variously, but there is no consensus on what it amounts to. The Antonine philosopher and physician Galen, a possible contemporary of Sextus, gives us the terminology that still today distinguishes the standard dichotomy of exegetical options. Either the Pyrrhonist conceives of himself as an urbane skeptic who has beliefs about states of affairs in a privileged domain, such as that of immediate appearance, to which he thinks it fruitless or inappropriate to apply the skeptical ability. Thus, e.g., he may believe that it is true that honey appears sweet to him. This is not a matter of opinion, for it lies undeniably in appearance. Or he is a rustic skeptic for whom the domain of matters of opinion covers all discursive accounts of reality.148

148 For Galen’s terminology: Diff. Puls 7.711K, Praenot. 14.628K. For an introduction to recent point to counter-point debate, vide (Barnes, 1997), p. 60-61, cf. (Burnyeat, 1997), (Frede, 1997), (Frede, 1997). Burnyeat, in opposition to Frede, thought that the Pyrrhonist held a rustic

112

To the second, the exegetical question is asked under a norm for charity derived from our trying to imagine the Pyrrhonian psychology. And our attempt at imagining this psychology is made under a condition of expectations about what is humanly possible or desirable. We get to ask after the extent of our potential to induce isostheneia and epochē with regard to beliefs in matters of opinion.149 And this question we qualify by asking it under a constraint of a further question after the extent to which we can go on suspending and still remain human. These considerations inevitably bring the incipient worry that the Pyrrhonist is in trouble. There is a temptation to think that either the skeptic will be a deficient agent, or, in acting, he will show himself some sort of urbane skeptic, or a failed rustic skeptic.150 There is a worry that human flourishing involves human rational activity, while human rational activity in turn involves having commitments in matters of opinion. Thus, rustic skepticism would be attainable only by the deficient—those who do not fully actualize their rational potential. The sentiment of this worry is familiar to us from Hume’s remark that, though without belief practical activity and philosophical discourse would come to a halt, in the case of a determined skepticism, as always, our nature is too strong for principle:

[A] Pyrrhonian cannot expect that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will skepticism. Barnes has sympathies with both Frede’s and Burnyeat’s positions. For those in a hurry, a reasonable summary of the dialectical landscape can be found in (Laursen, 1992), pp. 65- 93. While the Pyrrhonist’s stance is sufficiently unclear to support a cottage industry, the marked recent attempt to habilitate Pyrrhonism has been urbane—viz. the recent sheer epistemological skepticism of Fogelin’s neo-Pyrrhonism (Fogelin, 2004). 149 See (Annas, 1986), p. 11. 150 See AM 9.161-2.

113 acknowledge anything, that all human life must per- ish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 12151

The Pyrrhonist would live his skepticism at the expense of having denied his nature by an impossible subhuman effort. Hume’s challenge has ancient precursors. We can find the worry that the Pyr- rhonist could not live his life at work in Aristotle’s claim that the skeptic’s saying anything requires subscription to the principle of non-contradiction, and should he say nothing, he would be a mere plant;152 in Aristotle’s general worry that the

151 The quotation is central to Burnyeat’s question after the possibility of the skeptical life. (Burnyeat, 1997). Cf. Pascal, Pensées 434: Reason confutes the dogmatist, but nature the Pyrrhonian. 152 Metaphysics 4.4.

114 skeptic will, from lack of conviction, forgo actions that will better his lot;153 in the Stoic charge that action involves assent (sunkatathesis);154 in the Epicurean Colotes’ polemical claim that total epochē must result in total inaction; in Aene- sidemus’ defending Pyrrhonism by rejecting as spurious the account of Pyrrho’s unresponsiveness to appearances;155 in Galen’s wondering whether the skeptic would stay in bed when the sun is up, or not disembark when everyone else does, from doubt whether it is day, or whether what appears to be land really is land;156 in Sextus’ appeal to appearance in accordance with the tērēsis biotikē as the engine of Pyrrhonian action157; and in Aristocles’ arguing that belief cannot be isolated from the senses.

We might be tempted to reply to the worry, first, that the Pyrrhonist, in practicing philosophy with vigor and commitment, shows evidence to the contrary—i.e, shows evidence of actualizing his rational potential—and, second, that accordingly the Pyrrhonist is urbane, and the applicability of the skeptical ability is not intended to be universal.158 This way, we might think, say, that the Pyrrhonist believes that honey appears sweet to him, or that it appears that he must pursue epochē through equipollence, or that it appears that he has established equipollence.159

153 Ibid, and Posterior Analytics. 154 See Plutarch’s discussion of Arcesilaus, Adv. Col. 1122a-d. 155 DL 9.62. 156 De Diagnosc. Puls. 7.781, 16-783, 5K. See (Burnyeat, 1997), fn. 4. 157 Cf. AM 11.162. 158 For example, according to Barnes, the Pyrrhonist does not have to forgo all belief, but merely the ones that interfere with her psychological harmony. Pyrrhonian skepticism is an ability to produce suspension of judgment via equipollence as a result of the application of the Modes for the sake of philosophical therapy. This means that we cannot conclude that exercise of this ability produces an overall skeptical outlook. The variety of the Modes, together with the claim that Pyrrhonism is an ability, leads Barnes to conclude that the ability is applied piecemeal in cases where the agent is disturbed by belief. 159 So says Burnyeat of isothenia. In order to arrive in epochē with regard to some notion, the Pyrrhonist must be convinced that the two arguments pro and con are equipollent. (M. Burnyeat, 1997a). Barnes disagrees. (Barnes, 1997).

115 Naturally, there would be difficulties: We would need a fuller account of the criterion for distinguishing the domain inviolate to the skeptical ability. We would need to know more about how those beliefs within that domain serve as material for a rational human life. We would need some qualification of how, if he maintains a set of beliefs, the Pyrrhonist is any better off than the dogmatist psychologically.

However, the Pyrrhonist appears to betray an overwhelmingly rustic streak. For one, formally, the Pyrrhonian Modes appear to ever anticipate a further act of doubting. If, as he appears to, the Pyrrhonist follows these Modes without compromise, he would be left with no opportunity to carve out a domain of beliefs that would appear not to be a matter of opinion.160 Symptomatic of how transparent the Pyrrhonist is to the force behind these Modes is, e.g., the Pyrrhonist’s suspension on a criterion for the settling of any disagreement. And once we fathom that the Pyrrhonist does not even retreat here, we should not be surprised to find that he also suspends on the possibility of language itself. We will see the Pyrrhonist argue that it is possible that there are no propositions, so that there would be no medium for dogmatic assertion.

In the latter suspension, the Pyrrhonist appears fearless of the the kind of charge of self-refutation that fuels Aristotle’s complaint above. In fact, these sorts of suspensions are relished by the Pyrrhonist. Thus, both Sextus and Aenesidemus tell us that Pyrrhonian skepticism is so thoroughgoing that the Pyrrhonist does not believe that he believes nothing. Indeed, to believe so would constitute a form of dogmatism. And this sort of doubt about doubting seems to indicate that the Pyrrhonist is suspending on the formulation of the appearance of doubt he is experiencing. That is, he undermines phenomenal claims tout court. He might say:

116 “I don’t have any beliefs,” or: “Honey appears sweet,” but, pace some understanding of Moore, he does not believe it. There is a way of understanding Moore’s claim that we cannot say: “P, but I don’t believe that P,” that trades on a dogmatic understanding of Aristotle’s charge of implicative self-refutation. On this understanding, the employment of material needed to express radical doubt implies commitment to this material in a way that undermines the expression. This undermining trades on a notion of commitment, or belief, such that belief is unambiguous and can be attributed to an agent in virtue of behavior, especially behavior that involves manipulation of things that can be said. If you honestly say “P,” then your attitude towards P is such that you think that P stands in an overridingly preferred alethic relation to reality. We bear this understanding of commitment to honest activity of expression— whether in thought or medium—in mind. Thinking that this understanding is clear, we can look at the behavior of the Pyrrhonist, and ask whether such behavior really could occur without belief. If the Pyrrhonist makes out he is a rustic skeptic, to believe him the dogmatist will need to be shown the possibility of the Pyrrhonist’s engaging in the kind of activities she naively thinks would require belief, but which she would also think the Pyrrhonist does engage in: How does the Pyrrhonist get to philosophize? How does he get to say: “Suspension is the way,” or: “I suspend”? The dogmatists will insist she be shown a perspicuous answer. But the Pyrrho- nist’s brazen relishing of what quite clearly appears to amount to pragmatic self- refutation does not constitute such showing.

Well, perhaps the Pyrrhonist might say that, just as in practical affairs, he acts in contemplation just in accordance with unavoidable appearance. For example, when he says: “I don’t have any beliefs,” he may say this somehow without believing it, yet still move the mouth or the mind by following appearance.

160 See (Barnes, 1997), pp. 69-70.

117 But if this reply invokes just an image of reflexive, intuitive activity, it seems hard to fathom how Sextus’ engagement in philosophical activity—in which he engages in rational analysis, and has notions about what the telos is, and recom- mendations about how we should live in accordance with nature in order to attain it—is of a kind with his unreflective response to pull his finger back from a flame, 161 or to feed himself.

161 The Peripatetic Aristocles complains that the Pyrrhonist cannot say that we should live in accordance with nature and appearance rather than not. Aristocles apud Eusebius, Praep. Ev. 758c-763d, (Annas, 1986), p. 20.

118 Ethical worries

Second, regarding (b), there are ethical worries about tranquility as the final end. Sextus’ endorsement of tranquility as a final end might appear to idealize a kind of ‘oriental indifference.’162 Further, from Outlines 1.12 & 26, we may think that this endorsement comes as a result of abstracting from the different schools of Greek thought an underlying aim for tranquility. For in these passages Sextus appears to insinuate that the pursuit of ataraxia is a condition for the continued pursuit of philosophy. Taken together, this would amount to conceiving of the ancient ethical ideal as a capacity for life-negation. In this, the Pyrrhonist would outdo even the most radical of Cynics.

Sextus does not tell us much about Pyrrhonian tranquility explicitly, yet a caricature of it as a kind of anesthesia appears to persist. Perhaps cultural bias in the interpretation of the lore of the origins of Pyrrhonism is conducive to this caricature. Diogenes Laertius tells us that Pyrrho, when with Alexander in India, came under the influence of yogis,163 whose behavior in meditative asceticism we, looking from afar, might readily take as a mark of rejection of the world. And a suspicion that this asceticism rubbed off on Pyrrho and remained an object of admiration when Arcesilaus named his skepticism gives detail to a vision of the Pyrrhonist with the aspirations of a Stylite. Pertinent to our forgoing discussion: Such a vision may also appear convincing, because epochē is, by the Pyrrhonist’s own admission, concomitant with

162 The phrase is Alain’s, and it’s not supposed to be complimentary. See Hallie’s introduction in (Sextus Empiricus & Hallie, 1964), pp. 5-6. Hallie mentions some essays by Alain and Molière’s Le Mariage Forcé as guilty of perpetuating a misconception of Pyrrhonism as life-negating and seeking anesthesia. 163 The gymnosophoi, or naked philosophers. DL 9.61-3.

119 ataraxia, while, as we saw above, epochē will get caricatured as producing an apractical disposition. The phenomenological presentation of such a disposition might easily be thought one of indifference.

We might fear that if the caricature is deserved, Sextus’s claim that ataraxia is telos at best just holds for a proper subset of Greek schools.164 This would be particularly problematic for the Pyrrhonist, because if the dogmatists could see themselves as pursuing ataraxia, the Pyrrhonist can come ply his therapeutic trade among the dogmatists without having to explain his aim. But if the dogmatists cannot so see themselves, not because they fail to analyze themselves properly, but because they do not pursue ataraxia, the Pyrrhonist would have to set them straight about what they really should be aiming for—and this would require more than just saying that ataraxia is telos, which seems the brunt of what we see Sextus say on the subject. But in saying more, i.e., in motivating a prescription or correction that ataraxia is telos, it would appear that Sextus would be proselytizing a new dogmatism.

In assessing whether we can analyze Greek ethical thinking in general for a conception of ataraxia as telos, we might consider first that while the Greek dogmatic schools appear to disagree about the telos—Cyrenaics deny that there is a life-structuring goal at all; others whether it is pleasure or virtue—the concept of telos whose content and existence is under contention appears, if not captured, then shaped by Aristotle’s analysis.

164 Striker thinks the Greek schools did not really conceive of happiness as ataraxia. (Striker, 1990), while Sedley appears to think—perhaps with little inclination to disagree—that Sextus thought the goal of tranquility uncontroversially ‘nonsectarian’. (Sedley, 1983), p. 21-22. See Ch. 2.

120 At least, Sextus’ conception of the aim we put before us looks Aristotelian. Just like Aristotle’s telos, it is the final object of desire, it is that for the sake of which everything is done, and it is not pursued for the sake of anything else.165 Now, Aristotle says that the telos is happiness, and of the happy life that it must be teleion, or complete—it cannot be made any better by adding any other good to it. And so it would appear that attainment of the telos makes for a complete life.166 Second, we might consider that for those who think that the telos is to be attained through virtue—such as, apparently, the Stoics, Aristotle, and Plato— happiness will be virtuous theoretical and practical activity. But we might think that a condition on theoretical or practical activity’s being virtuous, rather than a fortunate unfolding of events, is the agent’s ability to see the aim and manner of his pursuit as desirable for the right reason.167 Then we can imagine having trouble seeing how a life of so-called ‘oriental indifference’ is teleion. Without a conception of the content of the telos beyond just an abstracted tranquility, the Pyrrhonian vision is in danger of offering us as ideal a kind of living death in a place where nothing ever happens, or at least, nothing that matters to us. We may have trouble imagining such tranquility without boredom; and boredom surely would indicate an incompleteness in our life.

To begin to lay in the balance, we might venture in response that a philosophy of detachment need not be given as one of sheer indifference. Thus, to continue to look East, for the Daoist of the Warring States period, the ideal of tranquility is attained in the paradox of action through inaction—wei wuwei. For example:

165 NE 1.7, PH 1.25. 166 Cf. EN 1.7. For the telos as final object of desire, see also: Cicero, Fin 1.12.42; Arius apud Stobaeus, Ecl 2.77.16-17 (Stoics), 131.2-4 (Peripatetics). For the telos as that for the sake of which everything is done, Arius ap. Stobaeus, Ecl 2.77.21-24 (Stoics), 131.4 (Peripatetics), Alexander, An Mant 150.20-1, 162.34. 167 (Striker, 1990).

121

…In not desiring, they would achieve equilibrium, And all the world would be properly ordered of its own accord. Dao De Jing, 37

…It is for this reason that sages keep to service that does not entail coercion (wuwei), And disseminate teachings that go beyond what can be said.

In all that happens (wanwu), The sages develop things but do not initiate them,… Dao De Jing, 2

Way-making (dao) is an easy-flowing stream… Dao De Jing, 34168

Nor are tranquility and activity mutually exclusive for Greeks and Romans. Just as dao is given as an easy flowing stream, the tranquility of the sage is explicitly idealized by the Stoics as a form of fluency (euroia) in the experience of virtuous living. As such, for them, too, tranquility is a feature of agency.169

Nonetheless, even if ataraxia is idealized as the experience of virtuous activity, this does not mean that anyone who seriously maintains that virtue is telos would say that ataraxia is telos, too. For one, Epicureans and Stoics appear to disagree exactly about whether the pursuit of virtue is subordinate to the attainment of the ideal experience, or is itself the final end. The Stoics, on the one hand, appear to think that any ideal experience super- venes on virtuous activity. But optimal pursuit of such activity is made possible not through affinity with this supervenient affect, but through rational recognition

168 All translations by Ames and Hall: (Ames & Hall, 2003).

122 of the rational nature of the kosmos as it unfolds in accordance with divine intelligence. Acting virtuously in accord with this rational recognition is to be in accord with divine intelligence. The value of the virtues is ultimately grounded in a theological cosmology. If we understand the virtues as divine in this way, we might readily imagine how the Stoic is adamant that the end we aim for is not affect but virtue.170 Our affect is merely a product of the unfolding of the world in accordance with divine intelligence. In so far as there is anything divine about our affect, we receive this only through our active participation in a rationally productive activity of god. On the other hand, according to the Epicureans, the good to aim for reveals itself to us just in the positive affect of ataraxia—that is of pleasure and/or lack of pain. The Epicureans take sensation as criterion for opinion. With this in hand they go on, on the one hand, to give an ethics grounded in perception, and, on the other, a science for an unfolding of the world without divine influence. Taking perception as criterion, the Epicureans say that the aim of human activity is pleasure. But they say that pleasure is maximized in the removal of all pain, and that the pleasures and pains of memory and anticipation are greater than those of the flesh. As a result, though we are to aim for pleasure, we must aim not for excessive pleasure or immediate gratification of the flesh, but for a life of stable pleasure. Since the pleasures of the soul are greater than those of the flesh, and the former are given in protraction over time, and since the greatest pleasure is the freedom of pain, we must aim for a protracted state of freedom of disturbance—that is ataraxia. Such aiming clearly requires more than just following the drives of desire: We must choose rationally, and sometimes forgo the lesser pleasures of the flesh in order to attain the stable pleasures. Such rational choosing requires virtue.

169 For example, Epictetus, Discourses 1.4, Arius 77-78. 170 DL 7.85-88.

123 The value of virtue is not grounded in any divine activity. The Epicureans construct a physics without god, and this affords them the liberty to conceive of themselves, and their affect, as the measure. Virtuous activity is just that activity which promotes the attainment by man of a life of the gods—who are tranquil and robust, and want for nothing—in accordance with his nature. So the Epicureans think that—as we can only aim for value through recognition of affect—when we aim for virtue, we do so legitimately because we aim for the experience of ataraxia.171

We may elicit a number of intuitions in support of the desire to distinguish between the goodness that we aim for and the experience of tranquility. First, from having been about in the world, we might think that tranquility can be within reach of the lotus-eater, or within reach of someone who has no ethical beliefs, or a set of mistaken ethical beliefs, or the right ethical beliefs for the wrong reasons.172 Thus the worry of the Peripatetic Aristocles that there is no guarantee that an ataraxic Pyrrhonist will refrain from shamelessness, wickedness, or injustice.173 Second, we ventured that the Pyrrhonist appears to aim to just act from unavoidabilities (the way he is, say, moved to eat from hunger). In so far as he is capable of this in more than just those activities we uncontroversially appear to share with the lower animals, he shows an affinity for the Daoist way of action through inaction. The Pyrrhonist would not make a positive rational decision about what activity to pursue, but, by pursuing a maximization of ataraxia, would take the experience of the path of least resistance as his guide.

171 Cicero Fin 1.29, Arius, 46.17-20, Epicurus, Ep. ad Men. 129, KD 25, DL 10.138, Athenaeus 12.546f-547a. 172 The spirit of the these remarks is echoed from (Striker, 1990). 173 Aristocles apud Eusebius, Praep. Ev. 761d-762a, (Nussbaum, 1994), p. 314, (Annas, 1986), p. 19.

124 But then the Pyrrhonist would appear as passive in, or detached from his activity.174 The philosopher prizes her autonomy in rational activity. It is a source of liberty from external impulses. It elevates her above beasts, who are slaves to these impulses. But, in the Pyrrhonian life, her aim would never be endorsed as autonomously justified. Instead, her aim would impress her the way hunger and thirst does a beast. Third, we imagine that our activity is with an ongoing intent to bring our projects into the future. This, it seems, would require the recognition of a dissatisfaction in the present which we are thankful our passage into the future allows us to rectify. Examples of such projects are, we would like to say, the raising of our children, the completion of our book, the graduation of our students. Of such projects, it would seem strange to say that the aim is first our tranquility, rather than the happiness of our child, the kalon of our book, the happiness of our student. The intuition that we would get the order of our priorities wrong here is brought out by the consideration that in so far as caring involves recognizing a lack, and the recognition of a lack dissatisfaction, and hence, disturbance, we would appear to be aiming to not care about the well-being of our child in aiming for our tranquility first. Our commitment to our projects over time requires that we care about them—it is through our caring about them that they accumulate sufficient presence in our deliberation to become material to structure our lives in accord with. But if we could ultimately reduce an account of the direction of our activity to an account of a pursuit of tranquility, such caring will have been analyzed away, and with it, the possibility for our engaging in our projects. Or: The Pyrrhonist seeks freedom from disturbance in his activity, but his engaging in such activity requires that he be disturbed.

174 (Annas, 1986), p. 21 ff.

125 The Pyrrhonist must, then, in dialogue about the telos, allay the dogmatist’s worry that any supposed thinker enlightened to see that ataraxia is telos will be incapable of rational recognition of value. This allaying may come one of two ways: by taking away the worry that this recognition must obtain, or by taking away the worry that it does not obtain. Either way, it appears the Pyrrhonist must do this in such a way that the dogmatist is no longer worried (1) that ataraxia may not supervene on virtuous action alone, (2) that pursuit of ataraxia would be a pursuit insensitive to value revealed through rationality, (3) that pursuit of ataraxia would leave impossible any genuine pursuit of individual activities of concern to us.

126 Methodological worries

Finally, regarding (c), there are methodological worries about suspension of judgment and tranquility. If in dealing with the epistemic worries the Pyrrhonist has managed to show that a life without belief is possible, and in dealing with the ethical worries that ataraxia is telos, the remaining challenge is to show how without dogmatic rational commitment the Pyrrhonist is most ataraxic. This explanation will need to be given in the face of challenges arising from the initial dogmatic intuition that Pyrrhonism fails to make space for a particular necessary role for rationality.

Say the dogmatist allowed that at best it seems that epochē might just produce metriopatheia, but not ataraxia, in the cases that matter. For example, to induce epochē so that one does not believe that we have a child, or that illness is bad, will do nothing to dispel the miserable appearance of our child’s illness. Equally in the case of fear of death, or resignation to our finitude. Suspending on the belief that life is short, and there is no return once we have crossed the Acheron, or that if there is no return this is bad, does nothing to undo our distress in trying to marry a rational intuition of infinitude with an empirical one of limit.

We might feel that this sort of allowance is rather generous. For surely the Pyrrhonist does not attain even metriopatheia, but is mightily disturbed, for he does not know what to believe. The resources left to the Pyrrhonist in the fourfold way may not suffice, so that epochē makes him worse off. Practically, the Pyrrhonist in epochē may be incapable of making decisions in cases where the norm for behavior isn’t provided by the rules of art, custom and law. His adherence to just the fourfold way bars him from thinking outside the box and evolving new paradigms under which, by new arts and customs and laws, his previous lot would appear one with greater occasion for disturbance.

127 Psychologically, we might fear that the ‘cured‘ dogmatist without belief would indeed be without a moral compass, and this, we might fear, does not produce detachment, but depression, for he fails to discern meaning in his life. Or, if it does produce detachment, it does so merely in the rational domain. But it is exactly the dogmatic attachment to ethical rules which keeps under control the rash and degenerate libidinousness the dogmatist has diagnosed as source of disturbance in the commoner.

According to the Pyrrhonist the dogmatist seeks to settle disturbance from a determination of the facts. But it seems that the Pyrrhonist uncovers tranquility by giving up on the project of trying to establish the truth. Such a route towards tranquility may appear radically antithetical to the dogmatist. We might expect that she thinks that the Pyrrhonist has slid down the snake back to square one, and is in fact worse off than when he was climbing the ladder under the impression that he was getting somewhere.

The Pyrrhonist appears to maintain that the very activity of believing is a source for pathology. This may strike the dogmatist as absurd. First, she can imagine kinds of belief of which it would appear that they are either innocuous, or more likely to benefit rather than not. Of the former, e.g., it might seem rather innocuous if someone came to believe that there is water on the other side of the galaxy. The conceivability of the latter is evidenced generally by explicit dogmatic assertion of the salubrity of certain beliefs, whether the dogmatist has these beliefs herself or not. For example, Epicureans present their materialism as instrumental to a cure for fear of death. Socrates in the Republic presents belief in the noble lie of the myth of the metals as a condition for the healthy state.

128 The Pyrrhonist faces a dialectical problem we have previously noted. He does not appear to be abstracting skepticism from dogmatism, but asserting skepticism as radically opposed to dogmatism. When the Pyrrhonist says that ataraxia is telos, we might be able to excuse him from prescriptive dogmatism, if his is an ad hominem observation—the Pyrrhonist is merely reporting back to the dogmatist the salient feature of the motivation for their philosophical activity. But the Pyrrhonist does not appear to be reporting ad hominem that belief is a source of disturbance. By our survey of the philosophical psychology, there does appear something dissociative about the philosopher, such that we could at least be intrigued by an ad hominem argument to the effect that the philosopher seeks tranquility. But what could provide material for an ad hominem to the effect that the dogmatist pursues skepticism? Doesn’t the philosopher live and breathe for the sake of discovery by which to assemble a stock of beliefs?

Rather, then, the Pyrrhonist appears to be setting the dogmatist straight: The whole project of the dogmatist is fundamentally wrongheaded. This wrongheaded- ness holds not just of the individual, whom the Pyrrhonist is trying to cure, but of the cultural phenomenon of dogmatic philosophy. If the Pyrrhonist may appear to the dogmatist like this—as radically opposed to what dogmatism is trying to attain—she will need an account of the pathology of belief and of its cure through Pyrrhonism. But in attacking a basic assumption of the dogmatist, the Pyrrhonist does not seem able to give an account ad hominem, and so the old worry of self-refutation surfaces. By his own standards infected with, rather than purged of the disease he seeks to cure, the Pyrrhonist is producing a dogmatism of his own.

129 Given that the Pyrrhonist appears so radically opposed to the dogmatist here, we can expect that Pyrrhonist and dogmatist end up at the kind of loggerheads that gives rise to impoliteness. For example, Aristotle, in considering the epistemological problems that drive the Modes, says that the radical skeptic is ill-educated.175 Where Aristotle seeks to preserve and reconcile what is good and noble in the historical development of philosophical dogmatism, the Pyrrhonist appears like a barbarian in a library.176

175 Posterior Analytics 1.3, Metaphysics 4.4. 176 (Fogelin, 2004) captures this spirit in its title. On the seriousness of the accusation that the radical skeptic is a peasant, consider (Long, 2006a).

130 B: Platonism as Pyrrhonism

131 Sketch 4: Analysis of the Skeptical Dialectic

132 Characters and mechanics of the dialectic

We declared earlier that we wished to try to live through Pyrrhonian therapy. This would mean that we cast ourselves dogmatists in—as we might understand it from a dogmatic point of view—a sort of skeptical indoctrination: We are to be converted to skepticism from an initial position of dogmatic participants in the dialectic that arises out of the stand-off between dogmatist and skeptic with regard to the ethical, epistemological, and methodological issues we have discussed. How could ataraxia be telos? How could we live in epochē? How could we attain ataraxia through epochē? If we were to map the trajectory of the intended transformation, our dogmatic conception of its point of departure would be the position of the dogmatist; and our difficulty to progress from it our dogmatic conception of the skeptic. As if we unroll a map of the journey ahead, we pause to give a synopsis of the characters of the participants in our dialectic.

But naturally, immediately we will also wish to know of our means for making headway on this journey. In our conception of the dogmatist with inchoate interest in Pyrrhonian skepticism, however we are to imagine him working towards skepticism, at least we will project upon him the wish for some insight into the method of his supposed cure. Since the dogmatist, as we have cast him, wants to be cured by coming to know truths, we may presume that he will have some interest in the mechanics of the therapy that is supposed to cure him. If he cannot see the correctness of the therapeutic method, he is unlikely to want to continue undergoing it. Satisfaction of this interest in the mechanics of therapy will be all the more pressing if we suspect that the Pyrrhonist, given her skepticism, is in danger of being unable to offer such a mechanics.

133 So, furthermore, we take a preliminary look at the methodology we mean to employ as we progress.

134 Fundamentals of the dialectic: Dogmatism

None of us is the same man in old age that he was in youth; none of us is the same man in the morning that he was the day before. Our bodies are carried off in the manner of flowing rivers. Whatever you see runs along with time; none of the things we see en- dures. I myself, while I speak of this change, am changed. This is what Heraclitus says: “Into the same river we descend twice, and we do not descend.” For the appellation of the river remains the same, but the water has been caused to pass through. This is more manifest in river than in man. But us, too, the course carries by no less quickly. And for this reason I am astonished at our folly, that we love with such need a thing most fleeting such as the body, and fear that some day we will die, when every moment is the death of our prior condition. Don’t you wish not to fear that one day that thing may happen which already happens every day! So much for my treatment of man—a fluid substance, and transitory, exposed to all causes for disease… Seneca, Epistles 58, 22-24

What, in essence, is the dogmatist? How may we distinguish the skeptic from her? If we tried to mark off the two positions in our dialectic, we might start by observing that the Pyrrhonist and dogmatist appear to share in their disagreement this: Each party says of the other that they are at a remove from life. The Pyrrho- nist, we saw, appears to say of the dogmatist that dogmatism drags the thinker

135 away from life. Instead of following appearance and living gently, the dogmatist is lured along towards the ends of her rash dogmatism. The dogmatist, on the other hand, says of the Pyrrhonist that dogmatism is necessary for life. Without belief, the Pyrrhonist will lack material for the rational pursuit of projects which give content to her life.

Philosophical dogmatism is intended as a therapeutic alternative to naive dogmatism. The naive dogmatist accepts and pursues her ends with too little reflection. Unreflective, she is confused about the nature of reality and the locus of true value, and as a result surrenders her capacity for happiness through self- sufficiency to an unbridled lust for control over the world. Philosophical dogmatism is to offer the thinker the opportunity for discovery of structure in the world, recognition of which reveals the true station of the human in the world. In this recognition, the thinker will see his domain for influence in life: He will see what he can and ought to hope for, or where the boundaries for his purpose are fixed. True value will so become defined by and for him. And by unsullied affinity for this value he will be drawn into activity without any undue anxiety from fear of failure and loss, or from lust for success and gain.

However, by ad hominem, the Pyrrhonist tries to impress upon the philosophical dogmatist that he is no less guilty of the error of the naive dogmatist. The naive dogmatist, in the face of apparently universal epistemic norms, supposedly sees value too quickly; but so, then, does the philosophical dogmatist. The philosophical dogmatist employs the epistemic norms to dismiss his opponent as quick to jump to conclusions, but these same norms may be brought to bear on any dogmatism in him that supposedly provides motivation for this act of dismissal. As a result, we saw how the philosophical dogmatist might be in danger of being worse off than the naive dogmatist. Having invested some intellectual effort

136 in his determination of value, his determination may seem all the more noble to him; he will run after this value all the more—whether this value is to be realized in practical activity, or, if there is any distinction, theoretical activity. He may suffer frustration or indifference when, even at his very best, his fellows ignore him, and go about their folly. Or, if not this, he will castigate himself for weakness, when he sees himself failing to live up to his ethical norm. And he will, if he is still keen on philosophy, suffer intellectual distress in providing ground for his determination in dialectical activity.

While the philosophical dogmatist considers the naive dogmatist by her unreflective blindness and lust at a remove from reality, the dogmatic philosopher, in pursuing headlong his philosophical way may also be at a remove from life. Blinded by his love for his wisdom, he would either not see his neighbor beside him at all; or would see his neighbor, but fail to see any value in her; or would see her, and see value in her, but only in so far as she is a conduit for some value recognized in philosophical abstraction.

On this picture, the dogmatic philosopher is no less rashly engrossed in his pursuit than the naive dogmatist. And no less, though perhaps differently, at a remove from reality. Perhaps we have the thought here that the commoner is too sensual, the philosopher too rational, or that the Pyrrhonist seeks to work towards a formulation of a middle way between dogmatism’s naïve and philosophical removes. But the commoner we have described is supposedly a dogmatist, and so is imagined as presuming to have what he might call rational commitments. Or, at any rate, what we might analyze as commitments under norms for superiority in verbal exchange. We often find such a character in elenctic dialogue with Socrates trying to give an accounting for himself. It is just that the motivation provided is not thought out

137 thoroughly: The dogmatist, in his attempt at justification, seeks to appeal to worldly valuables such as wealth and honor, in ignorance of—and then discomfit- ed by—any question after the unifying source of value for such valuables. An appeal to what lies close at hand in appearance as ground for justification remains ultimately a rational act in this sense: The sensibility that provides material for the dogma is propositionalized and ordered rationally in this empiricism. Or, at least, such is attempted. Then, we may think of the commoner as no less given to rational activity than the philosophical dogmatist. It is just that, in the eyes of the dogmatic philosopher, she is a neophyte, and acts naïvely, and so badly. Conversely, the rational activity of the philosophical dogmatist involves sensibility. Ultimately the ground for the dogmatism is given in experience. Something must be experienced as true. For example, some proposition is seen as self- evident. In this vision, reality is supposed touched over here. The thing is seen in sufficient detail for it to be affirmatively propositionalized.

The Pyrrhonist, by his desire to escape affirmation, does not seek the formulation of a middle way between dogmatism’s naïve and philosophical removes. Or, at any rate, does not seek affirmation of such a formulation. Sextus tells us that the Pyrrhonist seeks epochē by opposing the objects of apprehensive thought (ta nooumena) and of sense-perception (ta phainomena) in any way whatsoever— phainomena to phainomena, nooumena to nooumena, phainomena to nooumena.177 By contrast, then, both naïve and philosophical dogmatist would on a Pyrrho- nian analysis live at a remove from reality exactly because they want to marry the relation between sensibility for the object and the propositionalization of the object through this sensibility in the experience of rest in belief. This is the essence of dogmatism.

138

Well, this is still to say quite little. We will then wish to know what it is to rest in belief. The Pyrrhonist lays in the balance against dogmatic belief the consideration that we cannot rest in belief if we are engaged in rational activity: Justification for belief requires an appeal to self-evidence, circularity, or regress, by which inquiry can come to a halt; but in dialectic such appeal violates the Modes.178 Rational activity is governed by the norms of the Modes, and so inquiry must continue. We can get a grasp of what is meant by belief, then, by considering what supposedly vitiates it. Dogmatic belief would just be the presumed rational attitude whose rationality is negated by the Modes:

1. If we are rational, we cannot assert: “This just is clear.” If the provision of ground for the assertion is deferred, we are in the end hypothesizing what is in question.179 But if, on the other hand, what is brought for consideration is offered as self-evident, since the object of consideration appears differently to different points of view in dialectic, any appeal to self-evidence in rational light becomes an object for inquiry.180 2. We cannot say: “This is clear because that is clear, and that is clear because of some third thing’s being clear,” and then, “And so on.” We cannot speak in expectation of some further content that, though it is yet to come to us, already allows us to see ourselves as having been making progress so far, or as having, by seeing our progression as progress, already arrived. An explanation of what is supposedly self-evident would fragment the supposedly self-evident proposition into analysantia which must be connected by a line of

177 PH 1.31-33. 178 Our focus here is on the concise rendition of the skeptical technique in the five Modes of Aenesidemus. PH 1.164-178. 179 PH 1.174. 180 PH 1.175.

139 argument. But just as we can ask after the ground for the supposedly self-evident proposition, we can ask: “Why start drawing this line of thought, rather than another?” Until we have seen the final analysans in this line of thought, we are none the wiser.181 3. We cannot say: “This is clear because that is clear, and that is clear because this is clear.” We add a further dimension to our object for affirmation, so that the direction of the justificatory relationship between analysantia can be inverted. A limit can now be given to their number, while the repeated expression of the relation between them in explanation gives the appearance that the rule against appeal to hypothesis or self-evidence is being obeyed. But in rational light our object of contemplation, though now extended, remains an object for inquiry. Just as we can ask after the ground for setting out a linear argument of thought, we can ask after the ground for drawing this particular circle, rather than another.182

Dogmatic belief would then be the attitude of the thinker who seeks to violate these rules, yet thinks to perceive herself as still engaged in rational dialectic. The thinker who arrives in belief has a thought and thinks her dialectical work is now done—if not in the sense that she has a hold of a fundamental truth, then in the sense that she has by her established belief a grasp of the direction in which she must move towards this truth. All the while she takes herself as thinking rationally, and so under the norms of the Modes, yet at the same time supposedly finds herself in a position to rationally see how these norms no longer apply to her.

We are, supposedly, to be rational. The rules are simple, but generative of recursion, such that the denial of the possibility for affirmation is no less clear than the affirmation of this possibility. Under these rules, the naïve and philosophical

181 PH 1.171-2, 176. 182 PH 1.171.

140 dogmatist appear to violate a norm against affirmation. The rules require that the thinker keep moving on in her inquiry. But the dogmatist wants to rest here. In seeking to rest where she cannot, the dogmatist is supposed in constant struggle, like someone who seeks to hold on to a rock in a streaming river. She seeks in vain to secure a domain within which she can live in comfort. Such a domain for the naïve dogmatist in practical activity would be, if not within the state, then within the confines of her house, if not there, then within her own body. Such a domain for the philosophical dogmatist in contemplative activity would be, if not in possession of this or that fundamental truth, then in the possession of some posterior truth that possession of the fundamental truth lies ahead down this or that particular route of inquiry, or if not in this possession, then in the possession of the truth that there is something we can know, and that we must know it.

141 Unaware, he desires himself, and as he approves, he himself is approved, and while he seeks is sought, equally kindling and burning with fire. How often has he kissed the treacherous pool in vain? How often has he plunged his arms amid the waters to clasp the neck he sees? But he cannot not catch himself in them. What he sees he does not know. But he is en- flamed by what he sees, and the same illusion which causes his eyes to grow larger ensnares them. Metamorphoses 3.425-431

Pyrrhonism is supposed to lay bare, through rationality, a folly in—and a therapy for—some libidinous, supposedly rational, movement towards rest. The Pyrrhonist seeks to pursue the esteemed exercise of the philosophical dogmatist in accordance with the rules and aims that appear to obtain for the dogmatist. By attending to the nature of these rules and aims stripped of all partisanship, she seeks in this exercise to be rational through skepticism, and through this rationality, tranquil. So the story goes.

We have formalized this story in the following way: The Pyrrhonist appears to say (a) that ataraxia is the final end of activity (telos), and (b), that ataraxia is attained through suspension (epochē). And, we asked:

1. How could ataraxia be telos? 2. How could we live a life without belief? 3. How could a life without belief be ataraxic?

142 For, as we saw, first, it is a matter of controversy whether ataraxia is sufficient for the good life. For example, Epicureans, if they claim ataraxia is telos, appear to find a criterion for value in phainomena such that the pleasure of tranquility, in being the mark of the good, constitutes the good. But Stoics claim virtue is the final end in our deliberate activity; tranquility just is the concomitant experience of the virtuous agent. Tranquility is an attitude which takes an object about which to be tranquil, and it is this object rather than an experience of satisfaction in its pursuit that is the true end of our activity. The object’s choiceworthiness might be presented to us through the experience of ataraxia, but were ataraxia itself the good to be chosen, any arrangement of our affairs in the world would be indifferent to us. And second, it is a matter of controversy whether a life of epochē is at all possible or desirable. With regard to the second question, we have seen that there is a feeling shared among the dogmatic schools that activity requires assent (sunkatathesis), and so, that absent this we would remain inactive. But then, should the Pyrrhonist attain thoroughgoing epochē, she would fester. With regard to the third question, we have seen the question after the possibility of the tranquil suspensive life in the context of the dogmatic sensibility that, as living requires believing, a life without belief would, if possible at all, be confused or degenerate. A good life is structured through rational engagement in our projects, and this requires acting from belief.

In short, the Pyrrhonist pursues her own dissolution, and, in so far as she remains active (e.g., in this pursuit), suffers delusion about her end. Her manner is a slow form of suicide. Her body may survive, but she is stripped of her humanity. The more she moves towards suspension, the more she fades. Transfixed upon examination of her own reflection under the norms of the Modes, she becomes oblivious to the world. She turns plant-like, like Narcissus, and the possibility for any genuinely human, rich, knowledgeable, tranquility becomes lost to her.

143 144 General methodology for a Pyrrhonian reply

Our three questions are brought in challenge to the Pyrrhonian way. Behind them lies the essential question after the possibility of the goodness of the suspensive life. When we are approached by the proselytizing Pyrrhonist, this is what we in the end wish to know: Can we live the best of lives in epochē? In replying, we will come to conceive of discussion of the third question after the relation between epochē and ataraxia as capstone in a treatment of the relation between suspension and goodness. Discussion of the third question will complete our treatment, and so be paramount, while we take treatment of our first two questions as propedeutic: Their treatment provides context for, and is only complete in, our treatment of the third question.

Our aim, we said, is to live and breathe Pyrrhonism, and enact the Pyrrhonian therapy. We have insinuated time and again that the Pyrrhonist constructs material for her philosophy from ad hominem analysis of her dogmatic opponent. Then, we wish to see the Pyrrhonian therapy played out in the common philosophical dogmatist through such analysis. In giving an account of Pyrrhonism, we try to assume the role of the Pyrrhoni- an therapist whom we see aim to furnish the dogmatist with a route towards her end as revealed through Pyrrhonian ad hominem analysis. And in appreciating the account we assume the role of the dogmatist struggling to overcome her reservation.

In order for the therapy to be received by the dogmatist, as the dogmatist thinks that philosophical therapy comes through the discovery of truth, we may expect that she will only be interested in Pyrrhonian therapy if she can discern in it a recognizable end.

145 So, first, we wish to cater to the sensibility of the philosopher in doubt whether ataraxia can be good. We may have already intimated how we might, with perhaps not too much difficulty, give an account of a general conception of tranquility as philosophical end. But at issue is whether the Pyrrhonian conception of such an end, given in abstraction from any particular dogma, is impoverished. For example, as we saw, the Stoic may agree that, under some mode of presentation, tranquility is indeed the end. But its pursuit must come through the pursuit of some further dogmatic end such as virtue, the pursuit of which gives value and structure to a life. In the same vein, second, we would wish to begin to say something through ad hominem against the dogmatic sensibility that her way is the only rational way, since rational living requires believing. On this dogmatism, we act rationally from the past in the present into the future in belief. The dogmatist’s confidence in the formality of this—i.e., irrespective of whatever content the Pyrrhonist might have to offer concerning how such a rational life would play out without belief—we fear will vitiate reception of Pyrrhonian therapy, too: If we cannot begin to shake the dogmatist’s confidence here, she may well no longer be interested in an investigation of the possibility of the goodness of a suspensive life. For she will continue to consider any sketch of a rational life without belief as a sketch of an impossibility. And, set on the truth, and so on what is possible, further discussion will appear useless to her.

If our aim as therapists is to effect a therapy towards suspension by means of ad hominem, we must lay bare to the dogmatist within her already the affinities of the Pyrrhonist, such that we can lay in the balance against her confidence against skepticism an appreciation of the aim and strictures of her dogmatism as captured by Pyrrhonian analysis of her situation.

146 Pyrrhonism, we will repeat, appears a fundamentally alien philosophy to the mass of philosophers, if the mass is dogmatic irrespective the particular dogmatism. On the assumption that the culture the skeptic operates in is dogmatic, the Pyr- rhonist would do well to try to show herself, by ad hominem, in respectable company. This showing we might attempt in a general way by abstracting from all dogmatisms, or at least the respectable ones, a Pyrrhonian affinity. The wide scope of such an exercise would, as it would be given by us under the constraints of the anticipation of our finitude, compromise its depth. If we then thought that we should do the most important work first, we might better presently align ourselves by ad hominem explicitly with a particular respectable dogmatism, and leave the intricacies of an ad hominem identification of Pyrrhonism with other dogmatisms for a later date, or, if we have a sense of ourselves as operating in a community of fellows, for someone else. At least, by showing the particular respectable dogmatism Pyrrhonian, we will have overcome a fundamental and abstracted dogmatic resistance to Pyrrhonism. Of course, those dogmatists who have no affinity for the dogmatism we align ourselves with may say: “You have just given us a further reason for thinking the dogmatism obnoxious.” So we better choose a dogmatism which we may take readily as a source of inspiration or concerned reaction for any dogmatist. That is, if any concerned effort against a view pursued honestly we pursue with an effort to convince the opponent of the error of her ways in full appreciation of her view by which we think she is misled. To approach the opposition on its own terms and overcome it—this is what we aim for. But then we must try to understand the opposition as thoroughly as we can—that is to the limit of being lured by its vision.

147 If we choose for ad hominem analysis of skepticism a target dogmatist whom all other dogmatists are concerned to distinguish themselves positively from, since such distinction is only honestly come by through an effort to see how the opposition could have been lured, all other dogmatists may be concerned to investigate the lure of the target once more, now in light of its revealed skeptical essence. Still, we might better also begin to provide our interlocutor with material, reflection upon which will make plausible that we are just performing a particular exercise with regard to our particular dogmatism—an exercise which, if this dogmatism is not hers, may one day be carried out against hers, too. By ourselves or others.

The supposed dogmatism we presently select for our exercise we choose from an easy-coming impression of affinity between it and Pyrrhonism. But, then, in our making our choice, it will turn out that we are trying not just to work towards Pyrrhonian therapy, but also to bring into focus a puzzle which may intrigue the historian of ancient philosophy: What is the historical relation between this dogmatism and Pyrrhonism which may explain the appearance of their affinity?

Pyrrhonism as we encounter in Sextus, we have suggested, was exported from the Academy by Aenesidemus. We might say more: Pyrrho’s skepticism was given respectability through its appropriation by Arcesilaus into the analytical tradition of the Academy. And this appropriation was made easy by Plato’s rendition of Socrates as skeptical. We might then go on to argue at least that Pyrrhonism flourished in the Academy as a form of Platonism. Our theme shall be: Platonism as Pyrrhonism. If we can make plausible an appreciation of Pyrrhonism under Platonism, surely, by putting Pyrrhonism in respectable company, we have made some headway towards doing away with a dogmatic appreciation of Pyrrhonism as fundamentally surd.

148 Nonetheless, as we said, we should look to the future, and construct our argument towards a vision of Pyrrhonism in Platonism from a shared appreciation of what dogmatic philosophy aspires to. So, as we go along, we should give an impression of working towards Pyrrhonism in Platonism from a sensibility that much, if not all, of what motivates Platonism so reconstructed does not occur in isolation, but is inherent in philosophical investigation tout court. This is only fitting, if Platonism is indeed recognized as a viable source for reaction against by dissenting dogmatisms. For such reaction could only take place in a common vernacular, the generation of which occurs through affinity for shared concern.

149 On our reply as a form of therapy

Our exercise is a historical one. On the assumption that we live in history, we try to present an understanding of the historical phenomenon Pyrrhonism to those who are present with us. To effect this, we try to write as charitable a reconstruction of Pyrrhonism, such that we provide the Pyrrhonist with the historical material necessary for her to pursue in the Pyrrhonian manner (that is, through ad hominem) the Pyrrhonian end (suspension). We have said that the criterion for success in this endeavor will be the present thinker’s own development of the ability to rest from dogmatism.183 In general, if we feel we have been able to attain the experience of the historical subject, we reckon ourselves to have made some headway in our historical projects. This may be all the more so if Pyrrhonism is our historical subject, and our reader is assessing our account for accurate insight. For Pyrrhonism appears to aim for a suspensive experience unconcerned with factual accuracy. If our condoning the account comes by way of being able to slip into the ideal experience we construct for our historical subject, and this experience is not one of: “Yes, P is true,” then the value of the philosophy we give an account of does not lie in a power to describe the world such that we can say such a thing. In an exercise of understanding a historical subject we would construct as dogmatic, we would take as our measure our success in adopting his experience, and—in so far as we appreciate our subject as dogmatic—this experience would be of assent to his propositions as true. Our charitable effort at understanding a dogmatist, if it comes through an effort of seeing his way, struggles towards assent to his propositions as true. But, as the Pyrrhonist makes as if to avoid making truth claims, it seems we cannot take as our guide a dogmatic experience of truth in our attempt to understand the Pyrrho- nist. What remains for us to explore in giving an account of Pyrrhonism is, then,

150 just the experience of suspension. Our condoning the account will be under a norm for its contribution to our own ability to slip into this experience of suspension, without concerns about the veridical supremacy of any object of contemplation which produces the experience. Hence a sentiment that in our present discussion of the methodology for a Pyr- rhonian therapy, we only address ourselves as historians of Pyrrhonism properly if we address ourselves as prospective patients of the therapy we try to envisage. We must imagine ourselves, in giving our account, as providing ourselves with Pyrrhonian therapy. The aim of the therapy supposedly is tranquility, and its method, suspension. Then, in dealing with our questions, we must construct a historical account of the dialectic between Pyrrhonist and her opponents in which the ad hominem arguments ascribed to the Pyrrhonist in the face of problems with regard to ataraxia as telos and the possibility of living without belief bring to suspension her ancient interlocutor who would confidently deny that ataraxia is telos, and that life without belief is possible, let alone good. Or, at a higher order: In giving our account of historical influences, we proceed in the ad hominem manner of the Pyrrhonist in our construction of the ancient Pyrrhonist’s reply to our questions after the value of ataraxia and the possibility of its attainment through epochē, in order to bring about suspension of judgment in the present thinker with regard to the historical questions by producing Pyrrhonian arguments equipollent to those that produce denials that ataraxia is telos, or that life without belief is possible, or good.

183 See our preliminary remarks on our aim in Part A, Chapter 1, Section 2.

151 Sketch 5: Prelude to an Ethics of Wonder

152 Prelude to a Pyrrhonian ethics

We begin by reflecting on our first two issues—of ataraxia as telos, and of the possibility of the suspensive life. We will pursue the earlier suggestion that a resolution to the methodological issue of how ataraxia is brought by epochē is paramount: We must see the philosopher alive in activity, operating optimally in tranquil suspension, to gain appreciation for Pyrrhonism. But then, we must first have a notion of what tranquility amounts to, and of the possibility for suspension. Our treatment of our first two issues aims to set the scene for the final work of showing the skeptical philosopher alive in ataraxia through epochē. First, we will gain an appreciation of a telic notion of tranquility which the dogmatist shares. But it will turn out that the dogmatist balks not at the notion of ataraxia as telos, but at the thought that the ideal experience of tranquility could be the single mode of presentation of the good, in abstraction from an imagination of some sort of ideal life—e.g., the Epicurean, Stoic, or Platonic life. Then, second, we will formally defend in epistemology the possibility of a rational suspensive life. But, without offering the dogmatist a vision of the actuality of the rational skeptical thinker in attainment of the tranquil life, such a defense appears to do too little therapeutic work. In this way, our attention will come to turn towards consideration of how skepticism might breed tranquility.

153 Ataraxia as telos

How, then, do we agree that virtue is this kind of thing, but seek progress and give a specimen of it in other things? What is the actuality (ergon) of virtue? Fluency (euroia). Who, then, is making progress? Epictetus, Discourses 1.4.5

Therapy, clinically, is provided either in terms of modification of behavior, or of awareness. But the philosophical therapy is at least supposed to be a therapy for awareness. At least, under dogmatism, we are supposed to attain better formulations of reality through philosophy. But to effect Pyrrhonian therapy, we should not wish to communicate a preference for the negation of dogmatism. At least, if such preference were given dogmatically as a better formulation of the ethical facts. We would then somehow have to manage merely to aim to lay in the balance against a dogmatic sensibility against the suspensive life an equipollent alternative from ad hominem. The rational experience of equipollence, and hence, suspension, so produced in our interlocutor should—to speak in her vernacular—prove the Pyrrhonian case. Our focus will be on an attempt to provide for in the balance, by analysis of dogmatic philosophy, a sketch of the dogmatist in appreciation of rational activity as supreme when suspensive. As preliminaries to our sketch of this supremacy we said we would require for in the balance ad hominem impressions, first, of the dogmatist’s pursuit of

154 tranquility as final end, and, second, of a dogmatic appreciation of room for the possibility of life without belief.

First, to the denial that ataraxia is the philosopher’s telos: We might begin by trying to extend our study of the therapeutic ambitions of dogmatic philosophy, and construct, through a study of an endemic idealization of tranquility in ancient thought, an ad hominem sketch of ataraxia as the pursuit of the ancient thinker. We might go about gathering material for such a study first, as prelude to a dialectical treatment, from the recurring idealization of divine tranquility in ancient literature. And then, in philosophy supposedly proper, we might continue our gathering of material from, e.g., the Epicurean conception of the philosopher arrived, through contemplation of a godless nature, in a god-like ataraxia; or from the Stoic conception of the Sage in euroic activity in accordance with divine intelligence; or from the Epicurean and Stoic conceptions of ataraxia and euroia as health of the psuchē,184 and the health of the psuchē as the sole viable product of philosophy; We might gather material from Aristotle’s conception of an emulable god purely actualized in the unmoved, homeostatic activity of thought thinking itself in abstraction from the world. We might gather material from the Platonic idealization of psychological harmony in practical activity, and of a contemplative ascent through an abstraction from the world running from mathematical contemplation of unmovables to knowledge of the Platonic Ideas to apophatic rest in a vision of the Good as unifying principle from which the world emanates.

184 Euroia: We translated this earlier as ‘fluency’. Other translations seem also appropriate: ‘good flow’, ‘prosperous course’, ‘free passage’.

155 Now, such a study might manage to alleviate doubt that there is nothing to the Pyrrhonist’s observation that since the philosopher begins to engage in self- medicative philosophy in a state of disturbance (tarachē), her end is freedom from it (ataraxia). We might as a result of the study see how the ancient idealizes tranquility as the experience of perfection.

But the problem would remain that the Pyrrhonist gives this experience as an unsullied subjective mode of presentation of perfection, and so in abstraction from any particular dogma regarding the objective description of the activity of the perfect agent. Hence, the traction of the worry that ataraxia could be attained by bad medication. The dogmatist offers philosophy as therapy, and so philosophy as a drug. The pejorative connotations of the notion of drugging oneself in order to live are overcome in a dogmatism by the dogmatism’s conviction that the drug is a means to reality. Through the dogmatism, the thinker is to come to live naturally—in accordance with prescriptions that fall out of the particular dogmatic determination of the world and our place in it. The dogmatist’s particular philosophy would be a vitamin, not an opiate, while the dogmatist’s opponents—misguided dogmatists, and, if there is a difference, skeptics—are pushers of bad drugs.

The Pyrrhonist might ask: If the experience could be identical no matter the philosophical stance, and the experience is supposed to be realized through rational activity (since through philosophical therapy), and it is the experience of perfection, whence any possibility for negation of value by being misguided? But such a question merely serves to get the dogmatist to agree that tranquility is indeed a mode of presentation of perfection. She may still go on to say that this tranquility is only genuinely attained concomitant with a life according to her particular dogmatism.

156

The dogmatist would then set herself up against the skeptic in the same way she sets herself up against competing dogmatists. It is just that—at least, in Pyrrhonian analysis—qua dogmatist in argument with the skeptic, the dogmatist now hears most of her enemies sing in harmony with her: “We must believe something.”

On the Pyrrhonian analysis, the philosophical dogmatist would offer to replace in his patient one dogmatic naïve view with a sophisticated one. At least dogmatists would share this in common: Tranquility must be with regard to assessment of some definable object in the world—e.g., pleasure, or health or honor, or virtue or knowledge. The thinker would see herself satisfied under the correct norm— whatever it be—and, by living under the correct norm, become tranquil. But the Pyrrhonist purports to offer a drug which will flush itself out; while the dogmatist seeks to hold still in dialectic. Each dogmatism differentiated by its propositional content, the dogmatist seeks to replace one dogmatism with a better, and in satisfaction of seeing the better, kindly regard himself, and rest in this regard. But the skeptic supposedly flushes out not just a set of dogmatic attitudes to the exclusion of a singular correct dogmatic attitude (i.e., skepticism), but all such attitudes.

The dogmatist’s problem would then not be with a conception of ataraxia as telos, but with the impression that the Pyrrhonist presents ataraxia as the end of philosophical activity without further giving a dogmatism for the life in which this experience is attained. In the end, any dogmatists’ problem with skepticism would be with the conceivability of the attainability of genuine human tranquility through suspension, not with the desirability of tranquility.

157 Dogmatists might bicker among each other about whether this or that dogmatism is the singular concomitant of the properly tranquil life. But they would all agree that there must be some dogmatic concomitant: Our human life requires that we engage with the world, and, if we are philosophers, act rationally in it. But this requires belief, and so commitment to a dogmatism. Genuine tranquility cannot obtain unless the source of the activity has belief in the correct dogmatism, and so, unless it has belief.

We must then defer a movement towards equipollence with regard to the question of an abstract ad hominem formulation of ataraxia as telos until we have given an alluring ad hominem impression of the goodness of epochē. And this, we said, we set out to give in our treatment of our third question: How can ataraxia be attained through epochē? Our question in the end will be no longer after whether ataraxia is telos, but— since the dogmatist advocates her dogmatism as singular rational route to tranquility—whether we can show the dogmatist a route not through, say, the pursuit of Epicurean pleasure or Stoic virtue, but through suspension, in abstraction from some further objective norm for our life.

158 Eudaimonia and ataraxia: On a Pyrrhonian taxonomy of ends

Let us then resume the argument: Since every sort of knowledge, and every undertaking, seeks after some good, let us say what it is that we say political expertise seeks, and what the topmost of all achieva- ble goods is. Pretty well most people are agreed about what to call it: both ordinary people and people of quality say ‘happiness’ [eudaimonia], and suppose that living well and doing well are the same thing as being happy. But they are in dispute about what happiness actually is, and ordinary people do not give the same answer as intellectuals. NE 1.4, 1095a14-21185

If the Pyrrhonian method for therapy involves ad hominem analysis, we might be tempted to consider that if the Pyrrhonist gives ataraxia as philosophical end, the Pyrrhonist imagines that she can, by ad hominem analysis, show that the different dogmatic conceptions of happiness can be subsumed under the conception of the ataraxic life. Are we really to entertain, in some Pyrrhonian optimism and charity, the possibility of all philosophical activity as tending towards Pyrrho- nism, and so, in the end, towards Pyrrhonian ataraxia?

This seems indefensible. For example, we saw that the Stoics and the Epicure- ans appear to agree with Aristotle’s remark about the disagreement about the content of eudaimonia. The one, we said, conceives of what we should ultimately aim for in pursuing eudaimonia as virtue, the other, pleasure. These dogmatists conceive of happiness as a feature of a rationally structured, temporally extended life. The aim for happiness for them, then, appears an aim for a type of extended structure over the course of life. For the Stoics, the conception

159 of best structure is in terms of its composition of virtuous activities, for the Epicureans in terms of its composition from experiences of pleasure. But further, we said that the Epicureans think that the experience of our capacity for memory and future projection of experience is somehow more vehement than our immediate experience of the pleasures of the senses. Hence, they say, the pleasures of immediate sensual gratification are of less value than a pleasure of stable ataraxia distributed over a life.

The body rejoices just so long as it perceives a present pleasure; but the mind perceives both the present pleasure, along with the body, and foresees the one that is coming without allowing the past one to flow away. Hence the wise man will always have a constant supply of tightly-knit pleasures, since the anticipation of pleasures hoped for is united with the recollection of those already experienced. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.95186

But the Cyrenaics appear to disagree with a conception of happiness over a life as end. They disagree that the experience of memory and anticipation is more powerful, and think that immediate pleasure given in sensibility is the marker of value. The aim for them appears not a rationally structured life, but ever the immediate pleasure.

The above should suffice to remind us that the dogmatists appear prima facie at such loggerheads about the end that we may doubt that the Pyrrhonist could determine in all of them an agreement. How, then, could the Pyrrhonist say without qualification that ataraxia is the end?

185 Trans. Rowe, (Aristotle., Broadie, & Rowe, 2002). 186 Trans. Long & Sedley, 21T.

160 There appears a general problem of what, given the disagreement among the dogmatists, the Pyrrhonist could lay once and for all in favor of Pyrrhonian ataraxia in the balance against them. To each school the Pyrrhonist will turn round and lay against its claim to having given a definition of the end a definition of the good as tranquility. On the one hand, we might imagine a debate between Pyrrhonist and each school individually, and perhaps it would be possible for us to reconstruct tailored resources for the Pyrrhonist by which she might argue her particular opponent to a standstill. One strategy for responding to the Stoics, but perhaps a different one for the Epicure- ans. After all, we saw that the Pyrrhonist makes nothing of giving a poor argument if it is suitable to her particular audience.187 On the other, we might wish to see how the Pyrrhonist gets to abstract from all the different dogmatic expressions an agreement that whatever she conceives of as ataraxia is the end. We might, for example, want to see how the Pyrrhonist addresses the challenge of the opponent who gives a taxonomy for her end. The Pyrrhonist would, it seems, have to lay in the balance a taxonomy in turn. For example, the Epicurean might give a taxonomy in which the end of virtue falls under the end of Epicurean ataraxia. Just as the pursuit of the end of making good bridles is shown a worthwhile activity by conception of bridle-making's serving a further end of military victory, the pursuit of the end of virtuous activity would be shown a worthwhile activity by a conception of the further end it serves of attaining Epicurean ataraxia. The bridle-maker may think that all that concerns him is the production of good bridles; the Stoic, virtuous activity. But if they both looked up and around for a vision of a complete taxonomy of ends, they would see something further, towards which their activity tends.

187 See our discussion in Platonic ataraxia.

161 But if in Pyrrhonism the production of objects for in the balance is supposed to occur through ad hominem analysis, then, in providing for in the balance a taxonomy for Pyrrhonian ataraxia as final end, the Pyrrhonist would wish to subsume the Epicurean end of Epicurean ataraxia under the end of Pyrrhonian ataraxia, just as the Epicurean appears to see the end of virtue subsumed under the end of Epicurean pleasure. The dogmatists, in accordance with their preference for either perception or rationality as mode of presentation of a world, determine an epistemic axiology, or even an ontology, and from these the nature and taxonomy of the end. In turn, the Pyrrhonist, by ad hominem analysis of each dogmatism, appears, like a doctor of psychiatry, to take the psychologies of the dogmatists in their activity of determining the end as data for a theory that ataraxia is the further end. Then, in the Pyrrhonian taxonomy, if the Pyrrhonist’s analysis is ad hominem, her interlocutor’s pursuit appears to be given as subsumed under the pursuit of the complete and final end of ataraxia. By her ad hominem analysis of her interlocutor's motivation for his claim that his end is such and such, the Pyrrhonist appears to determine, for the sake of laying an opposing taxonomy in the balance, that her interlocutor's pursuit is actually directed, through the pursuit of his end, at the end of ataraxia. But, furthermore, this interlocutor may ask for a Pyrrhonian taxonomy while remembering that the Pyrrhonist has laid ataraxia in the balance against other dogmatists. For example, if the Stoic thinks that the brunt of Sextus' remarks are directed against him, he will also see that at the end of the first book of the Outlines, Sextus goes on to differentiate, rather tersely, the Pyrrhonist from Cyrenaics, Academics and others with whom she might be thought prima facie to share affinity. Can the interlocutor then demand that the Pyrrhonist lay in the balance not just a taxonomy of ends which subsumes the interlocutor’s, but of all dogmatists’ in one go?

162 But perhaps no activity of abstracting ataraxia as telos from all dogmatic tax- onomies, or of setting it over them, obtains in the Pyrrhonist. The Pyrrhonist has just found from experience that, more than of any other conception of end, her laying tranquility as end in the balance against her dogmatic interlocutor’s claim will over the course of argument make her interlocutor suspend on her claim. For example, if she claims in conversation with the Stoics that ataraxia is the end and uses the arguments of the Epicureans for the sake of bringing them to suspension about their end, or vice versa, she just finds herself successful. Still, at the dinner table with both Torquatus and Cato the Younger, it may appear asinine to offer each interlocutor a different argument for Pyrrhonian ataraxia as the final end—at least, if what she said against the Epicurean would be inconsistent with what she said against the Stoic. Then, someone will say in exasperation: "But you just said…," perhaps with a sense of frustration at having suddenly lost a resource—for something of what we just heard said by the Pyrrhonist against our dogmatic opponent, we thought we could put to use when our turn with the Pyrrhonist came round. Then, perhaps, the interlocutor may feel that he can demand that the Pyrrhonist give a taxonomy in which ataraxia subsumes all dogmatic ends.

It is not clear whether, if we provided arguments consistent with each other against all comers, we then must also provide a vision of what remains as option. Perhaps contingently, the Pyrrhonist might address each of her fellow guests with different but consistent arguments. But we must imagine all parties at their best, and perhaps this would mean that this contingency will not obtain.

Well, then the diagnosis that ataraxia is philosophical telos we might presently wish to construct, as we imagine the Pyrrhonist challenged to provide a taxonomy of ends, as a general claim about the activity of all dogmatists. The Pyrrhonian diagnosis would appear to come—for the sake of therapy of the dogmatists by

163 providing them insight into the nature of their target so that they, as if they are like archers, may better aim for it—as an observation about the direction of the activity pursued by the dogmatists. We must then work towards a general appreciation of ataraxia as telos of philosophy as it manifests itself in its variegated dogmatic expressions. If the effort is not otiose, we suggested that such appreciation might be attained by analysis of each individual expression in turn. We would with some care go through each dogmatism one by one. ⁠ We might presently be understood as wishing to work towards such individual analyses of all dogmatisms by attempting to fill out an impression of a general tendency we should be diagnosing for in these expressions. In the terms of Platonic dialectic: We try to gather together what we mean to pick out by the concept of tranquility. Or, as Aristotle says:

[We] must begin from what is knowable, but there are two senses of ‘knowable’: There is what is knowable in relation to us, and what is knowable without qualification. Presumably, then, in our case, we must start from what is knowable to us. NE 1095b3-6⁠2

In an effort to see the value of the Pyrrhonian diagnosis, we must gain an affinity for the direction which our search should pursue in evaluating each dogmatism for ataraxia as telos. Especially if the various dogmatisms are all supposed opposing expressions of philosophy, if we said of all philosophy that it pursues eudaimonia as ataraxia, we may expect that our search for ataraxia as telos in these different expressions will be futile if we give the conception of ataraxia just as tranquility, without informing this conception with preliminary observations about how philosophical tranquility might be sketched as abstractable end of dogmatism.

164 The different dogmatists may prima facie be seen to determine such radically different final ends that they find great difficulty to come to any agreement on what the purpose of life in general, and of their philosophical activity in particular is. We need to put some meat on the concept of tranquility, so as to understand how, nonetheless, these different ends can be gathered under it.

165 Ataraxia as euroia

In order to attempt to give a route to ataraxia through suspension, it would be helpful to flesh out the experience of ataraxia through some consideration of the materials we listed before. If we are in the end to tell a story of the attainability of the end of ataraxia through epochē, it remains that we must give a relation, and so the relata. In particular, even if we may have given an impression of a shared sentiment among the philosophers that ataraxia is telos, it is still not clear why this is so. At least, in light of our earlier worry that ataraxia appeared an experience of if not boredom, then indifference, we should be curious to see how it could, to the contrary, be the experience of virtuous, and so, engaged activity.

If anything, we are programmatically bound to say something about this issue. To gain dogmatic understanding of Pyrrhonism, we are in the end at least to see the goodness of epochē, such that we see it concomitant with telic ataraxia. Since the Pyrrhonist in epochē just follows appearances, the goodness of epochē would have to be sold to the aspiring dogmatic patient just by a description of what it is like to be in such a state—and not by pointing to any objective virtues to which such a state is epiphenomenal. But to be in this state,188 supposedly, is to be in ataraxia. Then, if we are to see suspension and goodness go hand in hand, we will require affinity for a positive experience of ataraxia.

188 State: But perhaps tranquility is a process. Later: A state can be a process if it is homeostatic.

166 We are, presumably, misguided in conceiving of ataraxia as amounting to boredom or indifference. However, as we observed, the Pyrrhonist herself, for all her talk of ataraxia, gives us little of its experience. Still, if the Pyrrhonist says little of the nature of ataraxia herself, if, as she appears to maintain, ataraxia is telos for all parties concerned, we might abstract, e.g., the experience of katastematic pleasure, of euroia, or of psychological harmony as the end of Epicurean, Stoic or Platonist,189 and then draw on these conceptions to fill out an experience of ataraxia. But a beginning to our Pyrrhonian exploration of the relatum ataraxia should take care not to become informed by any particular dogmatism. If we are allowed to take anything from philosophy as raw material for our description, it will be a shared idealization of the experience of ataraxia whose method for attainment is the source for the dogmatists’ disputation.

Any historical appreciation of a shared phenomenological end as the source of the lingua franca of philosophy would have to be approached pre- philosophically—at least, pre-dialectically. In consideration of what sets our dogmatism apart from other dogmatisms, there would have to be some intuition we share with our interlocutor regarding the definiendum in our dialectical disagreement.

And in what manner will you search this thing which you do not know at all? Meno, 80d

189 We set aside our remark on Aristotle’s god. We aim to give the experience of the philosopher in attainment of her end—ataraxia. But her end is the life and experience of a god. E. g.: Theaetetus 176b-c.

167

Just as the possibility of an object of Platonic inquiry is given through anamne- sis by an appeal to the subconscious history of the thinker, we might give the possibility of a shared intuition of the thing sought as source and so ground for the possibility of disagreement between historical disputants in philosophy by appeal to a pre-philosophical sensibility in the history of the disputants.

As poetry is not dialectic, but, if appreciated as an expression in language amenable to the dialectical operation, and so under a norm for beauty philosophy might be thought to presume to work better towards, still akin to it: We might begin an exploration of ataraxia as ethical source and end of philosophical inquiry with sensitivity to the poetical figures the philosophers employ in promoting it.

If we understood the Pyrrhonian analysis for ataraxia as telos in dogmatism as pervasive, we would, in consideration of this analysis perpetrated under Stoicism, receive through the Pyrrhonian abstraction from Stoic euroia to ataraxia an impression of the experience of ataraxia as ‘well-flowing’. An impression which is fortified by a shared source in genealogies for ataraxia and euroia. First, we may trace the Epicurean conception of ataraxia, through Epicurean affinity for the philosophy of Democritus,190 to the latter's concept of euthumia. Second, Diogenes Laertius describes euthumia as a state in which the psuchē, disturbed (tarattomenē) neither by fear, superstition, or any other emotion, operates steadily (eustathōs) and galēnōs—like still water. While later, Seneca translates euthymia as tranquilitas, and calls it a supreme and divine state of the

Then, since in giving a introduction to the experience of ataraxia we would give an introduction of the experience of a god, perhaps, as we go along, we might get to feel Aristotle’s theology less inscrutable. 190 Cf. the cutting remark in De Natura Deorum 1.26.73 that there is nothing original in Epicurus that is not said better by Democritus. Cf. Fin.1.6.21.

168 mind pursuing a course that is smooth and favorable (aequalis and secundus, the latter a term that collocates with flumen to give the expression ‘downstream’).191

The philosophers appear to give the experience of tranquility without controversy through the image of calm water. For the sake of fleshing out the experience of ataraxia, we wish to explore the neutral metaphorical language the philosophers use to denote it. We assume such language the product of pre-philosophical acculturation to an ancient ideal. On such an assumption, if we were to continue to look for a further pre- analytic cultural source of inspiration for the philosopher's giving her ideology through the metaphor of calm water, we might find it in the poetic topos of the locus amoenus. In poetry, the sort of oddness we might, in philosophical awe, discover of the world as ground for hope through dialectic is given in a language driven by a religious and emotional experience of features of the landscape the philosopher employs somehow as ground for her ideal experience. But as the focus is the landscape, features given as beautiful are described foremost through the prism of our material sensibility. A sensibility philosophy purports to transcend through dialectic under norms given not just by the norms of logic, but also by an imperative to never give up on operating under these norms.192

Materially, that is, in respect of the features of reality that so stand out to us pre-dialectically, first, calm water is integral to an idyllic landscape. For example, Sappho 2:

191 DL 9.45. See (Warren, 2002), Ch. 2, p. 33. 192 In her commitment to operate under the norms, the philosopher moves like Asimov’s Speedy round a selenium pool. Or: She remains transfixed by an effort to capture her reflection in Narcissus’ pool.

169 Come here, from Crete, to this holy temple, where your delightful grove of apple trees is, and altars smoking with incense, and where cold water bubbles through apple tree branches, and the whole place is shaded with roses, and sleep falls from the swaying leaves, and where a meadow, grazed by horses, blooms with vernal flowers, and the breezes blow gently... Here you... leaving Cyprus behind, graceful- ly in golden cups pour nectar mixed with good cheer.

Or Ibycus 286:

In spring, there are Cydonian apple trees fed from flowing rivers where the inviolate garden of the Vir- gins is, and the bloom on the grape growing below the dark flowering vine leaf shoots; but for me love is at rest at no time, but like the blazing North wind below lightning, rushing from the Cyprian with parched madness, dark, shameless, shakes my heart from the roots.

And second, these images evoke exactly the kinds of places the philosopher would habitually seek out for repose to philosophize. For example, the sanctuary of the Lyceum,193 the Academy’s sacred garden irrigated by the river Cessiphus, or, famously, Epicurus’ secluded kēpos nearby.194 And naturally we will remember that Plato tried his hand at the depiction of such a landscape for contemplation when setting the Phaedrus in a sacred grove on the banks of the Ilissus. Then, we have material for a story in which the idealization of ataraxia is from a pre-philosophical affinity for the grove: Ataraxia as euroia. And euroia in the grove. And the figure of the grove received through the idyll. But also: The grove is cultivated by the philosopher as locus which offers escape towards contemplation.

193 Abundant in water, apparently. See (Lynch, 1972), p.12.

170

Having been given the image of calm water for tranquility by the philosophers, we might press on, and attempt to fill out the experience of ataraxia through consideration of what we would take as source for the image: The cult of the landscape for such water.

We may, if we are not pessimists, imagine that the awareness of the philosopher in idyllic retreat will tend to be of a kind with the features of the landscape she perceives. The awareness of the perceiver, ceteris paribus, seeks to assimilate the thing perceived. If we are allowed to let our appreciation of the poetry as formative cultural phenomenon inform our construction of the ancient’s perceptual sensibility, she finds in her garden or gymnasium repose among the beauty and sufficiency of a holy place irrigated by easy-flowing waters.

But any material enjoyment of such a grove could not be the unequivocal goal of the philosopher. After all, a Cynic such as Diogenes might chafe at an actual retreat to such a garden. And Zeno preferred to philosophize just off the busy Agora, in a porch frescoed with scenes of warfare. And, in general, as we have seen, the thinker should be careful to avoid becoming prisoner to worldly pleasures by wishing to possess them. For example, Pliny the Younger to Caninius Rufus, on his pleasant villa on Lake Como:

Or, as you were wont, with the intention of taking care of your estates, are you continually called away on business? You are fortunate and happy if your estates possess you; if the other way round, you are one of the throng.

194 Fin. 5.3.

171 Letters 1.3

If we are to enjoy the garden, we cannot be anxious to preserve it. If we wish to cultivate it, or take our ease in it, we must remain within it, and be at ease in our wish. For example, if this ease requires self-mastery, then in any renunciation of—or control over—the desire for the pleasures of the garden, the philosopher would still seek to act with an equanimous awareness given pre-philosophically in the language of the idyll. Then, also, she could not go on to desire in abstraction that for which the grove is metaphorical vehicle, and be well. To desire instead of the actual garden an experience of homeostatic, self-renewing activity in beauty and sanctity would also be to replace one disease with another. At least, if desire vitiates tranquility, desire for tranquility will be self-defeating.

In Ibycus, the grove is set by simile in contrast with psychological turmoil. In the philosophical terminology, calm water is given in metaphor as ataraxia. Likewise, in our present exposition, the idyll is further vehicle for the ideal psychology in activity. Like the calm water that irrigates a sacrosanct grove, the philosopher ascended moves easily in a world expectant of divinity which will produce in it opportunity for her further repose and sustenance. Be her activity the pursuit of virtue or pleasure—or, perhaps, skepsis—the philosopher seeks an ideal tranquility; and it will, in abstraction from any philosophical affiliation, be to the ideal experience of this activity that the vehicle of the idyll is applicable. To translate out: If ataraxia is telos, and can be given by the figure of euroia, and so by the concomitants of the landscape for such flowing, then the experience of the garden appears akin to the experience of the philosopher in philosophical

172 arrival. But, then, it seems the ideal sensibility is given first as one of homeostasis, self-sufficiency, sanctity and beauty.195

195 Our comments have been preliminary. More work may be done in a study for contrast and tension in the rendition of landscapes of ataraxia.

E.g, we might consider our two idylls of the locus amoenus in light of Alcaeus 130, in which the poet is banished to a harsh life in a holy place on the borderlands.

We might compare., Pliny’s letter to Caninus Rufus, warning him lest he admires the beauty of his lake-bound villa too much to enjoy in it the opportunity for quiet study, with Seneca’s 55th letter on the sea-bound villa of Vatia, who lived his life in refined gardens in isolation from fear of proscription.

We might work further through the Phaedrus’ idyll of the river Ilissus—inhabited by the spirits of Nymphs and the god of rivers, father of the Sirens, Achelous—as locus for contemplation. On the bank of its flowing waters, surrounded by the hum of sweet-singing cicadas, eyes and ears of the gods, Socrates is inspired by the presence of divinity to give an account of philosophical love. We might attempt a contrast through further treatment of Narcissus’ reflection in a still pool only disturbed by his efforts to reach himself in Metamorphoses 3.

And so on.

173 Epicurean ataraxia and divinity

Our example of Epicurean ataraxia as material from which to abstract a concept of Pyrrhonian ataraxia as telos occurs in a list of examples of philosophies whose ontology we would present as ultimately, at its heights, including divinity as principle of reality—in the Stoics’ as rational creative intelligence, in Aristo- tle’s as imitated rational perfection, in Plato’s as source of emanation of the Forms after which the world is modeled by the demiurge and to be arranged by man. If we suggested that—even for Aristotle—pursuit of the rational regularity or unity of the divine is somehow an ethical end for these philosophers, and we thought to see in this a general feature of ancient philosophy, what would we say of the Epicureans, who, we saw, work hard to liberate themselves from a notion of god as rational manipulator of the world?196

At least in this sense, the Epicureans can be thought of as pursuing, in pursuing ataraxia, an affinity for divinity: They seek to live like gods as they imagine them.197 Now, the Epicureans conceive of gods as self-sufficient, unconcerned and robust. Tellingly, in their sufficiency, gods have no need to interfere with the world. To elaborate on what we mentioned before when we limned an account of ataraxia: The Epicurean pursues the life of a god through the denial of an alien divinity which orders the unfolding of the world such that the individual must pursue a life in accordance with it—as appears in Stoicism. In Stoicism, man is to become god in euroia through philosophical understanding of the world as product of creative divine intelligence internal to it. Analo-

196 Even for Aristotle: For example, if the virtue of an individual of a species is given in its maturing into an excellent specimen, and this involves the activity of procreation from a desire to emulate the regularity of God as thought thinking itself, then, as man is political species, we might conceive of the excellence of practical virtue given under a norm for perpetuation of the polis. 197 Cf. KD 11-13.

174 gously, in Epicureanism, man has the opportunity to become god in tranquility through the realization—by doing physics, and giving by this activity an explanation of cosmological phenomena—that she is free of the constraint of living under the norm of another (e.g., god, or the libido of her body.) This life of the gods is supposedly realized by the Epicureans in the garden, among friends, in whose company they discuss and rehearse, through contemplation of natural philosophy, an account of the world, so as to remind themselves of their liberty and self-sufficiency.

Let us go into detail: In our investigation, we wish to sketch in abstraction how the philosopher seeks happiness through overcoming the constraints of the world by a rational determination of her place in it by which she may become attuned to her natural role in it. In this attunement, any indigence in the face of the constraints of her environment—whether intellectual or empirical—becomes best manageable. Moreover, in this attunement, the very performance of virtuous activity comes, as we have seen both Epicureans and Stoics agree, concomitant with the experience of tranquility. Whether intellectual or empirical: We might give the natural environment of the philosopher as twofold: First, she is an animal operating in a material environment—e.g., in a political environment; or, if this is different, in an environment of family and friends. Second, she is an intelligence contemplating in a scientific environment. We intend this distinction to track a paradigmatic division in ancient psychology between material and scientific domains for human activity. For example, we see given in Aristotle’s distinction between virtues of character for somatic and political activities, and of intellect for deliberative and contemplative activities, two environments for excellence of human activity. And we see how this distinction perpetuates the Platonic compartmentalization of the psuchē into rational, emotional, and appetitive parts, and the impression in the Republic that agents may

175 fulfill their political roles better or worse in accordance with a distribution of talent over these parts. For example, while the most excellent agent of the Repub- lic will be the philosopher who commands the polis from rational ethical vision, her soldiers, lacking philosophical ability, may nonetheless excel at their business just as long as they are well inculcated towards both a courageous disposition that will allow them to stand their ground, and a moderate disposition that will curb any temptation to use their force for the sake of usurpation.198

In consideration of the former, material, environment, the envisioned ideal we will attempt to sketch for the philosopher is one of natural activity performed in ever renewed wholeheartedness. By the pursuit of such renewal, the pursuit of virtue turns out a pursuit of wholehearted homeostatic activity. Likewise, in consideration of the latter, intellectual, environment: Intelligence is to come to rest in contemplative homeostasis. Towards one end of the philosophical spectrum, we might think such homeostasis idealized as arrived at in acquaintance with divinity through understanding of divine rational principles of the world. We might, as we will attempt later, imagine that in Platonism the philosopher’s arrival in noēsis would bring a resolution to awe: We would become by our scientific understanding like a god, in homeostatic contemplation of divinity.

198 Perhaps we make our distinction on two assumptions: First, the assumption that although the dialectical environment for contemplation often manifests itself materially as a political exercise (e. g., in the activity of writing a scientific book we are to defend), it need not. To wit: Socrates left immobile in the street, dragged off by contemplation. Then, the dialectical environment of contemplative activity might not need to be political. Second, political activity is performed best only if there is affinity between the sensibilities of contemplation and material sensation: The intellectual insight must be applied in an effort to rearrange material as it presents itself in experience. (À propos a famous philosopher visiting UCLA: We can’t forget where we put our glasses, our pen, our notes.) This might entail that there is a further domain for excellence in activity, in addition to the domain of contemplative activity. For example an excellence of perceiving the potential of material to be rationally rearranged (e. g., here is a glass that can be filled). Or an excellence of acting on this potential (e. g. an excellence of pouring wine, or of wielding the sword, or of deploying troops, or of saying words, and swaying by rhetoric). Then, political activity need not fall under dialectical activity.

176 Towards the other, arrival in scientific surety appears imagined as an understanding that a science of the material causes of our world, and of the material causes for our perception of the world, exhausts our need for science. In our realization of what we are exclusively qua material, we are to find ourselves liberated from wonder about any metaphysics for divine intelligence which, e.g., orders the material world, as if it were plasticene, or surveys it like a well- informed tyrant. We would, then, be liberated from worry about ourselves conceived of as immaterial souls made of the stuff of divinity. Such souls, by this substantial kinship with divinity, would be object for judgment of their terrestrial activity under divine norms. But we are nothing over and above our matter, and, so, first, no ethics other than one given through sensibility obtains for us, and second, such sensibility allows us to see that our material constitution will become undone. So, we may in our scientific vision of material as reality come to live just in accordance with sensibility, and free from any concern that we should eventually find ourselves judged against divine norms by divine beings. The sensibility for material provides the criterion for the construction of our ends. In understanding this, we immediately are driven to consider ourselves as just a particular animal among animals. And we may see how the animal sensibility for material sets ends for the body congenial to it. They are easily fulfilled, and when they are not fulfilled, death, which does not concern us, is swiftly bound to follow. So, in the Epicurean scientific vision of living free from oversight and influence from gods, we would come to live from sensibility exactly like the gods as we best imagine them: free from concern that they may suffer deficiency. In this story, the idealization of ataraxia is given in an idyll of a life of philosophical friendship, of

177 men [lying] together on the soft grass near a stream of water beneath the branches of a lofty tree refreshing their bodies with joy and at no great cost. DRN 2.29-31

While of matters below

it is a pleasure to […] gaze on great contests of war deployed over the plains when you yourself have no part in the danger, DRN 2.4-5

here in the Epicurean garden, among friends,

pleasantest of all is to be master of those tranquil regions well fortified on high by the teaching of the wise. DRN 2.7-8

The communal contemplative rehearsal and further investigation of reality as material would be the essence of philosophical activity in Epicurean friendship. The activity is valuable in being, first, a shared reminder—that is, renewal of awareness—of our liberty from the metaphysical superstitions of overactive imagination; and so, second, an exhortation to attend to our senses, and see how the world is congenial to them. And in this vision we come to live like a god in appreciation of the bountiful world.

178 Pyrrhonian and Epicurean ataraxia

We limned three difficulties in the provision of a taxonomy of ends for Pyr- rhonian ataraxia. First, it seems that there are philosophers, to wit, the Cyrenaics, who are not full-blown rational eudaimonists. At least, if we take rational eudaimonism to be concerned with the pursuit of happiness as given in a protracted— whatever this means—rational construction of memory and anticipation over an extended life. In Cyrenaicism, in so far as there is rational aiming, it appears concerned with an end qua the immediate gratification of present desire for pleasure. Further, of those who appear to pursue such rational eudaimonism, we have given two, seemingly opposed conceptions of what the material of the extended happy life is by which we judge the life to be happy. Accordingly, these different conceptions yield different conceptions of what the end is, and what to pursue. Our paradigmatic opposition we take to be here, on the one hand, Stoic conception of the end to aim for as virtuous activity first, and only through this, supervenient- ly, ataraxic euroia, and the Epicurean conception of virtue as aimed at for the sake of the further end of the pleasure of ataraxia. So, as we have constructed it, an immediate problem in providing a taxonomy of ataraxia as end appears to lie in overcoming at least these three differences of opinion. Now, first, the provision of taxonomy is under a criterion for economy: We must make as few divisions as possible, and, equally, we must not repeat ourselves. We must not repeat ourselves in the taxonomy, as there would then be contradiction in our division. For example, we are in danger of saying that ataraxia would subsume all ends, but, also, since it is also given as subsumed end of the Epicureans in opposition to the Stoics, that it would not. As the Epicurean says

179 that ataraxia is the end, too, we would have to differentiate somehow the different understandings of the ataraxia.

It might be appropriate to try to limn this distinction here now. The first thing to say is that, of course, even in the provision of a taxonomy for ataraxia as final end, the Pyrrhonist should perhaps not end up thought of needing to prove too much. The Pyrrhonist says, after all, that she does not dogmatically believe that ataraxia is the end when she says it is she end. Instead, she is a psychological therapist who—perhaps like that dog, akin to the Methodic doctors,199 which without dogma perceives and removes a thorn from its paw—at once does two things: She diagnoses in the dogmatist, from his pursuit of his end, that he pursues ataraxia as end. And, accordingly, she lays the claim that ataraxia is end in the balance against dogmatic eudaimonism for the sake of suspensive therapy.

This observation might help us set a limit to what we would be responsible for in providing a taxonomy for Pyrrhonian ataraxia: While the Pyrrhonist must, for the sake of laying in the balance, make plausible to the dogmatist under therapy that he is aiming for Pyrrhonian ataraxia even if he claims he is not, the Pyrrhonist does not in the end want to convince the dogmatist that he is aiming for ataraxia rather than his old dogmatic end. This would be to replace one dogmatic end with another. We have limned of the Stoic and the Epicurean, how we might claim that they aim for ataraxia. And we might, in pursuit of ad hominem analysis, continue to fill out a picture of how this is so, or go on to seek in the pursuit of gratification of immediate desire in the Cyrenaic a further mode of presentation of the pursuit of ataraxia.

199 PH 1.238

180 But look, with regard to what we should aim for, we see the Stoic, despite our quote from Epictetus that the ergon of virtue is euroia, argue long and hard against the Epicurean’s conception of ataraxia as end. And we see the Pyrrhonist point out that while the end of the Cyrenaics is immediate pleasure, the Pyrrhonian end is ataraxia, and that in setting pleasure as their end, the Cyrenaics apparently invite no less unnecessary disturbance than anyone else who aims for what he does not have.200 And we might expect that the Pyrrhonist may bring the same complaint against the Epicureans who aim for the ataraxic life through aiming for a store of stable pleasures. We said before that the dogmatist may not have a problem with thinking that ataraxia is a—or, in the case of the Epicureans, even the—mode of presentation of the end. They have problems with a claim that ataraxia can be conceived of as end without further content—for the Stoic, supervenient on agency which takes as end virtuous activity exhibited in our rational choices; for the Epicurean, in possession of a store of stable pleasures; for the Cyrenaic, in gratification of immediate desires. But the Pyrrhonist also offers ataraxia as the end in these philosophies, because each of them conceives of their end as attained in the future through their present activity of seeking, and ataraxia is release from this seeking. The Stoic, in setting virtue as end to aim for, seeks to choose well, the Epicurean seeks tranquility in a store of simple pleasures, the Cyrenaic gratification in immediate pleasure. Ataraxia may be end, and, indeed, that for the sake of which everything can be said to be done, but this does not mean that we must be aiming for it. Indeed, this aiming would still indicate its not yet obtaining. This, perhaps, is the difference between the Epicurean conception of ataraxia and the Pyrrhonian conception abstracted from it by ad hominem.

200 PH 1.215

181 The Epicurean conceives of ataraxia dogmatically, as end that must be attained through living in accordance with the dogma. The dogma sets tranquility as normative end, and so puts us at a remove from tranquility. Likewise, the Stoic conceives of euroia as the mark of virtue, and conceives of virtue dogmatically, as end that must be attained through living in with the dogma. The dogma sets virtue as normative end, and so puts us at a remove from virtue. Likewise, the Cyrenaic conceives of immediate pleasure dogmatically, as end that must be attained through living in accordance with the dogma. The dogma sets immediate pleasure as normative end, and so puts us at a remove from immediate pleasure. Ataraxia the Pyrrhonist abstracts as end for these dogmatists, since in its arrival they would no longer be at a remove from their end.

182 Platonic ataraxia

“In which category of these,” he said, “do you place justice?” “I myself,” I replied, “reckon it among the finest, to be loved both because of itself and because of what comes from it by anyone who is destined to be blessed with happiness.”

Republic 357d-358a

Now we ought to think of the most sovereign part of our soul as god’s gift to us, given to be our guiding spirit. This, of course, is the type of soul that, as we maintain, resides in the top part of our bodies. It rais- es us up away from the earth and toward what is akin to us in heaven, as though we are plants grown not from the earth but from heaven. In saying this, we speak absolutely correctly. For it is from heaven, the place from which our souls were originally born, that

183 the divine part suspends our head, i.e., our root, and so keeps our whole body erect. Timaeus 90a201

Or haven’t you remembered,” she said, “that in that life alone, when he looks at Beauty in the only way that Beauty can be seen—only then will it become possible for him to give birth not to images of virtue (because he’s in touch with no images), but to true virtue (because he is in touch with the true Beau- ty). The love of the gods belongs to anyone who has given birth to true virtue and nourished it, and if any human being could become immortal, it would be he.” Symposium, 212a-b202

We pursue an ad hominem analysis of Platonism as Pyrrhonism to lay in the balance—indeed, as an illustration of the mechanics of Pyrrhonian therapy— against a radical denigration of Pyrrhonism. Since this analysis, under the professed aim of Pyrrhonism, must show the possibility of ataraxia attainable through some yet to be given Platonic skepticism, we might include in our study of ataraxia a sketch which situates our general result of ataraxia as homeostatic, sufficient, holy, and beautiful in the context of Platonism.

We divide our labor: We aim to say something about the Platonic aspiration for an experience of homeostasis and self-sufficiency in any worldly activity first. Next, as we must exemplify these in the experience of any philosopher the Pyrrhonist would wish to cure, we attempt an elucidation of this ideal experience in philosophical contemplation. In this contemplation, under the impression that

201 Trans. Zeyl. 202 Trans. Nehamas & Woodruff.

184 philosophy is supposed an attempt at divine homoiōsis, we aim to give features of divinity.

The Pyrrhonist, as the Platonist, purports to provide therapy in accordance with the nature of her audience. For example, the Pyrrhonist claims to offer supposedly weak arguments for those for whom such arguments would suffice to bring about suspension, supposedly stronger for the more resilient.203 Likewise, in the Phae- drus, Socrates determines as essential feature of proper rhetoric an appreciation for context, and so of such a rhetorician’s audience.204 In either case, the philosopher proceeds in accordance with the ability of those she addresses. Of course, in our catering to our audience, our audience may change, so as to become an audience of a different kind altogether, with new demands. For example, the Platonic dialogue may commence with a question after a matter seemingly sublunar enough—e.g., in Book 1 of the Republic, after the worldly benefit of justice (dikaiosunē)—to then ascend to greater heights. For example, through leaving the Thrasymachean behind, to eventually contemplate elevated philosophical considerations of the source of goodness in justice with Glaucon and Adeimantus. If we followed Plato’s manner in our ad hominem analysis of the Republic, the target of our Pyrrhonian pedagogy must eventually come to include an audience of philosophers so elevated under Platonism. Self-sufficiency and homeostasis must then be given as ideal not just in any old practical activity, but also in the activity of such philosophers as might seek in abstracted contemplation, e.g., the source of goodness in justice. But then self- sufficiency and homeostasis must be rendered attractive to the philosophical patient in appreciation of the hopes of the philosopher with regard to her activity.

203 PH 3.280-1. 204 Phaedrus 277c, Cf. Meno 75d: In the provision of definition the speaker must answer in terms already known to the quesitoner.

185

If philosophy is an attempt at divine homoiōsis, we must eventually say something about how the Platonic aspiration is after an experience of holiness and divinity, and, so, naturally, beauty.

We said the Pyrrhonist gives us but a thin account of ataraxia as telos. Because of this, and since the Pyrrhonist appears to give ataraxia as telos for any philosophy, we sought a further understanding of ataraxia through analysis for the concept in pre-dialectical expression. Now we wish to say that ataraxia so conceived is the end of Platonism. This, for the sake of a defense of Pyrrhonism through ad hominem analysis of Plato- nism: If we could understand how the experience of tranquility is seen as telos in Platonism, we could more readily overcome any philosophical impression that a Pyrrhonian ethics pursues the insipid altogether exceedingly. While we wish to ascribe ataraxia as telos to the Platonist for the sake of examining the Pyrrhonian contention that it is telos for all philosophy, we may also be seen to wish to further fill out an experience of Pyrrhonian ataraxia by seeing how the Platonic aspiration is after ataraxia, too. We build up from our lyrical analysis, through its application to Platonism, an impression of philosophical ataraxia such as the Pyrrhonist purports to see, by her ad hominem analysis, as the end of all—and so, her—philosophy.

In our exercise, we would like to draw an analogy between the Pyrrhonian ideal of tranquility and any Platonic ideal which prima facie appears as of a kind in Platonism. The production of this analogy through appreciation of a shared ideal generated through our lyrical analysis. Regarding the Pyrrhonian ideal: Given her pretension to provide a cure for precipitancy tout court by promoting movement in accordance with appearances in suspension, the Pyrrhonist seeks ataraxia in activity, and this will involve being in

186 an optimal condition—of tranquility—regarding activity, such that she acts not from belief, but by appearances. Epistemically, eventually, we will wish to say that in appearance purified by Pyrrhonian philosophy lies greater affinity for reality than in an act of dogmatic belief towards philosophical logoi. Reality is better revealed in the experiential remainder of dialectical activity. Ethically, if it is the case that under a conception of philosophy as therapy intuition of goodness must be given in the language of benefit: We recognize goodness through the enjoyment of an experience of tranquility. Even tranquility with regard to tranquility. Or tranquility with regard to our excitement.

Tranquility towards our tranquility and excitement: For example: The successful skeptic cannot help but be tranquil in matters of opinion. Philosophical awareness unadulterated by dogmatism, being genuinely skeptical and so thoroughly suspensive, supposedly will make a person ataraxic. Further, as it is an awareness purged of dogma, it will be metriopathetic of the unavoidabilities—ta katēnankasmena—beyond matters of opinion. The philosopher approaches her zenith in skeptical philosophical activity productive of metriopathetic awareness in unavoidable tranquility. Qua the emanation of tranquility in appearance with regard to her philosophical activity: First, in metriopatheia the philosopher would not be carried away by her tranquility so as to either exult in it to the degree that she would wish to hang on to it at all costs or discover by it unmitigated indifference to everything else in the world; second, commensurately, her philosophical suffering of epistemic incompleteness that is condition for her suspension in inquiry would remain alive in checking such exultation. By the unavoidability of her ongoing dialectical sensibility under the Modes which ever calls her back to the world to act in inquiry, she would consider the

187 value of her ataraxic experience of suspension in suspension, and she would embrace her unavoidable drive towards this further suspension metriopathetically. If there is anything sought wholeheartedly, even in awe, in suspensive inquiry, still inquiry becomes understood as a gently fluctuating sensibility. In this sensibility, she might open herself up to the world, and so make herself vulnerable to the possibility of friendship—when realized, a cause for exultation.

Apparently, if at least in the activity of inquiry, the Pyrrhonian pursues through reflection upon her activity a phenomenological ideal for her activity. Famously, in the Republic, Plato appears to give such an ideal: The optimal condition for activity comes in the virtue of justice. The presence of justice affords in the agent order between her psychological parts—appetitive, spirited, and rational—such that activity is wholeheartedly, harmoniously, endorsed.

We suggest a structural similarity between the ataraxic and the just experience: We gave the ideal Pyrrhonian experience of suspensive tranquility as approached in ongoing suspensive reflection upon this experience. Equally, the ideal experience of justice is approached in harmonious awareness of harmonization. Socrates, in an effort to discover justice by subtracting from virtue its further ingredients of wisdom, courage, and temperance, discovers justice as a harmony which affords the co-instantiation of the virtues of wisdom, courage, and temperance. But the virtue of temperance is the harmonization of wisdom and courage with desire. A harmonious experience of the just agent, then, would come in awareness of this activity of harmoniously integrating her psychology.205

205 Cf. Charmides, 166e-167a, 174d-175a, where an attempt to define temperance as a science of moderation towards itself is rejected by a rejection of the possibility that a faculty could take itself as object: Science should reveal the good. But a science merely of itself would not afford content for such discovery.

188 We examine Platonism for Pyrrhonism. But the Pyrrhonist neither affirms nor denies. She is neither a straightforward dogmatist who thinks she has arrived by her dogma in knowledge of the world. Nor is she a negative dogmatist who purports to just know this one thing: That she cannot know. Whatever Pyrrhonian ideal we pursue in Platonism, we should bear this in mind as constraint upon our appreciation of tranquility in Platonic justice. In terms of the individual, if the source of our disturbance is from sheer positive dogmatic fear for ourselves, or, in what we call detachment, from a negative dogmatic fear of our meaninglessness—we stand in need of liberation from fear and boredom. We must learn to embrace our activity without undue duress from fear that our desires for resources and meaningfulness are not being met: In our reconstruction of justice as tranquility, we need to make some approach to an experience of self-sufficiency in which is implied an active homeostasis. The agent wholeheartedly reaches into the world to perpetuate her activity in it.

By further examination of the Republic, we wish to discover an experience of tranquility in the experience of justice, such that, given our lyrical interpretation of ataraxia, we see in this harmony a self-sufficiency and homeostasis in wholehearted activity which renews itself. In defense of our procedure: We might concede that in exemplifying through the Republic an end of justice as tranquility in Platonism, we would fall short of showing tranquility end in all philosophy. To start, we might think there are philosophies which purport to disagree with Platonism, and so might disagree with any conception in it of ataraxia as end. Further, in our focus on the Republic’s examination of the experience of the virtue of justice as prism through which to approach acquaintance with the good, we touch upon just a fraction of the Platonic corpus. But it is—e.g., by our having in the term presocratic a marker which supposedly cuts our history of philosophy at a joint—uncontroversial to think Socrates the

189 focal point through which all that comes before is after him divvied up anew. Nor is it strange to think that, as our conception of Socrates is foremost presented to us as dialogic character in Platonic scripture, this focal point obtains rather in Plato. Nor strange to think that in the Republic we find a treatment of virtue in a dialectical context congenial to ascendant philosophy—e.g., set off properly by Thra- symachus wallowing in the body, and pursued thoroughly, through an attempt to pass through all pertinent domains of human activity, to abstraction with the philosophers Glaucon and Adeimantus—which allows opportunity for seeking in it a sufficiently accomplished impression of the Platonic petendum. We might then still present our exercise as primordial: Sextus’ Pyrrhonism in a milieu of seeming dogmatic fragmentation in response to the Platonic philosophy of Being, either with regard to how the end of tranquility is to be attained, or with regard to whether tranquility is the end. Our concern, being presently abstracted, lies first with the latter. If we were to investigate in further philosophies of Sextus’ milieu for ad hominem analyses of tranquility as end, and we are doing history under a norm of explanation which prefers analysis through an account of the development of ideas, then if we had some grasp of the historical source of contention, we would be better informed in our search in these philosophies for material for presentation in a convincing ad hominem. Platonism is prism through which to appreciate Sextus’ milieu, the Republic is prism through which to approach Platonism.

Our concern in our exercise is with the experience of the individual. Through consideration of the individual we—if we are still not just, and concerned with ourselves foremost—wish to gain an understanding of justice as harmony that is tranquility. In the Republic, Socrates comes to defend justice in response to Thra- symachus’ egocentric conception of the good as benefit for the individual, or—if

190 such unmitigated egocentrism precluded the possibility of any referent for our term good—of benefit under egocentric intuition as exhaustively indicative of direction for inclination. Or something like this. In our reconstruction of Socrates’ response, justice as harmony must show itself as welcome to the egocentric individual under our lyrical conception of tranquility as self-sufficient and homeostatic. Of self-sufficiency and homeostasis of the just individual in harmony we might say: Politically, in the Republic, the individual overcomes his lack of self- sufficiency in becoming appreciative of the possibility of his integration into a political unit that, in being directed towards its perpetuation, is condition of his own—at least—material, if not (unless he could still somehow be a hermit) continuation tout court.206 Psychologically, in his political integration, the individual overcomes this lack in becoming free of precipitancy, to just take care just of what is his own.207 Such just taking care in a vision of the world as endorsing itself by its seeking its own continuation would present itself in the experience of the individual as an embrace of her future, and so of her activity towards the future. (Her: as she is reconstructable to herself. For example: Not just here and now, but—as the eudaimonic happiness of the philosopher is not given just in the moment, but over a life, in the here and now, in a struggle to realize herself throughout.)

Early on in the Republic, Thrasymachus challenges Socrates to show that we should be just, rather than unjust. Thrasymachus contends that it is obvious that

206 See Rep. 369b for lack of self-sufficiency in the human individual as origin of the city. 207 See especially 443d. We speak of at least the philosophical individual.

191 injustice can offer overriding benefit if one is strong or clever enough to escape repercussions of unjust behavior.208 Socrates’ task will be to show, in the vernacular of the commoner who is preoccupied with benefit, that justice, rather than injustice, pays. Socrates will go on to claim that what concerns him in his elaboration is the happiness of the city over that of the individual.209 At least pedagogically, such a remark should not surprise us if the virtue of justice is first conceivable as a virtue of social interaction. We might at least start out with some naïve conception of justice as political behavior in accordance with some social order. But Socrates is ever concerned with the nature of the source of the activity. An agent who acts from regard of how social order serves the satisfaction of her own desires might endorse activity that perpetuates her political and social infrastructure from base motivation toward a perceived gain which is contingently provided by her activity in accordance with good order. But in a bad winter, or in war, or a in good season for olives privately foreseen,210 or suddenly in possession of Gyges’ ring, she might seek to draw excessive power towards herself, so as to rule one way or another over others for the sake of her lust. By contrast, a truly just agent would ensoul—bring into the soul—the well- ordering of the city such that the vulgar psychology of egocentric benefit which lusts after satisfaction is provided with a sensibility that quenches its desire. Socrates appears to give us an argument for justice from benefit not just for the entire polis, but for the individual, too. Thankfully, since the Thrasymachean challenge comes from an egocentric preoccupation with benefit, it will turn out

208 Rep. 343b-44d. 209 Rep 420b5. 210 Thales is said to have rented all the olive presses upon having foreseen from astronomy a good harvest. Politics 1259a. But, of course, Thales is said to have merely wished to exemplify how a philosopher could avail himself of riches if he so wished.

192 that the agent’s supreme benefit comes in an experience of activity for the benefit of the city in embrace of a norm for justice. Especially since benefit must be given in the Thraymachean vernacular, it must be given in terms appreciable to a psychology concerned to see benefit in its experience. In other words, the recognition of benefit must come in the egocentric experience of the thinker.

But it appears that in truth justice is indeed something like this, but not with regard to praxis in matters which are of the self externally, but with regard to what is inside, and so truly with regard to the self and the things of the self. A just man must not allow any one part of him to do the business of some other, nor allow these classes of the soul to interfere with each other, but he regulates well those things which in reality are his own, and rules himself, and puts himself in beautiful order, and becomes a friend to himself, and harmonizes the three parts of himself as if they were, quite literally, three limiting notes in a musical scale—of lowest, highest, and mean—and anything else there happens to be in between these, and he binds these together and becomes becomes altogether one from many things, temperate and in unison. Only then should he act, whether his activity is for the sake of the acquisition of money, or therapy for the body, or even something political, or for the sake of private contracts.211 In all of these he holds and calls just and beautiful the praxis which preserves and brings about this condition [of harmony], and wisdom the science (epistēmē) which oversees such praxis, but unjust the praxis which would always destroy this [condition of harmony], and opinion (doxa) the un- learned ignorance which in turn oversees it. Republic 443d-444a

211 If this is amenable, do we say that there is a punkish rhetoric of obfuscation: Surely, the culminat

193

Socrates gives us an ethical picture on which we ought to be just, because in being so we instantiate the best arrangement of both our political and our psychological parts—in the polis between ruling, policing and productive classes, in the psuchē between the rational, emotive, and appetitive parts. The happiness of the individual, it will turn out, is in alignment with the well- ordered arrangement of the political parts in the polis, where this best arrangement obtains in light of a classification of individuals according to their abilities. Socrates calls the best arrangements of city and soul ‘just’ (dikaios). The classification and determination of virtues of shared concern to the Greeks, at least if it is the product of acculturation, might proceed in a sensitivity to common use of virtue terminology. For example, in what prima facie appears to be the end of the Socrates’ attempt at laying in the balance against a Thra- symachean sensibility of benefit an appreciation of the experience of justice as supreme satisfaction, Socrates may begin his description of justice (dikaiosunē) with an appeal to the semantics of the term ‘dikaiosʼ:

And we have heard from many others and often said ourselves that to do one’s own business and refrain from being a busybody is justice (dikaiosunē). Republic 433a-b

Justice, Socrates tells us, obtains when in the organic whole each functional part seeks to do its own job, and no more.212 This optimal integration of parts into the organism constitutes harmony.213 In the ideal city, such embrace of function by each class—as no class would seek to overreach and meddle in the functional domains of other classes, but each would

212 Rep. 443b-c. 213 Rep. 443d.

194 take up its task with sense of purpose—would come about in some ready collaboration. We may have difficulty imagining any experience of dedication in a political part. If we were to imagine such an experience anywhere, we would imagine it in the individual. At least she has a heart that can be whole. And, under the analogy between polis and psuchē, in imagination of the ideal psychology of the individual, the embrace of function by each psychological part of the individual—as no part would seek to overreach and meddle in the functional domains of other parts, but each would take up its task with sense of purpose—we would also see come about in such collaboration. While we might more readily intuit a notion of justice in consideration of political behavior, in this alignment of psychological parts of the individual in activity we might more readily conceive of a further experience of wholeheartedness with regard to the activity. The conscious agent is pulled neither this way or that from her course by ongoing disagreement between her parts, but follows it, in some appreciation of her integration of her parts, steadily and single-mindedly.

First, the psuchē is just if it has the best arrangement of psychological parts as appreciable in experience. Thus, to be just is not just to move in a certain way, but to have a conscious disposition in action that is characterized by this best arrangement. The presence of genuinely beneficial activity is assessed by measuring in its motivation an reflective affinity for goodness. Hence, wisdom, courage, and temperance become genuine virtues by the presence of the virtue of justice, where justice is a virtue of further awareness in an affinity with goodness which offers ground for endorsement of the activity. Second, the polis is just if it has the best arrangement of political parts. And abstractable from ideal psychological and political agency is a manner of interaction given as harmony between psychological parts of the individual in the individual, and between political parts of the city in the city.

195 But—as the political parts are constituted of individuals, and the individual acts towards virtue in regard of her function in the political context—between individuals as members of political parts in the city and the city.

Justice in the city amounts to political collaboration engaged in by each citizen in recognition of the proper domain for her activity, given her educational, and— though this is perhaps not quite the word—biological background.214 For example: The person with natural philosophical ability, well-raised, should govern. The person with a natural love for honor, well-trained, should fight. The person with the talent of the artisan, well-trained, should produce. But not just this; ideally citizens should fulfill their roles in embrace of it. This requires in the individual citizen an arrangement of her psychological parts— rational, spirited, appetitive—such that a homologous political harmony obtains between them. Ideally, the harmonious relation between desire, courage, and wisdom in the psychology of the individual produces within her an embrace of her role in the world, and the collective of such psychologies arranges into harmoniously collaborative parts of producers, soldiers, and philosophers.215

In political activity, the optimal psychology is realized in interaction between the agent’s psychological parts with regard to her material of activity. That is, with regard to the distribution of resources in regard of the needs of the political organization the agent finds herself part of.

214 A problem for any eugenic conception of a Platonic division of labor: We all have the capacity for recollection. For example, in the myth of Er, we choose, with a liberty given by fate, our material station in the world. Perhaps ‘biological’, then is the right word, but given a notion of our essence as encapsulated by our biology, biology turns out a material limitation upon us of a kind with the limitation on us through our education later in the unfolding of our lives in the world of becoming. 215 Jesus a carpenter, Socrates a mason: An ideal society perhaps one in which all might become philosophers, and so, since we must defend and feed ourselves, soldiers and producers, too.

196 In this way, the ideal city comes about in virtue of its citizens’ exhibiting the ideal psychology with regard to the political roles they are to perform. The just person pursues her course steadily and single-mindedly. But by analogy, the just city equally so. But the just city does this in virtue of the just psychologies of its citizens which constitute its parts.

[B]ecause people need many things, and because one person calls on a second out of one need and on a third out of a different need, many people gather in a single place to live together as partners and helpers. And such a settlement is called a city. Republic 369b-c216

Our political activity is then from an unavoidable need to affiliate if we are to live.217 And our activity in the city is then for our continuation. But then, our just political activity is for the sake of its continuation. Such a valuation of just activity is given explicitly at the beginning of Book 2. There, Socrates elicits an agreement to a threefold division of activity: activity for its own sake, such as harmless enjoyment without any consequences; activity for its own sake and its consequences, such as knowing, seeing, and being healthy; and activity for its consequences, such as physical exercise, undergoing medical treatment, practicing medicine, and—more generally—making money. Socrates determines the finest of these kind to be the second, and claims that just activity is of this sort. So: Justice recommends itself as supreme virtue by promising harmony in the agent with regard to her activity in her situation. This harmony recommends itself in an experience of affirmation of the agent’s activity towards the future as conducive to its perpetuation, and so productive of homeostasis.

216 Trans. Grube. 217 Cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1.1253a.

197

Now, furthermore, homeostasis appears in the Republic as a mark of divinity.

But the best things are least liable to alteration or change, aren’t they? For example, isn’t the healthiest and strongest body least changed by food, drink, and labor, or the healthiest and strongest plant by sun, wind, and the like? Republic 380e218

In Book 2 of the Republic, Socrates attacks the popular religious anthropomor- phism which projects upon divinity the malignant features of human psychology. The attack results in acknowledgement of the unity and homeostasis of divinity, and proceeds by an investigation from our valuing integrity and resistance to change in natural bodies and artifacts. If integrity is valued, then this is a mark of divinity. But then divinity has a supremely unitary nature. But then there is no room for badness in divinity, for if it were to be just one thing, surely it would be good. Whatever the virtues of this elenchos, if philosophers are to become like gods by the pursuit of philosophy towards virtue, we see here that a projection of the features of divinity they are to pursue are derived from an idealization of objects in our human world. And this idealization is one of homeostasis. We value ourselves in terms of stability, and this valuing is departure point for consideration of how we might improve ourselves towards divinity. In the end, if we asked why activity for its own sake and its consequences is the finest, we might begin a reply by saying it is like that of a god, appreciation for the nature of whom we attain by considering our seeing value in resilience, and so in integrity.

218 Trans. Grube.

198 In order to show our analysis of psychological harmony amenable to Pyrrhoni- an appreciation, we still need to give psychological harmony in the vernacular of tarachē, freedom from which the Pyrrhonist sees the end of philosophy. Naturally, given the self-sufficiency and homeostasis of the just agent, we may expect in her the psychological robust resistance to disturbance which the Pyrrhonist hopes to discover through philosophy. But we are also explicitly shown in the Republic that in harmony we are supposed to gain an experience of invulnerability to the vicissitude and precipitancy Pyrrhonism seeks to liberate us of. We are told that the soul that is most courageous and knowledgeable—i.e., the just soul in which these virtues are best instantiated by the presence of justice—is least disturbed or altered by outside influence.219 A good person is most self-sufficient, and has the least need for others. So it is less terrible for her to be deprived of family or possessions, and she will bear it calmly and courageously.220 In the case of misfortune, it is not clear what is good or bad. We should keep quiet and not get irritated. Nothing is gained by being upset, and, besides, no human affair is really worth getting upset about. Instead, we should deliberate about how to continue on in whatever way reason determines best in order to curb our grief.221 The just man will be temperate, unmoved by fear of death, as human life will not be important.222 _Then, the aspiring philosopher will be steadfast in the face of pain and pleasure for the sake of the city.223 As an alternative, the failure to attain the just psychology is found in the experience of disturbance. Of all such failures, that of the tyrannical soul in submission

219 381a. 220 387e 221 604b-c. 222 486a-b. 223 503a.

199 to libido is given as the worst, and comparison with it provides the starkest contrast. Like an unhappy city governed by the whim of a tyrant, the tyrannical soul is governed by lawless and irrational passion, which drives him to frenzy.224 A monstrous madness has eradicated all shame and decency from the soul, and so has liberated those most savage and lawless appetites which are familiar to a moderate person only in dreams225 The tyrannical soul lacks freedom, is enslaved to sensual appetite, and is unable to do as it wishes. The natural order of psychological governance has been subverted, and the edicts of the rational part are cast aside. Set against itself by continuous and overwhelming desire, the tyrannical soul is never satisfied, it is often in a state of pain and fear, and will be full of tarachē and regret.226 No city is happier than that ruled by a philosopher, none unhappier than that ruled by a tyrant.227 And so for the psychologies of individuals, too.

We have given some impression of justice as ataraxic harmony in political activity. In politics, our activity which is performed for its own sake and its consequences will ideally perpetuate itself wholeheartedly and calmly until the material into which we are imbued loses its battle against material and runs out of resources through sickness, accident, or someone’s willful act of destruction. Now we must at least make a beginning to an account of the philosophical experience of ideal Platonic contemplative inquiry. To begin, then: If the ideal for contemplative activity comes under a norm for justice in activity tout court, then also in contemplation we would embrace our activity for the sake of consequences embraced in an intelligence that in them our desire for such activity for the sake of its consequences is renewed. Perhaps all the more so: In contemplative activity we may be liable to forget our materiality, and

224 573e. 225 572b, 573b, 574d. 226 567a. 227 567d.

200 feel as if we could wholeheartedly pursue our love of wisdom indefinitely. At any rate, we would embrace in contemplation our future come what may for the sake of our being in some way the same in a future seemingly indefinite.

You see, the man who has been thus far guided in matters of Love, who has beheld beautiful things in the right order and correctly, is coming now to the goal of Loving: all of a sudden he will catch sight of something wonderfully beautiful in its nature; that, Socrates, is the reason for all his earlier labors: First, it always is and neither comes to be nor passes away, neither waxes nor wanes. Second, it is not beautiful this way and ugly that way, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another, nor beautiful in relation to one thing and ugly in relation to another; nor is it beautiful here but ugly there, as it would be if it were beautiful for some people and ugly for others. Nor will the beautiful appear to him in the guise of a face or hands or anything else that belongs to the body. It will not appear to him as one idea or one kind of knowledge. It is not anywhere in another thing, as in an animal, or in earth, or in heaven, or in anything else, but itself by itself with itself, it is always one in form; and all the other beautiful things share in that, in such a way that when those others come to be or pass away, this does not become the least bit smaller or greater nor suffer any change. Symposium 210e-211b228

If philosophical activity is supposed to uncover fundamental ethical insight through contemplation, the Platonic philosopher would purport to approach by contemplative activity a vision of the goodness of just activity. In Books 6 and 7 of the Republic an attempt is made to provide us with such a vision by giving through analogy of sun and divided line and the myth of ascent from the Cave towards light and beauty an impression of how the philosopher ascends—via

228 Trans. Nehamas & Woodruff.

201 puzzlement in dialectic towards noēsis—towards rest in contemplation of the Good as first principle which secures knowledge.229 In this vision of goodness, the goodness of justice is to be ultimately embraced as motivation for activity in the world. The soul becomes transfixed by this vision of goodness, and since it is what it is in virtue of its intentionality, becomes what it sees, and emanates back into the world in a way appreciable as just.

In our passage from the Symposium, we find philosophical contemplation as an ascent towards a vision of beauty, and in this vision, an experience of unity and permanence. If we are to trust the Meno, and nothing is taught, but merely revealed by a facilitation of recollection, we must, it seems, approach a vision of the Good by a hermeneutic appreciation of the pedagogy of revelation towards it. To begin such an interpretation, so as to begin to appreciate the pedagogy, and, perhaps, approach the vision it pursues: In Book 3 of the Republic, we may see the thinker set off on this journey towards an aesthetic experience of unity in a propaedeutic musical education. Proper musical education is to instill order and harmony so as to prepare the thinker for beholding the Good. Socrates tells us that in music we should only admit those rhythms that promote an orderly and courageous life. Music should be purged of wailing and lamenting modes such as the Lydian mode, as it is over-emotional, as well as the Ionian mode played at symposia. Left are the Dorian and Phrygian modes. One mode to inspire courage in violent work, one to inspire moderation and calm. Musical training purged in this sort of way of the pathological and libidinous, we are told, is supposed to mold the innermost part of a thinker’s psuchē. Being properly reared in music—i.e., having been raised on the appropriate rhythms and harmonies—will make a thinker sensitive to which things show a lack, and aren’t fine. He will praise and take pleasure in fine things. This will occur before he has even learned to apprehend reason. But when he matures intellectually, he will

229 490b, 517b, 532e.

202 readily welcome reason, and recognize it by his affinity with the fine thus cultivated. Musical education is supposed to prep the budding philosopher to recognize what is akin to his soul. In Book 10 we are told that the soul is immortal, but, if so, its natural state is one of unity.230 For if it were full of dissimilarity and inner conflict, its changeability would vitiate its immortality. In the sublunar, the soul is in conflict by being maimed by its association with the body. This conflict is the result of a tension between the nature of the human as rational, and its material situation. The human function is determined by its ultimate nature, and in appreciation of its nature the human is given as rational being. Hence, we love wisdom as something akin to us in which we can find fulfillment. Musical education, in priming us for a sensibility of harmony and order, stimu- lates this love by steering us towards rational activity, in which we find arrival. What is akin to us is the realm of being revealed in rational contemplation.231 When we realize ourselves in accordance with our rational nature, reason rules, and our lesser inclinations towards desire for material sensuality and honor are subdued. We would then in embrace of rationality become invulnerable to vicissitude in the realm of change. By contrast, an exercise in rationally seeking after wisdom is in abstraction from the world of becoming, and towards discovery of an unchanging principle of reality. Development of our musical sensibility for harmony prepares us for the vision of order and stability given in philosophical acquaintance with this principle. The objects in the realm of being given to us in rationality are eternal and unchanging. And we have already seen that what is unchanging is supposed divine and best.232 Hence, the optimal condition of the soul becomes imagined as being

230 611a-b. 231 611d-e. 232 381a-e.

203 achieved in rational activity. In rational activity, the soul, in that part of her which is most akin to her and offers the greatest promise for stability, pursues divinity and immortality by seeking knowledge of the unchangeable principle of reality. In this contemplative activity, an experience of stability is to come to charac- terize the thinker. In ascent to contemplative acquaintance with the Good, the philosopher’s soul is supposed to become patterned accordingly,233 The soul, in becoming wise, would take on the divine properties of the object of knowledge— its being unchanging, orderly, unified.234 In this assimilation to the intentional object, the thinker will come to show himself unified in his activity.235 so as to genuinely exhibit justice of character,236 and so divinity.237 We might say: In accomplished contemplation, the experience of psychological harmony would be the result of the psuchē of the sophos’ becoming acquainted with the divine unchanging order and harmony of Platonic reality. In knowing this order, the psuchē takes up its place in this order by taking on the features of this order—stability, unity, orderliness, divinity, harmony, and so on.

233 484c. 234 500c. 235 519c2-4. Cf. (Irwin, 1979), p. 237. 236 490c. 237 613b.

204 Life without belief

Philosophical therapy, we may take it, is supposed to facilitate human flourishing. Whatever this may amount to, since philosophy is inquiry after reality, we may expect that a flourishing human life requires that we can see ourselves honestly—that we need not lie to ourselves when we look closely at ourselves. Then, when we judge a philosophy for its capacity to guide a flourishing life, it may appear that we must try to see our way to honestly embrace the philosophy. If the Pyrrhonian skeptic maintains that he has no beliefs whatsoever, and that, in virtue of suspension of belief he attains freedom from disturbance, such that he lives, by his account, a flourishing human life, any charitable account of Pyrrho- nism better maintain that that the Pyrrhonist maintains all this honestly, even if without belief. But then it would seem that, unless we give in, and concede that the Pyrrhonist, in his honesty, is just mistaken about having no beliefs yet living a flourishing life, at the very least we would be beholden to fend off the charge that the skeptic’s life would be impossible because proper, rational human activity that is a condition on flourishing, requires belief.

To elaborate a little on what we have said of the epistemic worries about skepticism,238 there are a at least two ways in which we can appreciate the role of the denial of the possibility of life without belief. We might appreciate the denial as a general charge of apraxia, such that any sort of human agency will be thought an impossibility without belief. But the charge may be refined. The dogmatist may grant the skeptic those activities we share with animals, but insist that, since we are rational creatures, human activity of a full, flourishing human life has as an ingredient purposeful activity from rational deliberation, and that such activity must involve belief.

205 On the refined charge, the dogmatist gives the skeptic two horns to impale himself on: Either he will admit that he doesn’t live a fully human life. Or he will admit that he is blind to some of his cognitive states—namely those that are beliefs. Either way, Pyrrhonism is bunk. The dilemma is supposed to vindicate dogmatism by showing that even in the face of the apparent inexorability of the Modes, we still will have to have beliefs.

The refined charge appears the more pertinent. First, since for the philosopher rational activity appears, by his commitment to philosophical activity, the sine qua non of a good life, there is an entrenched philosophical worry that under Pyrrho- nism we would fail to fulfill our potential as rational beings. But any capacity in us for supposedly arational animal activity—as if a movement of the plant towards the sun—appears to have no bearing on this issue. Furthermore, even if we granted that the return to the animal would constitute a sort of return to the garden, even the Pyrrhonist cannot manage such a return. For the Pyrrhonist gives every appearance not to be living a suspensive life which would be condition on this return. He philosophizes and proselytizes by speaking as if it is quite clear to him that he has no beliefs, and is the better for it.239 But, for all his protestations of innocence, such a demeanor is dogmatic. And this is not surprising, since the supposed psychological benefits of epochē will need to come in philosophical awareness of the psuchē of its suspensive state, and this awareness will need to present itself as belief. Accordingly, the dogmatist likes to offer the skeptic the peritropē that the unmitigated skepticism of the Pyrrhonist is itself an expression of belief, and hence fraught with pragmatic contradiction.240

238 See especially part A, chapter 3, section 2. 239 Ibid. 240 Ibid. And see e.g., DRN 469 et seqq., Metaphysics 3.5, (Burnyeat, 1997), p. 56.

206

It appears that we may appreciate the peritropē as a crucial expression of the apraxia challenge. At least, if the Pyrrhonist can promote a principled suspension on whether or not the honest expression of the Pyrrhonian philosophy requires belief, since such an expression is philosophical, and so, presumably, exceedingly rational, we may expect to have allayed a general worry that rational activity could not obtain in thoroughgoing suspension.

Against any argument for dogmatism, the Pyrrhonian method we pursue is to provide ad hominem inducement towards suspension. So, too, then, with regard to the denial of the possibility of life without belief. Now, it would seem brazen, if not futile and absurd, to argue by ad hominem to the result that the dogmatist in fact does not have dogmatic beliefs. In our present dialectic, the Pyrrhonist takes the position that the dogmatist presumes to have a rational hold of some fundamental truth without violating the Modes. And it is this presumption the Pyrrhonist wishes to cure the dogmatist of. But we might take the method of ad hominem argument as a therapeutic method for revealing to the dogmatist her Pyrrhonian aspiration in philosophy. If we could give an intimation of such aspiration, then we might provide an inducement to suspension on the matter. If not because the dogmatist would appear to aspire to live without belief, and so be expected to envision the possibility of such a life, then because by this aspiration she turns out to share—e.g., through recognition of the norms of the Modes against hypothesis, regress, and circularity that drive the Pyrrhonist towards skepticism—in the Pyrrhonian movement towards suspension on any matter, and so on the matter of whether belief is necessary for life.

The Pyrrhonian ad hominem deployment of the Modes against dogmatism proceeds from a hypothesis that the dogmatist, in practicing philosophy, must exhibit sensitivity to the norms of her practice such that she will all along need to

207 possess some awareness of the Modes’ prohibition against arrival in discursive affirmation. Against the deployment of the peritropē, the Pyrrhonist can then go on to argue that accordingly the dogmatist may possess enough awareness from which to elicit the further awareness that under the norms of the Modes she is to let herself forgo the dogmatic belief that life is possible only for those who look away from, or otherwise purport to be no longer subject to, these norms.

Consider: We can distinguish the Pyrrhonian skeptic from, e.g., the moral nihilist who positively affirms the absence of moral facts, or the moral skeptic who has beliefs regarding other domains. For example, moral nihilists may dogmatically believe that all the facts are facts of the physical sciences, but such sciences cannot accommodate moral facts. Or they may even believe that there are no facts whatsoever—physical or otherwise, other than the fact that there are no moral facts. On the other hand, restricted moral skeptics, e.g., under the example of being dogmatic physicalists, may believe that there are physical facts, but remain open to, and so remain confounded and unsure about, how moral facts may be gathered under the physical sciences. Relative to what they believe they know, they positively affirm that they are skeptical about issues in the moral domain. All parties—Pyrrhonist, moral nihilist, restricted moral skeptic—appear initially in some way in the same boat. After all, in philosophy we suffer the demand to explain ourselves given our convictions. Any thinker who denies that she operates from any ethical doctrine, if she is to give a philosophical explanation of her activity, appears under pressure to give an alternative account of how she gets to act with engagement in the world. It might appear that the greater the relevant domain about which the nihilist or skeptic fails to have positive belief, the more work will need to be done to show the possibility of praxis absent such belief about the domain. For example, if we

208 don’t believe everyday objects such as glasses and tables obtain, how do we get to appear concerned about their arrangement; if we don’t believe there are moral facts, how do we get to send in the troops? But we should not get carried away to think the relation between the extent of skepticism and explanatory burden monotonic increasing. The thinker who suspends belief globally—i.e., who has no beliefs about any domain—may actually appear better off dialectically. Moral nihilists and restricted moral skeptics would be supposed to consider the apraxia charge worrisome, to the extent that we expect the restricted moral nihilist or moral skeptic to give a model of action that makes the worry go away. Since such moral nihilists and non-global moral skeptics believe in some further facts that make them think either that moral nihilism is true, or that restricted moral skepticism is true, it is not obvious how, just in virtue of their moral nihilism or skepticism, moral nihilists or skeptics could also be nihilists or skeptics about facts about the mechanics of human agency. Perhaps, even, they should have something to say about what constitutes honest human flourishing—it is at least not yet clear how, given their commitments, they have rejected or suspended on the normativity involved in the concepts of honesty and flourishing. Thus, they might need to have some view about whether a flourishing human life need involve belief, or, if some among these moral nihilists or skeptics are also nihilists or skeptics about facts of human agency, given that they already have theories, we might expect from these a further motivation for their nihilism or skepticism regarding this domain. Absent such, their theories of the world that engendered their moral nihilism or skepticism still stand in need of defeating the charge of apraxia by showing consistency between agency and their nihilism or skepticism. Hence a general interest of the moral nihilist or restricted moral skeptic in providing theories of how we continue on in the face of nihilism or skepticism.

209

But the Pyrrhonist does not appear to have this worry. While the dogmatist may say of the Pyrrhonist that he believes he has no beliefs, the Pyrrhonist says that, to the contrary, he does not have any theory of the world whatsoever that needs to be embroidered upon to defeat the charge of apraxia. Consider that both Sextus and Aensidemus tell us that the Pyrrhonist does not even believe that he believes nothing. This expression of such a skepticism pregnant with recursion need not be a lie: The Pyrrhonist may give voice to it in a philosophical activity he conceives honest in virtue of its flowing in accordance with the norms of the Modes against assertion. The Pyrrhonist, then, makes as if he does not make any claim that he needs to defend. In the dialectic with him, under the Modes, the burden will then be upon the dogmatist who claims that skepticism and praxis are inconsistent, to show that this is so; not on the Pyrrhonist to show that skepticism and praxis consistent.

Of course, the Pyrrhonist is supposed not out to prove anything. He just wishes to therapize, to bring about katharsis, through the activity of inquiry. Given the skeptical methodology of the Pyrrhonist, his sensibility that the dogmatist is, in the end, unconditionally sensitive to the Modes in her philosophical activity will not be offered as a dogmatism, but merely as object to lay in the balance in order to produce equipollence.

For if the person who hypothesizes is trustworthy, we will be no less trustworthy whenever we hypothe- size the opposite. PH 1.173

In turn, the liberty to so lay in the balance the Pyrrhonist thinks to afford himself by observing that the dogmatist wishes to point to a criterion for the estab-

210 lishment of the superiority of one view over another, while, once more, by the Modes, the affirmation of such a criterion is vitiated.241 From the purported result of skeptical analysis that the criterion is absent, the Pyrrhonist goes on to maintain that any view laid in the balance against whatever is cherished by the dogmatist will have no less or more dogmatic traction on the unsullied rational thinker.

Accordingly, the dogmatist—from a belief in the superiority in her hypothesis that philosophy requires belief—may deny the Pyrrhonist equal liberty for offering a hypothesis willy-nilly. The Pyrrhonist must say what he believes if he is to be taken seriously in dialectic. Or, he must offer reasons for what he says, such that under some reasonable criterion, what he says can be assessed for superiority.

We might try to be helpful by drawing from appearance a picture of the Pyr- rhonist’s reasons for his hypothesis. The Pyrrhonist takes as a sign of the dogmatist’s motivation against affirmation a pervasive awareness in dialectic of a fragmentation of perspectives on objects of contemplation. The aversion to assertion—i.e., to the thinker’s looking away from others equal to herself looking from different times or places, or, even to the thinker’s looking away from her difference from herself as she looks, over time, from different times or places—is an ingredient to the disturbance at anomaly in inchoate contemplation that draws us on into philosophy in the first place. Respect for the norms of the Modes against affirmation is a condition for philosophical inquiry.

However, the dogmatist may agree that sometimes she is sensitive to a prohibition on assertion, but only when this prohibition obtains. And it exactly does not obtain here. For here, she has arrived at the truth, and is no longer seeking: Life simply requires belief. This is something she has reason to believe. When the truth becomes evident, as it supposedly does here, the prohibition against dogmatic

241 PH 1.114-17, and, especially, 2.19-20.

211 assertion dissolves. The dogmatist is no longer a lover of wisdom here, but, in fact, wise.

Perhaps, by the by, our present rendition of the dialectic should suffice to bring about suspension in some, after all. If the dogmatic interlocutor possesses sufficient modesty to wonder whether she is indeed wise, or cannot otherwise help but cast herself in all domains as a lover of wisdom rather than as having already arrived in its embrace, she will see that she is still engaged in dialectic with curiosity, puzzlement, and wonder, and so operates in interaction with an opposing view—in this case, first, that the Modes vitiate any sort of arrival in a criterion for determining when the Modes do not vitiate arrival. But then, in recognition of her interaction with a view that takes the norms of the Modes as inexorable, she might see that the settling of her dispute in her favor requires, in the end, the straightforward assertion that they are not inexorable; in her opponent’s favor that they are. But if she remains curious about what the fact of the matter is, she will have no reason to already accept one view over the other. And so she will suspend, and remain inquisitive. Then, from suspension on whether the Modes are inexorable, she may go on to suspend on whether there obtains a criterion for the determination of whether or not praxis and skepticism are consistent. And from this suspension, she will suspend on whether life without belief is possible.

So far, we may summarize as follows: The Pyrrhonist says, for the sake of laying in the balance, that the dogmatist is operating in bad faith when she asserts in philosophical dialectic that human agency requires belief, since the dogmatist, by engaging in dialectic, is unconditionally sensitive to the force of the Modes, such that her assertion is the result of her looking away from what she takes as normative conditions on her doing philosophy at all.

212 The dogmatist, on the other hand, thinks to tip the balance in her favor by the assertion that the Pyrrhonist is in bad faith when she says in philosophical dialectic that she has no beliefs, since expression in dialectic must be honest, and so in belief. The Pyrrhonist wishes that her interlocutor step back, and see that both views are laid in the balance without a criterion for judging which has the greater weight. The dogmatist wishes that her interlocutor stop fleeing to a higher order point of view of his activity in dialectic with her, and acknowledge that in the expression of a particular appreciation of the dialectical situation—e.g., that equipollence obtains between the dogmatic and skeptical positions regarding whether or not there is a criterion for judging whether or not equipollence obtains—he is expressing a belief. The dogmatist, seeing the balance already in her favor, asserts that the Pyrrho- nist must be asserting. But there appears no fact that she could lay in the balance as proof against the Pyrrhonist’s sensibility of herself as just acting honestly in rationality by following the Modes towards suspension on the criterion in giving expression to her skepticism.

If we wished to say more to becalm the dogmatist, given the foregoing, we would not be doing so with an express wish to see the balance tip in favor of the Pyrrhonian way. For what criterion could we employ to see this? But this does not mean that we could not attempt to bring about equipollence in the dogmatist with regard to the matter at hand. For the dogmatist still thinks that there are, by some criterion, good arguments and bad arguments, or good observations and not so good, such that her reception of a supposedly good argument may sway her. Since what is at stake is the right to prefer one hypothesis over another so as to assert it, and the Pyrrhonian aim in all conditions is equipollence, if we propose an argument in order to becalm her, it will be to sway her away from her dogmatism

213 that the philosopher in her exercise must invoke that right, and towards a sensibility that the argument before her is as weightless as any other.

214 Intimations of dogmatic desire for skepticism

We offer the dogmatist a cure by speaking to her dogmatic sensibility. We argue by ad hominem with her for the preferability of skepticism, and so we attempt to reveal to her her affinity for suspension. Or: We want to show how her predilection for rational activity under the Modes expresses itself in her dogmatism as a predilection for suspension. This will be the kind of exercise we will later pursue with vigor when we de- pict Platonism as Pyrrhonism: The Platonic dogmatist pursues a transcendence that is ultimately achieved in skepticism. But, we said, we wish to avoid leaving our dogmatic interlocutor with the impression that such pursuit is the folly of some lesser dogmatism she happens to disagree with. To that end, in the spirit of offering material for further skeptical reflection, let us introduce the kind of consideration we will pursue in our treatment of Plato- nism by limning a general intimation of skeptical tendency in the epistemologies of the main dogmatic opponents of the Pyrrhonist.

A bad faith may be diagnosed in the radical empiricist from a tension between, on the one hand, her retreat towards appearance as criterion for judgment, and on the other, her insistence that the appearance represents an object. We might find the tension manifest first in Socrates’ remark against Protagore- an empiricism in the Theaetetus: If appearance is Heraclitean flux, knowledge cannot be of appearance, since we cannot generate a unified object for judgment from just a series of temporally distinct appearances.242 Plutarch, a Platonist with skeptical affinities, later brings this complaint against the Epicureans:

215 So, too what they call confirmation (epimaturēsis) and disproval (antimaturēsis) [by the senses] has no bearing on sense perception, but on opinion (doxa). So that if they urge us to follow these in making declaration about the external object, they make the verdict of opinion concern the being, but that of sensation the appearance, and thus transfer the power of judging what is altogether unhidden (alēthēs) to what often slips away. Plutarch, Against Colotes 1121E243

In Pyrrhonism, appearance is just the criterion for activity, while this criterial function of appearance need not run through dogmatic judgment. The dogmatic insistence that appearance reveals an object—and is criterion for the truth of judgment about that object—is supposed to set dogmatic empiricism apart from the Pyrrhonian philosophy.244 And the judgment that an object obtains—that it exists, that these properties of it exist—is to provide the necessary ingredient for agency the skeptic is said to fail to acknowledge. But the ideal act of judgment in a radical empiricism appears to be grounded just in the material of appearance. For the Epicurean, ideal judgment would result from an attending to appearance purified of judgment. But then, the ideal scientific act—that of judgment—appears idealized as devoid of judgment. In other words, empiricism appears to contain an idealization of skeptical contemplative activity.

On the other hand, we might find in the philosophers of the Academy and Stoa as mark of disturbance at being trapped under the Modes an explicit desire to transcend the open-endedness of dialectical exchange between perspectives.245

242 Theaetetus 179c-183c. 243 See (Asmis, 1999), p. 285. Cf. AM 7.211-16, DL 10.34. 244 The distinction is made with special effort—vide the lengths Sextus goes to at the end of the first book of the Outlines to distinguish the prima facie congenial philosophy of Protagoras and Cynics from Pyrrhonism. 245 We might wish to accentuate a contrast here between radical empiricism and rationalism: The Stoic and Academic fall short of knowledge in virtue of a failure to reveal to themselves innate intuitions of the world by which they get to see it aright.

216 The thinker appears to pursue a radical epistemic transformation, from being a believer incapable of concluding dialectic, to a knower—where knowledge is not understood as a noble species of belief. Knowledge, being an altogether different epistemic species, would somehow escape being an object for the Modes’ prohibition against belief. The Platonist’s contemplative ideal ascends from belief to ineffable noēsis of the Forms.246 Belief is an inferior epistemic attitude proper only towards the images of being we encounter as objects in the tenebrous world of becoming. And the Stoics set themselves as epistemic end an aspirational ideal of overcoming the regressive demand for justification through arrival in epistēmē—a stable consciousness of true cognition (katalēpsis) with regard to the objects of the world of becoming, such that it is unmoved by logos.247 The idealized sage supposedly can know, e.g., that this is Castor and not Polydeuces,248 irrespective of any skeptical challenges that may come her way over the course of her life.249 But there is nothing in between virtue and vice for the Stoic.250 But any actual Stoic, as he is now, and will always be, appears at best ever inches below a surface, emersion from which would make for an emancipation from opinion towards knowledge.251 And so he is, by lights of his aspiration, ever drowning.252

In pursuit of her epistemic ideal, the dogmatist appears to pursue a manner of existence which is both apparently no less unfamiliar or surd than the Pyrrhonian

Even if we speak loosely here, of course, we may doubt we do well to place the Stoic among the rationalist. For a recent defense of Stoicism as rationalism through an analysis of Stoic prolēpsis as given a priori: (Dyson, 2009), pp.146-151. 246 The ineffability interpretation is controversial. 247 For example, AM 7.151 ff, Stobaeus, 2.73-74, 111-12, Academica 2.145. See LS 41. 248 But compare AM 7.402-10 and Academica 2.57. In the latter, the sage of the Stoic is said to refrain from distinguishing or identifying things when he experiences similar things he cannot tell apart. 249 AM 7.410. 250 DL 7.127. 251 Consider the reluctance in the Stoic to declare anyone sage. For example, Academica, 2.145, Alexander, On fate 199.14-22.

217 way, and equally devoid of an embrace in good faith of the dogmatic attitude of belief. The dogmatist says either: “Perception is knowledge,” so that it appears that if she ever would come to possess knowledge by concentration on perception, since sheer perception vitiates the construction of objects for dogmatic judgment, knowledge would be free from dogmatic belief. Or she even says explicitly: “We do not have knowledge of this world; then we must have belief.” But her idealization of knowledge vitiates any righteous embrace of belief, and, indeed, has her wanting to be rid of it. But if she can’t have knowledge, and doesn’t want belief, skepticism appears to remain her only genuine end.

From these few remarks, we may perhaps already see how an etiology of rashness in the dogmatist might be given through examination of how the dogmatist— despite her declared wish for knowledge which, by liberating her of opinion, would eradicate in her a fundamental shortcoming—hangs on to belief half- heartedly.

252 Plutarch, On common perceptions, 1063a-b.

218 Introduction to the question of ataraxia through epochē

…when Tiresias saw Athena wholly naked, she made him blind by covering his eyes with her hands. But when Charilco begged her to restore his power of sight, she was unable to do this. So, by purging his ears she made him present to all the sounds of birds… Pseudo-Apollodorus, Bibliotheca, 3.6.7

Our vindication of Pyrrhonism, we said, would in the end have to come about by addressing the question of the relation between epochē and ataraxia. We conclude our prelude to this question with an introduction of it in the context of what we have said so far. By consolidating the foregoing, we wish to bring into focus the nature of the work that remains outstanding.

First, we may have made some progress towards allaying the worry that the ataraxic life might be insipid, boring, selfish, and so forth, so that it would not seem a stretch to think that ataraxia could be telos. Our ad hominem analysis of philosophy tout court revealed a pursuit of the experience of ataraxia; but we noticed that in dogmatism this experience is considered but one way in which the philosopher may measure her arrival; another appears to be the assessment of her attaining the particular philosophical ends she has set herself under her dogmatism (e.g., virtue, pleasure, or wisdom). These two observations taken together give us a dogmatic appreciation of the experience of ataraxia as the experience of the agent who lives well under the correct dogmatism for the world. The dogmatist may not disagree with a conception of ataraxia as telos, but rather with the manner in which ataraxia is supposed to be attained. The Pyrrhonist gives the end as ataraxia in epochē. Because she gives the possibility of the attainability of tranquility in absence of any dogmatism, the dogmatist, irrespective her dogmatism, will balk. The sort of tranquility the Pyrrhonist

219 pursues is attainable in a life without dogmatic principle. But then, on a Pyrrhoni- an conception of the absence of necessary concomitants of ataraxia, the end of philosophy would appear to be attainable by the lad who filches from his mother’s wallet to procure the lotos. In reply, we said that we must then defer assessment of the Pyrrhonian claim that ataraxia is telos until we have assessed the way in which ataraxia is supposed to go hand in hand with epochē.

Second, in our treatment of the peritropē and the charge of rational apraxia we saw how the dogmatist would wish to know how a life without belief might fail to be beastly or confused. The Pyrrhonist does not appear to live like an animal, for she philosophizes. Moreover, in espying therapy through philosophy, the philosophical dogmatist insists that value comes our way through rational activity. In other words, the good life, according to the philosophical dogmatist, takes as a salient ingredient the activity of philosophizing. So we asked how philosophical activity could obtain in skepticism. And we replied, not by giving a straightforward positive account of how we might philosophize in thoroughgoing skepticism, but by a rather formal ad hominem analysis of the dialectical context in which the dogmatist brings the peritropē. By this analysis, we argued that the dogmatist appears no less conflicted than as he thinks the Pyrrhonist to be through the peritropē. Where the Pyrrhonist is said to deny his believing, and so, if she is honest, must believe, the dogmatist is said to be sensitive to her irrationality in assenting to her propositions as if they were in any way secure. And we argued this with the aim of laying a sensibility of this conflict in the balance against his dogmatic commitment to the peritropē, in order that we might purge him of this commitment, and bring him to suspension on the matter.

220 In the Pyrrhonian analysis we offer of the psuchē of the philosopher, the dogmatist is shown tolerant of all sorts of hidden inconsistencies, such that she is allowed to plod on in confusion. For example: Formally, she feels the force of the Modes without mitigation, but the source of her disease is a conviction that she has escaped them. There is no guarantee that any effect of a formal exercise such as the one we have just performed will manage to settle her. By the exercise, we have tried to provide her with Pyrrhonian awareness of her dialectical situation in abstraction. But in its abstraction, the exercise appears fit to be just either preliminary to further Pyrrhonian work, or the beginning of a conclusion to it. Preliminary to further work in priming the dogmatist for this work’s reception by providing it with an epistemological context that puts under pressure the appeal to self-evidence in the presumption to have successfully turned the tables on the Pyrrhonist. Conclusive to such work in providing a sketch of the structure and movement of the Pyrrhonian consciousness in increasingly abstracted suspensive reflection. If in the end, by the absence of a criterion, it may be formally redundant to actually lay a particular alternative in the balance against the dogmatic denigration of Pyrrhonism, before we can come to terms with the abstract formalities, we must cater to the idiosyncrasy of our patient (i.e., of other dogmatists, the dogmatist within us) and purport to lay in the balance a picture of the suspensive life through which, under a dogmatic sensibility, we may appreciate viscerally, not formally, its possibility. We want to see the Pyrrhonist alive, moving about.253

So far, the Pyrrhonist perhaps will have only managed to show the dogmatist that he is in danger of being no better off than the Pyrrhonist. As long as the Pyrrhonist has not overcome the dogmatic sentiment that she, in setting ataraxia through epochē as end, gives up on rational seeking, and so, on seeking to live by

221 truth, the dogmatist may remain repulsed by any analysis of his own philosophical activity which shows that he, too, pursues tranquility as final end and seeks to escape the attitude of belief. Even if the dogmatist comes to allow the Pyrrhonist to concoct a formal argument against the impossibility of a human life without belief, an expectation may remain that such a life will be, if not confused, then lethargic or beastly, carried out intuitively, never from reflection or principle.

In this persistent expectation of the dogmatist, the Pyrrhonist may appear to find in an animal intuition the practical resources required for the survival of the organic body, or in surrender to her socialization a passive complicity in the expression of the body politic, but she is never the head of the body. The Pyrrhonist gives us at best the human as happy pig. At worst a befuddled Cyclops who knows nothing better to do with an olive tree than use it for a club. Either live as slaves subject to contingencies. They appear blind to the nature of the world, and to an appearance of its ethical and practical dimensions and, hence, its opportunities available for operating in the world for the good. From the dogmatic point of view the Pyrrhonist wishes to address, philosophy is the kind of rational activity that sets the human apart from the animal, such that skeptical philosophy, being at best an invitation to a devolution towards the animal, pursues the impossibility of the rational forfeit of rationality. The dogmatist, in his appreciation of this impossibility, casts the Pyrrhonist as retrograde. As she is engaged in the indiscriminate destruction of the sciences by promoting suspension upon their axioms and theorems, the Pyrrhonist eventually eviscerates the rational faculty in order to effect her own exile from the best of us—i.e., from those who move out towards enlightenment through the pursuit of the facts, and through the shaping of the world in light of them.

253 As Socrates wished to see the polis of the Republic come alive.

222 Love of wisdom, we said, is considered by the dogmatist an essential constitu- ent to the good life. Love of wisdom is the supreme expression of the rational animal. But the Pyrrhonist is intent on obliterating this love by wishing to destroy the desire for truth manifest in disturbance about philosophical anomaly by eradicating the condition for the pursuit of its object—belief.

According to the Pyrrhonist, ataraxia follows epochē like a shadow.254 Then, the Pyrrhonist may feel that qua technique her dialectical work should be done once she has presented, quite generally, the Modes as equipollence against a commitment to a criterion that could pronounce upon the viability of the skeptical life. But her philanthropy (towards others who are dogmatists, as well as towards herself in moments of her own dogmatic intoxication) may motivate her to try to reach out further and provide the dogmatist with an alternative account of human life lived without belief to lay in the balance against any persistent revulsion we have just sketched.

Our general aim in the provision of such an account, we said, would be to illustrate how a life without belief could be ataraxic. And in providing this illustration, we work in the understanding that we must sketch the suspensive life by ad hominem as ataraxic in a way that appears attractive to the dogmatist. In order to ease the dogmatist into the Pyrrhonian life, we have to show the dogmatist how Pyrrhonism facilitates a way of suspensive living that is appreciable to the dogmatist. The dogmatist must come to appreciate as skeptical the performance of behaviors of the Pyrrhonist which the dogmatist thinks indicative of dogmatism—e.g., her acting from philanthropy in philosophy, her announcing her skepticism, her investigating under the norms of the science she engages in. And he must be able to see how the Pyrrhonist participates in the sort of activities

223 the dogmatist cherishes. Or: He must be able to appreciate under skepticism the place of, and value of the life he has lived so far.

We do not, then, want just to give the possibility of a life without belief formally, but show such a life attractive to the dogmatist. We began our attempt towards our end of giving a viscerally appreciable suspensive life by moving on from a formal discussion of the dialectical situation to a general discussion of how in dogmatic epistemology we may find reason to think that the dogmatist seeks to transcend belief, just as the Pyrrhonist does. It is this sort of exercise we wish to continue: If we can show Pyrrhonism in the content of the doctrine of the dogmatist, we can show Pyrrhonism a live option for the dogmatist.

In the beginning we made in this exercise—a brief sketch of dogmatic aspirations of epistemic transcendence of dogmatic belief—we presumed that our work must concern itself with an analysis of the transformative progress the dogmatist hopes to make through her philosophy. All wish to ascend to tranquility, supposedly. The Epicurean, then, through ideal judgment resulting from an attending to appearance purified of judgment. The Stoic in epistēmē. The Platonist in noēsis. Analogously, we find the Pyrrhonist saying that she arrives in ataraxic skepticism as a resolution to her dogmatic inquiry.

According to the Pyrrhonist, the problems of dogmatism are overcome by skepticism. For the thinker to have a sensibility of such arrival in skepticism from dogmatism, it would stand to reason that we would be able to describe his aspirations in dogmatism such that if he were to become a skeptic, he would recognize their fulfillment.

254 PH 1.29.

224 Then, if we were to bring about that moment in which the thinker is argued from dogmatism into skepticism, our task would be well served if we could bring out this sensibility, and show that already present within the thinker’s sensibility is the aspiration for skepticism. But our problem appears that, at the same time, the thinker moving from dogmatism to skepticism supposedly undergoes a metamorphosis which reveals a sensibility that is wholly alien to those she leaves behind. Hence a fundamental antagonism between the skeptic and any sort of dogmatist. Accordingly, the skeptical transformation appears to be a philosophical ascent from the familiar to the extraordinary. Just as, e.g., the Stoic sage in epistēmē, or the Platonist’s sage in noēsis, the Pyrrhonist’s sage becomes blind to an old way of seeing, but gains some new faculty.

Indeed, the Pyrrhonist appears to openly embrace a conception of skepticism as transformative, ascendant philosophy.

And, in turn, just as it is not impossible that the person who by a ladder ascends to a lofty position overturns the ladder with the foot after the ascent, so it is not unreasonable for the skeptic, having arrived (chōrēsanta) at the fixed solution (epi tēn kataskeuēn) of the question before him (tou prokeimenou) by, as it were, scaling a ladder (ōs dia tinos epibathras) of the argument showing the non-existence of proof (tou deikuntos logou to mē einai apodeixin), to then con- fute this very argument. AM 8.481

Wittgenstein’s famous line in the Tractatus of kicking away the ladder is de- rivative of Sextus depiction here of the Pyrrhonist who, as a result of his dialectic,

225 comes to give up on a dogmatic appreciation of the results of his dialectic, and thereby ascends to some elevation at which he no longer stands in needs of this appreciation.

Now, earlier, we set ourselves as a goal the task of exhibiting methodology by running on Platonism our Pyrrhonian ad hominem experiment of showing skepticism in dogmatism. And we hinted at a variety of reasons for thinking Platonism a good first candidate for this sort of exercise: the depiction of Socrates as skeptic; the datum that Arcesilaus brought Pyrrhonism into the Academy, the Platonic conception of psychological harmony in practical and contemplative activity as telos. In continuing our account, our intent would be to show such harmony is brought about under Platonism, where we understand skepticism the driving force behind Platonism. At least, as we wish to give an ad hominem conception of ataraxia in epochē, in this way we would aim to show a vision of the possibility of rational activity in attainment of skepticism, and the attainment of tranquility in such activity.

We should now then be looking for methodological isomorphism between dogmatic Platonism and the Pyrrhonism we hope to show Platonic. We might start with what is perhaps a triviality, if all philosophy is aspirational and so desires something different: Like Wittgenstein and Sextus, the Platonist also explicitly embraces a conception of his philosophy as ascendant towards radical transformation. Regarding the notion of philosophy as ascension, compare, e.g., Sextus’ remarks above with Socrates’ depiction of the philosophical progress of the lover

226 from loving an individual body in the world of becoming to loving beauty itself in the Platonic realm in the Symposium as an ascent up a ladder.255 Regarding the notion of such ascension leading to radical transformation, consider the images in the Republic of the philosopher blinded by the light upon being dragged up out of the Cave, unattuned to the dark when forced back down.

But then, we may begin to discern a route ahead. Our account of ataraxia in epochē would have to be an account of suspensive tranquility in rational activity by ad hominem analysis of dogmatism. But our model of the dogmatist in rational activity is one in which the thinker seeks to ascend towards radical transformation. But, also, our appreciation of the Pyrrhonian end of arrival in epochē is of such transformation. By the ad hominem, we wish to analyze for skepticism in the dogmatist. Then, we might investigate the nature of the rational transformation the dogmatist gropes to experience in her ascendant rational activity, to see if this experience could be that of suspension.

We will have to show the suspensive aspiration in the Platonic methodology. We will have much to say about how for the Platonist the final move in her ascent is not unlike the activity of kicking the ladder of her ascent away. In the end, the Platonist experiences in contemplation an unmitigated drive generated by skeptical consideration towards suspension. But if this were correct, we would have to see how the antecedent rational moves in the Platonic ascent lend themselves to her arrival at this move: The philosophical activity antecedent to the move towards suspension is performed under dogmatism—that is, with the confidence of the dogmatist in her progress, or, at least, in her notion of progress’ being ultimately towards her attainment of

255 Symposium 210a-211b and AM 8.481.

227 discursive insight into the truth. But on our reconstruction, this activity will turn out to be towards something altogether different—suspension. It would seem, then, that we have to give an account of the value of this antecedent activity under skepticism. We have to imagine ourselves going back, and looking with skeptical appreciation at the antecedent activities whose dogmatic performance once prepared us for skepticism.

We will take it that the Platonic trajectory for philosophical ascent runs from a propaedeutic move away from the everyday through the study of mathematics to dianoia and on to noēsis of the Platonic Forms. Then, to find isomorphism between Platonism and skepticism, we might give an account of the value of our study in mathematics and metaphysics under skepticism. For example, what is the value of the study of geometry under skepticism?

We might take this particular question as preliminary material for our exposition of the Pyrrhonian way—i.e., of the possibility of tranquil suspensive rational activity.

First, our giving a Pyrrhonian reconstruction of the role of the study of geometry in skepticism would give us a picture of the skeptical thinker revisiting geometry. (Revisiting, because any skeptical treatment of geometry would be from the new perspective of skepticism, rather than the old of dogmatism.) But so it would give us a picture of a thinker in rational activity in a field of science without dogmatic commitment. But this was our first difficulty: imagining the Pyrrhonist in any way prone to the necessary activity of scientific inquiry without dogmatism.

228 Our further difficulty is to see such skeptical rational activity as not confused or degenerate, but valuable and generative of tranquility. We want to see the Pyrrhonist in a suspension and tranquility we find attractive. Now, we take it that the value of the lower science is in Platonism revealed through higher contemplation. In this higher contemplation value tout court is revealed to the thinker. And we argue that this value is experienced in the experience of tranquility. For example, in the Republic’s account of the philosopher’s ascent from the Cave, mathematical contemplation is valuable in providing a dianoetic image of reality, and the vision of this image provides a route for intimation with the Form of the Good. And this intimation will on our account come in the experience of ataraxia. Then, under isomorphism from ad hominem: If we gave the value of skeptical geometry, we would end up giving the value of skeptical science in abstraction, towards the higher thought—as given, e.g., by a move towards mereological contemplation in general from doing geometry. But we would have to give the value of the ascent towards abstraction not qua dogmatic arrival in contemplation of the principle of reality, but qua skeptical contemplation in, at least, equal abstraction. We will give the aspirations of the dogmatic philosopher as driving the thinker in the end—ergo, for the Platonist, after she ascends from mathematics to contemplation of the principles of reality, and comes to glimpse the Form of the Good— to become absorbed in antinomy, naked to the drive towards skepticism and, so, the experience of suspension. In skeptical contemplation at this altitude, the thinker comes to exhibit the homeostatic experience we have given before of ataraxia as euroia. For this was the experience sought after by the philosopher.

229 Our account of suspensive tranquility will be given through an account of how skeptical geometry is done in and for the sake of wonder, and of how the experience of wonder is the experience of ataraxia. Aristotle has it that philosophy begins in wonder and ends in knowledge, but the Pyrrhonist says that nothing is resolved. We remain zetetic in skepticism. The Pyrrhonian question is not asked in confusion, boredom, or contrarian spite, but in wonder. But the experience of the Pyrrhonist is supposed to be tranquil. So, the experience of wonder is supposed the experience of ataraxia.

But we have given ataraxia as the experience of homeostasis, self-sufficiency, sanctity and beauty. Let us take sanctity first, and consider how the philosopher in suspension might be imbued with a sort of holiness. A consideration, we might add, not altogether ridiculous, if we remember that the aim of philosophy is supposed to be our transformation towards divinity. Then, why not imagine the ascended philosopher imbued in this way?

We might venture something like this: The experience of thoroughgoing inquiry is the experience of wonder. But wonder is a sensibility of the mysterious. To the latter: In wonder, something other than what we think is present in us for us, absorbed, to wonder at.

This presence is invoked as divinity by Sappho through prayer in the garden. It is invoked by the dogmatist through rational petition of the ultimate propositions which reveal the coherent unfolding of reality under laws. We seek to see homeostasis in the world by looking for its unfolding under laws expressive of the principle.

230 In this activity, we seek to capture the mystery of the world. If in our dogmatic perfection we would no longer wonder, still, we have captured the object of our wonder through our possession of the proposition. In our discursive science, we will have become aligned with the object of our wonder. In this alignment, as we see the world unfold effortlessly, so does our rational contemplation. It is invoked by the skeptic through surrender to the norms of rationality towards an experience of antinomy. The challenge that the suspensive life would be boring can be equally brought against the ideal dogmatic life. Philosophy seeks divine homoiōsis. But a god surely is in awe of herself—at least to the extent that she is drawn further into her self-perpetuating activity. Consider, e.g.: Aristotle’s god as thought thinking itself. But if the dogmatist’s survey of her domain is without wonder, she must be far from being a god. In inquiry, the Pyrrhonist seeks to live in the balance—neither confused by ignorance, or bored in presumption. She seeks to act spontaneously, in accordance with the norms of rationality, towards increasing awareness. And recognition of her situation comes in concentration on antinomy. In talking, on each occasion, she seeks to let go of as much as she can. Under the laws against hypothetical, regressive, and recursive affirmation, she does not wish to struggle against antinomy, but to embrace it. She seeks to shed any pre-conceived notions we have gladly. For example: “I think, therefore I am.” This subtractive exercise of the skeptic, when followed, is performed liberally, without need for confirmation, or fear of being shown a fool—even if she would be happier to find a friend. It is performed homeostatically, in flowing along with the norms of the Modes. Their inexorability has us consider our expression in the light of them, and they drive us from affirmation to regress and recursion. But such consideration, if it is to be easy-flowing and without undue effort under the Modes, then not by affirmation—as such would violate them—but by question.

231 And in this skeptical subtractive exercise we are in awe of the remainder.

Naturally, as our exercise is towards suspensive ataraxia, it will do no good to describe this ascent so as to convince. We must bring it about. We will then have to show the ataraxic and euroic experience in this sort of inquiry, after the value of geometry, and upwards. Or: Let us perform an exercise to bring the experience we talk about about.

Under Platonism we see the beginning of ascent in geometry, its end in contemplation of the Good. Our methodology of demonstrating the possibility, and so value, of skeptical inquiry, being under constraints of finitude, will focus on these points of departure and arrival as constraints upon our account of Pyrrhonian ascent. If we are to conceive of skepticism as a final move in the philosopher’s ascent by taking seriously the claim that suspension is the ultimate transcendent movement in rational contemplation, and we wish to exhibit this ascension in Platonism, we would do well to gain an understanding of what the Platonic ascent is supposed to be towards. And we can only gain an appreciation of the direction of the ascent if we understand where the ladder is supposed to start, and how it moves up.

We will consider the value of geometric inquiry under skepticism in appreciation of a Platonist conception of the objects and study of geometry as anticipatory of the objects and study of further ontology. But the underlying value that lends value to the study of geometry will need to be presented in an appreciation of rationally experiencing tout court. (For naturally: What of the value of the study of physics? Or of epistemology?)

232 We are driven to give an account of the experience of value in rational activity, and, because of our seriousness as we engage in this activity,256 at the same time, to give an account of the value of our activity tout court. And as altitude increases in our consideration of how we could give an account of such a thing, we struggle to see our description of value and our experience of value collapse into one. The best we can do here is attend to our discursive activity, and, in our eddy, seek for a beacon towards satisfaction. We must give Platonic philosophy as in the end aspirational of suspension. And we must give a projection of the experience of suspension as ataraxic.

256 What is seriousness?

233 Sketch 6: Problems in Pyrrhonian Science

234 Recapitulation of our method for vindication of Pyrrhonism

Imagine we want to share with the Pyrrhonist the sensibility that the experience of ataraxia is to be the singular experience of the accomplished philosopher. We want to come to relax our epistemological opposition to Pyrrhonism, and suspend on the possibility of rational activity without belief. Then, in anticipation of a vindication of Pyrrhonism, as long as we remain dogmatists, we will wish to see how the Pyrrhonist might act in ataraxic suspension in accordance with some ideal we persist in holding up for ourselves in our dogmatism.

Especially, given that we are dogmatists, and philosophers to boot, we will, in holding up this ideal, insist that the Pyrrhonist in her life engage in philosophical inquiry after the truth, whatever it is. And so we will wonder about the possibility of a thoroughgoing suspensive science. This sort of consideration, we might think quite decisive. If we could give a principled account of ataraxic suspensive science, since we would be giving the possibility of supremely rational activity in tranquil suspension, we could, it seems, put to bed for any domain the worry that the Pyrrhonist could not act calmly, rationally and purposefully. That is, if the material of thought offers the same kind of inertia as that we wish to overcome in the material world.

In an attempt at providing vindication of Pyrrhonism in face of the challenge that we show the Pyrrhonist acting rationally, purposefully and equanimously in accordance with dogmatic ideals, our aim is to put the Pyrrhonist in good company by situating him in the Academy. We aim to give skepticism as the filone aureo in Platonic inquiry, running from propaedeutic mathematical contemplation to noēsis.

235 Straightforwardly, our presumption is that if we manage to give Platonism as skepticism, the dogmatic Platonist will come to appreciate Pyrrhonism: She will come to see the Pyrrhonist exhibit suspensive rational activity which meets the norm for virtue or wisdom she held up for herself under a dogmatic appreciation of Platonism. Further, our exercise is one of a proof of methodology. We hope as a result of our showing Platonism a skepticism that the dogmatic opponents to Platonism, by their concerned opposition to and struggle with Platonism, come to engage with skepticism where they would perhaps have earlier taken it with a grain of salt, and walked off. Perhaps, in reflection upon how we showed Platonism a Pyrrhonism, they will consider how their dogmatism might undergo similar analysis.

Our method is the presentation of an equipollent view of skepticism as Plato- nism for laying in the balance against dogmatic Platonism. And this for the sake of laying something in the balance against a denigration of skepticism. We aim to generate this view by ad hominem. We might give as motivation for our calling our analysis ‘ad hominem’ an apparent demand of the Pyrrhonist to refrain, as much she can, from giving a metaphysics, ethics, or epistemology of her own as superior for laying in the balance against dogmatism. Whatever is laid in the balance against dogmatism better not gain its weight from its being pushed downward by an assertion of its correctness. In the end, of course, since her ad hominem analysis of the dogmatist is given in opposition to dogmatism, it will seem that she must be presenting her analysis as a viable object for laying in the balance with an affirmative accentuation—in other words, in a dogmatic music. Her aim, then, will be to minimize the need for such accentuation. The need for such accentuation is a mark of how she is still at odds with the dogmatist. If this is inevitable, still, she will wish to draw her opponent as near to her as she can.

236 Perhaps, ad hominem analysis is condition for any decent philosophical interaction. If we should inquire about the world, then surely we must inquire foremost about each other, and especially about how we might come to some agreement about the world that allows us a share vision with each other. In any case, the Pyrrhonist, seeking to have no dogmatic view of her own, might seek to bring her friend near by presenting him with an image of himself as sympathetic to her. In this, if we must, there is a logic: Dogmatism obtains iff it is not Pyrrhonian skepticism. But the conditions of skepticism are necessary for dogmatism. The Pyrrhonist seeks ataraxia through suspensive inquiry. Anything else the dogmatist offers as additional characterization of our end so as to secure his dogmatic attitude after all, would come in a negation of dogmatism’s further conditions.

To return to our attempt: The view derived by ad hominem for presentation is of skepticism as transcendent movement in Platonic ascent. We must then show the viability of Platonic education which draws along the student in this ascent— from slave-boy to sage—in the context of the conception of skepticism as its terminus.

So as to see the Pyrrhonist in Platonic activity, our demeanor is that of the dogmatist in the enactment of Pyrrhonian therapy. As we aim to enact the therapy, we must present the view by an attempt to imagine ourselves in the ascent. For example, we imagine ourselves on our way up the route from mathematical contemplation to contemplation of the Forms, as set out in Platonic education. Therapeutically, if we still possess the dogmatic sensibility on our journey, if Pyrrhonism is the completion of dogmatic Platonism, we will remain cut off from our goal. And a most intractable obstacle to our ascent would be our persistent inability to see the attraction of skepticism. Our expectation that the skeptical life is degenerate compared to a life of rational dogmatism will vitiate our trading in

237 our desire after a dogmatic affinity with the Forms for some sort of skeptical meditation.

In order to address this difficulty, we start with a Pyrrhonian appreciation of the supposed progress the dogmatist has made in her approach to skepticism by ascent up this route. That is, we will try to promote a Pyrrhonian understanding of the value of the philosophical progress the dogmatist has made so far through rational inquiry. We do this, first, to show the dogmatist the value of her intellectual life so far: It has been propaedeutic to skepticism. In giving skeptical context to her dogmatic efforts, we wish to provide the dogmatist with the power to imagine what the Platonic philosopher who has arrived in skeptical contemplation might be like. We give a skeptical appreciation of the history of her education from which she might extrapolate into the future for an experience of tranquility in suspension. Such showing, we presume, might make it easier for the dogmatist to let go of her dogmatism when the time comes.

238 Pyrrhonian skepticism and scientific nihilism

Furthermore, if anyone thinks that what follows upon what he hypothesizes is trustworthy, perhaps he makes away with all inquiry. Sextus Empiricus, AM 3.11

So writes Sextus at the beginning of Against the Geometers. Well, would we not be curious after the possibility and value of a genuinely skeptical geometry in which trust in hypothesis has been overcome? In considering the possibility and value of such inquiry, we must consider our quote in light of the aim the Pyrrhonist envisions such inquiry to pursue. And Sextus writes in appreciation of the sensibility of his ancient interlocutors that any activity in inquiry is worthwhile only in virtue of its ethical function. In this appreciation, the Pyrrhonian skeptic offers as ethical end of inquiry the experience of ataraxia. Moreover, while those who pursue philosophy dogmatically may think to find ataraxia in rest from inquiry through the possession of an affirmable, the Pyrrhonist says that the experience pursued is found not through affirmation, but through suspension of judgment. Ataraxia is not attained in any straightforward contemplative arrival. Pyrrhonian epistemology tracks this philosophical premium on the deferral of affirmation: In the first book of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus says that of all those who purport to practice philosophy only the skeptic is truly zētētikos, i.e., philosophically inquisitive. All others, by embracing some ground for their philosophical stance as given, cut themselves off from inquiry.257 This source of this sentiment we might trace to the generalities of Pyrrhonian virtue epistemology: By the skeptical Modes, genuine inquiry obtains only under

257 PH 1.2-4, 7.

239 norms against bold, regressive, or circular affirmation. And so it seems we must we never rest complacent, and always investigate further what presents itself to us as given. Affirmation of ground violates the norms for inquiry, and so curtails and vitiates it.

Accordingly, the Pyrrhonist offers arguments pertinent to a particular discipline such as geometry with the aim of suspension of judgment with regard to the propositions of that discipline. Furthermore, as we will see, the Pyrrhonist is wont to proceed by attacking the general conditions for the scientific discipline under investigation first, and only then its professed axioms and theorems. As a result we may gain the impression that the Pyrrhonist is out to destroy the discipline, and not really engaged with it. By denying himself affirmation of the principles of the discipline, the Pyrrhonist renders himself blind to the potential of the discipline to provide insight, and so is not inquisitive at all. Inquiry obtains within a science, and a science obtains on the condition of affirmation of its principles and end. Without their affirmation, the thinker has neither a conception of the thing sought after or the material and method for seeking it.

But we might already see that any sensibility of outrage in this objection to an outlandish thoroughgoing skepticism would be rash. At the heart of Platonism, and, so, one way or another, of ancient philosophy tout court, we might find a preoccupation with the possibility of inquiry given that dialectic tends to bring such an aporia that it is altogether unclear what the object of our investigation is, and, hence, how we could inquire at all:

Meno: And in what manner (tropos) will you search (zētēseis), o Socrates, this thing which you do not know at all? Pray, as you select an object for inquiry from among the things you do not know, what

240 sort of thing will you seek? Or, even if you assuredly happen upon it, how will you know that this is what you had not known? Meno, 80d

A challenge which Socrates reinterprets:

Socrates: I understand what you want to say, Me- no. Do you see how by this you draw us down into eristic argument, that a man can seek neither what he knows nor what he does not know? For he cannot seek what he knows—for he knows it, and there is no need for seeking it. Nor can he seek what he does not know—for he does not see what to seek. Meno, 80e

This debater’s argument—this sophistry a frivolity rhymeful with Zeno’s: As we cannot move under rational analysis in space, we cannot move in time measured over rational inquiry. We might, at least if we accepted the presently popular chronology of Plato’s work, consider this argument the spark that had Plato begin to give a theory of Forms. Socrates replies with a metaphysics of the soul as immortal, and of knowledge as the recollection of a commensurately immaterial reality. We are given philosophical pedagogy as the eliciting of such recollection through a dialectic which will stun—like a torpedo fish a diver—the thinker from compla- cency about her opinion into wonder. And this wonder reconstructed by the pedagogue as movement towards the thinker’s renewed probing of ground in an aspiration to uncover knowledge of the stable, unchanging reality of the Platonic realm.

Then, if we are to feel in any way confident in our objection to Pyrrhonism, we will presumably have one way or another overcome Meno’s paradox.

241 Perhaps we have made progress: “Clearly we have since then come to know things about where we are headed on our way towards recollection, such that we can have—by confidence in their hypotheses—legitimate sciences such as geometry.” For example, Meno’s slave boy was set on his way to discover how to prove in propositions what he intuitively grasped in a sensibility of geometrical space. He does not yet know how to propositionalize how to calculate the area of a triangle, but he already sees that a diagonal cuts the square in half. And, if given leisure, he will discover what we already have: That the area is half the height times the base.

Any confidence in our objection to Pyrrhonian geometry may come in a sensibility that Meno’s paradox is yet one more instance of Greek frivolity. (Pyrrhonian geometry: If there is objection to the use of the phrase, we will assume that there is a difference between inquiry in geometry and inquiry into ontology of the objects of geometry. Then, we might be seen as using the phrase as shorthand for the latter.) As the thinker who finds it obvious that indeed we get out of the room overcomes the paradox of Zeno by a rush to the assertion of integration, we may one way or the other, by pointing at a self-evident epistemic experience of inquiring with confidence in our pointing to the object for inquiry, point to the fact that our inquiry proceeds from acceptance.

The Pyrrhonist claims to follow appearances in her suspensive activity. And so she might admit the possibility of acceptance, but question whether then all inquiry must proceed from dogmatism. It is this questioning that the objection finds offensive. Whatever the Pyrrhonist presumes to accept in appearance must still be accepted with confidence, and so with belief. The Pyrrhonist must believe with the confidence of the slave-boy in the content of the propositions that serve as

242 hypotheses for her science—either that they are true, or that analytical activity which takes them as operands offers progress towards the true proposition. Progress towards the true proposition: In appreciation of movement towards whatever content, the Pyrrhonist might say of her actvity: “Yes.” But in consideration of her movement in an effort at reconstructing her history as progressive, in her need to say something more, “No.” Without such belief in her history, the Pyrrhonist suffers an absence of available objects for construction of the question whose answer is set as end of inquiry. This would appear to render inquiry impossible. We can accuse the Pyrrhonist of what we may call a scientific nihilism—Pyrrhonian investigation offers no tangible rewards of progressive discovery. In fact, it is entirely set on laying waste to the field that could yield such fruit.

Under such an accusation, in light of the apparent Pyrrhonian denigration of hypothesis in geometry above, Sextus’ interest in geometry may appear exhausted by a plebeian interest in vandalism. Especially so in consideration of the thoroughgoing application of the methodology of the Pyrrhonist. The opening salvo in Sextus’ attack in Against the Geometers comes in a general attack on the method of ex hypothesi assumption at work in the mathematician’s granting herself the principles of proof and each theorem.258 It might be seen to continue with a particular attack on the coherence of the notion of the point, to one on that of the line via the foregoing educement of the problems of extension encountered in the attack on the point,259 to one on that of the plane similarly via the attack on that of the line.260

258 For the desire behind the methodology to attack the foundations: AM 3.1-20. 259 See, e.g., AM 3.33-6. And compare Sextus’ mereological consideration of the notion of line as length without breadth starting at 3.37 with his treatment of the mereological problems of the point at 3.22. 260 Cf., e.g., the problem of contiguity of points in a line, and lines in a plane, especially at AM 3.34-6 and AM 3.60-4 respectively.

243 As discussion proceeds in this way from the difficulties of the method of hypothesis to those of the first principle of the hypothetical science to those of definitions and propositions constructed upon it, Sextus will promote the sensibility that the coherence of the topic under discussion has been granted rather magnanimously.261 As the first principles of the science haven’t been granted, in pressing on with the investigation of the science, the skeptic and her interlocutor appear complicit in a flight of fancy. Such a treatment of geometry, one might think, is repetitive and, as it fails to overcome a fixation on the starting point of the discipline whose hypothesis is a condition for the science, unsurprisingly shows itself insignificant, sophistic, and ignorant of geometry’s procedures and principles.262

261 For example, AM 3.29, 37, 60; cf. PH 2.21. 262 Vide (Dye & Vitrac, 2009), p. 156, à propos of Savile and Monteluca: “[L]es arguments de Sextus sont insignifiants et purement sophistiques, et révèlent une incompréhension à peu près totale des notions et des procédures fondamentales de la géométrie.” (Cf. Henry Savile, Praelec- tiones Tresdecim in Principium Elementorum Euclidis, 157; J. F. Montucla, Histoire des Mathématiques, Book 1, 21.)

244 On the possibility and aim of skeptical inquiry in the field of geometry

…and the skeptics, a kind of nomads who abhor all settled cultivation of the ground, from time to time would pick apart the common coalition. Critique of Pure Reason, A viii

Given the foregoing, we might be tempted by a question after what the motivation is for the remark in Against the Geometers that inquiry is ever crippled by hypothesis. The remark comes in the opening attack on the method of hypothesis of geometry. The geometer, says Sextus, avails himself by the method of hypothesis of principles of the science, and goes on to construct variegation upon them. Preoc- cupied with the constructive operation, he defers the investigation into the ground for the principles of the science to a further science. But the remark seems to imply that by refusing to assent to these principles as condition of the science of geometry the Pyrrhonist is the only true geometer. At least, if we imagine the remark addressed to geometers in their dogmatism, the remark might be taken as intended to correct something in the geometer qua geometer.

A desire to resolve any appearance of paradox might produce the interpretation that the Pyrrhonist is trying to do away with geometry by arguing ad hominem against the possibility of geometrical inquiry: For geometry to be a proper science, the practitioner must, by her own subscription to the epistemic norms at work in the Pyrrhonian Modes abstractable from dialectical procedure against regressive justification, brute assertion, and circularity, refrain from hypothesis. But the geometrical exercise is conditional on hypothesis. Therefore, geometry is impossible.

245

However: The attack on geometry is comprised as third book in a work of six books against the disciplines (mathēmata) of ancient liberal education.263 And in the propaedeutic discussion at the beginning of the first book of this work, Against the Professors, Sextus says that his attack is not from the intent to do away with the sciences altogether. Such vandalism would betray a negative dogmatic commitment. Further, in its viciousness, this vandalism would appear at odds with the amity and self- sufficiency of the Pyrrhonist. Sextus tells us that the churlish Epicurean may, from a sense of inferiority, attack the convoluted scientific endeavors of the intelligent- sia philosophizing at the Academy in order to do away with them. But the Pyrrho- nist, by her insouciance, is apparently moved by neither vanity nor rancor from without:

[I]n addition to being beyond the other philosophers in culture and sophistication, [Pyrrhonists] hold their ground (echousan) indifferently to against the opinion (doxa) of the multitude. AM 1.5

Moreover, Sextus tells us that the Pyrrhonist, as in general philosophy, is motivated from the intent to give expression to an honest aporetic sensibility brought out by consideration of the problems of the mathēmata. If so, the expression of skepticism regarding geometry appears at least the product of inquiry within the field of geometry. But in appealing to an experience imbued with perplexity as motivation for the exercise, the Pyrrhonist appears to have described himself without guile as zētētikos. Of geometry nothing is affirmed, and so, nor denied.

263 AM 1.5. The disciplines are: grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology and music.

246 At any rate, an inquisitive sensibility towards the activity of the geometer is, apparently, genuinely experienced.

We may try to resolve the paradox by paying attention to the therapeutic language of the Pyrrhonist. Skeptical geometry, like any skeptical exercise, is supposed to be a form of purification, rather than destruction. In the end, then, the Pyrrhonist does not intend to get the dogmatist to deny the objects of her science, but, through inquiry, to refrain from affirming them, merely suspend, and, by this suspension, achieve tranquility in attention to their appearance.

Still, it appears to remain, first, that the Pyrrhonist at work in geometry must submit with earnestness to the norms of the art of geometry—at least in so far as she works procedurally, in accordance with the structure of the science, worrying first its central principles, and then incrementally, by the foregoing worrying, everything that is constructed around them. Second, it appears that the attack will be performed deliberately, with a declared end of producing suspension of judgment. Thus, the Pyrrhonist will need to refrain from affirmation, yet, through her deliberate rational goal-directed activity, appear to betray a commitment to the desirability of her end, and the appropriateness of her methodology.

We might, then, want to investigate, first, how there will be anything left of a skeptical geometry for it to be a science. (For, e.g., if we didn’t accept the coherence of the notion of the point, how could we, in good epistemic faith, continue to talk about it, and all that is produced from it?) And second, we might want to investigate after a value to the Pyrrhonist’s method in geometry that shows it cathartic rather than destructive.

247 Skepticism in geometry as propaedeutic to thoroughgoing scientific suspension

…and our inquiry ascends from the more particular to the more general until we soar aloft up to the science of being in so far as it is being… Proclus, Commentary on the First Book of Eu- clid’s Elements, 1.9

We give expression to three claims: First: The remark on hypothesis in Against the Geometers is but an expression of the general sentiment given in the Outlines that only the skeptic is truly zētētikos. Second: The aim of equipollence in geometry is a particular expression of a general ethics of science. And third: The Pyrrhonian methodology in geometry is a particular application to a particular scientific branch of a general scientific methodology to bring about this aim. All this should not surprise us if skepticism in a particular science appeared generated from skeptical consideration of general foundational problems of dogmatic science. But if correct, we would have to abstract from our problems of suspensive geometry to problems of suspensive science tout court. Our problem was of inquiry in geometry only on the condition of skepticism about the principles of geometry whose acceptance appears condition for inquiry in geometry. By abstraction, it would become a problem of inquiry tout court only on the condition of skepticism about the fundamental principles whose acceptance appears condition for inquiry tout court. There is nowhere left to hide. And then, if we wanted to grasp the possibility and value of Pyrrhonism in the particular science that is geometry, we would want to investigate after the possibility for and value of the method in geometry in the context of the possibility for and value of the Pyrrhonian method in philosophy tout court. We would ultimately

248 want a fundamental epistemological and ethical accounting for the Pyrrhonian method to understand the Pyrrhonist’s skepticism in a particular science such as geometry.

Let us begin to attempt an elucidation by concentrating on our third claim and give epistemological context for Sextus’ skepticism in geometry. The first and second claim seem straightforward enough, for now. Furthermore, in an attempt to embrace the therapy, our hope would be that, in expressing ourselves at the beginning of Socratic elenchos as some Euthyphro pursuing naïvely some particular—in our case, an understanding of the aim of inquiry in geometry as towards Pyrrhonism—as a universal instantiation of the Good, we begin a discovery towards it.

To begin, Against the Geometers starts with an exordium on the procedure to be applied. The Pyrrhonian purports to adopt as a general method a procedure analogous to that of her dogmatic opponent. The dogmatic geometer starts from ground for his edifice supposedly safely secured by the method of hypothesis.264 The Pyrrhonist starts with attacking this ground. But it is not a particularity of the method in geometry that hypothesis becomes target for the opening salvo. Sextus tells us that he is writing in emulation of Timon under a norm standardized in the latter’s Against the Physicists. The method is applicable to any discipline which seeks refuge in hypothesis. Further, the method rests on general skeptical results of attack on the possibility of the science of logic.265 Dogmatic hypothesis, we are told in Against the Geometers, is a form of affirming with reserved confidence. Sextus’ attack on such affirming runs through the presumption that the reader will admit as equipol-

264 AM 3.6 265 To logikon. In the ancient division of the disciplines of philosophy (logic, physics, ethics), logic encompasses epistemology.

249 lent to any commitment to her hypothesis the consideration that any rational discourse must, under the norms of the Modes against arrival in assertion which generate such discourse, render as her equal the interlocutor who hypothesizes exactly the opposite with the same commitment. But the motivation for this is given in Against the Logicians and the Outlines in general epistemological work on the problem of affirmation in the light of the Modes and the problem of the criterion. Thus, skeptical inquiry in geometry by attack on hypothesis, and then on point, line through point, and plane through line is extended back to an inquiry in general epistemology after the possibility of rational affirmation tout court.

As both skeptical inquiry in geometry and in general epistemology will ultimately turn on the principled application of the Modes, we may expect to find isomorphism in methodology. In geometry and in general epistemology we see the Pyrrhonist work towards a suspension on the fundamentals in the science (e.g., the hypotheses, the criterion for decision) by consideration of the Modes, but then, seemingly, suspend disbelief to investigate the particulars of the science once more under the Modes, and so come to suspend on these by fundamental epistemological considerations, too. Pyrrhonian inquiry in the particular field will force the dogmatist to take refuge in hypothesis such that inquiry eventually becomes inquiry in the general field, and so, under the Modes, results in the thoroughgoing skepticism we attribute to the Pyrrhonist who does general epistemology. For example, in geometry, as the dogmatist moves on from hypothesis to give definition to the particulars of his science in light of his acceptance of ground through hypothesis, we see Sextus move on to provisionally grant the ground necessary to bring the particulars of geometry into view, and then attack them. Sextus will argue against the viability of the method of hypothesis. If this argument is conceived as successful by him, one might think it the satisfaction of

250 any need for further inquiry into geometry. After all, geometry rests on hypothesis. But Sextus still goes on to give particular attention to arguments against the conceivability of the point. Moreover, commensurately, he will then go on to suspend on his result of the inconceivability of the point to investigate the line, even though it appears that Sextus is operating with the Euclidean notion of line as constituted of points.266 His remarks against the line are generally analogous to his remarks from the problems in mereology against the point. For example, throughout, Sextus appears to employ an Epicurean mereology to challenge the materials of the geometer. If the objects of geometry are intelligible, they are so by transference from the sensible. But in apparent things, it is impossible to perceive a spatial object without dimension.267 Hence, first, the point, to be intelligible, must have dimension; but, in geometry, the point is supposedly without dimension. And later, the line, to be intelligible, must have breadth; but, in geometry, the line is supposedly without breadth. Finally, after having to his satisfaction dealt with the principles of geometry in this fashion, Sextus still goes on to treat its theorems, despite a professed sentiment that if the principles are undermined, geometry has been debunked as an art.268

Analogously, in general epistemology, Sextus begins his study of logic in the second book of the Outlines with consideration of the fundamental bone of contention among dogmatists in the field of logic—the criterion for decision about existence and non-existence. Without planting this first firmly in the ground (as it were), no decision in any discipline is possible. No wall of logic will be built without laying the first stone. The tree of physics will be smothered by wilderness,

266 AM 3.36, Elements, 1. Definitions 3-4. 267 AM 3.22-26. 268 Cf. AM 3.21, 108.

251 and never get to yield its ethical fruit. No truth will be formalizable so as to be grasped. But, via the Modes, the Pyrrhonist diagnoses recursion in the determination of the criterion. To rest in a determination of the criterion requires a criterion. Nonetheless, Sextus goes on to say that it will not be amiss to move on and undermine, under the norms for systematicity and completeness, the particular stances with regard to the analysanda the dogmatist has divided the problem of the criterion into: What is the substance of the subject of the criterial decision (e.g., the human being, in contrast with the animal or the god)? By what means does it decide (rationality or experience)? What is the material for decision (particular, supposedly veridical rational impressions)? Apparently suspending any disbelief we think he should have attained in arriving in the result that we cannot determine a criterion for decision in inquiry, he once more goes on to give skeptical arguments against the determination of a subject, means, and material of the criterial decision. But again, we find ourselves abstracting from these particular problems, by attention to the norms of the Modes, towards consideration of the generalized act of assertion absent a criterion in a community of equals. Any account of the mechanics of decision-making through analysis of the substance, means, and material of decision is to be given once more under a norm against affirmation of the account absent the antecedent establishment of a criterion for such affirmation.⁠269

From geometry to general epistemology and back, the skeptical methodology appears to have as aim a flowering throughout the tree of science of an awareness of our expressing ourselves without evidence. In geometry, the challenge to the method of hypothesis opens up the science to skeptical inquiry by increments from its foundations to what is supposed con-

269 With regard to substance: PH 2.34-5; means: 2.54, 56, 57, 6468-69; material: 2.77.

252 structed upon them—e.g., from point to line to plane—and back towards the foundations. In turn, skeptical awareness in hypothesis is nourished by awareness of the problem of the criterion under the Modes in general epistemology. And, commensurately, the challenge of the problem of the criterion in general epistemology opens up general epistemology to skeptical inquiry by increments from its foundations to what is supposed constructed upon them—e.g., from substance to means to material.

In being propaedeutic to thoroughgoing suspension, the attack on any facet of the particular science has as aim the rational (in being a concomitant of unadulterated rational activity under the Modes) sensibility of the successful skeptic in the general field. The Pyrrhonist works from attack on the fundamentals of the particular discipline, and then on the particulars of it through an attack on its fundamentals. She relies in this procedure, through her work in logic, on a supposedly rational sensibility of equal validity of the negation, and presumes a rationally shared sensibility of criterial lack. The presentation of the individual argument presents a particular route towards entertaining suspension on the fundamentals—eventually, in geometry, on hypothesis, and this in virtue of eventual suspension on the criterion in logic. In resting her case in a fundamental suspensive sensibility, the Pyrrhonist attacks the formative discipline of geometry with the aim of producing as thoroughgoing a suspension as could be attained in skeptical contemplation in higher philosophy. By attacking a complacent acceptance of the obvious in our curricular scientific education into the mysteries of the world, the skeptic wants to elicit in the dogmatist attention to, and perplexity at the problems of the act of affirmation tout court.

253 254 Scientific suspension as unadulterated philosophical awareness

If the aim of Pyrrhonism is suspension on dogmatism and acceptance of appearance, the skeptic will have it that such skeptical attention to and perplexity at our speaking at all in philosophy approaches a terminus of as unadulterated a philosophical awareness we can hope for. A perplexity which leaves inquiry utterly inconclusive is to be not shirked, but embraced by the true philosopher. Unadulterated inquiry would make for genuine philosophy—that is, genuine love of wisdom. But such inquiry is skeptical inquiry. Hence, genuine love of wisdom is skeptical.270 The successful philosopher comes to love wisdom freely in unadulterated inquiry—that is, in unadulterated skeptical awareness.

Consider, in the context of the sensibility that the dogmatic method of hypothesis cripples inquiry, the Pyrrhonist’s philosophical taxonomy:

Those who are of the opinion (dokousin) that they have discovered [the truth] are specifically called dogmatists (dogmatikoi), such as Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, and others, while Carneades and Cleitoma- chus and other Academics proved for themselves that [the truth] is among things ungraspable. But the skeptics keep searching (zētousi). Wherefore reasonably (eulogōs) they think (dokousin) the most general philosophies to be three—dogmatic, Academic, and inquisitive (kata to zētein). PH 1.3-4

270 A lover would love his lover badly if he put her up in a ranch house on the hill behind

…a barbed wire fence to keep out the unknown, and on every metal thorn just a little blood of his own.

Likewise, we would love wisdom badly if we wished to capture it in ivory tower or enclosed garden.

255

The skeptical way is called inquisitive (zētētikē) because of its activity in accordance with inquiry… PH 1.7

We see the skeptic denigrate dogmatic philosophy as so-called (kaloumenē philosophia)271, and set up skepticism in opposition to dogmatism as the only form of genuine inquiry. If, as Aristotle has it, philosophy begins in wonder, the Pyrrhonist seeks by skeptical exercise to reinvigorate or maintain this sensibility.

For the Pyrrhonist, philosophical progress is not conceived as moving towards awareness of conclusive scientific truth, but as towards further discovery of and concentration on perplexity. This may strike us as odd. Still, in the end, we can see a beginning to how we might maintain this result under our ad hominem as not just a peculiarity of the Pyrrhonist. A conception of scientific suspension as supreme philosophical awareness flows naturally from the nomenclature of our science: Pythagoras coined the term for our kind as philosopher in appreciation of our aspiration. As we found in Socrates’ claim in the Phaedrus: The best of us will not be wise, but lovers of wisdom.272

271 PH 1.5, see the section: The tenor and aim of Sextus’ writing. 272 See The dogmatist’s seeing herself be struck down.

256 Fundamental problems of skeptical science

We have suggested an isomorphism and dependency between the methodology in geometry and the methodology in general philosophy qua motivation (recognition of anomaly), aim (suspension), and procedure (from attack on the foundation, to attack on edifice through a return to attack on the foundation). Equally, we posit an isomorphism between the problems of these methodolo- gies. While the dogmatist is said to defer the mereological problems of the point through the method of hypothesis, the Pyrrhonist aims—by rendering the problems of geometry transparent to the abstract problems of affirmation—to bring the thinker to consideration of the abstract problems. Our questions after the epistemological and ethical foundations of skeptical geometry are in the end epistemological questions after the epistemological necessity and ethical value of affirmation tout court. Is rational discourse tout court necessary for the good life? Is affirmation tout court necessary in rational discourse?

So we encounter the problems of the particular science all the more boldly in skepticism in higher philosophy.

Epistemically: Surely, the Pyrrhonist in higher skeptical contemplation, in being perplexed, has a conception of what she lacks and seeks. Surely, she will possess, just as she must possess notions of point, extension, and divisibility in doing geometry, an ineluctable experience of the meaning of and, so, the conditions of applicability for the epistemic terms, such as belief or knowledge.273 Surely, in her recognition of speaking honestly in dialectic, she will realize that in her eventual explicit suspension on her believing, the term belief is going to be applicable to her attitude.

257

We might wish to say we are quite conversant with the language game, but not sufficiently.

Ethically: The Pyrrhonist, in giving up on affirmation, would give up on the material necessary for doing work in philosophy. The presumption of the necessity of affirmation in honest dialectic is an expression of the presumption that philosophy seeks a discursive settling of the facts. Surely, then, the Pyrrhonist’s perplexity is motivated by a desire to discursively grasp the facts. Otherwise, she appears to give up on the end of philosophical investigation altogether.

We will try to reply that the end of philosophy might be found in the transcendence of the need for affirmation: In stepping off the ladder which purports to lead towards discursive truth, the skeptic would overcome the love for wisdom in an arrival of wisdom. Tentatively: The pursuit of discursive truth may very well be an approach to wisdom. It may well be an expression of love of wisdom. But this does not mean that the attainment of wisdom or knowledge comes in the attainment of discursive truth. It might come in self-perpetuating perplexity at the problems of skepticism. A self-perpetuating wonder: a thought which renews itself wholeheartedly. Its abstraction perhaps understandable if, in the end

[divine thought] thinks itself, if indeed it is the most excellent, and the thought of the thought is the thought (noēsis noēseōs noēsis). Metaphysics, 12.9, 107430b

273 Lucretius, DRN 4.469.

258 Naturally, the Pyrrhonist will need to find a way of expressing a result like this undogmatically. But she will also immediately face the difficulty of making a philosophical case for the result. If the Pyrrhonist engages with the dogmatist in dialectic in order to cure him, we said, she will want to be understood by him. She will want to give a picture according to which the goodness the philosopher pursues through philosophy can be attained by understanding philosophy’s exercise after discursive truth as something which eventually she is to overcome. But qua philosopher, the Pyrrhonist’s interlocutor appreciates the norms for living well just philosophically, and he understands the end of philosophical inquiry as the discovery of the account of the nature of this life. If the dogmatist were to abandon philosophy so conceived for the sake of living well, it would be from philosophical reasons. So, philosophy so conceived will remain a necessary ingredient to his approach of the good life. Under a persistent appreciation that the activity of philosophy is valuable in its approaching discursive truth, the dogmatist will remain unmoved by a Pyrrhonian speculative appreciation of the end of philosophy as the transcendence of affirmation. A defense of the therapeutic value of skepticism must produce the dogmatist’s surrender to the skeptical method in the face of her dogmatic anticipation that skepticism constitutes a denial of the dogmatist’s hope of arrival in the good life through philosophy.

259 Motivation for increasing abstraction

You must be satisfied to be very clear, and very real, and to be very analytical. You can’t take the whole thing. And to approximate the whole thing in a vague way gives one a feeling that they probably more or less touched the thing. But in this way you just lead yourself toward confusion… Bill Evans274

Our move towards further abstraction may perplex any interlocutor with a predilection for the contained scholarly treatise which, by deferring through hypothesis any further question after the ground for the possibility of the subject of the treatise, gets to focus on the details of a single issue, and purport to clarity. We should, e.g., give a detailed epistemological account of the necessary and sufficient conditions of belief that is well-grounded in some dogmatic vernacular. We should give a rational theory of action without belief. We should give a rational account of the value of skepticism in geometry with regard to the aim of the monomaniacal geometer. But our move towards abstraction is appropriate and necessary for our therapy.

In order to trace an impression of the possibility for progress towards skepticism, we pursue the demonstration of the viability of Pyrrhonian geometry in the context of Pyrrhonian science tout court, and we conceive of the problems of

274 Bill Evans, in interview, in: The Universal Mind of Bill Evsans: Creative Process and Self- Teaching. Per, e.g., the Republic’s treatment of the philosopher’s ideal psychology as the eventual product of proper mathematical and musical education, the student’s aim can be approximated through the language of harmony. If harmony is the ideal of mathematics and music, and philosophical perfection is a transcendence of what we can hope for in mathematics and music, then this didactic statement from a an struggling musical virtuoso on musicianship.

260 showing this general viability in the context of a search for a resolution to the problem of imagining the possibility of constructive rational activity in radically suspensive scientific inquiry. In the end we are engaged, via an inquiry into the function and possibility of skepticism in a science with a particular content and prima facie dogmatically conceived aim such as geometry, in an inquiry into the value of philosophical reason at the limit of our power for contemplating the abstract. In order to understand a skeptical appreciation of the function of contemplation in geometry, we need to widen our awareness, and take the problems of geometrical scepticism in the context of the fundamental problematic of Pyrrhonism. This is only natural, because to work towards understanding Pyrrhonism, we would have to work towards the ideal Pyrrhonian experience. And to do this, we are supposed try to forgo the temptation to look at the problems of skepticism in a particular field in isolation purchased through hypothesis. At some juncture in the pedagogy, the Pyrrhonist, in pursuit of comprehensive suspension, seeks to break open a discipline supposedly safely isolated through the method of hypothesis by rendering the discipline vulnerable to epistemic generalities.

We live in danger of violating the norm for particularity expressed in the above quote. And the living in danger of this violation may very well be thought as an objection to the Pyrrhonist’s work in geometry. We might think that if the Pyrrhonist sees any value to her work in geometry, the source of this value comes from her work in general epistemology. Hence, no wonder that her treatment of geometry is superficial: She takes delight in geometry only in so far as it yields comprehensive suspension, and this can be achieved without burrowing into the details of the science.

261 The intellect of the Pyrrhonist is to move up from contemplation of the problems of geometry towards contemplation of the ethical problems in logic.

If so, we are presently compelled—by the hope that the generalities of Pyrrho- nism may explain the particular problem of value of skeptical inquiry in geometry, and, moreover, that these generalities may be elucidated by the particular problem—to draw in broad strokes the whole thing to which the current detail of interest belongs. We block in the background of our sketch in the hope of giving enough depth to our picture that the present subject in the foreground (skepticism in the field of geometry) becomes clear and real. And we hope that by this clarity of the object in the foreground, we discover a line of sight from it into the background. And vice versa.

262 Anticipation of Platonic context for skepticism in geometry

And now, just like a dream these opinions were awakened in him. And if someone interrogated him about these very things often and in different ways, you know that in the end he will understand them less than no one. Socrates of the slave boy in the Meno, 85c-d7

Should anyone take pity on him, we would wish to posit for the slave boy a Platonic education through geometry and dialectic towards skepticism. This for the sake of an ad hominem analysis of Platonism for skepticism, which we would wish to lay at least in the balance against any—at least, any supposedly Platonic— accusation of shallowness in Pyrrhonism. Geometry in this picture is first, as, e.g., per the Republic, or Proclus’ Platonic commentary on Euclid,275 propaedeutic to philosophical dialectic in the Platonic education: It elicits contemplation under hypotheses which abstract away from the spatio-temporal that exhibits itself to us in our concentration on movement in the material world: We move towards concentration on our ability to hold the world still, and consider spatial extension without time. Philosophical dialectic, in turn, is to move us away from an experience of space to consider the taxonomic structure of Platonic reality in a dialectical search of its principle which would provide ground for, e.g., the hypotheses in geometry.

275 A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements, 3-4.

263 But such dialectic is ever seeking in all directions, and under the Modes, cannot end. It must ever speak in defense of its honest thought. Or, perhaps, become stunned. We sought stillness in contemplation upon mathematics, but found movement once again in contemplation of the ground for its hypotheses. So, once more, under a norm for giving expression appropriate to our present situation, we may become aware of time in our future-directed dialectical activity. We must speak for evaluation in the future, and defend ourselves in it. For example: We come to see our thought drop out as it goes along, and see in this protraction a fragmentation which vitiates rest in any noetic appreciation of unity.

Such rest would only be found when we become driven under the norms of rationality in our dialectical activity to apophatic acquaintance with the unitary principle. We might think to see a structural homology between the experience of whatever this acquaintance would turn out to be for the Platonist, and the ideal experience of the Pyrrhonist.

The former—the Platonist—would arrive in knowledge by overcoming a preoccupation with the experience of true opinion with regard to the objects of becoming, and so with dialectical objects temporally extended in consciousness. Objects of becoming, we are told, both are and are not. Propositionally, we might understand this as: We can both affirm and deny the proposition, depending on the context in which we appreciate it. For example: In one context, e.g., in appreciation of the characters alive in the dialogue, we might take Socrates’ denigration of writing in the Phaedrus as inspiration to forgo writing. In another, looking at the page in whose header we find the author’s name, we might consider an irony in the presentation of this

264 denigration of writing in a written work. Our ethical sensibilities are thrown to and fro. We are never tied down. Overcoming of opinion, then, would be an overcoming of looking at Platonic objects through a fragmentation which allows alternatively the embrace or denial of the proposition. For example: “Don’t write!” And next: “Ceteris paribus, by all means, write.” In such overcoming, we would get to see the Form of the Good in abstraction from—swept clear of—becoming which only affords vision through contexts. But dialectic, as it proceeds inexorably, ever offers such new contexts.276 Thus, for purified vision to obtain, dialectic must be overcome. Either silence must ensue, orr even in speaking there must be some kind of silence. The hand or mouth or mind would move as if bewitched, or, if not this, with no further inter- ference—sanctioned by our daimōn. Afterwards, as Socrates complained of vain poets, we might feel that we cannot quite explain ourselves.

Structural homology: The latter—the Pyrrhonist—becomes stunned into suspension by the activity of laying in the balance one opinion against another. For her, every one of her expressive acts—even silence—would be performed from appearance received in a suspensive consciousness of the equipollences in her inquiry. The Pyrrhonist supposedly overcomes dialectic by arriving in suspension. And in suspension, for her, appearance remains. But then, if she is a philosopher—as it seems she must be in order to find an environment in which to perform the activity of suspending—her initial experience of wonder at the beginning of philosophy is still alive. And by wonder, if wonder comes in some acquaintance with the otherworldly, an implication of an affinity with the divine.

276 We do not mean to make this sound easy.

265 The skeptic acts from any appearance residual to her embrace of the paradox. She even amplifies the paradox by wishing, in every direction, to lay something in the balance. The greater the entertainment of paradox, the greater the wonder, and so, if genuine, affinity with the otherworldly. This affinity the residuum from which her activity somehow emanates as it encounters material in the world of becoming.

In a context so sketched, the beginning of an awareness of time abstracted from the material world would be an intermittent aim of a Pyrrhonian Platonism. For example:

For on the whole, the Pyrrhonist determines nothing, not even this very thing (oude auto touto), that nothing is determined. “But we phrase it like this,” [Aenesidemus] says, “without knowing in what manner we are to blurt out the judgment.” Photius, Bibliotheca 170a11-14

Such things, we may presume, are said by the skeptic in a gentleness we might see recommended by the Modes. Ideally: At the beginning and end of any course of thought a calm acceptance of speaking unconcealed, honestly—alēthōs— without evidence.

The Pyrrhonist comes to walk round her thought, the way we may survey a geometric object. This corner here, at this side here. This awareness of her thought, in her inability to make fully hers her thought as an object of her awareness, stuns her.

In Platonism, we aim first for an experience of unchanging unity in acquaintance with the first principle of reality—the Good, or, as conceived as the unifying principle from which reality emanates, the One—abstracted from its variegated

266 manifestation in the material of the world of becoming. But in any effort to propositionalize this acquaintance to provide ourselves with ground in dialectic, an awareness of the extension of the proposition which is to capture this acquaintance with unity once more obtains.

Then, the One could not be in time at all. If it were such. Or does something in time not need to always become older than it is? Parmenides, 141a

So there is neither a name of it, nor logos, nor understanding, nor sense-perception, nor opinion. Parmenides, 142a

We see, in contemplation of this difficulty, the Platonist Plotinus driven to a silence in which he finds rest in absorption in an experience of changeless unity.

In Pyrrhonism, we aim for an experience of some sort of appearance revealed by suspension on the proposition such that we get to act honestly in further wonder at the object we wish to capture in science. We get to be amazed at our own speaking under the Modes in our inquiry. Of the appearance that remains, we might, for the sake of an exercise such as the present one, afterwards try to say something about the inexorability of the Modes which shows our suspension on our suspension righteous. In Platonic terminology: We are shown through our ascent through dialectic towards acquaintance with goodness how operation under the Modes is epistemically virtuous. We would wholeheartedly continue our suspension upon our suspension in this acquaintance, and endeavor to speak once more away from any presumption in dialectic that we must conclude our inquiry in dogmatic belief.

We propose a Pyrrhonian revisiting with the geometer of what she thinks she has learned so far as propaedeutic to the capacity for this sort of awareness of the

267 fragmentation of our expression under the Modes which appears to vitiate dialectical arrival.

Work in geometry must include, in some way, a willingness to slaughter oxen over, e.g., the discovery of the relation between the long side of a rectangular isosceles triangle and the others.277 Something significant is discovered in geometry that engenders a movement away from what now appears complacent—e.g., in the case of Meno’s slave, perhaps eventually in contemplation of the root of 8, away from the rational number line. This sensibility the Pyrrhonist wishes once more to elicit in the complacent geometer by concentration on opposition between an empirical mereology of the point as extended and in possession of dimension, and a rational grasp of the point as dimensionless. By concentration on the tension, an awareness of difficulty with drawing the line or plane between points.

There would be nothing strange about this sort of introduction to the problems of being and becoming—of discreet unity in variegated continuous extension. We might find it first in Zeno’s paradox. And then—in abstraction away from physical movement towards consideration of the problem of the possibility of intellectual movement—in Meno’s paradox.

In this sort of consideration, when the geometer is faced with skeptical doubt generated from an Epicurean sensibility for a visualized geometry—even with our eyes closed—the hypotheses of geometry may be shaken, such that a demand to further ground them presents itself to the inquisitive sensibility of the thinker, so as to steer her to an investigation of unadulterated being.

277 Proclus, Euclid, 426; Plutarch Moralia 1094b; DL 8.12; Athenaeus 418f.

268 The thinker is turned towards consideration of the difficulties of the One in dialectic from consideration of the difficulties of the point in geometry. She is reminded of what she is trying to unify in geometry.

Pedagogically, in consideration of Against the Professors as an examination of the liberal education of the young in grammar, rhetoric, math, astrology, and music, we might in this way think that the challenges in Against the Geometers are exercises supposed to educe and select for a philosophical sensibility in our high school student conversant with geometry. At the door of the Academy:

Let no one unversed in geometry enter here.

The mathematical sensibility that is the condition for entering the Academy offers first an opportunity for contemplation in abstraction from material temporal becoming. And next, in providing opportunity for consideration of the material for geometry—and so the tension between point and line, etc.—an opportunity for affinity for flux in dialectic towards a grasp of the unitary principle of reality: Once presented in becoming in fragmentation, next seen throughout contexts reconstructable in dialectic. And so on.278

278 When is anything ever done, e.g., justly or beautifully? When done in skepticism. Justly: In skepticism the agent is just qua taking care of her own. She does not reach beyond herself from a preference for one opinion over another, but acts from her ability in accordance with appearance. In the activity of practical deliberation: Appearance is ultimately inclusive of an experience of propositional thought and the weighing of propositions. Eventually: What, in our sensibility of practical dialectic, can we come to do without? First: Which propositional commitments do we need? Later: Do we need any?

Beautifully: Of course, a man may murder beautifully in some way. But he will still need to come to live with himself. In optimism, in so far as we would get to act just from appearance that is the remainder of dialectical opining, the Pyrrhonist’s residual appearance would be one of offering a route towards completion of the activity we find ourselves engaged in. But we find ourselves engaged in philosophy, and in this activity we have no Gyges’ ring by which we could hide our act of murdering from ourselves.

269 In this pedagogical context a better contemplation in geometry is somehow elicited towards by consideration of the skeptical challenge to the acceptance in geometry of its hypotheses that start from a purportedly rationally evident hypothesis of the point as dimensionless and then go on to construct upon the point the continuous line and plane.

“Well, maybe I did or didn’t murder. In skeptical contemplation we can hide from all this.” In reply someone might offer a Cartesianism about our being somehow rational, yet—by our escape from dialectic in suspension—not deceived. And this freedom from deception is accessible by liberation from dialectic in attention to appearance. And via Descartes, in this appearance we find something like what the ancients called divine. And in this, there is no murder.

What then of the man who did murder, and afterwards finds by these considerations leisure for contemplation in which he can hide? Is it still hiding, if in skepticism he forgets, and assimilates through what he has forgotten to something new? He might return in a liberated activity for the better—that is, for better contemplation.

270 Sketch 7: Platonism as Pyrrhonism

271 On our aim

In general: We have set ourselves the aim of defending skepticism. We have come to set ourselves this aim in the course of philosophical reflection upon our embroilment in philosophy. It appears that what we thought made us better, cured us of our selfishness or timidity, and so on—in short, what we thought allowed us to live in accordance with a determination of the proper way of living—was all along a further manifestation of the disease this supposed medicine was intended to cure. Or, at least, as we had been administering the medicine, it supposedly did little to cure and much to make ill. Our medicine turned out a sort of drug—the kind that has us happily ignore our instincts for the sake of its indulgence. We became worried by its sway over us. For example, in practical activity, we found Socrates’ sending his children away at his execution to pursue philosophy to the end. In rational activity, we found the philosopher ignoring the Modes in order to pursue his dogmatism over that of others.

We came to recognize in his manner of pursuit an exuberance in the philosopher that indicated the same kind of uncontrollable and deviant hunger philosophy diagnosed in the commoner. The philosopher, by running after his end dogmatically, is dragged away from life as the commoner by her desire Pyrrhonism purported to offer a manner for administering philosophy which brought equilibrium and temperance to the thinker. In her pursuit, the Pyrrhonist supposedly operates with moderate feeling in tranquility, moved merely by appearance unsullied by excessive emotion from common appetitive or dogmatic intellectual desire.

Pyrrhonism makes as if to offer a means to a purified experience by which we live in some sort of natural pursuit of the unavoidabilities.

272 If we considered our two illustrations above: It holds out the hope that in Pyr- rhonism we will manage to do well by our children in our practical life, and well by the Modes in inquiry. Our present study of Pyrrhonism only allows us opportunity to put to the test our treatment of our children under Pyrrhonism through consideration of the manner of our effort to interrupt or finish our work for their sake. If we should wish to, we cannot philosophize with them in our current manner—yet. Either because they are too young, or because, in our present absorption in an exercise for supposed adults, we are too old. But it does allow us to put to the test explicitly the manner of our consideration of the Modes. At least, right here, in our discussion, much can go wrong. In our pursuit to investigate Pyrrhonism, and so, by charity, see a way of vindicating it, we may become unwitting dogmatists once again by asserting the truth or superiority of Pyrrhonism. Or we may otherwise get carried away by steadfast affirmation of our skepticism through truculent denial of any belief in us. Or we may become frustrated, and walk away from our endeavor with a pervasive sense of futility in rational inquiry. If in the beginning we had the wish to investigate Pyrrhonism out of curiosity whether we could live better as skeptics, as our philosophical activity is an activity in life, a settling of this curiosity may best come directly in an assessment of how we manage our present work of supposedly giving a skeptical defense of skepticism. We are in Pyrrhonism to act equanimously, with attention to the unadulterated appearance in any activity, and so equally when taking care of our children as when writing our book. As we are here but engaged in the latter, under Pyrrho- nism, we hope to give our present activity of inquiry into Pyrrhonism as template for any activity in our life.

273 Well, perhaps this is naïve: As if we could look upon our children in practical activity with the same sort of reflective attention and conation as we aspire after in our present philosophizing.

Our concern is, if anything, methodological. Our analysis of Pyrrhonism may in the end be towards an assessment of the facts purporting to the viability of the skeptic’s life-style. For example: Is it true that we can remain zetetic in epochē? Is it true that tranquility is the end of philosophical inquiry? Is it true that we can attain it through epochē? But our concern in our assessment is for discovery of a method for defending skepticism against dogmatism. And we search for this method in the face of the demand that we cannot defend Pyrrhonism as dogmatists. That is, we appear barred under Pyrrhonism from concluding the viability of the thing whose viability we nonetheless continue to wish to demonstrate—i.e., of Pyrrhonism.

From our initial position as dogmatists, our attempt to understand Pyrrhonism must come through an attempt to gain Pyrrhonian understanding. Pyrrhonism, being antithetical to every variety of dogmatism, and so, it appears, nigh every philosophy, is so alien as to be incomprehensible under dogmatism tout court. At least the dogmatists appear to share enough common ground in an agreement that the end of inquiry includes the discursive affirmation of the truth, so that they are able to disagree about what the important content is in the exercise of its discovery. In disagreeing with each other, they at least appear engaged in a shared scientific practice with a shared ultimate end. But the Pyrrhonist, in giving an analysis of inquiry as valuable just in virtue of its being a gateway to suspension, appears in trying to share in the practice just to want to overcome engaging in it for the sake of actually approaching discursive truth.

274

We said that in this overcoming, presumably, a new dimension is added to the philosophical practice, such that it is at once radically different, so as to render it utterly incomprehensible to those who have not yet overcome their dogmatic disagreement (with each other, themselves). The end of understanding Pyrrhonism, through the end of gaining Pyrrhonian understanding, presumes thoroughgoing Pyrrhonian practice. There is no peeking on the other side of the fence to be done without giving up on a fundamental assumption about philosophy. There is no theory to be examined through comparison and contrast with our own commitments. In order to see as the Pyrrhonist, the psychology must radically change. We have implied a point of chaos in activity: The moment of overcoming dogmatism. Before this, we cannot understand the Pyrrhonist; after it, we cannot be understood by the dogmatist. If, just by our current exercise of trying to understand Pyrrhonism, we will be in the former camp, we can only see our way towards our end by attending to what happens to us in the approach of and passing through this point.

We are to work towards an understanding of Pyrrhonism through a Pyrrhonian understanding, and the latter through the philosophical practice of the Pyrrhonist. And the latter may be approached by practicing it through the Pyrrhonian methodology, as seen applied time and again to different disciplines in the works of Sextus. As the Pyrrhonist wishes to proselytize, she needs to do more for the dogmatist than rest in her incapacity to be understood by him. Even if her content remains incomprehensible, her manner, being the product of a professed utter submission to the rational norms of inquiry, should be to some extent congenial to her interlocutor. She must, so to speak, attempt to provide a skeptical methodology for her interlocutor’s education without saying anything untoward.

275 Naturally, we cannot pursue an assent to the truth of the way of the Pyrrhonist, but we can still try to pursue, through exercising her methodology, her experience. If we got carried away, we might say: “This is the essential function of Sextus’ work: to introduce or recall into the psychology of the thinker a method of analysis in her philosophical activity, and through the dialectical shaping of the psychology produce a manner of paying attention.”

276 Skepticism in geometry as propaedeutic to unadulterated philosophical awareness

Programmatically: We profess to aim for an introduction of the Pyrrhonian methodology into our activity. In particular, in our present inquiry into the viability of skepticism, we wish to extend to the question after the possibility and value of rational inquiry under Pyrrhonism the procedure of laying in the balance for the sake of suspension an ad hominem account not just of the possibility, but even of the desirability of the thing denied by the dogmatist. Right now, this thing is no longer the possibility of ataraxia as telos, or the possibility of life without belief, but—in order to see the possibility of ataraxia through epochē—of rational, suspensive science. To this end, we have been attempting to construct, for laying in the balance against principled dogmatic denigration of skepticism, a dogmatically appreciable picture of suspensive science in which we show the skeptic in the sort of activity the dogmatist can find herself in. We attempt to construct this picture by an ad hominem analysis of Platonic ascent as a movement towards skepticism. In other words, we are attempting to see skepticism in the structure and motivation of the Academy’s philosophical program.

We said that in this program the Platonic ascent is supposed to set off from the propaedeutic study of mathematics. If this is correct, qua point on a trajectory of ascent, the study of mathematics itself would not constitute a science of final inquiry. The principles of mathematics are hypothesized; their ground is yet to be given. For now, at least, the preliminary nature of the study of mathematics appears appreciable in Pyrrhonism. For example, we see in Pyrrhonian geometry that mathematics is not for the sake of constructing a theory, but for the sake of finding, through skeptical inquiry, ontological objections against the methods and

277 materials employed in the dogmatic construction. We argued that the function of this skepticism in geometry is to bring to the attention of the aspiring Platonist the possibility of a realm of higher abstraction for contemplation. As we will see, the dogmatist may come to hope for insight into the ground for the mathematical hypotheses by contemplation of the objects of a higher realm. But, we said, the skeptic wishes to elicit eventually from the student of geometry attention to the abstract problems of general epistemology, and through this attention, generate an abstracted and fundamental suspension.

If the one is adequately seen itself by itself or is so perceived by any of the other senses, then, as we were saying in the case of fingers, it wouldn’t draw the soul towards being. But if something opposite to it is always seen at the same time, so that nothing is apparently any more one than the opposite of one, then something would be needed to judge the matter. The soul would then be puzzled, would look for an answer, would stir up its understanding, and would ask what the one itself is. And so this would be among the subjects that lead the soul and turn it around towards the study of that which is. But surely the sight of the one does possess this characteristic to a remarkable degree, for we see the same thing to be both one and an unlimited number at the same time. Republic 524e-525a279

To the question after the supposed propaedeutic role of geometry in a philosophy that seeks the ethical principle of the world, we purport to answer by considering what would happen if we studied geometry as rational seekers as idealized by Pyrrhonism. In geometry, and then upwards, the Pyrrhonist seeks to be a seeker

279 Trans. Grube.

278 who yields to the norms of inquiry whose satisfaction the dogmatist will consider condition for honest philosophical declaration.280

We give persistent skeptical attention to the epistemic norms in geometry, and so contemplation of antinomy in geometry, as propaedeutic to skepticism in general philosophy. We will soon go on to elaborate on an analysis of the function of persistent skepticism in contemplation in this further realm in terms of its power to elicit the transcendence of dogmatism—a transcendence by which the Platonist finally ascends to skepticism. On this account, the study of geometry in Platonism, by deferring provision of ground for its mereological hypotheses from which geometry starts, would awaken the thinker to the mereological problem of conceiving of the point in relation to the extensions of line and plane in geometry. And this, we will see, for the sake of eliciting perplexed conception of and attention to problems of speaking tout court. And such attention and perplexity for the sake of approaching a terminus of unadulterated philosophical awareness.

On our ad hominem account, skeptical geometry, then, has as aim such unadulterated scientific awareness. By bringing attention to mereological antinomy, Sextus brings further attention to the normative structure of our activity in doing geometry. The student in her activity operates under norms that invite her to consider her hypotheses, and then, to consider her act of hypothesizing.

280 A condition for honest philosophical declaration: If the dogmatist says: “Don’t you speak honestly? Aren’t you supposedly expressing some truth by this exercise?” We, as Pyrrhonists, reply: “Perhaps, but, as we express ourselves by these norms, we attend to a question, even in the satisfaction of giving a reply. We do not speak with your urgency for the captured fact, but with a different urgency.” Say the dogmatist then replies that, no, she speaks just like us—just as she seeks the fact in inquiry, we seek the fact. We will ask her whether she is speaking in denigration of or indifference to, or embrace of or attentiveness to antinomy. If any of the former, she is looking away from something. Otherwise—if equipollence, in abstraction, is generated from attention to antinomy—we are great friends.

279 In eliciting this consideration, skeptical geometry is an exercise in awareness of the activity of the student of geometry. This exercise becomes towards the end an exercise in awareness of rational activity in general.

By ad hominem the skeptic tries to derive from the behavior of the interlocutor skepticism regarding the norms, aim and function of her activity. In conversation with the dogmatist, the beginning of the skeptical exercise is ever from: “But you say this, namely…,” and its coda is supposed to lead up to skeptical consideration of whatever we started from as target for the ad hominem. (For example: “Virtue is the telos.” Or: “Tranquility is the telos.” Or: “Life without belief is impossible.”) But if, in our exercise, we are persistent in our skepticism, we will find no principle by which to exclude ourselves from the set of addressees we intend to harry by our technique. We will have to see that we who employ the ad hominem, say something, too. (For example, with regard to a question after our right to harry our interlocutor by ad hominem: “The deployment of ad hominem is philosophically kosher under ad hominem.” Or, with regard to our skeptical expression: “We do not believe that we have no beliefs.”) And so our thoroughgoing skepticism will bring to awareness, on the one hand, an inescapable sense of shamelessness in any thinking that one has found the truth, as well as, on the other hand, the unavoidability of our thought. And so thoroughgoing awareness of perplexity will be brought about in us.

Again, of this perplexity, if it brought philosophical tranquility, the skeptic might say: “This is not failure, but success.”

280 Platonic dogmatism as target of skeptical geometry

We might expect the expression of such an understanding of Platonism as Pyr- rhonism controversial. At least, we might expect our skeptical appreciation of the elicitive role of Platonic geometry controversial. Then it might not be amiss to first bolster a framework for appreciation of the relation we give between Platonism and Pyrrhonism. In our bolstering, we wish, with a force different from, but nonetheless equal to that of the dogmatic thought, to appropriate Platonic geometry by ad hominem.

To start our Pyrrhonian appropriation of Platonic geometry: We began our investigation through the treatment of skeptical geometry as we encountered it in Against the Professors. There, Sextus brings attention to both the structural deficiency of hypothesis under the norms against regress and hypothesis, and, next, to an antinomy between the point and the line by attention to appearance. In our naïve approach we appear capable of pointing at the point, the way we point, quite readily, at the moon. But the act of pointing entails an act of delimiting from the dimensions in which the point obtains. If two points touch, they are one, and so they must be delimited by something. This consideration of limit is to drive us to perplexity. And from this, eventually, to perplexity at our perplexity, and so to skeptical awareness.

By ad hominem, this exercise towards skeptical awareness is the expression of Platonic rational activity. Just as the Pyrrhonist, by ad hominem, appreciates Platonic philosophy as aiming towards an experience of tranquility, he appreciates it, qua contemplative effort, as aiming towards an experience of unadulterated inquiry—even though, since the Platonic dogmatist would perform inquiry with

281 entitlement that beggars surprise, such a Platonist’s inquiry would appear prima facie polluted.

We want to give the expression of the skeptic as aiming towards inquiry in contraversion to such entitlement by thinking of the skeptical geometrical activity as one of revisiting: We make a second pass at the history of our education, and reconstruct it as conducive towards skepticism. We see now what we were up to then, when we were neophytes. And the skeptical challenge to our students is to force them along the trajectory we reconstruct. But then, we must give a history which allows our thinking that Sextus is addressing the Academic student in this fashion. Why think he is addressing her at all? How would we reconstruct her recognition that the hypotheses of geometry must be answered for in an Academic educational program towards skepticism?

As in the end we wish by ad hominem to abstract a general, fundamental motivation for all philosophies from each philosophy, our means for appeal to ad hominem must lie at some remove from what sets one dogmatism against another. Ergo: Our conclusion to the study of the skeptical function of Platonic study in geometry must also eventually be given in abstraction from dogmatism about geometric facts. This giving, we might defer until later. But we can still ask the historical question of why we should think—regardless of the Pyrrhonist’s success at giving in abstraction a fulfillment of the ad hominem which shows the student’s sensibility towards skepticism—that the Pyrrhonist is speaking to the Academic student in the beginning. Our overcoming of our history by appropriation of it must still, in time, be started by an appreciation of the history of our education. And so we ask after the educational function of the exercises of Sextus’ work against the geometers. At least, we want to be able to

282 recognize the function of these exercises as propaedeutic skeptical moves in Platonism. For example, perhaps the geometric exercises Sextus proposes are indeed Aca- demic, but, per some proper dogmatic understanding of Platonism, the pursued result of the skeptical exercise is not an unadulterated skepticism, but a dogmatism at a higher order, which grounds the hypotheses of geometry. Say: We find in Sextus a compendium of Academic exercises selected from an original curriculum of Plato’s and cultivated by Arcesilaus cum suis towards Academic skepticism, and brought out of the Academy by Aenesidemus. And in Sextus, nigh by vulgar breach of copyright, deployed for the sake of Pyrrhonian skepticism.

Well, why even think this? Why think the exercise given in Against the Geom- eters is indeed a skeptical exercise within the Platonic vernacular, regardless of how we conceive of the Platonist’s end? Although we defer an account of the function of Sextus’ exercises as being aimed towards thoroughgoing skepticism, at the start, still caught up in our dogmatic ways, presumably we want to know why we should be thinking that Sextus is addressing the Platonist at all.

With regard to a question of whom we might take Sextus to be addressing in his work against geometry: We may take it that study of the issue seeks an isomorphic dogmatic stance in geometry to which the procedure in Sextus’ work is applicable. We would look for a candidate target of Sextus’ work by looking for a party which can be said to dogmatically affirm what the Pyrrhonist means to question. But in this looking, we need not just look at what propositions Sextus argues against, but also at the methodology he employs in proceeding. The procedure of

283 the ad hominem, if it is to be ad hominem, will be isomorphic to the dogmatism attacked by the ad hominem.

The target of Sextus’ attack appears, by a skeptical fundamentalism revealed in the attack on hypothesis tout court, to be the person who says of certain propositions in geometry: “This is true.” Or, at least: “This is pithanon,” or some such expression which, by predicating through hypothesis credibility or plausibility, seems to see in the propositions of geometry a discursive approach to reality. Furthermore, the procedure of attack through point to plane, if it is ad hominem, should be expected to follow as object for attack a procedure which constructs upon the point. Quite explicitly, as we hinted at earlier, we find this procedure in the production of the initial definitions of Euclid’s Elements.281

Under the rationalism of Platonism, the intuitive normativity of Euclidean geometry is taken as a sign of the higher reality of mathematical objects.

It is necessary that mathematical being is neither among the very first nor the very last and—by comparison to the simple—divided kinds of being, but that it cuts off an intermediate place from both the partless, simple, uncompounded and indivisible reali- ties and the things that are divisible and—in all kinds of syntheses and variegated separations—marked off by boundaries. For, on the one hand, the permanence, stability, and safety from questioning of the logoi that concern it show it exalted over the things seen moved about in matter. But, on the other, the discursiveness (to diexodikon) of the conceptions, the furnishing with spatial dimensions of the hypothesized subjects, and the acceptance of different things as proven from principles of another sort, these assign to it a status inferior to the partless nature which settles itself in itself perfectly.

281 See Elements, 1. Definitions 1-7.

284 Proclus, Commentary on the First Book of Eu- clid’s Elements, 1.1

We appear to find in Proclus’ Platonist treatment of Euclid’s Elements a position which sees a value (ontological, epistemological) in objects of mathematical understanding (dianoia) which is superior to the value of the variegated objects of sense perception. Furthermore, it appears that Proclus starts his Commentary with the sentiment that the objects of mathematics, though they are presented through hypothesis, are safe from questioning. But, it is clear that the initial move of quarantining geometry through hypothesis is the initial object of attack in skeptical geometry. And, as we said, the skeptical attack upon what has been presumed secured by hypothesis proceeds by placing in the balance an empirical mereology which prefers, through an Epicurean experience, a denial of the possibility of the non- extensibility of the Platonist’s conception of the point out of which the geometry of Euclid is constructed. So, Pyrrhonian geometry exhibits isomorphism of methodology with the methodology of a Platonist treatment of Euclid, and it places in the balance an ontology in opposition to this treatment’s Platonism. Qua vulgar history: We are tempted to see in these results motivation to pursue the thought that dogmatic Platonism is a deliberate target of attack in Against the Professors.

285 On a history of skepticism in the Academy

Whence also Ariston said of [Arcesilaus]: “Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle.” For he availed himself of dialectic in the manner of Dio- dorus, although he was without disguise a Platonist. PH 1.234282

Our ad hominem proceeds by taking basic commitments of the opponent and accentuating them in such a way as to bring about in him a sensibility of being one of us. Then, the Pyrrhonist, in her attack on Platonist geometry, would wish to present the Platonist with evidence of his having shared her affinity all along. And in our rhetoric on the validity of Pyrrhonian method in geometry, and, by abstraction, in philosophy tout court, we wish to take the methodology and aspirations of the dogmatic philosopher’s discursive program, and show them applied and realized through the suspensive philosophy. By showing the place of suspension inherent in the dogmatic struggle towards ontological clarity, we aim to present the validity of Pyrrhonian research and the possibility of rationality without belief .

Now, our presentation of the function and place of skepticism may be aided by a historical datum that thoroughgoing skepticism once flourished in the garden of the Academy. At least, an explicit Pyrrhonism appears to have entered the Academy with Arcesilaus, and, perhaps, eventually left it with Aenesidemus—Arcesilaus’ making good use of Pyrrho in opposing the emergence from the Academy of Zeno’s Stoic epistemology for the world of becoming; Aenesidemus’ salvaging

282 Cf. DL 4.33.

286 the resultant Pyrrhonism from the Academy in the age of Cicero as the gradual submission of the Academy to the Stoa approached a breaking point under Antiochus.283 We may ask after the presence of such skepticism in the Academy in relation to any history of the Academy’s dogmatism. And in answering, by abstracting towards an essence of Platonism from the dogmatic and skeptical expressions of Plato’s philosophy, we might find material for showing a shared sensibility between any skeptical and dogmatic Academics, such as to facilitate the production of an appreciation shared between dogmatic and skeptical Academic of the place of skepticism in the dogmatic struggle.

To start, we might think to see doctrinal and skeptical Academy share an idealization of the ataraxia of the sophos. On the one hand, for the Pyrrhonist, the sophos in perfect suspensive contemplation overcomes philosophical anxiety resultant from the desire to resolve the pervasive appearance of anomaly among things. By a stability attained through the equipollence of countervailing arguments under consideration, the skeptic arrives at tranquility. On the other, for the doctrinal Platonist, the philosopher who turns away from the world of becoming towards that of being will, by assimilation to her intentional object, begin to reflect in experience the stability and unity of the objects of dianoia and noēsis,284 finally to shed philosophical anxiety as a new mother her

283 Aenesidemus dedicates his Pyrrhoneia to Cicero’s fellow skeptical Academic Lucius Tubero. The dedication may indicate affinity for the addressee. 284 For example, Rep. 484b-c, cf. Parm. 132d, Phaedrus 248b6, Ennead 1.3.4: The soul of the philosopher is to pattern itself after the eternal and unchanging truth. The patterning of the philosopher’s soul in accordance with the invariant nature of the highest objects of philosophical contemplation is a trope for those schooled in Platonism. Compare, e.g., the Republic’s experience of the study of the regularities of heavenly bodies as propaedeutic to that of the contemplation of the stable truths of geometry and dialectic (Rep. 529e-532e, cf. Timaeus 36c-38b), with the cosmology of Aristotle at Metaphysics 12.7, where the greater perfection of the heavenly bodies is in virtue of their greater regularity, where regularity is an expression of desire for emulation of the Unmoved Mover.

287 birth-pangs (lēgoi ōdinos) in an arrival at the limit of noēsis and divine homoi- ōsis.285 These shared idealizations of the philosopher ascended might provide a beginning for an explanation of the place of the philosophy of Arcesilaus in the Acade- my. Both skeptical and doctrinal Academy pursue through inquiry the experience of ataraxia, or of harmonia, or of odou anapaula kai telos tēs poreias: rest from the road (odos) and an end (telos) to the journey (poreia).286

But, of course, we might think that the idealization of the ataraxic psychology is so common to Greek thinking that any discovery of shared affinity here fails to resolve an impression of antagonism elsewhere. After all, as we saw, Epicureans and Stoics idealize ataraxia, and yet appear much at odds with each other regarding how it is attained.287 And so, too, Pyrrhonist and dogmatist in the Academy may disagree about the function of skepticism and dogmatism in the approach to the ataraxic experience. For example, Antiochus ushered in Middle Platonism in rejection of the skeptical Academy: Contrary to skepticism, Plato seeks to convey a particular metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical commitment through the dialogues. Aristotle and the Seventh Letter give us the dialogues as propaedeutic to an unwritten doctrine.288 Philo of Larissa—Cicero’s teacher, and Antiochus’ predecessor—says that we must take seriously our profession of ignorance.

285 Divine homoiosis: For assimilation to god through philosophical contemplation as the telos of Platonic philosophy: See, especially, Theaetetus 176b, Timaeus 90c-d; cf. NE 10.8, Fin. 5.11. Lēgoi ōdinos at Rep. 490b might be translated straightforwardly as cease from anguish. (Shorey: surcease from his travail.) But the term ‘ōdis’ appears repeatedly in the figure of the philosopher in inquiry as a mother in childbirth at Symp. 206a-e, Theaet. 148e, 151a (see Shorey’s note on Rep. 490b). Hence, Reeve: is relieved from his labor pains. 286 Rep. 401d-e, 430e; rest from the road and an end to the journey: 532e. 287 We gave its attainment via either explicitly aiming for it (as the Epicurean appears to hold), or (as per Stoicism) aiming for virtue first, the attainment of which presents itself in experience as tranquility. 288 Physics 209b, cf. Seventh Letter, 344c.

288 All these views appear to ascribe to Plato’s edifice a doctrinism antithetical to the Pyrrhonian skepticism of the Academy under Arcesilaus. Any Pyrrhonism in Arcesilaus must contend with Pyrrhonism’s coming to say of Plato:

We declare in brief that when Plato makes statements about the forms, or about the reality of fore- sight or about the preferability of the virtuous life over the vicious, he is dogmatizing if he is assenting to these as actual truths, while if he is accepting them as more trustworthy than not, since thereby he gives a preference to one thing over another in point of trust- worthiness or untrustworthiness, he throws off the character of the skeptic. PH 1.222289

One way to suggest a pertinent kinship among the successive occupants of the Academy might come by an account of the contingent history of the transmission of Plato’s thought in the education of the successive generations of the Academy. By focussing on the educators of each generation, and examining how Platonic teaching was received and transmitted by these individuals given their particular circumstance, we might be able to construct a historical account of gradual change in which each successive expression of Platonism, under some norm for appreciating change, difference and identity, can be understood as flowing out of the previous expression into the next. We would give a historical account of the rise and fall of skepticism in the Academy. Such an account, no doubt, would come to point for influences on Arcesilaus to, e.g., the theatricality of the dialogues, or their studied pursuit of the absence of the author by, e.g., the tendency to frame the dialogue in a report, or by Plato’s absence among the characters drawn from among his historical friends whose dialogue he makes as if to report. It would point to the oft aporetic conclu-

289 Trans. after Bury.

289 sion in Socrates’ repeated professions of puzzlement in surveying the dialectic; to the denigration of writing in the Phaedrus; and to the Seventh Letter’s confession of the inability to speak of what matters most, or the deliberate apophasia of the Republic when finally turning attention to description of the fundament of reality.290 It would seek to explain the blossoming of these influences into Academic skepticism as the response of one of Polemo’s junior students (Arcesilaus) to one of his seniors (Zeno): Zeno’s materialism is the product of a confidence in a power to pronounce upon the world of becoming with an epistemic security antithetical to Platonic epistemology. At the heart of the Stoic challenge to Platonism lies an epistemology Platonism thinks it can provide, through skepticism, good reason for rejecting. We see play out a protracted history of epistemological stand-off between Stoa and Academy.

But, as we wish to show the dogmatist one of us all along by ad hominem, this sort of historical exercise of showing Platonism in Pyrrhonism would prove a failure if it did not illustrate how the Academy’s Pyrrhonian phase was not a bastardization of Platonism just resultant from a contingent history of dialectical pressures upon it, but rather an essential expression of Platonism. We do not mean to show just Platonism in Pyrrhonism, but the essence of Platonism Pyrrhonian. In other words, Pyrrhonism may have entered the Academy and left it, but if Plato- nism is bastardized in the history of the Academy, it would be rather when it tends towards dogmatism.

Our work must begin, then, with a general account of the essence of Platonism as Pyrrhonian. Any further historical explanation of events in the Academy will be under the norm that such events must be explained as an expression—no matter how failed—of Platonism understood as Pyrrhonian.

290 Socrates’ apophasia: Rep. 505a, 506c-d.

290 Thus, the explanation of any Pyrrhonism expressed by the Academy under Arcesilaus would come easily to us once we had established the norm. The litany of influences on Arcesilaus we just passed over—in the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Parmenides, the Seventh Letter—would not just be an invitation to the Pyrrhonist to wander into and then, by giving them undue focus, set up shop in the Academy. Focus on these influences would be an unadulterated exercise in Platonism.

On the other hand, any perceived falling away from Platonic progress as idealized under Pyrrhonian ascent to suspension, would, for now, have to be left to be explained by those who preoccupy themselves with contingencies. Such historians we would leave the task of taking as norm in writing the history of the Academy the presumption that the essence of Platonism is skeptical and that dogmatism has worth in so far as it presents the thinker with objects for the educing of skeptical meditation. As skepticism is an insouciant philosophy, in so far as any periods of dogmatism in the Academy should be thought to constitute a failure of Platonic expression, our historians will need to look at the supposed contingencies—the nature of fear and pride in the characters of the particular thinker and her opponents, the current preoccupations of her prospective audience inside and outside her Academy, the opinions of the vulgus, the political liberties afforded her Academy, the size of her Academy’s coffers, and so on—that manage to bear on the Academic thinker so as to pervert a genuinely Platonic expression towards wayward dogmatic intellectualism.

Are we really to call these people, and others who are students of these things, or of petty crafts, philosophers? Republic, 475d-e

291 In providing an ad hominem account of the Academy as Pyrrhonian, we must give, in explaining the kinship among the different historical expressions of the Academy, a dialectical account of a hierarchy among these expressions which shows the Pyrrhonian way to be the essence of Platonism. Our account of the Academy will not be of the expression of, and struggle towards apprehension of an abiding dogmatism, but of the expression of, and struggle towards energetic, suspensive activity.

The validity of the exercise lies in its therapy. For it to be therapeutic, the ad hominem argument runs from the commitments of the dogmatist to a result that must exceed the experience of commitment. We appear to want to give an ad hominem that derives as result in the thinker an adjustment away from the faction of the dogmatists towards that of the skeptics. If the ad hominem conceived under such factionalism is not meant to disabuse the interlocutor of her science,291 still, it at least must derive more than what the dogmatist is currently willing to embrace. By the ad hominem, both any positive dogmatism read into Plato through Aris- totle or Middle Platonism, and any negative dogmatism of the late skeptical Academy under Philo are supposed to be shown instrumental to, an approach to, or a falling short of the higher end of Platonic suspensive science.

291 As the Epicurean intends her analysis of Platonism in geometry.

292 On reading Plato

Were we to analyze the dialogues for skeptical Platonism, we would immediately see how the format of the dialogue allows Plato to avoid any straightforward doctrinal declaration his purported skepticism, from fear of shamelessness, should wish to avoid. For example, any skepticism he be supposed inclined to declare can be given through the mouth of an actor on a stage.

—Well, Socrates, it doesn’t seem right to me for you to be willing to state other people’s convictions (dogmata) but not your own, especially when you’ve spent so much time occupied with these matters. —What? Do you think it’s right to talk about things one doesn’t know as if one does know them? —In no way as if one knows them, he said, but one ought to be willing to state one’s opinions as such. —What? Haven’t you noticed that opinions without knowledge are shameful and ugly things? Republic 506b-c292

Instead of giving a philosophical manifesto, Plato reveals himself through a story with a hero. We seek to analyze this fiction for the true Plato. But also, as we give analysis of this fiction, we seek to incorporate this sensibility of revealing facts through fiction. After all, if we were to come to understand Plato as a skeptic by an effort to practice like we envision Plato, we would have to give our analysis in a manner equally congenial to any eschewal of dogmatizing.

* * *

293

In Plato's aporetic dialogues, we don’t, as we might readily in a tragedy, take the titular dogmatic character as hero, but, instead, embrace him as gadfly. In general, there is a tendency to see ourselves in the character of Socrates foremost, and to read the dialogues as if they were adventures of a comic book hero. Such a kind of reading we might think condition for seeing Socrates’ studied reluctance to claim possession of knowledge as decidedly Platonic: The hero Socrates is a skeptic, hence Platonism is a skepticism.

The hero Socrates is a skeptic: Our hero commends investigation after definition, yet might be seen to express himself negatively of the possibility of capturing the end of philosophical inquiry in sheer propositional experience. Through the hero, we see a Platonic apophasis approached as a dominant point of view in the dialectic, in the aporia and bewilderment of supposedly early dialogues, as well as, e.g., in Socrates’ denigration of writing in the Phaedrus. We see such an understanding of our hero confirmed in Plato's appreciation in the Seventh Letter of a difficulty in capturing in extended language of propositional thought tout court an experience of dialectical ground—i.e., via the Parmenides, a contemplation of the One.293 If we have generous—cheerful, rather than curmudgeonly—imagination, we might be optimistic enough to think we can take Socratic apophasia as genuine beginning to an understanding of Platonism as a skepticism without fear that we should become stuck in a commitment to some despicable nihilism in skepticism.

292 After Grube. 293 The Letter reports a difficulty in writing as foremost evident of a difficulty in language tout court (342e-343a, cf. 344b-c). Surely, if the Letter is not spurious, since it is not a dialogic expression, it is as dogmatic an expression as we could hope for.

294 But next: Any Socratic perspective—whether, in suspension of our foregoing reading, skeptical or dogmatic—is given in dialogue. And so, even if the dialogue has a hero, nothing appears affirmed directly by the author. On the one hand, we might be tempted by an analysis of Platonism as skepticism not just through interpreting Socrates as skeptic, but also through interpreting the dialogue format itself as medium for non-dogmatic expression. For example: We might be tempted to appreciate philosophy presented through dialogue as placed in the Pyrrhonian balance by locating it as given in the context of a dialogue between perspectives. But then, on the other hand, any supposed skepticism in Socrates would be further placed in the balance. If Socrates is a skeptic, still, he would be representative of just one dialectical perspective in the dialogues.

In our project of giving Platonism as Pyrrhonism, we would read skepticism into the Platonic text we wish to declare skeptical, both in spirit and in form. In our effort appears something of a contradiction akin to the paradox we find in an expression such as troubles us so in skepticism. For example a Pyrrhonian expression such as: “I don’t have any beliefs,” if made honestly in philosophy, seems an expression of dogma, and so, a philosophical dogmatism. Analogously, first our understanding of Socrates’ skeptical expression suffers a similar worry, if it is of a kind with the Pyrrhonian expression—as seems a condition for our running our ad hominem analysis of Platonism as a sort of skepticism. How could we charitably interpret Socrates as expressing skepticism seemingly rife with paradox? But second, our interpretive act of seeing through such expression skepticism in Platonism suffers similar worry if we find further motivation for skepticism in the format of the dialogue as instantiation of the idea of the balance into which the Pyrrhonist lays objects to consider equipollent from a further perspective appreciative of this balance in equilibrium. For then, as the dialogue is a way of laying in

295 the balance, any attachment to the paradoxical expression we have through our attachment to our hero who expresses it is supposed once more doubtful.

In fact, in seeing analogy between, on the one hand, the problem of the possibility of rational Pyrrhonian expression which purports to leave inquiry always open-ended (e.g., in the end, by the expression: I don’t have any beliefs), and on the other, a problem of the possibility of rationally interpreting for skepticism in the dialogues, we might begin to see the possibility of the former through analysis of the latter.

The skeptical expression is ever made in anticipation of further dialectic, while the dialogues themselves give us an image of the activity of a hero ever bent on further inquiry, even after the dialogue has come to an end.294 The skeptical proposition is expressed with the same artistic sensibility in the skeptical thinker of producing an image as in the author who writes dialogues in awareness that they merely provide a still of ongoing dialectical activity.

But it is much nobler to be serious about these matters, and use the art of dialectic. The dialectician chooses a proper soul and plants and sows within it discourse accompanied by knowledge—discourse capable of helping itself as well as the man who planted it, which is not barren, but produces seed from which more discourse grows in the character of others. Phaedrus 276e-277a295

The dialogue is image of spoken dialectical exchange in which interlocutors wish to capture, in living word, the truth. But, since it is in the living word, never conclusively. True dialectic is performed in living speech and thought whose nature is, as it is in time here and gone, always open-ended.

294 Though, of course, some dialogues end more dogmatically than others.

296 Socrates’ interlocutors will find something better to move on to from the inquiry at hand. Cephalus must go sacrifice to the gods, Euthyphro prosecute his father. And, in the end, Socrates, too, has engagements to keep that leave inquiry unfinished. Of course, we find in Socrates the relentless skeptical hunger of the philosopher.

Once preoccupied and talking to himself, and asked the reason, he said that he was practicing to be good. DL 9.64

Likewise, we are told in the Symposium that Socrates was in the habit of turning motionless in the middle of whatever activity when consumed by thought. Nonetheless, he will eventually snap out his philosophical trance to return to and go about his business in the world. Transfixed, Socrates leaves his friend Aristodemus to go ahead to Agathon's symposium, but eventually turns up mid festivity.296 Some unspecified appointment at the end of the Protagoras has him agree to give up on his inquiry. His trial for impiety beckons at the end of the Theaetetus. True to form, on his way from Theaetetus he happens on Euthyphro to do some more philosophy with. Still, in the end, he eventually walks into the courthouse. Famously, and, perhaps, impractically, Socrates pursues even there philosophy, instead of indulging in the formalities of legal pleading, and by this persistence appears to bring his sentence upon himself. Afterwards, awaiting his execution, his love for wisdom remains unabated, and he philosophizes until the very end in the Phaedo.

295 Nehamas & Woodruff. 296 Symposium 175b.

297 But at last, just as Socrates must eventually enter the courthouse in the Eu- thyphro, so he must take the poison at the allotted time.

Such practical interludes in Socrates’ life provide punctuation by which Plato may help divide Socrates’ ongoing contemplation into dialogues. But the implication is that beyond the dialogue, as long as there is life, the man would continue philosophical inquiry and never be done. In any concern with the chronology of Plato’s work we might prefer to consider an arrangement of the dialogues in attention to the biographical context in which Socrates’ ongoing thought is storied to have taken place. For example, chronologically, the Republic might come before the Timaeus, and these before the Theaetetus and Euthyphro, and these before the Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. And, under a norm for appreciation in the philosopher for her audience, the nature of the dialogue—propedeutically aporetic, or skillfully expository—would be determined by the talents of the interlocutor. Our chronological concern would not be with Plato foremost, but with the flight and perplexity of the intellect of the hero of Plato’s story given, by episodes, in the dialogues. In these dialogues, the concern of Socrates' reflection—the intuition of goodness—remains unaltered, but its expression is shaped variously by Socrates’ circumstance.

…for you have often heard that the form of the good is the greatest thing to learn about… Rep. 505a.

On the one hand Socrates is reported as free from a lifeless chemistry of his material—unaffected by cold, hunger, or inebriation. Still, on the other, he is given

298 nonetheless in the world, pulled about by the agency of his fellows. He is dragged off by Polemarchus to later find Thrasymachus and Glaucon; made to promise—if he is going to avoid the proper festivities—to come to Agathon’s after-party. In the dark, having given in to sleep, he is tickled at the foot by some youngster to go see Protagoras before daybreak. Nonetheless, he remains all the while in the ensuing interactions, as long as the audience permits, singularly concerned with the skeptical contemplation of goodness. In the very end, during his last days, this concern manifests itself in a range of expressions from, e.g., aporetic elenchus with Euthyphro, to philosophical flight in consideration of the forms with Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo. Through the chronology of our hero we see a man now quite explicitly aporetic, now expository of a possible solution, now once more aporetic, and so on. If we think Socrates, even if pedagogically, genuinely giving expression to perplexity in the aporetic dialogues, we cannot trace a progression in his psychology from perplexity to dogmatic vision if the chronology of his consciousness goes from, say, that of the philosopher arriving in vision of reality in the Republic, back to that of perplexity in the Euthyphro. As the dialogues play out against the background of Socrates’ never ending search over the course of his life, they would be given as still-lives of unfinished dialectic. And so they allow for a depiction of Socrates’ expressing himself skeptically without further commitment to his skepticism. Inquiry continues beyond the punctuation of the proposition given in living dialectic. And Plato’s preference for writing philosophical theatre in episodic plays that describe a life is from an attempt to capture this continuation of inquiry beyond the dialectic given in the episode.

Perhaps, we could insist that chronologically, as it constitutes an apex of the final dialogue in Socrates’ life, the vision of the realm of the forms by the soul

299 liberated through death from the body given in the Phaedo remains Socrates’ last word. If we took this vision as motivation in all other dialogues, if Socrates would approach with his interlocutor the vision given dogmatically in the Phaedo in other dialectical episodes as the best he can given the constraints of his audience, he would act from sheer pedagogical proselytizing—i.e., without wishing to learn more of the good from his interlocutor, and merely concerned to show his interlocutor something of the truth he has access to. Socrates was never genuinely inquisitive.

Still, not too long ago, in the Apology, Socrates says that for the first time he speaks without being checked by his daimōn. Where before he had the desire to speak, but was forbidden by his guiding spirit to act, here, before a court apparently intent on constraining his liberty by threatening an end to his life, he finds himself let unconstrained.297 Here he stands, he can do no other. In this sensibility, Socrates, in explaining his philosophical commitment in awareness of the danger of being condemned because of it, gives us an account of death as either a welcome dreamless sleep, or a life which will afford him continuation of dialectical inquiry.298 Transcendence of the body will result in welcome rest from any becoming, or if there remains still variegated mental life, he will pursue philosophical inquiry with the dead that have gone before. In this dichotomy, we find a commitment to, as long as there is any life in our souls, further inquiry. Even the anticipated punctuation of death turns out not interfere with the future-directed activity of inquiry.299 At the very last, even though we might be punctilious in administering the poison to ourselves, we will

297 Apology 40a-b. 298 Apology circa 40, cf. Phaedo circa 63. 299 The consciousness of this future-directedness of our awareness given, e.g., in Wittgenstein's wonder at his preoccupation with his future in this world, even in cognizance of the narrow window of time given him by doctors. (Rhees, 1981), p. 183; (Malcolm & Winch, 1993), p. 14.

300 take it in anticipation of our continuation. In the case of Socrates: In continuation as he is now, as a dialectical participant in inquiry.

Even, then, at the end of the chronology of his life, we may imagine Socra- tes—in so far as he is rationally engaged in his dialectical activity—anticipatory of further dialectic. The dialogue comes to an end. And in the Phaedo, so does the body. But through the demise of both the body of the character, and the text of the dialogue, the inquisitive sensibility survives. And so the last thing said will remain even at death—of the body, of the dialogue, of the dialogue as final episode—anticipatory of further inquiry.

If we are charitable towards a philosopher, we must attempt to practice her way. If our interpretation could turn out to be correct under this norm for charity, the practice will show itself robust. In a thoroughgoing attempt to understand Platonism through Pyrrhonism, we should learn to write in the spirit we interpret. Under this norm, we give our interpretation as for in the balance, open-ended and anticipatory of further inquiry—as if it were a dialogue. We do not give a proof of its correctness, but attempt to practice in accordance with it.

301 Some remarks on chronology and progress

Our task at present is to describe in outline the skeptical doctrine, first premising that of none of our future statements do we positively affirm that the fact is exactly as we state it, but we simply record each fact, like a chronicler (historikōs), as it appears to us at the moment. PH 1.4

…and [the critical art] which treats of readiness in handling unarranged material is historical. AM 1.249

We wish to present a case study of Platonism as a Pyrrhonism for the sake of showing Pyrrhonism viable. We imagine that such a presentation, given properly, would be given in the form of a Pyrrhonian therapeutic exercise for the dogmatic Platonist. We imagine a Platonist undergoing Platonic pedagogy, and we try to find a way of (a) analyzing by ad hominem for a notion of what a skeptical completion of this pedagogy would look like, and (b) of acting out this pedagogy, at least for the sake of its demonstration. Let two things be clear: First, our construction of Platonism may be controversial. We present it with the present intent to show Platonism skeptical, and perhaps we could make our task harder. Second, while we may not think our construction of Platonism unlikely, if we attempt to construct it for the sake of skeptical therapy of an imagined ancient Platonist, we might not think it correct, either.

302 For example, we operate in our construction on an assumption of affinity between the Platonists of the early Academy, and those of Plotinus’ day. And this is controversial. Or we tend to ignore issues surrounding the chronology of the dialogues which appear to have left the ancient Platonist cold, but are of much concern to us today. If there is a fact of the matter, perhaps our construction of Platonism is off the mark. However, perhaps there is something in it that we may find cheering. Perhaps, even if we only appreciate what we say through an appreciation of it as laid in the balance, a sense of optimism may prevail in our reading of Plato as a Pyrrhonist: Plato never settled into the thought that the best most could hope for was to live like a bee or ant under a philosopher queen. Plato's aim for all would always have been that we live together as philosopher kings, and this end would have been envisioned worked towards by fleshing out, over the course of his life, a pedagogy for different sorts of thinkers in different sorts of dialogues. We take for granted that Plato writes at least for the sake of paideia. Then, if the so-called early dialogues and the Apology appear directed at the commoner and the young, it might be an act of pessimism contrary to our demand for charity to imagine eventual disillusionment in Plato qua pedagogue, such that he abandoned or denigrated or thought the better of the project of writing the aporetic dialogues. And the same goes for the middle dialogues. Then, we might fall short of a norm for integration in our study of the object Plato the pedagogue if we could not see, e.g., how if the so-called early and middle dialogues were indeed completed before later work, Plato could consider them an integral part of a pedagogy which had sought to transform in the manner of Socrates and Meno's slave. If we appreciated that Plato conceived of himself throughout his authorial life in possession somehow—like a slave recollecting—of vision that would warrant public writing all along, a pedagogical filone aureo might appear to run through

303 the dialogues. And by the story of education in the Republic, it might appear that Plato would be giving throughout them a trajectory for ascent. With this in mind, we might try to make light of the need to subscribe to the presently popular division of Platonic texts into chronological categories of early, middle and late. For example, Plato may have started in the middle of his life, in realization of a warrant and demand for public writing, in the middle of his pedagogy, and worked outwards for the sake of a rationally determined pedagogy of the thinker from rational naïveté in the early dialogues towards vision in the late. But still, qua ascent, we might determine pedagogically the same popular chronology of the dialogues. The thinker is, e.g., just as we educate our students, first confronted with the demand for and difficulties of definition of virtue in the early dialogues. But this does not mean that Plato wrote them in the same order. For example, we may imagine Plato as just like us, and so concerned to write the most important parts first, to first give a general pedagogy—e.g., as in the Repub- lic—and leave for later how to work out, backwards and forewords, the details of tiered curricula later.

We give, for placing in the balance, a speculation that Plato may have started writing philosophy in possession of some sort of vision of the difficulties both of cultivating awareness in the uninitiated, and of further grounding the virtues in an elevated ontology we think given and examined in the so-called middle and late dialogues. In this vision of difficulty, Plato may have devised, in the manner of Sextus who tailors arguments to his audience, a dialogic pedagogy for interlocutors of different abilities (just as we might try to devise different curricula for those we meet in the street, in undergraduate classes, graduate seminars, and at conferences), or of different philosophical inclinations (just as we may against the relativist lay a science of the measurement of pleasure in the balance; or against the hedonist, the good of the rational activity of choosing).

304 But, as we will see, in our pursuit of a pedagogical analysis of Platonism as Pyrrhonism, we will even go so far in abandoning concerns of historical chronology of the texts that we give an apophatic contemplation of the One in Plotinus, who apparently comes—no less than after Plato—after Sextus chronologically, as exemplary expression of the advanced student under skeptical Platonic pedagogy, as if he were a more important Platonist than Plato. We limn a unified Platonic pedagogy which leads the thinker towards Pyrrhonism; and we project that Plotinus’ difficulties in advanced dialectic will be an exemplary expression of the final stages of the trajectory of our Platonic philosopher.

We may suffer an impression here that our interpretive moves are too sweep- ing, even careless. We might begin to suspect that our focus on the pedagogical chronology of the student in ascent as reconstructed towards Pyrrhonism has put paid to too many considerations regarding the history of the production of the material. The questions of the chronological order in which the dialogues were written, and of the historical contexts of Sextus and later Platonists’ reading Plato, perhaps give us reason to pause and consider whether, e.g. the Plato of later dialogues is on board with what has been said in earlier ones or revised his views as he went along; or whether we can take as manual for meditative exercise on the dialogues skeptical outlines apparently written in the second century with much concern to argue against the infiltration of Stoic dogmatism into the Academy of the Middle Platonists; or whether we can identify the opinions of Plotinus’ writing about Plato with the opinions of Plato. Perhaps our effort at discovery by producing pedagogy could be better: We should flesh out, or check, our terse remarks about how the task of the chronologist tracing the development of the Academy could just be a matter of explaining, through examination of historical contexts for the Academy, how the Academy, over the course of time, may appear to have fallen away from or regained the—as we give it for in the balance—true skeptical pedagogy of Plato. This terseness may

305 have betrayed a lack of sensitivity towards our present reader, if we should expect that our work is being read on the condition of the reader’s interest in the history of ideas. Then, a reconstruction of Platonism which is unconcerned with chronology appears a pedagogical mistake: If charity is a condition on Pyrrhonian therapy through ad hominem, in order to pursue it, we must construe the Pyrrhonist’s opponent on his own terms. If we think that the therapy applies even to us present- day historians, then perhaps we ought to construct the ancient dogmatic Platonic opponent in accordance with a dominant understanding of Platonism through the present state of the art.

To begin a Pyrrhonian therapy for historians, then,let us make a general remark about an assumption that we must construct an ancient dogmatic Platonist in consideration of modern chronological concerns: To be sure, we may commit a sin in assimilating Plotinus and Plato. For example, we prefer, in giving Platonism as Pyrrhonism, a succinct straightforward apohasia of Plotinus while Plato puts everything at a remove from himself through the dialogues. This alone should perhaps deliver sufficient ground for querying our interpretation. But our very act of performing written analysis of the dialogues already would involve this sin. In our act of analyzing Plato, if we fail to write like Pierre Menard, how could we then ever get things right with regard to Plato? In light of the consideration that our text, too, might be read in addition to Plato's dialogues, what would set us apart from Plotinus? We might reply, as we have been suggesting, “Very little.” Or we might reply: "But Plotinus was not Plato, because Plotinus believed this, and Plato that. For example: Plotinus’ One was not the Republic’s Good.” And we might say things intended to show this, and ally ourselves with those whom we find sympathetic, just as the Pyrrhonist might do if she finds Plotinus congenial to a Platonic skepticism.

306 But perhaps, if not probably, Plotinus was trying to capture some salient essence of the dialogues just as we are. If our worry is that Plotinus is chronologically at a remove from Plato, or that he expresses himself differently from Plato, so that we have reason to think that we would be hasty to assimilate Plotinus and Plato, we should be equally worried about what we have to say about Plato, or the difference between Plato and Plotinus. And perhaps more so, if chronology is of concern, and we assume that the lapse of time must expose the thinker to new distractions for thinking about: If we no less desired progress towards understanding Plato than Plotinus did, we would appear to be at a disadvantage by being further removed from Plato in history. The same consideration should occur to us when we consider now of importance something the ancients closer to Plato appeared to care little for: the chronology of the corpus. And this indifference should not surprise the Pyrrhonist, if the end of the Pla- tonists is in dialectic, but

the [historian] cannot declare, on the ground of any scientific and general consideration, that the shoulder of Pelops, after it was devoured by Ares of Demeter, was of ivory… AM 1.255300

Still, let us attempt to go ahead and take into consideration these chronological concerns in the construction of a skeptical ad hominem analysis of dogmatic Platonism. We ask: What is at stake in chronology? To what end do we wish to know the order in which Plato wrote? Perhaps we think by this order to trace a development through which Plato discovered, and perhaps subsequently rejected, the Forms. We would wish to discover a temporally extended author behind the content so as to better under-

300 Trans. Bury.

307 stand the genesis of the content. Perhaps the chronologist holds out the hope that if we know the order in which Plato wrote the dialogues, we will be able to say: "In the end, Plato arrived in the following vision: …" And then we will understand Plato, given that he is a pedagogue, all the better. We will be able to better understand the intended direction of his pedagogy by a history of his transformative discovery.

Both those who wish to give a pedagogical order, and those who wish to give a chronological order, wish to order the content under a norm given in developmental psychology. As students of pedagogy we wish to apply this norm—if we understand Plato both as developing towards vision over time, and as devising a pedagogy towards it—because we wish to know the congenial pedagogy towards discovery and transformation. As chronologists we wish to apply this norm for the sake of understanding the creative process of discovery and transformation in the actual author. But the chronologist of Plato must arrange any presumed historical data so as to provide a sensible picture of the development of the thinker. But then, our norm in developmental psychology for both historical and pedagogical reconstruction of Plato is given first through an expectation about the pedagogy.

If we consider the literary corpus as executed for the sake of pedagogy, most of what we need may already appear—perhaps unless we think our author so poor that in order to diagnose the pedagogy we need his biographical or stylometric details—given just qua philosophy in the corpus.301

301 We may still ask a fine question about, e.g., where the Timaeus goes, but we still already presume, or even think to see, much of a pedagogical order once we get round to this question. Our placement of the Timaeus may become of great importance to our conceptualization of this order, but we are presently removed from such details.

308 We might presently live with many chronologies for the actual writing of the dialogues. But if we must reconstruct the maturation of Plato's thought through a chronological ordering of the dialogues, we still do so under a norm we expect expressed through the pedagogy. We assume that where chronology matters, it will be reflective of Platonic pedagogy as much as of his discovery.

In a reconstruction of the pedagogy as being towards skepticism, we may consider the progress through the pedagogy as aligned with the chronology of the dialogues into early, middle, and late. Against this historical and pedagogical background, we may give a reconstruction of the pedagogical development of Plato consistent with Platonism as Pyrrhonism. Our reconstruction, then, need not be antithetical to an attempt to divide the dialogues into early, middle, and late; but our embrace of the division need not entail that we think that the dialogues are unified because throughout his writing them we can see that Plato entertained a single doctrine, nor that we think that they contain radical doctrinal revisions because we can see that Plato changed his mind. We might give the dialogues as both unified and revisionary, not qua doctrine, but qua pedagogy, because the student is supposed to be drawn along through a unified pedagogy, through revision, doubt, and question, towards a settled skepticism.

If throughout the corpus we will find a pedagogical filone aureo towards skepticism, then perhaps we may even overcome our chronological worry about the distance and difference between—if Pyrrhonism is our focus—Plato in the past, and Sextus as mouthpiece of Pyrrhonism in the present, and Plotinus in the future. Just as we reconstruct Plato in the past as a present Pyrrhonist, we project that the Plotinian expression we examine is exemplary of the advanced student in contemplation of the apex of speculative Platonic ontology. Just as we give Sextus' skepticism as philosophy for interpretation of a unified Platonic pedagogy, we

309 give in the tradition of this pedagogy Plotinus' Platonic apophasia for interpretation of the direction of this pedagogy. Since we give Platonism as a skepticism, no dogma is presented in it. The epistemological, ontological and ethical claims, counterclaims, and questions dis- persed throughout the dialogues considered pedagogically from early, through middle, to late are just given in order to further suspension and inquiry. Likewise, if we try to reconstruct Plotinus as true Platonist, his philosophy we try to take offered not as dogmatic, but as pedagogical. Then any question about a difference of opinion between Plato and Plotinus would become moot. We would have to examine the Plotinian corpus for success in the context of skeptical Platonic pedagogy, not for Plotinus' opinion. As we saw, in an attempt at Pyrrhonian optimism and charity, we even went on to suggest that we might attempt to gather all attempts at philosophy under an attempt at pedagogy towards skepticism. In this sort of attempt at gathering, as we intimated before, our study of the Academics would have to be first pedagogical, not chronological. Our investigation, under a norm for charity given together with an appreciation that supreme rationality is contingent on the thinker's abiding by the Modes, would labor against ascribing to the philosopher under investigation a blindness about her purpose before it succumbs. (For example, perhaps Plotinus really wishes to ground a Platonic ontology of Forms and Intellect in the One. But, as we will see, the skeptic may remain cheered by the difficulty Plotinus discovers in any attempt to propositionalize the nature of a principle from which all being emanates. In his provision of an apophasis in the activity of contemplating this principle we may discover skeptical advancement.) And if eventually we concerned ourselves with the chronological history of the Academy, we would do so first with regard to the questions of why the historical

310 characters of the Academy perform the pedagogical function that they do, or why they appear to fall into dogmatizing in the provision of this pedagogy.

Indeed, we might even go so far as to say that if we wish to give an account of Platonic pedagogy with a suggestion that Platonism is Pyrrhonism as found in Sextus, and that the direction of the pedagogy is given succinct expression in the apophasia of a later Platonist called Plotinus, our account may suffer little damage just from the chronological considerations that succinct Pyrrhonian analysis of Plato is afforded after him through Sextus, and that this analysis finds succinct expression in someone who comes after both Plato and Sextus. Our aim in doing history of philosophy includes the discovery of the philosophy. Perhaps this should mean that we try as best we can to make the philosophy our own. But in Platonism, perhaps the chronological details of the production of the texts are for those who love sights and sounds, not dialectic and philosophy. And then, perhaps, the historian so bedazzled and preoccupied with chronology remains at a remove from the philosophy. In that case, in a history of discovery we might speculate that the Plotinian apophasis we give as skeptical expression may have been the product of Plotinus' reading both Plato and subsequent skeptics like Sextus. But this tracing of influence would be, if true, an ancillary consideration to a pedagogical understanding of Plotinus' exhortation to subtraction as for the sake of elevated Platonic maieusis towards Pyrrhonism.

311 Platonism as skepticism

The soul runs after all truths, but, for all that, if someone tries to speak or think discursively (dia- noēthēnai), flees the truths of which we partake. For it is necessary that discursive thought (dianoia), in order that it proclaim, takes one thing after another. For this is how description (hē diexodos) is. But what is the description of that which is altogether simple? But it is enough to touch upon it by the intellect (noerōs). But when it touches, while it touches, it is altogether impossible, nor has it time, to speak. But afterwards, it is able to reason about it (sullogīzesthai). Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.17

With awareness, then, that some may balk at a cursory assimilation of Plotinus and Plato, and of Plotinus’ One and the Republic’s Good, we continue to present, for in the balance against the notion that the suspensive life is incomplete in lacking valuable rational activity, our ad hominem sketch of Platonism as Pyrrho- nism through consideration of how Plotinus imagines the Platonist as arrived in contemplation of the One. We try to sketch a dilemma for the dogmatist: Either her end is attained by overcoming rationality, in which case Pyrrhonism is, if anything, to be embraced, rather than rejected. Or her end is attained in rational contemplation, and the supreme expression of such contemplation is suspension, in which case, again, Pyrrhonism is, if anything, to be embraced, rather than rejected.

Plato will give the aim of the philosopher’s approach of wisdom as a dialectical transcendence of aporia through knowledge. The philosopher is to ascend away from the experience of fragmentation encountered in the world of becoming, through mathematical dianoia, towards a grasp of being in eidetic noēsis, and,

312 finally, a consciousness assimilated to the unified fundament of the world (the Form of the Good, or to hen—the One) that lies epekeina tēs ousias—beyond being.302 In setting off from mathematics, Platonic education presents the student first with objects for eliciting a sensibility of anomaly in the world of becoming by priming her sensibility for stasis. The first aim of the geometrical mathēma is, through the development of the discursive scientific sensibility of an approach to, yet falling short of, stasis, a development of the sensibility of anomaly arising from trying to hold still in contemplation of the unassailable proposition the variegated experience of the world of becoming. If we are to take seriously Proclus’ claim that the objects of geometry are intermediary between the world of variegated becoming and simple being, the science of geometry, being a science of an intermediate object, on the one hand moves us away from the naïveté in which we are lead, blindly and fragmented in a lack of awareness of the illusory nature of the world of becoming, by, e.g., the present pride, or the present lust or anxiety, or the present vulgar sense of propriety and honor. On the other hand, by the atemporal rational laws of geometry under which the presentations of its objects are to be unified, geometry is propaedeutic to any consciousness of the One. But the intermediary status we find ascribed by Proclus to the objects of geometry we see in our quote from Plotinus extended to philosophical discourse in highest exercise of philosophy: the attempt to capture the highest reality tout court. As in Sextus’ geometry the problem of the affirmation of the unity of the geometrical point is abstracted to a problem of affirmation tout court, so, too, the problem of the discursiveness of geometry is given by Proclus in the context of a

302 Rep. 6, 509b, 517b, 532a-b, e, Metaphysics 998a10, 1092a14-15, Ennead 1.3.1, 5.3.17 Cf. Proclus on Speusippus in Parmenidem Book 7, 38-40K; (Proclus, Morrow, & Dillon, 1987), pp. 485-86.

313 problem of discourse tout court already given by Plotinus. Philosophical arrival at the One will have to be an apophatic transcendence of the problems of discourse.

Scientifically, through the method of hypothesis, dianoia would purport to receive its ground from the results of noēsis. In the philosopher’s dialectical assent towards wisdom, the former is in some way prior to the latter. Thus, dianoia is anticipatory to noēsis and sophia. Didactically, Platonism presents the Platonic science as aiming, through the discursive investigation of mathematics, for noēsis of the Forms and, through this, a purified consciousness of the Good, or, in Plotinus, the One.303 As in relation to this pursued unified consciousness, mathematical understanding—being discursive of extended objects—is imperfect, we can ask: “How could a discursively imperfect object be grounded in perfection?” For the rules of derivation that govern scientific grounding of discursive objects are supposed to be transparent; there is no room for anything tenebrous to insinuate itself into the derivation from the unifying principle towards the hypotheses of geometry.

In one subsection, the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before, is forced to investigate from hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle but to a conclusion. In the other subsection, however, it makes its way to a first principle that is not a hypothesis, proceeding from a hypothesis but without the images used in the previous subsection, using forms themselves and making its investigation through them. Republic 510b And:

303 We suggest that the identification of the Good and the One is not just a Neoplatonism. Vide Aristotle’s, Aristoxenus’ and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ reports of Plato’s lecture On the Good. Plato is said to have astounded his audience by giving a mathematical demonstration of the Good as the One. Cf. proximal footnote above.

314 I understand […] that you want to distinguish the intelligible part of that which is, the part studied by the science of dialectic, as clearer than the part studied by the so-called sciences, for which their hypotheses are first principles. And although those who study the objects of these sciences are forced to do so by means of thought rather than sense perception, still, _because they do not go back to a genuine first principle, but proceed from hypotheses, you don’t think that they understand them, even though, given such a principle, they are intelligible. And you seem to me to call the state of the geometers thought but not understanding, thought being intermediate between opinion and understanding. Republic 511c-d304

The analogy of the Divided Line gives us a hierarchy of objects for consciousness in which mathematics is to the Forms in the intelligible realm of being as illusory reflections and shadows are to the objects of the visible world of becoming. We might interpret the analogy as following: In the visible realm the light reflects off the face, and then off the water back to the eye, and further distorts it. By the analogy, in the intelligible realm geometry becomes an image, and so a distortion of the Good. If we see Plato’s Good as anticipating Plotinus’ One, geometrical contemplation becomes an impressionistic act whose subject is not the reflection of the sun off Rouen’s cathedral as it moves through its course, but the reflection of unity off the extended objects of geometry. Geometry as an image of, or distortion from, reality puts it at a remove from reality.

304 Trans. Grube.

Mathematical contemplation is supposed to be just the first transcendence of the illusion of the world of becoming. As such, even though we are driven by the apparent self-evidence of claims about the objects of geometry to think them of reality, we should, as Platonists, be careful to recognize that, in the extendedness of the objects of geometry, lies a sign of their imperfection. These objects, too, are images.

315 But, at the same time, geometry, being a species of mathematical understanding, is supposed to lie on the higher side of the primary division of the Line. As shadows are to the objects of the visible world, the realm of the visible world and its shadows is, on our present interpretation, shadow to the higher realm of dianoia and noēsis. Yet, the ontology of shadow and reality is carried over, in accordance with the analogy given in the proportional relations between the segments of the Line, even into this latter realm. As an image in the world of becoming is to the objects of this world, this world is to the world of being, but also, in this world of being, geometry is as image of the object of the world of being.

At first, he’d see shadows most easily, then images of men and other things in water, then the things themselves. Of these, he’d be able to study the things in the sky and the sky itself more easily at night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than during the day, looking at the sun and the light of the sun. Finally, I suppose, he’d be able to see the sun, not images of it in water or some alien place, but the sun itself, in its own place, and be able to study it.

Republic 516a-b305

A common sense notion of unity in the point is taken as the hypothesis from which to seek further geometrical constructions (definitions, propositions) through an exercise in seeking an analysis of these constructions back into the point. But this practice of analyzing from the hypothesis to its particular data is propaedeutic to contemplation of the difficulties of what is hypothesized. The act of hypothesizing is to be overcome. On a dogmatic epistemology: As the act of hypothesis is an act of deferral, what is deferred to is supposed to provide the ground for the truth of the hypothe-

305 Grube.

316 sis. The higher science is to overcome hypothesis by securing the ground for it in affirmation of the fundamental principle.

Then also understand that, by the other subsection of the intelligible, I mean that which reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic. It does not consider these hypotheses as first principles but truly as hypotheses—but as stepping stones to take off from, en- abling it to reach the unhypothetical first principle of everything. Having grasped this principle, it reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a conclusion without making use of anything visible at all, but only of forms themselves, moving on from forms to forms, and ending in forms. Republic 511b306

In transcending a dianoetic science such as geometry through the dialectic of higher philosophy, the student is to seek noēsis of the Forms, and, by this, acquaintance with the Good. On our assumption of an intimate relation between Plato’s Good, and Plotinus’ One, then, we might understand how in Proclus the objects of geometry are intermediary in an ascent to the One. The achievement of noēsis is the epistemic condition of the thinker who is no longer forced along by dialectic to defer her establishment of her ground by the method of hypothesis. Dogmatically: The truth from which the theory is built up—e.g., the truth of her indicative proposition: “This is the One,” or the truth of the principles revealed as constituents in her definition of the One—would be grasped without worry that something more needs to be said. However, dialectic, being a discursive exercise, presents itself to us as extended over time, and so variegated. As a discursive meditation is a meditation upon a sequentially variegated object, in virtue of our need to survey our object in protraction, we would fail to render ourselves unified by an act of affirmation:

317 The soul runs after all truths, but, for all that, if someone tries to speak or think discursively, flees the truths of which we partake. For it is necessary that discursive thought, in order that it proclaim, takes one thing after another. For this is how description is. But what is the description of that which is altogether simple?

In our quote from Plotinus, we may see the notion of image—or shadow— extended from the literal notion of shadow or reflection in the world of becoming, through the notion of the world of becoming as an image laid out in the story of the human chained to see the movement of shadows on the wall of the Cave, through the notion of geometry as an image first encountered as she is dragged out of the Cave, blinded, towards the light, to, eventually, the general notion of propositionalization in dialectic as image. Affirmation would be ever of a distortion of the Good: It would be of a reconstruction thrown together by the thinker in a discursive activity whose fragmented experience falls away from unity.307

Intellectual assimilation to the One would involve overcoming not just a libidinous or scientific preoccupation with the material objects in the variegated world of becoming. It would also involve overcoming the desire to capture in the fragmented proposition the conclusion of the variegated process protracted in time of rationally ordering information for truth. Discursion tout court, being protracted in time, is itself of the world of becoming. The thinker absorbed in her attempt to describe the world so as to identify with the description, is formed in accordance with her phenomenal object, and so takes on the fragmentation of this object.308

306 Grube. 307 “Everything extensible shrinks from itself.” Ennead V.8.28.d 308 Cf. Ennead V.6.1.1-5. We do not mean to imply that in taking on this fragmentation, the thinker was not already fragmented.

318 The thinker who seeks to capture the truth in the proposition is engaged in an act of mīmēsis—she is still seeking to paint an image of reality. In Plotinus, it appears that the extensible distortion of reality we encounter in geometry did not originate from some insertion of turbidity in the derivation from the grounding principle to the hypotheses of geometry. Nor did it come about in the hypothesis of extendedness in space of geometry’s objects. The problem of extension encountered in space in geometry is already present in extended time in the giving of the principle that is to support the hypotheses of geometry.

But afterwards, it is able to reason about it (sul- logīzesthai).

There appears in Plotinus’ Platonism an implication that syllogizing is already the activity of a fragmented thinker. The term sullogīzesthai is variously given as reason about,309 or debate about,310 or throw into syllogism,311 or conclude from premises,312 or overcome in argument.313 It would seem that, as the remark comes in discussion of a categorical problem with any attempt at describing unity, we can assume that Plotinus uses the term sullogīzesthai to cover at least the activity of concluding inquiry in identification with the proposition. If any such activity is a condition for rationality, it would appear that the apex of the Platonic ascent is itself going to be arational. The Platonist would pursue as highest life one of arationality.314 In which case, any sentiment in the Platonist that the Pyrrhonian life is inferior because arational would be irrational. The Platonist in the grip of this sentiment should, at the very least, wish to be rational, and so come to lose the sentiment.

309 LSJ, and the patristic dictionaries of Lampe, and Bauer. 310 Lampe and Bauer. 311 LSJ and Lampe. 312 LSJ on its use in Aristotleian logic. 313 Lampe. 314 The highest life: The best life transcends nous (the intellect) in its ascent to the One. Ennead 5.3.17.1-15.

319 Perhaps, however, it may be that the supreme consciousness of the philosopher ascended is rational, even though this is not found in the rational identification with the propositionalization of a fundamental principle. The supreme philosophical wisdom may not come in the form of assertion, nor, even, in the form of a question whose coherence and pertinence is affirmed. But we can ask whether any such syllogizing is a necessary condition for rational contemplation. If not, the Platonist’s phenomenological end, though non-discursive, may still be given in rational contemplation. However this might obtain, of course, if we take up the view that rational activity need not involve affirmation, the dogmatist may appear once more where we want him: The fear was that the Pyrrhonist fails to live the good life by forgoing assertion and so rational contemplation. But the Platonist, we argued, will, in his full realization, forgo assertion. So, if this means that he must forgo rational contemplation, he should not recoil from the Pyrrhonist just because she equally forgoes rational contemplation by forgoing assertion. But, on the other hand, if forgoing assertion does not entail giving up on rational contemplation, then, again, since then the Pyrrhonist cannot be said to give up on rational contemplation in giving up on assertion, the dogmatist can find no reason to recoil from the Pyrrho- nist just because she suspends. Indeed, the Platonist might find suspension attractive. The Pyrrhonist may be thought to offer suspension as an alternative final rational activity. We might say that the activity, in its being generated from discursive activity, is rational. But in its being silent qua dogmatism, it is not conclusively discursive: It does not seek to capture a scientific conclusion. Then the accomplished Pyrrhonist would be supremely rational.

320 On an account of unity in suspension

Well, but this is something we must always further investigate: Is suspension not itself a form of conclusion? Again: Doesn’t the activity require discursive commitment to a coherent discursive object—the proposition, whether in the affirmative or in the form of the question—upon which the subject suspends? Doesn’t this commitment entail a commitment to the self as a suspensive subject of this object? Doesn’t the Pyrrhonist affirm: “I suspend on this,”? In a story in which we give the end of Platonism as suspensive unity, these questions are first and foremost pertinent not qua the determination whether suspension is rational or not, but qua the possibility of arrival in wisdom through suspension. Under the assumption that the final experience in ascent is non-dogmatic, we have tried to give the dogmatist a dilemma: Either the end is arational and no longer part of inquiry (then there is nothing to fear in Pyrrhonism here); or the end is rational (and then suspension would be a sure candidate for this goal). The dilemma is to produce at least the perception of hypocrisy in the dogmatist if she were to denigrate the value of Pyrrhonism. At least: Qua aspiration, the Pyrrhonist and dogmatist are in the same boat. But in just this recognition of sharing aspirations, nothing is yet clear about how these aspirations are better realized through skepticism. If indeed suspension still requires commitment to a discursive object, such that in suspending the Pyrrhonist is no less dogmatic in her act of suspension, the suspensive state will fall short of the pursued experience of unity, too. We want to lay in the balance against the dogmatic rejection of the possibility and value of skeptical science an appreciation of scientific suspension as spring- board for transcendence of dogmatic discourse. But we remain in danger of just offering another, and, indeed, impoverished dogmatism in which the Pyrrhonist turns out committed to her suspension, and, by this commitment, committed both

321 to an ontology of the subject in a relation of ignorance to the objective world and to a semantics for the epistemological terms necessary for the expression of doubt. The old complaints remain very much alive. Epistemologically: Pyrrhonian inquiry, even at its most abstracted, is impossible without commitment. Axiologi- cally: Given the inescapability of commitment, ceteris paribus, Pyrrhonism has no warrant to promote the affirmation of a crude ignorance over a rich scientific consciousness of variegation. The dogmatist, having set out on a trajectory towards divine homoiōsis when she came to philosophy, will still need to see how the Pyrrhonian technique would overcome dogmatic discourse to facilitate tranquility. She will need to see what the relation between suspension and unity is, such that the experience of suspension can be understood as, or finally conducive to, the state of a god.

322 Towards unity in suspension

Again: Socrates: I understand what you want to say, Me- no. Do you see how by this you draw us down into er- isitc argument, that a man can seek neither what he knows nor what he does not know? For he cannot seek what he knows—for he knows it, and there is no need for seeking it. Nor can he seek what he does not know—for he does not see what to seek. Meno, 80e

The Pyrrhonist lays one thing in the balance against another, and tries to produce epochē. But the views that go in the balance do not appear, qua what is measured by the balance, suspensive. In placing a view in the balance we are to examine it most charitably, and so, it seems, with an effort to assert its superiority. Then we assume, in our present exercise of laying Platonism as Pyrrhonism in the balance against dogmatic Platonism, that we must argue for the superiority of the former. We lay views in the balance because our dogmatic interlocutor is caught up in the activity of weighing in the balance. We, to be heard by him, must express ourselves by sharing in this activity. Then, we assume our interlocutor wants to know how Pyrrhonian ascent works, such that he may in this knowledge see the

323 superiority of skepticism. Accordingly, we present ourselves as arguing for this superiority in attempting to give the mechanics of suspensive ascent. We say: “Our ascent is extended beyond dogmatism through skepticism towards unity.”

The resources we availed ourselves of through ad hominem are in danger of running out. To show superiority, we must say something more than, or other than what our interlocutor says regarding what is rationally required for ascent. But will we not already sympathize with her consummate vision of the limit to the powers of speech? If so, we cannot be taken as straightforwardly asserting what we will say in moving on beyond Plotinus’ conclusion of apophasia. What manner of expression remains? We write out another exercise for us to perform. Our intent would not be to describe unity, but nonetheless reveal it through our exercise.

On the assumption that there is value in our current exercise, unity can be revealed through rational evaluation. But, by the aforegoing, it cannot come in the dogmatic experience of the correctness of discourse. So, it cannot come through an assertion, nor through assertion of the pertinence and coherence of a question. Perhaps it can be given through a more radically imagined skepticism.

* * *

And this is the soul's genuine end: to possess this light, and to contemplate in wonder (theāsasthai) upon it in itself—not by the light of something else, but the light itself by which it also sees. For by what it is

324 enlightened, this is what it must behold in wonder. For neither is the sun so beheld by the light of something else. How could this ever come about? Aphele pānta—subtract everything! Ennead 5.3.17.34-39

Aphele pantā: Well, how could this ever come about? However we account for it, since our account is for in the balance in dialectic, the account better be rational. And so, since the account is of subtraction, subtraction must be rationally understandable. But, it seems, for such an account to track the psychology, the thinker presented in the account must be rational. For, in our present exercise, the thinker seeks subtraction through understanding a rational account of subtraction. At any rate, we imagined our dogmatic interlocutor as engaged in a discursive approach to unity by turning away from the fragmentation of the world of becoming through rational exercise in mathematics and dialectic. As the dogmatist values rational analysis as the method for stripping away fragmentation in her ascent to the One, we may assume that she, in her activity of pursuing subtraction, will continue to seek her quarry through such analysis. Pantā: Our present quote comes just after Plotinus’ discussion of the problematic of unity and discourse we gave previously. Since the problem of discourse lies in its temporal extensibility, we might be tempted to think that pantā includes all things of the world of becoming. We are to strip ourselves of all becoming to reveal the One. If this is too bold a claim,315 for now, with regard to what appears immediately pertinent for our purpose, we can make a more modest extrapolation from context: We are to strip ourselves of a confidence that reality can be captured by the

315 For example: Appearance is in the world of becoming. But the Pyrrhonist follows appearances.

325 discursive thought; that through the proposition we already successfully touch it, or that we must touch it more successfully. Again:

For it is necessary that discursive thought (dianoia), in order that it proclaim, takes one thing after another. For this is how description (hē diexodos) is. Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.17

The domain for pantā will include at least any sensibility of having arrived in the possession of the fundamental proposition which captures the One. Contem- plation through the affirmation of the proposition would at best be a seeing by a light other than that of the One. In such contemplation we would remain absorbed in the vision of an image of the One. But in order to truly see the One by itself, such imagery would have to be pushed aside. The Plotinian Platonist would have to achieve her homoiōsis through a sort of silent insight.

Accordingly, wishing to adhere to the etiquette of the ad hominem, we will want to show how Pyrrhonism offers skeptical contemplation as rational route through transcendence of discourse towards the One. In wishing to give an account of how Pyrrhonism would so pursue philosophical subtraction of discursive affirmation of the principle of reality, first, we note that the Pyrrhonist, in pursuing epochē indiscriminately, pursues the subtraction of the affirmation of ground, and so of any such principle. Second, we observe that the thinker enacting the Pyrrhonian technique appears to pursue rationality to its extreme. The Modes are a concise expression of the norms of the philosopher’s rational practice, and the Pyrrhonist pursues adherence to them in dialectic without compromise. The Pyrrhonist is driven to suspension in unreservedly observing the norms against bold, circular, or regressive assertion.

326 Ergo, Pyrrhonism purports to pursue unadulterated rationality in pursuing suspension.

For the present, we will think these two remarks enough to allow ourselves the observation that the Pyrrhonist no less than the dogmatist seeks to perform subtraction through an unsullied rationality.

Then, we want to know how well the Pyrrhonist succeeds in her rational pursuit of unity through suspension. How does skepticism labor and give birth to the supreme grasp of unity?316 Didactically, we want a tracing of the route to unity through skeptical subtraction. But, we, as recalcitrant dogmatic students, do not want to be taught by the Pyrrhonian method before we see how it works. We want to see the method work under the duress we would suffer as dogmatists in apophatic conclusion: “The One cannot be said, yet we must speak, and say this.”

It seems that, as we are here, talking and listening, we have no choice but to think discursively, and, if we are philosophers, to try to do so honestly. With honest thought at the forefront, the dogmatist is given to take the thought to be a sign of the world: The thought is an honest grasp of the world, and so it aspires to truth. And it seems the thought aspires to truth by pursuing a proposition indicative of reality. In our higher philosophy, in contemplation of the tension between, on the one hand, our projection of supreme consciousness as unified and, on the other, our awareness of fragmentation in discursive thinking, we would still think as indicative of reality the proposition that the proposition fails to make contact with reality. Dialectically, it would seem we would be cut off from making any further rational progress to unity by affirming such a proposition. If we conclude an analysis

327 of the concept of unity in the context of the protracted experience of discourse with an affirmation of a shortcoming in the proposition’s capacity to capture the One, there is simply nothing more to be done qua rational ascent for the thinker who seeks conclusion to her rational work through affirmation. The One lies still beyond her reach, but she has exhausted her rational methodology for ascending towards it.

Here, a perceived ineluctable weakness in Pyrrhonism might be discovered a strength. The dogmatist who in her final ascent will discover apohasia when faced with the One will yet somehow have to affirm that something was revealed to her in this discovery so as to allow herself both the object for this discovery and the ground that lends value to the activity of rational inquiry by which this discovery is achieved. She will have to allow herself a vision of the One as indescribable, and yet of such brilliance that the dialectical ascent she has been pursuing is vindicated even if in the ultimate vision she is driven to give up on dialectic and embrace silence.

But when it touches, while it touches, it is altogether impossible, nor has it time, to speak. But afterwards, it is able to reason about it. It is necessary to have faith (pisteuein) that we have seen, when, of a sudden, the soul apprehends light. Ennead V.3.17.25-8

If she does not afford herself a faith of this sort, she will expose herself to the kind of charge of futility and inconsistency we have seen her bring against the skeptic who purports to express thoroughgoing suspension: The Pyrrhonist who honestly thinks that he suspends must in the end at least believe that he suspends. And so the Pyrrhonist could not suspend unreservedly.

316 Cf. e.g., Theaetetus 150 b-d, 151 a-b, 210 b-c. Cf. (Kaufmann, 1962), p.30.

328 Now: If the dogmatist is honest in her conclusion of the indescribability of the One, a dogmatic notion that belief underlies honest action will have to see the dogmatist acknowledge in her act of conclusion the belief that the underlying principle of reality cannot be described. But the One is the principle of reality both ontologically and epistemically. The world manifests itself as emanation from the One. But also, the One is source for knowledge of the world.317 At least, in the Republic, Plato speaks of the Good in this way:

So also you must say that not only being known is present in the objects of knowledge by the Good, but also their existence and being is present to them by it, while the Good is not being, but something even beyond being in rank and power. Rep. 509b

We have supposed the method of hypothesis in the lower sciences a deferral of the establishment of ground to the higher philosophy. This ground was ultimately to be given in the propositionalization of Plato’s Good, or, on Plotinus’ understanding of Plato, in the propositionalization of the One. We suggest that in Platonism, this kind of propositionalization of the supreme ontological principle is to provide material for the logical derivation of the ground for the hypothetical propositions of the lower sciences. But just as a proposition in geometry would need to be grounded in a logical relation to the fundamental proposition, so, too, in ongoing dialectic, would any other. Then, as we can ask what makes Euclid’s definitions correct, we can ask again what would make Plotinus’ apophatic conclusion from a sensibility of temporal fragmentation in the entertainment of any foundational proposition correct. For the

317 And so, ethically—if the philosopher is to act from knowledge towards philosophical action in the world. For example, in her teaching philosophy.

329 conclusion is once more given in a proposition: “The One cannot be said.” And the conclusion is apparently a result of considering the sensibility of propositionalizing tout court. So if it turns out that we must say of the One that it cannot be described, we will have no reason to acknowledge the correctness of our apophasia. If the One is supposed to be both an ontological and epistemic principle of reality, and the truth of an expression is revealed to the thinker in the experience of a logical relation between proposition and principle, since the experience of the principle cannot be propositionalized as a suitable relatum, the apophatic expression fails to expose the thinker to the truth. The dogmatist, in her belief that she will see the light and yet not be able to speak, has given up on science. In other words, where the dogmatist would project upon the skeptic a weakness in the skeptic’s confirming his thoroughgoing suspension, she would have to see in herself a weakness for believing that she can claim that the One is indescribable. This sort of consideration was already focus of Pyrrhonian attack on dogmatic Academic skepticism, according to which we may know that we do not know.

Those of the New Academy, even if they say that everything is inapprehensible, perhaps differ from the skeptics in respect to the very expression that everything is inapprehensible (for they maintain it firmly, while the skeptics admit that it is possible that something can be apprehended). PH 1.226

We see that both for dogmatist and skeptic the perception of weakness is generated from the assumption that the thinker affirms her honest thought. From this assumption, we bring the peritropic argument that the skeptic’s act of expressing

330 suspension contradicts the content of what is being expressed, as likewise does the dogmatist’s act of expressing the indescribability of the One.

But it is a dogmatic assumption that honest expression requires belief in the expression as indicative of reality, and one the Pyrrhonist, in her subtractive exercise, will work to suspend upon. In our exercise towards vision, on the one hand, (a) we find in Sextus precedence for a Plotinian rendition of the problem of the extensibility of the proposition. Sextus argues from the temporal fragmentation of expression to the absence of, and so impossibility of, the proposition tout court. For example, in Against the Logicians:

Every sayable (lekton) must be said—and for this reason it gains this appellation. But—as the Aporetics set before the mind—no sayable is said. Therefore, there is no sayable. From which it follows that there is neither self-evident principle, nor true or false. For to say is—as those from the Stoa claim—to utter the sound significant of the object apprehended by thought. For example, this verse:

Goddess, sing the wrath of Achilles, scion of Peleus.

But it is impossible to utter the sound signifying this, because that of which the parts do not obtain together itself obtains neither. But the parts of this object do not obtain together, so that it itself is not existent either. […] For when we utter the first half-verse, the second is not yet. And when we utter the second, the first is no more, so that we do not utter the whole verse. Nor the half-verse. […]. Nor, if we consider it, a single word. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, 2.80-2 (AM 8.80-2)

331 And in the Outlines Sextus offers a similar argument against the possibility for any self-evident judgment (axiōma) which by syllogism could reveal what is obscure as its consequent. First:

[The Stoics] say that the axiōma is a perfectly complete lekton which is asserted…318 PH 2.103

But:

[I]f ever by hypothesis it were granted that the lekton exists, the axiōma will be found unreal, as it is compounded from lekta which do not obtain together with each other. At least, e.g., in the case of: “If it is day, it is light,” when I say “It is day,” the “it is light,” does not yet obtain. And when I say “it is light,” the “It is day,” is no longer. If then things compounded of certain parts cannot obtain when those parts themselves do not obtain together, but the parts of which the axiōma is compounded do not obtain together with each other, the axiōma will not obtain. PH 2.109

And, incidentally, we assume that not much hangs here on these problems’ being illustrated in an act of speaking rather than thinking. To begin, for the Pyrrhonist, the act of talking to oneself can be an act of working through dialectic. When his interlocutor—no doubt in exasperation—has walked away from him, we find the Pyrrhonist take up her position in spoken auto-dialectic. Again:

318 Cf. Chrysippus apud Gellius, Attic Nights 16.8.

332

Once preoccupied and talking to himself, and asked the reason, he said that he was practicing to be good. DL 9.64

Furthermore, we see it taken for granted in Plotinus that the problem of se- quentiality in expression purports to both speech and silent activity of the intellect. For example:

“Nor has it time to think.” Ennead 5.3.17

In a general intellectual movement of the psuchē towards unity the contrast between unity and variegated discourse is revealed. The problem of talking in time no less obtains in thinking in time. For Plotinus, the movement of thought necessary for constructing the proposition vitiates stability and unity, and so the experience of the truth of the proposition could not be the experience of the principle of reality.

For Sextus, reflection upon this movement lays in the balance any sensibility of having grasped any proposition as a sign of reality, and with it the possibility of dogmatism tout court. We said: “Reflection upon this movement lays in the balance…” For, on the other hand, (b) in her subtractive exercise against the requirement that belief in expression is indicative of reality: If Plotinus may be thought to expose himself to a charge of inconsistency by affirming a limit to discourse in declaring the One indescribable, Sextus, just as he is not set on affirming the futility of geometry, will not be set on affirming the impossibility of propositionalizing. Rather, he will promote the inquisitive attitude.

333

To return to consider our earlier worry that the Pyrrhonist, in being unreservedly zētētikos, would lay waste to science, and could in fact never be thought inquisitive at all, we can now say that Sextus lays his arguments in geometry against Euclideanism in the balance for the sake of suspending on any supercilious dogmatic Platonic faith in the value of, or Epicurean faith in the uselessness of, mathematical education. Likewise, we may expect that he gives just for in one scale of the balance the argument from extensibility of the proposition to the denial of the possibility of propositionalizing.319 In the other will go a pragmatic argument for this possibility from our having argued in propositions against it. For example, for Sextus, the existence of the axiōma is a condition for the indicative sign (sēmeion endeiktikon) of what is immediately hidden:320

[T]he Stoics…say a sign (sēmeion) is an antecedent self-evident judgment (axiōma) in a correct syllogism indicative of the consequent. PH 2.104

For the Pyrrhonist who claims to live by following appearances, the purported grasp of such a sign of what is hidden is an intellectual act which, in going beyond the following of patent appearance, would constitute dogmatism. Naturally, then, Sextus works hard to undermine the possibility of the sign, and, since the axioma is condition for the sēmeion, one of the ways in which he tries to do this is by the aforegoing argument from temporal fragmentation of the syllogism against the possibility of the axiōma. However:

319 Sextus presents himself as balancing Epicurean denial of the existence of the lekton against the Stoic insistence that we can grasp the truth through the propositional sign. Cf PH 2.107-108. 320 For example, the movement of the body would be indicative of the hidden soul. PH 2.101, AM 2.155.

334 Either the expressions (fōnai) brought against the sign signify something, or they signify nothing. But if they are insignificant, how could they disprove the existence of the sign? But if they signify something, the sign exists. PH 2.130

And so we find Sextus bring against his own attack upon the sign the kind of peritropic argument we see the dogmatist bring against a skeptical argument from temporal fragmentation towards suspension: Did he not just give an argument against sign? If it was convincing, it revealed the absence of sign. But such revelation is the work of sign.

Sextus’ resultant suspension on his very expression is an instance of a movement in skepticism to distance the thinker from her expression in general:

In regard to all the skeptical expressions, one must understand in advance that we do not maintain firmly that they are absolutely true, since we say that they are also able to be refuted by themselves, since they are themselves included in those things of which they speak, just as cathartic drugs not only purge the body of humors, but also expel themselves along with the humors. We say then that we deploy these expressions, not to make exactly clear the things to which these expressions refer, but loosely, and if one wishes, inaccurately. It is not fitting for the skeptic to wrangle over expressions, and besides it contributes to our cause to say that these expressions have no straightforward meaning; but that their meaning is a relative one, i.e., relative to the skeptics. Besides, it is necessary to remember that we do not say them about all things in general, but about things unclear, and dogmatically investigated, and that we speak of what appears to us, and that we do not affirm decidedly about the nature of the substance of the external object. By these I think that every sophism brought against the skeptical expression can be overturned.

335 ⁃ PH 1.206-8

So we can also expect Sextus to bring the same peritropē against his own arguments against the possibility of lekton and axiōma. For example, by analogy with his peritropē against his arguments against sign: If truth is a feature of the proposition, for the claim that there are no lekta to be true, the claim would have to be a lekton. As a result, as in the case of any debate, the skeptic will have to say that it is no more (ou mallon) possible than impossible to say something true of the world.321 But such arrival in the expression of the skeptical formula ou mallon is welcomed and foreseen. Here is Sextus at the beginning of his attack on sign in the Outlines:

It remains for us to proceed to the refutation, not anxious (espoudakotes) to show that the indicative sign is altogether unreal, but attentive to the manifest equipollence of the logoi brought in favor of its existence and its unreality. PH 2.103

Our sketch of Sextus’ treatment of the existence of sign reveals a brazen use of weapons in the Pyrrhonist. Pyrrhonism is not a negative philosophy which seeks to establish the denial of all that is holy to the dogmatist, but a suspensive philosophy. The Pyrrhonist does not seek to establish the correctness of suspension. This would be to put herself as one antagonist amongst other dogmatists. Rather, she seeks to induce the suspensive attitude. And in doing this, as she is not intent on

321 Cf. the particular conclusion with regard to whether sign exists at PH 2.133:

[H]aving brought such convincing arguments both for the existence and for the non- existence of sign, we must say (rēteon) that sign is no more (ou mallon) existent than non- existent.

336 proving herself correct, she has no qualms in bringing against arguments for the truth of skepticism arguments the dogmatist would think devastating to skepticism conceived of as negative philosophy. Thus, we see her embrace the peritropē against arguments against sign. But we assume her arguments against sign are of a kind with her arguments against the proposition. And so we will expect her to equally embrace a peritropic argument against her argument against the possibility of the proposition from temporal fragmentation, or a peritropic argument against her argument against the epistemic propriety of an act of assertion. But then, it seems plausible to think that, should she come to argue for Plotin- ian apophasia in the face of the One, she will analogously argue peritropically against the indescribability of the One from her having described the One as indescribable. Yet, if to have pistis were to dogmatically believe, she would not then say dogmatically that we must have faith that we have seen the One. Her peritropic argument from the pragmatics of the expression of apophasia does not establish some belief, but goes in the balance to effect further suspension on the apparent inescapability of apophasia.322

As we are to argue from Plotinus on apophasia towards the Pyrrhonian way, this further suspension is to be given as further move towards subtraction through which the One is approached. In Plotinus, subtraction is to overcome, in the end, the problem we encounter of fragmentation in discourse. And we have given a sketch of the nature of the skeptical procedure as subtractive towards freedom from commitment even in the construction of our logoi.

For the skeptical expression ou mallon, cf. PH 1.188. 322 We give a description of the attitude of belief by an exercise in its negation.

337 But we still need to understand the condition—if not the possibility of it—of the thinker so stripped bare, such that we see our conception of the One we are to approach through skeptical subtraction live up to the experience of ascension idealized under Platonism as divine.

338 Zetetic wonder

MENO: Socrates, before I even met you I used to hear that you are always in a state of perplexity and that you bring others to the same state, and now I think you are bewitching and beguiling me (me pharmatteis—you enchant me by potions), simply putting me under a spell, so that I am quite perplexed. Indeed, if a joke is in order, you seem, in appearance and in every other way, to be like the broad torpedo fish, for it too makes anyone who comes close and touches it feel numb, and you now seem to have had that kind of effect on me, for both my mind and my tongue are numb, and I have no answer to give you. Yet I have made many speeches about virtue before large audiences on a thousand occasions, very good speeches as I thought, but now I cannot even say what it is. I think you are wise not to sail away from Athens to go and stay elsewhere, for if you were to behave like this as a stranger in another city, you would be driven away for practicing sorcery. Meno 80a-b323

It remains that the Platonist seeks divinity through philosophical clarity and a grasp of truth. But what would remain of a scientific consciousness of the world in skeptical suspension? But how are we to understand skepticism as moving towards clarity? In proselytizing skepticism among dogmatists, we have to sell the state of becoming stunned in aporia to an interlocutor who would seek to arrive somewhere in philosophy, and would measure the value of his philosophy against his approach to the goal he somehow has intuition of.

323 Trans. Grube.

339 Then, it may seem that in any impression that skepticism reveals—by the dialectical shaping of the thinker’s psychology—a proper manner of paying attention, we would need to find inspiration to further think that arrival in thoroughgoing skepticism would not just be a point of departure for genuine philosophy, but also provide a sensibility of equanimity we find in the dogmatic projection of an experience of accomplishment in philosophical inquiry.

SOCRATES: Have we done him any harm by making him perplexed and numb as the torpedo fish does? MENO: I do not think so. SOCRATES: Indeed, we have probably achieved something relevant to finding out how matters stand, for now, as he does not know, he would be glad to find out, whereas before he thought he could easily make many fine speeches to large audiences about the square of double size and said that it must have a base twice as long. Meno 84c 324

The skeptical effort to medicate ourselves so as to become stunned into aporia would make a beginning to philosophy such that philosophy thenceforth may of its own accord be perpetuated.

* * *

324 Grube.

340 For this is an experience which is characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering: this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else. And the man who made Iris the child of Thaumas was perhaps no bad geneal- ogist. Theaetetus 155d

Let us return to consider Aenesidemus’ professed suspension in Bibliotheca 170a11-14. It appears the last recourse of the Pyrrhonist in a dialectical exercise with the dogmatist of thoroughgoing application of the Modes in appreciation of the paradox of seeing ourselves driven to apophasia in dialectic. Again:

In skeptical contemplation of this final move in Platonic ascent, we learn, under the norms of rationality which demand justification, to think honestly without further thought of whether what we say measures up under such a demand. In so speaking, the Pyrrhonist gives us neither an affirmation that we do not speak the scientific truth in an expression of our incapacity to capture such truth in our expression, nor a dogmatic affirmation that at least this we know: That we speak the truth when we express such incapacity. The Pyrrhonist suspends, and thereby opens himself up to further inquisitive activity.

We said recourse—as in last recourse—in an appreciation of the expression’s perhaps appearing infuriating to the dogmatist. We dogmatists have presented the

341 skeptic with a categorical truth: To act requires belief. Such honest activities of saying: “I don’t have any beliefs,” or: “I don’t have any beliefs, not even that I don’t have any beliefs,” or of asking: “Do I have beliefs?” entail believing. If it were true that we must believe when doing philosophy, anything we said in opposition to dogmatism would be contingent on our seeing a superior truth. For example, in the formulation of a question, there would have to be a dogmatic sensibility towards the extension of the terms employed in describing the object to be investigated. For example, with dogmatic confidence in having sufficiently delimited it by an act of pointing, e.g., at the orb of the moon, while saying: “What is that?” At any rate, by putting ourselves in a relation of epistemic superiority to some object, we would have to be able to dismiss all other alternatives purporting to it. And if the Pyrrhonist so ended up arguing for an experience of suspension over the experience of appreciation of the rich scientific impression of reality, she would be in trouble. There would be nothing beautiful about such arguing, and everything ugly and destructive. And the ugliness would be alive in the willful obfuscation of the skeptical interlocutor.

We said last—as in last recourse—because here in all nakedness lies the object of contention. The dogmatist says that we must, if we are honest in dialectic, as in any activity, act in accordance with what we believe, and so, in dialectic, say what we believe. For example, we must believe that we suspend. Hence, we would at least believe that we don’t have any beliefs when we say we don’t. Boldly to the contrary, the Pyrrhonist goes on to imply that, alternatively, under the norms of dialectic, we lay in the balance that we may eventually come to think honestly without believing. 325

325 What do we mean by honestly thinking here? For example: “Say the moon is made of green cheese.” Or: “Say that leaf is made of beautiful sparrows.”

342 In a charitable effort at considering the Pyrrhonist’s appreciation of this possibility, we might, for better or worse, come to see the skeptic honestly incapable of rationally acting otherwise in giving Aenesidemus’ recursive denial for his reply. There would be no subterfuge, or any other chess-playing. The reply would merely be given from attention to saying while attending to the dialectical norms for saying, e.g.: “I cannot describe the One.” Or: “I cannot say that it is true that I cannot describe the One.” Or, upon saying this, perhaps: “We must cherish the experience of what we purport to have so discovered.”

In the Bibliotheca, Aenesidemus’ implication of recursive denial of our belief in our lack of belief is rather the expression of a question after the truth of our denial of our capacity to speak the truth. We wonder what is the case. On the one hand we have, under the Modes, rational motivation to suspend and forgo belief; on the other that our rational expression of this suspension appears evidence of affirmation. Which is it? Once more under the Modes, we appear to affirm them in taking them as the condition on our activity; we suspend, and are left with our question. But we do not suspend indifferently. Or: By suspending, we do not move towards greater indifference.

Indifference: For example, there is a sense in which we might be indifferent to whether the number of leaves on this tree is odd or even, because the issue does not appear pertinent in our present science. Or there is a sense in which we might become indifferent to and suspend on a question after the state of the liver or pattern of flight of the bird upon the dogmatic realization that augury is bunk. We no longer need to spot it, or cut it up. Why bother anymore, then? But the Pyrrhonist does not dismiss the rational inquiry into the nature of the object under investigation by suspending on theories about it. There is no affirmation by which he comes to make such a dismissal rationally.

343 He suspends not in order to set the question aside, but to ask it again. The question he suspends on has been important, and his incapacity to answer it does not release him from it.

Those who follow Pyrrho are moved neither by the thought that these subjects of learning are of no help in gaining wisdom (for this is a dogmatic assertion), nor by a dearth of culture. AM 1.5

The Pyrrhonist’s capacity to formulate his question comes through his training in scientific methodology. Ergo: The value of his rational training remains alive and present to him in his wondering at the object of his question. This object is seen not through subscription to a particular path of rational analysis of it, but through equipollence with regard to, and so in attention to, differing analyses.

Our philosophical history unfolds without finding resolution, but remains important to us by the sheer force of its rational unfolding in us. If we are rational beings, as we appear to be in this sort of discussion between dogmatist and skeptic, we remain beholden to the norms of our discipline. We cannot choose to give up on them without giving up on philosophy as we practice it in our exercise of converting the dogmatist. As we pointed out before: We want to approach, in confidence that philosophy is the way, a way for living. Hence, in philosophical consideration of this way, we could not embrace the rejection of considering the way philosophically. After all, we want to both effect a radical conversion in the dogmatist, and, under the norm of ad hominem, say as little as possible which exceeds the hopes and strictures envisioned by the dogmatist in her aspiration. And so we must work towards an understanding of our discipline in the vernacular of the dogmatist.

344 And so we must discover the value of the philosophical exercise that led us to skepticism philosophically. The Pyrrhonist does not recommend a return towards any arational animal. We supposedly remain zetetic in Pyrrhonian philosophy. And so everything that came before our suspension remains alive in our formulation of our question.

If Aenesidemus’ denial it the last recourse, in the end the Pyrrhonian question is perceived through concentration on seeing ourselves think thoughts in a sensibility of, e.g., an inability to plan them before we plan them. This, at least, seems the upshot of the Pyrrhonian argument from temporal fragmentation against the lekton. Our conscious thought appears to just drop out into the world in this consideration. But in coming to suffer this appearance, the Pyrrhonist is not yet done: Consid- eration of fragmentation in propositional thinking is carried over into a consideration, under the Modes, of propositions such as I don’t have any beliefs, or, somehow subsequently I don’t believe that I don’t have any beliefs.

There is a danger that to have planned our thoughts would be conditional on having seen them already in one go, such that no opportunity for sense of triumph or relief through their discovery would ever obtain. “This world of becoming is not here.” But there is also a danger that not to have planned them in advance would void any possibility of conception of ourselves. After all: “This thought is mine, because I thought it.” But with this expression of a relation between the present and the imperfect, we encounter everything—and no less—of the world of becoming once more.

345 The Modes, as forces that promote justification, promote consideration in the thinker of what she is saying. In expressing our Pyrrhonian recursive denial, not from eristic gamesmanship, but honestly under the force of the Modes, we would attend to its coming from us in rational bewilderment at its upwelling. Rationally unadulterated because permeated with the Modes, to us our expression becomes, over the course of its expression, new object of philosophical contemplation. In the end, under the Modes, our thought in aspiration after the truth we must lay over there, and look at from over here.

Thus the consciousness which says I think is pre- cisely not the consciousness which thinks. Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego, p. 29 326 By the subtractive exercise which brings such a thought, we become clear on what we cannot say.

In Platonism, the thinker is to touch reality through analysis by touching being and so amalgamating to it. Her consciousness is to become the object of contemplation, or, at least, become akin to it. In the end, the analysis leaves her in experience of a remainder—abstracted from the world through ascendant dialectic—which presents itself in such dialectic as the ultimate object for investigation. In her vision of it she is to become akin it, such that the subject of the vision of reality and the thing seen approximate each other. In skepticism is an exercise towards awareness of the subject in the world. In this exercise, the ultimate object for investigation becomes in dialectic object for a question after the subject which asks the question in suspension on both the theory presented forcefully and an alternative. Eventually, through skeptical awareness under the Modes of our dogmatic behavior in the lower sciences, our inquiry retreats from theories about the

326 (Sartre & Le, 1965).

346 particulars of the world. Our question becomes a question after the nature of the thinker tout court. For example: “By the Modes, I don’t have any beliefs.” And: “By seeing that I don’t have any beliefs, I have beliefs.”

Genuine skepticism is an unmitigated exercise under the Modes. In any field, such exercise is to lead to suspension on the object under consideration, and this is to come with wonder at it in the concomitant activity of renewed inquiry. Energy for this renewal the thinker receives in the act of suspension. In suspension, the object for consideration presents itself of old in a new way.

“E.g: In suspension in geometry, we may come to wonder at the point and the line, and so see the point as properly as we can in rational light: through the theories that our life presents us of the phenomenon, but without commitment to any one of them.” By saying something like this, we might allow for a notion of progress in philosophy, even though the point of departure and arrival for the philosopher is still wonder. At least, prima facie, if the skeptic’s exercise is in the end not one of destruction as given of Epicureanism by Sextus, 327but one which grants science the possibility of being valuable, we might think that the Pyrrhonist should already be working towards a sensibility of what could be laid in the balance against such an impression of skepticism as scorched earth annihilation.

The philosophical point of departure is a pre-scientific wonder at phenomena whose contemplation, by foreshadowing antinomy, stirs us in our innocent slumber. The rational sensibility of wonder comes about by the construction in language of a question after the object of wonder.

327 AM 1.5.

347 The construction is an ongoing process. Our intellectual lives one long thought. For example we progress in our construction in moving from asking “What is that?” of some object in the world of becoming to the same question after the point in geometry. Or, in consideration of the supposed therapeutic powers of philosophy, perhaps more generally: For example, from asking “What is reality?” or “What am I in this reality?” in physics, to the same question in ethics after the Good in fundamental ontology. Philosophy’s progress lies in its giving, through philosophical sophistication, a development of a language for a question about the object of wonder. The development of this language approaches the source of our wonder. The rational thinker wonders at an object, and the object in its wonderfulness works its way into the rational thinker through consideration of the negation of the superiority of one way of describing the object over any other. In suspensive consideration of the fluctuating field of philosophical descriptions that our history of thought presents us of the object, the philosopher works towards an ever more intense bewilderment. The activity of suspension is the more intense, both the greater the number of visions of the thing are held in the balance, and the greater any prima facie, everyday weight of an object for in the balance. For example: Suspension on the norms of the institutions that raised us, in its radicalness, allows us to consider everything anew.

Everything anew. If we have the fortune to be able to keep ourselves from dogmatism in all our activity with the world—to start, in our seeing the world, and, just by this, in expressing ourselves in it—we may become disposed to a recommendable gentleness whose source shares something with a philosophical innocence. Innocence such as when we first felt the need for gods, but could not say what they were. Or: When we first doubted our gods, or—if this is something different—our science.

348 All that philosophy demands from the good life—the rationally inquisitive mind—remains alive in skepticism. Or: It is the better realized in it. In dialectic with the skeptic, the source for wonder at the world will be, has been, and is revealed in the effort of the subject to identify itself objectively. 328In this dialectic, we are left with a remainder in the experience of suspension that registers as scientifically valuable in philosophical inquiry. But the source and object of inquiry is the subject that can see the proposition from afar. We want to know what the world is, we say. But always in such a way that the world encapsulates us. We are, or wish to see ourselves, this in the world. But this seeing is achieved by setting ourselves in opposition to the world by questioning our scientific constructions of it. We are presented in appearance unavoidably with phenomena. For example, at the beginning of our investigation, when we may start to wonder in philosophy, with this body of ours taken for granted as a privileged seat of consciousness among other bodies. What am I? What is everything else? Or later, we may wonder at the appearance of self-evidence of the nature of geometric objects as given under Euclid’s definitions. Or, later still, at the appearance of self-evidence of the force of peritropē against the supposed skeptical suspension on our denial of belief. In consideration of our suspension on the dogmas purporting to these phenomena, we work towards a vision of ourselves. We seek to perceive ourselves in the remainder of our subtraction, and so in relation to what we suspend upon in the subtraction. Then, this perception requires that we attend to the science we suspend upon.

328 So identify. In re-reading, we might think to take this so out. But, here, who are we to revise ourselves? After all, our exercise has become one of seeing ourselves well in wonder.

349 Mythology for the zetetic psychology

Only when all of these things—names, definitions, and visual and other perceptions—have been rubbed against one another and tested, pupil and teacher asking and answering questions in good will and without envy—only then, when reason and knowledge are at the very extremity of human effort, can they illumi- nate the nature of any object. Seventh Letter 344b329

On a Platonic understanding of the subtractive activity as movement towards arrival in the ascent, we need to give it as of tranquility and divinity.

Let us recapitulate. Philosophy is inquiry whose aim is divine homoiōsis. This can be given as the attainment of ataraxia. Scientifically, the aim can be given as the uncovering of reality. We exemplified this uncovering by a study of Plotinus, who, driven to unify phenomena through rational analysis, conceives of reality as a unified source of the emanation of the world we encounter in becoming. Dogmatically, the convergence of the experience of ataraxia and scientific success in uncovering reality by uncovering the One might be imagined as an experience of the stasis of being imbued with the truth of the fundamental proposition. But we are tossed about in this reverie by considering the problems of unity and fragmentation in the expression of such a proposition in the face of the unity of the One.

329 Trans. Morrow.

350 In liminal abstraction, approaching the One, we would be speaking without ground if we then affirmed that the One was indescribable, and so we would have given up on rational discourse.

Indeed, we appear to want to say more than that the One is indescribable, or that its relation to the world of becoming, since it stands in opposition to the fragmentation in becoming, is impossible to give in a language given in becoming. We also want our vision of the One to recommend itself. But we cannot argue for the goodness of our vision if our vision is just given in argument. For the goodness we are supposed to see is assumed given in an overcoming of argument.

And you know that those who believe this [that knowledge is the good] cannot tell us what sort of knowledge it is, but in the end are forced to say that it is of the good. Republic 505b

All we might do here for the better is try to wax lyrical: After all, at a juncture such as this, we may find Plato expand his analysis, to provide it with some sort of premiss, with a mythological exploration of a relation between the thinker ascending and the Good. For example, we are cave-dwellers in escape, and as we exit we are blinded by light. But, still, wiser thinkers than us would have to be questioned for an account of the nature of the object we encounter as we ascend.

“Do you want to look at shameful, blind, and crooked things, then, when you might hear illuminat- ing and fine ones from other people? “ “By god, Socrates,” Glaucon said, “don’t desert us with the end almost in sight. We’ll be satisfied if you discuss the good as you discussed justice, moderation, and the rest.”

351 “That, my friend,” I said, “would satisfy me too, but I’m afraid that I won’t be up to it and that I’ll dis- grace myself and look ridiculous by trying.” Republic 506 c-d330

Some sort of premiss: Say Socrates’ myths in the Republic are given to further a particular argument for a view on justice. They would serve in dialectic as premisses that through the act of telling a thoroughly otherworldly story, understandable in the language of the poets and dramaturgs which concerns itself with heroic protagonists like death-defying Er or the cave-dweller set free, appeal to a more primordial intuition.

But as what is said is given as myth, even if it were to present itself as amenable to reformulation under logical analysis, its intent cannot be to serve straightforwardly, without, say, metaphor or irony, as premiss for argument that describes the world. Especially given the Pyrrhonist’s attempt to speak honestly, without attempting to see the world under a preferred analysis: If the Pyrrhonist should venture to say something more in her approach to wisdom at this elevation, she could not be blamed if she followed Plato, and practiced the art of myth-telling. But still, her aim was to show our ascent extended by skeptical philosophy beyond dogmatism. She is bound to tell a myth in which she shows how in saying something more here we do not have to give up on rationality, and can continue to do philosophy. We are to approach divine wisdom through rational subtraction of everything. This approach we sketched in the Pyrrhonian exercise of canceling out even the commitment to the indescribability of the One by bringing against ourselves the peritropē that the pragmatics of the expression of such commitment commits us to

352 the describability of the One. But we do not then in the end come to dismiss a commitment to indescribability. Instead we embrace in wonder the experience of paradox engendered by the two opposing results in continuing our inquiry.

What myth could we tell as an exercise that shows this embrace of paradox in wonder rational progress? Let us repeat our above quote from Photius and continue to work towards an understanding of it:331

We said that the recursive pattern of suspension implied in our quote would be the last resort of the Pyrrhonist in a dialectic which works towards categorical understanding of ourselves. As we have discussed previously: It is a dogmatic claim that we must believe something to act. And it is up to the dogmatist to ground it. For the Pyrrhonist does not say we don’t have any beliefs, and so she is not beholden to defend such a claim. We said this may appear a nice bit of gamesmanship on the part of the Pyrrho- nist perhaps, but, if she is to be a philosopher, we must imagine her honest and at least somewhat serious in her having such a thought. So: She does not offer Aenesidemean apophasia dismissively in frustration, nor does she go through its recursion the way we count numbers by rote off the face of a clock. She is aware that she is performing the exercise. And we want to

330 Trans. after Reeve. 331 Whenever I consider our quote I am put in mind of Julius Moravcsik, who said of Heraclitus’ “I have sought myself:” “Well, but what does this mean? I have thought for many years about this.”

353 know what kind of an awareness this is supposed to be, such that its experience could advance our ascent.

In Platonic philosophy, at least in so far as we engage in dialectic, we are to act properly by acting rationally. We ascend to divine homoiōsis by such activity. But the rules of rational dialectic are inexorable: By the Modes we are in dialectic to be neither the point in primitive assertion, nor the line in deferral through hypothesis, nor the circle in circularity. Dialectically, if these three modes of expression exhaust our options for speaking dogmatically, the only rational dialectical alternative to such expression is to question. The only way to exhibit epistemic virtue would then be to come to embody the norms of the Modes and inquire unreservedly. We would no longer struggle against the current, hanging onto some rock we wish to make our ground, but, in euroia, travel along with it. “I don’t have any beliefs, not even the belief that I don’t have any beliefs, and I wonder at myself saying this,” would be a final move towards embodying the norms of rationality that prohibit primitive, regressive, or circular assertion. To be sure, the Pyrrhonist may work back through further regression, but she speaks without the expectation that she must then further explain herself, and show herself correct. She does not assert. But the norm was against regressive assertion, not against regress tout court.

As skepticism stands so radically apart from dogmatism of any variety, we should not be unduly surprised if we are to thoroughly revise our conception of and hope for ourselves in philosophy if we are ever to make sense of it.332 As dogmatists we had been wont to recognize ourselves in dialectic as asserters, and had been wont to hope that one day we would assert better propositions. But on a

354 skeptical appreciation of the norms of philosophy, we are to see ourselves in dialectic not as asserters, but as questioners. Reality is supposed to be revealed by the subtractive inquisitive exercise. We make progress towards reality by stripping ourselves of unwarranted commitments through inquiry. This sort of claim appears common enough. In the study of ontology, the dogmatist’s hope had been of divine homoiōsis through discursive uncovering of propositions that capture the underlying reality of our world. In Plotinus’ Platonism, this was to be brought about through the affirmation of the nature of the One by such uncovering. But as skeptics, we would, if we were to continue to express ourselves in the terminology of such pursuit of the One, approach reality just by questioning. Our previous dogmatic hope had been to structure our consciousness in accordance with the divine principles of reality by achieving a supreme rational experience in contemplation of the fundamental proposition. For example, in dogmatic Plotinian Platonism, we wished to become akin to the One, to hold it in consciousness, through our being imbued with the proposition which defines it. By analogy, our skeptical Plotinian hope would be to make contact with the One in skeptical contemplation. To indulge a little more in this kind of myth: In questioning our formulations of the One, we would reveal to ourselves a fundamental wonder as the source of the river of dialectic we follow by following the Modes. To contemplate in wonder: If the Pyrrhonist is to arrive in unreserved questioning (however this might be possible), as her end is ataraxia, such questioning is supposed to be presented not as confusion or rote indifference, but as a divine tranquility. A god is neither disturbed by confusion, nor by boredom. If she were ignorant of the world, a god would not feel any lack because of it. All she needs is within her. If she were all-knowing, she would not survey the

332 Unduly: A mysterious adverb warrants challenge.

355 world in such knowledge with the demeanor of a bureaucrat. Commensurately, the human in awe appears transfixed by a vision of a relation between herself and the divine such that she sees, by this relation, herself touched by the divine and infected by it.

[W]hen the philosophical theorist achieves a vision of true being, he experiences knowledge and wonder simultaneously. In “seeing” and apprehending metaphysical reality, the Platonic theorist develops a sort of reverential knowledge: wisdom accompanied by wonder and awe. In addition, the soul’s encounter with “Being” also leads to an understanding of the soul’s own nature, boundaries, and capacities. In its ongoing attempts to “see” the Forms, the soul grasps its own nature and limitations by apprehending both its kinship to and difference from these timeless, changeless beings. Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy, p. 12

The expression of “I don’t have any beliefs, not even the belief that I don’t have any beliefs, and I wonder at myself saying this,” is exceedingly rational. And in the act of attending to our expression, we see ourselves act wholeheartedly—for we act wholly rational in following the Modes. And we see ourselves act in such wonder. Philosophy begins in wonder, but ends in it, too. And the more unadulterated through subtraction the better. Philosophy as euroia, or philosophy as self- sufficient, and homeostatic activity: The wisdom to be loved in loving wisdom is the loving of wisdom. Further down: What we wonder about in wondering is our wondering. Our despair is given by the dogmatic formulation of the future as threat to our activity. For example: We might not succeed in our project (e.g., of acquiring, or

356 maintaining wealth). We formulate our end in some vision of it as sine qua non of our being. Our resolution to our despair comes by laying this vision in the balance so as to suspend on it. This, in every activity, and, pertinently, so also in philosophy. Then, we should learn to speak rationally without concern for the future. Under dogmatism, our attainment of this ideal would be conceived as involving our being able to defend ourselves rationally for our dogmatic commitments. In skepticism, we are to overcome our struggle by yielding to the norms for justification as they express themselves—because we are under an expectation that we live up to them—in time. In such yielding, we act rationally without disturbance, flowing down the river as we might travel down, say, a visual animation of a fractal function.

It is clear we have already said too much in favor of skepticism, even if we pretended it has been a mythological exercise not just in the end, but all along. In this, we might have shown ourselves but aspirants. Our own psuchē and that of others we perceive around us speaks often confidently with such harsh vanity that our honesty demanded we lay something in the balance from ad hominem with equal vigor, in an attempt at the beginnings of a mythological ontology equally brilliant: unification through rationality in awe.

357 On having written

[T]hose who earnestly and with all their might worked out treatises and arguments against it did not succeed in calling into question epochē about everything. In the end, they grew weary of bringing apraxia from the Stoa like a Gorgon’s head as a witness against it. Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1122A

Thus, when what is endeared to us by nature appears, motion and tendency towards it has no need of opinion (doxa), but impulse (hormē) comes directly, being a movement and line of thought or action (fora) of the soul. Against Colotes, 1122d

Our quotes are from a passage concerned to point out that Arcesilaus did not conceive of skepticism as an innovation which he brought into the Academy, but an integral mode of Academic philosophizing.333 In our present exercise, clearly, we are sympathetic to Plutarch’s effort to understand skepticism as integral to the Academy. Then, we may wonder how the skeptical Platonist would conceive himself capable of activity without the need for doxa, directly from hormē. A suggestion: The skeptical Platonist receives her hormē in skeptical subtraction as the commands of her otherworldly daimōn. This daimōn can be given a rudimentary psychology: It speaks from the Modes. But the Modes appear to prohibit certain kinds of action, or a certain spirit behind the action, not action tout court.

333 See especially 1121F-1122A.

358 My friend, just as I was about to cross the river, the familiar divine sign came to me which, whenever it occurs, holds me back from something I am about to do. Phaedrus, 242b-c334

The challenge to the skeptic is: How do we move rationally without belief? The skeptic may, as we have done in placing the burden of proof on those who assert that we must believe to act (whether somatically or intellectually), formally challenge the entailment from activity to belief. But she may also make some sort of empirical argument from an affinity for our psychology: It appears we are always in movement—in thought, and in the material world of becoming. In the latter, this would be given by our being tied to a body ever under our control. Then, even the decision not to move would be movement. Then, the background against which such decision is made is one of movement. So, too, then, the background against which we give expression to suspension.

In suspension, against a background of movement, we remain in movement, but come to give up on performing certain actions, or performing them with certain intentions and sensibilities—e.g., with the intent to speak once and for all, or with the intent to speak towards just a certain end given in dialectical space of scientific divisions of reality, in pursuit of a certain route over others, once and for all.

(Given in a dialectical space: But this space is defined by our philosophical history. In our acceptance of its limitations, we appreciate our particular history as progress over what we conceive of as the past. Our thinking about problems with

334 Trans. Nehamas & Woodruff.

359 this particular content given through this past—say, in appreciation of the variegated analyses that run through the footnotes on Plato written so far—affords a greater satisfaction in stunning discovery. In reply to such dogmatic notion of progress: We ever live in our philosophical context like an ape in the woods. The scientific satisfaction—the experience of slipping into clarity and puzzlement—of the ancient philosopher was no less than any such satisfaction we suffer in surveyance of our particular sophisticated history towards paradox. Yet: We are presently given these divisions—these theories—of reality to consider. We must take whatever our dialectical partner speaks of as material for our particular historical context. Hence, we must investigate the theories of the day for the sake of considering them in suspension.)

In suspension, the movements that remain to us are those sanctioned by our daimōn revealed to us in subtraction under the Modes towards appearance. Our daimōn would come to whisper to us its prohibition, so to speak, and so define a field for activity, through the Modes.

The Pyrrhonist might try to offer as evidence of the possibility of her rational activity within such a field her particular effort to address the question after this possibility under the Modes: She has, by the force of the Modes unavoidably in appearance, been prohibited from conclusion, and so been continually driven back down into describing her thoughts regarding the question after the possibility of her rational expression, such as to offer them for further investigation by laying them in the balance against the view that she must have beliefs in her provision of her analysis of herself. Her daimōn does not sanction arrival in this activity. There would, in her effort at philosophy, be no escaping a movement of constructing in description a further object for inquisitive contemplation.

360

We just saw in Outlines 1.206 how the skeptical expression is given not as description of the world, but as drug which produces its own purging. The skeptical expression is supposed first as an optimal act in medicine, rather than any conclusion to be appreciated or followed in doing science. In arrival, the Pyrrhonist would through dialectic approach divine homoiōsis, and attain a facility for virtue we find in a god.

The gods placed sweat before virtue, but should anyone reach its heights, however much difficulty it presents, thereafter it becomes easy. Protagoras, 340d335

The embodiment of this virtue would be the object of the therapy. In our attempt at going native, we would accordingly seek to finish as we can no other way, given the ever present threat of death and our rational submission to the Modes as they express themselves in time as an expectation to be met. In this submission, we come into our own as rational beings, and so, in any meaningful sense, free from disturbance. We simply, and—in so far as our pursuit of philosophy is proper to our constitution—naturally, posit and question what we have posited.

If we must, we offer our nakedness to the force of the Modes as a sort of reflective equilibrium without belief as source for our movement—intellectual, somatic. Again, then how do we move rationally? Well, from hormē revealed in skepticism.

335 Cf., Hesiod, Works and Days, 289-92. We find in a god: See Protagoras 341d: ‘Only god can have this honor.’

361 We may purport to move in a ballgame while thinking and kicking. Afterwards we may try to claim possession of our pass as having emanated from us, of being not some freak occurrence, by giving a rational reconstruction of our having dogmatic thoughts in our striking the ball. We planned our kick, and then kicked as we planned. “I saw my winger dash down the left, and the defense out of position. I thought that if I struck the ball just so,…” But none of these propositions appear to have been present when we try to relive our movement as we kicked. Indeed, if we were to operate like this in kicking, with all this propositionalizing necessary for our action, we would be in danger of wavering, overhitting, trying too hard. In billiards: We find ourselves on a roll until we are suddenly brought out of our concentration by the falling glass and ensuing laughter. Doubt creeps in and we start measuring in order to take our shot. We deliberate and say to ourselves: “We must strike the ball just so,” looking for some imperfection—some speck of blue chalk—on the ball in relation to which we may align our cue. And strike poorly.

Likewise, in skeptical philosophy, we see ourselves move while just thinking. But don’t we act from belief? But we lay in the balance that we do not plan our sentences. Or that we could not. In defending ourselves, we say: “I thought this, because I thought that.” But we did not plan our story’s unfolding as it did. Or we did not plan our plan. We thought our proposition in philosophy just as our foot kicked the ball in soccer.

Our skeptical expression is supposed to be therapeutic, but, as it is an expression in philosophy, it is, if it is philosophically ideal, supposed an expression of knowledge. But knowledge, then, not in virtue of the expression’s discursive accuracy of the world under the norms of the Modes, but in virtue of the propriety of the exercise we perform in speaking.

362 For example: Liberated from the everyday by our skeptical subtraction we come to embody the Modes in our allowing ourselves to speak. As a result, we might come to say knowledgeably with Socrates that we know that this is true: That we must always do our best to inquire after the truth.336 But knowledgeably, not because we know, under the norms for justification, that it is true that this is true, but because in subtraction our ethical imperative towards inquiry reveals itself unavoidably in appearance as sanctionable.

Inevitably, then, with regard to its veracity, we must, by our submission to the Modes, continue to consider our work from some distance, even if, in any confidence in the goodness of our activity under the Modes, it is appreciated as an expression after truth. We no longer see ourselves as trying to speak under duress to formulate once and for all the true proposition of the world. For once we have written our thought, it is gone. At least: We are no longer subject of our discourse; it has become new object for evaluation.

SOCRATES: Now tell me, can we discern another kind of discourse, a legitimate brother of this one? Can we say how it comes about, and how it is by nature better and more capable? PHAEDRUS: Which one is that? How do you think it comes about? SOCRATES: It is a discourse that is written down, with knowledge, in the soul of the listener; it can defend itself, and it knows for whom it should speak and for whom it should remain silent. PHAEDRUS: You mean the living, breathing discourse of the man who knows, of which the written one can be fairly called an image. Phaedrus 276a.337

336 Phaedo 89d: There is no greater evil than hatered of reasonable discourse. By the same way arise misology and misanthropy. 337 Nehamas & Woodruff.

363

Like Daedalus’ statues, our propositions remain on the move.338 In unadulterated consciousness under the Modes, they present themselves anew as object for inquiry, even though we feel led unavoidably to their expression. In thought as we listen to ourselves, and so in reading our writing.

On this account no sensible man will venture to express his deepest thoughts in words, especially in a form which is unchangeable, as is true of written outlines. Seventh Letter, 342e-343a339

In a Pyrrhonian paideia, as in a Platonic one, to write any wisdom into the living and breathing soul could not come by insinuating any unassailable proposition into the soul. For in our act of thinking, the proposition thought is rendered vulnerable.

We might then, come to think of our work artistically, as some plaything, without pretensions that it gets the world right.

[A] written discourse on any subject can only be a great plaything, and no discourse worth serious attention has ever been written in verse or prose. Phaedrus 277e

Plaything: This is not to say we suffered for it. We look out our canvas, penni- less, nicotine stains on our fingers, paint everywhere, our lover off in a huff. Any foolishness in writing, then perhaps most in such reckless suffering of damage for

338 Euthyphro 11b-e; cf. Meno 97c. 339 Trans. Morrow.

364 the sake of our art. Could we have done any other than philosophize with such ferociousness?

Artistically: Any scientific effort in our work to get the world right comes in the frame of a story such as the dramaturge gives for that of heroes. For example, for a story of Oedipus and Laius, but also for Socrates and Phaedrus, say. Our work is rational in its aspiration after a movement under the Modes, scientific in its representational aspiration, and artistic by its flowing impulsively from our hand under the norms of our technē we have learned to embody by our subtractive exercise under the Modes. For example the painter who believes in a physicalism barren of aesthetic facts may still work with determination towards beauty. Likewise, the philosopher in radical suspension may write philosophy to the same end. And yet, if towards beauty, then towards goodness, and so truth.

Here, an understanding of ourselves as wearers of the smock, rather than the lab-coat, in Sextus’ discovery of the ideal skeptical experience in a myth of a painter:

In treating in logoi of our logical sensibility under the Modes, we are invited to ever further consider what we say of this sensibility. We try to capture a delicate

365 thing whose intricacies at high resolution, as we stare and stare at our work, appear to prohibit conclusive representation. In order to finish, we give up. But we purport to have produced an artistic effect which represents our sensibility by throwing at the page what is left of us qua our education in its subtractive exercise.

366 Epilogue

The beginning is the most important part of the work. Republic, 377b.

In the greater stories we will be shown the lesser also. For surely the archetype must be the same, and both the greater and the lesser must signify the same. Republic, 377c-d

SOCRATES: Surely we have not done him any harm by making him aporetic, and numb as the torpedo fish does? ⁃ Meno, 84b

Surely then, by now let us have played amorously with, and pummeled about (pepaisthō) matters concerning words tolerably. Phaedrus, 278b

The night having passed, yet the dawn still dim, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and Phason’s brother, struck my door most vigorously with his staff, and when someone opened for him, he straight- away forced himself inside, shouting: “Socrates! Are you awake or asleep?”…

… “But, if you wish, we will go over these things once more some other time. But now it is time to turn to other things.” Said I: “And thus we ought to act, if it seems right to you. For the time for me to keep the appointment I spoke of is just past. I merely stayed to humor our noble Callias.” Protagoras 310b, 361e-362a

If then after this you should attempt to conceive again, Theaetetus—or if you should indeed con-

367 ceive—by the present examination you will be full of the better ideas, while if you should remain empty, you will be less heavy-handed with your friends, and gentler, with a moderation not to think to know what you do not know. My skill is only capable of this, nothing more. I know nothing about what others know, the great and wonderful men that are and have been. But this midwifery I and the mother receive by lot from the god, hers for women, mine for the young and the noble, and all who are beautiful. But now I must present myself at the Porch of the King to face the indictment which Meletus has brought against me. But tomorrow, Theatetus, let us meet here again. Theaetetus 210 b-d

And the children come round him with their prittle prattling stories, with their prittle prattling stories to take care away. And he’s as happy as those, who have thousands of riches. Contented he'll remain and not ramble away. Spencer the Rover

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