PYRRHONIAN PAIDEIA A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Matthew Darmalingum Stanford August 2012 © 2012 by Matthew R. Darmalingum. All Rights Reserved. Re-distributed by Stanford University under license with the author. This dissertation is online at: http://purl.stanford.edu/ms571wr3930 ii I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Christopher Bobonich, Primary Adviser I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. R. Anderson I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Andrea Nightingale I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Allen Wood Approved for the Stanford University Committee on Graduate Studies. Patricia J. Gumport, Vice Provost Graduate Education This signature page was generated electronically upon submission of this dissertation in electronic format. An original signed hard copy of the signature page is on file in University Archives. iii Foreword First, perhaps our work is an aborted conical spiral towards an asymptote. In philosophy, we dance around the thing in as orderly a fashion as we can muster, and yet, in speaking, are in danger of purporting to have captured it—or, at least, to have captured it by capturing something of it. In such speaking, we would purport to give, by completing the proposition— our account—in the full stop, a base to our story, by which it is contained… Our completing our proposition appears an affirmation of it—if not of it per se, then of it as valuable in being towards a valuable consideration. Second, in giving a story, we purport somehow to conceive our work intact, even though perhaps by the time we reach our conclusion, the beginning of it passes away, such that it may appear somehow eroded. iv To our friends, with gratitude: v Pursue love, and earnestly desire the spiritual gifts, especially that you may prophesy. For one who speaks in a tongue speaks not to men but to God; for no one understands him, but he utters mysteries in the Spirit. On the other hand, the one who prophesies speaks to people for their upbuilding and encourage- ment and consolation. The one who speaks in a tongue builds up himself, but the one who prophesies builds up the church. Now I want you all to speak in tongues, but even more to prophesy. The one who prophesies is greater than the one who speaks in tongues—unless someone interprets, so that the church may be built up. 1 Corinthians 14:1-5 The refusal to belong to any school of thought, the repudiation of the adequacy of any body of beliefs whatever, and especially of systems, and a marked dissatisfaction with traditional philosophy as superfi- cial, academic, and remote from life—that is the heart of existentialism. Walter Kaufmann, Existentialism From Dostoev- sky to Sartre, p.12. But in that exhortation this alone delighted me: that I should love and search after and pursue and grasp, and strongly embrace not this or that sect, but wisdom itself, whatever it is. Augustine on Cicero’s lost Hortensius, Confes- sions 3.4 And what do you have, on account of which you are in anticipation? Seneca, Ep.ad Luc. 77.16 vi “Well then, tell him, Cebes,” he said, “the truth, that I composed them without wishing to rival him or his poetry—for I knew this would not be easy. But I was making trial of the meaning of some dreams, sat- isfying my conscience unless perhaps it often en- joined me to make this music. For they were some- thing like this. Often the same dream would visit me throughout my life, appearing in one aspect or anoth- er, but saying the same things: ‘Socrates,’ it said, ‘make music and labor at it.’” Phaedo 60-61a A god can do it. But how, tell me, shall a man follow him through the narrow lyre? His mind is in discord. At the crossing of two paths of the heart stands no temple for Apollo. Singing, as you teach it, is not desire, is not wooing of what in the end is still to be won; singing is being. For the god, an easy thing. But when are we? And when will he turn to our being the Earth and the stars? That you love, child, this is not, if also then the voice knocks your mouth open—learn to forget that you sang out. That passes. To sing in truth, is a different breath. A breath around void. A blowing in the god. A wind. The Sonnets to Orpheus 1.3 In fact the very same thing befalls the skeptic as is said of Apelles, who painted from nature. For they say that when he was painting a horse and wished to represent in the picture the horse’s slaver, he was so botching the job that he gave in, and flung at the painting the sponge onto which he would wipe off the vii colors from his brush. But the mark made the repre- sentation of the slaver of the horse. Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.28-9 viii Table of Contents The life, work, and acumen of Sextus Empiricus 1 A: Skeptical therapy 11 Pyrrhonism as Philosophical Therapy 12 Intent and motivation 13 The principles of Sextus’ Pyrrhonism 14 Aim 16 The tenor and aim of Sextus’ writing 18 A Pyrrhonian medical kit 21 Philosophy as therapy 38 Skepticism as purgative of belief 43 The need to cure the philosopher 48 Pyrrhonian sympathy for a vulgar allegation of philosophical sick- ness 51 Skeptical Diagnosis of Dogmatic Philosophy 56 Vulgar embrace of philosophy 57 Dogmatic evaluation and rejection of common values 65 Dogmatic evaluation and embrace of common values 73 Contemplative dissociation in philosophical dogmatism 76 Pyrrhonian reduction of the sickness of dogmatism to an epistemic mistake 78 Despair likes to hide 88 Concupiscence and anxiety in dogmatic inquiry 91 The dogmatist’s seeing herself be struck down 96 A rational therapy for rational therapy 102 Dogmatic Doubts about Skepticism 106 The problem of Pyrrhonism: dogmatic worries 107 Epistemic worries 111 Ethical worries 119 Methodological worries about epochē and ataraxia 127 B: Platonism as Pyrrhonism 131 Analysis of the Skeptical Dialectic 132 Characters and mechanics of the dialectic 133 Fundamentals of the dialectic: Dogmatism 135 Fundamentals of the dialectic: Skepticism 142 General methodology for a Pyrrhonian reply 145 On our reply as a form of therapy 150 Prelude to an Ethics of Wonder 152 Prelude to a Pyrrhonian ethics 153 Ataraxia as telos 154 On a Pyrrhonian taxonomy of ends 159 ix Ataraxia as euroia 166 Epicurean ataraxia and divinity 174 Pyrrhonian and Epicurean ataraxia 179 Platonic ataraxia 183 Life without belief 205 Intimations of dogmatic desire for skepticism 215 Introduction to the question of ataraxia through epochē 219 Problems in Pyrrhonian Science 234 Recapitulation of our method for vindication of Pyrrhonism 235 Pyrrhonian skepticism and scientific nihilism 239 On the possibility and aim of skeptical inquiry in the field of geome- try 245 Skepticism in geometry as propaedeutic to thoroughgoing scientific suspension 247 Scientific suspension as unadulterated philosophical awareness 255 Fundamental problems of skeptical science 257 Motivation for increasing abstraction 260 Anticipation of Platonic context for skepticism in geometry 263 Platonism as Pyrrhonism 271 On our aim 272 Skepticism in geometry as propaedeutic to unadulterated philosophi- cal awareness 277 Platonic dogmatism as target of skeptical geometry 281 On a history of skepticism in the Academy 286 On reading Plato 293 Some remarks on chronology and pedagogy 302 Platonism as skepticism 312 On an account of unity in suspension 321 Towards unity in suspension 323 Zetetic wonder 339 Mythology for the zetetic psychology 350 On having written 358 Epilogue 367 x Prologue: The life, work, and acumen of Sextus Empiricus Sextus Empiricus is considered our main authority on ancient Pyrrhonism. We possess three works: Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH 1-3), Against the Professors (AM 1-6), and Against the Dogmatists (AM 7-11). In these works, Sextus Empiri- cus presents himself as sympathetic to Pyrrhonism. We are unclear exactly where Sextus Empiricus lived, or when. And we know little to nothing about what kind of man he was, or who his associates were. Nor do we know the extent or precise order of his writing. All this, of course, entails that it is difficult to say what kind of influence and reception he enjoyed in his own day. However, the rediscovery of Sextus in the 15th century is thought to have deep influence on many thinkers on either side of the Reformation, and his work is thought to be a critical force in western philosophy ever since, one way or another inspiring such luminaries as Montaigne, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein—to mention but a few.1 Sextus’ work comes to us by way of five Greek manuscripts from the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries, three of which are closely related. There is also an almost complete 13th century Latin translation from an independent archetype.2 Of the works we have received, the Outlines of Pyrrhonism is probably Sextus’ best known work.