31 October 2012 SRI LANKA A hidden displacement crisis More than three years after the end of the 26-year armed conflict between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), nearly 470,000 people displaced during its various stages have returned to their home areas. This does not mean, however, that there is no internal displacement in the country any more. As of the end of September 2012, more than 115,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) were still living in camps, with host communities or in transit sites, A cyclone hits the return areas in northern Sri Lanka where people who had been or had been relocated, often against their displaced by the armed conflict continue to live in make-shift shelters constructed from old tin sheets and tarpaulins several months after their return. will, to areas other than their places of (Photo: NRC/October 2012) origin. Among those registered as having returned, many have not been able to achieve a durable solu- tion but continue to face difficulties in accessing basic necessities such as shelter, food, water and sanitation, in rebuilding their livelihoods, and in exercising their civil rights. De-mining op- erations are still ongoing in livelihood areas. Unresolved land issues have been a major obstacle to durable solutions for IDPs and IDP returnees. Conflict-affected areas remain highly militarised, which has made progress towards achieving durable solutions more difficult. The military has become an important economic player and a key competitor of local people including returnees in the areas of agriculture, fishing, trade, and tourism. It has also been involved in areas that would normally come under civilian administra- tion. It continues to occupy private land, thereby impeding IDPs’ return. The government has failed to make durable solutions a priority, and humanitarian organisations have faced funding shortages and restrictions on programming and access. All these challenges have the potential to lead to new grievances which could spark further violence among the population in the north and east. www.internal-displacement.org General map of Sri Lanka 80° 80°30' 81° Ka Kankesanturai Point Pedro National capital rai SRI LANKA tiv u t i I Jaffna Provincial capital a . r Peninsula t Kayts Jaffna Town, village S Kayts I. Airports Ja k ffna l Punkudutivu I. L Elephant Pass agoon Provincial boundary 9°30' a Devipattinam P Delft I. Main road I N P a l k B a y Kilinochchi Secondary road D I Puthukkudiyiruppu A - Nanthi Kadal Railroad Rameswaram Iranaitivu Is. Mullaittivu Pamban I. Vellankulam 81 30' 82 Ferr ° ° Dhanushkodi y Mankulam Nayaru Lagoon Ad Talaimannar am 's Nedunkeni Bridg NORTHERN Kokkilai e Mannar Lagoon 9° Puliyankulam 9° Island Mannar Pulmoddai Madhu Road Bay of Bengal Gulf of Mannar Silavatturai Vavuniya Kebitigollewa Pankulam Nilaveli A Medawachchiya Horuwupotana Trincomalee r u yar Bay v di i d 8 30' A o 8 30' ° r Hamillewa K ° Karaitivu I. u Mutur a y O n Kantalai Pomparippu a Anuradhapura Y Kalpitiya NORTH CENTRAL n o Kathiraveli o Maragahewa g a L K al a m Oya a l a Habarane t Kekirawa t u Puttalam Galgamuwa 8° P 8 Polonnaruwa ° NORTH a y Valachchenai O Anamaduwa Maho a Mundal L. r Dambulla u Chenkaladi d a WESTERN Naula M Batticaloa Oya uru ed a D Ganewatta g EASTERN n Chilaw a Madura Oya G Reservoir i l Maha Oya Paddiruppu e 7 30' Kurunegala w 7 30' ° Matale a ° h Kuliyapitiya a Kehelula CENTRAL M Uhana Kalmunai Pannala Kandy Mahiyangana Amparai ya Randenigale Maha O a Res. y Tirrukkovil Negombo Kegalla l O Ga Negombo Victoria Falls Senanayake Lagoon Gampaha Reservoir Bibile Samudra Ja-Ela Nuwara 7 a Eliya Badulla 7 ° ng ° Kelani a Avissawella Colombo G Sri Jayewardenepura Kotte UVA Mount Lavinia Pottuvil Monaragala Moratuwa Haputale Laccadive Sea WESTERN Ratnapura Buttala lu Ganga Panadura Horana Ka Balangoda K i r Okanda a i g n Kalutara SABARAGAMUWA n d i a O Matugama G Telulla y Pelmadulla e a Kumana 6 30' Rakwana w 6 30' a ° l ° Beruwala a W Kataragama Embilipitiya SRI LANKA Deniyaya Tissamaharama Ambalangoda I N D I A N Udugama SOUTHERN Kirinda OCEAN Akuressa Hambantota Galle 0 25 50 75 km The boundaries and names shown and the designations Tangalla 6 used on this map do not imply official endorsement or ° acceptance by the United Nations. 0 25 50 mi Matara Dondra Head 79° 79°30' 80° 80°30' 81° 81°30' 82° Map No. 4172 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS Department of Peacekeeping Operations January 2004 Cartographic Section Source: UN Cartographic Section More maps are available at www.internal-displacement.org/maps Sri Lanka: A hidden displacement crisis Background left the peace negotiations, attacked the security forces and politicians, and took control of most of In 1983, internal armed conflict broke out be- Jaffna along with large areas of northern and east- tween government forces and the LTTE, an ethnic ern Sri Lanka. They also killed the leaders of rival Tamil group which, using political negotiation and Tamil groups and expelled around 75,000 Muslims violent means, aimed to create a separate home- who had been living in the north (ICG, Sri Lanka’s land in the north and east of Sri Lanka. After Sri North I, 16 March 2012, p.3; ICG, 28 November Lankan independence in 1948, the Tamil minority 2006, pp.3-4; BBC News, 23 October 2012). - which had played a greater role than the ethnic Sinhala majority in the British colonial administra- The government’s response included killings, tion - lost influence and was discriminated against disappearances and other human rights viola- in a series of political decisions. In 1956, Sinhala tions against large numbers of Tamil civilians. replaced English as Sri Lanka’s official language The LTTE began to use suicide bombers, most and in 1972 the new constitution declared notably in the assassinations of the Indian Prime Buddhism, which most Sinhala adhere to, the Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 and Sri Lankan country’s main official religion (ICG, 28 November President Premadasa in May 1993. Chandrika 2006, pp.2-3). Kumaratunga, who assumed the presidency in November 1994, also tried to conduct peace In the 1970s, several armed Tamil nationalist negotiations. Her initiative soon failed, however, groups emerged in Jaffna district. They became and in December 1995 the security forces took stronger and gained in membership after ethnic control of Jaffna. The war continued and included clashes between Tamil and Sinhala militants in the LTTE attacks on the Sri Lankan central bank in early 1980s, and they received funding, weapons Colombo in 1996 and the Buddhist shrine of the and training from India. In July 1983, militant Temple of the Tooth in Kandy in 1998. President Tamils killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers in Jaffna. The Kumaratunga was wounded in an LTTE attack in security forces carried out reprisal attacks and did 1999. In 2000, the rebels launched an assault on nothing to prevent Sinhala mobs from killing as Colombo’s Bandaranaike international airport, many as 1,000 Tamils, attacking and destroying destroying half of Sri Lankan Airlines’ fleet. They Tamil homes and property and displacing more also conquered the strategic Elephant Pass, which than 100,000 people both within the north and connects the Jaffna peninsula to mainland Sri east of the country and to India. Under the com- Lanka (ICG, 28 November 2006, pp.4-5). mand of Vellupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE became the strongest of the armed Tamil groups and car- In February 2002, the government led by Prime ried out attacks on members of the security forces Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe signed a ceasefire and the government (ICG, 28 November 2006, p.3; agreement with the LTTE brokered by Norway. Global IDP Database, 7 March 2005, p.17). The LTTE was given official control of the northern Vanni region and rural areas of eastern Sri Lanka, In 1987, Delhi sent the Indian Peace-Keeping while the government retained the towns of Force (IPKF) to the north-east of Sri Lanka to stop Jaffna, Trincomalee and Batticaloa. The LTTE set the fighting and put pressure on the government up its own police force, judiciary and bank, but in Colombo to accept a degree of autonomy for Sri Colombo continued to provide most services in Lankan Tamils. IPKF left in 1990 upon the request LTTE-controlled areas. The Sri Lanka Monitoring of the then-president, Ranasinghe Premadasa, Mission (SLMM), made up of more than 70 per- who believed he was close to reaching a peace sonnel from Nordic countries, was charged with agreement with the LTTE. The rebels, however, monitoring the ceasefire in the north and east 31 October 2012 www.internal-displacement.org 3 Sri Lanka: A hidden displacement crisis of the country. Both parties began violating the Heavy fighting from January to May 2009 was ac- agreement soon after it was signed, with the LTTE companied by a humanitarian crisis in the Vanni, recruiting children and carrying out political kill- with both sides to the conflict committing more ings (ICG, 28 November 2006, pp.5-6). violations of international humanitarian law than ever before. Civilians found themselves con- Peace negotiations broke down in April 2003, tained inside “no fire zones” or “safe zones” that and three years later the LTTE withdrew from the government had unilaterally declared. There the process altogether. In July 2006, the rebels was, however, no safety. Reports suggest that the closed the Mavil Aru sluice gates that supplied army attacked civilians, hospitals and humanitar- water to government-controlled areas, and the ian operations; that the LTTE killed and injured army responded with an intense military offensive civilians, in some cases forcing the wounded to aimed at recapturing LTTE-controlled areas in stay in conflict areas; and that tens of thousands the east.