The Classical Quarterly http://journals.cambridge.org/CAQ Additional services for The Classical Quarterly: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here Signor Ferrero's Reconstruction of Caesar's First Commentary T. Rice Holmes The Classical Quarterly / Volume 3 / Issue 03 / July 1909, pp 203 - 215 DOI: 10.1017/S0009838800005838, Published online: 11 February 2009 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009838800005838 How to cite this article: T. Rice Holmes (1909). Signor Ferrero's Reconstruction of Caesar's First Commentary. The Classical Quarterly, 3, pp 203-215 doi:10.1017/S0009838800005838 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/CAQ, IP address: 138.251.14.35 on 26 Apr 2015 SIGNOR FERRERO'S RECONSTRUCTION OF CAESAR'S FIRST COMMENTARY. THE credibility of Caesar's account of his campaigns against the Helvetii and Ariovistus has recently been attacked anew by Signor Ferrero, whose fame, rapidly acquired, is not only European but Transatlantic, and who has conducted his case with more ability than his predecessors and on entirely new lines. I do not think that it will be a waste of time to analyse the article in which he has set it forth.1 Let me begin by summarizing the relevant part of Caesar's narrative. In 61 B.C. Orgetorix, whom Caesar describes as ' pre-eminent among the Helvetii in rank and wealth,' 'organized a conspiracy among the [Helvetian] nobles in the hope of making himself king, and persuaded the Helvetii to undertake a national emigration.' He told them that they ' could easily achieve dominion over the whole of Gaul'; and as they were dissatisfied with their own territory they readily listened to him. Accordingly they proceeded to make preparations and resolved that the emigration should take place two years later. Orgetorix undertook a political mission to various Gallic tribes, in the course of which he persuaded Casticus and Dumnorix [the leaders of the Nationalist or anti-Roman parties among the Sequani and the Aedui], to form a triumvirate with himself for the purpose of obtaining sovereignty over their respective tribes and making themselves joint rulers of Gaul. Orgetorix's design was revealed to the Helvetii, who summoned him to take his trial for treason. He succeeded with the help of his retainers and slaves in overawing his judges, but the magistrates raised a force to crush him, and he died, perhaps by his own hand. The Helvetii, however, continued their preparations, and induced four other tribes to join them. In March, 58 B.C., the whole host, numbering 368,000 souls, of whom one fourth were fighting men, assembled near Geneva, intending to cross the Rhdne and march through the Roman Province. Caesar, on receiving this news, ' promptly quitted the capital, pushed on as fast as he could possibly travel into Further Gaul, and made his way to the neighbourhood of Geneva. As the entire force in Further Gaul amounted only to one legion, he ordered as many troops as possible to be raised throughout the Province, and directed that the bridge at Geneva should be broken down.' The Helvetii asked him for permission to march through 1 Guglielmo Ferrero, The Greatness and Decline of Rome (Eng. trans.), ii. 1907, pp. 336-51. 2o4 T. RICE HOLMES the Province, which he refused, in the belief that they would commit depreda- tions ; and when they attempted to force a passage he stopped them. They then obtained leave from the Sequani, through the mediation of Dumnorix, to take the route leading through the Pas de l'Ecluse, to the Sa6ne. Caesar ascertained that their ulterior object was to march through the country of the Aedui (which comprised the departments of the Saone-et-Loire and the Nievre, and parts of the Cote-d'Or and the Allier) and settle in the country of the Santones,—the fertile basin of the Charente. As they would there be in dangerous proximity to the western districts of the Roman Province, he determined to stop them, and accordingly returned to Cisalpine Gual, raised two new legions, withdrew three from their winter quarters, and hastened back to the district situated in the angle between the Rhdne and the Sa6ne. The Helvetii were at this time ravaging the lands of the Aedui, who, with the Ambarri and the Allobroges, applied to Caesar for aid. Thereupon he inter- cepted and destroyed the Helvetian rearguard, which had not yet crossed the Saone, and crossed it himself. The Helvetii in alarm attempted to negotiate, but, failing to obtain satisfactory terms, marched northward up the Sadne valley, followed by Caesar, who ultimately defeated them [about three miles north-west of Toulon-sur-Arroux]. Some years before Caesar came to Gaul the Aedui and the Arverni were striving for supremacy. After a prolonged struggle the Arverni conjointly with the Sequani enlisted the aid of Ariovistus, who crossed the Rhine with about 15,000 men, and was reinforced by successive hordes until in the first year of Caesar's proconsulship his host amounted to 144,000, [of whom perhaps three-fourths were women and children]. He inflicted a series of defeats upon the Aedui and their dependents; and the Aedui were compelled to give hostages to the Sequani. Diviciacus [an Aeduan Druid] accordingly undertook a journey to Rome and solicited aid from the Senate, which he failed to obtain ; but in 61 B.C. the Senate decreed that whoever might at any time be Governor of Gaul should, consistently with his duty to the republic, take steps to protect the Aedui and the other allies of the Roman People.x In the following year Cicero told Atticus that the Aedui had recently suffered a defeat [evidently at the hands of Ariovistus], and that the Helvetii were raiding the Province. He added that the Senate had decreed that the consuls should draw lots for the two provinces of Gaul—Cisalpine and Trans- alpine—that troops should be levied, and that envoys with full powers should be sent on a mission to the several Gallic communities to dissuade them from joining the Helvetii.2 Not long afterwards (soon after the 12th of May) he wrote again, remarking that Gaul was reported to be tranquil, but that Metellus Celer, one of the consuls, was not at all pleased with this news: ' I suppose,' said Cicero, ' he is hankering after a triumph.3 To return to Ariovistus. Caesar says that he did not allow the Sequani ^B.G. i. 31, 35, § 4 ; vi. 12. 2Ati. i. 19, § 2. sIb. 20, § 5. SIGNOR FERRERO ON CAESAR'S FIRST COMMENTARY 205 to enjoy their victory long, but took possession of one third of their territory and [evidently after Diviciacus's unsuccessful mission] defeated the united Gallic forces in a decisive battle at a place called Magetobriga.1 In 59 B.C. the year of Caesar's consulship, Ariovistus applied to the Senate for the honorary titles of King and Friend, which were conferred upon him with Caesar's consent if not on his initiative.2 Signor Ferrero insists that the alliance of Rome with the Aedui, on the one hand, and with Ariovistus on the other, is inexplicable unless something had occurred to change the situation in Gaul and convince the Romans that a recon- ciliation between Ariovistus and the Aedui was both probable and expedient. The change was produced, according to Signor Ferrero, by the aggressive activity, alluded to by Cicero, of the Helvetii; and he argues that it was ' to the interests of Romans, Suevi [the followers of Ariovistus], and Aedui alike to unite against' them. ' The Senate,' he continues, ' had hoped to provide for emergencies by the decree to which Cicero refers, while another section of opinion, represented by Metellus and Caesar, undertook to supplement these precautions by the alliance with Ariovistus.' Signor Ferrero conjectures that, public interest having now been awakened in Gallic affairs, ' the prevalent spirit of imperialism intervened to give a new direction to the purely defensive policy which the Senate had in view. A coterie of politicians,' he continues, ' proposed to use this policy to kindle a war which was to be as lucrative and as glorious as the campaigns of Lucullus and Pompey in the East' The leader of this coterie was Metellus, who ' first hit upon the idea of using the migration of the Helvetii to stir up a war in Gaul.' ' It seems quite clear,' says Signor Ferrero, ' that it was the Helvetian design of founding a great Gallic empire which had obliged the Senate to take defensive measures, and that these defensive measures were transformed into aggression by the prevalent influence of imperialism.' But, he says, when we read the first book of the Commentaries we find that ' the Helvetii had not the slightest ambition to found a great Gallic empire, and that the " Helvetian peril" was a bogey of the imagination.'3 I engage to show in the course of this paper that what Signor Ferrero calls the alliance of Rome with Ariovistus is susceptible of only one explanation, namely, that Caesar thought it expedient to throw a sop to Ariovistus in order to secure his neutrality in case he should himself find it necessary to undertake a campaign against the Helvetii. That it was ' to the interests of Romans, Suevi, and Aedui alike to unite against' the Helvetii I cannot admit: it was to the interests of Romans and philo-Roman Aedui (represented by Diviciacus) to do so; and possibly Ariovistus may have thought that the countenance of Rome would secure him against the contingency of attack ;4 but the whole tenour of his policy shows that he saw no need for taking any offensive part in such a combina- tion.