Constraining a Shadowy Future: Enacting APAs in Parliamentary Systems Jeeyang Rhee Baum Department of International Relations Boston University Christian B. Jensen Department of Political Science University of Nevada, Las Vegas Robert J. McGrath∗ Department of Health Management and Policy University of Michigan & School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs George Mason University April 6, 2015 ∗Forthcoming, Legislative Studies Quarterly. Corresponding author. Robert Wood Johnson Scholar in Health Policy Research. M2240/SPH-II, 1415 Washington Heights, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-2029. T: 734-763-0483 F: 734-936-9813,
[email protected] Abstract Single-party parliamentary governments often have no institutional checks on their authority. Such governments can pass and implement policies constrained only by the need to maintain party loyalty and win elections. Literature on delegation suggests that such governments would never adopt reforms such as Administrative Procedures Acts (APAs) that are designed to constrain this freedom. Nevertheless, such governments do pass APAs: Greece, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden have all done so in the past thirty years. We argue that the possibility of losing power motivates parliamentary governments, both single-party and coalition, to trade current policy loss for future gain with APAs. Single-party governments in parliamentary systems often have no domestic institutional checks on their authority. Such governments can pass and implement policies constrained only by the need to maintain party loyalty and win elections. Why then would such a govern- ment ever adopt administrative reforms such as Administrative Procedure Acts (APAs) that limit their ability to do so?1 Both presidential and parliamentary systems have implemented APAs that constrain the ability of bureaucrats to implement public policy.