A Scientific and Economic Analysis of the Hyperloop As It Pertains to Mass Transportation

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A SCIENTIFIC AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE HYPERLOOP AS IT PERTAINS TO MASS TRANSPORTATION

PETER THOMPSON

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science

Department of Physics

CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

August, 2019

CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

We hereby approve the thesis of

Peter Thompson

Candidate for the degree of Master of Science*.

Committee Chair

Edward Caner

Committee Member

Dr. Robert Brown

Committee Member

Dr. Michael Marten

Date of Defense

May 22nd, 2019

*We also certify that written approval has been obtained for any proprietary material contained therein.

I would like to dedicate my work to my advisor Ed without his guidance, I never would have been able to accomplish this thesis. To my mother, Karen Foli, who through it all showed me patience and love. To my Father, John Thompson, whose ever-growing heart has shown me great kindness. Finally, to Jacqueline Krogmeier, who continually provided moral, spiritual and emotional support.

Table of Contents

List of Tables ------5 List of Figures ------6 Abstract ------7 Defining the Hyperloop ------9 Defining High-Speed Rail (HSR) ------10 Previous Hyperloop Proposals ------10 High-Speed Interstate Travel: Historical Development ------11 The Hyperloop ------13 Present Technology and Viability ------14 Evacuation of Tubes ------15 Levitation Methods ------18 Propulsion Estimation ------23 Construction of the Tube ------29 Safety and Reliability ------30 Technology Readiness Level ------31 High-Speed Rail: A Global Case Study ------32 Japan ------33 China ------38 France ------39 California, United States ------42 Discussion ------45 Conclusion ------47 References ------49

List of Tables Table 1. Physical Constraints with Varying Pressure ------17 Table 2. Force of Air Drag by Velocity ------26 Table 3. Costs from Building the Sanyo Line ------37

List of Figures Figure 1. Model to 1km tube and piston ------16 Figure 2. Work equation from classical mechanics ------16 Figure 3. Definition of Pressure ------17 Figure 4. Figure 2 applied to Figure 3 ------17 Figure 5. Equation to calculate work from a change in volume ------17 Figure 6. Required Air Tank Volume for Different Heights of Lift and Air bearing areas - 19 Figure 7. Diagram of a Halbach array ------21 Figure 8. Force body diagram of the pods in the Hyperloop ------24 Figure 9. Equation to calculate force of drag ------25 Figure 10. Defining work as the sum of the forces acting on the hyperloop pod ------26 Figure 11. Velocity over time from Elon Musk’s (2013) Hyperloop report ------28 Figure 12. Velocity over time accounting for air drag ------28 Figure 13. Map of Japan and the Shinkansen lines in the country ------34

A Scientific and Economic Analysis of the Hyperloop as it Pertains to Mass Transportation

Abstract

PETER THOMPSON

This thesis discusses the technological and economic feasibility of the Hyperloop as it pertains to mass transportation. The Hyperloop transportation system as it has been proposed by Elon Musk in 2013 requires several technological advancements in vacuum and propulsion technology before a system such as this can even be built. Along with technological feasibility there is a great financial burden associated with these kinds of systems. As seem in High-speed rail across the world, the political, economic, and geographical challenges these systems face can delay projects for decades as seem in the

California High-Speed Rail project. It is thus the conclusion of this these, that the technological readiness level for this project is not ready to be adopted for commercial use and if it were, the countries to adopt this system would have to allocate a large amount of time and resources to build the system.

A Scientific and Economic analysis of the Hyperloop

As it Pertains to Mass Transportation

In 2013, Elon Musk published his white paper outlining what he called the

“HyperLoop” (Musk, 2013). Musk created this proposal in response to the California

High-Speed Rail Project, a project that would connect San Francisco to Los Angeles with a passenger rail system. The high-speed rail (HSR) project’s growing costs and continuous extension of the project timeline was bothersome to Musk (Musk, 2013).

When this proposal was released, the public’s response was very positive. The idea of traveling from San Francisco to Los Angeles in less than 40 minutes was, and still is, appealing. In fact, because of the open source status of the idea that Musk proposed, several companies were founded based upon the Hyperloop name and continue to this day; these companies explore the possibilities of this technology (“Hyperloop

Transportation Technologies”, “Hyperloop One”). High-speed rail and the Hyperloop should not be confused, however. The form in which they transport passengers differs significantly. HSR is a passenger train that moves on wheels in open air and the

Hyperloop consists of a vacuum sealed tube and some form of levitation. While the form factor is different, the goal of transporting passengers along a highly limited-access permanent-structure right-of-way is the same. It is for this reason this paper will compare these methods of transportation.

Since 2013, however, little progress has been made on the front of Hyperloop transportation. Aside from a 1-mile track at the SpaceX campus, which is used for yearly competitions, and a few “prototype” tracks, which are in use by Virgin Hyperloop One and Hyperloop Transportation Technologies, there is little evidence that this technology

9 is ready for commercial use (Opgenoord et al., 2017). There have been research projects in China that have investigated the scientific merits of this transportation method with promising results but on a small scale (Deng et al. 2017). These research projects have been performed on tracks 6 meters in diameter, no longer than 45 meters and at top speeds no more than 50 km/h (Deng et al. 2017). As mentioned previously, there is still much work to be done before commercial viability. Technologically speaking, the hyperloop is plausible on small scales as seen in the research projects conducted in

China. Yet, the projects that Musk and his predecessors proposed, which vary in length and geographical displacement, fall short in their theoretical applications due to the technological, economic, and political challenges they face many of which are similar to or exactly the same as HSR.

Defining the Hyperloop

To fully understand the purpose of this thesis, I will describe the Hyperloop and its importance to high-speed transportation. To begin, the Hyperloop, as it has been proposed, is a form of mass transportation that will move passengers or goods at speeds of 750 miles per hour or more. Furthermore, the Hyperloop uses encapsulated and pressurized pods to move at high speeds through evacuated tubes. High speeds are theoretically achievable because the evacuated tubes minimize air friction. Second, the

Hyperloop levitates the pods carrying passengers and cargo via magnetic levitation technology or other means of levitation, thereby removing friction that occurs when wheels come into contact with rails.

Defining High-Speed Rail (HSR)

High-Speed Rail (HSR) is defined as passenger transportation that moves between

120 km/h and 220 km/h for trips that range between 1.5 to 3 hours long. Over half a century ago in 1964, the first high-speed rail system was installed in Japan (Albalate &

Bel, 2014). Since the early adoption of the HSR technology, it has grown significantly across the world. This mass transportation method is quite different than the Hyperloop yet shares in the same goal of safe, efficient, and economic mass transportation. HSR does not rely upon magnetic levitation at present nor evacuated tubes to transport passengers. This technology is being widely used and continues to be adopted globally as seen with the massive expansion of HSR in China.

Previous Hyperloop Proposals

The concept of the Hyperloop as we know it today has been around for over a century. Inventor and rocket scientist, Robert Goddard, initially proposed a vactrain idea in 1904 as a freshman physics student at Worcester Polytechnic Institute in

Massachusetts (Goddard, 1950). This essay, initially intended as a class assignment, caused so much interest, that young Goddard submitted this idea in the form of a story to the Scientific American in 1906 (Goddard, 1950). Just as the class responded to his idea with much skepticism, so did the Scientific American, and thus, his story titled, “The

High-Speed Bet,” was not published (Goddard, 1950). Goddard’s essay and story described a method of transportation that would eliminate friction from wheels on rails using magnetic levitation and attempt to eliminate air resistance by moving the vehicle in a partially evacuated tube. Even though Goddard's ideas for transportation did not make it to print, the idea of this type of transportation was published later by Robert M. Salter, an

American physicist, in the years 1972, 1978, and then in 2013 by Elon Musk. While there have been other publications about this topic, these were chosen because their similarity to Musk’s (2013) proposal.

High-Speed Interstate Travel: Historical Development

While these reports were published decades apart, the scientific premise and concepts remained the same: insert a vehicle inside an evacuated tube and eliminate friction due to wheels by levitating the vehicle. Still there are many similarities and differences to be noted. Robert Salter’s “The Very High-Speed Transit System” paper was the 1972 publication referenced above on the underground high-speed form of transportation. The 1978 report by Salter complemented his previous publication and was titled: “Trans-Planetary subway systems - A Burgeoning Capability”. These publications identify a high-speed vehicle route between Los Angeles and New York. The unique aspect of these papers compared to Musk’s paper is that the evacuated tunnels in which the vehicles travel are underground. Salter’s (1972; 1978) reports outline further details about safety, economic, environmental, and efficient aspects of high-speed travel using

Hyperloop science.

In these reports, Salter (1972; 1978) first mentions that his goal for this transit system is to have these vehicles travel at speeds like those of aircraft. These speeds would be only be achievable in a vacuum environment with little to no friction. The energy that would be needed to move the vehicles at these speeds would be significant; however,

Salter (1972) proposed braking systems that would reclaim a good portion of the energy from the kinetic energy of the crafts as they were slowing down.

Environmentally speaking, this method of transportation has fewer emissions from the transport vehicles as they would be electrically powered. Aircraft, cars, and coal or diesel trains all have emissions from their sources of energy. The benefit of requiring electricity to power the high-speed/Hyperloop transportation, however, is that you can generate electricity in many ways such as solar, wind, and hydro source of energy.

Salter (1978) knew that moving thousands of passengers in pressurized pods in a vacuum posed serious safety concerns and addressed them briefly in his report. The safety considerations are periodic air locking systems that will engage should there be a crack in the tube or a malfunction with the craft carrying the passengers. Another safety scheme in the paper is attaching airbag-like inflatables that would be triggered to expand instantaneously in the event of a malfunction or collision. Thus, the airbags would inflate to create a pressurized compartment through which passengers could exit the vehicle.

There would then be manholes throughout the length of the tube so passengers could also exit the tubes and exit to safety outside the tunnel.

Salter’s (1972; 1978) proposals have a brief cost analysis of the construction of the project and of the transportation charges to passengers to generate revenue and offset costs. Just as any project of this scale costs significant sums of money, this project is no exception. The New York to Los Angeles transportation project was estimated to cost between $250 to $500 billion in 1978 US (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). Accounting for inflation, that would be $1 trillion to $2 trillion in 2019 USD. To pay for the project,

Salter’s (1978) proposal suggests an initial collaboration with the military to create and use these underground tunnels to transport resources across the United States. Along with the military’s assistance, utility companies would have access to these tunnels to

13 transport materials such as gas, water, and electricity, and they would pay for usage with fees. Lastly, to pay for the project retroactively, passengers would pay $50 ($200 in 2019

USD) each way. At 100 passengers carried in each vehicle, and assuming 300,000 people per day, the transportation system could see $5.3 billion in revenue per year.

Unfortunately, Salter’s (1972; 1978) proposals have not been developed further since their publication. Perhaps this lack of interest can be attributed to the overwhelming project costs or the lack of support by the public and policy makers. Regardless, nearly

40 years later, the Hyperloop idea surfaces again and this time, gains traction with the masses.

The Hyperloop

A report issued in February 2011, estimated the cost of a high-speed rail project, the California High Speed Rail (HSR) Project, to transport people and goods between Los

Angeles and San Francisco would be $65.4 billion (Musk, 2013). It was this report that prompted Elon Musk to publish his white paper outlining the “Hyperloop” idea, sparking interest in the media and a few ambitious entrepreneurs. The proposal boasted a price point of $6 billion to construct the whole Hyperloop project, including the pods and tube structure. Which is a radical difference in price compared to Salter’s high-speed transportation proposal.

Musk (2013) proposed that the pods would be levitated using compressed air to produce an “air hockey” effect. The pods would be accelerated using linear accelerators to produce a maximum speed of 760 MPH. The tubes that will be responsible for transporting the pods would be constructed from steel and mounted on concrete pillars.

The pillars would include stabilization technology to prevent any issues that might arise

14 from earthquake-ridden California. Each pod would house up to 28 passengers and the frequency of each pod’s departure has been suggested to be every 30 seconds at the busiest times and every 2 minutes at hours of less traffic. Musk’s goal for the Hyperloop project has a new alternative mass transportation infrastructure that will be:

• Safer • Faster • Lower cost • More convenient • Immune to weather • Sustainable self-powering • Resistant to earthquakes • Not disruptive to those along the route

While these are reasonable goals to strive for when building a mass transit system, the technological and economic feasibility must also be considered. Further analysis of this system is required to fully understand the feasibility of the Hyperloop.

This paper will analyze the following: 1) the concepts behind the technology proposed in Musk’s (2013) white paper, 2) existing technology for this project, and 3) the success and failures of HSR as it applies to mass transportation. Since Musk proposed the

Hyperloop as a mass transit system, this paper will compare HSR to the Hyperloop because it is the closest competitor for the same market.

Present Technology and Viability

This section of the paper will discuss the current technologies that are being researched and implemented in Hyperloop development and HSR construction including technologies for levitation, propulsion, evacuation of the tube, construction of the tube network, and passenger safety (Deng, 2017). Included in this section, will be a discussion

15 and analysis of the energy it will take to maintain a Hyperloop network, and the technology that needs to be implemented. There are several technological hurdles to overcome, however. The most obvious technological feat is to create a partial vacuum in a large amount of tube that will be used to transport the pods. While this is not a new concept in the science community, an evacuated structure of this magnitude has not been built to date. The next technological implementation to be discussed is the use of compressed air to levitate vehicles such as the pod discussed by Musk (2013). In addition to levitation by means of compressed air, I will discuss other viable options to levitate vehicles in the Hyperloop tube. Lastly, I will describe the efficacy of these concepts and technologies and the viability of their implementation.

Evacuation of Tubes

For the Hyperloop to run as it has been proposed, the tubes in which the pods will be traveling must be evacuated. The goal of this section is to explore the viability, energy use, and costs for evacuating a tube that the Hyperloop might use if it were to exist. If this system were to be built, air pumps would be used to remove air from within the tube, and the pumps will be located along the length of the tube. The Hyperloop project proposes a route between San Francisco and Los Angeles, which is approximately 570 km.

To calculate the energy to remove air down to the desired pressure, simplifications had to be made. For this example, I will assume a 1km in length tube with a diameter of 4.5m to accommodate a 2.3m pod diameter to calculate the evacuation costs and energy. Instead of modelling air pumps to calculate the air removal, a piston will be used to expand the volume of the tube until the desired pressure is reached within the tube. An example of the system can be seen in Figure 7.

P0, initial internal a.

D = External pressure 1atm

L = 1Km b.

External P1 final internal pressure pressure 1atm

Figure 1 Figure 1a is the initial state of the example system and Figure 1b is the final state of the example system. At the one end, there is a sealed cap and a piston that can move left and right. As the piston moves to the right, as depicted in figure 1a, the pressure of 1atm will be dispersed throughout the growing volume. There will be a constant pressure of 1atm (1) external to the piston pushing opposite to the piston as it moves to the right. To calculate the work done, the classical equation for work will be used (Figure 2).

푊 = 퐹 ∙ 퐷

Figure 2 (1)

Pressure is defined by a force divided by an area (Figure 3).

(2)

퐹 푃 = 퐴

Figure 3

Applying equation 2 to equation 1, I arrive at (Figure 4):

푊 = 푃 ∙ 퐴 ∙ 퐷

Figure 4 In this equation, D is the distance the piston will move along the tube (Figure 10). This equation, when simplified, becomes the following equation and is used to calculate the work done to “evacuate” the tube (Figure 5).

푊 = 푃∆푉

Figure 5 The following values are calculated using the physical constraints defined in Figure 1 while varying the pressure (Table 1).

Physical Constraints with Varying Pressure

Final Internal Pressure Length of tube (m) Diameter of tube (m) Work done (kJ) KiloWatt

(atm*) hours**

0.1 1000 4.5 1.4E6 403.2

0.01 1000 4.5 1.6E6 443.5

0.001 1000 4.5 1.6E6 447.6

Table 1 * Conversion rate of 1atm = 101,325 N/m2

** Conversion rate of 1 Kj = 0.278 Watt hours

As of the writing of this paper, the energy rates in California are 18.3 cents per kilowatt hour which means the initial evacuation cost of a 1km tube with a 4.5m diameter is approximately $81 USD. Extending this tube along the 600 km distance between San

Francisco and Los Angeles increases this cost up to $48,696. This means to initially evacuate both tubes for the system, it would cost $97,392. This cost does not consider the inefficiency of vacuum pumps, the leakage of air through the tube, the introduction of air at the terminals, nor the constant running of those pumps to maintain the vacuum.

Because of significant safety concerns, there would have to be redundancy pumps in place to prevent critical failure of the Hyperloop system as well. It must be noted, that all of these calculations are rough estimates.

Levitation Methods

There have been two proposed methods for levitation for this mode of transportation. Salter (1972;1978) proposed magnetic levitation for his reports and Elon

Musk (2013) proposed an “air hockey” type levitation for his hyperloop proposal.

Magnetic levitation has made its way into research for the companies pursuing the

Hyperloop but the “air hockey” effect has not yet found a place in research or innovative use. The air bearing approach for levitation was attempted by a team at MIT for a chance to compete in the annual Hyperloop competition hosted at SpaceX’s campus (Opgenoord,

2017). The team quickly scrapped the air levitation method when their calculations showed large setbacks with this method and moreover they discovered they had a track to work with and adopted magnetic levitation (Opgenoord, 2017).

Compressed air was the method of levitation that Musk (2013) proposed to eliminate cost. This would be achieved using an array of 28 1.5 by 0.9-meter air bearing skis. These would then float on a cushion of air giving a 0.5 – 1.3 mm gap of air between the pods and the tube (Musk, 2013). The air gap would be created using aerodynamic properties and compressed air that will be carried on board (Musk, 2013). Once the pods are accelerated to a certain speed a film of air would be captured under the skis due to viscous forces while compressed air would be forced against the tubes originating from the pod (Musk, 2013). This method of levitation has yet to be proven effective in research

(Opgenoord, 2017). In their pursuits of air compression for levitation, the MIT team did calculations to determine what would be required to levitate the vehicle. The results of their calculations can be seen in Figure 6.

Required Air Tank Volume for Different Heights of Lift and Air bearing areas

Figure 6 Source: Opgenoord, 2017

Figure 6 depicts the ratio between air bearing area to the height of pod from the tube and the volume of the air tank required for that height. The larger a gap the pods can achieve through levitation, the better since imperfections in tube design and construction may be present. Air bearings distribute pressurized air across the surface area of the bearings. The larger the air bearings the lower the gap will be between the tube and the pods. Air bearings are positionally dependent, which means that any change in gap distance to the tube could cause loss in elevation (Janzen, 2017). Even at 1mm for the gap distance between the pod and tube, any imperfections in the tube could cause friction between the pod and the tube. Further, elevations in the tube may arise since the tube will span hundreds of miles and different elevations of terrain. Any damage from contact with the tube could result in catastrophic collisions between other pods and the walls of the tube (Janzen, 2017). Not only do collisions pose an issue with air being used as a levitation method, the volume of compressed air becomes increasingly large and infeasible as the gap between the pod and the tube increases (Figure 6). Given the safety concerns of the “air hockey” effect and the results of the MIT calculations in Figure 6, it can be concluded that using compressed air to levitate a pod, even to 1mm, is insufficient and dangerous. The benefit of this method of levitation, however, is a cheaper form of levitation compared to magnetic levitation. Magnetic levitation is inherently more expensive because of the energy that goes into electromagnets if they are used, or the initial investment in permanent magnets and superconductors if this is the system used.

Magnetic levitation has been the leading technology for the Hyperloop prototypes being designed and researched, which only contributes to the growing cost of a project such as this. Because of the wide use of magnetic levitation for the Hyperloop idea, the remainder of this section will discuss magnetic levitation and the energy and costs associated with it. Of the research conducted on evacuated tube transportation, high temperature superconductor levitation has been explored. Paired with a guideway consisting of a Halbach array (Figure 7) of permanent magnets, a high temperature superconductor located in the pods will have a range of stable equilibrium positions and orientations (Deng et al. 2017). The design of the Halbach array uses permanent magnets to strengthen and dampen magnetic fields depending on the orientation of the poles of the magnets (Choi & Yoo, 2012). As seen in figure 7, the fields above the magnets are amplified while the field lines below the magnets are being diminished. One of the benefits of the Halbach array is creating a homogenous “one-sided” magnetic field that another magnet or superconductor would then repel against to create the desired levitation (Raich & Blumler, 2004). Additional methods of magnetic levitation are proposed as well, including use of the Halbach array in different formations, and an array of electromagnets (Choi & Yoo, 2012).

Figure 7 Source: Choi & Yoo, 2012

In China, there are extensive efforts to expand mass transportation within the country, and as a result, there is an abundance of funding for this area of research

(Albalate & Bel,, 2014). As such, China has conducted research in magnetic levitation using Halbach arrays and superconductors. The nonideal type-II high-temperature superconductors being used are cooled with liquid nitrogen (Deng et al. 2017). The results of one study revealed that an evacuated tube utilizing magnetic levitation to suspend a vehicle was achievable (Deng et al. 2017). This experiment used a 6m diameter tube, a 1-ton cart, and a 45 m circular track. While the results were promising from a technological stance, commercialization and scalability has yet to be determined (Deng et al. 2017). The Halbach method, however, when paired with superconductors can prove to be self-stabilizing, simple in structure, and environmentally conscious; yet permanent magnets and superconductors would drive initial costs up significantly (Deng et al. 2017).

The Chinese research project that built a test track included a permanent magnet guideway (Deng et al. 2017). This guideway consisted of Nd-Fe-B magnets assembled in a Halbach array to maintain a consistent magnetic field for the pods to levitate upon

(Deng et al. 2017). Nd-Fe-B magnets make up 2/3 of the rare earth magnets that are being produced on a large scale (Coey, 2012). In 2012, the cost of Nd-Fe-B magnets were more than $100 per kg (Coey, 2012). Depending on how high the temperature was when creating the Nd-Fe-B magnet, the density can vary from 5.38 g/cm3 to 7.52 g/cm3 with temperatures varying from 724 degrees Celsius to 1060 degrees Celsius (Yan et al.,

1999). For this cost estimate, we will assume two “rails” made of permanent magnets, the cost of the magnets will be $150/kg and that the density of the magnet will be 7.52 g/cm3. From these constants, it will cost $450,000 per kilometer of permanent guideway.

In total, the cost for permanent magnets will be $2.7 million in magnets alone. This cost assumes two rails of magnets in each tube that spans the 600 km path between San

Francisco and Los Angeles. This does not include the framework for which the permanent magnets will need to support magnetic levitation nor any additional magnets that might be needed for support. While this cost for purchasing magnets may not be as daunting of a number as one might expect, this cost does not include the construction of the system, nor the challenges the come with constructing a magnetic levitation system.

Hyperloop fans must realize that even magnetic levitation being constructed in high speed rail today is either still being build but isn’t being explored due to high costs.

When planning the construction of the Shanghai maglev train, it was estimated that the project was going to cost $300 million per kilometer (Yan, 2004). If that number were to be applied to the hyperloop project in California, we would see numbers of $180 billion to construct the hyperloop. The cost estimates to construct the hyperloop are estimates and should not be considered actual values to be used for production.

Propulsion Estimation

According to Musk’s (2013) Hyperloop proposal, the pods that will be accelerated in the evacuated tubes will be approaching Mach 1, the speed of sound. There are a few factors that need to be considered before these speeds are reached or achieved. First, the energy to move these vehicles at this top speed must be calculated; second, the air resistance would need to be calculated, even though these tubes will be partially evacuated. Assuming each pod would carry 30 people per craft, according to Musk

(2013), each passenger pod would weigh 3,100kg and would hurl down the tubes at top speeds of 330 meters per second.

The following items from Musk’s (2013) proposal will be used in calculations in the paper and represent the route from Los Angeles to San Francisco:

• 480 kph for 167 seconds

• 890 kph for 268 seconds

• 1,220 kph for 1,083 seconds

• 890 kph for 232 seconds

• 480 kph for 385 seconds

• Trip total time: 2,153 seconds

With these parameters and the previously mentioned constants, I will calculate the energy it would take to complete this trip. Each of the bullet points from the summary will have maximum accelerations of 0.5 g or 5 m/s2. To begin the calculation of energy, all the forces must be calculated and accounted for. For this, the energy for propulsion will be calculated; refer to Figure 8 for the Force Body Diagram of the pod.

Fd F a

Figure 8: Force Body Diagram Fg

Fd = Force of drag, FL = Force of Levitation, Fa = force of acceleration, Fg = force of gravity The force body diagram is a snapshot of what the direction of the forces acting upon the pod at any given moment. First, the force of acceleration on the pod will be

25 calculated. This can be easily calculated from the classical equation of F=ma. This force will be a sum of the air drag force and the acceleration force upon the pod. From this force, we can divide by the mass to get the actual acceleration forward of the pod. With a constant acceleration of 5 m/s2 and a weight of 3100Kg per pod, the force due to acceleration on the pod is 15,500 N of force. Note that this acceleration will only be applied to get to the desired speeds it will not be continuously applied through the 600km trip. The energy that will be put into the pod can be calculated based upon the intervals of acceleration and the distance this acceleration will be applied to the pod for. This acceleration will account for the force of drag upon the pod during the time of applied force. Because the force due to air resistance will be opposing the direction of motion and therefore slowing it down, more energy must be put into the pod system to counteract the effects of air drag. To calculate the force due to air drag, the following equation will be used (Figure 4):

1 퐹 = 휌푣2퐶 퐴 푑 2 푑

v=velocity, ρ=air density, Cd=coefficient of drag, A=cross Figure 9 sectional area of craft

Because the coefficient of drag must be calculated experimentally, I will assume the coefficient of drag to be that of a bullet, 0.29 (“Shape Effects on Drag”). This coefficient of drag is constant for these calculations and does not vary with velocity. For this exercise, the other constants to be defined are the cross-sectional area of the pod, assumed to be a circle with a diameter of 2.3 meters. The density of air will be on the scale of 0.01 atm, which is the assumed air pressure. Based on the assumptions stated above, the force of air drag can be found for each velocity in Table 2. This table shows

26 what the force upon the pod at the maximum speeds during the trip. Because the pod will have a changing velocity through the trip, the force of drag and acceleration was calculated computationally.

Force of Air Drag by Velocity

Velocity Force of Air drag Coefficient of air Air density Cross sectional (m/s) (N) drag (unitless) (kg/m3) area (m2)

133 125.5 0.295 0.0116 1.32π

247 432.9 0.295 0.0116 1.32π

339 815.4 0.295 0.0116 1.32π

Table 2

With the forces calculated, the energy for the trip from Los Angeles to San Francisco can be calculated using classical mechanics that W = F∆D. From this equation, I obtain the following for work done from external forces on our pod system (Figure 10):

푊 = 퐹푇∆퐷 Figure 10

When accounting for air drag on the pods, we find that there are several places throughout the tubes that there will have to be linear accelerators to increase the speed of the pods (Figure 12). In Musk’s (2013) report, he claims that for most of the trip between the two cities, the pods would be coasting. This can be seen in figure 11 which was pulled from that same report (Musk, 2013). When performing computational analysis of the velocity accounting for air drag with respect to time, we get a similar graph, yet it

27 shows that there will be many linear accelerators placed throughout the tube. Each bump seen in figure 12 is a location where the velocity had to be increased because the velocity fell below the specified velocity for the trip. This same computational analysis showed the energy required to maintain these velocities while combating air resistance is 457,172

Kilojoules. To reiterate, the energy rates in California are 18.3 cents per kilowatt hour giving us $22 USD to provide that much energy. The vacuum provides a great advantage when it comes to the energy required to transport passengers.

The implications of these graphs go further, however. Because more linear accelerators would be required to maintain the speed of the craft, a larger initial investment will be incurred. Also, there are safety issues concerning power outages that may happen. Musk (2013) mentioned power outages would not prove to be an issue because the pods would coast most of the time. The costs and calculations within this section are estimates and should not be considered for actual production of the

Hyperloop.

Figure 11 Source: Musk, 2013

Figure 12 Velocity of Hyperloop pod accounting for airdrag

Construction of the Tube

The cost associated with the construction of this system has been advertised as being $6 Billion USD which is an order of magnitude lower than the HSR project that was proposed for the same route. Because the technology for this system is still conceptual and the stage of research is in its infancy it is difficult to predict the infrastructural needs for this kind of project. Comparison to national research labs can be drawn, however, to give a rough estimate for what would be required. The national laboratory LIGO, has 8 km of evacuated tube to perform experiments which is a much smaller scale than the Hyperloop would be but is a good basis for comparison (“Facts”).

The vacuum that LIGO has achieved is one-trillionth of an atmosphere and is contained within steel tubes only 3mm in thickness (“Facts”). Given these specifications, we know that the tube would need to be at least 3mm thick when using stainless steel to construct the tube.

There have been different vacuum tube structures considered to fulfill the vacuum requirements of the hyperloop. Three of the structures use steel and concrete combinations as those materials are cheap and can hold a vacuum (Zhang & Wang,

2012). The first structure is making the tube out of pure steel which for tubes with a diameter of 5m can cost between $900,000 - $2.3 million per kilometer depending on the thickness of the tube which varies between 8-20mm (Zhang & Wang, 2012). Another structure is a tube with a concrete wall with a thin steel airproof layer (Zhang & Wang,

2012). The third structure is a tube with an inner steel shell with a concrete exterior

(Zhang & Wang, 2012). The concrete variations allow for a cheaper construction cost as the expense of having thicker tube walls.

One of the biggest concerns with constructing a system such as this is preventing air leakage into the tube. The main three causes of air leakage are a crack in the wall, imperfections in seals at link connections, and at air locks when pods are reaching their destinations (Zhang & Wang, 2012). Air leakages can contribute to a large cost because vacuum pumps will be running constantly to keep the tube at a partial vacuum (Zhang &

Wang, 2012). It is therefore imperative to make sure this system has an advanced detection system which can quickly isolate an issue in the tube.

The LIGO National Laboratory has shown the world that vacuum technology today can create a vacuum that the hyperloop could use. The scale of LIGO, however, is not what the hyperloop would be. To construct a tube system long enough to go between

San Francisco and Los Angeles would cost $540 million to $1.4 billion in materials alone based upon the quotes listed in this section.

Safety and Reliability

In this section of the discussion, I will present questions and realistic concerns that need to be considered before a project such as the Hyperloop is considered. These issues manifest themselves in two major areas: as safety concerns for the passengers, and reliability of the transportation that affects ridership and revenue. The main concerns to be addressed are:

• How will a Hyperloop company maintain or repair damage to the tubes while

passengers are being transported and how will the passenger’s safety be ensured?

• How do you protect against the pressurization issues of a pod if it became

compromised?

• What happens when the vacuum pumps malfunction or need repairing? How

quickly will repairs be made?

• Will there be redundant tubes to carry pods while other tubes are being serviced

or repaired?

• How will the tubes withstand different temperature environments, and will

different climates affect the pods traveling in the tubes?

While these issues can be approached with engineering solutions, they are pragmatic concerns with significant consequences. The safety of this transportation method are a large undertaking and the concerns of the Hyperloop reliability and safety are considerable issues when even comparing the method to HSR.

Musk (2013) mentioned few safety considerations in his report. The section he included about safety was brief and only mentioned that there would always be communication between the pod and terminals, there would be on board first aid kits, and that depressurization is unlikely. While catastrophic events such as depressurization and tube breaches will be engineered to be unlikely, they cannot be ignored. Musk (2013) mentions that in an even such as a pressurization break that the entire length of the tube would be rapidly repressured. These issues are largely unaccounted for and safety questions remain unanswered.

Technology Readiness Level

To implement this mode of transportation, the technology for it must be ready to be tried and tested. Because there does not exist a prototype, it is hard to gauge the readiness for this technology. Human lives would be at stake when using this system. The

Department of Transportation outlines 9 descriptions for the technology readiness of a

32 technology before it is adopted. These descriptions are 1) Basic principles and research 2)

Application formulated 3) Proof of concept 4) Components validated in laboratory environment 5) Integrated components demonstrated in a laboratory environment 6)

Prototype demonstrated in relevant environment 7) Prototype demonstrated in operational environment 8) Technology proven in operational environment 9) Technology refined and adopted (Department of Transportation, 2017). Because the farthest any tests have gotten with this technology is a 42-meter track in China, the stage for which this can be placed in technology readiness level as defined by the Department of Transportation is 3.

Thus, there is much work to be done before this project will be ready to transport passengers.

High-Speed Rail: A Global Case Study

Throughout this section, HSR will be discussed in detail from a global perspective. I will evaluate the role of HSR in certain countries and investigate the economic impact HSR has on the local and national economies. Then a planning and economic review of HSR will be compared to the financial feasibility of the Hyperloop project. Finally, I will draw a comparison between HSR and the Hyperloop projects to show that even though Musk (2013) advocates his Hyperloop is cheaper, the reality is that implementing mass transit systems such as the Hyperloop will be just as expensive if not more expensive than HSR. Both the Hyperloop and HSR, have similar goals: affordable, safe, and environmentally friendly mass transportation. The concept of the

Hyperloop idea has provided inspiration to many in the scientific community as well as

33 industry; however, when approached from fiscal and political positions, this idea must be scrutinized given the history of its distance cousin: the high-speed rail.

High-speed rail systems have provided transportation to millions across Europe and Asia over the past half-century and offered many benefits to the countries it serves.

While there are potential economic, social, environmental and political benefits countries can gain from building HSR between large cities, the debate is still ongoing in the United

States. Ever since the inception of the HSR project between Los Angeles and San

Francisco, the debate has continued. To broaden an understanding of how HSRs have been utilized outside the United States, I will examine HSRs in Japan, France, and China.

Japan

High-speed rail has been crucial for intercity travel for Western Europe and Asia where the majority of HSR lines exist (Opgenoord, 2017). Asia has used HSRs for the longest period of time as this mode of transportation began to serve the people of Japan in

1964. The Shinkansen traveled between the cities of Tokyo and Osaka for 20 years and was the only HSR system in the world. This rail line has grown from serving the people of those two cities to a large network over the nation’s main island, Honshu Island. This rail line has often been admired and has been considered the best example for the most successful HSR line in the world. According to Albalate, D., & Bel, G. (2014) by 2012, more than 300 million passengers were being serviced per year, making this the primary method of transportation for the country. Because of the high number of passengers every year and the reliance the Japanese people have on the HSR, this rail system has been a model for the world when looking to build similar systems (Figure 12).

The island of Honshu, the largest island in the country, is an ideal location for an

HSR system. HSR can connect cities within 450 to 700 kilometers efficiently; the most densely populated cities lie on the plains of the coast, which is ideal for HSR. When this project was first under construction, the building costs were financed by a loan of eighty million dollars from the World Bank (Albalate, & Bel, 2014). Today, this amount equates to 18 billion USD. The construction debt, however, was paid within three years of HSR services due to the commuter fee charged to passengers. The Japanese HSR system has also proven to be quite safe. In fact, in the entire existence of the HSR system in Japan, there has yet to have been a fatality or injury due to an accident (Hayashi, Mimuro, Han,

& Kato, 2017).

Figure 13 Source: Ministry of Transportation, 2013

When the Shinkansen rail line was being proposed, the system was designed to carry as many passengers as possible and as frequently as possible due to the heavy

35 reliance of the Japanese people on rail transportation at the time (Hayashi, Mimuro, Han,

& Kato, 2017). This has allowed the large number of reported annual riders: “In its first year of operation, the Shinkansen attracted 31 million annual passengers (MAP), or about

87,000 passengers per day” (Hayashi, Mimuro, Han, & Kato, 2017). As ridership has grown on this line for the past six decades, car ownership has also increased as expressways in Japan have been developed as well (Hayashi, Mimuro, Han, & Kato,

2017). Car ownership went from 18 personal cars owned per 1000 people in 1964 to 400 personal cars owned per 1000 by the year 2000 (Hayashi, Mimuro, Han, & Kato, 2017).

Despite the increase in car ownership, however, the Shinkansen still holds 70% of intercity travel for trips under 900km (Hayashi, Mimuro, Han, & Kato, 2017).

Despite the early successes of the Shinkansen, as HSR lines were further developed, there were some drawbacks to building such a sprawling connection of lines.

These drawbacks were primarily fiscal issues. Albalate and Bel (2014), comment: “… it seemed inevitable that the surpluses earned by the profitable lines would serve to cross subsidize the rest of the high-speed lines…” (p. 44). Financial distress and debt led the

Japanese National Rail to privatization in 1987, 23 years after the inauguration of HSR in the country (Albalate & Bel, 2014). The following year in 1988, there were criteria established to how projects such as HSR were funded. Some of those criteria are

(Albalate & Bel, 2014):

• Long-term profitability in the railway business

• The effects of spending on the national economy

• Future business outlooks and policies for the construction of Shinkansen

railways

• Consensus reached by residents in affected areas

Even though the HSR lines are now controlled by private companies, the financing model since 1997 is one that is co-financed by the national and the local governments served by the new rail line (Albalate & Bel, 2014). Because of this arrangement, the HSR railways being built are public property; however, the company that services the rail lines pay the

Japanese government a fee to use the railway (Albalate & Bel, 2014).

To this day, the Tokaido-Shinkansen line (yellow line in figure 12) built in 1964 carries 44% of all HSR passengers for Japan and thus, is more profitable (Albalate & Bel,

2014). This more profitable line cross subsidizes other lower economically performing

HSR lines in the country. The Tokaido-Shinkansen line carries passengers between

Tokyo and Osaka. To better understand the reasoning behind the profitability of the

Tokaido-Shinkansen line, the ridership must be understood and what motivates passenger numbers on this line. The ridership growth tracks the economic growth of Japan

(Hayashi, Mimuro, Han, & Kato, 2017). In the 1960s, ridership grew along with the economy; however, during the 1973 to 1975 oil crises, ridership decreased (Hayashi,

Mimuro, Han, & Kato, 2017). The Tokaido-Shinkansen and the Sanyo-Shinkansen lines account for 60% of the ridership of the HSR lines in Japan at 200 million passengers per year (Figure 12) (Hayashi, Mimuro, Han, & Kato, 2017). The lines between Tokyo and

Nigata opened in 1982 and carries approximately 50 million passengers per year

(Hayashi, Mimuro, Han, & Kato, 2017). As lines were continually added throughout the nation, ridership on newly added lines proved to less successful than their predecessors.

Connection to Nagano city was added in 1997 and carries less than 10 million passengers

37 per year. The Kyushu-Shinkansen line, which opened in 2004, carries 2.7 million per year (Hayashi, Mimuro, Han, & Kato, 2017).

The breakdown of the costs from building the Sanyo line (blue line in figure 12) can be found in Table 3. As can be seen in table 5, the largest budgeted item for building this line was the infrastructure of the system. This large number was a result of the vast amount of bridges and tunnels that needed to be constructed to allow the train to travel along as flat a surface as it could in the countryside (Albalate & Bel, 2014).

Costs from Building the Sanyo Line

Budgeted Item Percentage of Budget

Infrastructure (Bridges, tunnels, etc.) 58%

Land 26%

Electrical equipment 11%

Tracks 5%

Table 3 Source: Albalate & Bel, 2014

The population density and connections to the surrounding areas are the principal reasons for the high ridership of these lines. The three major metropolitan areas, Tokyo,

Osaka, and Nagoya contain over half of the Japanese population. Employment grew from

22.4 million in Tokyo, 14.4 million in Osaka, and 7.9 million in Nagoya in 1964 to 38 million, 20 million, and 11 million inhabitants, respectively, in 2009 (Hayashi, Mimuro,

Han, & Kato, 2017). The Shinkansen HSR has been so influential in the country that it has not only contributed to economic development but also to the growth of Tokyo

(Hayashi, Mimuro, Han, & Kato, 2017). This rail line has contributed to the growth of these metropolises and has been crucial to the economic development of these areas.

Over the past 60 years, HSR has been developed and expanded in the country of

Japan. This has contributed to the economy and the growth of major cities throughout

Japan. Even with economic success, the HSR system has not been without financial distress. Throughout its existence in Japan, HSR has undergone financial restructuring and privatization. HSR in Japan would not have seen the degree of success it has without the assistance of government subsidies and highly dense population metropolises.

China

Southwest of Japan, in China, the fastest growing HSR systems in the world exist.

Even though HSR is an expensive endeavor to integrate into regions and cities, China is continually developing its HSR infrastructure (Cheng, & Vickerman, 2015). As of 2018,

China had 20,000 km of HSR track, making it the country with the largest HSR system in the world (Meng, Lin, & Zhu, 2018). In tandem with the HSR growth, the economy of

China has also grown over the past decade. As the Chinese government realized the need for high speed cargo and individual transportation, the state invested and accommodated the aggressive expansion of their HSR system (Meng, Lin, & Zhu, 2018). A revised plan from 2008 has an ambitious goal of having 29,000 km of HSR track within the country by 2020 (Meng, Lin, & Zhu, 2018).

Between the 1970s and 1990s, China experienced economic growth throughout the country; however, not all regions of the country experienced the same growth rates

(Chen, & Haynes, 2017). Some regions experienced over 10% GDP growth and other regions realized a significantly slower growth of 6% (Chen, & Haynes, 2017). This

39 uneven economic growth concerned the Chinese government. One of the government’s solutions was to expand public transportation to the masses (Chen, & Haynes, 2017).

With monumental support from the Chinese government, the HSR system in China was able to be quickly constructed (Chen, & Haynes, 2017). This financial backing allowed the HSR network density to nearly double in size over 14 years (Chen, & Haynes, 2017).

The speed and vastness of construction came at a considerable cost, however. The

Chinese government invested $400 billion into these rail lines (Albalate & Bel, 2014).

Moving forward, what is unknown is whether this investment will result in revenues, particularly with the extensive geographical areas the rail system covers. One speculation is that the more densely populated areas will have a higher rate of ridership as seen in previous applications of HSR.

France

The country with the second oldest HSR system in the world is France. Since the

1981, France has had an HSR line transporting passengers between Paris and Lyon.

Similar to the Tokaido line in Japan, this 450 km route between Paris and Lyon has had great success. In 2010, the HSR network transported 114.5 million passengers making this network the second largest in the world behind the Japanese Shinkansen (Albalate &

Bel, 2014). Due to the immediate success of HSR in France, the Paris-Lyon line became the foundation of a series of HSR expansions that developed the network to more than

2,000 km in the country (Crozet, 2017). This network has carried four times more passenger-kilometers than domestic air transportation (Crozet, 2017). The rapid expansion of these networks and the desire to expand these networks has been referred to as ‘HSR mania.’

As the HSR network continued to grow in France, so did the ridership. In the early 2000s, HSR traffic grew 3.5 percent per year; however, since 2008, traffic only grew 0.5 percent per year (Crozet, 2017). Because of the growth in the early 2000s, between 2007 and 2010, France planned to add up to 4,000 km more of HSR lines within the following three decades (Crozet, 2017). As time passed and ridership growth slowed,

‘HSR mania’ began to dwindle. This decreased demand led to an announcement from the

Ministry of Transportation in June 2013 that many of the proposed projects were delayed or dropped entirely (Crozet, 2017). These cancellations were due to an overgrowth of

HSR lines in France, which also created financial burdens. In addition, the planned projects were expensive and had low predicted ridership, which would have resulted in lower revenues (Crozet, 2017). The delays meant that another HSR line would not be expected to open until 2030 (Crozet, 2017). This change in investment priorities was due to a decrease in demand and an increased need for governmental subsidies, both affecting the affordability of future expansions (Crozet, 2017).

Multiple contributing factors influence ridership demand of HSR. Among these factors are the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country, personal mobility, and transportation speeds (Crozet, 2017). Studies of GDP and transportation have shown relationships between GDP and personal mobility. These studies have shown that as GDP grows, so too does per capita distance traveled per year. However, the key variable in continued growth of distance travelled is transportation speed (Crozet, 2017).

Transportation between two cities appears to be motivated by length of the trip between the cities and access to the transportation method (Crozet, 2017).

Even though ridership has been shown to have a positive relationship with growing national GDP, HSR itself has resulted in limited economic benefits in France.

HSR has played a secondary role in attracting companies that relocate to cities. For example, HSR can favor the continued presence of companies, but HSR does not stop companies from relocating. Further, there is little evidence of the vitalization of HSR from the service sector (Albalate & Bel, 2014). Benefits of HSR include faster transportation between cities, more energy efficiencies, and broader business reach of high added value service companies (Albalate & Bel, 2014). Another benefit is the revenue generated by the Paris-Lyon line. The financial success of this line covered repayment of its costs (Albalate & Bel, 2014). The only other line in the world able to accomplish this fiscal goal was the Tokaido Shinkansen (yellow line in figure 12) line in

Japan (Albalate & Bel, 2014).

When the second line was installed in France, however, public subsidies we required to keep the system running (Albalate & Bel, 2014). These lines have relied on government subsidies to the extent that the Européenne line required 75% of its construction costs to be paid for by the government (Albalate & Bel, 2014). Not only have these financial subsidies prevented the expansion of HSR in France, it has also pressured taxpayers (Albalate & Bel, 2014). High speed rail has also claimed to be a clean method of transportation while also able to transport many passengers. In addition to large HSR financial investments, there can also be environmental investments for lines that will not attract large numbers of riders. A carbon analysis for an eastern HSR in

France showed that 12 years of traffic would be needed to offset the emissions produced during construction (Crozet, 2017).

Despite setbacks to HSR in France, there are geographical factors that contribute to the unique successes of the system. The “relevancy zone,” which are high speed rail trips of 1.5 to 3 hours duration, create the most competitive HSRs (Crozet, 2017). Cars and airplanes still maintain dominance for shorter and longer trips respectively (Crozet,

2017). This “relevancy zone” is applicable to France because the cities are of sufficient size to support profitable HSR ridership, are in close enough proximity that planes are too expensive but, are far enough apart that distances by car are too lengthy. It is this relevancy zone that makes the France HSR model unique. For example, the HSR system in Germany makes many more stops and travels much slower than the French HSR

(Crozet, 2017). The more frequent stops are a result of slower growth in HSR in that country as well as developing conventional rail freight and passenger alongside HSR

(Rothengatter, 2017). Germany’s mass transportation system also complements air travel whereas with other countries, those two methods of transportation are in competition with one another (Rothengatter, 2017).

California, United States

Musk (2013) wrote his white paper in response to the HSR plans to develop a system to transport passengers between San Francisco and Los Angeles. The Hyperloop, once implemented, would be faster than traditional HSR today, a significant scientific and engineering accomplishment. However, given HSR’s history and success, speed may not be the optimal quality of mass transit in this situation. This section will discuss the feasibility and history of the HSR debate in California and draw comparisons to the

Hyperloop. Given the history of HSR in countries abroad, this discussion will also elaborate on the feasibility of HSR within California.

The California HSR debate has been an ongoing process for the past 60 years.

Many projects across the state have been proposed and select proposals have received significant attention from policy makers (Albalate & Bel, 2014). In 1994, the infrastructure costs for bridges and tunnels of HSR alone were estimated to cost $9.5 billion (Albalate & Bel, 2014). Authors of a study in 1997 concluded that building an

HSR system in California would be more expensive than expanding the existing air service or auto travel (Albalate & Bel, 2014). In 2011, the cost estimate grew to $65.4 billion, and as the cost estimates kept rising, ridership forecasts decreased to 41 million passengers per year in 2035 (Albalate & Bel, 2014). As ridership forecasts show decreasing numbers, potential revenues and environmentally friendly benefits also become questionable.

This debate has extended for many years due to the economic and political policy boundaries that prevent actionable decisions for any HSR project (Deakin, 2017a).

Geographical features also present challenges as mountain ranges and earthquakes are prevalent in California and prove to be costly and problematic (Deakin, 2017a). An example of geographical issues posing large burdens is when the Shinkansen was built in

Japan. Infrastructure costs took more than half of the budget for the Sanyo line to build bridges and tunnels (Albalate & Bel, 2014). Along with the hazards of the terrain, the property values around the Bay Area and Los Angeles are high, which contribute to the rising budget for the California high speed rail project (Deakin, 2017a). An additional consideration when building this system is the effect it may have on agriculture.

California’s agriculture business is substantial and produces more than half of the fruits and vegetables grown in the United States (Deakin, 2017b). Proposals that may impact

44 the agricultural sector of the economy are additional reasons why HSR faces political challenges.

Perhaps the most significant hurdle in California preventing the HSR project from becoming a reality is politics. As mentioned previously, the agricultural economy in

California is large and protected by the government (Deakin, 2017b). These governmental protections require the examination of indirect and direct effects on agriculture and the exploration of alternatives before approving any activity that would impede or manipulate the farmland from producing crops (Deakin, 2017b). Since HSR would irreversibly occupy portions of land across the state, seeking approval would be an arduous process, but required to satisfy the governmental agricultural policies (Deakin,

2017b). If this project were to become funded and tens of billions of dollars went into building HSR in California, resources would be diverted from projects that other stakeholders believe to have higher priorities (Albalate & Bel, 2014).. As a result of this political influence, the private sector is expected to largely fund HSR projects

(Henriquez, & Deakin, 2017). However, with a minimum, but increasing cost of $65.4 billion to complete, private companies are challenged to provide such capital investments with no guarantee that they will see a return on the investment. Governmental subsidies would be required to offset the cost a company would undertake. Despite considerable financial risks involved with constructing an HSR system in California, there are some rewards that can come from it such as fast transportation in the region and opening labor markets.

These financial and political hinderances are not exclusive to HSR. The

Hyperloop would face a similar fate if implemented within California. The Hyperloop

45 would span the same geographical space as the HSR system would and thus face similar political battles. Before those challenges are considered, though, the technology must be perfected and tested first. As discussed previously, the technology for the Hyperloop is still being tested and researched. One thing can be certain from this, we will not see the

Hyperloop in California in the next 5 years, as media responses nationwide have indicated (Baggaley, 2018).

Discussion

The reasons I have presented in this paper provide support for why the Hyperloop proposed by Elon Musk (2013) will significantly exceed $6 billion to build. There is a myriad of political, geographical, economic, and technological barriers to overcome before the Hyperloop can be practically implemented. While the Hyperloop is not high- speed rail, they share similar concepts and functions. A direct comparison between the two systems may not prove to be completely analogous, however, when considering building a Hyperloop, there are lessons to be learned from HSR systems around the world.

Previous magnetic levitation train projects have proven expensive and the hyperloop will not be an exception. With costs of $180 billion to build magnetic levitation trains, the hyperloop would experience the same expenses as the technology used in both projects is similar. The hyperloop in fact has additional features that HSR does not. The Hyperloop would include a steel or concrete tube, evacuation pumps, and pods that carry far fewer passengers per trip. A California high speed rail project would be a third of the cost of a magnetic levitation train.

Ridership predictions cannot be ignored when it comes to mass transportations systems. The use by passengers of Japan’s and France’s HSR systems produced revenue and created profits in some HSR lines and others had to be supplemented by governmental stipends or the revenues generated from the other lines. As ridership forecasts decrease for California, HSR needs to find an appealing approach to its potential riders. These ridership predictions can be extended to Hyperloop ridership predictions. If applied to California, private sector entities that consider constructing, operating, and owning a Hyperloop system will need to strategize how to feasibly fund the project and then generate revenue to pay off the initial investment. High-speed rail projects provide a baseline of the expenses; however, the magnetic and vacuum technologies of a Hyperloop project would necessitate increased costs of the project. As seen from experiences abroad, often governmental intervention is required to complete these projects. While governmental intervention is not inherently negative, subsidies for high speed rail may be passed onto taxpayers. We have seen previously in France how large subsidies for these systems can threaten a country’s budget. France was able stop building their HSR system before it became too cumbersome.

Beyond fiscal and technological considerations, other aspects to these projects are the long-term effects these systems will have on the areas. For Japan, the system shaped the economic landscape for the country, and opened labor markets to urban and developing areas of the country. Because of France’s urban landscape with respect to the country’s size, HSR proved to be quite successful in connecting cities within the relevancy zones. However, while initially successful, HSR ultimately became a financial burden on the country because of quick expansion of the system known as “HSR mania.”

The Hyperloop will be costly and will inevitably burden the taxpayers. Given the need to develop the technology and the lack of a prototype, consideration of the

Hyperloop as a viable option is limited. As defined by the US Department of

Transportation, the technological readiness of this technology is at around stage 4 out of

9 where stage 9 is the implementation and adaptation of the technology and the idea of this type of transportation has been around for over a century. If nothing else, the history of the HSR debate within California proves that implementing the Hyperloop within the state would still face political and economic hurdles.

Technological hurdles for the Hyperloop prove to be a bigger challenge than portrayed in Elon Musk’s (2013) white paper. While magnetic levitation technologies are maturing and being implemented in train technology, vacuum technology and safety measures to accompany the system are still not proven. The preliminary studies performed in China give an optimistic perspective; however, the question to be explored is “Will it scale?” Assuming the levitation and vacuum technologies are designed and implemented, other challenges will quickly present themselves such as, creating hyperloop stations that preserve the vacuum, securing safety precautions that prevent passengers from being exposed to the vacuum if the passenger pods were to be compromised, and accommodating maintenance of tubes if there are only two tubes carrying passengers. Therefore, the Hyperloop, while appealing at first glance should not be considered as a viable option given current and historical circumstances.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the concept of the Hyperloop originated in the early 1900s, and while projects for this transportation system are at best in their infancy, we can still compare

48 this to modern day transportation endeavors, the HSR lines. High-speed rail has been implemented in cities across the world and has proven to be effective in densely populated areas of the world. High-speed rail while effective, has historically been expensive to construct and maintain. The question of the Hyperloop technology becoming a similar mass-transit system to HSR is far from answered, a question characterized with known barriers to the technology and unknown scientific hurdles that have yet to be articulated. Perhaps if Elon Musk really believed in this project and thought that it would cost $6 billion to construct, the he could fund it himself from his net worth of $23 billion (Loudenback, 2018)

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