Tunnel Accident Data and Review of Accident Investigation Methodologies

SafeT Work package 4

D4.5 report

First Deliverable to EU Part I

Tunnel accident data and review of accident investigation methodologies

Author: Christian D’Alessio (SESM) Francesca Matarese (SESM) Ilaria Neri (SESM) Version: March 2005

Index

1. Introduction...... 3

2. Methodology ...... 4

3. References...... 5

4. Accidents...... 7 4.1. Road Accidents...... 7 4.2. Rail Accidents...... 63 4.3. Metro Accidents...... 91

5. Tunnel Accident Investigations ...... 122 5.1. Methods and Methodologies...... 122 5.2. Accident Investigation Problems ...... 123 5.3. Accident Perceptions...... 125 5.4. Accident Investigation Processes...... 126 5.5. Accident Investigation Methodologies ...... 129 5.6. Accident Investigation Outputs...... 132 5.7. Relationships Among Findings...... 133 5.8. Conclusions...... 134

1. Introduction

The aim of this document is to provide a data collection on tunnel accidents. Any available document regarding road, metro and rail accidents has been analyzed in order to obtain information on the accidents in various kinds of tunnels. Different types of information, necessary to study this problem (tunnel structure, accidents causes, number of deaths and injured, etc.), have been collected.

The information in the tables below is based on the available information from the Internet and Media sources and is therefore subject to the reliability of those sources.

This report is an output of the European Project Safe-T. It gives an overview about the investigation and evaluation of relevant tunnel accidents in road, train & metro tunnels. This task is part of Work Package 4 “Post accident investigation and evaluation”: “Task 4.1: Collection of relevant tunnel incidents information”

T4.1 will collect all the available documents, reports, official relations and technical descriptions regarding accidents in tunnels in the different transport modes (rail, road and metro). Besides the data on the accident itself, information on the methodologies of investigation will also be collected.

The report consists of the following topics: • collection of data about Road Accidents • collection of data about Rail Accidents • collection of data about Metro Accidents • incident and accident investigation methodologies.

The emphasis is placed on accident investigations methodologies in road, train & metro tunnels. Task 4.1 gives recommendations to supplement the actual EU Directive, to improve safety management in tunnels, including organisational and institutional issues such as incident and accident investigations.

2. Methodology

The methodology used for data collection consists basically in web researches. Many different databases and other sources have been consulted.

A template structure containing all the information necessary for a complete description of the tunnel accident problem has been defined. The information gained on the web has been used to fill the template.

Reporting all the available information in a common structure allows an easy management of data in terms of both consultation and future insertion of nowadays missing information.

A template has been filled for each tunnel accident with data such as: • Date of accident; • Country; • Tunnel information (length, control center, etc.); • Accident Profile (number of deaths and injured, tunnel damages, etc.); • Comments on the accident and relative source.

For some accidents has been quite easy to find a lot of documentation that allowed a complete fulfillment of the corresponding template, for others, instead, not all the information needed has been found thus leading to a partial fulfillment of the corresponding template.

3. References

The sources used to collect accident data are the followings:

[1] Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

[2] Feuerwehr Wettingen http://www.feuerwehr-wettingen.ch/baregg04a.htm [3] ANPI magazine n°169 March 2004. [4] ANPI magazine n°171 June 2004. [5] NFPA Journal, May/June 2003 issue, p46/47.

[6] The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

[7] CNN web site http://www.cnn.com/2000/TRAVEL/NEWS/11/27/norway.tunnel.reut [8] Tunnel Management International, Oct 1999, p6 [9] STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen (Research Association

for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

[10] BBC web site http://www.bbc.co.uk [11] New York Times, 20/04/2004.

[12] MTA web site http://www.mtala.com/files/fire.html

The time period covered is from year 1842 to 2004 and accidents considered are from all over the world.

The principle database queried is the FIT one.

Data available are not completed in details and, apart from the most known tunnels, no information about the type of tunnel (such as bidirectionality, time of accidents, traffic intensity, etc.) are available. So, the accident templates reported below are not completed but, since they refer to a large number of accidents, they can be however helpful to statistical analysis.

References for the accidents and incidents investigation methodologies are the followings:

[13] The Editor's Cornered, ISASI forum, Vol. 14:2, Summer 1981. [14] "Disagreement about Tenerife Crash," Foresight, August 1981 [15] Petitions from Air Line Pilots Association to the National Transportation Safety Board, June 9,1980 and June 15, 1981.

[16] The President's Task Force on Aircraft Crew Complement, Report of the Mishap Analysis Panel Working Group Concerning the Boeing Study, "Jet Transport Safety Record, May 5, 1981. [17] Report of the President's Commission on The Accident At Three Mile Island, The Need For Change: The Legacy of TMI, October, 1979. [18] Ferry, T.S., "Modern Accident Investigation and Analysis: An Executive Guide," John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1981 [19] Benner, L., "Accident Theory and Accident Investigation," Proceedings of the ISASI Annual Seminar, Ottawa, Canada, 7-9 October, 1975. [20] Benner, L., "Accident Perceptions: A Case for New Perceptions and Methodologies", SAE Transactions, Vol. 89, 1980. [21] NTSB "Survival in Hazardous Materials Accidents", Report HZM-80-4, 1980.

4. Accidents

4.1. Road Accidents

CH-2004-06-22 Time, date and location 2004/06/22, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Naxberg tunnel, on A2 motorway near Göschenen Length of tunnel 515 m Operator ? Configuration Motorway. Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 car and 1 truck. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating The car collided the truck at the front then caught a fire. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human : 1 injured (car driver) / Economic: damage estimated Consequences 40.000 CHF. Fire quickly put under control. A2 motorway closed 1 hour in one way. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net /

CH-2004-04-14 Time, date and location 2004/04/14, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Baregg tunnel Length of tunnel 1.080 m Operator ? Configuration ?

Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire Vehicles involved 1 car and 1 truck. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 1 death and 1 injured. Comments Source Feuerwehr Wettingen http://www.feuerwehr- wettingen.ch/baregg04a.htm

CH-2004-03-25 Time, date and location 2004/03/25, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel St. Gotthard tunnel Length of tunnel 16.920 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire Vehicles involved 1 coach. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Traffic jam at Northern portal. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

CH-2004-03-12 Time, date and location 2004/03/12, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel St. Gotthard tunnel Length of tunnel 16.920 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire Vehicles involved 1 truck. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and Users invited to get sheltered in refuges. intervention measures Economic : tunnel closed during 40 minutes following the Consequences incident Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

CH-2004-03-03 Time, date and location 2004/03/03, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Bargias tunnel (A 13) near Zillis, Grisons Length of tunnel 416 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Trailer truck. Initiating event ?

Cause of initiating Fire started in the engine compartment, cabin fully destroyed. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR/IT-2004-02-21 Time, date and location 2004/02/21, France/Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Frejus tunnel Length of tunnel 12.870 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 truck fire (brakes). Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and Small fire that was put under control rapidly. intervention measures Human : NO. 30 people in shelters. / Economic: tunnel closed Consequences some 2.5 hours according to press releases. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

SL-2004-02-10 Time, date and location 2004/02/10, Slovenia of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Trojane tunnel Length of tunnel 2.900 m

Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire incident during contruction works. Vehicles involved Diesel powered air compressor. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Fire fighting difficulties due to smoke. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

BE-2004-02-03 Time, date and location 2004/02/03, Belgium of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Kinkempois tunnel (Cointe) Length of tunnel 635 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type ? Vehicles involved Refrigerated truck (small). Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and Emergency plan worked well allowing some 20 users to be intervention measures sheltered during emergency response operations. Consequences ? Comments More info in a series of 2 articles in ANPI magazine n°169 March Source 2004 & 171 June 2004.

SL-2004-01-20 Time, date and location 2004/01/20, Lubijana, Slovenia of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Ring tunnel Length of tunnel 700 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire Vehicles involved 1 bus with 50 passengers Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences ? Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-2004-01-18 Time, date and location 2004/01/18, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Dullin tunnel Length of tunnel 1.550 m Operator ? Configuration Twin tubes on A43 motorway. Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire Vehicles involved 1 bus

Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Very particular incident scenario in terms of emergency Emergency and management, given the fact that the bus driver was a former intervention measures firefighter ! Consequences None. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

SL-2003-12-20 Time, date and location 2003/12/20, Lubijana, Slovenia of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel "Golovec" Ring tunnel Length of tunnel 700 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire Vehicles involved 1 bus with 50 passengers Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Fire started on bus turbocompressor. event The fire tookplace during rush hours and many drivers drove Emergency and through the tunnel by the fire although red lights had been intervention measures triggered at the portals and smoke issuing the portal was visible ! ! Consequences ? Comments Fire started on bus turbocompressor : the fire was easily extinguished by the passengers, all being volunteer fire men on their way to a training centre. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

NO-2003-11-10 Time, date and location 2003/11/10, Norway of accident

Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Floyfjell tunnel Length of tunnel 3.100 m Operator ? Configuration: ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 car. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating The car fire is reported to have propagate fire to the combustible event lining of the tunnel. This tunnel has unlike most European tunnels a sprinkler system, Emergency and 11 heads of which were activated by the fire (1 min after the intervention measures crash) that put the lining fire out, but not the car fire. Consequences ? Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-2003-09-25 Time, date and location 2003/09/25, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Mont-Blanc tunnel Length of tunnel: 11.600 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved None. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Light fire smoke intoxication in fire brigade abri in centre of event tunnel, dur to uncontrolled cooking process at meal time. Emergency and ? intervention measures

Human: 2 injured (CO intoxication ?) / Economic: 2 hours of Consequences traffic interruption was the only real consequence... Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

SL-2003-07-25 Time, date and location 2003/07/25, Slovenia of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Locica tunnel Length of tunnel: 771 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 truck. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Truck unable to leave the tunnel by its own due to air break ; the Emergency and use of two powder extinguisher was unsucessful to extinguish the intervention measures fire ; the cabin and canvas completly burnt out. Consequences ? Comments 28 cars entered the tunnel after red lights were set up to stop the traffic. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

US-2003-07-24 Time, date and location 2003/07/24, Boston, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Prudential tunnel Length of tunnel 184 m Operator ? Configuration ?

Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire Vehicles involved 1 "empty" bus Initiating event No. Cause of initiating The driver was the only vehicle occupant when the bus caught a event fire. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences None. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-2003-06-30 Time, date and location 2003/06/30, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel 44 Length of tunnel 618 m Operator DDE des Bouches du Rhône Configuration one tube bi-directional Transport of dangerous No. goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire Vehicles involved private car + motorcycle Initiating event ? Cause of initiating A light vehicle bumped a motorcycle and a fire occurred. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human : 2 deaths / Structural: number of configured tunnel tubes: Consequences 1. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-2003-05-15 Time, date and location 2003/05/15, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel 72 Length of tunnel 1.591 m Operator ESCOTA Configuration one tube bi-directional. Motorway. Transport of dangerous No. goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved HGV + car. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating A light vehicle bumped a HGV which caught fire. event Emergency and Control center: yes (remote). intervention measures Human: 1 slightly injured / Structural: number of configured Consequences tunnel tubes: 1. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

NZ-2002-11-03 Time, date and location 2002/11/03, New Zealand of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Homer tunnel Length of tunnel 1.200 m Operator State. Configuration one tube bi-directional. Express way. Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Bus. Initiating event No

Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and Control center: yes (at portal). Tunnel in the mountains, 900 m intervention measures above see level, without linings not lightings. Human: 4 injured (smoke inhalation) / Structural: number of Consequences configured tunnel tubes: 1. Comments Bus fire that lead to self evacuation of all 33 passengers and bus driver in smoky environment, linking arms to guide them over. Very important tunnel for tourism, essentially used by buses Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-2002-06-07 Time, date and location 2002/06/07, France. of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel 52- interior tube. Length of tunnel 660 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating A motorcycle bumped another motorcycle and a fire occured event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 2 injured. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-2002-06-02 Time, date and location 2002/06/02, France of accident Tunnel Profile

Name of tunnel 80 – North tube Length of tunnel 1.836 m Operator Communauté Urbaine de Lyon Configuration two tubes monodirectional. Motorway. Transport of dangerous No. goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event No Cause of initiating Breakdown of a light vehicle which caught fire. event Emergency and Control center: yes (at portal). intervention measures Consequences Human: No. Structural: number of configured tunnel tubes: 1. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-2002-05-20 Time, date and location 2002/05/20, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel 96 Length of tunnel 4.100 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating A light vehicle bumped the sidewall and caught fire. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human : 1 slightly injured.

Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

US-2002-05-19 Time, date and location 2002/05/19, Boston, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Ted Williams tunnel Length of tunnel 1.200 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Bus. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments A fire that took place in a bus transporting a baseball team. Fire was detected first by CO detectors and not by linear heat detectors that only activated until after the fire department was on the scene... Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net / More info in NFPA Source Journal, May/June 2003 issue, p46/47.

NO-2002-03-20 Time, date and location 2002/03/20, Norway. of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Valderoy tunnel Length of tunnel 4.200 m Operator ? Configuration ?

Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire Vehicles involved Bus. Initiating event ? Fire fighters able to extinguish when arriving on site after 11 min ; Cause of initiating three people involved in dense smoke du to ventilation triggered event to fire exhaust mode? Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments Genuine day of occurrence to be confirmed (March 2002 reported in the Norwegian magazine "brannmannen"). Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net / Source Norwegian magazine "brannmannen"

FR-2002-03-05 Time, date and location 2002/03/05, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel A 86 tunnel Length of tunnel 1.800 m (approx. Length at time of accident) Operator ? Tunnel under construction, designed to enclose two superposed Configuration roadways (second ring road round Paris), near Rueil malmaison. Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Special rolling stock Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and 20 workers bloqued several hours in pressurised refuges in TBM. intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

AT-2002-03-02 Time, date and location 2002/03/02, Austria of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Ostwaldiberg tunnel Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 car in fire after crash. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human: 1 dead (the person was trapped in the car wreckage in Consequences flames). Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

AT-2002-01-18 Time, date and location 2002/01/18, Austria of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Tauern tunnel Length of tunnel 6.400 m Operator State Configuration one tube-bidirectional Transport of yes with restrictions dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire.

Vehicles involved 1 lorry loaded with paint Initiating event Front-back collision. Cause of initiating Faulty engine at the origin of the fire that produced a lot of smoke event but was successfully and quickly tackled by the fire brigades. Emergency and ? intervention measures Human: No / Structural: serious damage. Number of configured Consequences tunnel tubes: 1 / Economic: tunnel closed for about 3 months. Comments Faulty engine at the origin of the fire that produced a lot of smoke but was successfully and quickly tackled by the fire brigades. Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net /. The World’s longest Source tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

CH-2001-10-24 Time, date and location 2001/10/24, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Saint Gotthard tunnel Length of tunnel 16.920 m Operator Counties of Uri and Ticino Configuration one tube-bidirectional. Motorway. Transport of dangerous yes with restrictions goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved two HGVs (initial phase) Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and Control center: yes (at portal). intervention measures Human: 11 deaths / Structural: number of configured tunnel tubes: Consequences 1. Comments The surviving driver of one of the lorries which crashed said he had managed to escape from his vehicle and direct other people away from the crash site about 2km (1m) from the tunnel's southern exit. Police spokesman Mario Ritter said rescuers struggled to reach the site. "The heat is too high and there is zero visibility," he said. About 150 firefighters and other rescuers worked through the night.

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

DK-2001-10-17 Time, date and location 2001/10/17, Denmark of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Guldborgsund tunnel Length of tunnel 460 m Operator ? Configuration Sub- sea tunnel. Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Incident just occurred (started by a front collision) in dense fog event less than 100 m outside tunnel portal. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 5 dead, 6 injured. Comments A dense fog was originated by the fire and caused the collisions, which brought as a consequence dead and injured. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

AT-2001-09-03 Time, date and location 2001/09/03, Austria of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Gleinalm tunnel Length of tunnel 8.300 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile

Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 touring coach. Initiating event No Cause of initiating No event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

AT-2001-08-07 Time, date and location 2001/08/07, Austria of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Gleinalm tunnel Length of tunnel 8.300 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human : 5 deaths, 4 injured. / Economic: tunnel temporary closed Consequences to traffic until completion of coach removal of the tunnel. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

AT-2001-07-29 Time, date and location 2001/07/29, Austria

of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Gleinalm tunnel Length of tunnel 8.300 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Swedish touring coach. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and No. intervention measures Consequences ? Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

AT-2001-07-10 Time, date and location 2001/07/10, Austria of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Tauern tunnel Length of tunnel 6.400 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved two private cars (post crash fire). Initiating event ? Cause of initiating The driver take the option (and was successful in doing so) to event drive out of the tunnel before stopping in the open air. Emergency and Fire extinguished by one of the cars drivers.

intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

IT-2001-05-28 Time, date and location 2001/05/28, Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Prapontin tunnel Length of tunnel ? Operator Sitaf Two tubes monodirectional. Express way. Cut-and-cover tunnel in Configuration acces motorway to Frejus tunnel on the Italian side. Transport of dangerous Yes with restrictions goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved two private cars Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human : 14 intoxicated / Structural: number of configured tunnel Consequences tubes: 2. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

NO-2000-11-27 Time, date and 2001/11/27, Norway location of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Laerdal tunnel (longest road tunnel in the world today). Length of tunnel 24.500 m Operator ? Configuration ?

Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments The incident (minor) is mentioned as it took place the day of the inauguration of the tunnel! It was a minor fire indeed, starting on a fan in a bus that required provisional evacuation of the 50 passengers of the bus, before passengers were able to reboard and join the ceremony place... Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net / CNN http://www.cnn.com/2000/TRAVEL/NEWS/11/27/norway.tunnel.reut

NO-2000-09-28 Time, date and location 2000/09/28, Norway of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Oslofjord Length of tunnel 7.200 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Truck. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

DE-2000-08-24 Time, date and location 2000/08/24, Weinham, Germany of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Saukhopf tunnel Length of tunnel 2.700 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Car. Initiating event ? A car caught fire and stopped in a lay-by area, near one of the Cause of initiating portal. Huge production of smoke but did not trigger the fire event alarm... Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-2000-07-20 Time, date and location 2000/07/20, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Frejus tunnel Length of tunnel 12.870 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile

Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Truck fire. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and Fire under control within 20 minutes (occurred at 4:00 am). intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-2000-08-04 Time, date and location 2000/08/04, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Toulon tunnel (town center) Length of tunnel (small) Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Tank truck fire. Initiating event ? The truck caught fire at close to the portal, since the truck was Cause of initiating trapped there as a result of truck height slightly higher than tunnel event clearance !!! Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: driver injured (burns). Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

NO-2000-07-14 Time, date and location 2000/07/14, Norway of accident

Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Seljestad tunnel Length of tunnel 1.272 m Operator Norvegian Public Roads Adm Configuration one tube bi-directional. Ordinary way. Transport of dangerous Yes. goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human : 6 injured / Structural: number of configured tunnel tubes: Consequences 1. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

HK-2000-05-29 Time, date and location 2000/05/29, Honk-Kong of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Cross Harbor Tunnel Length of tunnel 2.000 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures

Consequences No. Comments Minor incident involving a private car, but evacuation was some concern, espacially with a bus nearby radio broadcast confusing users for some time... Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

DE-2000-04-26 Time, date and location 2000/04/26, Germany of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel L'Ems tunnel Length of tunnel 1.000 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Road type: ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

AT-2000-03-04 Time, date and location 2000/03/04, Austria of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Lermoos tunnel Length of tunnel 3.200 m

Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-2000-02-01 Time, date and location 2000/02/01, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Toulon tunnel Length of tunnel 2.969 m Operator ? Urban tunnel, under construction at the time of accident Configuration occurrence. Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Fire involving two public works machines. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

AT-2000-01-10 Time, date and location 2000/01/10, Austria of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Tauern tunnel Length of tunnel 6.400 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

DE-1999-08-30 Time, date and location 1999/08/30, Germany of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Munich Candid Tunnel Length of tunnel 252 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Minor accident involving one private car ; other users not aware Vehicles involved of the smoke...

Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

NO-1999-06-29 Time, date and location 1999/06/29, Norway of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Olso Fjord tunnel Length of tunnel 7.200 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire and explosion. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Fire and explosion incident during construction phase. Insulation Cause of initiating material, ignited by a welding flame is reported to be the fire load event burning; a store of dynamite then was hit and exploded. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human : 2 deaths (firemen), 15 injured. Comments Another source quotes 3 deaths; when the explosion occurred, some firemen were inside the tunnel, windows of nearby building were shattered. Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net Source Tunnel Management International, Oct 1999, p6

AT-1999-03-29 Time, date and location 1999/03/29, Austria of accident

Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Tauern tunnel Length of tunnel 6.400 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved No Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human : 12 deaths. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-1999-03-24 Time, date and location 1999/03/24, France/Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Mont-Blanc tunnel Length of tunnel 11.600 m Operator ? Configuration one tube bi-directional. Motorway Transport of dangerous yes with restrictions goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. 23 HGVs, 1 van, 9 cars, 1 fire-engine vehicle, one emergency car, Vehicles involved 1 motorcycle Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and Control center: yes (at portal). intervention measures

Human : 39 deaths / Structural: serious damage to about 100 m of Consequences ceiling. Number of configured tunnel tubes: 1. Comments Fire that began in a truck carrying margarine and flour blazed through the tunnel connecting France and Italy. The blaze reached temperatures of 1000 degrees Celsius and killed 35 people, who could not be rescued. The fire services had previously warned the company operating the tunnel that it would be extremely difficult to carry out rescue operations. The tunnel was used by 766,000 heavy goods vehicles in 1998 Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net / Source STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen (Research Association for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

AT-1998-09-08 Time, date and location 1998/09/08, Austria of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Gleinhalm tunnel Length of tunnel 8.300 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 double deck bus. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences ? Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

CH-1997-10-31 Time, date and location 1997/10/31, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile

Name of tunnel Saint Gotthard tunnel Length of tunnel 16.300 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved A truck carrying new cars. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: No / Structural: 1.000 m on tunnel invaded by smoke. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

CH-1997-09-17 Time, date and location 1997/09/17, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel St. Gotthard Length of tunnel 16.920 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved No Initiating event No Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No.

Comments Initial fire involved a bus with 47 passengers that were finally driven safe out of the tunnel by another passing bus. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

NO-1996-08-21 Time, date and location 1996/08/21, Norway of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Ekeberg tunnel Length of tunnel 1.600 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 line bus. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences ? Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net /

IT-1996-03-18 Time, date and location 1996/03/18, Sicily, Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Isola delle femine Length of tunnel 150 m Operator ? Configuration Motorway. Transport of dangerous ? goods

Accident Profile Accident type Fire and explosion. Vehicles involved 18 cars, 1 tanker with liquid gas, 1 bus. Initiating event ? Wet road collision of a bus with a tanker (stopped because of a Cause of initiating previous collision) explosion. Minibus and petrol tank truck event collided which explains the origin of the fire and casualties. Emergency and ? intervention measures Human: 5 deaths, 20 injured / Structural: number of configured Consequences tunnel tubes: 1. Comments At beginning, a fire came up as a result of a car crash, than the bus collided with the LPG tank truck, followed by a BLEVE. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

AT-1995-04-10 Time, date and location 1995/04/10, Austria of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Pfänder tunnel Length of tunnel 6.700 m Operator ? Configuration one tube bi-directional. Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 lorry, 1 van, 1 car Initiating event Collision. Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human : 3 deaths, 4 injured / Structural: serious damage to ceiling Consequences and equipment, tunnel closed for 2,5 days. Number of configured tunnel tubes: 1. Comments Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net Source STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen

(Research Association for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

DK-1995-01-24 Time, date and location 1995/01/24, Denmark of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Hitra tunnel Length of tunnel 5.600 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

UK-1994-10-15 Time, date and location 1994/10/15, Mersey, United Kingdom of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Kingsway tunnel Length of tunnel 2.000 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire.

Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

CH-1994-07-05 Time, date and location 1994/07/05, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel St. Gotthard Length of tunnel 16.300 m Operator ? Configuration two tubes monodirectional. Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 lorry + trailer loaded with bikes wrapped in carton and plastic. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Friction between wheels and loading bridge. event Emergency and intervention measures Human: no / Structural: serious damage to ceiling, pavement and Consequences equipment for 50 m, tunnel closed for 2,5 days. Comments Fire originated on a lorry carrying 750 sets of packaged bicycles ; full destruction of the lorry and heavy damage on 50 m on tunnel linings. Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net Source STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen (Research Association for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

FR-1994-04-14

Time, date and location 1994/04/14, Nice, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Castellar tunnel Length of tunnel 570 m Operator ? Configuration Two tubes monodirectional. Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

SA-1994-02-27 Time, date and location 1994/02/27, South Africa of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Huguenot tunnel Length of tunnel 3.910 m Operator ? Configuration two tubes monodirectional Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Bus. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Engine break down event

Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 1 death, 28 injured. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

NO-1993-06-01 Time, date and location 1993/06/01, Norway of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Vardo tunnel Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences ? Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

NO-1993-06-01 Time, date and location 1993/06/01, Norway of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Hovden tunnel Length of tunnel 1.300 m Operator ? Configuration ?

Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Collision. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event Collision. Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human : 5 injured. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

Comments Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-1990-01-11

Time, date and location 1990/01/11, France/Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Mont-Blanc tunnel Length of tunnel 11.600 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

CH-1989-05-18 Time, date and location 1989/05/18, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Brenner tunnel Length of tunnel 1.236 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event

Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human : 2 deaths, 9 injured (tox) Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

AT-1987-07-02 Time, date and location 1987/07/02, Austria of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Tanzenberg Tunnel Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human : 1 injured. Comments The driver at the origin of the fire committed a suicide attempt. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

DE-1987-05-15 Time, date and location 1987/05/15, Germany of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Münden tunnel Length of tunnel > 1.200 m Operator ? Configuration ?

Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type ? Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

CH-1987-02-18 Time, date and location 1987/02/18, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Gumefens tunnel Length of tunnel 340 m Operator ? Configuration two tube monodirectional. Motorway Transport of dangerous Yes goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 2 lorries + 1 van. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Mass collision on slippy road. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human: 2 deaths, 5 injured / Structural: slight damage / Number Consequences of configured tunnel tubes: 1. Comments Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net Source STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen (Research Association for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

AT-1986-12-30 Time, date and location 1986/12/30, Austria of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Herzogberg Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-1986-09-09 Time, date and location 1986/09/09, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel L'Arme tunnel Length of tunnel 1.105 m Operator ? Configuration one tube bi-directional Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ?

Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and Control center: yes (at portal). intervention measures Human : 3 deaths, 5 injured / Structural: number of configured Consequences tunnel tubes: 1. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

AT-1984-07-01 Time, date and location 1984/07/01, Austria of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Felbertauern tunnel Length of tunnel 5.130 m Operator ? Configuration one tube bi-directional. Motorway Transport of dangerous Yes goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Bus Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Blocking brakes. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human : no / Structural: damage to ceiling and equipment for 100 Consequences m. Number of configured tunnel tubes: 1. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

CH-1984-04-02 Time, date and location 1984/04/02, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel St. Gotthard

Length of tunnel 16.300 m Operator ? Configuration one tube bi-directional. Motorway. Transport of dangerous Yes. goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 lorry loaded with rolls of plastic. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Fire engine event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: no / Structural: serious damage for 30 m. Comments Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net Source STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen (Research Association for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

FR-1983-02-03 Time, date and location 1983/02/03, France/Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Frejus tunnel Length of tunnel 12.870 m Operator ? Configuration one tube bi-directional. Motorway Transport of dangerous yes with restrictions goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 truck. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Gear box breaking. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 1 slightly injured / Structural: serious damage for 200 m

Comments Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net Source STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen (Research Association for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

IT-1983-02-01 Time, date and location 1983/02/01, Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Pecorile tunnel Length of tunnel 600 m Operator ? Configuration two tubes mono-directional. Motorway. Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 lorry loaded with plastic materials Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human : 8 deaths, 22 injured / Structural: damages to the tunnel Consequences lining and lighting equipment. Number of configured tunnel tubes: 2. Comments Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net Source STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen (Research Association for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

AF-1982-11-02 Time, date and location 1982/11/02, Afghanistan of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Salang tunnel Length of tunnel 2.600 m

Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Petrol tankers ? Military vehicles. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Explosion likely to be at the origin of the fire event and huge event death toll. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Over 400 deaths ? Comments Accident really occured according to existing sources, but circumstances and casualties not clear. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

US-1982-04-07 Time, date and location 1982/04/07, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Caldecott tunnel Length of tunnel 1.028 m Operator ? Configuration one tube mono-directional. Motorway Transport of dangerous Yes goods Accident Profile Accident type Collision. Vehicles involved 3 trucks ( 33.000 l of petrol ) + 1 bus + 4 cars. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Front-back collision. event Emergency and Control center: yes ( at portal). intervention measures Human: 7 deaths, 2 injured (tox) / Structural: serious damage for Consequences 580 m. Number of configured tunnel tubes: 2. Comments

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a combination of events involving (1) the erratic driving by the intoxicated driver of a passenger vehicle which stopped in a through traffic lane creating a traffic obstacle; (2) the inattention of the truckdriver causing his vehicle to strike the passenger vehicle; and (3) the busdriver's overtaking the truck too rapidly to enable him to avoid striking the passenger vehicle when it unexpectedly appeared in the path of his bus. Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net Source STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen (Research Association for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

JP-1980-07-15 Time, date and location 1980/07/15, Japan of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Sakai tunnel Length of tunnel 459 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 5 Initiating event 5 Some of the casualties may be attributed to multi vehicle Cause of initiating collisions at the origin of this accident and not as direct event consequence of the fire ? Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human : 5 deaths, 5 injured. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

JP-1980-04-17 Time, date and location 1980/04/17, Japan of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Kajiwara tunnel

Length of tunnel 740 m Operator ? Configuration Motorway. Transport of dangerous Yes goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 light truck (4 t) with 3.600 l paint in 200 cans + 1 truck (10 t) Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human : 1 dead / Structural: damage for 280 m / Number of Consequences configured tunnel tubes: 1. Comments Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net Source STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen (Research Association for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

JP-1979-07-11 Time, date and location 1979/07/11, Yaizu City, Japan of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Nihonzaka tunnel Length of tunnel 2.045 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Collision. Vehicles involved 127 trucks + 46 cars Initiating event ? Cause of initiating front-back collision. event Emergency and ? intervention measures

Human: 7 deaths, 2 injured/ Structural: serious damage for 1.100 Consequences m Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

NL-1978-08-11 Time, date and location 1978/08/11, Netherlands of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Velsen tunnel Length of tunnel 770 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 2 trucks, 4 cars. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating front-back collision. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 5 deaths, 5 injured / Structural: serious damage for 30 m. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

US-1978-03-23 Time, date and location 1978/03/23, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Baltimore Harbor tunnel Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods

Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

CH-1976-09-21 Time, date and location 1976/09/21, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel San Bernadino Length of tunnel 6.600 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Although the fire involved started on a bus carrying 33 people, Cause of initiating fire response was nearly immediate and likely explains the event absence of casualties. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences ? Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-1976-08-11

Time, date and location 1976/08/11, at entrance nearby "Porte d'Italie" on Paris ringroad, of accident France Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel B 6 motorway tunnel Length of tunnel 430 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 lorry loaded with 16 t of polyester in bundles. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences 12 intoxicated / Structural: damage for 150 m. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

ES-1975-08-14 Time, date and location 1975/08/14, Spain of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Guadarrama Length of tunnel 3.330 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 truck. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event

Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human : no / Structural : serious damage for 210 m. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

US-1974-05-03 Time, date and location 1974/05/03, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Chesapeake Bay Bridge tunnel Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and Very limited damage due to immediate and efficient fire fighting intervention measures and overall adequate reponse, according to report available. Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

US-1970-10-01 Time, date and location 1970/10/01, USA (Alabama I-10) of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Wallace tunnel Length of tunnel 1.000 m Operator ? Configuration ?

Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved A camper truck. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

DE-1968-08-31 Time, date and location 1968/08/31, Germany of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Moorflet tunnel Length of tunnel 243 m Operator ? Configuration two tubes mono-directional Transport of dangerous yes with restrictions. goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 lorry trailer (14 t of polyethylene bags) Initiating event ? Cause of initiating brakes jamming. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human: no / Structural: serious damage for 34 m. Number of Consequences configured tunnel tubes: 2. Comments Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net Source STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen (Research Association for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

US-1965-01-01 Time, date and location 1965/01/01, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Blue Mountain, PA, Turnpike Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net Source STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen (Research Association for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

US-1949-05-13 Time, date and location 1949/05/13, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Holland tunnel Length of tunnel 2.550 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile

Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 10 trucks + 13 cars. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating load falling of lorry event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 66 intoxicated / Structural: serious damage for 200 m. Comments Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net Source STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen (Research Association for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

IT-1993-02-01 Time, date and location 1993/02/01, Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Serra Ripoli tunnel Length of tunnel 442 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 3 lorries + 1 lorry loaded with rolls of paper +11 cars Initiating event ? Cause of initiating vehicle out of control and collision. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human: 4 deaths, 4 injured / Structural: serious damage to lining. Consequences Number of configured tunnel tubes: 1. Comments Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net Source STUVA-Studiengesellschaft für unterirdische Verkehrsanlagen (Research Association for Underground Transportation) http://www.stuva.de/

4.2. Rail Accidents

CH-2004-06-28 Time, date and location 2004/06/28, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Sedrun St Gotthard base tunnel Length of tunnel 19.000 m (expected 2001) Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type ? Vehicles involved No vehicle, conveyor belt. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Fire ignited by spark on a conveyor belt , destruction of 300 m of event the muck out installation of the construction works. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

SK-2004-04-22 Time, date and location 2004/04/22, South Korea of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Ryongchon, 20.000 m from China's border Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile

Accident type Explosion. Vehicles involved A passenger train Initiating event ? Cause of initiating electrical contact caused by carelessness event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: more than 154 deaths and 1.200 injured. Comments

Source BBC web site http://www.bbc.co.uk

CH-2004-03-08 Time, date and location 2004/03/08, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Steg St Gotthard base tunnel Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type ? Vehicles involved Jumbo drilling machine. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating the machine was in an access tunnel to main tunnel construction event works when it took fire Emergency and ? intervention measures Human: No / Economic: brought by specialised fire-fighters, Consequences important property damage to deplore (> 1 million CHF) Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

ES-2003-08-06 Time, date and location 2003/08/06, Spain of accident

Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Guadarrama tunnel Length of tunnel 4.000 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Special rolling stock. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating fire than explosion or explosion of the locomotive than a fire ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

FR-2003-05-02 Time, date and location 2003/05/02, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Mornay tunnel Length of tunnel 2.600 m Operator ? Configuration Single rail, single track. Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved “autorial” vehicle. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures

Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

IT-2002-08-01 Time, date and location 2002/08/01, Cagliary, Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel tunnel on line Ozieri Chilivani-Decimomannu Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences ? Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

IT-2002-05-03 Time, date and location 2002/05/03, Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Tunnel on line Genova Nervi-Pisa. Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods

Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Loco of passenger train. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and small fire easily extinguished by mobile equipment of operating intervention measures staff Consequences No. Comments Ignition of Fire in the locomotive of train 538 in tunnel "RUTA", due to fault of power supply system. Fire of limited dimensions, tamed at the movement place with the use of the on board fire estinguisher system. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-1977-05-20 Time, date and location 1977/05/20, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Saint Julien Length of tunnel < 1.000 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Collision. Vehicles involved loco of passenger train. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 1 dead. Comments: Collision between two trains on the line from Chambery to Modane. One of the train drivers was killed. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

FR-2002-04-27 Time, date and location 2002/04/27, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Crêt d'eau tunnel Length of tunnel 4.000 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and Dispite the absence of any emergency procedure, safe evacuation intervention measures of the 57 passengers. Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

IT-2002-03-29 Time, date and location 2002/03/29, Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Tunnel on line Nodo di Napoli Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved passenger train. Initiating event ?

Cause of initiating fire set by unknown arsonist, using paper to ignite the chopper event cabinet. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments Person unkown set fire to the chopper cabinet trough the use of piece of papers. This fact has been established by the criminal laboratory departament of police. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

US-2001-07-18 Time, date and location 2001/07/18, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Baltimore tunnel (Howard st tunnel) Length of tunnel 2.600 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Derailment. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Derailment. event Emergency and ? intervention measures massive evacuation of public and traffic congestion were the Consequences major consequencesHuman: no / Structural: damage expand on length more 50 m and less than 100 m. Comments A freight train with 60 cars, of which 8 cars were carrying dangerous goods, caught fire probably as a result of a derailment inside a tunnel. The train was stopped in the tunnel and the train staff disconnected the locomotives and managed to escape the fire. The cars containing dangerous goods were in the rear half of the train. The tunnel is situated inside the city of Baltimore, and a huge quantity of smoke poured out of the tunnel at various access points. Fire hoses were brought into the tunnel through manholes in the street above the tunnel. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

AT-2000-11-11 Time, date and location 2000/11/11, Kaprun, Austria of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Kitzteinhorn Length of tunnel 3.400 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Passengers rail cabins. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 155 deaths. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

NL-2001-07-11 Time, date and location 2001/07/11, The Netherlands of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Schipol airport tunnel Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ?

Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

IT-1999-05-23 Time, date and location 1999/05/23, Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Salerno tunnel Length of tunnel 10.000 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Passenger train. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Deliberately started fire in train event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 4 deaths, 9 injured of total 1.100 passengers. Comments A fire was started in one car of a 13-car train carrying 1100 football supporters on their way back home from a match. The fire was most likely deliberately put on fire, and it was perhaps the result of a smoke bomb. The incident took place in a long tunnel, but there are no indications that the train stopped in the tunnel. Thus the tunnel may not be of essential significance to the outcome of the incident. This was the second football supporter train fire in Italy during a 2 week period. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

DE-1999-03-02 Time, date and location 1999/03/02, Germany

of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Leinebusch tunnel Length of tunnel 1.740 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved half of a freight train with 24 wagons Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Ice line. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human : No / Structural : minor damage expanding less than 10 m Consequences of tube section. Comments Half train manage to uncouple and left the tunnel. The other part experienced a fire originating in a wagon containing 21 tons of copy paper that caught fire after derailment ; 12 hours required by fire brigades to extinguish the blaz. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

CN-1998-07-10 Time, date and location 1998/07/10, China of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Gueizhou tunnel Length of tunnel 800 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ?

event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human : over 80 people killed. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

IT-1997-07-01 Time, date and location 1997/07/01, Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Exilles tunnel Length of tunnel 2.100 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 18 cars + two locomotive freight train carrying cars. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Open back door of one of the transported cars caused friction on event the electric lines causing car to catch fire. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments major fire response difficulties due to lack of nearby water supply. The fire was started by the open back door of one of the transported cars, which caused friction on the electric lines inside the tunnel. The ignition point was 1.1 km from the downhill entrance (towards Modane) and flame spread first to the affected car, then to the other ones. The rescue operations were as follows: - notification of the fire at 13.30; - arrival, after 20 minutes, of Fire Brigade teams from Susa (12 km from the tunnel); - arrival, 45 minute later, of Fire Brigade teams from Turin (45 km from the tunnel); - total personnel employed: about 60 fire fighters divided into 10 teams; - rescue vehicles at the site: 5 fire engines, 2 water tenders with built-in pumps, 4 land-rovers, 1 helicopter, 1 command vehicle radio equipment, 1 electric generator, 1 locomotive, 1 earth scoop on wheels.

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

IT-1944-03-02 Time, date and location 1944/03/02, Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Armi tunnel Length of tunnel About 1.000 / 1.500 m Operator ? Configuration Single track Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Carbon-monoxide poisoning. Vehicles involved Train. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Use of open cars. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 426 deaths, 60 injured. Comments Two steam locomotives drove a long and heavy train from Balvano to Potenza. The train experienced problems in a tunnel with strong inclination due to low quality coal. The train used a very long time in the tunnel without getting through, and in the end it had to back out of the tunnel. Most of the passengers in the train had suffocated of carbon monoxide poisoning by then. The incident took place during the allied invasion of Italy in World War II. One source indicates that the travellers were stowaways on a freight train, while others have indicated that it was a matter of evacuation of civilians, transportation of troops etc. From the description of the course of events, it seems possible or probable that open cars were used. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

FR-1996-11-18 Time, date and location 1996/11/18, France/UK of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Channel tunnel

Length of tunnel 50.000 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Transmodal system. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Embarked fire started from a brake problem (?) and witnessed event before train entrance into tunnel. Emergency and Twin bore tunnel with service tunnel. Access to service tunnel intervention measures every 375 m. Human: minor intoxication / Structural: damage expand on length Consequences more than 100 m. Comments One of the trucks on the train caught fire before the train entered the tunnel. The train was one of the Eurotunnel's lorry shuttles with the truck drivers in a separate car next to the locomotive. The train continued at normal speed ( 120 km/h) for about 10 minutes before it stopped beside an exit to the adjoining service tunnel. It was impossible to disconnect the burning part of the train. Due to the heavy fire, the power catenary was damaged relatively quickly once the train has stopped. The fire was at that moment very strong (max 100 MW) and it rapidly spread to cars nearby. Thick smoke forwarded quickly in the train due to other trains running in the current tube. This made the evacuation more difficult. Persons in the staff car and the truck drivers managed to evacuate through the neighbouring door leading to the parallel service tunnel. Overpressure from the service tunnel door created a "fresh-air bubble" when opened. Locomotive staff was at a later stage rescued by a rescue party from the adjoining service tunnel. Huge structural damages in the tunnel. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

CH-1995-12-20 Time, date and location 1995/12/20, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Simplon tunnel Length of tunnel 19.800 m Operator ? Configuration Double track. Transport of ? dangerous goods

Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments A fire started in a diesel-powered train immediately after the train had entered the tunnel, most likely in the machinery in the stern end of the train. The passengers were directed forward in the train. The train stopped at an emergency station with an emergency telephone. The burning car was disconnected from the rest of the train and the rest of the train with the passengers could drive out of the tunnel with only a 14-minute delay. 10 of the passengers however, did not follow the instructions from the conductor, and under guidance from to railroad employees they proceeded to the tunnel gateway. The light conditions were poor and the passengers were also obstructed by smoke. A train driving carefully towards them from the opposite direction rescued these passengers. There were no injuries. The fire extinguishing started after one hour and lasted for about three hours. The tunnel was re-opened the following day. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

DK-1994-06-11 Time, date and location 1994/06/11, Denmark of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Great Belt East Tunnel Length of tunnel 8.000 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating damage on the TBM, where the fire originated. event

Emergency and ? intervention measures Human : No / Structural : damage expand on length more than 10 Consequences m and less than 50 m. Comments Tunnel boring went through difficult ground conditions at time of fire. A leak in the hydraulic system may have occurred. Fire fighting was unsuccesful. All personnel in the tunnel was evacuated safely. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

CN-1991-08-01 Time, date and location 1991/08/01, China of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Unnamed tunnel Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human : 15 passengers killed ? Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

CH-1991-04-16 Time, date and location 1991/04/16, Zurich, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Hirschen Graben tunnel Length of tunnel 1.300 m

Operator ? Configuration Double tracked. Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 0/0? Of total 50 in train S9 and 90 in train S5. Comments A fire was observed in the second last car of a 6-car local train, S9, as it left Zurich Hbf and drove into the Hirschengraben tunnel. The train stopped almost halfway through the tunnel, as someone activated the emergency brake. The tunnel has double tracks, and was rapidly filled with smoke. The escape routes leading to the tunnel portal were about 500-800m long. It took 2-3 minutes from the train stopped until evacuation was initiated. Before evacuation started the passengers were encouraged to stay in the train. Nearly at the same time as train S9 stopped inside the tunnel, train S5 entered the tunnel in the opposite direction from Stadelhofen station. Train S5 was stopped before it reached the accident area. The train driver takes the other driver's room in use, and after 4 minutes starts to drive slowly back towards Stadelhofen. After 100m he stops the train to pick up evacuating passengers from train S9. After a while the power from the voltage conducting wire disappeared, and the train remained standing in the tunnel. All of the passengers were requested to evacuate the train and to leave the tunnel on foot. The fire brigade and rescue personnel were present outside the tunnel gateway 10 minutes after the burning train had come to a stop. Their duty was first of all to advise and help the last of the evacuating persons. They were all able to walk, and nobody needed to be carried out. The last passenger came out of the tunnel about 20 minutes after the burning train had stopped. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

IT-1984-12-23 Time, date and location 1984/12/23, Italy of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel San Benedetto tunnel Length of tunnel 18.500 m Operator ?

Configuration Double tracked. Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Bomb.. Vehicles involved Train. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Bomb attack at the origin of fire. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 17 deaths, 120 injured. Comments A bomb was detonated in a passenger train in the middle of the 18,5 km long double tracked San Benedetto tunnel between Bologna and Florence. The explosion totally destroyed 2 cars, but no large fire was developed. It took more than 2 hours before the rescue team reached the injured passengers in the tunnel. A very long access route, scattered pieces of wreckage, torn down main electric supply and total darkness caused the long delay. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

UK-1984-12-20 Time, date and location 1984/12/20, United Kingdom of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Summit tunnel (also called Todmorden tunnel). Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Train. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Derailment and fire in freight train carrying gasoline. Very event spectacular accident due to jet fires issuing from ventilation shafts. Emergency and ? intervention measures

Human: No / Structural: damage expand on length more than 10 m and less than 50 m. / Economic: the tunnel lining was damaged Consequences and the tunnel was kept closed for all kind of traffic for several month Comments An axle bearing on the front bogie in car 4 overheated, failed and made the train stop in the tunnel. This caused the subsequent cars to derail. Car 6 and 10 overturned and landed on the adjacent track. Gasoline started to leak from the cars. The incident took place early in the morning. Train crew went to examine the situation. When they reached car 3 they heard a muffled explosion and saw flames. They disconnected the first three cars and drove out of the tunnel to the nearest telephone (1500 m from the accident) before the accident was reported and other traffic was stopped. The tunnel was built in 1841 and was furnished with 13 passive ventilation shafts (chimneys) 28 - 94 m tall. The chimneys were originally built to ventilate smoke from steam locomotives. The fire brigade entered the tunnel and made fire-fighting attempts the first hours after the accident. This could be carried out without wearing smoke proof breathing equipment since the flue gas efficiently was extracted through the ventilation shafts. At 09:30 one of the cars burst and the fire increased heavily and the fire fighters had to retreat. The flue gases being extracted by the shafts closest to the fire, supported the retreat. After this moment the flames reached a height of 50 m above shaft 8 and 9. To gain control of the fire, water was pumped down shaft 10 (later shaft 9) and foam in shaft 7. At 3:00 the following night, the flames from shaft 8 decreased and at 10:30 there were made attempts to inspect the location of the accident. There were no visible flames, but the tunnel was very hot. Cooling of the tunnel proceeded until afternoon December 24th. The tunnel lining was damaged and the tunnel was kept closed for all kind of traffic for several months. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

JP-1972-11-06 Time, date and location 1972/11/06, Japan of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Hokuriku tunnel Length of tunnel 13.900 m / built in 1962 Operator Double tracked Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Train. Initiating event ?

Cause of initiating A dining car in the late night train "Kitaguni" caught fire while the event train was in the tunnel. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 30 deaths, 690 injured. Comments A dining car in the late night train "Kitaguni" caught fire while the train was in the tunnel. The train driver tried to disconnect the burning car, but a power failure brought the train to a stop in the tunnel in darkness. The passengers evacuated the train and tried to get away from the fire and to escape the tunnel. Trains on the other track picked up some of the passengers, but most of them tried to evacuate by foot. Rescue trains were driven in from both sides and most of the passengers were rescued, but there were many injuries. After the accident, criticism was raised at inadequate illumination and ventilation. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

CH-1972-02-01 Time, date and location 1972/02/01, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Lötschberg tunnel Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type ? Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 3 injured. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-1971-03-20

Time, date and location 1971/03/20, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Crozet tunnel Length of tunnel 226 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 2 deaths, 200 injured. Comments

Source Fire in tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

YU-1971-02-14 Time, date and location 1971/02/14, Jugoslavia of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Wranduk tunnel Length of tunnel 1.600 m Operator ? Configuration Single track. Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event

Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 34 deaths. Comments A Diesel-electric locomotive in a train carrying 200 passengers caught fire in the Vranduk tunnel between Zeneca and Doboi in Bosnia. The train stopped about 300 m from the northern end of the tunnel. During the locomotive staff's attempt to put out the fire, it spread to the cars. Some of the passengers jumped from the train and tried to escape from the smoke filled and dark tunnel, but was unable to get out. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

CH-1969-11-08 Time, date and location 1969/11/08, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Simplon Tunnel Length of tunnel 19.800 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

UK-1991-12-07 Time, date and location Severn tunnel of accident Date of accident: 07/12/1991 Country: United Kingdom

Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel 6.800 m Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration Double tracked, underwater Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Collision. Vehicles involved No Initiating event Cause of initiating Collision; front – rear. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 0/100? of total 291 passengers. Comments This was the first sub sea railway tunnel, and it was first opened in 1886. The disastrous day, there was an error in the signalling system. Because of this error the operation was made by manual routines from the control centre with the help from local train dispatcher at the tunnel portals. A HST (high speed train) entering the tunnel first, received driving permission for careful driving through the tunnel. The motor vehicle train driving behind the HST did not stop at the signal in front of the tunnel gateway, and proceeded through the tunnel at a considerable higher speed than the HST. The motor vehicle train caught up with the first train immediately before the western tunnel outlet, and was unable to stop in time. The last cars of the HST derailed and the coupling to the rest of the train broke and the brakes were activated. No persons were killed or seriously injured, but the rescue operation went on for a very long time. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

UK-1949-06-23 Time, date and location 1949/06/23, United Kingdom of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Penmanshield Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ?

goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

ES-1944-01-03 Time, date and location 1944/01/03, Spain of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Torre tunnel Length of tunnel 1.000 m ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved One train (after collision). Initiating event ? Cause of initiating braking defects. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 91 deaths. Comments Due to braking defects an 11-car passenger train collided with a shunt in a tunnel near Torre station on the Leon - Coruna line. A following collision with a coal train occurred when the shunting locomotive was pushed out of the tunnel. 6 cars caught fire. The middle part of the tunnel was still blocked by burning wreckage the following day. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

FR-1971-06-17 Time, date and location 1971/06/17, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Vierzy tunnel Length of tunnel 800 m Operator ? Configuration Double track. Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Structural collapse. Vehicles involved 240 Initiating event 108 Cause of initiating event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 108 deaths, 240 injured. Comments In the 110 year old Vierzy tunnel between Paris Gare de Nord and Soissons parts of the roof and overlying mass suddenly fell down on the line and blocked both tracks. Almost simultaneously trains from both directions drove into the tunnel. The train speed was about 110 km/h. The cross-section was filled by twisted and distorted metal parts from the two trains. There was no sign of the accident outside the tunnel apart from the warning bells on an activated level crossing. The rescue work was very difficult due to fear of further landslides, scarcity of space and restrictions against use of acetylene cutting torch because of poor ventilation. The last two survivors were rescued 40 hours after the accident, and the last perished, one of the drivers, was removed 5 days after the accident. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

FR-1921-10-05 Time, date and location 1921/10/05, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Batignolles tunnel

Length of tunnel About 1.000 m Operator ? Configuration Double track. Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Collision front – rear. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Due to a mistake the subsequent train received permission to drive event into the tunnel. The train drove into the rear end of the first train. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 28 deaths. Comments A local train heading for Versailles stopped in the Batignolles tunnel, which is situated right outside Gare St Lazaire in Paris. Due to a mistake the subsequent train received permission to drive into the tunnel. The train drove into the rear end of the first train. Some people died in the collision, but even more died as a result of a subsequent fire caused by discharging gases from the train's illumination system which caught fire. After this accident all gas illumination on trains in France was replaced with electrical illumination. There are reasons to believe that the number of fatalities could be higher than the official number of 28 fatalities. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

UK-1866-06-xx Time, date and location 1866/06/XX, United Kingdom of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Welwyn North Tunnel Length of tunnel About 1.000 m Operator Double tracked Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 3 trains fully destroyed

Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences ? Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-1988-06-27 Time, date and location 1988/06/27, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Gare de Lyon, Paris Length of tunnel Under ground track at Gare de Lyon Station Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Collision. Vehicles involved two train (1 stationary train) Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Brake failure, collision with stationary train. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 59 deaths, 32 injured. Comments A passenger pulled the emergency brake on a delayed suburban train outside Gare de Lyon. While releasing the brakes, the driver of the train made a grave mistake, and the train continued but nearly without functional brakes. In the downward slope to the under ground part of the Gare de Lyon station the train ran away due to the brake failure, and at high speed it hit a train ready for departure. Prior to the collision attempts were made to evacuate the stationary train, but there was not enough time. There were many people at the platform as well, and some of them were killed too. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

FR-1842-10-xx Time, date and location 1842/10/XX, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Mendon Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 150 deaths. Comments Circumstances not explained clearly ( 'fire in a tunnel) mentioned' in a Belgian Journal. Source Fire in tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

ES-2003-08-06 Time, date and location 2003/08/06, Spain of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Guadarrama tunnel Length of tunnel 4.000 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved special rolling stock. Initiating event ?

Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments Fire occuring during construction phase (tunnel expected to be completed in 2005 only, so far dug no more than 4 km long the fire started on a transporting train ferrying the workers on the construction site, some 3.9 km inside the tunnel Following the fire, 34 workers were cut-off the issue of the tunnel, and remained blocked by the smoke cloud during for hours , they manage to cope with the situation due to an air pocket where they stay for rescue. Source Fire in tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

CH-1972-02-01 Time, date and location 1972/02/01, Switzerland of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Lötschberg tunnel Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 3 injured. Comments:

Source Fire in tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

AT-2000-11-11 Time, date and location 2000/11/11, Kaprun, Austria of accident

Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Kitzteinhorn Length of tunnel 3.400 m 43° inclination Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved passenger rail cabins Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 155 deaths. Comments: The cable car caught fire in the rear drivers cab at the bottom of the tunnel immediately after departure. Due to the fire the car came to a stop 0.6 km inside the 3.4 km long tunnel. The lights went out, and at first the doors were impossible to open. After a while they nevertheless managed to open some of the doors. The cross section of the tunnel is very narrow (diameter 3.6 m) and the space at the side of the car is very limited. The great inclination (43o) made the tunnel a chimney in it self and the escape route downwards was blocked by the fire. People coming out of the train and trying to escape upwards the tunnel, were caught by the smoke and warm flue gases and died inside the tunnel. Only 12 of the passengers survived the cable conveyor fire. They managed to escape the train at an early stage by a broken window and evacuated downwards in the tunnel. 3 of the fatalities had been staying in the station building on top of the tunnel. Source Fire in tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

4.3. Metro Accidents

US-2004-04-19 Time, date and location 2004/04/19, New York, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel New York Underground (Penn station) Length of tunnel ?

Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Collision. Vehicles involved Two train Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 129 passengers injured. Comments An empty Amtrak train rumbled into the back of a Long Island Rail Road train full of rush- hour commuters at Penn Station this morning, injuring about 130 passengers but none seriously, the authorities said. There was no immediate explanation for the collision. The westbound commuter train was stopped about 2,000 feet from the underground platform, when the westbound Amtrak train struck it about 7 a.m., cracking a rear window on the L.I.R.R. train and crumpling a small section in front of an engineer's cab next to the back door. The commuter train, the 5:42 a.m. from Ronkonkoma carrying about 900 passengers, had just gotten the signal to continue on to Track 14 but had not yet moved, railroad officials said. Source Newspaper: New York Times.

2004-02-06 Time, date and location 2004/02/06, Moscow, Russia of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Moscow Metro Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire due at terrorist attack. Vehicles involved Rail carriages. Initiating event ?

Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 39 deaths, many injured. Comments The fire is consecutive to an explosion due to terrorist attack. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

SK-2003-02-18 Time, date and location 2003/02/18, South Korea of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Daegu Underground Length of tunnel 2.200 m Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved two 6-carriages train. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 198 deaths. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

DE-2001-07-07 Time, date and location 2001/07/07, Berlin, Germany of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Kurt Schumacher Platz St. (Berlin), nearby Length of tunnel ?

Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved rear carriage of 100 m long train. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human: No / Structural: however huge smoke production reported Consequences inside and outside carriage. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

DE-2000-07-08 Time, date and location 2000/07/08, Berlin, Germany of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Deutsche Oper Stat. Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments Took place during the Love parade attracting more than 1 million people in Berlin streets. 350 people cut off inside the station during the fire scenario that involved a train that manage

to get out the tunnel section and reach the next station ; difficult operation for the fire brigades. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

NL-1999-07-12 Time, date and location 1999/07/12, Amsterdam, The Netherlands of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Weesperplein ST Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: No, evacuation needed. Comments Equipment fire produced much smoke which filled the station trapping 10 persons later rescued by firefighters. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

AZ-1995-10-28 Time, date and location 1995/10/28, Aizerbaijan of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Baku Length of tunnel Metro, about 2.200 m between stations. Operator ? Configuration Twin bore tunnel. Transport of ?

dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved Metro carriage. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating electrical fault on train. event Emergency and Possibly no intervening connections between the tube. intervention measures Human: 289 deaths, 256 injured, about 245 killed in train and 40 Consequences in tunnel. Comments Each tunnel bore has a relatively narrow cross-section (H=5,6m W=5m). The tunnel is equipped with a controllable ventilation system. A fully loaded 5 car metro train stopped about 200 m after Uldus station due to sparkover/ electric arc in electrical equipment in the rear end of the fourth car. The fire rapidly spread to car 5. Because of problems with the opening of doors in car 4, the passengers were forced to evacuate through car 3. Many travellers, narrow tunnel cross-section and the door problems lead to slow evacuation, and panic arose. The ventilation was set on exhaust mode and much of the smoke was drawn in the same direction as the evacuation was going. 245 of the fatalities were afterwards found killed inside the train, most of them either squeezed or stamped to death and 40 of them were found in the tunnel. 95 % of the persons who managed to evacuate the train survived. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

FR-1994-02-01 Time, date and location 1994/02/01, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Eole transit line Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ?

Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

US-1990-12-28 Time, date and location 1990/12/28, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel NY subway tunnel Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Cable fire at the origin of the accident. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 2 deaths, 200 injured. Comments

Source Fire in tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

US-1990-07-13 Time, date and location 1990/07/13, Los Angeles, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Red Line Length of tunnel ? Operator ?

Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments The fire was fueled by wood structures, plastic liner and ground satured with gasoline. Source www.mtala.com/files/fire.html

addition there is a distribution hall with ticket offices, placed below street level. From the distribution hall several escalators descend to the different platforms. The fire started in escalator 4, which serves Piccadilly Line's platforms. After about 15 minutes moderate fire, a flashover of the whole upper part of the escalator shaft and the distribution hall suddenly occurred. The length and great inclination of the escalator shaft contributed to intensify the fire. Trains that continued running for some time after the fire broke out, rescued the passengers on the lower platforms. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

UK-1987-11-18 Time, date and location 1987/11/18, London, United Kingdom of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel King's Cross Station Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Fire in escalator. Special reference in the sense that the fire took Cause of initiating place in the station network, starting on wooden-frame escalator event machine. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 31 deaths, about 100 injured. Comments Kings’s Cross is one of the most frequently used stations in London Transport's subway network. The King’s Cross station is operated by 5 different lines in 4 different levels. In addition there is a distribution hall with ticket offices, placed below street level. From the distribution hall several escalators descend to the different platforms. The fire started in escalator 4, which serves Piccadilly Line's platforms. After about 15 minutes moderate fire, a flashover of the whole upper part of the escalator shaft and the distribution hall suddenly occurred. The length and great inclination of the escalator shaft contributed to intensify the fire. Trains that continued running for some time after the fire broke out, rescued the passengers on the lower platforms. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

BE-1987-June Time, date and location 1987/June, Brussels, Belgium of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Metro St. in Brussels Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Fire in a cafetaria in concourse of metro st. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

FR-1985-04-12 Time, date and location 1985/04/12, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Barbès Rochechouart st. Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Cales from fire spread from rubbish.

100

event Emergency and Several trains in nearby tunnels required evacuation of all intervention measures passengers. Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

UK-1984-11-23 Time, date and location 1984/11/23, London, United Kingdom of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Oxford Circus Tube Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Fire occured in material store. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 15 injured. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

DE-1984-09-30 Time, date and location 1984/09/30, Hamburg, Germany of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Landungsbrucken st Length of tunnel ? Operator ?

101

Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type ? Vehicles involved 2 out of 3 cars train. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 1 slightly injured. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

DE-1983-09-05 Time, date and location 1983/09/05, Germany of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel München Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 2 vehicles. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating A train fire is at the origin, due to an electrical fault. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 7 injured by smoke. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

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UK-1982-08-11 Time, date and location 1982/08/11, London, United Kingdom of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Piccadilly Line Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 car. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Short circuit. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 15 injured by smoke. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

US-1982-06-02 Time, date and location 1982/06/02, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel N-Y subway tunnel Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ?

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event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 10 injured, over 1.000 evacuated. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

US-1982-03-16 Time, date and location 1982/03/16, New York, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Exchange place st. Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 4 cars. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating event Emergency and 6 hours needed to put fire under control. intervention measures Consequences Human: several people affected by smoke. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

US-1982-01-13 Time, date and location 1982/01/13, Washington DC, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Washington DC Length of tunnel ? Operator ?

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Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Derailment at the origin of a fire in train. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: no victim, 1.200 evacuated. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

DE-1981-09-11 Time, date and location 1981/09/11, Bonn, Germany of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Ramersdorf st. Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Reported due to technical default , fire lasted only 25 min. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

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RU-1981-06-01 Time, date and location 1981/06/01, Moscow, Russia of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Oktyabrskaya st. Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 7 deaths, > 2.000 evacuated. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

UK-1980-06-21 Time, date and location 1980/06/21, London, United Kingdom of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Northern Line Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved No vehicle, equipment. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Cables in a cross passage.

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event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 1 death due to smoke. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

DE-1980-04-08 Time, date and location 1980/04/08, Germany of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Hamburg U-Bahn. Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event Collision; front – rear. Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and People injured are firemen that had to work entirely with breathing intervention measures apparatuses. Consequences Human: no victim, 3 injured. Comments The accident took place in the afternoon rush at 17:40 at the Christophstrasse MediaPark station. A train in traffic was halting at the station for passenger exchange when a test driving train suddenly ran into it from behind. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

US-1979-09-08 Time, date and location 1979/09/08, new York, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel New York Metro

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Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Fire started in Central terminal and transmitted to 2 of 12 cars Cause of initiating stabled nearly, delayed evacuation due to poor communication event with crew. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 4 injured. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

US-1979-09-06 Time, date and location 1979/09/06, Philadelphia, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Philadelphia Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 train. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating The fire started in an on-board transformer, followed by an event explosion. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 148 injured. Comments

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Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

FR-1979-03-25 Time, date and location 1979/03/25, Paris, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Line 1 Reuilly – Diderot Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences ? Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

US-1979-01-17 Time, date and location 1979/01/17, San Francisco, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Bart system Length of tunnel 5.900 m BART-metro Operator ? Configuration Twin bore tunnel with service tube. Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire.

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Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating fire in a circuit breaker. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 1 dead, 58 injured. Comments A fire broke out in a circuit breaker in the 5th and 6th of 7 cars in all. The train was stopped by the emergency break and could not be restarted. An unsuccessful attempt to disconnect the burning cars delayed the evacuation and escape of the passengers with about 30 minutes. The tunnel was filled with smoke despite of induced draught outlet every 300 m and activation of the ventilation system. The passengers were taken to the service tunnel and out in the open air through the other main tunnel. Smoke was drawn into the service tunnel and the other main tunnel. The fire caused 1 fatality and 58 serious or minor injuries, most of them caused by flue gases or poisonous gases from combustion of plastics. The death victim was a fireman who died due to flue gas poisoning. The tunnel system has intervening connections from the main tunnel to the service tunnel every 100 m. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

DE-1978-10-24 Time, date and location 1978/10/24, Köln, Germany of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Köln Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 1 light rail car in premetro tunnel. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures

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Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

FR-1977-03-09 Time, date and location 1977/03/09, Paris, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel RER Paris CDG-Etoile station Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved No vehicle, equipment fire inside false ceiling. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Passengers evacuated. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

CA-1976-10-02 Time, date and location 1976/10/02, Toronto, Canada of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Christie Station Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods

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Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 3 H4-class cars Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences ? Comments

Source Fire in tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

PT-1976-05-25 Time, date and location 1976/05/25, Lisbon, Portugal of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Lisbon Metro Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 4 cars fully destroyed. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: no, users evacuated. Comments

Source Fire in tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

MX-1975-09-01 Time, date and location 1975/09/01, Mexico of accident

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Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Mexico Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Collision front - rear. Vehicles involved Two trains Initiating event ? Cause of initiating The other train omitted to stop when activation of the emergency event brake stopped the first train. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 50 deaths, 30 injured. Comments Front-rear collision between two trains at a subway station in Mexico City. The other train omitted to stop when activation of the emergency brake stopped the first train. The collision took place at high speed. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

US-1975-07-02 Time, date and location 1975/07/02, Boston, USA of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Boston subway Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Fire started as a consequence of a broken catenary. event

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Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 34 injured. 400 people evacuated. Comments One of the cars in the other train climbed the car in front and almost damaged the station ceiling. Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

CA-1974-01-23 Time, date and location 1974/01/23, Montreal, Canada of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Montreal, likely to be the Rosemont (Rosemard ?) Station case. Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 24 cars fully destroyed. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 1 dead, > 1.000 evacuated. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

FR-1973-03-27 Time, date and location 1973/03/27, Paris, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Line 7, near Porte d'Italie Length of tunnel ? Operator ?

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Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

DE-1972-10-01 Time, date and location 1972/10/01, Germany of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Alexanderplatz Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved 4 carriages destroyed + EMU Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 2 killed by smoke. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

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1972-1978 Time, date and location 1972/1978, Stockholm, Sweden of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Stockholm network Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved rail carriages in 7 fire incidents. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Fire set inside carriages due to arson. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences ? Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net/

CA-1963-03-02 Time, date and location 1963/03/02, Toronto, Canada of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Union Station Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved six cars train, fully involved. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Fire originating from a technical failure, while train was at rest in

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event an underground tail track just outside station. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences ? Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

SE-1960-11-23 Time, date and location 1960/11/23, Stockholm, Sweden of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Stockholm Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of dangerous ? goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved One carriage fully destroyed. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences No. Comments

Source Fire in Tunnel (FIT) http://www.etnfit.net

UK-1960-08-11 Time, date and location 1960/08/11, London, United Kingdom of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Moorgate St Station Length of tunnel ? Operator ?

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Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Wall collision. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures Human: 39 injured. 38 people treated in hospital for smoke Consequences inhalation. Comments An arriving 6-car train drove at high speed into the end wall of the tunnel at Moorgate without activating the brakes. The train driver was killed and the cause of the accident is still not revealed. Subsequent to the accident the subway system in London was furnished with a mechanical device, which will activate the brakes automatically in similar situations. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

UK-1958-07-28 Time, date and location 1958/07/28, London, United Kingdom of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Shepards Bush/Holland Park London Tube station Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? A sparkover in the electro-technical equipment caused a powerful Initiating event electric arc that caused subsequent fires. Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures

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Consequences Human: 1 dead, 47 injured by smoke. Comments A sparkover in the electro-technical equipment caused a powerful electric arc that caused subsequent fires. Delayed evacuation of the train caused intense smoke exposure of the passengers during evacuation. One person died in hospital after the accident Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

FR-1903-08-10 Time, date and location 1903/08/10, Paris, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Couronnes Station Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Fire. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Fire originated from the engine of the subway train. A sparkover Cause of initiating in the electro-technical equipment caused a powerful electric arc event that caused subsequent fires. Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 80 deaths. Comments Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

RU-1999-05-29 Time, date and location 1999/05/29, White Russia of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Nyamiha station Length of tunnel ?

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Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Crowding together. Vehicles involved ? Initiating event ? Cause of initiating Crowding together. event Emergency and ? intervention measures Consequences Human: 52 deaths, 150 injured of total 2.000 passengers. Comments 52 (54?) persons were killed when a crowd of 2000 people tried to squeeze themselves into a metro station in Minsk due to a heavy hailstorm. All the people came from a rock concert and beer festival when the hailstorm broke out, and the crowd of people sought shelter in the metro station. People slipping and falling on slippery floors increased the crowding. Among the fatalities were many youths and 2 policemen trying to control the crowd. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

FR-2000-08-30 Time, date and location 2000/08/30, Paris, France of accident Tunnel Profile Name of tunnel Notre Dame - de – Lorette, Underground station. Length of tunnel ? Operator ? Configuration ? Transport of ? dangerous goods Accident Profile Accident type Overturning. Vehicles involved Metro system Line 12. Initiating event ? Cause of initiating ? event Emergency and ? intervention measures

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Consequences Human: 24 injured of which 10 seriously. Comments A south going train on line 12 derailed and overturned in a narrow curve (radius 52m) at the entry to the station at Notre-Dame-de-Lorette. The first car skidded into the station overturned and stopped 1 m ahead of a train in opposite direction that was standing at the Notre-Dame- de-Lorette platform. Too high speed in the curve ahead of the station was probably the cause of the accident. Source The World’s longest tunnel page http://home.no.net/lotsberg/index.html

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5. Tunnel Accident Investigations

Investigators unconsciously base their investigative methods on methodologies adapted from their academic disciplines or previous work experience; this leads to highly individualized, personalized investigative methodologies.

Adaptations of an individual investigator's methodologies lead to differences in "tests" for technical truth used by each investigator in tunnel accident investigations.

Differences among tests for investigative "truth" make it hard for investigators to work together, and lead to differing conclusions by each investigator.

The lack of commonly accepted investigative truth tests allows each investigator to incorporate untested descriptive and judgmental materials into an accident report, increasing the potential for subsequent disagreements.

These findings, resulting from academic and NTSB (National Transport Safety Board) researches, highlight the need to develop a generally acceptable investigative methodology with methods for testing technical truth during investigations.

Today no mechanism exists to delineate. report and evaluate the differing methodologies used in tunnel accident investigations. Thus investigators have no basis for picking a "best" methodology and few incentives to improve their own until they personally get caught up in a controversy.

5.1. Methods and Methodologies

The recognition of the differences between "methodologies" and "method" is necessary. Let's consider the term methods first. As you consider the findings, think of method as being a regular, disciplined and systematic procedure for accomplishing a task. A method is a technique. During an investigation, investigators use different "methods" or techniques to interview witnesses, calculate flight paths, examine debris, read out data from records, and even to structure the participation of other investigators. Method emphasizes procedures according to an underlying detailed, logically-ordered plan. Methodology, on the other hand, has a broader context. A methodology is a system of principles practices and body of procedures (methods) applied to a specific branch of knowledge determining in large measure how that branch of knowledge is practiced. A methodology is an overall approach to a field.

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5.2. Accident Investigation Problems

Accident investigations involve the necessity of answering the following important questions: - What is this thing called “accident”that investigators investigate? - When they begin an investigation what should be the scope of their investigative efforts? - What data should they seek during an investigation? - How will the “right” data be recognized? - When will the investigator have enough data? - How should this be determined? - How should the data be organized, summarized or reported? - How does the investigator determine if the outputs or work products from the investigation are satisfactory, and whom the data and outputs must satisfy? - At what point does the investigative task end and the analytical task or use of the outputs begin? - What conclusions can be drawn from the outputs, and how should their validity be tested? - Where should one turn for the answers to these questions, and how does one assess the quality of the answers? - How do accident investigations contribute to safety in the most effective way? These are not rhetorical questions. Every investigator is faced with these questions each time an accident investigation is begun, because every accident is different from previous accidents in one or more ways. Presently each investigator answers such questions with “common sense” and with “good judgment” seemingly predicated on experience and academic background, rather than on generally accepted decision rules that led to reproducible outputs. Observed differences in the purposes of investigations, in the scope of matters investigated and in the nature of data reported indicated that the investigation conclusions weren’t theoretically consistent and replicable anyway. Observations of uses of the work products suggested that these differences create problems for users of investigative work products, and persons involved in the accidents. For the users, unreproducible, inconsistent and incomplete work products can impede discovery of safety problems, misdirect corrective efforts, generate controversy, undermine credibility, and confuse the users’ audience. For the persons involved in the accidents, work products can overly simplify complex relationships and result in unjust blame for the accident, or even worse effects. For all concerned, investigators’ problems get magnified when the outputs are used.

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The main objective of an accident investigation is: “understanding the accident phenomenon”.

Informal inquiries among investigators showed essentially no agreement about the “best” accident investigation methods to be used. The choice of methods was usually intuitive, and was not addressed explicitly by any investigators. Additionally, no pressure from users of the work products was exerted on investigators to address this issue. Investigators became very uncomfortable when the issue was raised, and were unable to discuss the question of criteria for selecting methodologies for their investigations, probably because they had not previously attempted to articulate them.

Specifications for work products from accident investigations were, for practical purposes, non-existent. The closest approaches to specifications were scattered instructions for the use of forms for reporting accidents. However, even the simplest forms required interpretations by investigators, as will be shown later, and none of the instructions provided a basis for determining the quality of the data reported with accident-based criteria. The numerous outputs often generated from a single accident further demonstrated the problem confronting an investigator seeking criteria by which to judge the acceptability of the work products--both with respect to one’s purpose and the realities of the accident. The same dilemma confronts users and evaluators of the investigators’ outputs.

When one attempts to use investigative outputs for evaluation purposes, or to reach a better understanding of accidents, problems with the scope, methods and outputs are accentuated.

These practical problems were discovered to reflect even more basic theoretical problems. As the research progressed, they became more clearly understandable. They can now be characterized in terms of perceptions or concepts, assumptions, principles and rules of procedure. The clarity arose from attempts to identify and understand the theoretical underpinnings of the safety and accident investigation fields. Available theory did not provide workable criteria needed to answer investigators’ questions cited above. The reasons varied widely and significantly, when judged by the criteria that will be discussed shortly. Other visible symptoms are the disputes which often arise about “probable cause and its determination. Many other symptoms could be cited. They all suggest that the lack of a theoretical “glue” to resolve the investigators’ dilemmas is a real and continuing problem.

To sum up the problems, accident investigators have been resolving their investigative dilemmas in every accident, each in his or her own way, using personally developed decision criteria. The results are not hard to anticipate. Replicability, verification, prediction, communication, utility, consensus and credibility suffer. Users never have the right, good or reliable or enough data. The more one delves into these problems, the greater the enormity of their consequences seems. Ponder the effects on safety policy, public opinion, safety programs and objectives, research outputs or on the assignment of personal fault or culpability, and the need for their resolution can be seen.

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5.3. Accident Perceptions

Accident investigators investigate accidents. What is this thing called “accident?” The question is not new.

The first step of this analysis requires the examination of models of accidents and test them in practice.

The next step was to try to answer the questions using “definitions” of accidents found in the regulations, literature, safety publications, investigation manuals, and periodicals. Review of over 200 different definitions disclosed that the diversity of opinions about the nature of the accident phenomenon was even greater than suspected.

The third step was to observe the methods used by individual investigators during investigations, and to try to discern from their actions, comments and decisions what their perceptions of the accident phenomenon were. These observations and the work described above led to the identification of five general and differing perceptions of the accident phenomenon. Each perception was found to be accompanied by a set of ‘implicit assumptions, rules for investigative procedures, and “principles.”

The five perceptions, and their implicit assumptions, principles and rules of procedure or theories include: 1. Single event perception and “cause”_theory . Assumes that an accident is a single event which has a “cause.” Investigator identifies cause to understand phenomenon. Investigative task is to find cause, correct it and the accident will be prevented in the future. Assumes replicability of phenomenon. Also assumes someone/something failed, was at fault or to blame; otherwise accident is “act of God” or unexplainable. May be related to historic need for “scapegoat” for inexplicable events. Singular “event” still widely used in literature.

2. Chain-of-events perception and “domino” theory. Assumes “unsafe” conditions create vulnerable relationships in which “unsafe act” can trigger “chain—of-events” called accident. Investigative task is to identify “unsafe conditions” and “unsafe acts” that “caused” events sequence. Criteria for unsafe acts and conditions unspecific; conclusions rely on investigators’ judgment. Criteria for beginning and end of chain unspecified. Conclusions usually symptomatic and descriptive, rather than etiologic.

3. Determinant variable perception and “factorial” theory . Best described by Thorndyke (25) as “the search for the experimental ideal of the single independent variable” which set “the goal and ideal of an accident investigation as the gathering of data in such a way that statistical comparisons will permit fair estimates of the influence of the variables in a particular factor on the probability of an accident.” Assumes common factors are present in accidents and that they can be discerned with statistical analysis of the “right” data from accident investigations. Assumes hypotheses about determinant variables can only be identified by secondary examination of facts. Criteria for scope, data, outputs dictated by hypothesis, rather than direct observations from accidents. Requires extensive exercise of investigator’s judgments; often uses data reporting forms. Requires occurrence of sufficient accidents to build data base. In practice, results in differentiation between fact gathering during field investigation and secondary data analysis function.

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4. Branched events chains perception and “logic tree” theory. Assumes accidental events are predictable, and structures predictive search for alternative events pathways leading to selected “undesired event, through speculations by knowledgeable systems analysts. Follows rules of procedure for structuring speculations and assigning probabilities in a branched events chains display. Demands ordering of events into accident sequences. Displays facilitate communication, discovery, constructive criticisms and technical inputs. Provides basis for identifying data needed .during operations to update probability estimates. Displays can provide guidance during investigation of actual accidents, and accidents can be used to upgrade predictions. Does not provide for incorporation of events time relationships and durations; criteria for undesired event choices are unspecified.

5. Multilinear events sequences perception and “process” or ”p-theory. ” Assumes accident is transient segment of continuum of activities; views accident as a transformation process by which a homeostatic activity is interrupted with accompanying unintended harmed state. Process is described with actions by interacting actors, each acting in a sequential order with each sequence related to each other interacting sequence in a specific temporal and spatial proceed/follow logic. Investigative tasks call for identification of the actors, their actions and interactions and resultant changes of state from the initiating perturbation through the last sequential harm to the actors. Prescribes criteria for beginning, end of accident; for data search; select4on; recording; organization and testing. Display provides “time coordinate” to discipline events timing relationships, and hypothesis generation method, in addition to benefits of “logic tree” displays described above.

After these perceptions were identified, an attempt was made to link them to commonly held safety concepts and philosophies, in order to attack the “close the loop” problem.

Relationships between these perceptions and numerous safety concepts became visible. For example, the single event view is clearly linked to the concept of “cause” of accidents, and the body of investigative procedures related to that determination. The idea of unsafe . acts and unsafe conditions appears to be linked inextricably to the domino view, as is the idea of “causes” and safety actions to “break the chain of events.” The branched chain and multilinear events sequences perceptions, dealing with interactions and probabilities of events sets, compel a risk perception of safety, and the view of a non-zero probability of an accident with any activity. The determinant variable perception relates clearly to the “causal factor” view of safety problems, and data sampling for safety analysis. Each view has the effect of influencing a different philosophy of safety, and the safety programs which ensue. These perceptions also help to interpret the meaning of safety concepts in concrete terms, as will be shown in the next section.

5.4. Accident Investigation Processes

There is no single tunnel accident investigation process. The processes ranged from the simple “investigation” of a few minutes duration by an employee’s supervisor in a “minor” accident to a multi-million dollar effort for a major accident. Among the differences observed were the sizes of technical staffs, and their technical capabilities; authorities; funds available; methods employed; work products; and the effectiveness of the investigative efforts.

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One way to categorize the processes identified is in terms of their staffing. Each category of investigative processes is briefly described below:

1. One-person process. One investigator performs all investigative functions, from data gathering, interpretation and analysis, to reporting of findings. Also answers questions arising during investigation. Tasks usually governed by reporting forms or check lists which investigators must interpret and satisfy. May involve coding of entries. Outputs usually brief verbal or narrative reports, or completed accident report forms. Recommendations usually not made, or if made, are shallow. Investigative procedures usually insubstantial.

2. Intra-organisational ad hoc team process. When accident happens, investigative team is formed within organization, staffed by regular employees without substantive investigative training. Usually teams search for chain of events, unsafe acts or conditions. Investigative duties often subordinated to other duties after initial cursory inquiries. Outputs usually internal reports of “cause(s)” with shallow recommendations because of self interests of team members. Team disbands after investigation is completed.

3. Intra-organisational standing team process. Predesignated team performs full range of investigative tasks, often involving testing or examinations. Team usually includes one or more extensively trained investigators with investigative experiences. Outputs usually are narrative reports of “cause(s)” with reasoned, objective recommendations for improvements in non-management areas of the organization’s activities. Team members often able to implement improvements before report is issued. Investigative procedures usually provided.

4. Multiorganizational ad hoc team. Participants designated after accident occurs; disbanded after investigation is completed. Used by both public and private sector organizations. Investigators usually detailed to team for duration of investigative effort. procedures governing tasks range from sketchy to comprehensive. Draws on mixed talents of investigators to achieve adequate investigation. Investigators usually trained. Outputs usually are narrative reports of “causes” with mixed quality recommendations that depend largely on project manager and team members, rather than procedures.

5. Multi-organizational standing team process. One organization organizes team formation, using representatives from several other organizations or groups to investigate a series of accidents. Typified by multi—disciplinary investigation teams from several cooperating universities under contract to government, or teams from several companies investigating a kind of accident plaguing an industry. Investigators often trained on thejob; often assisted by experienced investigators on teams. Teams usually focus on specific kinds of accidents to understand them better. Methodologies usually reflect academic disciplines of investigators. Outputs are narrative reports, usually comprehensive, often supplemented with substantial tabulated or other data. Team dismissed at end of project.

6. Judicial investigation process. Special task force assembled and operated under the direction of a distinguished jurist, often of national prominence. May be directed by jurist in jurisdiction within which accident occurred. Investigation relies primarily on witnesses’ testimony; may involve some technical testing or analyses. Process governed by judicial procedures, rules of evidence and adversary methods. Usually associated with an accident of

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national concern. Outputs are usually narrative reports of “cause(s)” with recommendations, but may also include criminal or other legal proceedings against parties at fault.

7. Legislative Investigation process. Investigation initiated by legislative entity acting in legislative or oversight capacity. Usually involves investigation by legislative staff, consultants. Investigation relies principally on witnesses’ testimony before legislative subcommittee, and hearing records. Outputs are hearing records, narrative committee report, and sometimes new legislation. procedures of legislative body govern investigation.

Methods ranged from intuitive methods in one-person cases to the use of sophisticated analyses and calculations in others. One person methods included the use of multiple choice codes for completing forms, while other processes attempted to identify sequences of events, determine “cause” and report all the facts and circumstances of the accident. One-person, judicial and legislative processes relied most heavily on witnesses’ statements. The standing team processes relied on a more balanced split between data from people and things. Some scenario modeling was used by standing teams or in teams with trained investigators. Uses varied widely, forming no readily discernable patterns within a process.

Common to almost all process observations were attempts by investigators to determine “cause(s)” and usually also a “sequence of events.” As a rough outline of a course of events evolved, most investigators tended to desegregate events for a more detailed understanding of what happened.

Within team processes, common time and spatial events testing procedures were noted. Investigators felt impelled to “get all the facts” about an accident so the “facts” could be analyzed and reported. The distinction between fact gathering and analysis of the facts was sharply drawn almost universally, and is encouraged by the format of most narrative reports. This may be a carryover from legal concepts related to the weighing of evidence under adversary proceedings. Criteria for identifying “facts” during an investigation, however, were either absent or were stated in equivocal terms; the determination that data constituted a “fact” was a judgment call which sometimes generated heated controversy. The “facts” sought seemed to be most heavily influenced by the investigators’ personal background and experience, and by the assumed hypotheses formed early in the investigation. Interestingly, organizations using accident reporting forms customarily provided at least one additional level of persons to verify or evaluate the completed forms from the investigator before processing them for accident “analysis.”

The observed uses of the data reported on forms suggested that a distinction should be made between “primary” and “secondary” accident investigations. The primary investigation incorporated direct observations of debris or physical evidence and witness’ information collected by the investigators. The secondary investigations were conducted solely with data reported by others after primary investigation efforts, to draw conclusions about the accidents. For example, field investigators usually completed the report forms used by the secondary investigator .

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5.5. Accident Investigation Methodologies

At least six different basic methodological approaches were observed in tunnel accident investigations. The approaches included:

1) events reconstruction, 2) statistical, 3) adversary, 3) modeling, 4) simulation and 5)“hunt and peck.”

Events reconstruction methodologies used “events” deduced from physical evidence remaining after the accident, witness interviews and speculations by the investigator to “reconstruct” the sequence of events viewed as the accident. The methodology drew heavily on physical science disciplines and examination techniques. The degree to which events were decomposed or broken down into sub-events was left to the investigators’ judgments. Frequently, one or several events were selected as the “cause” or “causes” or “probable cause” or “proximate cause” of the accident. Events were undefined, and therefore the nature of the events described varied widely. Reported events sequences often stopped with a crash or collision. Reports often included recommendations designed to “break the chain” of events. Events reconstruction methodologies were augmented with logic trees, which provided for treatment of concurrent as well as sequential events. Logic trees culminated in a single undesired event, selected by the investigator. However, these logic trees did not show actual time relationships among interacting events connected with “and” gates.

Statistical methodologies were used for secondary investigations, usually involving several accidents. They included manipulation of data using statistical rules of procedure to identify determinant variables in an accident occurrence. Both static and dynamic descriptors were used indiscriminately, and the accident scope issue was not addressed. A fatal defect with these methods from an investigator's perspective was the failure to treat time relationships among events, although sequences were often addressed. Observation of conditions being represented as events was common. A frequent complaint about the outputs was the inability to identify corrective actions after “problems” were identified. For example, the conclusion that drinking is involved in half the highway accidents does not provide a basis for corrective actions.

Adversary methodologies were used frequently in the judicial and legislative investigative processes. The premise that opposing interests would bring out the truth about the accident forms the basis for the formation of investigative teams with representatives of several parties involved in the accident. Information was often gathered in an adversary setting, particularly during witnesses’ “interviews.” The “facts” gathered were tested informally by discussing their apparent logic and consistency against the summary hypotheses that incorporated these “facts.” The methodology was disciplined by rules of evidence and other procedures drawn from the judicial processes, but the outputs were usually incomplete, and not subjected to any rigorous investigative disciplining criteria such as “beginning” and “end” tests. Issues reported were largely judgment calls by investigators, and no methodology for the calls could be detected.

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Modeling took several forms. One observed form was a “mental movie” procedure, in which the investigator tried to form a movie of the accident in his or her mind as the accident data was being gathered. The mental movie provided a model into which data would be fitted as it comes to the investigator’s attention. As the model grew, the unknowns or gaps in the movie could be identified and overcome before the investigation was finished. The movies were developed intuitively, and beginning and end points were not consciously selected. The finished movie constituted an accident model, complete with settings and actors, actions and outcomes. This kind of modeling seemed to explain the events reconstruction methodology origins. Flow charting was another kind of modeling observed. Events flow charts describing the accident mechanism or scenario in its sequential order were developed and recorded on paper in chart form. The charts, in some cases, implied or presented the timing and duration of events. Logic trees were a form of this kind of modeling during the investigations, and sometimes were included in the outputs. However, charts rarely constituted the sole outputs. Scale modeling was another technique used in tunnel accident investigations. Use of scale models with witnesses during interviews helps them explain their observations to investigators. Two other observations about models were noteworthy. First, events flow charts or models did not have to deal with variables in an accident investigation, because the events had a certainty of one, i.e., the accident happened. Secondly, inadequately disciplined models were often observed. Curious mixtures of actions and conditions within supposed events sequence models were not uncommon. Another defect in most models was the violation of the “advancing time” discipline. Time was represented by the order in which events were presented and linked with arrows. However, arrows often pointed in opposite directions, creating the suggestion that time flowed forward and backward. In accidents, time was never observed to have flowed backward; participants in accidents never got to pass through a given time segment a second time.

Simulations constituted another methodology. Crash simulations intended to reproduce automotive accidents were widely used to form the basis for safety actions. Simulations were usually thought of as reenactments by the investigators. The reenactments were used both to develop data about gaps in their understanding of what happened, and to formulate hypotheses by seeing if the simulations resulted in the same outcomes, Simulations also permitted investigators to vary the assumed events hypothesized during investigations, to assess the effects of the changes in the accident scenario. Simulations constitute one way of demonstrating that the investigator fully understands an accident mechanism.

“Hunt and peck” is the catch-all term used to describe unstructured investigative approaches observed. Some investigators, especially inexperienced ones, have no methodology in mind when they begin an investigation. This methodology is indicated when an investigator must visit the scene of the accident before anything else can be done, in the hope that some insights will come from just looking at the accident. No useful results have been observed with this methodology. While not distinguished separately from the above, comparative analytical methods were employed in each of the investigative methodologies described above. In investigations, comparisons of the expected versus the actual actions, events or conditions were frequently addressed, and the determination of the expectations was an important task for many

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investigators. Comparisons also form the basis for the use of checklists and accident report forms; the comparison in the one case is between the expected and actual investigative tasks, and in the second case is between the form designers’ view of the accident, the investigator’s view and the realities of the accident.

Supporting these general methodologies are at least 22 investigative examination techniques were observed. These techniques are listed below: 1. Visual inspection for residues, deviations from norms, deformations, etc. 2. Chemical analysis methods, including chromatographic, infrared, wet chemical analyses, pH tests, miscibility tests. 3. Thermal analysis methods, including “temperature bars” differential thermal analyses, decomposition or polymerization temperature analyses. 4. Radiographic methods, including x-ray, gamma ray scans, carbon dating, emission measurements. 5. Structural analysis methods, including engineering calculations of force distribution or changes; rotational analyses. 6. Force vector analyses, based on Newton’s law of equal and opposite forces and directions of deformation. 7. Dimensional analyses, including comparative analyses of new vs. present dimensions . 8. Energy traces, including energy flow, stressor/stressee analyses, thermodynamic analyses. 9. Electrical analyses, including circuit, conductivity, static charge, sneak circuit analyses. 10. Metallurgical testing, including grain microphotographs, yield mode patterns, strength and hardness tests, bend tests, ductility tests. 11. Crystallographic analyses, including xray diffraction, formation conditions, types of crystals present. 12. Reconstruction of surviving parts, as with mockups, sequential break—up analyses . 13. Char analyses, such as determination of char depth, char patterns, and char composition versus known standard specimens and exposures. 14. Fault tree analysis, for speculation on how the condition observed might have come about. 15. Pressure analyses, including vapor equilibrium, reaction pressure and velocity, rate-of- pressure-rise-and—effects experiments . 16. Scenario modeling techniques, such as events charting. 17. Flash point tests for flammable liquids, dusts, powders. 18. Incubation tests for etiologic and infectious agents, carcinogen, etc. 19. Buoyancy tests for density determinations, mixing rate estimates. 20. Flow tests, for viscosity, angle of repose, air entrainment effects.

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21. Toxicity tests, such as LD 50 and LC 50 animal tests, skin corrosivity tests, asphyxiation concentrations, blood tests. 22. Corrosion tests, such as inches per year (ipy) rates, stress corrosion cracking tests.

The quality criteria for these examination techniques usually reside within the disciplines represented, and are not published in useful forms for accident investigators’ use. Examinations were usually performed without substantive test plans. They did not address the entire accident phenomenon when they were used, and they usually focused on a narrow set of events. On a few occasions, these examinations constituted the principal investigative effort.

5.6. Accident Investigation Outputs

Three types of investigative work products were observed. They were, in the estimated order of frequency:

1) completed accident report forms; 2) narrative accident reports; and 3) models.

Sometimes, more than one kind of work product was observed from a single investigation. Supporting materials for these work products included documentation such as photos, test reports, maps, sketches, diagrams, etc..

Comp1eted forms usually were designed by someone other than the investigator; often they were designed by insurers, researchers, or regulators, seeking specific information to serve their needs. Entries were specified in what appeared at first to be concrete terms, but which upon analysis were found to require extensive interpretation by the investigators. Typically, forms were not fully completed by investigators in all detail, or else non-specific entries were used when all the blanks had to have some kind of entry. Every form required investigators to make judgment calls about the entries, for reasons that included the inapplicability of the form to their specific accident, lack of investigative data, misperceptions about the accident phenomenon that found their way into the forms, and conflicts with entry specifications. Using the five accident perceptions described above, the form content and entry specifications were found to be internally consistent with one of the perceptions, or in some cases two of the perceptions, when they were analyzed. Observed difficulties with the use of forms in accident investigations included limitations on the opportunities to discover new insights into the accident phenomenon being investigated; distortion of data about an accident because of the need to fit actual observations into predetermined specifications that didn’t fit the actual observations; and the tremendous variations in the scope of the data about an accident that were reported.

Narrative reports were observed in two forms: written and verbal. Report length (reflecting the scope of the data about an accident) varied from a few minutes duration to over 300 pages plus appendices. No universal pattern was discerned for narrative reports. However, a general format used in National Transportation Safety Board reports was observed frequently in other

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reports. That format provides for presentation of facts/analysis/conclusions/recommendations sections in that order in written reports about accidents. Non-governmental reports had no discernable pattern beyond a narrative description of what happened, followed by a discussion of investigative, cause or related information. In narrative reports of accident investigations, the accident was described as an events sequence description, without exceptions. Analysis sections had no common pattern. Most organizations prescribing narrative reports provided some form of investigative manual. These supporting manuals contained varying levels of detail about investigative purposes, procedures, examination methods reporting formats, and-on occasion safety philosophy. Manuals often prescribed matter to be reported, but did not provide criteria for determining whether the quality of the matter covered was adequate. The International Civil Aviation Organization and the Energy Research And Development Administration investigation manuals are typical of the better manuals available, but neither treats the quality criteria question explicitly.

Models are listed as a type of deliverable, but they are rarely the sole deliverable. At the present time, models are usually appended to reports. Recommendations are often considered an output from an accident investigation. However, the preparation of recommendations from information developed during an accident investigation seems more properly to be an end use of the investigative output, rather than an integral function of the investigation. The view that an investigation should produce recommendations is apparently tied to the accident prevention purposes of accident investigations, rather than the risk-based perception of safety reflected in the events sequences perceptions. Of all functions related to accident investigations, the development of recommendations was the least structured, and the most dependent on the investigators’ common sense and good judgment. Research into countermeasure development and evaluation has disclosed only one major published effort to present countermeasure theory and principles for the investigator. Supporting documentation should not be confused with total outputs, but their contribution to understanding accidents can be significant. An aerial photo of an accident site, for example, contains data for both the investigators and the users of outputs. However, specifications for supporting documents and for their role in the outputs were skimpy. Only the judicial processes provided criteria for evaluating data, in that rules of evidence were used.

5.7. Relationships Among Findings

These findings were interrelated. An individual’s perceptions of the nature of the accident phenomenon influenced the individual’s reasons for investigating an accident. These reasons determined the process selected, the scope of the investigation, and the methods used. These in turn influenced the work products. Both the perceptions of an accident and the deliverables from the investigation influenced the eventual applications of the work products. These relationships are shown in the following model.

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Fig. 1 — Influence of accident perceptions on accident investigations

When one considers that there are at least 5 differing accident perceptions, 44 reasons for an accident investigation, at least 7 different investigation processes, at least 6 basic and 22 supporting methodologies, and at least 3 types of work products, one gets insights into the range of choices available to investigators. Add to these choices the undefined scope of investigations and the resultant additional variations in resultant decisions by investigators, and the impossibility of achieving reproducible investigative results becomes unmistakably clear.

Sometimes more than one set of choices was observed in the investigations of a single accident. For example, following one accident, nine separate investigations were conducted. An obvious question arises: why didn’t one investigation with one investigative output serve everyone’s need for an explanation of the accident? The linking of several investigations of one accident was not addressed in any accident manuals reviewed. Witnesses have been observed to be questioned as often as five times: what is the likelihood of getting identical statements each time? Did all the investigators have access to all the residues or debris that survived the accident, even after destructive testing had occurred? In multiple investigations, who did what testing? These kinds of questions suggest a need to consider the larger question: why not one investigation? The answer seems to lie in the differences in perceptions of the accident phenomenon and resultant perceptions of “safety,” which drive different persons to seek different information from the accident to serve their narrow purposes.

Another relationship concerns applications of investigative findings for evaluation purposes. Not one of fourteen major accident investigation manuals treats the relationship between investigations and “safety” predictions. Validation of “safety” performance assumptions on which countermeasures are instituted is still apparently considered the domain of “researchers.” While this linkup has been examined in the tunnel and hazardous materials safety fields, actual use of the predictive analyses and logic by investigators during the planning and initial stages of an accident investigation was observed only in two actual cases.

5.8. Conclusions

It is clear from this analysis and its applications that there is an urgent need for unifying perceptions of the accident phenomenon and for disciplined tunnel accident investigation methodologies that will overcome practical and theoretical uncertainties facing accident investigators. Unless present diverse perceptions are made visible, attempts to gain acceptance of the need for reconciliation of diverse views are not likely to be supported. To get these debilitating differences resolved, certain actions seem to be needed.

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1. Individuals practicing safety activities should reexamine their perceptions of the accident phenomenon, and then explicitly report that perception in the work products that it influences. This would include investigative reports, program evaluations, safety analyses reports, and similar work products. This action would have the initial effect of forcing articulation and disclosure of these perceptions. It should have a collateral effect of driving divergent perceptions toward a ‘consensus as the effectiveness of work products based on different perceptions become visible. In addition, it would have the immediate effect of providing disciplining criteria for the work products produced.

2. Accident investigators must re-examine their investigative methodologies, and then explicitly specify both the accident perception and the methodology used in each reported investigation to produce the deliverables offered. This action would have the effect of making visible implicit criteria for investigator’s decisions about accident scope, data sought, analysis methods and information reported. This should also have the longer term effect of demonstrating the benefits of each methodology, based on the utility of the outputs produced with each methodology. In addition, the perceptions and methods, if reported, would put users on notice about the known difficulties with each, identified in this research.

3. Persons performing secondary investigations, using primary data reported by accident investigators from field observations, should report both the accident perceptions on which their work is predicated, and also the perceptions on which the primary data was predicated. This would reduce the potential for misuse of primary investigative data in secondary investigations. It would also help secondary investigators self-evaluate their work products.

4. Research should be initiated to develop a “best” tunnel accident investigation methodology based on unifying safety, accident and methodological perceptions and concepts. The methodology should not be an adaptation of methodologies from other disciplines, but rather should be derived from the unifying safety, accident and related concepts. This research would transcend any single public or private agency’s interests, so it is not clear who should sponsor such research. The “best” methodology should serve the greatest number of users, whose perceptions of their needs may be reshaped if the first three actions are implemented.

5. Tunnel accident investigation program managers should re-examine their personal perceptions of the accident phenomenon, and then explicitly specify the perceptions on which their programs are predicated. This should have the effect of providing criteria for operating and assessing all the elements of an investigative program, as well as rationalizing the outputs. It could affect the nature of accidents investigated, as well as the methods specified for the programs. This action would probably provide a strong incentive to strive toward unifying perceptions of the phenomenon in fig. 1 that does this.

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