Executive Pay in the FTSE 100: Is Everyone Getting a Fair Slice of the Cake?
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Annual Report and Accounts 2010 Annual Report and Accounts 2010 Accounts and Report Annual Annual Report and Accounts 2010 Welcome Aboard!
Annual report and accounts 2010 Annual report and accounts 2010 Annual report and accounts 2010 Welcome aboard! Navigating your way around this report... 01 Overview 54 Accounts 2010 Business highlights 01 Independent auditors’ report to the members easyJet at a glance 02 of easyJet plc 54 15 years of continued success 04 Consolidated income statement 55 Chairman’s statement 06 Consolidated statement of comprehensive income 56 Consolidated statement of financial position 57 Consolidated statement of changes in equity 58 Consolidated statement of cash flows 59 Notes to the accounts 60 Company statement of financial position 90 Company statement of changes in equity 91 Company statement of cash flows 92 Notes to the Company accounts 93 08 Business review 95 Other information Chief Executive’s statement 08 Five year summary 95 Strategy and KPIs 14 Glossary 96 Financial review 16 Corporate responsibility 28 34 Governance Directors’ report easyJet plc is incorporated as a public limited company and is registered in Directors’ profiles 34 England with the registered number 3959649. easyJet plc’s registered office Corporate governance 36 is Hangar 89, London Luton Airport, Bedfordshire LU2 9PF. The Directors Shareholder information 40 present the Annual report and accounts for the year ended 30 September Report on Directors’ remuneration 41 2010. References to ‘easyJet’, the ‘Group’, the ‘Company’, ‘we’, or ‘our’ are to Statement of Directors’ responsibilities 53 easyJet plc or to easyJet plc and its subsidiary companies where appropriate. Pages 01 to 53, inclusive, of this Annual report comprise the Directors’ report that has been drawn up and presented in accordance with English company law and the liabilities of the Directors in connection with that report shall be subject to the limitations and restrictions provided by such law. -
Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK
Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK Fabrizio Ferri* David Maber Harvard Business School Abstract: We examine the effect on CEO pay of new legislation introduced in the United Kingdom at the end of 2002 that mandates an annual, advisory shareholder vote (“say on pay”) on the executive pay report prepared by the board of directors. We find no evidence of a change in the level and growth rate of CEO pay after the adoption of say on pay. However, we document an increase in its sensitivity to poor performance. The effect is more pronounced in firms with high voting dissent but extends more generally to firms with excess CEO pay, regardless of the voting dissent, suggesting that some firms responded to threat of a negative vote by acting ahead of the annual meeting. Evidence on explicit changes to CEO pay contracts made in response to specific shareholder requests confirms a shift toward greater sensitivity of CEO pay to poor performance. These findings are consistent with calls to eliminate “rewards for failure” that led to the introduction of say on pay and may be of interest to regulators and investors who are pondering the merits of say on pay in the US and other countries. * Corresponding Author: Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02138, phone: (617) 495-6925, email: [email protected] We thank Gennaro Bernile, Brian Cadman, Brian Cheffins, Shijun Cheng, Joe Gerakos, Jeffrey Gordon, Yaniv Grinstein, Dhinu Srinivasan, Laura Starks, Randall Thomas and discussants and participants at -
Outrage and Camouflage – an Empirical Examination of the Managerial Power Theory
TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT MÜNCHEN TUM School of Management Chair for Management Accounting Outrage and Camouflage – An Empirical Examination of the Managerial Power Theory Iris Carola Pfeiffer Vollständiger Abdruck der von der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Technischen Universität München zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. rer. pol.) genehmigten Dissertation. Vorsitzender: Prof. Dr. Jürgen Ernstberger Prüfer der Dissertation: 1. Prof. Dr. Gunther Friedl 2. Prof. Dr. Michael Kurschilgen Die Dissertation wurde am 19.09.2017 bei der Technischen Universität München eingereicht und durch die Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften am 15.12.2017 angenommen. Contents List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... IV List of Figures...................................................................................................................... V List of Abbreviations .......................................................................................................... VI 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Motivation ................................................................................................................ 1 1.2 Positioning of the dissertation within compensation research .................................. 2 1.3 Research gap and research questions ................................................................... -
The Regulatory Framework of Executive Remuneration: Contributions from Shareholder Activism and Board Accountability Jingchen Zhao
Hastings Business Law Journal Volume 15 Article 2 Number 2 Summer 2019 Summer 2019 The Regulatory Framework of Executive Remuneration: Contributions from Shareholder Activism and Board Accountability Jingchen Zhao Zhihui Li Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/ hastings_business_law_journal Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons Recommended Citation Jingchen Zhao and Zhihui Li, The Regulatory Framework of Executive Remuneration: Contributions from Shareholder Activism and Board Accountability, 15 Hastings Bus. L.J. 203 (2019). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_business_law_journal/vol15/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Business Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1 - EXECRENUMERATIONMACROFINAL SL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2019 10:56 AM The Regulatory Framework of Executive Remuneration: Contributions from Shareholder Activism and Board Accountability Professor Jingchen Zhao and Dr. Zhihui Li INTRODUCTION The economist Roger Bootle once argued that “the level of executive pay is a total and complete scandal. There is a real crisis of capitalism about all this. Where people are paying themselves tens of millions of pounds, it adds up to a form of expropriation.”1 The High Pay Commission in the UK emphasized that excessively high pay is “a -
Pursuing Long-Term Value for Our Clients
Pursuing long-term value for our clients BlackRock Investment Stewardship A look into the 2020-2021 proxy voting year Executive Contents summary 03 By the Voting outcomes numbers Board quality and effectiveness Incentives aligned with value creation 18 Climate and natural capital Strategy, purpose, and financial resilience Company impacts on people Appendix 71 21 This report covers BlackRock Investment Stewardship’s (BIS) stewardship activities — focusing on proxy voting — covering the period from July 1, 2020 to June 30, 2021, representing the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s 12-month reporting period for U.S. mutual funds, including iShares. Throughout the report we commonly refer to this reporting period as “the 2020-21 proxy year.” While we believe the information in this report is accurate as of June 30, 2021, it is subject to change without notice for a variety of reasons. As a result, subsequent reports and publications distributed may therefore include additional information, updates and modifications, as appropriate. The information herein must not be relied upon as a forecast, research, or investment advice. BlackRock is not making any recommendation or soliciting any action based upon this information and nothing in this document should be construed as constituting an offer to sell, or a solicitation of any offer to buy, securities in any jurisdiction to any person. References to individual companies are for illustrative purposes only. BlackRock Investment Stewardship 2 SUMMARY NUMBERS OUTCOMES APPENDIX Executive summary BlackRock Investment Stewardship Our Investment Stewardship (BIS) advocates for sound corporate toolkit governance and sustainable business Engaging with companies models that can help drive the long- How we build our term financial returns that enable our understanding of a clients to meet their investing goals. -
PERSONNEL and COMPENSATION COMMITTEE CHARTER As of April 28, 2021
CITIGROUP INC. PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE CHARTER As of April 28, 2021 Mission The Personnel and Compensation Committee (the “Committee”) of the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Citigroup Inc. (the “Company”) has been delegated broad authority to oversee compensation of employees of the Company and its subsidiaries and affiliates (“Citi”). The Committee will regularly review Citi’s management resources and the performance of senior management. The Committee is responsible for determining the compensation for the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and approving the compensation of other executive officers of the Company and members of Citi’s Executive Management Team. The Committee is also responsible for approving the incentive compensation structure for other members of senior management and certain highly compensated employees (including discretionary incentive awards to covered employees as defined in applicable bank regulatory guidance), in accordance with guidelines established by the Committee from time to time. The Committee also has broad oversight over compliance with bank regulatory guidance governing Citi’s incentive compensation. Membership The Committee shall consist of at least three members of the Board, each of whom shall (a) meet the independence requirements of the New York Stock Exchange corporate governance rules and all other applicable laws, rules, regulations and guidance governing director independence, as determined by the Board; (b) qualify as “non-employee directors” as defined under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act; and (c) qualify as “outside directors” under Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code. A majority of the members of the Committee shall constitute a quorum. Members of the Committee and the Committee Chair shall be appointed by and may be removed by the Board on the recommendation of the Nomination, Governance and Public Affairs Committee. -
The Female FTSE Board Report 2014 Crossing the Finish Line
The Female FTSE Board Report 2014 Crossing the Finish Line Professor Susan Vinnicombe OBE, Dr Elena Doldor, Caroline Turner CRANFIELD INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR WOMEN LEADERS The Female FTSE Board Report 2014 Supporting Sponsors: Foreword FEMALE FTSE BOARD REPORT 2014 It has been exactly 3 years since Lord Davies challenged the UK’s top performing companies to recognise the benefits of gender equality in the boardroom and to take action to increase the number of women on British boards. Since then we have been encouraged to see chairmen and their businesses take ownership of this agenda. The figures speak for themselves. FTSE 100 companies have increased the number of women on their board from 12.5% in 2011 to 20.7% today, with the FTSE 250 similarly improving from 7.8% to 15.6%. We have also seen considerable efforts and a significant change of mindset from other key players such as investors, executive search firms and business leaders – all working together to bring about real change. We are also pleased to see that within the FTSE 100, 98% of boards now include women. Glencore Xstrata and Antofagasta – are now the outliers. This is a considerable turnaround from where 1 in 5 boards were all male in 2011. The FTSE 250 also continues in the same vein with around 50 all male boards today, down by well over half on 3 years ago. In addition, this report highlights the many strong women candidates capable of filling board positions. Cranfield have identified 100 of their top Women to Watch, which is included here. -
Executive Pay in the FTSE 100: Is Everyone Getting a Fair Slice of the Cake? London: Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, P19
in association with RESEARCH REPORT | August 2020 FTSE 100 CEO pay in 2019 and during the pandemic The CIPD is the professional body for HR and people development. The registered charity champions better work and working lives and has been setting the benchmark for excellence in people and organisation development for more than 100 years. It has more than 150,000 members across the world, provides thought leadership through independent research on the world of work, and offers professional training and accreditation for those working in HR and learning and development. The High Pay Centre is an independent, non-partisan think tank focused on the causes and consequences of economic inequality, with a particular interest in top pay. It runs a programme of research, events and policy analysis involving business, trade unions, investors and civil society focused on achieving an approach to pay practices that enjoys the confidence of all stakeholders. FTSE 100 CEO pay in 2019 and during the pandemic Research report FTSE 100 CEO pay in 2019 and during the pandemic Contents Foreword 2 Our recommendations 3 Key findings 3 What happened to CEO pay during COVID-19? 7 What happened to CEO pay in 2019? 8 What makes up CEO pay packages? 12 Ethnic diversity 15 Conclusion 16 Our methodology 17 Appendix 19 Notes 22 Acknowledgements This report was written by Louisa Shand, Governance and Risk Adviser, CIPD, and Rachel Kay and Luke Hildyard from the High Pay Centre. We would like to thank the CIPD team who contributed to this research – Charles Cotton, Ben Willmott and Edward Houghton. -
Aviation Week & Space Technology
UK-Japan Should the USAF Quebec’s Drive Fighter Proposal Lead in Space? To Digital $14.95 APRIL 3-16, 2017 RICH MEDIA A320neo EXCLUSIVE Report Card Digital Edition Copyright Notice The content contained in this digital edition (“Digital Material”), as well as its selection and arrangement, is owned by Penton. and its affiliated companies, licensors, and suppliers, and is protected by their respective copyright, trademark and other proprietary rights. Upon payment of the subscription price, if applicable, you are hereby authorized to view, download, copy, and print Digital Material solely for your own personal, non-commercial use, provided that by doing any of the foregoing, you acknowledge that (i) you do not and will not acquire any ownership rights of any kind in the Digital Material or any portion thereof, (ii) you must preserve all copyright and other proprietary notices included in any downloaded Digital Material, and (iii) you must comply in all respects with the use restrictions set forth below and in the Penton Privacy Policy and the Penton Terms of Use (the “Use Restrictions”), each of which is hereby incorporated by reference. Any use not in accordance with, and any failure to comply fully with, the Use Restrictions is expressly prohibited by law, and may result in severe civil and criminal penalties. Violators will be prosecuted to the maximum possible extent. You may not modify, publish, license, transmit (including by way of email, facsimile or other electronic means), transfer, sell, reproduce (including by copying or posting on any network computer), create derivative works from, display, store, or in any way exploit, broadcast, disseminate or distribute, in any format or media of any kind, any of the Digital Material, in whole or in part, without the express prior written consent of Penton. -
Say on Pay: Do Shareholders Care?
ISSN 0956-8549-751 Say on Pay: do shareholders care? By Carsten Gerner-Beuerle* and Tom Kirchmaier DISCUSSION PAPER NO 751 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES March 2016 1 Say On Pay: Do Shareholders Care? Carsten Gerner-Beuerle* and Tom Kirchmaier† First draft: 22 January 2016 This draft: 17 March 2016 Abstract This paper examines the impact of enhanced executive remuneration disclosure rules under UK regulations introduced in 2013 on the voting pattern of shareholders. Based on a hand-collected dataset on the pay information disclosed by FTSE 100 companies, we establish that shareholders guide their vote by top line salary, and appear to disregard the remaining substantial body of information provided to them. Analyzing the unique British feature of two votes, one forward looking and one backward looking, we establish that shareholders differentiate between the two dimensions in about 23% of the cases. In contrast to the rationale of the legislation that introduced the two votes, however, differentiating voting behavior is not driven by characteristics of the executive’s remuneration policy, but mainly by exceptionally positive future performance expectations. JEL classifications: G34, G38, K22 Keywords: executive remuneration, say-on-pay, disclosure regulation, shareholder voting * Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. E: [email protected]. † Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics and Political Science. E: [email protected]. 2 1. Introduction In spite of numerous policy initiatives to reform executive remuneration, the compensation packages received by directors of listed companies continue to attract attention and controversy in the UK and abroad (see e.g. -
ITV Diversity Acceleration Plan
DIVERSITY ACCELERATION PLAN REPORT 2021 WELCOME CAROLYN MCCALL, CEO ITV Welcome to our report. A year ago, we committed to increasing investment, including appointing a new Diversity & Inclusion team, in order to accelerate the speed of change and increase representation on-screen, in our production teams and within our own workforce. Attracting the best talent from a wide range of backgrounds, creating an inclusive culture where all colleagues can flourish, and making programmes that appeal to wide and diverse audiences are all hugely important priorities to our business. I feel incredibly proud to work for ITV and this has been an extraordinary year. I would like to acknowledge the passion and commitment ITV colleagues have displayed to drive this agenda forward and particularly the hard work of and the important role that our colleague Network Groups have played. Lockdown made things harder to deliver on many fronts including some elements of this plan and there are further steps to reach all our targets. There is no doubting our commitment – we are also committed to measuring our progress and reporting publicly each year because we know that we will rightly be judged by actions rather than words. 2 INTRODUCTION ADE RAWCLIFFE, GROUP DIRECTOR DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION, ITV As a senior leader at ITV I know how essential it is for us to use our position in society to shape Britain’s culture whilst reflecting who we are; it’s a position of privilege and responsibility. ITV has a duty to remain relevant, successful and profitable. As custodians of an organisation which millions of British people have a close relationship and affinity with, we understand the importance of ensuring that ITV consistently lives up to their expectations. -
Is Say on Pay an Effective Governance Tool? Analysis and Recommendations
Is Say on Pay An Effective Governance Tool? Analysis and Recommendations Report submitted to the Institute for the Governance of Public and Private Organizations Michel Magnan, Ph.D., FCA Claudine Mangen, Ph.D. PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY : PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR MENTION WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE AUTHORS Is Say on Pay an Effective Governance Tool? Executive Summary This report examines whether Say on Pay is a useful tool to ensure that executive compensation plans are designed in a way that is consistent with the firm’s best interests. It addresses five related questions: 1) What is Say on Pay? 2) What does Say on Pay imply about governance? 3) What means are available to provide shareholders with Say on Pay? 4) What is the impact (the impact on whom or what?) of providing shareholders with Say on Pay? 5) Should Canada consider Say on Pay? What is Say on Pay? Say on Pay is a commonly used expression to reflect the concept that shareholders have an opportunity once a year to hold a vote on the pay of a firm’s executives. The vote can either be non-binding (Australia, U.K., Canada and the U.S.) or binding to directors (Netherlands, Sweden). What does Say on Pay imply about governance? Say on Pay implicitly implies that the underlying governance, most notably the board of directors, is ineffective. Say on Pay may then be useful if one assumes that shareholders are more adept than the board of directors in dealing with executive pay issues, and have less conflict of interests then the directors in doing so.