Objectivity in Science Co-Authors the Opportunity to Respond to Each Criticism That Their Papers Drew

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Objectivity in Science Co-Authors the Opportunity to Respond to Each Criticism That Their Papers Drew 5_ss ____________ CQRRESPQNOENCE---_____:_::NA_:_:_T-=-=uR=E_:_vo:::..::L::_::.3.::.:_31-=-ls..:...:.FE=B.::..:..::Ru:.:..:A.:.:..:RY~l9=ss Research Letters that gave Frank and his Objectivity in science co-authors the opportunity to respond to each criticism that their papers drew. I am SIR-Despite some unfortunate, inaccur­ For it is studies in this area that throw into pleased to outline the editorial policy that ate and even outrageous remarks about sharp relief yet another distinction, governed the publication of the original philosophers of sciences the community of namely that between actual and public papers by Frank et al. and of the ensuing science is greatly indebted to Theocharis motivations. Over the past 20 years or so, comments and replies. and Psimopoulos (Nature 329, 595; an immense amount of painstaking Geophysical Research Letters seeks to 1987). They have raised questions that call scholarship has been devoted to private publish papers that describe interesting, for urgent and honest answers. Not least, papers, diaries and other manuscript forefront science. These papers occasion­ they have brought into the open the prob­ sources, and has produced overwhelming ally challenge conventional wisdom and lems of objectivity and truth in science evidence that the practice of science is thereby engender controversy. Written at and, perhaps, reminded us of what we are very culturally dependent. Yet even that the turbulent interface between ignorance in danger of losing. But some cautionary overlooks a further distinction which is and knowledge, such papers are fre­ notes need to be sounded. probably more important than any of the quently wrong. However, not all contro­ In suggesting that the practice of science others. It is the difference between versial ideas are wrong. The importance today is affected (adversely) by the pre­ approaches to science, which may be for scientific progress of the occasional vailing whims and fashions of 'philosophy', conditioned by our culture, and the new idea that proves correct is out of all are they not in mortal danger of selling the empirical results determined by nature. proportion to the number of such ideas. pass to their enemies? Is this not precisely Whether the buzz-words 'objectivity', Because it is not possible to tell in advance the point of the cultural relativists 'truth' or 'value-transcendence' are which new idea is correct, it is best to get whom they oppose? According to these actually used or not, common observation them into the open literature where they "betrayers of the truth", science is always suggests that few scientists doubt that can be discussed, attacked, tested or conditioned by cultural values and it there is something 'out there' to be ex­ supported as the will of the community cannot be said to deal with unchanging amined, whatever their own circumstances and the soundness ofthe idea dictate. This objective realities. The present difficulties may be. That pragmatic belief today is is the way science has advanced, and no vexing the Royal Society, for instance, are successor to a deeply held Christian con­ better way has been demonstrated. a standing demonstration of the critical viction about the created world that Exposure of conflict is a proper function dependence of science on socially accept­ attended the rise of modern science. for a letters journal that publishes new and able values. Yet this is to fudge the distinc­ Donald MacKay has argued that "the interesting research results. Comments tion between public (including govern­ ideal of objectivity ... is the main spring and replies are an important part of ment) attitudes to science on the one hand behind the success of science. and finds its Geophysical Research Letters. They pro­ and the attitudes of the scientists on the status reinforced by that success"'. Such a vide a forum for discussion and testing of other. It by no means follows that the one view is entirely compatible with historical new ideas. Rather than restricting such is reproduced in the other. The opposite research about the ways in which scientists debate to private exchanges between may well be true. formulate programmes, examine and authors and referees, the publication of If that is a distinction between the piper select data and interpret their results. It is comments and replies allows the broad and he who calls the tune, there is another not that we have to choose one or the scientific community to hear both sides of to be drawn between music-maker and other: culturally conditioned methodol­ an issue and form an independent critic. Few would deny the latter the right ogy or an objective world outside. We judgment. to exist, but it is to be hoped he or she is need both. Only then can we appreciate Finally, I would claim that the publica­ not tone-deaf. When criticism of science is the essential humanness of science, but tion by Nature of the paper by Donahue et concerned, however, tone-deafness (or its only then can we find any hope of escape al. is, in itself, a vindication of the original equivalent) is all too prevalent. The public from the miasmic swamps of sociological decision to publish the papers of Frank et understanding of science is often formed relativism from which the image of science al. Their papers and the ensuing debate by those with no experience of doing so urgently needs to be rescued. To set the will, no doubt, inspire other useful work. science, and great harm is done by their record straight is a noble agenda for his­ And, although Feldman is perhaps guileless and simplistic pronouncements. tory of science for the rest of this century. annoyed by the protestations in the replies A further distinction may further clarify CoLIN A. RussELL of Frank et al. that their critics have not the issues. It is that between scientific Department of History of Science shown conclusively that the claimed method and scientific intention. One reason and Technology, comets do not exist (in the sense that why scientists are so embarrassingly coy The Open University, Walton Hall, claims are made that the non-existence of about their methods is that these vary Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, UK the Loch Ness monster has not been con­ widely over the whole field of science, as l. MacKay, D. Objective Knowledge (ed. Helm, P.) 43-57 clusively proved), it seems clear from his witness the different approaches to (say) (Inter-Varsity, Leicester, 19H7). statements that Feldman himself has not evolutionary theory and antibiotic • This correspondence is now closed. - been persuaded. I don't believe many therapy. (Another reason is simply that Editor. Nature. others have been either. the methods have become second nature A. J. DESSLER and are rarely defined in words.) But this (Editor) is not to imply a diversity of intention, for Editorial policy Geophysical Research Letters, there always is a determination to wrest SIR-In his article on evidence for an Department of Space Physics and secrets from nature, whether or not this influx of small comets into the Solar Astronomy, Rice University, leads to 'practical' applications. Indeed, it System, Paul Feldman (Nature 330, 518; Houston, Texas 77251-1892, USA could be argued that it is this very unifor­ 1987) also comments on the editorial I. Frank, L.A. et at. Geophys. Res. Lett. !3. 303-306 (1986): mity of intention that binds the scientific policy of Geophysical Research Letters. Geophys. Res. Lett. 13.307-310 (1986). community together. He asks whether the papers of Frank et 2. Donahue, T.M. eta/. Nature330.548-550(1987). It is remarkable that Theocharis and al. ', which inspired the Nature article' Psimopoulos make little mention of the whose findings Feldman discusses, should Letters submitted for Correspondence history of science (apart from a passing have been published at all. He also dis­ should be typed. double-spaced, on one reference to an unspecified golden age). agrees with the policy of Geophysical side of the paper only. 0 © 1988 Nature Publishing Group.
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