DOCSLIB.ORG

No. 42 Antisubmarine Tactics October 1918

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
No. 42 Antisubmarine Tactics October 1918 MAY 4 ].Sfl7 0. N. I. Publication No. 42 Most Confidential ANTISUBMARINE / TACTICS OCTOBER, 1918 WASIDNGTON GOVERNMENT PRJNTJNG OFFICE 1918 - - OF,CLASSIFIED ~ A uthority f _Jz_.1.P_Ej ll [ ~ ·-- -~ • PLANNING SECTION MEMORANDUl\1. SUBJECT: ANTISUBMARINE TACTICS. GENERAL SITUATION. War us at present (July, HH 8) . I ASSUME. -1 (1 ) That the final answer to the ,mhmnrine will he tactical. MOST CONFIDENTIAL (2) A long war. · REQUIRED. OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, Estimate of the situation and decisions as to tactical weapons and WasJiington, October 1, 1918. tactical methods that should be employed in combating submarines. • By direction of the Office of Na.val Operatio~ this dis_cussion of . MISSION. "Anti-Submarine Tactics" is published for the mfor~at1on of the To determine the best tactical weapons and tactical methods for United States Na.val Service. ; combating enemy submarines. This pamphlet is most confidential and is for the use of commis- ENEMY FORCES. sioned officers only. ROGER WELLES, We need to consider the following concerning enemy submarines : Rear Admiral, U. S . Navy, (1) Tacti cal chamcte1-istics. Director of Naval Intelligence. (a) Ability to rest on the bottom for 72 hours. (b) Ability to remain submerged under way- 60 hours at 1 to 2 knots. 36 hours at 3 knots. 12 hours n.t 5 knots, 3 hours at 7 knots.' l½ hours at 11 knots. (c) Increasing ability to run n early silent wh en submerged. (d) Surface speed, 10 to 16 knots. (e) Ability to submerge in 20 to 90 seconds. (f) Wben submerged can hear pursuing vessels. (g) With upper encl of periscope showing, hull is too deep for torpedo running ut 25 feet, the maximum depth setting. · (h) Torpedo range is limited to · 3,000 yards. 'fhe most farnrable range is abon t 300 yards. 1 Sterrett, 7 hours at 7 knots. ~3027-18-1 (1) ---EL._--====:::;;;;,;_~~~;;._..-•P-------- ~,:;:I:.; atll;.:A=Y~ 4r;;aa;al~•'l,•l -----l!IIMiiiiiii!iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!iiiiiil!!ll!ll!!!!!!!!!!!!!!ll!I!!!!_.....,......~~ ~ .. PLANNING SECTION MEMORANDUM. SUBJECT: ANTISUBMARINE TACTICS. GENERAL SITUATION. War as at present (July, 1918). ASSUME. (1) That the final answer to the suhmnrine will be tactical. ~)A loogwM. • MOST CONFIDENTIAL REQUIRED. OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, E stimate of the situation and decisions us to tactical weapons and WasJiington, Octobe·r 1, 1 ~ 18• tactical methods that should be employerl in combating submarines. By direction of the Office of Na.val Operations· t his d"1 scuss10n of . MISSION. th "Anti-Submarine Tactics" is published for the infor~a.tion of e To determine the best tacticnl weapons and tactical methods for United States Naval Service. combating enemy submarines. This pamphlet is most confidential and is for the use of coIDJDJS- ENEMY FORCES. sioned officers only. - WELLES ROGER , We need to consider the following concerning enemy submarines : Rear .Admiral, U.S. Navy, (1) Tactical chcwacteristics. Director of Naval Intelligence. (a) Ability to r est on the bottom for 72 hours. (b) Ability to remain submerged under way- 60 hours at 1 to 2 knots. 36 hours at 3 knots. 12 homs at 5 knots, 3 hours at 7 knots.' 1½ hours at 11 knots. (c) Increasing ability to run nearly silent when submerged. (d) Surface speed, 10 to 16 lmots. (e) Ability to submerge in 20 to 90 seconds. (f) W11en submerged can bear pursuing vessels. (g) With upper end of periscope showing, bull is too deep for torpedo running ut 25 feet, the maximum depth setting. · (h) Torpedo range is limited to · 3,000 y ards. The most fayorable range is ab011t 300 yards. t Sterrett, 7 hours at 7 knots. 83627-18-1 (1) --0EcLAss1Frnn ~ Au tl10rity C. D-jO ~c>/ I '----- -- ~ - L 2 3 (2) Operating a1·eas. • Torpedo Firing from Submarines. (a) English Channel and Irish Sea: Submarines can bot­ "Aasume that firing at a ranire of over 3,000 meters (3,280 yards) is useless, and there ­ tom. fore better not attempted for single boats." (b) West coast of France an<l the Atlantic. Submarines "The rule for submarines remains as before: Proceed unobserved to a position from can not bottom. which a high-speed shot can be fired and a hit certainly obtained." (c) . North Sea. Can bottom in places, but not on the north­ I. MOST FAVORABLE SIDE FOR ATTACK. about route. (d) Mediterranean Sea. Submarines can not bottom. "When choice is possible, the sunny side should be chosen, particularly when the sun is not too high, and provided the shot can be fired more or less from the direction (e) U. S. Atlantic coast. Submarines can bottom, but as of the glare of the sun." a rule U-boats never bottom-only the smaller boats "In a strong breeze the weather side is preferable." bottom. Converging points are still favorite hunting grotmds . Good II. STRENGTH OF WIND AND SEA. weather permits off-shore work. Bad weather and long nights bring "Do not fire in a calm with a perfectly flat sea (except from the direction of the the submarines into narrow sheltered wa ters. Large submarines glare of the sun or at. a slow car.~o steamer)." prefer deep water and waters not frequented by patrol craft. vYr "Forre of wind 3-4, and sea 2- 3, preoent the most favorable conditions for attack." may expect operating areas to be extended in order to cr eate corre­ "If the sea is 5-G, when it may be just possible to fire, fire at right angles to the direction of the sea. '1 sponding extension of the escort system and pre,·ent the forrration "Do not attack in a heavy sea and a long Atlantic swell." of hunting units. The subrrarine does not like to l::e hunted. It much prefers to determine for itself the time when all hands must III. USE OF P E RISCOPE. be on the alert. "Periscope·showing 1.5 t o 2 meters can not be seen more than 4,000 meters, pro­ (3) Numbers. vided a suitable speed is maintained and the favorable side for attack chosen." "With biqoculars it has not been possible to distinguish the periscope even at German submarine situation, June 1, 1918 . 2,000 meters." "An unseen attack (periscope used sparingly) implies keeping the periscope low Sunk . and showing it frequently but for quite short periods (a few inches of periscope only, Not T otal in T otal Total ro- so that the object irlass is almost awash)." Total yet act ual School actively r:nn ining Class. built. l>"ot operat- com- s ubs. opernt- 1n co,n- "You must not for any Jeno-th of time omit to take a look around." Idcnti- iden ti- Total. lng. mis- i ng. 1n fas.ion. "I "' fled. fled. sion. ,ower the periscope completely and go to a depth of 18 meters (59 feet ) when high 6_peed (full speed or utmost speed ) is necessary to attain the position for .fi ring." - - -- --- ---- -- "Never show two periscopes at the same time." -Cruiser ..........•.. .... 19 1 . ....... 1 12 0 ·-····-· 6 1S u ....................... · 121 50 4 60 r, Gl 11 .J5 61 " Come to the surface with periscope lowered." U B .................... 122 37 5 ~2 6 80 8 60 80 "Handling of periscope immediately after firing: UC ........ .... .... _. ... 79 51 2 53 ...... 26 3 23 26 " (a) Lower the periscope and dive to the greatest possible depth (45 meters) T otal. ........... 3H 145 11 150 23 163 22 I 140 185 (148 feet); this applies particularly to small boats with only one periscope. "A better method: "(b) Observe the shot and the hit; also whether a second shot is necessary and On April 20, 1918, enemy submarines were dis tributed as follows: possible. · German. Austrian . " For this purpose, after firing show the periscope ru, sparingly a.s possible Adriatic __ _____ ___ ____ ___ _ in every way; that is, show very little of it, and, as t he boat invariably Home ports __ _____ _ . _ __ __ 77 31 rises somewhat, always fi rst lower the periscope a little; then raise it Flanders_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ __ __ __ 24 again according to your depth. Adriatic_ _ __ __ __ __ _ _ __ __ __ 43 "After observing the hit and the counter mea.sures adopted, then (and Constantinople. ______ ___ __ 1 21 not till then) proceed for about 15 minutes at t he greatest possible depth. Lower the periscope completely and preserve silence in the boat." Total __________ ____ 165 I V. S PEED WHEN ATTACKING. (4) Submarine tactics. "The speed of the submarine is a vital factor in an ' unseen' attack. 1 - The following are extracts from the German Submarine Manual: "l. To close the enemy, first proceed at high speed until the bearing does not change. When actually attac1.-i11g, endeavor to limit yourself. to the lowest speed t Includes 14 capt ured Russions. at which the boat keeps her depth well. ---DECL.~S.JFIEn ~i Authority C . () .LP_ S_o I I ------~~ I ------- 4 5 "2. Before using your periscope, always reduce speed. night to recharging batteries. Recharging may be done while pro- "3. If the enemy is zigzagging, it is advisable uot to proceed a t too low a speed_." ceeding on the surface at moderate speed: · 5. General intentions of enemy. I' . l'IRl:-10 RANGE . (a) To continue submarine wa1iare to the end. Its effect is "The most favorable firing range is' 200 to 300 meters (219 to 328 yards)." still of the first importance. To give up submarine "It is advisable, in addition, after firing to turn away iu the direction of the enemy's war on commerce would be a blow to enemy prestige.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • No. 45 Depth-Charge Problems October 1918
    - MAY 4 19?.7 O. N. I. Publication No. 45 Most Confidential! • . • . NA VY DEPARTM.ENT OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE OCTOBER, 1918 ) I - • WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1918 DF.f'L ~SI FiRe ~ A utll (lrll: C D lo s·t, I i __ _ _,, ____ I ----- __ ___!_ -~ DEPTH-CHARGE PROBLEMS. Lieu tenant Commander H. H . F ROST, United States Nai:y . In 0. N . I. Publicittion No. 44, " Gcrm1tn Submarine Attacks" i t wa!'; seen that Germans use four stnnd nrd torpedo shots: 1. D irect bow shot. 2. D irect s tern shot. :3_ 90° angled bow shot on parallel courses. 4. 90° angled s tern shot on opposite cow·scs. As in other pnrts of the subject of naval tactics it is neither possible nor desira.ble to lay down Jrnrd and fas t rules for the depth-ch a1-gc attack. A s tudy of a gren.t numher of actual s itua tions will r esult in th e deduction of several general principles regarding th e attack. Once these principles a.re nrnster ecl a dcpth-cha.r O'e doctrine can be_l aid _down. This c~n b_e followed in a m ajority of the :i c tua.l situations wh ich m ay b e cx;ected . I n some s1tua t1ons, how~ver, 1t will ~10t apply and th en the ('Ommn.nding o fliccr must fall h nck u pon his g encr n.l knowledge of th e suhJect and dcc1clc on the spot as to the b est m 0nsurcs to tn kc.
    [Show full text]
  • Scenes from Aboard the Frigate HMCS Dunver, 1943-1945
    Canadian Military History Volume 10 Issue 2 Article 6 2001 Through the Camera’s Lens: Scenes from Aboard the Frigate HMCS Dunver, 1943-1945 Cliff Quince Serge Durflinger University of Ottawa, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Quince, Cliff and Durflinger, Serge "Through the Camera’s Lens: Scenes from Aboard the Frigate HMCS Dunver, 1943-1945." Canadian Military History 10, 2 (2001) This Canadian War Museum is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Quince and Durflinger: Scenes from Aboard the HMCS <em>Dunver</em> Cliff Quince and Serge Durflinger he Battle of the Atlantic was the the ship's unofficial photographer until Tlongest and most important February 1945 at which time the navy maritime campaign of the Second World granted him a formal photographer's War. Germany's large and powerful pass. This pass did not make him an submarine fleet menaced the merchant official RCN photographer, since he vessels carrying the essential supplies maintained all his shipboard duties; it upon which depended the survival of merely enabled him to take photos as Great Britain and, ultimately, the he saw fit. liberation of Western Europe. The campaign was also one of the most vicious and Born in Montreal in 1925, Cliff came by his unforgiving of the war, where little quarter was knack for photography honestly.
    [Show full text]
  • WRECK DIVING™ ...Uncover the Past Magazine
    WRECK DIVING™ ...uncover the past Magazine Graf Zeppelin • La Galga • Mystery Ship • San Francisco Maru Scapa Flow • Treasure Hunting Part I • U-869 Part III • Ville de Dieppe WRECK DIVING MAGAZINE The Fate of the U-869 Reexamined Part III SanSan FranciscoFrancisco MaruMaru:: TheThe MillionMillion DollarDollar WreckWreck ofof TRUKTRUK LAGOONLAGOON Issue 19 A Quarterly Publication U-869 In In our previousour articles, we described the discovery and the long road to the identification ofU-869 off the The Fate Of New Jersey coast. We also examined the revised histories issued by the US Coast Guard Historical Center and the US Naval Historical Center, both of which claimed The U-869 the sinking was a result of a depth charge attack by two US Navy vessels in 1945. The conclusion we reached was that the attack by the destroyers was most likely Reexamined, Part on the already-wrecked U-869. If our conclusion is correct, then how did the U-869 come to be on the III bottom of the Atlantic? The Loss of the German Submarine Early Theories The most effective and successful branch of the German By John Chatterton, Richie Kohler, and John Yurga Navy in World War II was the U-boat arm. Hitler feared he would lose in a direct confrontation with the Royal Navy, so the German surface fleet largely sat idle at anchor. Meanwhile, the U-boats and their all- volunteer crews were out at sea, hunting down enemy vessels. They sank the merchant vessels delivering the Allies’ much-needed materials of war, and even were able to achieve some success against much larger enemy warships.
    [Show full text]
  • The Weird Nukes of Yesteryear
    The Cold War produced some oddball weapons. Here are three of them. The “Davy Crockett,” shown here mounted on a tripod at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, was the smallest nuclear warhead ever developed by the US. The Weird Nukes DOD photo end of a series of thermonuclear bombs initiated in 1950. This followed the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb of Yesteryear in 1949, several years before Western By Norman Polmar and Robert S. Norris intelligence agencies expected such an event. y the time the Cold War reached some concern about whether they could It was the era of “bigger is better.” its height in the late 1960s, the be carried in aircraft, due to size. The The zenith of “big bombs” would be American nuclear arsenal had “Little Boy” dropped on Hiroshima seen on Oct. 30, 1961, when the Soviet grown to more than 31,000 tipped the scales at 9,700 pounds, and Union detonated (at Novaya Zemlya in Bweapons. The Army, Navy, Air Force, the “Fat Man” dropped on Nagasaki the Arctic) a thermonuclear bomb that and even the Marine Corps worked weighed 10,300 pounds. The immediate produced an explosion equivalent to to acquire weapons for the “nuclear follow-on bombs were about the same 58 megatons—the largest man-made battlefield,” whether in the air, on the size or smaller. explosion ever achieved. Soviet Premier ground, on water, or underwater. However, the development of ther- Nikita Khrushchev would later write Three of the more unusual—and in monuclear or hydrogen bombs led to in his memoirs: “It was colossal, just the end impractical—of these weapons much larger weapons, with the largest incredible! Our experts later explained were the enormous Mk 17 hydrogen US nuclear weapon being the Mk 17 to me that if you took into account the bomb, the Navy’s drone anti-submarine hydrogen bomb.
    [Show full text]
  • ASROC with Systems
    Naval Nuclear Weapons Chapter Eight Naval Nuclear Weapons The current program to modernize and expand U.S. deployed within the Navy (see Table 8.1) include anti- Naval forces includes a wide variety of nuclear weapons submarine warfare rockets (both surface (ASROC with systems. The build-up, according to the Department of W44) and subsurface launched (SUBROC with W55)), Defense, seeks "increased and more diversified offensive anti-air missiles (TERRIER with W45), and bombs and striking power.. increased attention to air defense . depth charges (B43, B57, and B61) used by a variety of [and] improvements in anti-submarine warfare."' The aircraft and helicopters, both carrier and land based (see plan is to build-up to a "600-ship Navy" concentrating Chapters Four and Se~en).~ on "deployable battle forces." Numerous new ships will The various nuclear weapons systems that are under be built, centered around aircraft carrier battle groups, development or are being considered for tactical naval surface groups, and attack submarines. New, more capa- nuclear warfare include: ble anti-air warfare ships, such as the TICONDEROGA (CG-47) class cruiser and BURKE (DDG-51) class  A new surface-to-air missile nuclear war- destroyers, will be deployed. New nuclear weapons and head (W81) for the STANDARD-2 missile, launching systems, as well as nuclear capable aircraft soon to enter production, carrier based forces, form a major part of the program. A long-range, land-attack nuclear armed As of March 1983, the nuclear armed ships of the U.S. Sea-Launched
    [Show full text]
  • J Class Fleet Destroyer
    J CLASS FLEET DESTROYER FEATURE ARTICLE written by James Davies For KEY INFORMATION Country of Origin: Great Britain. Manufacturers: Hawthorn Leslie, John Brown, Denny, Fairfield, Swan Hunter, White, Yarrow Major Variants: J class, K class, N class, Q class, R class (new), S class (new), T class, U class, V class (new), W class (new), Z class, CA class, CH class, CO class, CR class, Weapon class Role: Fleet protection, reconnaissance, convoy escort Operated by: Royal Navy (Variants also Polish Navy, Royal Australian Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Netherlands Navy, Royal Norwegian Navy) First Laid Down: 26th August 1937 Last Completed: 12th September 1939 Units: HMS Jervis, HMS Jersey, HMS Jaguar, HMS Juno, HMS Jupiter, HMS Janus, HMS Jackal, HMS Javelin Released by ww2ships.com BRITISH DESTROYERS www.WW2Ships.com FEATURE ARTICLE J Class Fleet Destroyer © James Davies Contents CONTENTS J Class Fleet Destroyer............................................................................................................1 Key Information.......................................................................................................................1 Contents.....................................................................................................................................2 Introduction...............................................................................................................................3 Development.............................................................................................................................4
    [Show full text]
  • USSR General Staff Academy Lesson: Current Status and Forms
    Withheld under statutory authority of the C0 1197694 TOP SECRET Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g) W.UNING /'IOTICl-rl'il....,,",..;E SOUIICES oa Mf'THOOS JNVOlVfO HOT IIEUASAW TO foOUIGH N.UIONALSj I THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED 24 J une 1988 ·· MEMO RANDUM FOR:. The Director of Central Intelligence S\reJECT USSR GENERAL STAFF ACA DEMY -LESSON: Current St~tus ?Od Forms of Operationa l -S t rategic Employment of the ~avy in Ocean and Sea Theaters of Military Operations 1. The enclosed Intell i gence Information Special Report i s part of a series now in preparation, classified fOP seeRtT, prepared in 1985 f or use in the .----------'V-=o;.ro.shilov General Staff Academy. 25Xl, E.0.13526 .this d ocumen t 1,-b-e"""'h,...a-n"""'d,-:,1-e..,.d_o_n_a_s,...r_,i,...c.,..t-ne-e"""'d"""-7t-o--=k-n_o_ w--:-ba-s""'"'i,_s_w..,..it'"'h-,i,...n- r -:-ec-1,--.p....,l_e_n.,-~t agen c _i es • ;Ij~"~ Deputy Director for Operations ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CON1ROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT Page 1 of 13 Pages Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g) DECLASSI FIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURJTY C LASSIFJCATION APPEALS PANEL, E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3) ISCA P APP EAL NO. 2012-026, document no. 12 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: May 14, 2015 TOP SECRET C01197694. TOF SECRET SEeli!T WAINIHG NOTIQ-JNla.uGENa SOURCU 01 MEIHOOS INVOC.VlD NOT IBU.SAII.IlO FO•IIGN NATIONALSA I Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Ageqcy Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g) Distribution: .The Director of Central Intelligence The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence Department of .the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence U.
    [Show full text]
  • Mitt77001.Pdf
    IMPACT OF OIL SP ILLAGE F ROM WORLD WAR I I TANKER S INK I NGS by Brad Campbell Ed Kern Dean Horn Department of Ocean Engineering Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts 023.39 Report. No. MITSG 77-4 Index No. 77-304-Nnt Administrative Statement The rash of oil tanker mishaps in or near U.S. waters during December 1976 and January 1977 gives this report special significance. Research findings allow us to draw three main conclusions. First, the amount of oil spilled duri~g the first six months of 1942 within 50 miles of the U.S. Atlantic coast was 484,200 metric tons. This is approximately 145 mi1lion gallons of petroleum products, the equivilent of the cargo of 20 Argo Merchants, almost one per week for six months. Se'cond, the only clean up efforts were the burning - of oil incidental to the torpedoing, and the cosmetic actions to clean the swimming beaches for touxists. Otherwise, the ocean and coastal environments had to absorb the full impact of the spilled oil. Third, findings indicate that the ecologv of the coastal regions survived this wartime devastation, though there is no definite evidence that long-term or permanent damage did not occur. Finally, the areas pinpointed in this study suggest opportunities for follow-up investigations assessing the current physical conditions and long-term impacts of oil spills on the coastal ecology. Dean A. Horn Director Acknowledgments We would like to extend our deepest thanks to B.J. Copeland, Hughes Tillet, and Sumber Midget, of the University of North Carolina; to Phyllis Grygalin, of the Time-Life Photo Agency; and to the immensely helpful staff of the Operational Archives in Washington, D.C.
    [Show full text]
  • 207 Max Walker: Uss Cummings
    #207 MAX WALKER: USS CUMMINGS Steven Haller (SH): My name is Steven Haller and we're here at the Sheraton Waikiki Hotel in Honolulu, Hawaii. It's December 5, 1991 at ten AM and I have the pleasure to be speaking with Mr. Max Walker. Mr. Max Walker was a Seaman Second Class on the destroyer, USS CUMMINGS, at December 7, 1941 -- or rather on that date. He was twenty-one years of age. And Mr. Cummings, Mr. Walker, I'd like to thank you very much for joining us here today and taking . Max Walker (MW): Quite all right. SH: . to tell the story. We were talking about destroyer duty before we got in here to do the tape and you told me that you didn't particularly ask to be . MW: No, I didn't ask for destroyer duty. I was assigned to the CUMMINGS right out of boot camp in Great Lakes, Illinois. SH: When did you join the CUMMINGS? MW: I went aboard the CUMMINGS, best of my recollection, in April of '41. SH: Where was she then? Where did you join her? MW: Well, I came to Pearl Harbor and the CUMMINGS was not there. It was on a goodwill cruise to New Zealand. And so they put me on the USS DIXIE, and I spent a week or two on the DIXIE, waiting for the CUMMINGS to come back from her cruise and then when the CUMMINGS came into port, then I went aboard the CUMMINGS. SH: When you joined CUMMINGS, what division were you assigned to? MW: I was in the Second Division, deck division.
    [Show full text]
  • A Brief History of Active Sonar Angela D’Amico1 and Richard Pittenger2
    Aquatic Mammals 2009, 35(4), 426-434, DOI 10.1578/AM.35.4.2009.426 A Brief History of Active Sonar Angela D’Amico1 and Richard Pittenger2 1Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific, 53560 Hull Street, San Diego, CA 92152-5001, USA; E-mail: [email protected] 2Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, 266 Woods Hole Road, Woods Hole, MA 02543-1049, USA Abstract the coast of Newfoundland, Canada. Work on what was termed the Fessenden oscillator was conducted As background for this special issue on strand- until 1931, during which time the frequency was ings and mid-frequency active sonar (MFAS), this increased from 540 Hz to 1,000 Hz (Lasky, 1977; paper presents a brief history of active sonar, trac- Hackman, 1984; Bjørnø, 2003; Katz, 2005). ing the development of MFAS from its origins in The emergence in World War I of the submarine the early 20th century through the development of as a weapon of choice of weaker naval powers— current tactical MFAS. an “asymmetrical threat” in today’s parlance— stimulated the need to detect submerged subma- Key Words: mid-frequency active sonar, MFAS, rines that were otherwise invisible (Cote, 2000). anti-submarine warfare, ASW, whales The stealthiness of the submarine and the opacity of the oceans profoundly changed naval warfare Introduction for the remainder of the 20th century (Keegan, 1990; Cote, 2000). Since sound is the only trans- It has been suggested from several fronts in recent mitted energy that penetrates water for any appre- years that surface ship mid-frequency active sonar ciable distance, acoustic echo-ranging had to be (MFAS) use is responsible for mass strandings of exploited to counter this threat.
    [Show full text]
  • Atlantic Fleet, It Is the Atlantic
    The Battle of the Atlantic On September 1, 1939 Germany invades Poland. Allies or go on the offensive with deadly submarine Two days later Britain and France declare war and wolf packs and surface raiders of the German the Battle of the Atlantic begins. Over the next five Kriegsmarine. years and eight months a deadly struggle would be fought on the high seas, from the frigid waters "The Battle of the Atlantic was the dominating of the Arctic to the South Atlantic. factor all through the war. Never for one moment could we forget that everything happening At the heart of the conflict was the tonnage war. elsewhere, on land, at sea or in the air depended Britain required a continuous supply of imported ultimately on its outcome." - Winston Churchill war materials to keep on fighting and the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) was tasked with Getting Started preventing the arrival of these goods from across If this is your first time playing Atlantic Fleet, it is the Atlantic. recommended to begin by completing the Training Missions. To do so, simply select Training Missions Atlantic Fleet from the main menu. Atlantic Fleet is a turn-based tactical and strategic simulation of the Battle of the Atlantic. Take Continue with some Single Battles to get a feel for command of surface ships, submarines as well as combat and gunnery. The Battle of the River Plate carrier and land based aircraft in a deadly struggle and Convoy HX-106 battles (playing Germany for for control of shipping lanes during World War II. both) make for excellent initial practice.
    [Show full text]
  • Sub Signals Scanr Document
    23 October 1962 (Cont'd) (ADM RICKETTS) 5, Op-04 is keeping a running record of the status of our ships* overhaul—both regular and reserve—in order to assist in making judgment on the expediting or stopping of an overhaul on short notice. He is also making a list of those ships that are scheduled to go in for overhaul in the near future to help to make judgment whether or not to delay overhaul of any ship. y6. There may be a requirement for simultaneous operation of about three submarines to land up to about 125 people at various points around the periphery of Cuba. CIA project. Op-31 checking availability of subs. General Lansdale and LTCOL Patchell are the contact points. 7. Mr. McNaraara would like to have some means worked out by which a Soviet submerged submarine could be given a signal to surface. It is possible that the description of this signal would be sent to the Soviet Government so that they could transmit it to the Soviet submarine. I told Mr. McNamara that a practice depth charge would probably be the most practical and effective means of transmitting such a signal i since we don't know whether or not our underwater telephone V" gear is compatible with the Soviets. OP-31 is working up a /A proposed signal. d / W 1. ^a-i • •• '•avy or FM SECDHF TO SSCSTATS 1 li ia r«quc«jtcd the following message be sent to the Government of USSR; Government to Government Message Submarine Surfacing and Identification Procedure*, when in contact with U.S- Quarantine Forces in international waters in che vicinity of Cuba* U.S.
    [Show full text]