CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED SUBMARINE REPORT DEPTH CHARGE. BOMB, MINE. TORPEDO AND GUNFIRE DAMAGE INCLUDING LOSSES IN ACTION 7 DECEMBER 1941 TO 15 AUGUST, 1945 VOLUME I The Chief of Naval Operations d rects that this report be shown only to those persons to whom the report would be of value 1n the performance of their duties. Steps shall be taken accordingly to insure that this report w.il be seen by those persons responsible for design, con· struction and repair of naval vessels, es well as for their operation, but by no others. 71,1G4~1 Preliminary Design Branch Bureau of Ships 1 J anuary 1949 Navy Department WAR DAMAGE REPORT No. 58 Printed By U . S. Hydrographlc OH1ce CONFIDENTIAL SUBMARINE REPORT Depth Charge, Bomb, Mine, Torpedo and Gunfire Damage Including Losses in Action 7 December, 1941to15 August, 1945 1 January 1949 APPROVED C. L. BRAND Rear Admiral, USN Ass' t. Chief of Bureau for Ships CONFIDENTIAL 7.1 J04S1 (I D 1 3 5 8' :> ~ '1q v I CONTENTS ~CTION Page FOREWORD 1 II GENERAL 2 III JAPANESE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND WEAPONS 8 Name No. Damaged by Locale Date IV PERCH 1'76 Depth Charge Java Sea 3/3/42 17 v KING FISH 234 Depth Charge Formosa 3/23/43 26 VI TUNNY 282 Depth Charge Palau Is. 8/26/43 47 VII SALMON 182 Depth Charge S. E. of Kyushu 10/30/44 61 VIII GRENADIER 210 Bomb Malaya 4/22/43 82 IX SCAMP 277 Bomb Mindanao, P.I. 4/ 7/44 89 x TANG 306 Torpedo Formosa 10/24/44 109 XI BERGALL 320 Mine Gulf of Siam 6/13/45 125 XII GRAMPUS 207 Gunfire Truk 5/17/42 131 XIII GROWLER 215 Collision New Britain 2/'7/43 137 XIV DRAGON ET 293 Grounding Kurile Is 12/15/ 44 148 xv BEHAVIOR OF UNDERWATER NON- CONTACT EXPLOSIONS 161 XVI HULL DAMAGE AND STRENGTH 177 XVII STABILITY, BUOYANCY AND FLOODING 193 XVIII SHOCK PROTECTION 203 XIX ENGINEERING NOTES 213 xx PIPING 223 XXI HABITABILITY 233 XXII SUBMARINE ESCAPE NOTES 239 XX III CONCLUSION 248 APPENDIX I BRIEFS OF DAMAGE INCURRED BY U.S. 250 SUBMARINES DURING WORLD WAR II. APPENDIX II TABULAR SUMMARY OF U.S. SUBMARINE 296 LOSSES DURING WORLD WAR II. APPENDIX l1I MAP COVERING AREA OF PRINCIPAL U.S. SUBMARINE OPERATIONS. CONFIDENTIAL SECTION I FOREWORD 1-1. This report is one of a series of sixty-two war damage re­ ports prepared by the Bureau covering damage received in action by vessels of the U.S . Navy during World War II. It is the only report of the entire series which deals with war damage sustained by sub­ marines. The remaining sixty-one reports cover cases of significant damage incurred by surface vessels, and include r::lany instances of torpedo damage which may be of interest to submarine personnel who desire information on the destructive effect of their principal World War II weapon, the torpedo. 1- 2. As a group, U.S. submarines have established an enviable record in combat, not only in destruction inflicted upon the enemy but also in their ability to sustain severe attacks without themselves receiving serious damage. Although the basic operational character­ istics of our submarines remained substantially unchanged throughout the war years, with the notable exceptio:i of considerably increased m:?.Ximum allowable submergence depth for the SS285 anj subsequent Classes, marked advances were achieved in practically every 0th :· aspect of submarine and submarine equipment design. Improvements in shock protection have resulted in subm:irines which are highly re­ sistant to damage short of actual destruction of their pressure hulls. 1-3. It is the purpose of this report, by presenting case histories selected from the great volume of war experience, to illustrate the behavior of U.S. fleet type submarines in service during World War II when subjected to enemy attack, and in particular, to attack by non­ contact underwater explosive charges since the Japanese anti-submarine forces employed the depth charge and bomb as their principal weapons. Cases of damage by mine, torpedo, gwlfire and collision are also in­ cluded. An effort has been made to present a comprehensive sum- m"l.tion of the effectiveness with which our submarin8s withstood attack, the materiel and design weaknesses revealed by war damage, the dam­ age control problems attendant upon flooding of intact spaces or de­ rangement of vital systems and equipment, and the corrective measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of our submarines to damage. It is hoped that the information presented here will be of value to submarine operating personnel and submarine design, repair and outfitting activities. 1-4. No attempt has been made in this report to evaluate the opera- tional arid military characteristics of our submarines in the light of war experience other than by statements of fact when such character­ istics were impaired through war damage, nor have casualties incident to normal service operations been discussed. Lessons learned through the recent CROSSROADS OPERATION, and their possible effect on sub­ marine design, have not been included. CONFIDENTl.A.L -1- ON Ot\JT1A .3ECT II GE :EFA s n CONFIDENTIAL 2-4. Commencing with the BARRACUDA Class of 1924 and con- tinuing through the end of World War II, all submarines built by the U.S. Navy, with the exception of the 800 ton-type submarines MACKEREL (SS204) and MARLIN (SS205) completed in 1941, were of the fleet type, designed for high surface speeds and capable of operating for extended periods at sea and covering great distances. The submarine war effort of the United States was dependent almost entirely upon these fleet ty1 e submarines and for this reason only the damage ex­ periences of fleet type submarines have been included in this report. 2- 5. It is pertinent to mention that only negligible war experience was gained by our submarine service during World War r.1 The evolution of the fleet type submarine during the years of peace pre­ ceding Worla War II was the result of hypothesis and experience obtained through simulated exercises rather than actual war service conditions. The operating characteristics of the fleet type submarine proved adequate to carry the war to the enemy throughout the entire Pacific area, although great distances were involved. 2- 6. U.S. submar:ne operations in the Atlantic during World War II were on a minor scale. Throughout the entire war only four enemy vessels were sunk by our submarines in the Atlantic, two of the four being Gerran submarines, and but five other enemy vessels were damaged. ~Y one U.S. submarine was damaged in the Atlantic through enemy action. In the Pacific, however, where the major portion of our submarine effort was exerted, the U.S. submarine service established an impressive record almost from the first day of our entry into the war. Unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan was ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941. With the exception of a few special missions and support operations during the Battle of Midway and the initial phases of the Solomons Campaign, submarines were employed during the first two years of the war as free agents in a campaign of attrition against enemy combatant vessels and merchiint shipping. With the inauguration of the Gilbert Islands campaign in November 1943, a gradually increasing percentage of the submarine effort was diverted to the support of fleet operations although normal offensive patrolling con­ tinued to the end of the war. The statistics of the Joint Army- Navy Assessment Committee credit U.S. submarines with the sinking of 54.6 percent of all Japanese naval and merchant vessel tonnage sunk during World War II by U.S. forces of all categories. The total of sinkings 1so far as can be determined, the first vessel credited as destroyed by submarine action in the history of the U.S. Navy was the Japanese cargo ship ATSUTASAN MARU (8 ,662 gr oss tons), sunk in World War II by SWORDFISH (SS193) on 16 December 1941, lat. 18° - 06'N., long. 109° - 44'E. (credited by the Joint Army- Navy Assessment Committee, NavExos Publication P - 468). 2submarine Oper ational History, World War II, prepared by Commander Submar ine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (Preliminary Issue). 3BLACKFISH (SS221), damaged by Ger man depth charge attack in the Bay of Biscay on 19 Febr uary 1943. See brief of damage in Appendix I. CONFIDENTIAL - 3- ,.. CON Fl DENTIAL credited to U.S. submarines includes 201 Japanese naval vessels with a combined tonnage (standard displacement) of 540,192 tons, 28.6 percent of all Japanese naval tonnage sunk by U.S. forces, and 1113 merchant vessels above 500 gross tons with a combined tonnage (gross) of 4, 779,902 tons, 60.4 percent of all Japanese merchant ton­ nage sunk by U.S. forces.1,2 The following numbers and types of combatant Japanese naval vessels were sunk by U.S. submarines: 1 battleship, 4 lar ge aircr aft carriers, 4 escort aircraft carriers, 3 heavy cruisers, 8 light cr uisers, 38 destroyers, 23 submarines and 100 escort, patrol or mine vessels. In addition to the 1314 naval and merchant vessels credited as sunk, appr oximately 1000 Japanese ves­ sels in all categories, with an estimated combined tonnage of over It been i.> 1 000,000 tons, were damaged by U.S. submarines. 3 has estimated that approximately 275,000 Japanese were killed as a direct result of Allied submarine operations.4 2- 7. On r December 1941 there were 46 fleet type, 2 - 800 ton- type, 37 S-type, 18 R- type and 7 0-type submarines in commis-sion in the U.S.