Hematite-Biochemical and Immune Response of Caspian Brown Trout (Salmo Troutta Caspius, Kessler, ) Juveniles Fed Different Levels of Spirulina (Spirulina Platensis)

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Hematite-Biochemical and Immune Response of Caspian Brown Trout (Salmo Troutta Caspius, Kessler, ) Juveniles Fed Different Levels of Spirulina (Spirulina Platensis) Iranian Journal of Fisheries Sciences ( ) - DOI: /ijfs. Hematite-biochemical and immune response of Caspian brown trout (Salmo troutta caspius, Kessler, ) juveniles fed different levels of spirulina (Spirulina platensis) Meshkat Roohani A. ; Fallahi Kapoorchali M. *; Abedian Kenari A. ; Sayyad Borani M. ; Zorriezahra M.J. Received: July Accepted: August Abstract The effects of dietary Spirulina platensis on haemato-biochemical and immunity responses of Caspian brown trout (Salmo troutta caspius) juveniles was investigated. For this purpose, diets with five S. platensis inclusion levels (control, FMR ( g kg- spirulina in diet), FMR ( g kg- spirulina in diet), FMR ( g kg- spirulina in diet), and FMR ( g kg- spirulina in diet) were prepared. Six hundred juveniles with an average initial weight of g were assigned to experimental tanks. The experiment lasted for weeks. At the end of the experiment, growth performance, haemato-biochemical parameters including white and red blood cell counts, neutrophils lymphocytes counts, hematocrit, hemoglobin, glucose, albumin, total protein, aspartate amino transferase (AST), alanine amino transferase (ALT), triglyceride, cholesterol, as well as immunity parameters including lysozyme, C , C , Immunoglobulin (IgM), ACH and respiratory burst activity were assessed. The results indicated that fish fed diets supplemented with FMR and FMR had a significantly higher weight gain ( g and g) and specific growth rate ( %bw day- and %bw day- ) compared with control. Furthermore, FMR and FMR treatments had statistically higher protein efficiency ( and ), lipid efficiency ( and ) and statistically lower feed Downloaded from jifro.ir at 15:41 +0330 on Friday October 1st 2021 conversion ratio ( and ) compared to the other treatments respectively (p< ). The physiological and immunological factors were improved when fish were fed a high level of S. platensis supplement. S. platensis inclusion also increased activity of Lysozyme C , C , IgM and ACH and respiratory burst activity and reduced AST and ALT formation. These results indicate that S. platensis supplement is promising for disease prevention in S. trutta caspius juveniles, at an optimum dietary level of in diet. Keywords: Spirulina, Salmo trutta caspius, Growth performances, Haemato-biochemial parameters, Immunity. -Inland Waters Aquaculture Research Center, Iranian Fisheries Science Research Institute, Agriculture Research, Education and Extension Organization (AREEO), Bandar Anzali, Gilan, Iran -Department of Aquaculture, Faculty of Natural Resources and Marine Sciences, Tarbiat Modares University, Noor, Mazandaran, Iran -Iranian Fisheries Science Research Institute, Agriculture Research, Education and Extension Organization (AREEO). Tehran, Iran *Corresponding author's Email: m_fallahi @yahoo.com Meshkat Roohani et al., Hematite-biochemical and immune response of… Introduction multi-cell microalgae is gaining more Growth performance and disease attention from medical scientists as a control are the most important priorities nutraceutical and source of potential in current aquaculture. Nowadays, use pharmaceuticals. There are several new of antibiotics and chemotherapeutics peer reviewed scientific studies about has increased significantly, due to spirulina's ability to inhibit viral intensification of culture practices and replication, strengthen and enhancing followed by high prevalence of both the cellular and humoral arms of infectious diseases (Andrews et al., the immune system (Kozlenko et al., ). Accumulation of antibiotic ; Hirahashi et al., ; Andrews residues in fish tissues and environment et al., ). It has been received the causes human and animal health issues most research and public health and led to an urgent need for alternative attention due to its bioactive disease preventive substances and use compounds including vitamins, of immune-stimulants in aquaculture essential amino acids, minerals, (Andrews et al., ; Krishnaveni et essential fatty acids (gamma linolenic al., ). Several types of stimulants acid), and antioxidant pigments such as with different mechanisms and phycocyanine (Belay et al., ; functions such as bacterial products, Regunathan and Wesley, ; Ragap complex carbohydrates, vaccines, et al., ); Ceballos et al., ). immune enhancing drugs, nutritional Additionally, spirulina has high protein factors, animal and plant extracts are content ( – by dry weight) and is considered, and their abilities to the richest natural source of vitamin B activate the innate immunity have been (Estrada et al., ). This alga studied (Raa, ; Sakai, ; contains a whole spectrum of natural Downloaded from jifro.ir at 15:41 +0330 on Friday October 1st 2021 Shahbazi and Bolhassani, ).One mixed carotene and xanthophylls supplement source, with ease of phytopigments (Belay et al., ; production, processing and distribution Estrada et al., ; Andrews et al., along with a wide range of macro- and ). It has been confirmed that the micronutrients of health benefits is addition of small amounts of algae to spirulina (Ravi et al., ). Research fish feed can exert pronounced effects has shown that this alga contains a wide on growth, lipid metabolism, body variety of compounds such as composition and physiological response phycobiliproteins, carotenoids, to stress and disease (Mustafa et al., phycocyanin, polysaccharides, ; Mustafa and Nakagava, ; unsaturated fatty acids, superoxide Palmegiano et al., ; Abdel- dismutase, different vitamins, and other Tawwab and Ahmad, ; Teimouri et elements which by bring improvement al., ). Spirulina as an immune in body coloration, growth and modulator not only stimulates the immunity of fish (Nakagawa et al., immune system, but also strengthens ). Spirulina (Spirulina platensis), a the body's ability to produce new blood blue-green filamentous, fresh water and cells (Andrews et al., ). Important Iranian Journal of Fisheries Sciences ( ) parts of the immune system, such as endangered species, however, little is bone marrow stem cells, macrophages known about their nutritional cells (number of cells and requirements especially in the field of phagocytosis), T cells (lymphocyte), increasing immunity of species and NK (non-specific cytotoxic), spleen as types of immune-stimulants. Therefore, well as thymus show tangible activities the main objective of this study was to when treated with spirulina extract evaluate the effects of S. platensis meal (Henrikson, ; Watanuki et al., as feed additive on immune system, ; Tongsiri et al., ; Yong-Chin biochemistry and haematology in S. et al., ; Shahbazi and Bolhassani, trutta caspius as a valuable species. ). Recently, spirulina has been speculated to be associated with Materials and methods modulation of the host immune system Experimental diets (Hironobu et al., ). Five artificial diets were formulated Caspian brown trout (Salmo trutta using five levels of microalgae S. caspius, Kessler ), is one of the platensis (Sina microalgae Co., Qeshm, world’s nine subspecies of brown trout Iran) and in three replicates were (Quillet et al., ; Habibi et al., examined in a randomized design. The ) and attains the greatest size and experimental diets were formulated by growth rate of all brown trout partially replacing fishmeal in the basal (Sedgwick, ; Rajabi et al., ). diet ( in control) with spirulina This species is a critically endangered powder at inclusion levels of , , anadromous species distributed in , and , respectively. Diet southern region of the Caspian Sea. In formulations were performed using , this species was declared at risk Lindo software (Lindo copyright, Downloaded from jifro.ir at 15:41 +0330 on Friday October 1st 2021 according to IUCN conditions (Kiabi et release, ), and fishmeal and S. al., ; Coad, ; Kalbassi et al., platensis powder were used as a protein ). Artificial propagation and source. Test diets provided, which were releasing fingerlings to the natural iso-nitrogenous ( - crude protein) waters is an approach to prevent brown and iso-caloric ( MJ kg- ) were trout’s extinction (Rajabi et al., ). analyzed in this regard, only varied in In addition, in the recent years, this terms of fish meal and S. platensis species has attracted interest for content. The proximate composition of aquaculture in cage and raceways in experimental diets was measured intensive culture systems (Kalbassi et according to the standard methods of al., ). S. trutta caspius, like many Association of Official Analytical other species is sensitive to stressors Chemists (AOAC, ) for moisture, and pathogenic agents. Thus, strong protein, fat, and ash determination. defense mechanisms or immune system Briefly, Moisture content was estimated are needed against pathogens to by drying the samples to constant improve the health of the fish. Despite weight at ˚C in a drying oven (GCA, the importance of Caspian salmon as an model EM, Precision Scientific Meshkat Roohani et al., Hematite-biochemical and immune response of… Group, Chicago, IL, USA). N content (kJ g- ) for protein, fat, and was measured using the Labconco carbohydrates, respectively (NRC, Micro Kjeldahl Apparatus (Labconco ). The experimental diet Corporation, Kansas, MO, USA) and formulation and proximate composition crude protein was estimated by are showed in Table , respectively. multiplying N content by . Dietary feed ingredients were ground Lipid content was determined by using a laboratory grinder (Philips acetone extraction using the extraction HR , Finland) and then blended Soxhlet apparatus (Lab-Line into a homogenous doughy
Recommended publications
  • A WAY FORWARD with IRAN? Options for Crafting a U.S. Strategy
    A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? Options for Crafting a U.S. Strategy THE SOUFAN CENTER FEBRUARY 2021 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S. STRATEGY A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? Options for Crafting a U.S. Strategy THE SOUFAN CENTER FEBRUARY 2021 Cover photo: Associated Press Photo/Photographer: Mohammad Berno 2 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S. STRATEGY CONTENTS List of Abbreviations 4 List of Figures 5 Key Findings 6 How Did We Reach This Point? 7 Roots of the U.S.-Iran Relationship 9 The Results of the Maximum Pressure Policy 13 Any Change in Iranian Behavior? 21 Biden Administration Policy and Implementation Options 31 Conclusion 48 Contributors 49 About The Soufan Center 51 3 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S. STRATEGY LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BPD Barrels Per Day FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization GCC Gulf Cooperation Council IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IMF International Monetary Fund IMSC International Maritime Security Construct INARA Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act INSTEX Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGC-QF Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Qods Force JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action MBD Million Barrels Per Day PMF Popular Mobilization Forces SRE Significant Reduction Exception 4 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S. STRATEGY LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Iran Annual GDP Growth and Change in Crude Oil Exports 18 Figure 2: Economic Effects of Maximum Pressure 19 Figure 3: Armed Factions Supported by Iran 25 Figure 4: Comparison of Iran Nuclear Program with JCPOA Limitations 28 5 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Download File (Pdf; 3Mb)
    Volume 15 - Number 2 February – March 2019 £4 TTHISHIS ISSUEISSUE: IIRANIANRANIAN CINEMACINEMA ● IIndianndian camera,camera, IranianIranian heartheart ● TThehe lliteraryiterary aandnd dramaticdramatic rootsroots ofof thethe IranianIranian NewNew WaveWave ● DDystopicystopic TTehranehran inin ‘Film‘Film Farsi’Farsi’ popularpopular ccinemainema ● PParvizarviz SSayyad:ayyad: socio-politicalsocio-political commentatorcommentator dresseddressed asas villagevillage foolfool ● TThehe nnoiroir worldworld ooff MMasudasud KKimiaiimiai ● TThehe rresurgenceesurgence ofof IranianIranian ‘Sacred‘Sacred Defence’Defence’ CinemaCinema ● AAsgharsghar Farhadi’sFarhadi’s ccinemainema ● NNewew diasporicdiasporic visionsvisions ofof IranIran ● PPLUSLUS RReviewseviews andand eventsevents inin LondonLondon Volume 15 - Number 2 February – March 2019 £4 TTHISHIS IISSUESSUE: IIRANIANRANIAN CCINEMAINEMA ● IIndianndian ccamera,amera, IIranianranian heartheart ● TThehe lliteraryiterary aandnd ddramaticramatic rootsroots ooff thethe IIranianranian NNewew WWaveave ● DDystopicystopic TTehranehran iinn ‘Film-Farsi’‘Film-Farsi’ ppopularopular ccinemainema ● PParvizarviz SSayyad:ayyad: ssocio-politicalocio-political commentatorcommentator dresseddressed aass vvillageillage ffoolool ● TThehe nnoiroir wworldorld ooff MMasudasud KKimiaiimiai ● TThehe rresurgenceesurgence ooff IIranianranian ‘Sacred‘Sacred DDefence’efence’ CinemaCinema ● AAsgharsghar FFarhadi’sarhadi’s ccinemainema ● NNewew ddiasporiciasporic visionsvisions ooff IIranran ● PPLUSLUS RReviewseviews aandnd eeventsvents
    [Show full text]
  • Design Characteristics of Iran's Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
    Design Characteristics of Iran’s Ballistic and Cruise Missiles Last update: January 2013 Missile Nato or Type/ Length Diameter Payload Range (km) Accuracy ‐ Propellant Guidance Other Name System (m) (m) (kg)/warhead CEP (m) /Stages Artillery* Hasib/Fajr‐11* Rocket artillery (O) 0.83 0.107 6; HE 8.5 ‐ Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐12* Rocket artillery (O) 1.29 0.244 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐23* Rocket artillery (O) 1.82 0.333 120; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐14* Rocket artillery (O) 2.8 0.122 18.3; HE 21.5 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐25* Rocket artillery (O) 3.2 0.122 18.3; HE 30 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐36* Rocket artillery (O) 2 0.122 18.3; HE 18 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐17* Rocket artillery (O) 2.9 0.33 190; HE 13 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐28* Rocket artillery (O) 3.9 0.33 190; HE 20 Solid Spin stabilized Oghab9* Rocket artillery (O) 4.82 0.233 70; HE 40 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐310* Rocket artillery (O) 5.2 0.24 45; HE 45 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐511* Rocket artillery (O) 6.6 0.33 90; HE 75 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐112* Rocket artillery (O) 1.38 0.24 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐213* Rocket artillery (O) 1.8 0.333 60; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐614* Rocket artillery (O) 6.3 0.355 150; HE 100 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat15* Rocket artillery (O) 5.9 0.355 150; HE 120 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐116* Iran‐130 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 100‐125 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐1A17* Mushak‐120 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 160 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐1018* Mushak‐160 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.45 250; HE 150 Solid Spin stabilized Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
    [Show full text]
  • Gholamreza Rouhani
    CURRICULUM VITAE First Name: Gholamreza Last Name: Rouhani Date of Birth: 24 February.1971 Marital Status: Married Nationality: Iranian Cell Phone: +98-912-1769307 Email: [email protected] Gholamreza Rouhani WORK EXPERIENCES 0- IAIO – Iran Aviation Industries Organization. 1989-1994 (Internship) 1- The Government sector. 1994-2014 Manager and Chief designer and Research Assistant & Head of Overall Design Department of Mechanic & Aerospace Engineering in some research and development center (AIO-DIO-MIO).1994-2014 1-1- AIO - Aerospace Industries Organization. 1994-2006 Senior Expert of 122 mm Mortar, Shahid Dastvare Industry, 1994-1995 Senior Expert of Research project (H satellite), Research Center of Shahid Bakeri industries group, 1995-1996 Senior Expert of Aerodynamics, Research Center of Shahid Bakeri industries group, 1996-1997 Senior Expert of Propulsion, Shahid Sanikhani Industry, Shahid Bakeri industries group, 1997-1998 Head of Solid Propellant Motor design, Shahid Sanikhani Industry, Shahid Bakeri industries group, 1998-1999 Head of Structural design, Shahid Sanikhani Industry, Shahid Bakeri industries group, 1999-2000 Manager of Final Assembly, Shahid Sanikhani Industry, Shahid Bakeri industries group, 2000-2001 Senior Expert and Manager (Sub cooperation) of projects of Ashoura missile - optimization of Zelzal artillery rockets - Katyusha 122 mm artillery rockets - Misagh missile SAM -Two stage ballistic missile - Fateh SSM - JTO - Standard motor - , ... Shahid Sanikhani Industry, Shahid Bakeri industries
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Extensive Cruise Missile Program Requires U.S. Action
    BACKGROUNDER No. 3460 | JANUARY 6, 2020 CENTER FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE Iran’s Extensive Cruise Missile Program Requires U.S. Action Peter Brookes n an unprecedented attack in September 2019, KEY TAKEAWAYS Iran struck the expansive Saudi oil processing facility at Abqaiq and the oil fields at Khurais The recent Iranian attack on Saudi I with armed drones and cruise missiles. The attack cut Arabia’s largest oil facility and one of its Saudi oil production by 50 percent.1 largest oil fields affected 5 percent of the world’s oil supply. The strike on Saudi Arabia’s largest oil facility and one of its largest oil fields affected 5 percent of the world’s oil supply.2 It also shook global energy markets, caused a spike in oil prices, and significantly affected It also reflects an underappreciated evo- lution and growth in Iran’s air power and the world’s spare oil capacity. military prowess in the Middle East. It was a significant demonstration of Iranian mil- itary force against an important regional rival that had the potential to escalate into a broader conflict The threat of Iranian cruise missiles and in the Middle East with untold consequences. There their proliferation merit immediate U.S. has been much attention placed on Iran’s missile attention and action to protect American programs, especially its space launch vehicles and bal- forces and advance U.S. interests. listic missiles, but the use of cruise missiles—alongside drones— in this attack reflects an underappreciated This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg3460 The Heritage Foundation | 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE | Washington, DC 20002 | (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
    [Show full text]
  • “The Gulf and Iran's Capability for Asymmetric Warfare” (.Pdf)
    Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy The Gulf and Iran’s Capability for Asymmetric Warfare Anthony H. Cordesman Burke Chair in Strategy Working Paper: Please send comments to [email protected] January 10, 2020 Photo: ARASH KHAMOUSHI/AFP/ Getty Images Introduction 2 Much of the reporting on the clashes between Iran and the United States that began in late December 2019, that led to the strikes that killed the commander the Iran’s Quds force, Qasem Soleimani, and led to Iranian missile strikes on U.S. bases in Iran, have focused on the Quds force and treated it as the dominant element of Iraq’s military forces and Iran’s asymmetric capabilities. The Quds force is only part of a much broader and steadily growing mix of Iranian asymmetric warfare capabilities. Its role must be kept in careful perspective in evaluating the threat of any major escalation in the tensions and military exchanges between Iran and the United States and the risk of a major war in the Gulf. Furthermore, much of the recent news reporting on Iran has misstated the nature of Iran’s forces and capabilities. It is critical to assess Iran’s actual military capabilities, and the developments in its approach to asymmetric warfare, as accurately as is possible at the unclassified level and put them in the broader context of the capabilities that the U.S. and its Arab strategic partners can bring to bear in deterring and defending against Iran. This analysis focuses on both Iran’s overall capabilities for asymmetric warfare and the overall military balance in the Gulf – including U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies
    Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Updated April 29, 2020 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R44017 SUMMARY R44017 Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies April 29, 2020 Iran’s national security policy is arguably the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, Kenneth Katzman perception of threats to the regime and to the country, and long-standing national Specialist in Middle interests. Iran’s leadership: Eastern Affairs [email protected] Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime. For a copy of the full report, please call 7-.... or visit Takes advantage of regional conflicts to advance a broader goal of overturning a www.crs.gov. power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. Seeks to restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of ancient Persian empires. Provides material support to regional allied governments and armed factions, including increasingly precise missile systems that enable Iran to project power. Supports acts of international terrorism, as the “leading” or “most active” state sponsor of terrorism, according to annual State Department reports on international terrorism. Backs actions against international shipping in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq that represent, in part, an attempt to pressure the United States to relax sanctions on Iran. These actions have continued despite Iran’s struggles with the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak there.
    [Show full text]
  • Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2020
    DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE BALLISTIC MISSILE ANALYSIS COMMITTEE 2 KEY FINDINGS Many countries view ballistic and cruise missile systems as cost-effective weapons and symbols of national power, especially when those systems are armed with weapons of mass destruction. However, numerous types of ballistic and cruise missiles have achieved dramatic improvements in accuracy that allow them to be used effectively with conventional warheads. Some weapon systems have characteristics of both ballistic and cruise missiles. For example, ballistic missile-launched hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) can maneuver in the atmosphere similar to cruise missiles, and future supersonic/hypersonic cruise missiles may be launched by large rocket boosters. Highly accurate ballistic and cruise missiles can be used to deter or counter adversary forces deploying to or operating within a defined space or theater. Russia SS-27 ICBM TEL NORTH KOREA North Korea has a strong desire to develop long-range ballistic missile systems that can threaten the United States and its allies. During a 2012 military parade, North Korea unveiled its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Hwasong-13, and subsequently debuted the Hwasong-14 ICBM in an October 2015 parade. Flight testing of the Hwasong-10 (Musudan) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) began in April 2016 with a series of failures. North Korea followed those failures by launching multiple new missiles in 2017. In April 2017, North Korea also commenced flight testing of a new liquid-propellant IRBM, the Hwasong-12. That same year, North Korea performed the inaugural flight tests of the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 ICBMs. Upon its launch in 2017, the Hwasong-14 marked the first flight-tested ICBM-class missile for North Korea.
    [Show full text]
  • National Cruise Missile Defense: Issues and Alternatives
    National Cruise Missile Defense: Issues and Alternatives FEBRUARY | 2021 At a Glance Since the 1980s, the United States has invested considerable resources to develop and field ballistic missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland from attack by long-range ballistic missiles. In recent years, concerns have arisen that another type of weapon—land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)— may also pose a threat to the U.S. homeland. Unfortunately, the systems that the U.S. military has deployed to protect the United States from ballistic missile warheads that fly high above the atmo- sphere are ill-suited to counter LACMs, which fly close to Earth’s surface. This Congressional Budget Office report examines the potential for LACM attacks against the United States and the types of systems that might be fielded to provide a cruise missile defense with nationwide coverage. Such coverage would be analogous to that provided by national ballistic missile defenses. CBO’s analysis yielded the following findings: • Cruise missiles could be used to attack the United States. Adversaries attempting such attacks could range from nonstate groups (including terrorists) that might be able to acquire a small number of missiles to “peer powers” (nations with large, advanced militaries) capable of launching much more sizable attacks. • Cruise missiles could be defeated with available technology, but a wide-area defense of the contiguous United States would be costly. Modified versions of systems that the military uses today could be purchased for homeland cruise missile defense. CBO estimates that the lowest-cost “architectures” it examined—integrated systems that comprise airborne or space-based radars, surface-to-air missiles, and fighter aircraft—would cost roughly $75 billion to $180 billion to acquire and operate for 20 years.
    [Show full text]
  • Lack of Modern Technologies Hampers Iran's Defense Industry
    Iranian tank, Karrar Wikimedia Commons/Tasnim News Agency Lack of modern technologies hampers Iran’s defense industry IranSource by Robert Czulda Iran Middle East Politics & Diplomacy Iran belongs to a relatively small group of states with an indigenous defense industry. It serves as an important element of Tehran’s official strategy of economic, military and industrial self-sufficiency. However, this defense industry is largely confined to the modernization of Cold War-era equipment. Iran’s industrial base was established under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and later reorganized and enlarged during the Islamic Republic. While, in many countries, defense companies are private, they are state-owned in Iran. Because of the Islamic Republic’s long pariah status, interaction with the outside world has been limited. Currently, Iran can produce various systems domestically and, to a limited extent, modernize and copy by reverse engineering some advanced sub-components, such as engines, electronics, and older types of avionics. The industry’s greatest achievement has been to repair and overhaul old equipment. The majority of Iran’s military hardware was acquired during the time of the shah or in the 1980s and 1990s. To keep these systems operational has been a truly impressive accomplishment. This includes antiques such as the F-14 twin-engine variable-sweep wing fighter aircraft, known as the Tomcat, and AH-1J assault helicopters—both purchased from the United States in the 1970s. Some spare parts are produced locally, while others are, reportedly, smuggled in from other countries. Due to logistics shortfalls, an important source of spare parts is cannibalization, which is a process of removing usable parts from other systems, such as tanks and aircraft, to replace broken parts on others instead of using parts from inventory.
    [Show full text]
  • T-PB 26-Hans Kristensen INF Weapons
    Policy Brief No. 20 APLN/CNND 1 Policy Brief No. 25 November 2018 INF Weapons: Status, Modernisations, and Arms Control Prospects Hans M. Kristensen Introduction Over the past 30 years, arms control treaties and unilateral initiatives have resulted in the destruction of more than 50,000 nuclear warheads.1 The vast majority of those warheads were Russian and U.S. weapons. These accomplishments reflected a political will and con- viction that nuclear forces had to be constrained and the role of nuclear weapons reduced. Over the past decade, however, both the will and conviction have changed. Instead, Russia and the United States – and by extension also NATO – are now embroiled in a deepening political clash that has rekindled Cold War rhetoric and triggered significant changes in mil- itary postures and strategies. Although less of an ideological clash and intensity compared with the old Cold War, the changes contain all the building blocks needed to create a new one. In this climate, the salience of nuclear weapons is increasing. Both sides are reinvigorating the role of nuclear weapons in their national strategies, increasing nuclear first-use options, slowing reductions, and adding new nuclear weapons to their arsenals. As a result, arms control agreements are under strain – even attack. Most recently, the Trump administration declared it would pull the United States out of the Intermediate- range Nuclear Force (INF) treaty in reaction to what it says is Russian cheating. Moscow has denied the allegations and issued its own counter-accusations. The INF treaty has served Europe well by removing a particularly dangerous group of nu- clear weapons, thereby significantly increasing stability in Europe.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran and the Changing Military Balance in the Gulf
    1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Working draft, Washington, DC 20036 Please send comments Anthony H. Cordesman and suggested additions Phone: 1.202.775.3270 to Email: [email protected] [email protected] Iran and the Changing Web version: www.csis.org/burke/reports Military Balance in the Gulf Net Assessment Indicators Anthony H. Cordesman With the assistance of Grace Hwang March 26, 2019 Burke Chair Photo: -/ Getty Images In Strategy 1 Table of Contents The Third Key Shift in the Military Balance: The Impact of Iran’s Missile Forces …………………………………………………………….……….…… 162 The Changing Impact of Iran’s Missile Forces ……………………………………………………….……..………………………….…………………..163 The Air and Air Defense Side of the Air-Missile Balance ………………………………………………………………..……….………………………. 165 Comparing the Missile Forces on Each Side ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 184 The Changing Character of Iran’s Missile Forces …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 203 Beyond the Chronology, Examples of Iran’s Recent Use of Missile Forces ……………………………………………………..…………….…………. 204 Gulf Vulnerability and the Regional Nature of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) ……………………………………………………..…………. 217 The Need for Missile Defense? ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 243 The Iranian Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Risk ……………………………………………………………………………….……………..………. 251 The Uncertain Future Evolution of Missile Forces ………………………………………………………………………………….………………….…. 257 Probable Patterns of Deterrence, War Fighting, and Escalation ……………………………………………………………………………………………261 15
    [Show full text]