New Zealand Responses to the Peaceful Atom in the 1950S
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Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Vol. 139, p. 51–62, 2006 ISSN 0035-9173/06/010051–12 $4.00/1 Prospects for Enrichment: New Zealand Responses to the Peaceful Atom in the 1950s matthew o’meagher Abstract: The origin of the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand is discussed. An assess- ment is made of the impact of the New Zealand Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament on New Zealand politics and foreign policy. Keywords: Anti-nuclear movement, New Zealand, New Zealand Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, politics, foreign policy, ‘Atoms for Peace’. INTRODUCTION ful atom’ was the only or even the main fac- tor preventing New Zealand embracing the anti- This paper forms part of a wider study of the nuclear cause until the 1970s and 1980s; anti- history of anti-nuclear New Zealand before it be- communism, anti-Japanese sentiment, faith in came famous, its roots if you will, on which the and friendship towards the two original West- transformations in that nation’s identity and ern nuclear powers, and a host of factors spe- foreign policy of the 1970s and 1980s would cific to the arms race itself were more impor- grow. The heart of that project is the story tant. Nevertheless, Eisenhower’s initiative, in of a peace group I first researched as a student tandem with a coincidental burst of hope that two decades ago, the New Zealand Campaign this country might have uranium deposits of its for Nuclear Disarmament (NZCND). This coun- own to exploit, did revive official and popular try’s first exclusively anti-nuclear national or- interest in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, ganisation, it tried to convert New Zealanders to just as it did elsewhere in the world, thereby the disarmament cause in the early 1960s, and diverting New Zealanders’ attention away from was a local manifestation of the second stage of more disturbing nuclear developments. Along a three-stage global movement. In it, moreover, the way, it helped New Zealanders come to see the influence of scientists was just as significant the United States as the ‘true atomic work- as it in other Western societies [2], and kept shop of the world’, and encouraged them to be leaping out at me (in the same way that the wowed and not just concerned by its technolog- role of other groups like Christians and mothers ical might [3]. did) in the primary sources my study is based on – NZCND records, and reports on New Zealand society and politics sent home by the diplomats SCREENS AND WALLS of all three Western nuclear powers based there. In order to appreciate the full significance of By the end of 1953, nine years after Hiroshima NZCND’s contribution to the development of and Nagasaki, there was still much about nu- New Zealand politics, identity and foreign pol- clear energy that even citizens of democracies icy, one must first examine those factors – some did not know, especially in regard to its bel- obvious, some not – which mitigated against licose applications. From their wartime ori- the appeal of the anti-nuclear cause before and gins in the Manhattan Project, when the US when this group appeared. That is where this government cordoned off vast tracts of land in paper seeks to make a contribution. Its aim is to Tennessee and Washington State to build fac- discuss the influence in this country of President tories that appeared to produce nothing, the Eisenhower’s attempt to calm the rising world- vast majority of nuclear weapons-related activ- wide ‘nuclear fears’ of the mid-1950s through ities were not for public consumption, in any his ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative. It does not ar- country. In fact, the opposite was true; so gue that the ensuing excitement over ‘the peace- stringently protected did the whole process of 52 O’MEAGHER preparing for nuclear war become, that even walls to hide their preparations for nuclear com- in the democracies, defence labs and test-sites bat were, they were not the only means West- became states-within-states, replete with their ern nuclear powers employed to head off public own airplanes and nigh-sovereign secrets, and concern about what they were up to. A further surrounded by guards with orders to shoot-to- tactic – indeed, a giant distraction – was to play kill unauthorised intruders [4]. Within these en- up the peaceful potential of the atom, thereby claves, moreover, officers and officials asserted tapping into the utopian hopes and genuine sci- their control to such a degree over scientists entific excitement that immediately manifested that in the US at least the information about themselves, once the new energy source’s power the different parts of the bomb-building pro- was first revealed in war. cess was often divided between labs, and with- held from anyone whose political loyalties came to be deemed suspect. This was in sharp con- NEW ZEALAND’S FIRST trast to the pre-1939 days when scientists shared DOMESTIC NUCLEAR STEPS their research freely across borders and now neither atomic scientists nor their ideas could To understand how this tactic played out in New travel easily across the new Iron Curtain [5]. Zealand though, we first need to consider New In such a context, therefore, information about Zealanders’ prior and autonomous aspirations nuclear tests was especially guarded, if it was for the peaceful atom. In telling this story, I will divulged at all. Besides the lack of warning not address the role of Ernest Marsden in shap- Britain gave about its atomic debut described ing those aspirations in any depth, as it features elsewhere in this edition, the Soviets never did prominently in a companion paper in this issue. announce their atomic breakthrough, and nei- Nevertheless, it is impossible to leave Marsden ther President Truman nor the Atomic Energy out altogether. Once he was alerted to ura- Commission would say how many tests Amer- nium’s military potential in 1943, he not only ica conducted in the Pacific in 1951. They did set the wheels in motion by which this county’s not encourage coverage of its first H-bomb test scientists became involved in the Manhattan or convey its ‘leap in destructiveness’ [6]. In- Project, but immediately instructed the govern- deed, even some defining facts about the new ment Geological Survey team in December 1943 weapon’s dangers – the adverse consequences to see if this element was present in this country of explosions, for instance, or the handling of in any exploitable amounts. On his return from radioactive material in bomb construction – abroad in June 1944, he set up an atomic en- were not merely censored, as occurred after Hi- ergy section within the same section of the DSIR roshima and Nagasaki. With total disregard for that pioneered this nation’s breakthroughs with the health of its citizens adjoining such sites, radar. Within a week of Hiroshima, he was able they could even be hidden by government ly- to announce that small concentrations of ura- ing, as occurred when Washington told hun- nium were present in a mineral found predomi- dreds of private companies processing radioac- nantly on the South Island’s West Coast. As he tive elements there were no ‘special dangers’ for conceded, its recovery was probably not ‘eco- their workers, when America’s Atomic Energy nomically practicable’, at least not with ‘old- Commission (AEC) said the danger from its nu- fashioned methods’ [8]. The New Zealand Her- clear tests was ‘no worse than having a tooth ald later deduced from President Truman’s an- X-rayed’, when its Commissioner said America nouncement of the Bomb, that the appealing was working on a clean bomb’ while enhancing ‘possibilities of harnessing atomic energy for the radioactivity of its existing weapons, and peaceable uses’, which some had raised, ‘can when the residents of St. George, Utah, were very well be put aside for the time being’, for given assurances though tests in Nevada ‘appar- scientists were ‘definite that years of work will ently always plaster[ed]’ them with fallout [7]. be needed before the new forces can be brought under control’ [9]. Important as these physical or propaganda When it came to peaceful possibilities of NEW ZEALAND RESPONSES TO THE PEACEFUL ATOM IN THE 1950s 53 the new energy source, nevertheless, some New reading that ‘this energy is so wrapped up with Zealanders (like Britons or Americans) could the development of a country that it cannot be not let facts stand in the way of dreams. allowed to pass into the control of private in- Among those who preferred to be inspired by terests’, and that the West Coast black-sands those overseas authorities who instead empha- held ‘a fairly high percentage’ of the ‘radio- sised ‘the great possibilities if energy on the active ores we want so badly’. In January 1946, scale represented in the bomb is made avail- accordingly, the Labour government began dis- able to drive machinery and provide sources cussing the possibility of a nuclear research pro- of power’ were the Christchurch Press and the gramme, and in late 1948 Fraser discussed mat- New Zealand Herald, who between them passed ters to do with an ‘atomic pile’ with Britain’s onto their readers the speculation of the Manch- Defence Minister in late 1948. As Nash an- ester Guardian that ‘atomic power may pro- nounced to the 1948 Labour Conference, ‘rather vide energy for exploring the solar system and than have a cessation of atomic energy research, the universe’, pronounced that ‘atomic energy the Government was anxious to have it go to might supplement the power from coal, oil and the limit.