International Security Nonproliferation Arms Control

Digest of the Russian Journal

(nuclear control)

Volume 5, № 1

Winter 2000

Publisher: PIR - Center for Policy Studies in Russia

Moscow, 2000

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

2 Contents

Editorial 3 The World Community Should Form a United Front against a New Wave of Terrorism Hot Topic 4 75% of Russians Stand for Nonproliferation. By Ivan Safranchuk PIR Center News 10 Winter 1999-2000 Summary 12 Yaderny Kontrol Journal, No.6, 1999 Interview 13 Vladimir Yakovlev: 'Strategic Missile Forces Are the State Shield' Interview 19 Victor Yerastov: 'Minatom Has All Conditions for Providing Safety and Security of Nuclear Material' Commentary 21 The CTR Program and Russia's National Security Interests. By Yevgeny Maslin Analysis 25 Russia and the 2000 NPT Review Conference. By Roland Timerbaev Viewpoint 41 Shaping the Non-Proliferation Agenda for the Coming Decade. By Michael Davenport Analysis 43 Draft of the Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Factor. By Andrei Gordiyenko Yaderny Kontrol Journal in 1999 47

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

3 DIGEST OF THE RUSSIAN JOURNAL YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL) International Security. Nonproliferation. Arms Control. Volume 5 N 1 (13) Winter 2000 Published four times a year since 1996 Contains selected analytical articles from Yaderny Kontrol, a journal published in Russian six times a year Vladimir A. Orlov, Editor-in-Chief Dmitry Litovkin, Staff Writer Dmitry Polikanov, Editor Dmitry Kovchegin, Staff Writer Dmitry Evstafiev, Assistant Editor Olga Shamanova, Secretary Yevgeny Maslin, Senior Advisor Vyacheslav Zaytsev, Accountant Roland Timerbaev, Senior Advisor Elena Trofimova, Layout Vasily Lata, Advisor Natalya Kharchenko, Distribution Ivan Safranchuk, Analyst

Printed in Russia Address: P.O. Box 17, Moscow, 117454, Russia Phone: +7+095-335-1955 Fax: +7+503-234-9558 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.pircenter.org

Subscriptions worldwide (Russian and English editions): please, send requests to fax +7+095-234- 9558 or e-mail: [email protected]. Checks or wire transfers. Express mail delivery. Circulation: Russian journal: 2,000 copies English Digest: 800 copies Signed for printing on December 3, 1999 • © PIR Center, 2000. All rights reserved. This publication may not be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in whole or in part, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without written permission of the Publisher. To request permission, please, contact the PR Department: [email protected]. For educational purposes, permission is given free-of-charge. • Statements of fact and opinion expressed in the Yaderny Kontrol Digest are responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors and the PIR Center • The editors wish to express special thanks to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies for making this publication possible through its support of the PIR-Center for Policy Studies in Russia

Publisher: PIR–Center for Policy Studies in Russia Amb. Roland Timerbaev, Executive Council Chair Dr. Vladimir A. Orlov, Director, and Executive Council Member Dr. Vladimir A. Mau, Executive Council Member Prof. Yuri Fyodorov, Executive Council Member

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

4

Editorial movement, whose activities have become a global security challenge and replaced THE WORLD COMMUNITY existing Islamic non-governmental SHOULD FORM A UNITED organizations. Another threat is the Taliban movement combining the ideology of radical FRONT AGAINST A NEW WAVE Islam with a strong Pashtun nationalism. The OF TERRORISM world has to fight against international drug dealers, who directly affect the decision- The situation in the North Caucasus and making process in some European states (this terrorist explosions in Moscow forced was clearly demonstrated by the Russian society to seek new methods of developments in the Balkans), and to face the countering terrorism in its various challenges coming from other religious and manifestations. The social concern about easy ethnic entities of sub-national or ways of conducting terrorist acts resulted in transnational character. the understanding that the main challenges to Russian national security would come not For the representatives of these sub-national from the USA or NATO (as one might think non-governmental groups, terrorism is one of analyzing military expenditures) but from the ways to let the world know about their instability in the south of Russia. The public existence; to assert their claims, since they realized the danger of limited armed have no opportunity to achieve their goals conflicts. within the framework of a state. In these circumstances, the most dangerous thing Russia has to face the most complicated type would be the lack of unity within the of terrorism - unselective terrorism, which international community. Unfortunately, we chooses its objects to provide maximal witness a situation where the illegal activities intimidation of the population, to undermine of sub-state groups are used to pursue morale and to destroy the political will of the political goals. This is true with respect to the elite. Under such circumstances, Russia will loyal NATO attitude to the drug-traffickers have to work out a social psychological of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Western pattern, which should influence public flirting with the Chechen secessionist consciousness and will reduce, if not prevent, movement, and moral support to the Kurdish the cases of terrorism. This doesn't mean Labor Party on the part of the Russian promoting a climate of suspicion and political elite, although the Kurds were slander. We advocate reasonable caution and involved in drug trafficking and terrorism. attentiveness. In fact, these processes are even deeper. They Most desirable would be to de-politicize mark the emergence of a multi-polar world, terrorism, to deny the terrorists excusable which is so highly praised in Russia. The motives for their activity. All political parties emergence of a multi-polar system is an and movements of the country should come objective trend of the world development in to an agreement that terrorism is an absolute the last decade of the XXI century. However, evil, and neither living standards nor a fight it has to overcome the resistance of the USA for ideals should call into question the right and other members of the UN Security and duty of the Government to struggle Council’s exclusive club, who don't want to against terrorism using the severest methods. concede some of their rights and to make the Unfortunately, Russia lacks such a unity of change of status quo in world politics more intentions. predictable, dirigible and painless for the Great Powers. This process of creating a multi- The current wave of terrorism results from polar world order has found other ways of the stirring up of non-governmental groups military-political and geopolitical of the world system. In recent years, the implementation. In its fight against terrorism international community has found itself and other challenges the international confronting the international Islamic community should not forget the genuine roots of this extremism. Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

5

Hot Topic We will therefore examine answers to three of the questions: - 75% OF RUSSIANS STAND FOR Will the world be more stable if the number of nuclear weapon states NONPROLIFERATION increases? - Should Russia transfer its nuclear by Ivan Safranchuk, weapons and technologies to other PIR Research Associate states? - Is nuclear theft from Russian nuclear © PIR Center, 1999. All rights reserved. facilities possible or not? Translation into English. Abridged version Will the World Be More Stable if the The PIR Center is conducting the research Number of Nuclear Weapon States "Examining Attitudes of Russians towards Increases? Nuclear Weapons" in cooperation with the The results of the poll demonstrate that Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Russians generally support nonproliferation. Monterey Institute of International Studies. 75% believe that the world will not be more This research is the first of its kind in Russia. stable if the number of states possessing Within the framework of this research nuclear weapons increases. It is somewhat project, we have just conducted an all- alarming that 11% think that the world will Russian public opinion poll. The poll covered indeed become more stable with 1,500 people in 56 localities, within 29 regions proliferation, while 14% found it difficult to of the Russian Federation, in all economic- answer this question. geographical zones. The percentage of those predicting a more

stable world is nearly the same among men The results of the poll will be thoroughly and women: 11% and 10% respectively. At analyzed in a PIR Study Paper, which will the same time, there is a substantial come out in early 2000. The respondents difference among those presuming that were asked more than 20 questions nuclear arms proliferation would make the concerning nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear world less stable (80% of men and 72% of arms reduction, nuclear terrorism, and women). Russian nuclear policy. Unfortunately, it is impossible to cover all results of the poll in Women are not as clear about the problem of this article. This is why it's main objective is

Will the world become more stable if the number of nuclear weapon states increases?

No 75%

Difficult to answer 14% Yes 11%

to present the most thought-provoking proliferation as men, since nearly one fifth of results relating to nonproliferation problems. them has no particular opinion on the matter. When we correlate this fact with the evidence that fewer women predict that proliferation

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

6 will lead to global instability, a striking give an answer. They amount to 14% of all conclusion can be drawn: women believe less respondents, 9% of people with higher enthusiastically than men in the advantages education, 14% - with secondary education, of nonproliferation. and 28% - with only primary education.

The answers given by two of the age groups Thus, the opinion on nuclear (18-29 and 40-59) were nearly the same. 75% nonproliferation and the level of education of each group supposed that the world are correlated in the following manner: the wouldn't be more stable if the number of higher the level of education, the fewer the nuclear weapon states increased. 13% (18-29) number of people who find it difficult to and 12% (40-59) shared the opposite view, assess the consequences of nuclear while the respondents of the two other age nonproliferation and the larger the number groups were even more pacifistic: 8% of of those sharing nonproliferation values. At those over 60 and 9% of those between 29 the same time, the share of those who believe and 39. The latter group (29-39) that global stability will be strengthened demonstrated the largest percentage of through proliferation is not subject to nonproliferation supporters (81%) in fluctuations and accounts for 10%. comparison with other age groups and the average figure. Moreover, this group The inhabitants of small provincial towns comprised the smallest number of those answered in nearly the same manner as the finding it difficult to answer (10%). 73% of citizens of big towns and cities (including senior citizens (over 60) are sure that the Moscow and St. Petersburg). 77-78% of town world won't be more stable. 20% of seniors inhabitants (78% from megalopolises and hesitated to answer, and this was the largest 77% from big and small towns) believe that number among all the age groups. nuclear arms proliferation won't make the world more stable. The number of their Thus, the 29-39-year old respondents are opponents increases depending on the type most inclined to share nonproliferation of locality (9% in small towns and 14% in values, while as much as one fifth of the Moscow and St. Petersburg). On the contrary, older generation has no particular opinion on the number of those hesitating to answer this matter. decreased in the big cities (14% in small towns and 9% in Moscow and St. The answers concerning nonproliferation Petersburg). In rural areas, this figure was significantly depend on the level of even greater (19%), while 72% believed that education of the respondents. For instance, the world wouldn't become more stable with 81% of the people with higher education proliferation and 10% believed it would. believe that the world won’t be more stable if Thus, there are more proponents of the number of states possessing nuclear nonproliferation in towns than in villages. weapons increases. This can be compared with 74% of the respondents with secondary The number of nonproliferation opponents is education and 64% of the people with only nearly the same in all political groups (8- primary education. 10%), except Yevgeny Primakov's voters (13%). The share of those believing that the world will be more stable if the number of nuclear On the contrary, the number of weapon states increases is nearly the same nonproliferation supporters differs from across all educational groups. (11% of all politician to politician. The highest figure is respondents, ranging from 8% to 12% 87% (Sergei Kiriyenko's followers); then 83% depending on the level of education; of Alexander Lebed's and Grigory incidentally, 11% of people with higher Yavlinsky's adherents. The smallest number education share this view). was among Yevgeny Primakov's proponents (74%). The quantity of those finding it However, the level of education does difficult to answer also varies. The extremes influence the number of those hesitating to here are 5% of Sergei Kiriyenko's voters, 7%

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

7 of Grigory Yavlinsky's voters and 8% of favor of the transfer of nuclear arms and Alexander Lebed's voters against 16% of technologies. While the average figure is 15- Gennady Zyuganov's followers. 17%, the senior group accounted for only 8%. Only 5-7% of people in all age groups found It turns out that the supporters of Sergei it difficult to answer, although among those Kiriyenko, Alexander Lebed and Grigory over 60 this figure amounted to 14%. Yavlinsky tend more strongly towards nonproliferation values than others, while Regardless of education, the number of Yevgeny Primakov's followers are the least opponents of such transfer amounts to 77- nonproliferation-oriented. It is noteworthy 80%. In fact, this figure increases with the that the opinion of two radical political level of education of respondents (77% - groups - Gennady Zyuganov's and Vladimir primary education; 78% - secondary Zhirinovsky's adherents - was not education; 79% - secondary specialized outstanding and was very close to the education; 80% - higher education). average results among all respondents However, this data don't enable us to draw regardless of political preferences. any conclusions about a stable correlation between the answers and the level of Should Russia Transfer Its Nuclear education, since a 3% range may result from Weapons and Technologies to Other States? normal statistical error (2.5%). 78% of the Russian population are against transferring Russia's nuclear weapons and Meanwhile, depending on the level of technologies to other states. 14% are happy to education, the number of those supporting let this happen, while only 8% find the such transfer varies (9% - primary education; question difficult to answer. 13% - secondary education; 15% - secondary specialized education; 18% - higher

Should Russia transfer its nuclear technologies and weapons to other states?

No 78%

Difficult to Yes answer 14% 8%

The men were more enthusiastic about education). There is a strict correlation transferring nuclear arms and technologies - between the level of education and the 17%, compared with 11% of the women. The number of those finding it difficult to answer share of those opposing such transfer is (14%, 8%, 6%, 2% respectively). nearly the same (77% and 80% respectively), while more women were indecisive on the Thus, there is a clear linkage between the matter (10%, against 6% of men). answers and the level of education. As the educational level increases, the number of 77-79% of respondents in all age groups those hesitating to answer is decreasing support the prohibition of the transfer of while the share of supporters of nuclear nuclear arms and technologies under any transfer is growing significantly. At the same circumstances. At the same time, age time, variation in the number of opponents of considerably affects the number of those in nuclear transfer is negligible. Thus, public

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

8 opinion on this matter will change slightly as The difference in views with respect to the level of education of society increases: the political preferences is not sufficient to draw same number of people will oppose the any particular conclusions. The number of transfer of nuclear weapons and transfer proponents is nearly the same in all technologies, while an increasing number political groups (13-15%), except Yury will support such transfer. Luzhkov's voters (11%) and Sergei Kiriyenko's adherents (18%). 13% of the inhabitants of Moscow, St. Petersburg and megalopolises believe that The share of transfer opponents does not nuclear transfer should occur, 82-84% are seriously depend on political preferences and against this, while the number of those amounts to 79-83%. 4-7% of respondents find finding it difficult to answer is low (3-6%). it difficult to answer (the only remarkable figure is Sergei Kiriyenko with his group: As far as small towns and rural area are 2%). concerned, 78-80% are against transferring nuclear arms and technologies to other states. Is Nuclear Theft from Russian Nuclear More supporters of such transfer live in Facilities Possible or Not? villages than in small towns (15% and 9% The gap between the answers of men and respectively), while the number of uncertain women is 1-2%, which corresponds with a respondents varies (7% in villages; 11% in normal statistical error. Hence, it is possible small towns). to presume that men and women gave the same answer to this question. It is noteworthy that the inhabitants of big cities painted a different picture. 18% of them The respondents of two age groups (18-28 back the transfer of nuclear technologies and and 40-59) answered in a similar manner: weapons (more than in the rest of the groups, 82% believed that the theft was possible and above average) and 74% are against it while 11-12% thought that it was impossible. (less than in the rest of the groups, and below This nearly corresponds with the results of average). the senior group (60 years or above), which were 79% and 10% respectively. Hence, the answers vary from group to group, although there is no direct correlation. The situation is different with those aged The data doesn't enable us to make any between 29 and 39. 89% of them are sure of unequivocal conclusions, though one can the possibility of nuclear theft, 8% believe the presume that people in megalopolises opposite, and the number of those finding it support the non-transferal actively and more difficult to answer is the lowest among all than others. age groups. One should bear in mind that this group is the most active from the point Grigory Yavlinsky's and Yevgeny Primakov's of economy and its activities are often voters gave nearly the same answer to this connected with the circumvention of question (14-15% of transfer proponents established rules, petty violations of the law, against 79% of opponents; 5% and 7% etc. uncertain, respectively). Gennady Zyuganov's followers share a similar view The people with secondary, secondary (14% against 78%). Moreover, the opinion of specialized and higher education answered these three political groups is close to the similarly to one another. 84-86% of them total results (figures concerning Gennady assume that the leakage of nuclear material is Zyuganov's voters correspond perfectly). possible, while 9-11% don't think the situation to be that gloomy. As far the The largest number of transfer supporters is primary education group is concerned, 75% found among Sergei Kiriyenko's voters believe in the possibility of nuclear theft, 13% (18%). At the same time, they account for the are more optimistic and 13% (the largest biggest figure of nuclear transfer opponents. number among all educational groups) find it difficult to answer.

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

9

The answers didn't depend on the type of impressive - only 2% had no particular locality (the gap is negligible): 82-83% are opinion on the matter. pessimistic and 10-12% are optimistic. The only astonishing figure relates to the So, only 10% of respondents are sure that inhabitants of Moscow and St. Petersburg: nuclear theft from Russian nuclear facilities is 91% believe in the possibility and only 3% impossible. This result is extremely low. At disagree with this. the same time, only 7% find it difficult to answer (or even 2% in some groups), what The percentage of those assuming the reflects the firm public opinion on this issue. possibility of nuclear material theft is nearly the same across all political groups and is Nonetheless, we presume that 83% believe in very close to the average results: 83-86%. The the possibility of nuclear material theft not extremes are Sergei Kiriyenko's voters (90%) because they know how and where to do and Yury Luzhkov's followers (only 80%). this, but due to a Soviet stereotype - it is allegedly possible to steal practically The share of those sure of the impossibility of everything from one's working place. The nuclear material leakage is practically the majority of the respondents may follow this same among Gennady Zyuganov's, Yevgeny logic, thinking 'If it is possible to steal a

Is nuclear theft from Russian nuclear facilities possible or not?

Possible 83%

Difficult to answer 7% Impossible 10%

Primakov's, Alexander Lebed's and Grigory telephone or all necessary construction Yavlinsky's adherents: 8-11%. Sergei materials from my office or my enterprise Kiriyenko's voters stand apart (5% believe than why can't the nuclear facility employee that it is impossible to steal nuclear material steal some nuclear material from his plant!' in Russia). On the contrary, Vladimir This conclusion is proved by the fact that the Zhirinovsky's and Yury Luzhkov's number of those believing in such illegal supporters give the opposite results (15 and actions with respect to fissile material is more 16% respectively). in the economically active and mobile population groups, members of which have The number of those hesitating to respond an everyday experience of violating laws and didn't vary much: 5-8%, which is quite a low regulations (which is often a prerequisite for result. The answers of Vladimir successful economic activity in modern Zhirinovsky's voters were even more Russia). The pensioners and the respondents with low educational level were less afraid of

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

10 this danger, since they are the least active Russian military-political Establishment as the and enterprising group. most probable Russian response to the US plans). The analysis of answers concerning nonproliferation issues enables us to come to 55% of Russians support START II ratification certain conclusions. The Russian population while only 25% are against it. However, 72% on the whole supports nonproliferation. The believe that the USA will implement only those most important correlation is that between provisions of nuclear arms reduction treaties that are beneficial to Washington. the answers and the level of education.

Therefore, the problem of nonproliferation 86% expressed fears that nuclear weapons in values and culture depends on the problem the hands of international terrorist groups may of access to appropriate information and the be used against Russia. 10% think that such an availability of this information. As the attack is improbable. And only 4% found it educational level increases, the number of difficult to answer this question, which hesitating to answer decreases and the share indicates that the overwhelming majority of the of nonproliferation supporters grows. population is concerned about the issue of nuclear terrorism. The possibility of nuclear The nonproliferation values are shared mostly attack on the part of terrorist groups seems by those who believe that Russia needs nuclear more serious to Russians than the possibility of weapons. 78% of Russia's nuclear arsenal nuclear aggression on the part of foreign states supporters think that the world won't be more (52% raised their concern about such stable if the number of nuclear powers aggression). However, Russians are even more increases. Only 71% of Russia's nuclear arms worried about the possibility of sabotage opponents believe in this. Meanwhile, the latter against the nuclear sites themselves (nuclear have more people finding it difficult to answer power plants, nuclear munitions storage (20% against 11% of nuclear arms proponents). facilities, etc.). 90% of the respondents expressed such a fear. Both opponents and proponents of proliferation back START II ratification by Russia. 60% of the 77% of Russians support the wording contained nonproliferation-oriented public supports the in the Concept of National Security – 'nuclear treaty, while 25% are against its ratification weapons play a decisive role in providing national (49% and 35% of the proliferation-oriented security'. At the same time, 18% (or nearly one respondents respectively). fifth) believe that Russia doesn't need nuclear weapons at all. The supporters of nuclear proliferation have more people presuming that foreign states may Russians seem to back the idea of complete attack Russia using nuclear weapons (57% nuclear disarmament. For instance, 57% of against 51% of nonproliferation advocates). respondents think that the world will be more stable if all nuclear weapons are eliminated. Other Results of the Poll 34% share the opposite point of view. Senior The answers to questions about US plans to respondents (60 years or older) surprisingly develop its national missile defense system contain the largest number of supporters of proved to be some of the most thought- complete nuclear disarmament - 67% of them provoking results of the poll. 54% of believe that the elimination of all nuclear respondents had no previous knowledge of weapons in the world will contribute to American NMD plans, 25% had heard international stability. Here there is a stable something about them before, and only 16% correlation between the answers and the age of claimed to be properly aware of the problem. respondents. Only 49% of the young (18-28 When asked what measures Russia should take years old) believe in a more stable world in response, if the US plans in the area of resulting from elimination. This figure amounts missile defense are implemented, 54% to 55% of people aged 29-39 and 56% of people supported the development of Russia's own aged 40-59. NMD system, 32% preferred to reduce the threat to Russia by diplomatic means and only More proponents of the Russian nuclear status 8% backed the build-up of Russia's strategic are to be found among people with higher nuclear forces (the course declared by the education than in other population groups.

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

11

The political preferences, in general, had PIR Center News practically no impact on the answers to the questions posed by the poll. However, it turned out that supporters of Grigory Yavlinsky Winter 1999-2000 (leader of the Yabloko party and faction, candidate for the presidency in 1996 and 1999, October 5. The PIR Center held a would-be candidate at the 2000 presidential regular Research Council meeting on "The elections) are more inclined than others to Safe Storage of Nuclear Weapons in Russia and believe that Russia needs nuclear weapons Disarmament Problems". (85% of them share this view). Researcher of the Center for Energy and Yury Luzhkov's voters have the most pacifist Environmental Studies at the Princeton intentions (only 73% of them think that Russia University Joshua Handler made a report on needs nuclear weapons). "Russian Nuclear Weapons Storages and Dismantlement Rates: Implications for Future Followers of Sergei Kireyenko (former Prime Arms Control Proposals and Co-operative Minister and one of the right-wing leaders Programs for Nuclear Weapons Security". participating in the parliamentary elections) are strongly against nuclear arms proliferation. As In his report, Mr. Handler touched upon the we mentioned above, 87% of them are sure that following topics: the world won't be more stable if the number of - the Russian weapons storage capacity; states possessing nuclear weapons increases - the withdrawal from deployment and (compared to 76% of all respondents, who share dismantlement rate of Russian nuclear this point of view). weapons; The majority of voters supporting Vladimir - the implications these factors have for Zhirinovsky (leader of the Liberal-Democratic START II, START III, de-alerting measures, Party and corresponding faction in the the CTR program, and transparency. parliament) believe that the Russian nuclear arms should be permanently targeted at certain PIR Senior Advisor Colonel-General (ret.) states (54%). However, amongst the supporters Yevgeny Maslin, former head of the 12th of all the other politicians, only a minority GUMO of the Russian MOD, commented on shares this view. the matter.

It turned out that the supporters of Gennady In the course of informal discussion, the Zyuganov (leader of the Communist Party of participants touched upon the problems of the Russian Federation and corresponding the safe storage of nuclear munitions, the faction in the parliament) give the least backing prospects of continuing negotiations on to the idea of US-Russian nuclear parity. About nuclear disarmament, the de-alerting 23% of them maintain that Russia must have measures, and other issues. the same number of nuclear weapons as the

USA (in comparison with the followers of other Vladimir Frolov (MOD), Vladimir Belous politicians, no less than one third of whom (RAU-University), Alexander Kalyadin advocate this idea). At the same time, 31% of Gennady Zyuganov's voters are sure that (IMEMO), Vladimir Novikov (RISI), Andrei Russia needs more nuclear weapons than the Zobov (Russian Nuclear Society), Anatoly USA. Moreover, his supporters account for the Dyakov (MPhTI), Ivan Safranchuk (PIR largest number of START II opponents. Center), and others delivered reports on the matter. Among other participants were Yevgeny Primakov's followers demonstrated Valery Menshchikov (Security Council), their distrust of the USA in the area of Sergei Prokhorov, Yury Zabaluyev (MOD), implementing nuclear arms reduction treaties - Vladimir Shmelyev (the Kurchatov Institute), 79% of them don't believe that the USA will act Alexander Nikitin (Center for Political and fairly in the fulfillment of the agreements. International Studies), Sergei Zelentsov (Minatom), and others.

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

12

1999, October 30-31. The PIR Center and the Oleg Grinevsky, Monterey Institute of London-based International Institute for International Studies, Nikolai Voloshin, Strategic Studies (IISS) held the international Minatom, Vasily Lata, PIR Center, Yury conference "Nonproliferation Policies: Shaping Polyakov, Council of the Federation, Valery Agenda for the Coming Decade" in the Moscow Prozorov, General Staff Academy, Mikhail Proton hotel. Shelepin, Diplomatic Academy of the Russian MFA, Pavel Zolotarev, Inter- The conference united leading experts in the Regional Public Foundation in Support of the area of WMD nonproliferation and arms Military Reform, Dmitry Litovkin, Krasnaya control from Russia and Great Britain, Zvezda, Alexander Zarubin, Security Council representatives of France, Sweden and the of the Russian Federation, Sergei Belov, RISI, Netherlands as well as the governmental Richard Nystrom, SIPRI (Sweden), Robert structures concerned, non-governmental Schuddeboom, Dutch Embassy in the experts, and journalists. Russian Federation and others.

The conference assessed new challenges to *** the international WMD nonproliferation regime; studied the NPT state-depositaries 1999, November 11-12. The PIR-Center for preparation to the 2000 NPT Review Policy Studies in Russia and the Center for Conference; analyzed the prospects of the Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, USA) CTBT entering into force and the problems of held a seminar for Russian specialists on negotiating the FMCT; and touched upon the "Nonproliferation and MPC&A Sustainability". export control issues, the interdependence between arms control and nuclear Minatom addressed the opening session of nonproliferation matters, and the regional the seminar emphasizing that First Deputy aspects of nonproliferation. The conference Minister of Atomic Energy Valentin Ivanov set forth proposals on expanding the 'attaches tremendous importance to the cause assistance to Russia in the area of nuclear of developing US-Russian cooperation and threat reduction and in the sphere of devotes much of his energy and power to strengthening nuclear security, above all on solve the problems of nonproliferation. First the part of European states. Deputy Minister V.B. Ivanov is sure that the seminar will make a significant contribution The following participants delivered their to building confidence and developing reports and made comments: Michael partnership between our countries and hopes Davenport, British Embassy in the Russian that the practice of holding such seminars Federation, John Chipman, IISS, Terence will continue.' Taylor, IISS, Gile Andreani, IISS, Paul Schulte, British Ministry of Defense, John US Assistant Secretary of Energy Dr. Rose Badley, HM Customs and Excise, Neil Gottemoeller delivered an introductory Harper, British Ministry of Commerce and report. She pointed out that 'to efficiently Industry, Vladimir Frolov, Russian MOD, solve the problems of nonproliferation Marina Belyaeva, Minatom, Vladimir originating from hundreds of metric tons of Dvorkin, 4th TsNII of the Russian MOD, Russian weapons-usable nuclear material, it Pavel Podvig, Center for Disarmament, is necessary to promote close cooperation Energy and Environment of the MEPhI, between the USA and Russia to create a solid Natalya Kalinina, Government Staff, Dmitry basis for long-term functioning and Evstafiev, PIR Center, Arzamat sustainability of MPC&A systems in the Kulmukhametov, MFA, Valery Semin, MFA, Russian Federation. In this respect, the work Roland Timerbaev, PIR Center, Vladimir should follow several directions. First of all, Orlov, PIR Center, Yevgeny Maslin, PIR the joint US-Russian program on material Center, Ivan Safranchuk, PIR Center. consolidation and conversion will help to maintain the security of Russian fissile Among other participants of the conference material, to define the resources allocated to were Andrei Zobov, Russian Nuclear Society, solve this problem efficiently and to reduce

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

13 long-term operating costs. Secondly, it would Summary be reasonable to prefer a way of modernizing security systems which does not require Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) huge financial spending on operation and Journal of the maintenance. Thirdly, it necessary to conduct joint activities in the area of training skilled PIR Center for Policy Studies personnel capable of taking responsibility for Volume 48, No. 6, November- modern MPC&A systems. Fourthly, we December, 1999 should work at developing a technical and personnel infrastructure to operate the Colonel-General (ret.) Fyodor Ladygin in his MPC&A systems, capable of producing and article "Current External Challenges to Russian maintaining the equipment used in these National Interests and Security" argues that 'On systems.' the one hand, it is quite understandable that the state leadership is willing to abandon the In the course of two-day discussions the policy of continuous long-term para bellum seminar touched upon, among others, the and to focus on creative peaceful activities. following issues "Problems of Nuclear What's more, the Russian defense potential is Nonproliferation and New International weakening and the state possesses no Challenges", "Developing a Culture of resources to restore the military might in the Nonproliferation and MPC&A Sustainability at near future. That's why senior officials Large Enterprises", "The Role of Education and should be cautious in using declaratory Training", "The Role of Technology and threats. On the other hand, top political and Methodology". military leadership should be well aware of the realistic external security challenges, The list of participants included Yury should know the scale and degree of danger. Volodin, Gosatomnadzor (Moscow), Nikolai However, it should not always cry wolf, Pogojin, MEPhI (Moscow), Eduard exaggerate its weakness, and terrorize the Kruchkov, MEPhI (Moscow), Alexander electorate. It would be more important for Tolstoi, MEPhI (Moscow), Vasily Glebov, the state security if the Russian leadership MEPhI (Moscow), Oleg Peskov, VNIIA assesses the realistic threats, takes them into (Moscow), Alexander Izmailov, NPO Eleron account in pursuing the foreign policy, and (Moscow), Igor Bumblis, VNIIA (Moscow), deliberately and coherently takes all Andrei Sviridov, VNIIA (Moscow), Stanislav necessary measures to maintain the state Sergeyev, TsNIIAtominform (Moscow), defense might at the required level.' Andrei Zuyev, ISTA company (St. Petersburg), Vladimir Yuferev, VNIIEF The issue also contains a Documents section, (Sarov), Victor Maltsev, VNIIEF (Sarov), including the Federal Law "On Financing the Vadim Rayev, Urals Electrochemical Combine State Defense Contracts for Strategic Nuclear (Novouralsk), Vladimir Sirotenko, Forces of the Russian Federation", the Protocol to Electrochemical Plant (Zelenogorsk), Igor the Agreement between the United States of Goloskokov, Siberian Chemical Combine America and the Russian Federation Concerning (Seversk), Gennady Tyurin, the Krylov TsNII the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and (St. Petersburg), Fred Wehling, Monterey Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Institute of International Studies (USA), Weapons Proliferation, the Federal Law "On Carrie Smarto, US DOE, Sonia Ben Amending Article 64 of the Federal Law on Ouagrham, Monterey Institute of Nuclear Energy Use". The issue includes an International Studies, NISRO (Kazakhstan), Information section. Roland Timerbaev, PIR Center, Vladimir Orlov, PIR Center, Yevgeny Maslin, PIR Center.

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

14

Interview influence on the international processes, NATO attempts to ignore Russian national VLADIMIR YAKOVLEV: interests in the Balkans, and the expansion of unstable zones in the neighboring regions 'STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCES ARE sharing borders with Russia. This, together THE STATE SHIELD' with a number of other foreign policy factors, has dramatically changed the approach to the [This article was originally published in modern role and the terms of using various Russian in Yaderny Kontrol, No. 6, Vol. 48, components of the Russian military might. November-December, 1999] © Yaderny Kontrol, 1999. All rights reserved At present, the SMF increasing role results in © PIR Center, 1999. Translation into English. maintaining deterrence politically. Perhaps, Abridged version under current circumstances, we can speak about extended nuclear deterrence, taking On December 17, 1999, the Russian Strategic into account that any armed conflict and any th Missile Forces will celebrate their 40 infringement of Russian national interests anniversary. During these years the SMF evolved will involve the leading powers, including from nuclear truncheon to nuclear shield. the USA. In this situation, an adequate Nowadays, Russian politicians consider the SMF response is impossible without to be the means of deterring external aggression, demonstrating nuclear deterrence while the nuclear arsenal is no longer regarded as capabilities. However, we should not expect the means of limited nuclear war. However, the drastic improvements to the state of the missile forces continue to develop, to upgrade Russian Armed Forces in the near future. The their materiel and equipment, to improve Russian economy can't create the necessary command and control systems, and to commission conditions for the fast build-up of combat new Topol-M ballistic missile system. The SMF have become a pioneer of the military reform capabilities. For instance, in 1998, the MOD initiated by Russian Defense Minister Marshal received only half of the funds appropriated Igor Sergeyev. by the state budget. In fact, nearly all the funds were expended to cover maintenance Yaderny Kontrol Journal Staff Writer Dmitry costs of the Armed Forces. Expenditure on Litovkin interviews Commander-in-Chief of the purchasing arms and equipment and SMF Colonel-General Vladimir Yakovlev on the conducting research and development (R&D) life and problems of the missile forces. activities accounted to less than six percent of the allocated budgetary means. YADERNY KONTROL: What are the SMF today: a means of deterrence or an offensive Q.: What decisions does the SMF leadership force? What external and internal factors take in order to possess the adequate determine the future of the SMF and response capabilities and to meet modern contribute to enhancing the capabilities of technical requirements in this difficult this Armed Service? situation?

VLADIMIR YAKOVLEV: I would like to A.: We have a program of SMF development say that at present the SMF are the state that relies on estimates of the current shield, although if necessary they may serve economic situation and takes into account its as the Nemesis sword. So, if we speak about possible changes in the next decade (2000- further development priorities of this Armed 2010). Our program complies with the Service, we should emphasize that they are documents providing for the key stages of directly connected with changes in the the military reform till 2005, which have been foreign policy environment and in the approved by President Yeltsin. These are the military-strategic situation in the world, Concept of State Policy on Military Construction which reached their climax in 1999. I mean and the Presidential Decree of November 10, further NATO expansion to the East, US 1998, containing the guide-lines for the claims for world leadership corroborated prospective development of nuclear with enforcement measures, decreasing UN deterrence forces. In conformity with the

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

15 aforesaid provisions, the SMF command has space carriers on the basis of chosen the appropriate priorities in further decommissioned SS-19 missiles and finish SMF development and their components' the modernization of Soyuz-2 and Proton-M improvement. carriers. The SMF will continue works to up- grade the existing and to develop new space We have two major tasks to accomplish for systems for various purposes. The program the SMF to succeed. The first is to complete provides for the infrastructure development the development and commissioning of of the Plesetsk space-vehicle launching site, Topol-M stationary and mobile missile which should replace the Baikonur site. The systems. Despite the lack of funding, we Svobodny space-vehicle launching site managed to achieve certain progress in this development is connected with the use of area. In December 1998, the first missile carriers produced from decommissioned regiment armed with Topol-M missile ICBMs, i.e. Start-1, Rokot, and Strela carriers. systems was on active duty. In accordance with the plans, we continue to test and up- We will improve our aerospace defense by grade the missile system and to carry out the developing the characteristics and enhancing modernization of another missile regiment. combat capabilities of the missile-attack early Hence, despite the slow pace of the process, warning system, by controlling outer space the tangible basis for a prospective Task and providing for missile defense by Force armed with advanced missile systems modernized and newly invented means. The is being formed. SMF defense and information components will develop along with improving command The other priority is to extend the existing and control system by increasing the level of missile systems' service life. Such an automation. The pre-requisite of successful extension is a forced step in the state of missile forces development is the uncertainty which exists with the coordinated improvement of command and implementation of strategic offensive arms control structures and the upgrading of reduction. Such a measure also creates major combat group elements. conditions for gradual nuclear forces improvement at a pace corresponding with Q.: At present, when the economic situation the capabilities of the modern Russian in the country determines the amount of economy and military-industrial complex. funding for military reform, the SMF experience in integrating various military In this connection it is necessary to bear in structures, which were accomplishing mind the importance of START II ratification similar missions and pursuing similar and the further elaboration and signature of strategic interests, may serve as an example START III agreements. In the current of the army prospective development after economic situation, only these measures can the reform. How successful was this provide for balanced reductions in US integration? What are the practical results nuclear warheads. In Russia the reductions and what goals have you failed to achieve? are objective and occur naturally, resulting from Russia's limited capability to up-grade A.: The Aerospace Military Forces (AMF) and its aging weapons. Aerospace Defense Forces (ADF) integration into the SMF structure in 1997 enabled us to The major track in developing SMF space find tangible inner reserves to economize on components is maintaining the orbital group maintenance, to reduce the troops' strength, at the level necessary to accomplish its and to optimize the structures preserving current and future missions, i.e. to have at required combat efficiency. least 60-80 spacecraft. Moreover, we are planning to change the structure of carriers According to our estimates, the optimization and to enhance the capabilities of land-based of the integrated Armed Service organization launching and control infrastructure. By and the elimination of parallel and 2005, only three types of space carriers out of redundant military structures allowed us to seven will remain. We will develop new light economize 700 million rubles on maintenance

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

16 costs. This amount accounted for 10% of the would be assigned with accomplishing a SMF costs in 1998. certain strategic mission. The first experience in this area (although not perfect) has been At the same time, the normal functioning of obtained through establishing operational- the SMF during this period proved their tactical commands on the basis of military viability, controllability, and high degree of districts' directorates. Another example combat readiness. Despite severe financial relates to the strategic nuclear forces. restraints, the SMF managed to preserve the Uncoordinated financing of the separate military training capabilities and to carry out elements results in dissipation of funds, since its primary duties in a regular regime. the state has not determined the principal area of expenditures. We believe that this This year proved the necessity of amending problem should be urgently addressed. systematically the decisions made in the area However, so far this issue is only under of military construction. First of all, this discussion. relates to the NATO military operation in Kosovo. The example of Yugoslavia Q.: So, what is the modern SMF technical demonstrated that the USA together with policy? What tasks, requiring a centralized other Western states was deliberately government solution, do you consider to be working out the ways of conducting combat the most urgent for the missile forces? operations, which would be used in the armed conflicts of the next century. A.: Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev approved the Plan of SMF Construction until 2001 The massed employment of aviation, long- setting forth the main objectives, tasks, tracks range high-precision weapons, electronic of SMF development, and their minimal countermeasures, and the use of the financing. We have laid down the Program on spacecraft information capabilities - all this Maintaining Technical Development of Aerospace has been actively practiced by the US and Missile Weapons. This program provides military since the Desert Storm operation for technical policy priorities in the area of against Iraq in 1991. Moreover, the USA maintaining existing, operational, offensive, clearly determined the principal objects to be defensive and informational strategic destroyed in the course of the conflict - key systems taking into account not only minimal economic infrastructure facilities, major financing but the assessed limitations on elements of the command and control SMF funding in the future. system, means of communication, and transportation routes. NATO expansion to Naturally, we can't expect cardinal changes the East has drastically changed the balance in defense expenditure today and a sudden of power on the theater of war and increase. That is why we are seeking inner encouraged the use of tactical and reserves to finance the implementation of the operational-tactical weapons to accomplish Plan's major provisions, and it is the core of strategic missions. command organizational activities. The Program on Maintaining Technical Development All these changes and innovations should be is based on the principle of preserving and taken into account in the course of Russian maximizing use of the existing arms service military construction, above all, with respect life through conducting R&D and the to the strategic nuclear forces, military tactics practical assessment of the actual technical and strategy, and the Armed Forces state. These activities will allow the service personnel training. Besides, there are a life of weapons to be extended and provide number of other aspects that should be born for nuclear safety and security, as well as in mind, due to changes in the nature of maintaining Russian defense potential. future armed conflicts. Hence, we will be able to preserve the SMF The current state of the Russian military qualitative characteristics with minimal organization requires the establishment of maintenance costs. The solution of this unified commands at different levels, which problem will encourage our activities on

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

17 modernization and qualitative build-up of missiles will be carried out through attracting the arsenal. The technical policy foreign investments. For instance, the implementation should be based on two Khrunichev State Space Science and principles: unification and optimization. As Production Center collaborated with German for unification, we are planning to re-arm the DASA in developing a Rokot carrier on the ICBM units (to replace six various types of basis of the SS-19 missile, whose payload is missile systems with Topol-M system) and to 1.9 ton. SS-19 serves as a basis for Strela reduce the types of carriers to launch carriers developed at NPO Mashinostroyeniye. spacecraft from seven to three (Proton-M, Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and PO Angara, Soyuz-2). In the case of ICBM units, Yuzhmashzavod use an SS-18 missile to we'll manage to cut launchers' maintenance construct a Dnepr carrier rocket with about costs by 32% per annum. 4-ton payload. The use of each decommissioned missile to launch spacecraft The program envisages the establishment of yields approximately 50-60 million rubles. a unified arms ordering and purchasing system and a unified R&D plan to eliminate The technical policy efficiency is reflected in parallelism and to finance the top-priority setting up a unified system to store and projects and activities. We are planning to repair the SMF arms and materiel. The restructure the system of arms production implementation of the program enabled the and development to provide for the deeper reduction of administrative staff (integrating cooperation of enterprises, which will ensure AMF, ADF and SMF structures) and the list the defense contracts' fulfillment with 30%- of technical documentation required for reduced costs. The idea is to concentrate repairs. The use of experts, working at SMF main R&D works at the most advanced and principal repair plants, to repair AMF and mighty scientific research enterprises with a ADF arms ensured the rational use of high technical potential and to get rid of existing funds and enhanced the production unprofitable and unpromising production capacity of SMF enterprises, which got new facilities. In 1999, these activities helped us to defense contracts and managed to prevent a economize 515 million rubles on the drain of skillful personnel. We also create the development and production of arms and SMF logistic support computer system materiel. providing for efficiency, reliability and flexibility of spare parts supplies to the Another track of SMF new technical policy is troops. The calculations demonstrate that the the decision to raise the efficiency of establishment of unified complexes of spare decommissioned ICBM disposal. This industrial equipment will enable us to cut process is complicated and requires down regular purchases by 20-30%, and substantial spending. According to expert hence, to reduce shipment and storage estimates, a solid-fuel ICBM disposal costs expenditures. In these circumstances, the 1.2-2.2 million rubles while a liquid-fuel shortage of spare parts will go down by 25- ICBM disposal amounts to 300 million rubles. 30%. One of the possible solutions is to re-equip the decommissioned missiles and convert One of the most important technical policy them into carriers for launching commercial tracks is the establishment of a unified spacecraft. For instance, on March 4, 1997, at system to provide for arms operational safety the Svobodny site, the Russian MOD launched based on the achievements of all three a Zeya spacecraft with the help of the Strela-1 branches of a new Armed Service. The carrier rocket based on RS-12M Topol system will ensure nuclear and missile. A Start-1 rocket can go into a 300-km environmental safety of arms and equipment orbit with 420 kg of payload. In December and will allow for reducing the SMF costs in 1997, this rocket was used to launch a US this area. satellite. What's more, the SMF and AMF used to It is necessary to point out that the re- conduct the ICBM tests independently, equipment of decommissioned ballistic although the mission of missile test ranges

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

18 and space-vehicle launching sites was nearly processing. The annual operational costs on the the same. This problem will be also solved cosmodrome measuring system will decrease within the program framework. by three fifths of their current level.

Q.: Vladimir Nikolaevich, as far as I Q.: START I and START II determine the understand, this was an underlying cause SMF prospective development. Much will for setting up a unified test range base at depend on the dialogue to review the ABM Kapustin Yar site, which would comprise treaty provisions and to perform aerospace military activities. What is their impact on the the 10th Balkhash test range and the 11th SMF technical policy? Emba test range (both situated in

Kazakhstan). A.: First of all, let me emphasize the

significance of the START treaties, which A.: Quite right. The Kapustin Yar site was provide for preserving a US-Russian nuclear designated to carry out tests for various Armed balance, i.e. the main factor of strategic stability. Services: the SMF, the Air Force, the Army Without these treaties, it would seem ADA, the Navy, etc. Nowadays it's the most unrealistic for Russia to maintain this balance complicated structure among Russian test sites even if the economy made efforts comparable comprising Kapustin Yar, the 10th, and the 11th to the World War II strain. We should certainly test ranges. The unification aims to clarify the possess enough strategic arms to protect amount of necessary works to develop the test independence and territorial integrity but this range till 2005, for Kapustin Yar is used to task can be accomplished with less expensive implement about 130 various R&D programs to means (political, diplomatic, or cultural). up-grade the arms and materiel characteristics.

We should estimate how reasonable and The Helsinki summit agreements to extend the promising these tests will be. In the USSR we START II implementation by five years could afford a large number of test sites and to (reaffirmed in New York in September 1997 in conduct vast research activities. However, an additional protocol) solve the problems of modification and unification of arms and Russian MIRVed ICBMs' early destruction, and materiel as well as the unification of R&D the extra costs relating to this process. The works require economical approach to START II ratification by the State Duma will financing, including expenditures on pave the way for concluding a new US-Russian maintaining testing facilities. agreement - START III, which will create

favorable conditions for technical policy At present, the number of research areas has implementation in a climate of strict financial decreased and we enjoyed the opportunity to restraints. concentrate a number of tests in one location in order not to depend on political moods in the Another important element is the 1972 ABM neighboring state [Kazakhstan - Ed.]. We can treaty with the First and Second Agreed now reduce the Emba site personnel strength. Statements, and the Statement on Confidence- We should also bear in mind that Russia has to Building Measures of September 26, 1997. pay Kazakhstan $4.7 million annually to rent Besides limitations on the parameters of the Emba site, which constitutes a substantial interceptors and target missiles, the agreements amount of spending for the MOD. commit the parties not to deploy any tactical missile defense system that may pose a realistic The unification of test ranges' measuring threat to each other. systems and space-vehicle launching sites' measuring systems will provide for the The START treaties and the ABM agreements optimization of organizational structure and shape a legal system aimed at maintaining technical facilities, increasing the cost-efficiency strategic stability. However, other components of testing activities. At the Baikonur launching of this system exist only in a feebly marked site we'll reduce the number of measuring posts form. In our opinion, the next stage should be from seven to three. Personnel can be reduced an agreement on the status of land-based to a third of its present strength, due to the use missile-attack early warning systems. of new flight control methods and perspective telemetric data processing means. We plan to cut the number of existing technical means for measuring, information collection and data Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

19

Q.: Do you agree that to maintain strategic Q.: Before the Balkan crisis the Russian stability it is necessary to prevent a nuclear strategic missile forces and their US arms race in outer space? counterparts were fulfilling the so-called Shadow program. Russian and US officers got A.: The maintenance of strategic stability is to know the duties and peculiarities of connected with the problems of counter- service, following their colleagues like satellite measures and arms deployment in shadows and performing their duties. After outer space. This problem first emerged in the NATO attacks air raids against Yugoslavia, all course of US-Soviet negotiations in 1978-1979 contacts in this area were suspended. Do you but didn't lead to a diplomatic breakthrough in find it necessary to resume the practice of this area. The USA insisted on an agreement to exchanging experience, which promotes eliminate existing anti-satellite systems and to mutual understanding between the two prohibit their development and deployment. armies? The USSR didn't agree with these proposals, because the prohibition was not supposed to A.: You are quite right, the program was rather cover the deployment of US space shuttles interesting and useful for both states. These capable of conducting anti-satellite warfare. contacts have been developed for five years, and I believe they have born their fruit. We Since 1983, when the USSR declared a unilateral witnessed some positive moments in the US moratorium on deploying anti-satellite military routine and our colleagues had a weapons in outer space, the process began to chance to make sure that we were not monsters resemble a pendulum, as the parties first or Russian bears. Even in private talks many US unilaterally declared bans on counter-satellite officers told me that they understood our measures, then revoked these commitments. In similarity and our unwillingness to make a pre- 1988, the USA intensified the anti-satellite emptive nuclear strike. development activities. In October 1997, it succeeded in conducting a series of tests of the Some time should pass so that we may Miracle land-based chemical laser, which was understand each other. The US fear of Russian used directly against a spacecraft situated at a ballistic missiles results from the apprehensions height of 400 km. This laser is capable of that our systems are not safe and unauthorized destroying spacecraft's solar batteries and launches may occur. The Shadow program optical-electronic devices, and can significantly proved that it was not true. The US officers reduce the sensitivity of early warning system served together with Russian counterparts and space sensors. could study in person the organization of our decision-making structures. As a result, they The lack of agreements banning counter- agreed that the USSR had managed to develop satellite activities negatively affects the viability reliable missile delivery systems and systems to of START and ABM treaties since all elements prevent unauthorized access to nuclear arms of strategic stability maintenance are inter- and unauthorized missile launches. twinned. The missile defense systems are Commander-in-Chief of the US Strategic capable of accomplishing aerospace defense Command General Habiger admitted that the missions and, hence, the possible agreements level of Russian SMF expertise exceeded that of on space defense should be linked to the the US missile forces. I visited the command corresponding missile defense commitments. posts of a regiment and a brigade in the USA The threat to the parties' spacecraft, including and I can state that our security systems are not the early warning systems, will have an impact worse than the US analogues, and sometimes on strategic arms treaties. This interdependence they are even better. The statistics show that in will grow as the strategic offensive arms 1998, our orders registration system didn't lose reduction continues, and the lack of agreement a single order out of tens of thousands of orders on the matter will undermine the strategic a year. balance. That's why the negotiations and further improvement of the international arms As for the resumption of cooperation, I can only control regime should be carried out in close say that after developments in Yugoslavia we connection with the whole system of need some time to return to the prior level of agreements in the area of strategic stability. relations. That's why I would prefer not to make any forecasts for the future.

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

20

Interview reveal any cases of fissile material loss or theft at the enterprises in Chelyabinsk: all material was in the right place. VICTOR YERASTOV: 'MINATOM HAS ALL CONDITIONS FOR Q.: Will you please tell us the number of PROVIDING SAFETY AND exposed cases of fissile material theft from SECURITY OF NUCLEAR Minatom enterprises?

MATERIAL' A.: We have officially registered 52 cases in our database. In most cases the illicit trafficking [This article was originally published in involves radioactive substances having nothing Russian in Yaderny Kontrol, No. 6, Vol. 48, to do with fissile material. These sources of November-December, 1999] radiation are mainly used in the national © Yaderny Kontrol, 1999. All rights reserved economy, in various industries. The last case of © PIR Center, 1999. Translation into English. fissile material theft in the Minatom structure Abridged version dates back to 1995. Since then we haven't registered any theft. In late December 1998, the ITAR-TASS news agency reported on the detention of a criminal group Q.: You argue that after 1995 the nuclear theft that had stolen fissile material from a Minatom has suddenly stopped. What accounts for such enterprise in the Chelyabinsk region. a drastic change of the situation?

To clear up the situation regarding fissile material A.: It is all very simple. In 1992-1995, the storage facilities, Yaderny Kontrol Staff Writer privatization program was under way and the Dmitry Litovkin talks with Head of the Department boost of business development was following of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control the all-for-sale motto. Naturally, some dealers (Minatom) Victor Yerastov. began to incite the employees of our enterprises to make money on illicit trafficking in fissile YADERNY KONTROL: Victor Vladimirovich, and radioactive material. The press was fuelling would you, please, clear up the situation. the myth about the fabulous price of this What has happened in Chelyabinsk? material on the black market and alleged interest in it on the part of criminal groups. This VICTOR YERASTOV: Minatom checked the was the time when the press invented red information on the aforementioned case. There mercury and some other non-existing are several Minatom enterprises in the substances, which were supposed to be Chelyabinsk region, and Minatom and FSB necessary for the criminal groups. Thus, the specialists managed to prevent an attempt to mass media promoted the craving for profits illegally remove fissile material from one of the and a growth in the amount of illegally taken enterprises. I can't go into details, for the nuclear material. investigation is under way. The only thing I can confirm is that the thieves could have inflicted a Before and after 1995, the Minatom leadership significant damage to the state. The substance paid much attention to fissile material security they were interested in is a sort of semi-finished and took steps to strengthen controls in this product made of fissile material. It can be used area. The ministry held a special Ministerial in the manufacture of various military and Board session devoted to this issue, which civilian products in the nuclear industry. The decided to work out a program for maintaining attempt to steal this material was prevented at security and control over fissile material at the very beginning, on the enterprise territory, Minatom enterprises. The program was and we do not find it correct to say that the submitted to the Government, which ordered theft occurred. the implication of the Federal Program on Establishing the State System of Nuclear Material Moreover, all our enterprises working with Accounting, which for the first time replaced our fissile material undergo annual, quarterly and sectoral program and covered the whole monthly inventories, which show the state of country. materials and provide for calculating a material balance. The enterprises are under strict and So, today, in accordance with the Law "On comprehensive control. That's why I can state Nuclear Energy Use", we are responsible for that the Minatom annual inventory didn't Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

21 general security. Concerted efforts of different A.: Since 1993, we have been implementing a agencies resulted in the elaboration of the cooperating program with the United States. aforesaid national program. These decisions Minatom and the US DOD signed an agreement coincided with the beginning of broad on improving the MPC&A of fissile material. At international cooperation in the area of first, the program was financed in the Nunn- maintaining nuclear material security and Lugar framework, but in 1995, the US DOD safety. This problem is topical for many states ceded its powers to the US DOE, which has of the world and Russia is not an exception. become our exclusive partner in this area. All Nonetheless, I would like to point out (and our contacts are aimed at solving the problem of foreign partners usually agree) that information improving the MPC&A systems. This work about the existence of international crime engages practically all our nuclear enterprises, groups interested in acquiring nuclear material including federal nuclear centers in Sarov and and in its further use to blackmail the Snezhinsk. international community is exaggerated by the press. The USA rendered substantial aid to our enterprises in this area. For instance, we Q.: The fissile material can't be used by itself. introduced an MPC&A system in the FEI It is impossible to create an atomic bomb at (Physics Energy Institute) in Obninsk. In some home. This sounds unrealistic… cases, our institutes developed and started manufacture of indigenous MPC&A systems A.: If we speak about primitive devices it's financed by the USA. We are now introducing quite possible. A lot of general information radioactive monitors produced by one of our about nuclear munitions' production is laboratories in VNIIEF (Sarov), which got described in detail in literature that is available funding from the Los Alamos laboratory (USA); to the public. Thus, if you have enough the monitors have already been tested and knowledge and perseverance you can solve this certified. Our cooperation with the USA has problem. That's why the UN is concerned with enabled our enterprises not only to consume this threat and calls for the signing of an the assistance but to develop new technologies international convention on preventing nuclear and introduce them into serial production. terrorism. So, the world community is anxious Beside the USA, Minatom collaborates with the about this possibility because you can't Euroatom Safeguards Directorate, EU Joint completely rule out the emergence of nuclear Research Center, and nuclear centers in terrorist groups. We do our best to prevent this, Germany, Great Britain, and France. work out and implement the programs aimed at enhancing security of fissile material, and Q.: What is your vision of the further take appropriate measures at all enterprises of improvement of fissile material storage our industry. systems? May it happen that the human factor will be completely excluded one day? Q.: We have discussed the external aspects of the problem, but how is it solved at the level A.: The human factor will always exist, but the of an enterprise? machinery should serve mankind. A comprehensive system of organizational and A.: We have organizational and physical means technical means should hamper nuclear theft. of protection. We have set up a reliable system We can say that the human factor is not as of physical protection of nuclear plants and decisive as it was several years ago. Modern fissile material production facilities. Specially equipment allows us to control the movement trained MOI units guard Minatom enterprises. of a uranium pellet weighing only 10-15 g and We actively use various technical means: a containing 3-4% of uranium-235. Our monitors multilevel system of control containing for radiation control can register the movement computers and television sets, enabling us to of a single pellet. control and monitor the security and safety of nuclear material at all stages of its life cycle, i.e. Besides, the State Customs Committee (GTK) from the phase of production to a complete has set up a system of external radiation disposal. monitoring at customs posts and terminals. All this provides for a unified system of reliable Q.: How important is the international control over the safety and security of nuclear assistance rendered to Minatom? material in Russia.

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

22

Commentary this spring the CTR underwent a serious durability test. THE CTR PROGRAM AND The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia inflicted RUSSIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY significant damage to US-Russian bilateral INTERESTS relations. It's known that at one point the Russian leadership began to question the by Yevgeny Maslin, necessity of continuing cooperation on PIR Senior Advisor nuclear threat reduction. The Russian legislature and executive consistently proposed to freeze or even bury the program. © PIR Center, 1999. All rights reserved. Some program components, albeit the less Translation into English. Abridged version important ones involving the Russian Defense Ministry (MOD), were actually The first year of the approaching millenium suspended for a brief period. becomes a key stage in implementing the US-

Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction program, However, even when the tensions in bilateral also known as the Nunn-Lugar Plan. relations reached their climax, when it

seemed that bilateral contacts established in In the program framework, the US provides late 1980s and early 1990s were falling to technical assistance to Russia and other pieces, CTR implementation continued at the former Soviet states in strategic offensive pre-determined pace, although with a few arms elimination, transportation and storage exceptions. The Nunn-Lugar program became of fissile materials, and chemical weapons one of the few elements of US-Russian destruction. Since the program's inception in partnership which stood the Kosovo test. The 1991, the US has appropriated $1.7 billion to program turned out to be equally needed on Russia, 450 million of which have been both sides of the ocean. actually spent. The Clinton administration request for FY2000, which amounts to $475.5 CTR Program: How It All Began million ($35 million more than in 1999), has Even today we can here skeptical voices: did already gained the consent of the Senate. Russia have to join this program, to bite a US

fly? The number of these skeptics has On June 16, the parties signed the protocol in decreased since 1992 but those remaining the Russian embassy in Washington, continue to repeat: the only place to find free extending the CTR umbrella agreement till cheese is a mouse-trap. This idea was first June 16, 2006. By signing the protocol, Russia voiced at the Supreme Soviet hearings in provided for the program's legal basis for the 1992 when the MOD and Minatom senior next seven years and, hence, contributed to representatives had to answer the questions CTR maintenance. At the same time, all of the MPs astonished by the US initiative. previous agreements were left unaltered.

To my mind, we should proceed from the Even a month before the agreement's actual state of affairs. This is not just from expiration neither the Pentagon nor the US word of mouth. I remember how in 1992- Congress had any certainty about Russian 1993 and even later I had to face ex officio (as willingness to extend it in time. That's why head of the Russian MOD Main Directorate the US administration notified the in charge of storage and transportation congressional committees concerned about security of the Russian nuclear arsenal) a the possible freezing of funding, while the completely new, non-typical situation, US DOD on June 9, 1999 was ready to inform concerning the maintenance of control over contractors, working in the program's entrusted munitions. framework, that the projects might be suspended. More likely, the actions of the US Specialists who operated nuclear weapons executive were formal and overcautious, were at a certain loss due to a growing although there were reasons for uncertainty - number of tasks - we had to transport

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

23 nuclear munitions throughout Russia more My colleagues and I had to solve the problem often than not by railroads and vehicles. of enhancing nuclear arms security. We There was an increasing munitions inflow required many things to accomplish this task from the Russian neighbor FSU states. I - supercontainers, new computer systems, remember how in the early 1960s Soviet and armored blankets. We had to deploy the nuclear munitions were delivered to Eastern emergency systems to respond to potential Europe in ordinary railway cars usually used accidents involving nuclear weapons. All this for the transportation of cement, iron, etc. In we got from the US: railcar conversion kits the 1990s, the situation was different. We had (100 cargo and 15 guard), 4,520 Kevlar to think about enhanced transportation ballistic blankets, and 150 supercontainers. In security. And we were not ready to solve the CTR framework, we set up an analytical these problems on the spot. security assessment system (ASSESS), automated inventory control and The process of arms reduction intensified, management system to account for and track above all within the START I framework. nuclear warheads. The Security Assessment Could we then have solved the problem on and Training Center began operation in our own and in time? I have serious doubts Sergiev Posad. We also received polygraph about this. equipment to check personnel reliability, which was somewhat exotic for us at that With this background we had to meet the time but turned out to be extremely new challenge of nuclear terrorism, trying to necessary. prevent unauthorized access to stored or transported nuclear weapons. We felt the The main value of the CTR program is the most serious threat in 1991-1992, at the time efficiency of funding. When the financing is of the escalation of the Chechen conflict. timely and correct and helps to cure our weak points, the program can be called really I don't want to describe the situation in terms useful. of Hollywood action movies, showing our nuclear arms storage facilities simply as a Could we then have solved the problem on yard with a through-passage for terrorists of our own? Perhaps, yes, but it would have different nationalities. Russian nuclear required titanic efforts and in conditions of weapons storage bases can be said, with Russia's difficult financial-economic some reservation, to be sufficiently protected. situation, the process of enhancing security It isn't supermen-peacemakers, who wouldn't have been as fast as it had to be due safeguard the world from nuclear arms to circumstances and security challenges. proliferation, but soldiers and officers, professionally guarding storage facilities. However, we should not forget that the US assistance to the MOD is an important and At the same time, I'm not going to run to appreciable contribution but not the another extreme; we have to admit that the determining financial factor. The lion's share situation was quite problematic. of money is appropriated from the Russian budget. The Russian political leadership and So, there was an objective need for external the legislators are beginning to realize the assistance. utmost priority of appropriating funding for the programs of nuclear security and arms Obviously, the CTR agreements with the reduction. This positive trend should be USA were promoted partly thanks to the marked. general climate of US-Russian bilateral relations which existed until 1994-1995. It The CTR program played a remarkably had some elements of euphoria and naivete. positive part. Nowadays we can admit that There was an illusion that the USA and the US-Russian cooperation in enhancing Russia had common foreign policy goals, the storage and transportation security of most important of which was the nuclear nuclear warheads encouraged Russia to start arms reduction. solving the problems of nuclear arms

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

24 proliferation prevention and to reduce the dismantlement should also be kept in secret risk of nuclear terrorism. in order to prevent unauthorized access to the technology of a nuclear charge. The program equally helped both states to maintain their national security, hence, the At the same time, the progress in the area of program is mutually beneficial and information enables us to gradually but demonstrates a real cooperative threat inevitably reduce the threshold of sensitivity reduction. and welcome more transparency, since the parties know the alleged secrets of each other. I would like to say a few words about successful implementation of the program for Shortcomings of the Program strategic offensive arms elimination, which is At the same time, although the program's aimed at assisting in disposal of ICBMs, silo evident achievements are its timeliness and launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, the partner-like and mutually beneficial and liquid fuel. character reflected in its title, the CTR has some negative sides, impeding its The agreement on this project was signed on implementation and casting a shadow on the August 26, 1993. In accordance with the whole CTR concept. agreement, the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) obtained $10.5 million-worth of different First, it's worrisome that the program, equipment. The substantial assistance was annually approved by Congress, is provided for the re-cultivation works. constantly linked with certain political conditions, which have nothing to do with The SMF received 20 items of materiel worth CTR (for instance, there are demands for the $4 million. In the next years, the cooperation cessation of Russian-Iranian cooperation). improved, resulting in open contacts on Preserving such a policy of artificial but rigid constructing the base for solid-fuel ICBMs linkages results in disappointment and a lack destruction at the Votkinsk Plant and on of understanding. I believe that the CTR has reconstructing the similar bases in become a quite independent element of US- Surovatikha and Pimashura. Russian bilateral relations, and that we should strive for preserving its importance, Transparency and Secrecy regardless of the domestic or external Sometimes in Russian lobby interviews, political situation. especially in conversations among legislators, one can hear the following accusations: how Tactical reasons shouldn't hamper the could Russia run such a risk and become movement towards strategic goals. transparent to US equipment and inspectors? I'll make no secret of the fact that on-sight Otherwise, we may find ourselves having to inspections are sometimes meticulous if not confront a situation where Russian overly opportunistic. However, in most cases legislators, pressured by the US, Congress in in the course of program implementation, the particular, and willing to hinder the policy of parties have learned to feel the boundaries of artificial linkages, may try to block further secrecy, which shouldn't be crossed. At the CTR implementation. And they have such same time, we know each other very well opportunity, for Russian law requires and know too much about nuclear weapons ratification of the June 16, 1999 protocol by and technical capabilities to bluff or to be the State Duma. At present, President Yeltsin secretive if the secrets are no longer secrets for hasn't submitted the protocol to the State anyone. Duma for ratification, and thus, the decision will be taken by new parliamentarians after I believe that the most sensitive issue for the the December elections. national security is the brain drain, i.e. the knowledge of our scientists and designers Secondly, the program's social component involved in developing military equipment. hasn't been taken into full account yet. In the The process of nuclear munitions' process of arms reduction under START

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

25 treaties, providing housing for thousands of The good news is, however, that the two people who earlier worked with nuclear sides have learned to discuss collaboratively arms and their carriers, should become one emerging problems. The CTR program of the most important parts of the program; hardly resembles a dialogue of the deaf. On at least, no less important than missiles or the contrary, it's an impressive starting point nuclear powered submarines dismantlement. for the realization of ideas and the creation of It's noteworthy that US partners, involved in an atmosphere of trust and transparency. the program's fulfillment for many years, When the program was launched, my US demonstrate a better understanding of the partners - Assistant to the Secretary of importance of the human factor in nuclear Defense Harold Smith and Gen. Roland threat reduction. The sooner CTR provides Lajoie - made every effort to promote its for social programs and the sounder their success. The air of confidence helped us to fulfillment is, the more fruitful will be our found the basis for the present-day steps of cooperation on new directions and the less our successors in the two defense political objections will emerge on the part of departments. Russia. Nunn-Lugar Plus Thirdly, it's not always clear what amount of The US contribution to nuclear threat allocated funding eventually reaches Russia, reduction in Russia is decisive, although i.e. what the amount of actual assistance is. Russia also highly appreciates the support As far as I understand, this problem is not provided or promised by other states. The only Russian but relates to the US General MOD has received assistance from Great Accounting Office as well. Impressive Britain and France. At present, we appreciate declared sums are normally no more than the aid provided - or to be provided - for figures of appropriated assistance. However, Russian enterprises working with nuclear at the final stage when we try to figure out material, whose security should be how much money has been spent on nuclear guaranteed. Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, threat reduction, attaining the program's and Italy are making efforts in this field. objectives in Russia, and what amount has been left for administrative and other vague Nevertheless, I have to emphasize that the costs, it's always difficult to understand the amount of assistance from G-7 states (except real situation. It seems that in certain cases USA) and European countries is still small. the gap between appropriated funds and actually received funds is rather large. Without the active participation of all leading developed economies, Europe in particular, There are problems in Russia as well. First of Russia may fail to solve the problems of all, it's the lack of coordination among aid nuclear arms reduction and to maintain recipients. Unfortunately, bureaucratic nuclear materials security. squabbles occur very frequently and each ministry attempts to prove its primary CTR Prospects importance. As a result, the money is Is the CTR agenda still topical? Does the appropriated not to those who badly need it, above-mentioned success give reasons for but to those who are good at elbowing their finishing it? To my mind, it is still topical and way. This vicious practice reduces the there are no such reasons. On the contrary, attractiveness of the program. A solution the program is steadily developing, partners might be found in establishing a Russian have learned to understand each other, all coordinating structure, whose functions growing pains have been cured, and the might be performed by an Arms Control and program seems to gain resistance to crises Disarmament Agency, and it would be after Kosovo. It's high time we thought about important if President Yeltsin eventually exploiting the program's former takes the decision to set up such federal achievements and yet unrevealed potential at authority. least for the next seven years.

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

26

Changes in governments, parliaments, and Analysis administrations shouldn't affect the program's dynamics. RUSSIA AND THE 2000 NPT

Russia and US have, as never before, a rich REVIEW CONFERENCE CTR agenda. By 2007 1,003 ICBMs and 500 silos should be eliminated, 95 bombers and by Roland Timerbaev, 669 SLBMs dismantled. The fissile material PIR Senior Advisor storage facility at the Mayak plant in the Urals will become operational. Two nuclear cities - [This article was originally published in Zheleznogorsk and Seversk - will conduct Russian in PIR Study Paper, No. 12, 1999] reactor core conversion to cease production © PIR Study Papers, 1999. All rights reserved of weapons-grade plutonium. © PIR Center, 1999. Translation into English. Abridged version As for the enhancement of nuclear munitions' security, which has been my area of work for The Process of NPT Implementation and several decades, I have to admit that despite the Present Status of the Nuclear large-scale activities in this area, much is left Nonproliferation Regime to do together. It's important for the program It is useful to study in more depth the to be able to adequately respond to emerging process of NPT implementation in the light challenges. There is still room for of the 1995 conference decisions, which led to improvement in nuclear arms security. the agreement of the majority of non-nuclear weapon states to the treaty's indefinite Coming back to US-Russian CTR extension. cooperation, we can't neglect another of the program's advantages - a pragmatic concept Decision 1 of the conference hasn't been and the utmost concrete implementation. fulfilled, because the Preparatory Committee failed to approve recommendations for the When euphoria in bilateral relations has 2000 conference in accordance with this yielded (presumably, for long) to cool decision. relationship, romanticism of the past is absolutely irrelevant. At a time when the The main document of the conference bilateral agenda has been, if not ruined, then concerning substantive matters is Decision 2 washed out by the Kosovo crisis and the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear equal indifference of foreign policy makers in Nonproliferation and Disarmament". The Moscow and Washington, it's extremely document names as the top-priority issue the important to find pragmatic islets, enabling problem of universality: 'All States not yet us to cross the swamp and not to perish in party to the Treaty are called upon to accede quagmire. Despite swelling voices in to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly Moscow and Washington, surreptitiously those States that operate unsafeguarded advising the governments to ignore the nuclear facilities. Every effort should be interests of each other, the existence of made by all States parties to achieve this nuclear weapons makes inevitable, even at objective.' worst, the continuation of bilateral strategic dialogue. An ignore-and-neglect policy won't There are four such states - Israel, India, work, in spite of one's bad will. In the lack of Pakistan and Cuba1, while all other 187 breakthroughs, with the uncertainty about the countries of the world are the NPT prospects of negotiations on further strategic participants. India and Pakistan have openly arms reduction (the so-called START III conducted nuclear tests. There is no such process) and with the fragile future of the ABM data on Israel, which continues to adhere to a treaty, the policy of small deeds should become policy of opacity. However, it is recognized the basis for resuming dialogue. We should and everyone proceeds from the assumption work hard together to persistently enlarge such that Israel possesses nuclear weapons and islets as the CTR program. their delivery systems2.

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

27

Naturally, it would be unrealistic to expect under construction, which are not directly these states to accede to the NPT, in any case, related to military programs. This step, in before the opening session of the 2000 practice, would demonstrate their conference, although many countries are willingness to promote the expansion of the urging them to do so3. And one can hardly nonproliferation regime. doubt that all three states must be interested in preventing further proliferation of nuclear India has six operating reactors in Madras, weapons, since the emergence of new de facto Kakrapar, and Nagora and four energy units nuclear weapon states in their regions would in Kaiga and Kota, which will soon come into undermine their security. This should be operation. All these reactors have the clearly understood and explained to their capability for producing plutonium. The officials and to the public, especially in India experimental fast breeder reactor in and Pakistan. Israel fully recognizes the Kalpakkam and all research reactors are not threat of proliferation. In 1981, an Israeli air covered by the safeguards6. It is necessary to raid destroyed the Iraqi Ozirak reactor, which point out that some other Indian nuclear might have been used for plutonium plants are under the IAEA safeguards, production, and the international community including two energy units in Kudankulam, condemned these arbitrary actions of Israel. the construction of which will be aided by Russia. What can these states do to help to maintain the nonproliferation regime, taking into Pakistan has one energy reactor in Kanupp account their own interests? and two research units in Parr-1 and Parr-2, which are under the IAEA safeguards. Firstly, they can declare without reference to However, the heavy water Kushab reactor the appropriate provisions of the NPT (e.g. with plutonium production capability is not Article I) that they will refrain from covered by the safeguards. transferring nuclear explosive devices and from assisting, encouraging or inducing the Israel has no energy reactors and has only manufacture or acquisition of such devices4. one research reactor in Soreq, supplied by the It would be more difficult for Israel to make USA and covered by the IAEA safeguards. such a statement because of its proclaimed However, the spent fuel re-processing plant policy of opacity but this could be voiced, in Soreq is not under the safeguards. perhaps, in another, more disguised way. Fourthly, these states may join the 1980 Secondly, they can participate in activities to Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear ensure strict nuclear export controls. In 1975, Material. Israel signed the convention in 1983 France took part in the work of the Nuclear but hasn't ratified it yet. Suppliers Group, although it hadn't joined the NPT (France acceded to the treaty in 1992). Fifthly, they may accede to the 1994 At this stage, it is obviously unrealistic to Convention on Nuclear Safety. All three states speak about Israeli, Indian or Pakistani have signed the convention but haven't participation in the NSG but they can ratified it yet. coordinate their actions with the group. According to Prof. Larry Scheinman, all three Sixthly, they may join the CTBT. states can officially pledge their commitment to the guidelines established by the NSG and Seventhly, Israel can accede to the CWC and the Zangger Committee and can pass the Biological Weapons Convention. India and appropriate national legislation on nuclear Pakistan are participants to these treaties and export controls5. India has submitted information on its prior capabilities of chemical weapons production. Thirdly, they can submit to the IAEA Israel hasn't even signed the Biological safeguards (following the example of Weapons Convention and it is suspected of officially recognized nuclear weapon states) performing activities in violation of its their operating reactors or power plants provisions in the Institute for Biological

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

28

Research in Ness Ziona7. As for the CWC, states have signed the treaty. Out of the 44 Israel has signed it but not ratified the treaty. countries possessing nuclear potential (energy and research reactors in accordance Eightly, three states may support the earliest with the IAEA data), whose ratification is possible commencement of FMCT required under Article XIV for the CTBT's negotiations without any conditions, in entry into force, 26 states have ratified the which neither of three countries has so far treaty (Argentina, Australia, Austria, shown great interest. India and Israel as de Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, facto nuclear weapon states are against France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, considering the issue of existing stockpiles of Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, such material, while Pakistan insists on Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, taking these into account. South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK). In total, 51 states have ratified. The implementation of some of these measures, which do not run counter to the The treaty has a provision that if it 'has not security interests of India, Pakistan, and entered into force three years after the date of Israel, would make the problem of the anniversary of its opening for signature', universality less acute at the 2000 conference its depositary (UN Secretary-General) shall and would contribute to creating a favorable convene a conference of ratifiers upon the climate at the conference and to request of a majority of these states. This strengthening the nonproliferation regime. conference 'shall consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with Decision 2 of the 1995 conference emphasizes international law may be undertaken to the importance of the NPT for preventing accelerate the ratification process in order to further proliferation of nuclear weapons. In facilitate the early entry into force of this this connection, one can expect that the 2000 Treaty' (paragraph 2, Article XIV). Such conference will discuss many topical issues conferences may be repeated in the future such as the situation with Iraq, North Korea until the treaty becomes effective (paragraph and some other states suspected of nuclear 3). All signatories to the treaty may attend ambitions, the problem of nuclear material the conference as observers (paragraph 4), i.e. drain and physical protection of this without the right to participate in decision- material, the problem of nuclear terrorism, making. etc. The conference might touch upon the issue of WMD and the proliferation of their This clause concerning the conferences is delivery systems. aimed at exerting political pressure on the states delaying ratification of the treaty and, The 1995 conference decision on the hence, its entry into force. Vague wording principles and objectives of nuclear about the time of convening the conference nonproliferation and disarmament attached caused debate but most of the states agreed special importance to the goal of nuclear to hold the conference in October 1999. disarmament. As we have already said, the most urgent tasks in this area were defined The CTBT conference was held in Vienna on as follows: October 6-8, 1999, and was presided by the - conclusion of the CTBT no later than Japanese foreign minister. Among its 1996; participants were ratifiers, signatories and - commencement of negotiations and some states that didn't sign the treaty (Libya, conclusion of the FMCT; Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe). - and continued efforts of all nuclear India refrained from participating in the weapon states to reduce their nuclear conference, although it had earlier declared arsenals with the ultimate goal of their its intention to sign the CTBT. complete elimination. The conference adopted a final declaration The CTBT was concluded and opened for urging all states to sign and ratify the treaty. signature on September 24, 1996. So far, 155 The parties to the CTBT reaffirmed their

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

29 commitment to major obligations of the documents and was going to use them to treaty and pledged to refrain from acts which dispose of the ABM treaty. would defeat its object and purpose before the CTBT becomes effective. In his opposition to the treaty, Jesse Helms was backed by the Senate Republican Many NGOs attended the conference. George majority. According to Arms Control Today, Bunn delivered a statement on behalf of all Senator Helms enjoyed the full support of the NGOs, including the PIR-Center for Policy leader of the Senate Republican majority, Studies in Russia, and called for the CTBT Trent Lott9. entry into force at the earliest possible date. In this connection, the Washington Post It is difficult to say so far how effective the pointed out that senior executive officials Vienna conference will be from the point of would refrain from submitting to the Senate facilitating the process of CTBT entry into the amendments to the ABM treaty unless force8. Obviously, the fate of the CTBT the Russian parliament ratified START II. depends on its ratification by the USA, Therefore, it's a vicious circle. The Senate Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel. Committee or, at least, its leadership linked The situation in these states is analyzed the CTBT ratification to the abolition of the below. ABM treaty. At the same time, the State Duma of the Russian Federation, if it decides United States of America to ratify START II, will link it to the strict The US administration submitted the CTBT observation of the ABM treaty on the part of to the Senate for ratification in September the USA. Thus, US prompt ratification of the 1997. US President Bill Clinton and US CTBT seemed extremely problematical. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright have many times emphasized that the treaty Nonetheless, the US executive branch complies with US security interests and has a continued to make resolute statements in high foreign policy priority. For instance, Bill favor of prompt ratification. On March 2, Clinton in his foreign policy speech on 1999, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson February 26, 1999, urged the US Senate to maintained that the whole Cabinet would be ratify the CTBT in 1999 because of the engaged in promoting the ratification and significance of the treaty to the USA and the that he believed that the chances of passing world at large. On July 20, President Clinton the ratification bill were more than 50-50 if it reiterated his resolution to achieve was put to the vote of the Senate. It is well ratification of the treaty and urged the Senate known that international agreements need 67 Foreign Relations Committee to start votes to be ratified by the Senate. On April 1, hearings on the CTBT in autumn 1999. He 1999, Madeleine Albright reaffirmed the made a similar resolute statement on October administration’s appeal to ratify the CTBT in 6, 1999. 1999. The public opinion polls conducted in summer 1999 demonstrated that 82% In late January 1999, Madeleine Albright supported the treaty (in comparison to 73% informed the Chairman of the Senate Foreign before Indian-Pakistani tests in May 1998). Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, that the US administration believed the CTBT to be The US Government used all available means the matter of top priority among the to convince the senators, including a positive international agreements submitted to the reaction to the agreement by the directors of Senate for consideration. However, according three nuclear laboratories (Los Alamos, to the Washington Post, Senator Helms said Livermore and Sandia) and the Joint Chiefs that the committee would not consider the of Staff. CTBT until the administration submitted additional documents related to the 1972 However, on October 13, 1999, the US Senate ABM treaty and signed in 1997. On February rejected ratification of the CTBT by 51 votes 15, 1999, the Washington Post wrote that Jesse against 48 without even holding hearings in Helms had objections to these additional the committees. The voting was seriously

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

30 influenced by party interests. The US refusal After the US Senate’s refusal to ratify the to ratify the treaty has dealt a significant CTBT, on October 14, 1999, the MFA blow to the prospects of the CTBT entering spokesman expressed Russia's into force. President Clinton stated after the disappointment and grave concern about the voting that the USA would continue to Senate decision and regarded that decision as observe moratorium on nuclear tests and a serious blow to the prospects of the CTBT’s would continue to strive for CTBT entry into force. 'In the existing situation, ratification. Russia commits itself to the CTBT but finds it necessary to take into account the US Vice-President Al Gore, who is one of the consequences of the Senate decision for its Democratic Party's presidential candidates security and world stability.' for the 2000 elections, is also backing the ratification. Another Democrat candidate, Bill Among FSU states, only Azerbaijan, Bradley, supports the treaty as well, while a Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan Republican candidate George W. Bush have ratified the treaty. (Governor of Texas and the son of former US President George Bush) is against the CTBT. China The mass media have not reported on the Russian Federation process and prospects of the CTBT President Boris Yeltsin has submitted the ratification by China. At the same time, it is CTBT to the Federal Assembly for ratification noteworthy that some Chinese officials use only in November 1999. The Government any opportunity to criticize (sometimes in a officials realize the complicated character of harsh manner) the Indian nuclear tests of the issue and predict a difficult ratification May 1998. Therefore, one may presume that process by the State Duma now that the US China won't be willing to ratify the CTBT Senate position is clearly negative and before the Indian Government signs the especially if India and Pakistan continue to treaty. China is likely to exploit the delayed refrain from signing the CTBT. Yaderny ratification by the USA and Russia to Kontrol Journal called for the prompt postpone its own stride to ratification. ratification of the treaty by the State Duma in Besides, China is strongly against abolishing order to demonstrate Russia's strong will to or amending the 1972 ABM treaty (contrary promote the CTBT's entry into force10. to the intentions of many US senators).

Head of the Russian delegation at the CTBT According to the Kyodo news agency, in conference in Vienna Valery Loshchinin November 1998, the Japanese Foreign stated on October 7, 1999: Ministry took steps to urge 29 states to accelerate the process of ratification. 18 'We intend to continue to observe the basic states, including China, responded positively obligations under the CTBT pending its entry and said that the treaty would be ratified in into force. Provided, of course, that the other the near future. The other 11 states, including treaty signatories will do likewise. Our the USA, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Israel, attitude towards the CTBT ratification responded that they were not ready yet to process is based on the assessment of the ratify the CTBT. On March 26, 1999, China's overall ratification process, including in those President Jiang Zemin maintained at the states whose ratification is required for the Geneva Conference on Disarmament that the Treaty's entry into force.' Chinese Government would soon submit the treaty to the National People's Congress for The Russian representative said that the ratification. However, since that time the process of preparing for the CTBT situation has only became worse due to the international verification regime, in general, espionage scandal, NATO bombing of the was going smoothly, including on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and Russian territory, which would contain more aggravating relations with Taiwan. In July than 10% of all future International 1999, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi Monitoring System (IMS) facilities. addressed once again the leaders of China,

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

31

Russia and the USA, asking them to ratify the any obligations before achieving a CTBT before the Vienna Conference, but this parliamentary consensus. The Indian appeal fell flat. Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, in his interviews for the ITAR-TASS news At the CTBT Conference in Vienna, the head agency and for Ekho Moskvy radio during his of the Chinese delegation named some of the visit to Moscow in May 1999, maintained that 'negative' developments affecting the the problem of signing the CTBT would be situation with the CTBT. Amongst the events considered by a new Cabinet after the cited were the nuclear tests in South Asia; the parliamentary elections. decision of 'some states' to develop and deploy a national missile defense system In August 1999, New Delhi published a draft (NMD) and TMD system, guaranteeing their nuclear doctrine based on the principle of own absolute security at the expense of the assured minimal deterrence and providing security of others; and the arbitrary and for the development of a nuclear triad (air unscrupulous uninterrupted bombing of a force, land-based mobile missiles, and small and weak non-nuclear weapon state for SLBMs). Reportedly, the doctrine is still to be 78 days by the most powerful military bloc, approved by the Indian Government. under the pretext of protecting human rights. He said that China would continue to fulfil As we can see, the prospects of signing the the CTBT but, because of a series of negative CTBT by the two states are not entirely actions, Beijing would start the process of optimistic. ratification only as soon as it was "practically possible", taking into account the international Israel security situation. Israel has signed the treaty but hasn't yet ratified it. At the CTBT conference in Vienna, India and Pakistan Director of the Israeli Atomic Energy India and Pakistan haven't signed the treaty. Commission Gideon Frank said that Although the premiers of both states ratification would depend on three major declared in the UN in 1998 their readiness to factors. Firstly, the degree of readiness of the join the treaty before September 1999, this verification regime and its resistance to promise was not kept. The two countries 'potential abuses'. In this regard, special have witnessed a new escalation of the attention will have to be paid to the protracted conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. procedures of on-site inspections. The second The USA hasn't lifted sanctions against India factor is equal and sovereign representation and Pakistan imposed in connection with the for Israel in the governing bodies of the 1998 nuclear tests, and this has provoked a CTBTO. Thirdly, ratification by Israel will wave of criticism from both states. depend on the developments in the Middle East, including other states within the region Pakistan sent its representative to the CTBT acceding to the treaty. Bearing in mind that conference and he stated that Islamabad was some states within the region from among still committed to acceding to the CTBT, but the 44 (Algeria, Egypt, and Iran) are not only when the pressure was lifted, which he hurrying towards ratification, and that all the hoped would happen soon. As a result of the other aforementioned factors will take time military coup in Pakistan, the situation to be implemented, one may conclude that became even more vague. Many states, Israel will not accelerate the ratification including Russia and other nuclear powers, process. expressed their deep concern about the military being in power in a country which North Korea possessed a nuclear arsenal. Nothing is known about the intentions of North Korea, which is one of the 44 states The parliamentary elections in India in late and which hasn't signed the treaty. September-early October 1999 made Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee argue that it As for other states from among the 44, the would be pointless to bind the country by number of ratifiers is unlikely to rapidly

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

32 increase after the US Senate's negative Conference on Disarmament to resist these decision on the CTBT. The treaty envisages plans12. We can't rule out the possibility that convening more conferences in order to China will be unwilling to facilitate the promote its entry into force. At the Vienna prohibition of weapons-use fissile material conference, some delegations tried to include production, since the Chinese Government, in the final declaration, or in the report on the unlike other nuclear weapon states, has made results of the conference, a provision calling no official statement on this matter. for the next conference to be held in 2000. However, these attempts didn't gain support Moreover, some Non-Aligned Movement of those nuclear weapon states that hadn't states might be prepared to block any work ratified the CTBT. of the Conference on Disarmament on FMCT until the 2000 NPT Review Conference in Hence, the prospects of the CTBT entering order to exert additional pressure on nuclear into force soon seem to be now slight, and weapon states. this may have a negative impact on the work of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. On July 23-25, 1999, Munich hosted an international seminar on the FMCT, which As for the FMCT, the situation seems to be was attended by the representatives of many quite gloomy as well. In December 1993, the states. The participants pointed out that UN General Assembly passed Resolution delayed negotiations on this matter were due 48/75L in favor of a non-discriminatory and to the unsolved problem of establishing the universally applicable convention banning ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament the production of fissile material for nuclear within the Geneva Conference, and China's weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. toughening position on PAROS, which However, the Conference on Disarmament in remains unacceptable to the USA. The non- Geneva took a decision on establishing the ad aligned states are unlikely to be satisfied with hoc committee on FMCT and its negotiating an initiative proposed by Belgium, Germany, mandate only in August 1998. But so far, the Italy, and the Netherlands, to establish a committee hasn't started its work. working group without a specific negotiating mandate to discuss ways of organizing the There are many reasons for this delay. On the exchange of information and opinions on one hand, some non-aligned states insist on nuclear disarmament. the simultaneous establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, which is In the course of the seminar, some experts opposed by some nuclear weapon states. As emphasized that the motion put forward by experts believe, in Geneva 'it is generally certain states (Egypt and Pakistan in thought that India and Pakistan would like to particular), implying that the FMCT must string the fissban negotiations out long cover stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile enough to produce as much plutonium and material, should not serve as a pretext for highly-enriched uranium as they deem postponing the negotiations, since agreed necessary for their projected nuclear weapon negotiating mandate gave the CD requirements.'11. participants the right to raise any issues during the talks. On the other hand, China insists on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on Representatives of Britain, France, the USA preventing arms race in outer space (PAROS) and some other countries raised objections to - an idea opposed by the USA. The Chinese the link between FMCT negotiations and the representative at the Geneva Conference said committee on nuclear disarmament, and that many delegations, including the considered the future treaty to be one of the Chinese, believed that nuclear disarmament first steps in the concerted international and PAROS were of no less importance than efforts on nuclear disarmament. They the FMCT. The Chinese are concerned about stressed the importance of a stage-by-stage the US and Japanese plans to deploy their approach to this process and the missile defense systems, and try to use the unacceptability of its artificial acceleration by

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

33 the adoption of an all-or-nothing position. As arsenals and existing strategic for the stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile doctrines16; material, these countries pointed out the - India and Pakistan conducted nuclear counter-productiveness of this proposal, tests; which would, in fact, lead to immediate - the US Senate refused to ratify the CTBT; nuclear disarmament. etc.

As for the verification mechanism for the Cathleen S. Fischer, a US researcher from the FMCT, most of the participants believed that Washington-based Henry Stimson Center, has it should be efficient, non-intrusive, recently analyzed the shifts in US public inexpensive, and more focused, i.e. it should opinion concerning nuclear weapons. She cover key fissile material production facilities names three stages in the debate on the - uranium-enrichment and chemical future of nuclear weapons after the Cold processing plants. Some delegates (Egypt War. and Canada) called for the use of comprehensive safeguards under During the first stage (1992-1995), NGOs and INFCIRC/15313, while others presumed that many independent experts began to doubt it would require a three-fold increase of the the traditional Cold-War vision of the role of current IAEA safeguards budget. Indian and nuclear weapons, and stood for the Pakistani representatives opposed the idea of declaratory policy of diminishing the role of comprehensive safeguards, arguing that this nuclear arms by limiting their function solely would mean the application of NPT to deterrence against nuclear threats. verification mechanisms while neither of the two states were parties to the NPT. During the second stage (1995-1996), as the movement for achieving nuclear zero began to The Munich seminar demonstrates that the gain broad support there appeared FMCT negotiations, when they start, will be a authoritative reports and statements in favor complicated and lengthy process. of decisive steps to eliminate nuclear arms (the Canberra Commission Report, the Finally, the third item of the 1995 program - statement of 61 retired generals and admirals nuclear arms reduction with a view to from 17 countries, including Russia, etc.). eventual elimination - will inevitably trigger a most heated discussion at the 2000 NPT During the current third stage (since 1996), Review Conference. the worsening East-West relationship and new challenges to nonproliferation have The evident reasons for the lack of progress resulted in a split among NGOs, while their in this area in recent years are the following: attention has shifted to such short-term and - START II is not ratified by both parties14; more feasible tasks as the deactivation of - the ABM treaty is called into question nuclear weapons, de-alerting measures, with the threat of US withdrawal from virtual nuclear arsenals, etc.17. On July 25, the treaty raising concerns from Russia, 1999, the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear China, and France; Nonproliferation and Disarmament adopted a - the aggravation of the general political report supporting some urgent steps to climate in the world (NATO expansion to strengthen the international nuclear the East, the NATO operation in the nonproliferation regime and to reduce the Balkans) and Russia's weakening general nuclear threat without laying down more purpose forces make the Russian prospective plans in the area of nuclear military-political Establishment rely disarmament. more on nuclear weapons (both strategic and tactical) 15; US-Russian bilateral dialogue on nuclear - all nuclear weapon states reaffirmed by disarmament seems to have slowed down. their statements and actions, the On June 20, 1999, during their meeting in intention to preserve their nuclear Cologne, Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton agreed on bilateral discussions on START III

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

34 and the ABM treaty, to start later that The implementation of the Bangkok Treaty is summer. In August-September 1999, the hindered by the objections of nuclear weapon parties started to exchange their views on the states to the Protocol which stipulates that problem and held bilateral meetings. they should respect the non-nuclear status of However, it is still too early to speak about the NWFZ19. The nuclear weapon states are any results of these contacts or about the not willing to accede to the Protocol, since willingness of the parties to reach any the zone covers a 200-mile EEZ which may agreement. We should take into account the restrict access to the strait connecting the political situation in the two states, in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. year of parliamentary (1999) and presidential Moreover, China has territorial claims to (2000) elections in Russia and the 2000 some islands in the South China Sea, which presidential race in the USA. are included in the NWFZ under the Bangkok Treaty. India has recently The joint statement of the foreign ministers of demonstrated its readiness to join the the UN Security Council P-5, issued after Protocol in order to legitimize its nuclear their meeting in New York on September 23, status. Naturally, officially recognized 1999, contains no new encouraging signs, nuclear weapon states and many other except the reiteration of their commitments countries won't agree to that. on nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament under Article VI of The work on establishing the NWFZ in the NPT18. Central Asia is under way, although the treaty is yet to be finalized. The Kazakhstani So, it seems that the world will still have to Declaration of Independence stated the wait some time for nuclear disarmament, and intention to ban nuclear tests and to shut the non-nuclear weapon states will use the down the test range in Semipalatinsk. In 2000 conference to express their 1993, Uzbek President Islam Karimov used disappointment and concern about the the UN rostrum to call for establishing the unwillingness of all nuclear weapon states to NWFZ in Central Asia. At the 1995 NPT fulfil their commitments under Article VI of Conference, Kyrgyzstan disseminated a the NPT. working paper on this matter. The efforts to establish the zone got a new impetus with Another section of Decision 2 of the 1995 the Tashkent Conference of September 1997, conference names the establishment of convened at the invitation of Uzbekistan. In nuclear-weapon-free zones as a matter of 1997-1998, the UN General Assembly passed priority. a resolution endorsing the idea of NWFZ in Central Asia. Since 1995, treaties have been signed establishing NWFZ in Africa (the Pelindaba The Central Asian states have held several Treaty of 1996) and in South-East Asia (the working meetings attended by Bangkok Treaty of 1995). None of them have representatives of the UN and IAEA yet come into effect. secretariats to negotiate a draft of the treaty. The latest meeting took place in Sapporo As for the Pelindaba Treaty, its entry into (Japan) in October 1999. The IAEA Legal force is delayed chiefly by slow ratification Division provides assistance in laying down by Arab states, who are waiting for the provisions of the draft. The unsolved clarification of the situation with the NWFZ issues on the threshold of the Sapporo in the Middle East, which should include meeting have been as follows. Israel. Meanwhile, many sub-Saharan African states are also reluctant to ratify the - Russia supports the idea of NWFZ and treaty. So far, only 11 of them have ratified believes that the treaty should contain the agreement, while the treaty's entry into the provision that the treaty will work force requires 28 ratification instruments without prejudice to rights and deposited. obligations of the member states under existing international agreements. Russia

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

35

has in mind the Tashkent Treaty on plants and material, including radioactive Collective Security of the CIS states20; waste belonging to other states. - The possible participation of neighboring states in the NWFZ. China is worried As for the place of signing the treaty, the about the possible consequences of such Uzbek representative suggested Tashkent a provision21; while Kyrgystan proposed Issyk-Kul. The - Transit of nuclear weapons through the parties agreed that they would conduct zone. Washington doesn't want the treaty diplomatic consultations with the states that to prohibit such transit and believes that didn't attend the Sapporo meeting, in order member states should take a unilateral to coordinate positions on the unsolved decision on each particular case22. Russia matters. holds the same position; - The place of signature and the name of Some experts still hope that the NWFZ in the treaty reflect a certain rivalry among Central Asia may be established before the Central Asian states - Kazakhstan and opening session of the 2000 NPT Review Uzbekistan in particular - for dominance Conference. in the region. Kyrgyzstan is also believed to hold a claim for a leading role in the The idea of establishing a NWFZ in Central process of NWFZ establishment. and Eastern Europe has failed due to the unwillingness of new NATO member states Only three Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, to join this zone, the lack of interest on the Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan) participated in part of Ukraine and US resistance. the Sapporo meeting in October 1999. Representatives of Tajikistan and There was a plan to establish a NWFZ in the Turkmenistan were absent due to technical Caucasus, which has been recently voiced by reasons (as it was announced at the meeting). Georgia and Azerbaijan. At the same time The parties achieved further progress in Armenia, relying on its alliance with Russia, preparing the draft of the treaty. has expressed no interest in this zone, referring to the potential threat from The Kazakhstani representative managed to neighboring states23. convince his colleagues to preserve Article 12 stating that the treaty would not affect the In 1997, Mongolia declared itself a NWFZ existing rights and obligations under other and the UN General Assembly officially took bilateral treaties and agreements signed by note of this decision in 1998. the parties, though Uzbekistan had reservations. The participants didn't touch The situation with the NWFZ in the Middle upon the issue of the Caspian Sea and the East is described below in the paragraphs existing description of the zone of application relating to the implementation of the 1995 was preserved (the zone includes land, water resolution on this matter. (harbors, lakes, rivers, and streams) and air belonging to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, In general, the hopes for the prompt Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones Thus, the Caspian Sea is beyond the zone of are not justified and the discontent of many application of the treaty. The article states about this issue will certainly affect the providing for the possible accession of work of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. neighboring states remained. As far as security assurances for non-nuclear The parties failed to approve Article IV about weapon states are concerned, the 1995 the terms of transit. The draft text of this conference decisions have not been article envisages that each party is free to implemented. All nuclear weapon states decide on its own whether or not to permit continue to adhere to their nuclear doctrines, the transit by air, water or land of nuclear which they have confirmed in recent years. weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, As for China, it has once again declared its policy of non-first use of nuclear weapons.

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

36

Non-aligned states, on their part, are still agreements and agreements of seeking legally binding arrangements to INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type: assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. To • obtaining information and access for that end, these states are insisting on the inspectors to all components of the establishment of an ad hoc committee within nuclear fuel cycle of the states - from the Geneva Conference to work out uranium mines to uranium waste storage regulations under the framework of facilities, and to all other sites with international law. Nuclear weapon states are nuclear material designated for non- trying to hamper this process. nuclear use; • obtaining information on research and At the third meeting of the Preparatory development activities related to the fuel Committee, the South African delegation cycle, and the mechanisms of their submitted a draft protocol to the NPT inspection; concerning negative assurances24, which was • obtaining information on all buildings not discussed due to the lack of time and the situated at nuclear sites and access for reluctance of nuclear weapon states. the inspectors to these buildings with short-term notification; The foreign ministers of the P-5, in their • obtaining information about the statement of September 23, 1999, pointed out development and export of sensitive that they understood the willingness of many technologies related to nuclear activity, non-nuclear weapon states to obtain security and the mechanisms of corresponding assurances. However, they didn't go beyond on-site inspections; the promises stated in UN Security Council • taking environmental samples beyond Resolution 984 and in their unilateral the declared sites if the IAEA deems it statements on negative assurances. necessary; • administrative activities improving the One can expect a heated discussion on this process of appointing inspectors, issue to continue at the 2000 NPT conference. granting multiple-entry visas (necessary for undeclared inspections) and the The 1995 conference decisions relating to the IAEA's access to modern means of IAEA safeguards emphasize the importance communication. of these activities for nuclear nonproliferation and the necessity to assess The Board of Governors has approved and evaluate the safeguards of the Agency Additional Protocols with 45 states. and to increase the IAEA's capability to Negotiations with Russia and some other detect undeclared nuclear activities. 'Nuclear states are under way. Cuba, which has an fissile material transferred from military use INFCIRC/66-type agreement with the IAEA, to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon has also expressed its eagerness to sign an as practicable, be placed under IAEA Additional Protocol, and the Board of safeguards in the framework of the voluntary Governors has approved it. safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear weapon States.' The expanding IAEA activities in the area of safeguards are demonstrated by the constant The IAEA has carried out a substantial growth of the substantive quantity of nuclear amount of work in this area. To strengthen material under the safeguards25: the number the comprehensive safeguards system has risen from 94,294 in late 1996, to 103,883 approved in the early 1970s for non-nuclear in late 1998. weapon states participating in the NPT (INFCIRC/153), the Board of Governors Since adopting the Additional Protocol, the adopted the Additional Protocol Agency has continued its endeavors to (INFCIRC/540), in May 1997, providing for improve the system of safeguards. Another the following extended measures for the stage is to develop an integrated system of verification of comprehensive safeguards safeguards, aimed at their optimization with

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

37 regard to new measures provided in the the dismantlement of nuclear warheads. In Protocol, and including the most September 1996, Russia, the USA and the economically feasible use of modern IAEA agreed that the Agency should verify technical means. If the Agency knows that weapon-origin material. In their joint the undeclared irradiated fuel reprocessing statement of September 27, 1999, Minister of plants really do not exist, it may reduce the Atomic Energy Yevgeny Adamov, Secretary level of safeguards currently required for of Energy Bill Richardson and IAEA Director such fuel. Such an optimization can touch General Mohamed ElBaradei maintained that upon other categories of nuclear material the parties had considered the which are not sensitive from the viewpoint of implementation of the Trilateral Initiative nuclear nonproliferation. The economized aimed at solving technical, legal and financial resources can be used to control more problems of IAEA verification of weapon- sensitive nuclear material and to apply origin fissile material, designated as no international safeguards to an increasing longer required for defense purposes. The amount of nuclear material released from parties stated that a substantial progress in defense programs. developing and testing the verification equipment had been achieved. This is a new It is noteworthy that the money expended on technology known as information barriers the safeguards doesn't exceed $100 million: in designed to allow the inspectors to derive 1998, the Department of Safeguards sufficient information for the verification to accounted for $80 million of the regular be credible and independent, while budget and obtained $18 million from extra- preventing access to classified information as budgetary sources. The IAEA aggregate it is required by Article I of the NPT. The budget has had a zero growth rate for the last standard verification agreement may be used 15 years and amounted to approximately by other nuclear weapon states parties to the $220 million in 1998 (which is less than the NPT to provide for the international price of one modern fighter aircraft). monitoring over the fissile material released in the future under arms control agreements. The IAEA General Conference session noted in September 1999 that 52 non-nuclear In the USA, the Agency will inspect the K- weapon states participating in the NPT had Area Material Storage Facility at the Savannah not concluded or ratified safeguards River Site. In Russia, the monitoring will be agreements with the Agency. Although these organized at the Fissile Material Storage states conduct no nuclear activities, they Facility at the Mayak plant, which is under committed to sign these agreements under construction in the Urals. the NPT and should fulfil this obligation. The delegates of the General Conference had The 2000 NPT Review Conference will a chance to visit an exhibition of verification discuss the issues concerning IAEA equipment and technology, which is being safeguards in Iraq and North Korea. Since developed within the framework of the the UN Security Council hasn't set up a new Trilateral Initiative. The exhibition provided verification mechanism for Iraq, the Agency information about the future Fissile Material is not able to provide for the application of Storage Facility at the Mayak plant in Ozersk, required safeguards to verify the which will store Russia's weapon-origin implementation of the 1991 UN decisions. plutonium. Among the technologies The IAEA can't monitor all nuclear material demonstrated, were the non-destructive in North Korea subject to the safeguards, but neutron and gamma ray assay equipment, does monitor the freeze-on graphite- using information barrier technology to moderated uranium reactors and related prevent the disclosure of classified nuclear facilities as required by the UN Security weapon information; remote monitoring via Council. the Internet involving test installations at the Sandia National Laboratories in the USA and The IAEA is preparing to control weapon- at Sarov (Arzamas-16) in Russia; and origin fissile material released as a result of integrated radio frequency sensor platforms

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

38 for inventory monitoring systems at storage working group on arms control and regional facilities. security (ACRS), set up within the framework of the peace process, no longer Taking into account the character of meets due to Israel's unwillingness to discuss discussions on the IAEA safeguards at the nuclear problems. Preparatory Committee meetings, we may presume that these matters, as usual, won't Israel (and the Israeli authorities do not deny be a stumbling block for the decisions of the it) possesses nuclear weapons and advanced 2000 NPT conference. delivery systems27 but, presumably, have conducted no nuclear tests, except The same goes for the issue of peaceful uses hydrodynamic experiments28. Moreover, of nuclear energy. In 1998, nuclear power Israel pursues an official policy of opacity in plants (434 nuclear energy units) accounted nuclear matters. One can assume that, after for 16% of the world’s energy output. the Indian-Pakistani nuclear tests and while Throughout the year four more units became there is instability in the Middle East, the operational - three in South Korea and one in Israeli politicians and mass media have got Slovakia. The number of reactors under new arguments for preserving nuclear means construction amounted to 36, most of which of deterrence. were being built in East Asia. Seven reactors were shut down. After the Civaux-2 reactor in Following the decision of the General France has been built the European Union Conference on the application of will construct no more energy reactors. The comprehensive safeguards as the basis for USA, which is the world leading nuclear establishment of the NWFZ in the Middle energy producer, cancelled the construction East, the IAEA Director General addressed of NPPs many years ago. Despite the Israel and received the traditional response: continuous building of new nuclear power 'The policy of Israel has always maintained plants, in some countries the share of electric that the nuclear issue, as well as all regional power produced by the NPPs will reportedly security problems, conventional and non- decrease from 16% to 13% in 2010 and drop conventional, should be dealt with solely to 10% in 2020. within the context of the regional peace process.'29. In 1998, the IAEA's financial situation improved thanks to the donations of the In these circumstances, Arab states will member states to the Technical Assistance naturally raise the issue of NWFZ in the and Cooperation Fund. 73 states took part in Middle East in a most resolute manner at the financing the Agency's projects in developing 2000 conference and this will, obviously, countries, generating a total of $65 million. complicate the situation. Nonetheless, bearing in mind the Israeli interest in In April 1999, the parties to the 1994 maintaining the nuclear nonproliferation Convention on Nuclear Safety held their regime, we can only hope that the Cabinet of review meeting in Vienna to study the states' Ehud Barak will be able to start the dialogue reports on the situation regarding nuclear with Egypt and other Arab countries on safety. The report of the meeting stated that nuclear matters within the framework of the the process of reviewing the individual Middle East peace process, which, in fact, is reports had demonstrated their importance under way. for national nuclear safety programs26. Some Steps to Strengthen Nuclear Finally, we would like to deal with the Nonproliferation situation as regards the implementation of Summing up the course of implementing the the 1995 conference resolution on the Middle 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference East. No practical steps have been taken decisions, we have to admit that nearly all during the past years to meet the call for key political decisions have not been establishment of a NWFZ. The Madrid peace fulfilled. Besides, the political climate in the process is practically dead: the multilateral world does not bode well for the successful

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

39 conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, it is still possible to improve the Conference. One can presume that the situation in the next few months and to take conference will be a success even if it only some steps to implement the provisions of manages to keep the current status of the the treaty which currently raise grave nonproliferation regime and to review the concerns (some of our recommendations implementation of the treaty without any have been described above). substantial losses. At the bilateral level (Russia-USA) It is obvious that all nuclear weapon states Provide for the entry into force of START II. are interested in maintaining and The US Senate has ratified the treaty but strengthening the international nuclear without additional agreements concluded in nonproliferation regime. However, September 1997 in New York. Nowadays, the experience shows that, in practice, at least Senate links the ratification of these some of them like to follow their transient additional documents with amending or interests and indulge in some violations of abolishing the 1972 ABM treaty. The State the regime. They often do not take into Duma has been considering START II for consideration the broad nonproliferation several years, has discussed the treaty at the agenda, which is paramount to ensuring the level of committees in cooperation with the efficiency of the regime. To mention just two executive branch, has prepared all necessary examples, the State Duma has been delaying documents for ratification and even agreed the process of START II ratification and the on the time of voting. Nonetheless, the US Senate refused to approve the CTBT. unfavorable political climate, including foreign policy developments, such as the Due to differences on this or that matter, the NATO expansion to the east and NATO interaction of nuclear weapon states in the attacks against Yugoslavia, and domestic area of nonproliferation is becoming policy factors, such as the differences among increasingly formal and is not always parliamentary factions and their fruitful. In fact, none of these states has confrontation with the government, has managed to give an adequate response to the resulted in new delays with the voting. key issues of the NPT: the fate of the regime However, there is still a chance for START II depends on the coherent efforts of these ratification by the new Duma to be elected in states to cut down nuclear arsenals, and their December and its entry into force before the ability to find new ways of maintaining 2000 conference. strategic stability in the changing world. It is noteworthy that this question relates not only The parties can come to an agreement on to Russia or the United States but concerns START III and the ABM treaty as was all nuclear weapon states, including those decided by the two presidents during their countries that have recently demonstrated meeting in Cologne on June 20, 1999. Some their possession of nuclear explosive devices Russian independent experts believe that the or those that may hide their nuclear bombs in USA and Russia can meet halfway, taking the cellar. into account their concerns and interest in further arms reduction and maintaining Despite the complicated situation regarding strategic stability, on the following basis. NPT implementation, and the gloomy prospects of the 2000 conference, we can't START III will envisage the reduction of give way to despair, as some experts do, by strategic offensive arms to 1,500 warheads for predicting the end of the arms control era each state with the subsequent elimination of and a new arms race following the Senate nuclear warheads under mutually acceptable voting on the CTBT. transparency to prevent the use of reverse potential. START III should provide for the We believe that the post-arms race epoch still possibility of mounting MIRVs on existing has a chance of survival. There is a window (to be remained under START II) stationary of opportunity for further nuclear arms or mobile missiles (but no more than three re- reduction. As for the 2000 NPT Review entry vehicles on each missile).

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

40

The ABM treaty will continue to be effective start five-power negotiations on further preserving the existing ban on deploying the nuclear arms reduction. The parties should ABM systems for a defense of the territory discuss the possibility of inviting the UN and providing a base for such a defense Secretary General or his special (Article I). At the same time, the parties may representative to participate in the talks so agree to designate two areas of limited that the international community might be in missile defense deployment with the same the know. An appropriate declaration of number of interceptor missiles as it is intentions should be made before the 2000 provided in the treaty (Article III). Hence, the conference. amendments would deal with the ABM deployment sites, which may be chosen by The parties should try to agree on the the parties. This could be achieved by negative security assurances for non-nuclear making amendments to the Protocol related weapon states, in the form of a UN Security to the ABM treaty of 1974 reducing the Council resolution. Taking into account the number of sites from two to one. Thus, the special position of China, it would be helpful modified treaty would allow for developing if the Chinese Government agreed to such a limited missile defense without undermining resolution and refrained from blocking its strategic stability, whose 'cornerstone' it is, as adoption. In exchange, China would make an confirmed by the two presidents in Cologne additional unilateral statement in compliance on June 20, 1999. with its declared non-first use policy. This UN Security Council resolution on negative It will be significant if the parties manage to assurances would strengthen the existing achieve a principal, if not final, agreement on unilateral statements of nuclear weapon START III and the ABM treaty before the states, although it won't completely meet the 2000 conference. demands of non-aligned states for an international convention on security It would be reasonable to take measures to assurances. This resolution would be promote the cooperation of the two states in complementary to Resolution 984 on the the area of developing non-strategic missile positive security assurances. defense systems. At the multilateral level In our opinion, a solution of the issues It is necessary to start the FMCT negotiations concerning offensive and defensive arms on before the 2000 conference. Nuclear weapon the aforesaid basis would meet the Russian states should take a flexible position on interests in maintaining international setting up the corresponding committee at stability. Otherwise, Russia risks not only the conference if non-nuclear weapon states losing the ABM treaty but impeding the insist on the parallel establishment of other process of nuclear arms reduction and subsidiary bodies, e.g. on nuclear inflicting irrevocable damage on the disarmament issues. It would be reasonable nonproliferation regime. to take into account the position of China and some other states on creating a subsidiary Intensify efforts to implement the Trilateral body on PAROS. Initiative (together with the IAEA) to verify weapon-origin fissile material in conformity The CTBT entry into force before the NPT with the agreement reached in Vienna in conference is unrealistic. Nonetheless, partial September 1999 at the meeting of the two and even substantial progress in increasing energy ministers and the IAEA Director the number of ratifiers, especially from General. among the 44, is quite possible before the 2000 NPT Review Conference. This would be At the five-power level (Russia, the USA, the UK, useful for the NPT conference. France and China) It is necessary to agree at the top-level talks As for Russia, it is extremely important that (presumably at the summit of the P-5) that the State Duma ratify the CTBT at the earliest after concluding START III the parties will

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

41 possible date. President Yeltsin should 5 encourage the ratification process. L. Scheinman, Engaging Non-NPT Parties in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. PPNN Issue Review, No.16, May, 1999, p. 2. Russia, the USA and other states should take 6 steps to persuade India and Pakistan to sign Ibid., p.3. 7 Ibid., p.5. the treaty as their premiers promised before. 8 Some observers attending the conference

believed that its convening was counter- 1 Cuba occupies a special place in this list, since productive and pointed out that the Republican the only operating reactor of zero power and majority in the US Senate timed the negative energy units to be constructed in Haragua are CTBT voting to coincide with the conference. under the IAEA safeguards. Moreover, Cuba has 9 Arms Control Today, June-July, 1998, рр. 3-9. agreed to sign the Additional Protocol with the 10 R. Timerbaev, Prospects of CTBT Entry into Agency (INFCIRC/540) and the Board of Force. Yaderny Kontrol Journal, No. 3, May- Governors approved it in September 1999. June, 1999, pp. 67-71. Director of the Nuclear It would be good if before the 2000 conference Program of the Moscow Carnegie Center Cuba completed all procedures necessary to Alexander Pikayev has also supported the idea of accede to the Tlatelolco Treaty, which it signed in the earliest possible submission of the treaty to 1995. This step would contribute to the efficiency the State Duma (Moscovskiye Novosti, No. 40, of the treaty and, besides, could be used to exert October 19-25, 1999). pressure on Israel, India, and Pakistan to make 11 Disarmament Diplomacy, No.37, May, 1999, them join international nonproliferation efforts. p.27 and No.39, July-August, 1999, p.19. Moreover, this Cuban step might give impetus to 12 It is noteworthy that the Chinese delegation other states to accede to the NWFZ treaties and headed by China's deputy minister of foreign promote further establishment of nuclear-weapon- affairs visited Moscow in April 1999 and had free zones. Even more important would be Cuban consultations with Deputy Foreign Minister accession to the NPT. Georgy Mamedov. The parties issued a However, according to the recent statements of communique emphasizing the critical importance Cuban officials at the international forums and of preserving the ABM treaty and stating that our conversations with some of them, it is hardly China, although not being an ABM treaty feasible. Thus, the head of the Cuban delegation participant, expressed its solidarity with the at the 43rd session of the IAEA General Russian endeavors to prevent attempts to Conference (September 1999) said that his undermine or circumvent the treaty. country was still supporting its opinion about the 13 At the Conference on Disarmament, South discriminatory character of the nonproliferation Africa proposed to apply verification measures to system and referred to the 1996 Helms-Burton the FMCT similar to the IAEA safeguards and law passed by the US Congress which declared mentioned that as a result of using only that the functioning of any nuclear plant on the transparency measures with regard to fissile Cuban territory would be regarded as aggression material in the USA, 2,800 kg of plutonium have against the USA. been left unaccounted for. 2 The Israeli researcher Avner Cohen believes that 14 While the State Duma hasn't ratified START II on the eve of the 1967 war with Arabs Israel had in its full form with all additional agreements, the two nuclear explosive devices which might have US Senate has ratified the treaty only in its initial been delivered to the targets with available form without the protocol and other amendments delivery systems. (A.Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, negotiated and concluded in 1997. NY, 1998, р. 274). 15 Nuclear weapons will remain a necessary 3 The 1998 G-8 summit in Birmingham urged means of deterrence for a long time. However, in India to listen to global public opinion and the current political situation, the demonstrative immediately join the NPT and the CTBT (the stressing of the special role of nuclear weapons summit took place before the Pakistani nuclear for the Russian Federation (which is often used by tests). some representatives of the Russian military- 4 In the Lahore Declaration signed by the Indian political elite to obtain additional funding for the and Pakistani prime ministers on February 21, nuclear complex, or because of populist 1999, the parties pledged their commitment to considerations) is not understood by many and universal nuclear disarmament and irritates the international public. Russia should nonproliferation. However, the parties failed to avoid this. In this connection, it is necessary to continue the dialogue. mention the published draft of a new military doctrine which broadens the potential use of nuclear weapons. Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

42

16 Viewpoint The 1999 NATO summit reaffirmed the alliance’s strategic concept, providing for the first nuclear strike and the deployment of US nuclear SHAPING THE NON- weapons in Europe for a undetermined period. PROLIFERATION AGENDA FOR 17 C.S. Fischer, Reformation and Resistance: Non- THE COMING DECADE Governmental Organizations and the Future of Nuclear Weapons. The Henry L. Stimson Center Report, No.29, May, 1999. Washington, pp. vii- by Michael Davenport, viii. First Secretary, Cathleen Fischer, however, doesn't arrive at British Embassy in the Russian pessimistic conclusions, believing that the efforts Federation taken by the NGOs in recent years have founded the basis for their future cooperation and for the emergence of new ideas to achieve nuclear arms © PIR Center, 1999. All rights reserved. reduction and to exert pressure on the Abridged version governments and legislators. 18 UN Document, S/1999/996. This speech was delivered by Mr. Davenport at 19 The treaty became effective in 1997. the PIR-IISS conference "Nonproliferation Nonetheless, without the Protocol, which is its Policies: Shaping Agenda for the Coming integral part, the Bangkok Treaty is not truly Decade" held in Moscow in late October 1999. effective. Mr. Davenport spoke on behalf of Mr. Paul Hare, 20 I. Safranchuk, The Russian Position on the Head of the Non-Proliferation Department at the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Foreign and Commonwealth, concerning the Central Asia. Yaderny Kontrol Journal, No. 4, priorities in this area as seen from the UK. In his July-August, 1999, p. 45. report, he also thanked the organizers for taking 21 Clay Moltz, Brief History of Establishing the initiative to bring together those interested in Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. Presentation at the non-proliferation issues in Russia, the United briefing seminar "Nonproliferation and Mass Kingdom and elsewhere and paid tribute to the Media". Alma-Ata, July 16-17, 1999, p. 18. important role played by the PIR Center in 22 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 23 enhancing understanding of non-proliferation Ibid., p.15. issues in the Russian Federation. 24 NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/9

25 The data is given according to the IAEA annual As a consequence of current problems, it is reports of 1996 and 1998. The substantive quantity is 25 kg of uranium-235 and 8 kg of not difficult to be pessimistic about the plutonium and can be found in separated coming decade. Many things are not going as plutonium, plutonium in irradiated fuel, highly- we would wish at the moment. enriched or low-enriched uranium and other nuclear material. Three important states are not parties to the 26 IAEA Document, GOV/INF/1999/11- Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as Non- GC(43)/11 Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) - India, 27 According to the Tel-Aviv-based Ha’aretz of Israel and Pakistan. Regrettably, there is no April 12, 1999, Israel has developed the third realistic prospect that they will become generation Jericho ICBM with the range of parties in the near future. Instead, there is a 11,500 km. (See: PPNN Newsbrief, No.46, 2nd serious danger of a new arms race Quarter 1999, p.19). developing in the sub-continent following 28 Israel, presumably, conducted such a test in November 1966. (A.Cohen. Israel and the Bomb. last year's tests by India and Pakistan. Some NY, 1998, р. 232). A hydrodynamic test involves NNWS parties to NPT also pose a continuing the testing of a nuclear charge by using high challenge - I am thinking here of Iraq and explosives to exert pressure on substitutes for North Korea. fissile material or small quantities of uranium- 238. Meanwhile, efforts by two major Nuclear 29 IAEA Document, GOV/1999/51-GC(43)/17. Weapon States (NWS) parties to NPT to Annex II, р. 4. reduce their nuclear forces are not proceeding as smoothly as was anticipated in September 1997, when agreements were

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

43 reached in New York designed to ensure the forward on the ABMT-START nexus in order ratification of START II and to resolve to keep the whole structure of strategic outstanding issues relating to the ABM nuclear arms control in place and moving in Treaty. the right direction. We very much hope that a serious US-Russia dialogue on this complex On top of all this, we are now faced with the set of issues can lead to a mutually rejection by the US Senate of the acceptable balancing of concerns for strategic Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), in stability, on the one hand, with legitimate addition to the failure of India and Pakistan concerns about threats from missile to sign CTBT and our inability to start proliferation, many of which have arisen negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off since the ABMT was first signed in 1972, on Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on the other. Disarmament in Geneva. The UK has ratified the CTBT. We welcome the continuing It is essential that the United States and commitment of the US administration to Russia keep this show on the road in order to secure the ratification of the treaty in the put pressure on India and Pakistan to form, in which it has been ratified by the UK, restrain their nuclear programs and to France and others. reassure the bulk of good-faith NNWS parties to the NPT that their continued self- In addition, it is proving more difficult than restraint is paving the way to implementing we had hoped to conclude negotiations on a the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Verification Protocol to the Biological and Toxic not simply leaving the field open to others. Weapons Convention (BTWC). Several important Middle East states have yet to This in turn will strengthen international ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. support for efforts to deal with the small number of NNWS which pose non- Against this background, there is an even compliance challenges and concerns. It is greater need for us to work together to shape worth underlining in this context the an agenda for the coming decade that will importance of reinforcing existing put things back on a more promising path. international export control regimes, especially (in this context) the Nuclear A good start would be the successful Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology conclusion next year to negotiations on a Control Regime. We welcome the attention Verification Protocol to the BTWC. We would given in Russia to strengthening Russian also like to see continuing progress with the export control legislation, including the implementation of the Chemical Weapons adoption of a new federal law. The key will Convention, including renewed efforts on CW be to see its effective implementation, destruction and conversion of former CW especially in the areas of enforcement and production facilities. internal compliance. The UK is engaged in a program of cooperation to support these A start to FMCT negotiations would be a efforts. further step forward, as would renewed momentum towards meeting the CTBT's Even during the worst years of the Cold War, conditions for entry into force. In this the Soviet Union and Western powers found context, we welcome Russia's stated sufficient common ground to promote an intention to accelerate the process of Russian effective non-proliferation and arms control ratification of CTBT. agenda. More than ever, it is essential to harness the necessary political vision to make And, of course, it will be essential for the progress on these vital issues, not only in the USA and Russia to find an agreed way coming decade, but in the coming century.

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

44

Analysis ways of conduct, and on the organization of the state and social activities to provide DRAFT OF THE MILITARY military security of the Russian Federation and its allies.' DOCTRINE: THE NUCLEAR FACTOR The structure of the doctrine comprises three parts: military-political, military-strategic, by Andrei Gordiyenko, and military-economic guidelines for Trialogue Center providing Russia's military security. The document has no separate section devoted to © PIR Center, 1999. All rights reserved. nuclear arms and nuclear policy. Provisions Translation into English. Abridged version on nuclear matters can be found in all three parts of the doctrine.

On October 9, 1999, the draft of a new The general principle determining the nature Russian military doctrine was published. of the doctrine is its defensive character This document has been under development stated in the introduction, 'The military since 1994. When in October 1993 Russia doctrine has an exceptionally defensive approved the Basic Provisions of the Military character predetermined with the Doctrine, the first such document in the combination of a persistent commitment to history of the USSR and Russia, everyone peace and the firm resolution to defend realized that this document had a provisional national interests and ensure the military character. However, the development of a security of the Russian Federation and its new doctrine was delayed for a number of allies.' reasons. Intensive deliberate work on the new doctrine started immediately after Military-Political Guidelines appointing Igor Sergeyev as Defense As far as nuclear issues are concerned, the Minister. Nonetheless, the ideas of Sergeyev's first section of the doctrine is the most team were irritating the General Staff and the detailed. The doctrine states that the modern ministry officials, which impeded the work world has two trends: the shaping of the on this document. A new variant of the multi-polar world order with universal non- doctrine was expected to appear in 1998. But force mechanisms of conflict resolution; and the struggle around the Concept of National the shaping of the unipolar world with the Security, when the ministries and agencies prevalence of force and uncoordinated concerned were presenting their own drafts measures of conflict management. The directly to the Commander-in-Chief, has authors of the doctrine share the second ruled out the possibility of speedy vision of the world and base the document elaboration of the doctrine. on these assumptions. Hence, they name the

following 'key features of the military-political According to military experts, the military situation': doctrine should contain the basic principles - 'the decreasing threat of waging a world war, of modern warfare, indicating the ways of including nuclear war'; preventing and conducting a war. It is not - 'the increasing regional arms race' (It is meant to sum up Russia's military difficult to understand whether they development, to analyze the state of the mean missile and nuclear areas or not. Armed Forces, or to set forth a long-term The doctrine on the whole clearly defense policy plan. In this sense, the distinguishes nuclear arms and other meaning of the military doctrine hasn't WMD from conventional arms. changed since 1993, when there were Therefore, we may presume that this discussions about the essence of the military phrase relates to missile and nuclear doctrine. The draft states that the military areas, for there are no reservations.) doctrine is 'a systemized aggregation of - 'the proliferation of nuclear arms and other fundamental official views, concentrated in a types of WMD and their delivery systems'. single document, on preventing wars and armed conflicts, on their character, on the Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

45

Among the main factors destabilizing the When there is little probability of direct military-political situation, the authors aggression against Russia, 'the major external mention 'the violation of international treaties threats' relating to the nuclear sphere are 'the and agreements in the area of arms limitation and activities aimed at undermining global and disarmament'. regional stability through interdicting the work of Russian systems of state and military The aforesaid provisions evidently control, systems providing for the normal characterize the new features of a multi-polar functioning and combat viability of the world: forming regional centers of power, strategic nuclear forces, missile attack early separatism, etc. It is noteworthy that many warning, missile defense, controlling outer provisions of the first and second sub- space, and for the normal functioning of sections [features and destabilizing factors - nuclear munitions storage facilities, nuclear Ed.] coincide and just have a different energy facilities, nuclear and chemical wording. At the same time, the first sub- industry facilities, and other potentially section speaks about 'the expansion and dangerous objects.' So, the existence of deepening of transnational organized crime threats to Russian nuclear and strategic groups, terrorism, illicit arms trade, and facilities implies that these facilities may have drug-trafficking', while this factor is not to counter diversions or other similar included in the second sub-section. activities.

The analysis of these two sub-sections draws The list of internal threats focuses on us to a conclusion that the main features of terrorism: five out of six named threats relate the multi-polar world are regarded in Russia to terrorism. The list of external threats also as challenges to national security, although includes diversion and terrorist activities as this is not stressed in the doctrine in order to we have already said. Unfortunately, the save the multi-polar concept, i.e. the doctrine doesn't try to correlate in detail all fundamental principle of the Russian foreign these factors. policy. The sub-sections have evident contradictions. For instance, the first sub- The doctrine implies that nuclear arms play section mentions 'the development of an important role in 'providing state military mechanisms for maintaining international peace security'. This comes from the following and security at global and regional levels'. provisions: Meanwhile, among the destabilizing factors - Russia 'preserves its nuclear power status we can find 'the decreasing efficiency of to deter (prevent) aggression against it existing mechanisms for maintaining and its allies'; international security, above all the UN and - 'accurately fulfils all intertwined the OSCE'. commitments concerning strategic offensive arms and missile defense, and Analyzing 'the major threats to military is ready to provide for further reduction security', the authors of the doctrine of its nuclear arms bilaterally - with the emphasize that the 'threat of direct military USA - and multilaterally - with other aggression against the Russian Federation nuclear weapon states - to the minimal and its allies in its traditional forms is levels meeting the requirements of prevented by pursuing an active foreign strategic stability and of maintaining the policy course, maintaining a sufficient level strategic arms balance as a guarantee of Russian military might, including the from returning to a global confrontation potential for nuclear deterrence.' This and arms race, if other states, above all statement runs counter to the the USA, are also committed to these aforementioned 'decreasing threat of waging a goals through preserving and world war'. It would be more reasonable to strengthening the 1972 ABM treaty'; speak about the decreasing possibility of - 'stands for attributing a universal waging a world war because the character to the nonproliferation regime, interpretation of the military aggression for the stopping and comprehensive implies that the threat will remain. banning of tests, and, in the future, for

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

46

complete elimination of nuclear arms as weapons. However, the document states that an ultimate goal'; 'the Russian Federation keeps the right to use - 'promotes the expansion of confidence- nuclear weapons in response to the use of building measures in the military sphere, nuclear arms and other WMD against it or its including mutual exchange of military allies, and in response to a large-scale information, coordination of military aggression with the use of conventional arms doctrines, plans, and military in situations critical for the national security construction, and of military activity' (we of the Russian Federation or its allies.' In fact, believe that this provision relates to the this practically means the declaration of the nuclear area as well). right to the first use of nuclear weapons.

The sub-section "Key tasks of providing military Taking into account the significance of security" contains a number of provisions for nuclear weapons, the development and both the times of peace and war. It is improvement of nuclear deterrence forces is noteworthy that in this sub-section there are called a top-priority for military construction practically no provisions relating to nuclear and military organization of the state. weapons. In times of peace the key tasks are 'the prevention (deterrence, including Military-Strategic Guidelines nuclear) of aggression or threat of aggression The sections starts with the classification of of any scale against the Russian Federation or modern wars, in accordance with three its allies on the part of any state or a group of criteria: states', 'verification of the implementation of - military-political objectives; commitments taken by the foreign states in - employed combat means (nuclear - with the areas of arms limitation, preservation, the use of nuclear weapons or other elimination, and confidence-building'. Before types of WMD; conventional - with the war and when war breaks out, the key tasks use of conventional arms); will be to 'suspend the implementation of - scale (local, regional, and global). Russia's international commitments in the area of arms limitation, preservation, and The doctrine admits the possibility of world elimination'. and regional nuclear warfare and argues that a conventional world war 'will be characterized The doctrine includes some details of the by a high probability of escalating to a nuclear Russian nuclear policy. It is strange that these level'. The doctrine suggests that any nuclear details are mentioned in the sub-section conflict, either global or regional, will result "Military organization of the state". The from a non-nuclear confrontation. This document states that Russia must have a means that Russia doesn't see the danger of potential for nuclear deterrence ensuring 'the direct nuclear aggression and practically infliction of required damage to any rules out the possibility of sudden nuclear aggressor, either a state or a coalition, under attack. any conditions'. The document continues with the declaration of the negative This section reiterates some of the provisions safeguards regarding non-nuclear weapons of the first section: states, 'Russia will not use nuclear arms - Russia's right to use nuclear weapons if against the NPT member states not necessary to prevent or repel aggression; possessing nuclear weapons if there is no - the main mission of the nuclear arms is invasion or any other attack against the deterrence; in case of nuclear warfare - Russian Federation, its territory, its Armed infliction of required damage; Forces or other troops, its allies, or against a - one of the main tasks of providing state, to which it is tied with security military security is to maintain the commitments, carried out or supported by a organization, composition, combat and non-nuclear weapon state jointly or due to mobilization readiness, and training of alliance commitments with a nuclear weapon the strategic nuclear forces; state.' The doctrine doesn't mention directly - one of the main tasks of repelling Russia's right to the first use of nuclear aggression against the Russian

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

47

Federation and its allies is to maintain main reasons for possessing nuclear arms is the readiness for use and to use (as to prevent aggression, including nuclear provided in the doctrine) the potential of aggression. The doctrine implies that the nuclear deterrence. availability of nuclear arms reduces the risk of nuclear attack. So, the dilemma is that the Military-Economic Guidelines means of neutralizing one threat become the One of the priority tasks of maintaining source of another threat. This dilemma has military security with military-economic not been addressed in detail in the document. means is to provide for 'the qualitative improvement of the strategic arms complex'. One The doctrine attaches significant attention to of the major tracks in this area is 'the terrorism. This is a positive fact, but the implementation of international document doesn't characterize the threats commitments on reduction and limitation of coming from terrorists and doesn't offer the Armed Forces and arms, as well as the ways of combating these threats. maintenance of international security and peace.' If the previous variant of the nuclear doctrine and the 1997 Concept of National Security We would like to point out a provision of the reflected the trend of the increasing role sub-section "International military and military- played by the nuclear factor in maintaining technical cooperation". The key mission of Russia's national security the present international military and military-technical document doesn't develop this trend. This cooperation is 'to increase the inflow of hard doesn't mean that nuclear wording in the currency for the needs of the state, for the doctrine is less tough. However, we can feel development of military production, the reassessment of threats to Russia in the conversion, elimination and disposal of arms modern world. It is noteworthy that the and materiel, structural reform of the doctrine doesn't mention nuclear weapons as enterprises in the defense industries.' the means for providing Russia's Great Power status (this was one of the Analysis of the military doctrine enables us fundamental principles of Russian nuclear to make some conclusions concerning the policy). perception of military threats by the Russian leadership and the approaches to neutralize these threats.

The doctrine, especially its first section, has obvious contradictions. The main contradiction lies between the perception of the multi-polar world (positive) and the ways of describing the modern world (through negative factors, hence, virtually equating the characteristics of the modern world with the destabilizing factors).

The doctrine practically rules out the possibility of a nuclear attack against Russia. Some parts of the document put it more clearly, others - more vaguely. It is difficult to understand how small the probability of nuclear aggression is. The nuclear factor is mentioned in the list of external threats only because of its possible impact on the Russian systems of control over nuclear weapons and nuclear munitions' storage, missile defense system, etc. At the same time, one of the

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

48

YADERNY KONTROL JOURNAL Documents Presidential Decree on the Issues of Military-Technical (IN RUSSIAN) IN 1999 Cooperation of the Russian Federation with Foreign States. No. 1, January-February, vol. 43, pp. 36-39. Editorial Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Reorganization of the Global Export Control System: Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and with or without Russia? No. 1, January-February, vol. 43, Technologies (Vienna, December 3, 1998). No. 1, p. 3. January-February, vol. 43, pp. 40-42. Concept of Strategic Triangle in Asia: Result of Foreign Order of the Minister of Justice of the Russian Policy Illusions. No. 2, March-April, vol. 44, p. 3. Federation of October 30, 1998, No. 152 on Approving Roots of US-Russian Tensions Are Far from Kosovo. No. the Charter of the Federal Agency for Legal Protection of 3, May-June, vol. 45, p. 3-4. the Results of Intellectual Activities of Military, Nonproliferation: Game without Rules? No. 4, July- Specialized, and Dual-Use Character. No. 2, March- August, vol. 46, p. 3. April, vol. 44, pp. 30-34. Joint Statement in Cologne: Breakthrough or Lack of List of Amendments to the Legal Acts Issued by the Agenda? No. 5, September-October, vol. 47, p. 3. President of the Russian Federation. No. 2, March- The World Community Should Form a United Front April, vol. 44, pp. 35-38. against a New Wave of Terrorism. No. 6, November- Federal Bill on Export Controls. No. 3, May-June, vol. December, vol. 48, p. 3. 45, pp. 39-49. Federal Law on Making Amendments to the Criminal Hot Topic Code of the Russian Federation. No. 3, May-June, vol. 45, Roland Timerbaev. Towards a New Nuclear Arms p. 50. Limitation Treaty (Negotiations Resume on Banning the Joint Statement between the United States of America Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons). and the Russian Federation Concerning Strategic No. 1, January-February, vol. 43, pp. 4-10. Offensive and Defensive Arms and Further Harold P. Smith, Jr. Cooperative Dismantlement of Strengthening of Stability. No. 5, September-October, Russia's Chemical Arsenal. No. 2, March-April, vol. 44, vol. 47, p. 27. p. 4-11. Communique of the Heads of States and Governments Nikolai Uspensky. Export Controls as a Key Element of of the G-8. No. 5, September-October, vol. 47, p. 28. National Security. No. 3, May-June, vol. 45, pp. 5-8. Federal Law on Financing the State Defense Contracts Gennady Evstafiev. Export Controls in Russia: It Will Be for Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation. Naive to Expect Easy Solutions. No. 3, May-June, vol. 45, No. 6, November-December, vol. 48, pp. 36-37. pp. 8-13. Protocol to the Agreement between the United States of Vladimir Misyuchenko, Svetlana Gvozdeva, Vladimir America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe Orlov. Law "On Export Controls" Is Needed but Requires and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Additional Work. No. 3, May-June, vol. 45, pp. 13-19. Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation. Dmitry Litovkin. Indian Program of Nuclear Fleet No. 6, November-December, vol. 48, p. 38. Development: Cooperation with Russia. No. 5, Federal Law on Amending Article 64 of the Federal Law September-October, vol. 47, pp. 4-13. on Nuclear Energy Use. No. 6, November-December, Vladimir Yakovlev: 'Strategic Missile Forces Are the State vol. 48, p. 39. Shield'. No. 6, November-December, vol. 48, pp. 4-10. Analysis Interview Vladimir Medvedev. Russia's Nuclear Deterrence: A Stanislav Petrov: 'We'll Fulfil Our Commitments to the Look into the Next Decade. No. 1, January-February, vol. International Community'. No. 2, March-April, vol. 44, pp. 43, pp. 48-56. 42-45. Alexander Yakovenko. Policies and New Technologies: Yury Solomonov: 'US Missile Defense? There Is Still a Role in the 21st Century. No. 2, March-April, vol. 44, pp. Chance for Dialogue'. No. 4, July-August, vol. 46, pp. 4-9. 46-53. Valentin Yevstigneyev on Issues, Relating to Russian Alexander Kalyadin. Russia at the Edge of Default in Biological Weapons. No. 4, July-August, vol. 46, pp. 15- Fulfilling CWC Commitments. No. 3, May-June, vol. 45, 25. pp. 54-60. Nikolai Voloshin: 'Subcritical Tests Are an Important Yury Fyodorov. Caspian Region: Periphery or New Component of Verifying Arsenal Efficiency'. No. 5, Center of World Politics? No. 4, July-August, vol. 46, pp. September-October, vol. 47, pp. 29-32. 26-39. Victor Yerastov: 'Minatom Has All Conditions for Ivan Safranchuk. The Russian Position on the Creation of a Providing Safety and Security of Nuclear Material'. No. 6, Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Central Asia. No. 4, July- November-December, vol. 48, pp. 40-42. August, vol. 46, pp. 40-48. Guzel Taipova. Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. No. 4, Information July-August, vol. 46, pp. 49-56. Anatoly Dyakov. Nuclear Arms Reduction and No. 1, January-February, vol. 43, pp. 11-35. Transparency Problems. No. 5, September-October, vol. No. 2, March-April, vol. 44, pp. 12-29. 47, pp. 37-42. No. 3, May-June, vol. 45, pp. 20-38. Oleg Bukharin. Post-Cold War Consolidation of Nuclear No. 4, July-August, vol. 46, pp. 10-14. Weapons Complexes in the United States and in Russia. No. 5, September-October, vol. 47, pp. 14-26. No. 5, September-October, vol. 47, pp. 43-56. No. 6, November-December, vol. 48, pp. 11-35.

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000

49

Natalya Kalinina. Russian Legislation in the Area of Newsboard Chemical Weapons Dismantlement. No. 6, November- The conference "The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation". No. 1, December, vol. 48, pp. 50-71. January-February, vol. 43, p. 82. The Asia-European Cooperation Forum. No. 1, January- Commentary February, vol. 43, p. 82. Nikita Nikiforov. Comments to the Resolution No. 746 Legal Documents on MPC&A of the Nuclear Fuel of the of the Government of the Russian Federation "On Russian Navy. No. 1, January-February, vol. 43, pp. 83- Establishing the Rules of Organization of the State System of 85. Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials". No. 1, The Carnegie International Conference on January-February, vol. 43, pp. 43-47. Nonproliferation. No. 2, March-April, vol. 44, pp. 81-82. Dmitry Litovkin. Unified Supreme Command of The Pugwash Workshop on Nuclear Proliferation and Strategic Deterrence Forces Is a Source of Contradictions Security in the Pacific Rim. No. 2, March-April, vol. 44, in the Ministry of Defense. No. 2, March-April, vol. 44, p. 82. pp. 39-41. The international symposium "Europe's East Enters the Abram Ioyrysh. The Changes in the Criminal Law 21st Century". No. 2, March-April, vol. 44, p. 82. Norms Regulating the Nuclear Energy Use. No. 3, May- Maria Katsva. Licensing System in Russia. No. 3, May- June, vol. 45, pp. 51-53. June, vol. 45, pp. 77-81. Inna Melnikova. Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis The conference on security in South Asia. No. 4, July- Won't Affect US-Russian CTR Cooperation. No. 5, August, vol. 46, pp. 75-76. September-October, vol. 47, pp. 33-36. Pyotr Litavrin. Small Arms and Light Weapons Vadim Kozyulin. Re-Export of Russian Conventional Proliferation: Russia's Position. No. 4, July-August, vol. Arms May Intensify. No. 6, November-December, vol. 46, pp. 76-80. 48, pp. 43-49. Newsboard. No. 5, September-October, vol. 47, p. 77. Newsboard. No. 6, November-December, vol. 48, pp. 84- Polemics 86. Victor Mikhailov. Ministry of Atomic Energy and International Cooperation. No. 2, March-April, vol. 44, Letter to Editor pp. 62-66. Alexander Tokarev. Changes in the Export Control Vladimir Zakharov. Factors, Affecting the Russian System Don't Result in Easy Documents Registration. Defense Doctrine. No. 2, March-April, vol. 44, pp. 67-80. No. 1, January-February, vol. 43, pp. 86-87. Roland Timerbaev. Prospects of CTBT Entry into Force. Yaderny Kontrol Readers about the Journal. No. 4, July- No. 3, May-June, vol. 45, pp. 67-71. August, vol. 46, pp. 81-83. Sergei Reshetnikov. Russian Position on CTBT and Stephen V. Mladineo: 'Russian and US Nuclear Cities Prospects of Its Entry into Force. No. 3, May-June, vol. Have More Similarities than Differences'. No. 5, September- 45, pp. 72-74. October, vol. 47, pp. 78-80. Yevgeny Maslin. CTBT and Maintenance of Nuclear Yaderny Kontrol Readers about the Journal. No. 5, Warheads Safety. No. 3, May-June, vol. 45, pp. 75-76. September-October, vol. 47, pp. 80-83. Igor Nikolaichuk. First Strike Concept as an Important Component of Modern Nuclear Policy. No. 4, July- Library August, vol. 46, pp. 57-74. Ildar Akhtamzyan. On the Way to Nuclear Anarchy? Fyodor Ladygin. Current External Challenges to Russian Insufficient Security of Fissile Material in Russia and the National Interests and Security. No. 6, November- CIS. Research Institute of the German Foreign Policy December, vol. 48, pp. 72-80. Society. Joachim Krause, Erwin Haeckel. Bonn, 1998, 79 p. No. 1, January-February, vol. 43, pp. 88-89. Review Alexander Kalyadin. Russian and Nuclear Oleg Dyachenko. Legal Regulation of Export of Nonproliferation. 1945-1968. Roland Timerbaev. M., Conventional Arms and Materiel in the Russian Nauka, 1999, 383 p. No. 3, May-June, vol. 45, pp. 82-84. Federation. No. 1, January-February, vol. 43, pp. 57-81. Roland Timerbaev. Israel and the Bomb. Avner Cohen. Scott A. Jones. US System of Excessive Weapons New York, Columbia University Press, 1998, XVIII+470 Elimination: Underestimated Nonproliferation p. No. 4, July-August, vol. 46, pp. 84-87. Challenge. No. 2, March-April, vol. 44, pp. 54-61. Ivan Safranchuk. SIPRI 1998. Arms, Disarmament and Vladimir Belous. Characteristics and Mission of Modern International Security. M., Nauka, 1999, 684 p. No. 5, Neutron Weapons. No. 3, May-June, vol. 45, pp. 61-66. September-October, vol. 47, pp. 84-85. Michael Jones. Missile Defense Testing in the Pacific. No. 5, September-October, vol. 47, pp. 57-66. PIR Center News Victor Zaborsky. Ukraine's Nuclear Energy Sector: No. 2, March-April, vol. 44, pp. 83-88. Challenges and Prospects. No. 5, September-October, No. 3, May-June, vol. 45, pp. 85-87. vol. 47, pp. 67-76. No. 4, July-August, vol. 46, pp. 88-89. No. 5, September-October, vol. 47, pp. 86-87. Stories of the Past No. 6, November-December, vol. 48, p. 87. Roland Timerbaev. Andrei Gromyko and Nuclear Nonproliferation. No. 6, November-December, vol. 48, pp. 81-83.

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.1. Winter 2000