Cominform 1947

For A Lasting Peace, For A People’s Democracy FOR A LASTING PEACE, FOR A PEOPLE’S DEMOCRACY

Full and complete Reports submitted to the Nine Communist Parties’ Conference held at Warsaw in September 1947

PEOPLE’S PUBLISHING HOUSE, LTD. Bombay, 1948 First Indian Edition March 1948

PUBLISHER’S NOTE We are printing in the following pages the full reports as submitted by the representatives of the leading Communist Parties of Europe who attended the Informatory Con- ference held in Warsaw towards the end of September 1947. They have been taken from the fortnightly organ of the Commu- nist Information Bureau, For A Lasting Peace, For A People’s Democracy!—Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CONTENTS

COMMUNIQUÉ ...... 1 DECLARATION ...... 2 RESOLUTION ...... 5 EDVARD KARDELJ: The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Struggle for the Independence of the Yugoslav Peoples.... and Socialist Reconstruction of the Economy ...... 6 1. The Party in the Period of the National Liberation War ...... 7 2. The Role of the Party in the Political and Economic Construction of the New Yugoslavia ...... 18 WLADISLAW GOMULKA: The Activities of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Poland ...... 28 G. MALENKOV: The Activities of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) ...... 44 1. Directing the National Economy in the Post-war Period ...... 44 2. Problems of Building the Party ...... 52 3. The Foreign Policy of the CPSU (B) ...... 59 JACQUES DUCLOS: The French Communist Party in the Struggle for the Independence of the Country against American Expansionism ...... 63 1. The Economic Situation in the Country...... 63 2. The Remadier Government in the Halter of the American Imperialists ...... 70 3. For a Free, Independent France...... 73 R. SLANSKY: The Activities of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia after the Liberation of the Country ...... 77 1. The Role of the New Democracy in Czechoslovakia ...... 78 2 The National Front and the Fight against Reaction ...... 85 3. The Party ...... 86 4. Foreign Policy ...... 88 M. DJILAS: The Organisational Work of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia ...... 91 V. CHERVENKOV: The Activities of the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Communists) ...... 97 1. The Struggle for People’s Power in Bulgaria ...... 99 2. The Economic Development of the Country ...... 102 3. Question of Foreign Policy ...... 106 4. The Political and Organisational Work of the Party ...... 107 5. The Principal Tasks of the Party ...... 112 G. GEORGIU-DEJ: The Communist Party of Rumania in the Struggle for the Democratisation of the Country ...... 114 1. The Struggle for a New Regime in Rumania ...... 114 2. The Democratic Transformation in the Country ...... 119 3. For Further Development of the New Democracy ...... 124 J. REVAI: The Activities of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party ...... 127 1. The Political Situation in the Country ...... 127 2. The Struggle Around the Formation of the New Government ...... 131 3. The Line of the Party in the New Conditions and its Prospects ...... 132 4. Party Activities ...... 136 5. Foreign Policy ...... 138 LUIGI LONGO: The Activities of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy ...... 142 1. The struggle to Overthrow the Fascist Regime. Organisation of the National Liberation Movement. Guerrilla Warfare ...... 142 2. The Activity of the Party during the Period of American Occupation ...... 146 3. For the Creation of a Broad Popular Democratic Front of Struggle, for Peace and National Independence ...... 152

COMMUNIQUE On The Informative Conference of Representatives of a Number of Communist Parties At the end of September 1947, an informative conference was held in Poland with the participation of the following parties: the Communist Party of Yugoslavia—Comrades E. Kardelj and M. Djilas; the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Communists)—Comrades V. Chervenkov and V. Poptomov; the Com- munist Party of Rumania—Comrades G. Dej and A. Pauker; the Hungarian Communist Party—Comrades M. Farkas and J. Revai; the Polish Workers’ Party—Comrades W. Gomulka and G. Minc; the Communist Party of the So- viet Union (Bolsheviks)—Comrades A. Zhdanov and G. Malenkov; the Com- munist Party of France—Comrades J, Duclos and E. Fajon; the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia—Comrades R. Slansky and S. Bashtovansky, and the Communist Party of Italy—Comrades L. Longo and E. Reale. The participants in the Conference heard informative reports on the activities of the Central Committees of the Parties represented at the Confer- ence made by Comrades E, Kardelj and M, Djilas for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia; by Comrade V. Chervenkov for the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Communists); by Comrade G. Dej for the Communist Party of Rumania; by Comrade I. Revai for the Hungarian Communist Party; by Comrade W. Gomulka for the Polish Workers’ Party; by Comrade G. Malenkov for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks); by Comrade J. Duclos for the Communist Party of France; by Comrade R. Slansky for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and by Comrade L. Longo for the Communist- Party of Italy. After exchanging their opinions on these reports, the participants in the Conference decided to discuss the question of the international situation and the question of the interchange of experience as well as that of coordination of the activities of the Communist Parties represented at the Conference. A report on the international situation was made by Comrade A. Zhda- nov. The participants in the Conference exchanged opinions on the report, ar- rived at complete agreement on the present international situation and on the tasks arising therefrom, and unanimously adopted a declaration on the question of the international situation. A report on the interchange of experience and the coordination of the activities of the Communist Parties was -made by Comrade W. Gomulka. On this question the Conference has decided, in view of the negative effect caused by the absence of contacts among the Parties represented at .the Con- ference, and taking into account the need for mutual exchange of experience, to set up an Information Bureau. The Information Bureau will consist of representatives the Central

1 Committees of the above-mentioned Parties. The task of the Information Bu- reau will be to organize interchange of experience among the Parties, and, if need be, to coordinate their activities on the basis of mutual agreement. It was decided that the Information Bureau would publish a printed organ. The Information Bureau and the editorial office of its official publication will be located in the city of Belgrade. DECLARATION The representatives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the Bulgar- ian Workers’ Party (Communists), the Communist Party of Rumania, the Hungarian Communist Party, the Polish Workers’ Party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), the Communist Party of France, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of Italy, having exchanged views on the international situation, have agreed upon the following declaration: Fundamental changes have taken place in the international situation as a result of the Second World War and in the post-war period. These changes are characterized by a new disposition of the basic political forces operating on the world arena, by a change in the relations among the victor states in the Second World War, and their re-alignment. While the war was on, the Allied states in the war against Germany and Japan went together and comprised one camp. However, already during the war there were differences in the Allied camp as regards the definition of both war aims and the tasks of the peace settlement. The Soviet Union and the other democratic countries regarded as their basic war aims the restoration and consolidation of democratic order in Europe, the eradication of fascism and the prevention of the possibility of new aggression on the part of Germany, and the establishment of a lasting all-round cooperation among the nations of Europe. The United States of America, and Britain in agreement with them, set themselves another aim in the war: to rid themselves of competitors on the markets (Germany and Japan) and to establish their dominant position. This difference in the definition of war aims and the tasks of the post-war settlement grew more profound after .the war. Two diametrically opposed political lines took shape: on the one side the policy of the USSR and the other democratic countries directed at undermining imperialism and .consolidating democracy, and on the other side the policy of the United States and Britain directed at strengthening imperialism and stifling democracy. Inasmuch-as the USSR and the countries of the new democracy became obstacles to the realization of the imperialist plans of .struggle for world domination and smashing of democratic movements, a crusade was proclaimed against the USSR and the countries of the new democracy, bol-

2 stered also by threats of a new war on the part of the most zealous imperialist politicians in-the United States of America and Britain. Thus two camps were formed—the imperialist and anti-democratic camp having as its basic aim the establishment of world domination of American imperialism and the smashing of democracy, and the anti- imperialist and democratic camp having as its basic aim the undermining of imperialism, the consolidation of-democracy and the eradication, of the remnants of fascism. The struggle between the two diametrically opposed camps—the imperialist camp and the anti-imperialist camp—is taking place in a situation marked by a further aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism, the weakening of the forces of capitalism and the strengthening of the forces of Socialism and democracy. Hence the imperialist camp and its leading force, the United States, are displaying particularly aggressive activity. This activity is being developed simultaneously along all lines—the lines of military strategic measures, economic expansion and ideological struggle. The Truman-Marshall plan is only a constituent part, the European sub-section, of the general plan for the policy of global expansion pursued by the United States in all parts of the world. The plan for the economic and political enslavement of Europe by American imperialism is being supplemented by plans for the economic and political enslavement of China, Indonesia, the South’ American countries. Yesterday’s aggressors—the capitalist magnates of Germany and Japan—are being groomed by the United States of America for a new role, that of instruments of the imperialist policy of the United States in Europe and Asia. The arsenal of tactical weapons used by the imperialist camp is highly diversified. It combines direct threats of violence, blackmail and extortion, every means of political and economic pressure, bribery, and utilization of internal contradictions and strife in order to strengthen its own positions, and all this is concealed behind a liberal-pacifist mask designed to deceive and trap the politically inexperienced. A special place in the imperialists’ arsenal of tactical weapons is occupied by the utilization of the treacherous policy of the right-wing Socialists like Blum in France, Attlee and Bevin in Britain, Schumacher in Germany. Renner and Scherf in Austria, Saragat in Italy, etc., who strive to cover up the true rapacious essence of imperialist policy under a mask of democracy and Socialist phraseology, while actually being in all respects faithful accomplices of the imperialists, sowing dissension in the ranks of the working class and poisoning its mind. It is not fortuitous that the foreign policy of British imperialism found its most consistent and zealous executor in Bevin. Under these circumstances it is necessary that the anti-imperialist, democratic camp should close its ranks, draw up an agreed programme of action and work out its own tactics against the main forces of the imperialist

3 camp, against American imperialism and its British and French allies, against the right-wing Socialists, primarily in Britain and France. To frustrate the plan of imperialist aggression the efforts of all the democratic, anti-imperialist forces of Europe are necessary. The right-wing So- cialists are traitors to this cause. With the exception of those countries of the new democracy where the bloc of the Communists and the Socialists with other democratic, progressive parties forms the basis of the resistance of these countries to the imperialist plans, the Socialists in the majority of other countries, and primarily the French Socialists and the British Labourites— Ramadier, Blum, Attlee and Bevin—by their servility and sycophancy are helping American capital to achieve its aims, provoking it to resort to extortion and impelling their own countries on to the path of vassal-like dependence on the United States of America. This imposes a special task on the Communist Parties. They must take into their hands the banner of defence of the national independence and sovereignty of their countries. If the Communist Parties stick firmly to their positions, if they do not let themselves be intimidated and blackmailed, if they courageously safeguard democracy and the national sovereignty, liberty and independence of their countries, if in their struggle against the attempts to enslave their countries economically and politically they be able to take the lead of all the forces that are ready to fight for honour and national independence, no plans for the enslavement of the countries of Europe and Asia can be carried into effect. This is now one of the principal tasks of the Communist Parties. It is essential to bear in mind that there is a vast difference between the desire of the imperialists to unleash a new war and the possibility of organizing such a war. The nations of the world do not want war. The forces standing for peace are so large and so strong that if these forces be staunch and firm in defending the peace, if they display stamina and resolution, the plans of the aggressors will meet with utter failure. It should not be forgotten that the war danger hullabaloo raised by the imperialist agents is intended to frighten the nervous and unstable elements and by blackmail to win concessions for the aggressors. The principal danger for the working class today lies in underestimating their own strength and over-estimating the strength of the imperialist camp. Just as the Munich policy untied the hands of Hitlerite aggression in the past, so yielding to the new line in the policy of the United States and that of the imperialist camp is bound to make its inspirers still more arrogant and aggressive. Therefore; the Communist Parties must take the lead in resisting the plans of imperialist expansion and aggression in all spheres—state, political, economic and ideological; they must close their ranks, unite their efforts on the basis of a common anti-imperialist and democratic platform and rally around themselves all the democratic and patriotic forces of the nation.

4 RESOLUTION The Conference states that the absence of contacts among the Commu- nist Parties participating at this Conference is a serious shortcoming in the present situation. Experience has shown that such lack of contacts among the Communist Parties is wrong and harmful. The need for interchange of experience and voluntary coordination of action of the various Parties is particularly keenly felt at the present time in view of the growing complication of the post-war international situation, a situation in which the lack of connections among the Communist Parties may prove detrimental to the working class. In view of this, the participants in the Conference have agreed on the following: 1. To set up an Information Bureau consisting of the representatives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Commu- nists), the Communist Partly of Rumania, the Hungarian Communist Party, the Polish Workers’ Party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshe- viks), the Communist Party of France, the Communist Party of Czechoslova- kia and the Communist Party of Italy. 2. To charge the Information Bureau with the organization of interchange of experience, and, if need be, coordination of the activities of the Communist Parties on the basis of mutual agreement. 3. The Information Bureau is to consist of two representatives from each Central Committee, the delegations of the Central Committees to be appointed and replaced by the Central Committees. 4. The Information Bureau is to have a printed organ—a fortnightly and subsequently a weekly. The organ is to be published in French and Rus- sian, and, when possible, in other languages as well. . 5. The Information Bureau is to be located in the city of Belgrade.

5 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Struggle for the Independence of the Yugoslav Peoples, for the People’s Power, for Economic Rehabilitation and Socialist Reconstruction of the Economy

By EDVARD KARDELJ

The road traversed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from the time of the fascist invasion of Yugoslavia up to the present is a glorious road of great victories and successes in the struggle for the independence of the Yugo- slav peoples, for the people’s power, for the economic rehabilitation of the country and for its socialist reconstruction. Such great victories over a more powerful enemy could have been achieved only by a Party steeled in the long struggle against the enemies of the people and which in that struggle reached a relatively high ideological level. It is precisely this that enabled the Party to take good advantage of all the means and possibilities opened to it by objective conditions for destroying the enemy and the traitors to the people. It is a big mistake to think that it was only during the war that the Communist Party became closely linked with the wide masses of the people, that is, that it “accidentally” gained influence among the masses of the people because of certain “favourable” conditions during the war. On the contrary, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had gained strong positions among the masses of the people long before the war. The Party proved itself not only as a champion of the economic demands of the working class, the peasants and the working masses but as the only consistent political party in Yugoslavia which took a clear stand on the national question and which activated the masses in the struggle for the self-determination and equality of the peoples of Yugoslavia and for the democratic rights of the masses of the people. The policy of mobilising the masses for the defence of the country against the ap- proaching danger of Axis aggression played a particularly important role in strengthening the influence of our Party. Parallel with this the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, working in complete illegality and under conditions of ruthless terror and persecution, strengthened and purged its ranks and extended its organisation throughout the whole country. There can be no doubt that the purge and organizational strengthening of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia after 1937, under the leadership of Marshal Tito, was a pre-condition to and one of the most important factors in the victory. The Party entered the war, internally monolithic and imbued with a deep revolutionary spirit, while, at the same time, closely linked to the masses. Thus our Party was already before the war one of the strongest political - factors in the country. This was even more clearly shown during the German-Italian attack on

6 Yugoslavia in April 1941 and during the first months of the occupation.

I. THE PARTY IN THE PERIOD OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION WAR AGAINST THE INVADERS AND TRAITORS OF THE PEOPLE In the April phase of the war, the line of our Party was above all to strengthen with all forces the resistance at the front against the aggressor’s armies, to remove incapable and treacherous officers and to transfer the leadership of the resistance on certain sectors of the front to capable patriots, to arm the civilian population and especially .the workers in the cities and organize them for battle together with the army, to strengthen the anti- fascist positions in the army, to emphasise the need for a democratic people’s government which could wage war against the invader, to continue the battle against the German-Italian aggressor with partisan tactics because of the superior strength of the enemy on the front. Naturally our Party could not have achieved practical military successes with such tactics in the April phase of the war, since the collapse of the old Yugoslav army was extraordinarily quick, thanks to the traitorous role of the majority of the political and military leaders in the old Yugoslavia. The whole of reaction and even the General Staff for the most part consciously acted in such a way as to end the war as soon as possible, figuring that they could in collaboration with the invader retain power, no matter how the war finished. While one section of the reactionary forces was consolidating its position in cooperation with the invader, the other section—that is, the reactionary circles around the émigré government—was making preparations abroad to return to the country after the war with outside help and to continue their old anti-people’s policies. It stands to reason that these gentlemen never even thought seriously of fighting against the fascist aggression inasmuch as they were motivated exclusively by their class interests and the interests of their imperialist masters whose agents they were long before the war. It goes without saying that the first and hardest blow of the invader after the enslavement of our country was aimed at the Communist Party. Thanks, however, to the internal firmness of our Party and to the rich experiences of long years of its illegal work, the Party not only succeeded in resisting the terror but it became the leading force in the liberation struggle of Yugoslavia. The political line of the- Communist Party of Yugoslavia after the April events was clear: unity of the patriotic forces in the struggle for national liberation, continuation of armed resistance to the invader in the form of diver- sionary tactics and sabotage, unmasking and isolation of traitorous reaction of all shades from the masses of the people and strengthening of the leading

7 role of the working class in the national liberation movement, as that was an imperative condition for a consistent struggle; unmasking the traitorous role of the reactionary circles in the émigré government who were responsible for the shameful capitulation; developing a widespread struggle against the invader and his collaborators, the native traitors; the political and organizational preparation for a general people’s uprising at the right moment. ‘The preparations for the armed uprising against the invader had both their political and organizational aspects. From the political point of view the Party fought for the widest possible development of the National Liberation Front, parallel with the application of the most varied forms of struggle against the enemy, including the boycott and sabotage of the invader’s measures, passive resistance, hiding of foodstuffs, and the placing of all sorts of economic obstacles in the path of the invader. Waging a struggle for the unity of all patriotic forces on the platform of the struggle against the invader, the Party endeavoured to achieve unity with the leadership of various party groups as well, but at the same time, independently of this, it created committees with a mass character in the National Liberation Front, and other unified mass organizations, from below. Thus the Party independently developed the mass struggle against the invader, at the same time extending the hand of cooperation to all patriots and patriotic groups among the leading circles of other parties. The National Liberation Front, it is true, was joined by certain groups from the old political parties together with individuals from the leadership of these parties, who were brought into the camp of the national liberation struggle by their national and patriotic sentiments. It should, however, be particularly emphasized at the same time that the leadership of the old political parties as a whole, as well as all kinds of reactionary and pseudo- democratic cliques “orientated to the West”, immediately took the line of collaboration with the enemy. Some did this openly, others tried for some time to mask themselves, but the course of events very soon brought them out into the open and they were compelled to show themselves to the people in their - true colours—that of accomplices and helpers of the invader. Of course, this development of the ruling cliques in the old Yugoslavia, is not accidental, did not start only during the war. It is generally known that the present émigré Yugoslav “democratic coryphaeus”, whom reactionary American and other imperialist entrepreneurs depict as the persecuted victims of “Communism”, are persons who at first prepared and signed the agreement with Hitler and later, when this trick did not quite work according to plan, tried to bring about, as rapidly as possible, the capitulation of the old Yugoslav army. Later when these gentlemen and their supporters continued this line by collaborat- ing with the invader, they were only running true to type. Whence this consistent treachery of these gentlemen? The explanation is to be found in the fact that these reactionary gentlemen were the same

8 during the war as they were before it—the enemies of the people. The privileged wealthy class and the different capitalist exploiters and their accomplices, together with the rest of the reactionary cliques, feared every democratic movement of the masses during the war as much as they did before it. They saw in every popular movement of the masses a growing danger to them, danger to their order. There is, therefore, nothing surprising in the fact that these reactionary gentlemen in the struggle between the democratic forces and the occupation troops unhesitatingly decided to go over to the invader, the defender of the imperialist system. National treachery became a lawful precept in the activities of these reactionary circles. Our reaction remained true to this precept also during the war—both as regards the section which openly supported Hitler, as well as the section with a “Western orientation”. The imperialist invader meant more to this treacherous reactionary company than did the people who had taken to arms. They basely and mercilessly trampled upon all national interests in their fear that their exploiting, class interests and the interests of their imperialist masters might be menaced when the people are armed. Had there been no active national liberation movement and armed uprising the reactionary cliques would have perhaps been able to mask their traitorous role before the people, to a certain extent, as was the case in some other countries. The development of the armed struggle, however, demanded everyone to show where he stood. The traitors came out into the open more and more and all those who were honest and patriotic abandoned their camp. It is clear that in such a situation it would not have been sufficient to have fought for the National Liberation Front only on the basis of a coalition of the leaderships of political parties. It was necessary to fight in every way for the unity of the masses from below. The struggle of our Party for the formation of committees with a mass character in the National Liberation Front from below, parallel with the .endeavours to achieve unity with the leaderships of the various political parties as well, speeded up the unmasking of the pseudo-patriotic phrase-mongers and helped to adopt a clear-cut attitude: either for the national liberation movement leading towards a general people’s armed uprising, or for collaboration with the invader. The development of the armed uprising itself brought out this differentiation to the full. Under the conditions of a sharp armed struggle which extended to every corner of our country, every one who took a “centre” position was soon forced to show on whose side he stood. The organizational aspect of the preparation for the armed uprising consisted, in the first place, in the establishment of completely illegal military committees, which was undertaken immediately after the April defeat in 1941. The military committees were entrusted with the task of carrying out all organizational preparations, for organizing the collection of arms, training military cadres and organizing sabotage and diversionist activities. At the

9 time of Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, we already had a whole network of such committees throughout Yugoslavia which were capable of assuming the role of direct military leaders in the armed uprising in its first phase. Those who slandered our Party often advanced the “argument” against the national liberation movement of Yugoslavia, to the effect that the national liberation uprising developed fully only after Hitler’s attack on the So- viet Union, and not before. With this “argument” they wished to “prove” that during the war the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was not thinking of the interests of national independence but of other interests. To what extent this “argument” is false and slanderous is best shown by the fact that our Party as far back as April 1941 began founding military committees with concrete military tasks. On the other hand, it is also clear that it would have been impossible to have developed the people’s uprising on a large scale at the time when Hitler was on the shores of the English Channel and when not a single army in Europe offered any resistance to the German and Italian fascist hordes. Besides, the masses of the people were not yet ready after the April defeat to take up arms on a mass scale. These were the main reasons which led the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to call upon patriots in the country, in June 1941, to develop broad partisan activity against the invader with the prospect of its growing into a general people’s armed uprising. As far back as July and August partisan activity extended throughout the whole of the country and rapidly began to develop into a general uprising of the people. In September a considerable part of the territory had already been liberated, while towards the middle of the same month the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia left Belgrade in order to go to the liberated territory. The Supreme Headquarters of the partisan detachments headed by Marshal Tito as Supreme Commander, and the various National Headquarters, were formed. * * * * Our military forces grew steadily until the end of the war. Many offensives were launched, enormous sacrifices were made but the forces of the Na- tional Liberation Army steadily grew and the liberated territory extended from year to year. The broad masses of the people responded to the call of the Communist Party to take up arms. The line of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as regards the development of partisan warfare as the main form of the armed struggle against the enemy, proved to be .correct. The victory .of the line of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the national liberation movement was assured in the first place by four factors, by four basic elements in its tactics. The first factor was undoubtedly the clear course of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia regarding the armed uprising from the first day of occu-

10 pation. The Party fought ceaselessly for cooperation with all parties and all patriotic groups which were ready to take part in the armed uprising. Our Party, however, did not make the development of the uprising dependent on the results of these endeavours. Our Party fought for the masses by developing the armed uprising, by setting up a people’s power on the liberated territory and by the widespread development of the national liberation movement throughout the entire country. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia came to the fore not only as the initiator and organizer of the national liberation struggle but as the most consistent and best organized leader of the struggle, as the leading force in the national liberation war. It is clear that it was precisely this role that closely linked our Party to the masses. At that time there were people even in our Party, die-hard dogmatists, who said that partisan warfare could be only a means of aid and in no way the main factor in an armed uprising. They said that the cities, and not the forest and the outskirts, would decide the fate, of an armed uprising. That is why they considered it a mistake to take workers from the cities for the partisan detachments, or even that the Party leadership should leave the cities with part of it assuming military leadership. Actually, all such and similar theories were the result of opportunism which feared warfare. The victory of the line of the Central Committee of our Party proved, in opposition to all such opportunistic theories, that under conditions of brutal fascist occupation it was precisely partisan warfare combined with many-sided activities in the cities that was the best, quickest and the only possible road to victory. It is understood that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia led by Com- rade Tito did not stop at the organization of the original partisan detachments. Comrade Tito, as Supreme Commander of the partisan detachments, at the very beginning outlined a clear course for the formation of regular units. The original partisan detachments were more or less connected with a certain territory and were led by permanent territorial headquarter com- mands. Even though these units were of a mass character and their heroic struggle inscribed a glorious and heroic chapter in the history of the development of our national liberation uprising, it was clears that to stop at the original partisan detachments would have meant losing the war. It was necessary to create an army which would not only be capable of inflicting damage upon the enemy but which could destroy and defeat him and which would be capable of waging frontal warfare, of taking towns and fortifications, of liberating the country. That is why the Supreme Headquarters, as soon as the conditions were ripe, began, as far back as the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942, to take the best units and fighters from the partisan detachments, forming operational brigades out of them which would not be bound to any definite territory. These were the first regular units of our army which were transferred from place to place and which operated according to the unified operational plan of the Supreme Headquarters. Divisions and corps grew

11 out these brigades, and the National Liberation Army came into being, which, by its discipline and experience in warfare and because of its striking power and manner of waging war, was essentially different from the partisan detachments which were and remained, in the main, the starting point for the organization of the mass armed uprising. In this connection, Comrade Tito characterized this process, at the end of 1942, as follows: “The creation of the people’s army is the greatest success of the people’s uprising in Yugoslavia up to now. “The process was a long and difficult one because our people’s army grew up out of small partisan detachments composed of unarmed patriots, peasants, workers, honest intellectuals, and the youth of towns and country, who rose up against the invader and his hirelings. “It was necessary, at the cost of enormous sacrifices, to wrest from the enemy each rifle, each bomb, each bullet, each machine-gun, each gun, each mortar, and to resist the numerous offensives of the numerically and technically superior enemy who wanted at all costs to suppress the people’s uprising, to smash the partisan detachments and brigades. Hence, our people’s army was not created from above by decree, forcibly, nor was it armed by munitions makers…. On the contrary, each soldier of our brave people’s army, in bitter fighting and with his own blood, captured and is capturing arms from the enemy which were shamefully turned over to it in April of last year by the traitors of our people, by various higher officers and generals in the former Yugoslav army. “The formation of divisions and corps, the creation of our people’s army, took place at a time when all the conditions were ripe, when an imperative need for this arose, when numerous brigades and battalions had already been formed, when these brigades and battalions were equipped with almost all kinds of arms (except aviation), when it had become impossible to command all the brigades, battalions and divisions in the same way as hitherto, and finally, when a great part of our territory had been liberated and the need arose for offensive operations on a large scale....” (Tito: The Struggle for the Liberation of Yugosla- via, p. 304). From all this it clearly follows that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in developing the partisan war and the armed uprising did not generally regard it as the sole means for weakening ‘the enemy, for inflicting damage upon him, for putting pressure on the traitorous domestic reaction, but considered it from the very beginning as the road to the complete victory of the

12 people over the invader and over his accomplices in the country. The second important factor in the victory of the national liberation struggle was the specific development of the National Liberation Front in Yugoslavia, of which we have already spoken here. The unity of the National Liberation Front did not consist merely in an unified political platform. The development of the National Front was determined especially by two factors: 1) The National Liberation Front demanded of every member political group and of every individual member that they in one way or another actively help in the national liberation struggle. There were, especially in the beginning, various politicians who were prepared to adopt, in words alone, the general political platform of the National Liberation Front but not to accept an armed uprising and partisan warfare. There was no small number of persons who were democrats and patriots in word but who in practice, at the same time, said that the uprising should wait until the end of the war when our allies would liberate us. These persons and political groups wanted the National Liberation Front to be a non-militant organization which would simply issue general declarations, because they wanted to find in it a temporary shelter until the forces of reaction would again recover their leading positions. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia not only did not agree to the inclusion of such persons and political groups in the National Liberation Front, but unmasked them before the masses of the people as a reserve force of the invader, as a hidden stronghold of the enemy. Such a policy on the part of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the National Liberation Front gave the latter exceptional fighting strength and, at the same time, exposed all the traitorous manoeuvres of the so-called “democratic centre”, which, on the one hand, used pseudo-liberal and pseudo-democratic slogans, and, on the other hand, attacked the Communist Party and the National Liberation Front, al- leging that they were leading the Yugoslav peoples into adventures, to un- necessary sacrifices, instead of waiting to be liberated by the allies. The Na- tional Liberation Front was joined by all those who were genuine patriots and democrats. In fact, the way of the development of the National Liberation Front was, at the same time, the way of isolating reaction from the masses, and the way of unifying the working people and all patriotic and democratic elements under the leadership of the working class. 2) This political substance also corresponded to the organizational development of the National Liberation Front— that is, the People’s Front—as the Front was renamed after the liberation of Yugoslavia. The great liberation struggle demanded the unity of the people under a unified leadership. All this led to the consolidation of the leadership of the National Liberation Front and all its organizations. The main role in this respect was played by the unity of the local Front organisations which completely paralyzed the activity of the various local political groups of the old reactionary parties. Thus the People’s Front became a huge, unified, militant organization of the people

13 which did not and does not operate on the basis of coalition, or on the basis of parity committees, but on the basis of unified, mass, local Front organizations. This development of the People’s Front as a separate but united mass organization of all genuine people’s democratic, patriotic forces in our country, under the leadership of the working class, played a decisive role in the mobilisation of the masses for the liberation war, for routing the invader and native traitorous reaction which served him. The third factor in the victory of the national liberation movement was the national liberation committees. The national committees as organs of power first made their appearance in our country in 1941, as soon as the first part of our territory was liberated. They developed over a period of years from the lowest forms to the highest and became the base for the unified system of state power from the bottom to the top. The national liberation committees naturally did not come into existence accidentally. It was clear to the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and to the National Liberation Front that the fate of the armed uprising against the invader depended on the participation and the fighting determination of the broad masses of the people, that is, the working people of town and country. Moreover, to mobilize these essential sections of the people, it was not enough merely to put forward national liberation slogans. Speaking of this, Comrade Tito, for instance, said: “It is understood that the correct solution of the national question and the correct solution of the social question and, further, the clear prospect of a thorough social transformation in the new Yugoslavia were of great significance in strengthening and stabilising the People’s Front. It is more than certain that without such clear prospects our peoples would not have been able to endure such difficult conditions in the liberation war.” (Tito: Re- port to the Second Congress of the People’s Front of Yugoslavia). There were, indeed, people who said that the formation of national liberation committees and the realization of certain revolutionary democratic demands of the masses of the people would repel certain strata and political groups from the National Liberation Front. The Communist Party of Yugo- slavia fought resolutely against such points of view. Had the People’s Front of Yugoslavia followed such a course, it would not have had the masses, or more correctly speaking, the masses of the people would not have been ready to make such sacrifices and fight with arms in hand as they did, having before them not only prospects of national liberation but the realization of their democratic and. social aspirations. It was borne out in practice that the linking up of the national liberation uprising with the process of the people’s democratic revolution not only did not weaken the striking power of the uprising, but drew the masses of the people strongly to it and gave it indestructible

14 stability and vitality. It was necessary to break and destroy the old, hated power which op- pressed the people in the interests of the exploiters, it was necessary to guarantee that the new Yugoslavia would no longer be a prison of the peoples—as the old one was—but a state which would be built up on the basis of self- determination and equality of all its peoples. It was necessary to stress clearly that the cursed anti-democratic and anti-people’s power of the past would never again return. It was necessary to prevent the return of the dynasty as the centre of all traitorous and anti-people’s cliques. It was necessary to give the workers, peasants and all working people the guarantee that they would be able to build a better life for themselves than they had had in the old Yugoslavia. It was necessary to prove all this in practice to the masses of the people on liberated territory. This is why the old state apparatus was immediately torn down to its foundations and a new form of state power created everywhere on liberated territory. The slogan of the National Liberation Front was: “All power on liberated territory—insofar as this was not limited by purely military needs— belongs to the national liberation committees, that is, the people should take it into their own hands: the peasants, workers, all working people and all honest patriots. Comrade Tito, speaking of the people’s committees, said: “That was a form of people’s power which was known to the peoples—known because they had waited and yearned for it for a long time, had carried it in their hearts. It was precisely that form of power which best corresponded to the interests of the peoples of our country….” (Tito: Report to the Second Congress of the People’s Front of Yugoslavia) Having much in common with the Soviets, the national liberation committees were built up in accordance with the actual conditions in Yugo- slavia and according to the specific developments of our national liberation uprising. It is quite clear that the national liberation committees, as well as certain revolutionary democratic measures which they put into effect, infuriated the traitorous anti-democratic cliques in our country, which were ready to ally themselves with the Devil himself in order to wrest that powerful weapon from the hands of the people. On the other hand, the national liberation committees swiftly gained great popularity among the people. During the war they played a tremendous role in consolidating the working masses of our country around the National Liberation Front, led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It was this strength and popularity of the national liberation committees, that is, the true people’s power, which made possible decisions such as those taken by the Second Session of AVNOJ (the Anti-Fascist

15 Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia), as the supreme organ of the people’s power on liberated territory, in Jajce on November 29th, 1943. This session proclaimed the removal of the émigré government from power, banned the dynasty from returning and made Yugoslavia a federative state on the basis of national equality. It also finally confirmed the national liberation committees and the whole structure of state power which was based on all of them, including AVNOJ, as the sole legitimate organ of all the peoples and of the state power in the country. This step greatly raised the prestige of the people’s power and marked the final turning-point in the balance of forces in favour of the national liberation movement and the people’s power. It can be said that the development of the national liberation uprising and the people’s power in Yugoslavia represents a specific example of linking a national liberation war with a democratic people’s revolution, under the leadership of the working class, striving in its development to a higher socialist form. The fourth factor in our victory was our clearly defined relationship with the allies in the war. The entire policy of the Communist Party of Yugo- slavia and the National Liberation Front was directed towards strengthening the unity of the anti-Hitler bloc as a precondition to the victory over the fascist invader. In spite of this, however, we did not refrain from publicly criti- cising that which it was necessary to criticize in the relations between the allies, so that the masses of the people would have a clear picture of the position and relationship of forces. It was exactly because of this that the Com- munist Party of Yugoslavia could without difficulty throw off the influence of certain opportunistic tendencies which appeared in the final phases of the war. Some people were ready to believe that after the war there would begin a period of peaceful, parliamentary development of imperialism, and not a period of the further sharpening of the general crisis of capitalism and all its internal contradictions, a period in which at the first opportunity the reactionary imperialist forces would again attempt to free themselves from the pressure of democratic forces and to untie their hands for new imperialistic expansion, if not hampered by the democratic forces. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia shattered these illusions during the war and immediately following it. The peoples of Yugoslavia freed themselves of such illusions by their own experiences. In this respect the armed uprising was the best teacher. It was most clearly seen at the front who was a truly sincere friend and who was not. Had there not been an armed uprising of our people, they could not have possibly seen this, they could not have exposed pseudo-democratic phraseology. The masses of the people, however, knew of the reasons for the very poor help in arms given to the National Lib- eration Army of Yugoslavia by the Western allies, and with their own blood had to pay for the support which the chetniks of Draza Mihailovic and other traitors received from abroad up to the last day of the war. They saw many instances of insincerity on the part of the Western allies in the war and fol-

16 lowed the insidious political manoeuvres of certain imperialist circles regarding the Second Front. All these and other bitter experiences taught the masses of our people not to judge the allies by their words alone but also by their deeds. That is why our peoples had no illusions regarding imperialist “democracy”, or the “improvement” of imperialism. On the other hand, the masses of our peoples, on their own experience, were daily convinced of the great liberation role of the Soviet Union and its unselfish help to our liberation struggle. Our peoples saw that the Soviet Union was bearing the brunt of the war and followed closely its unselfish policy of helping all enslaved peoples. That is why they understood that the struggle of the Soviet Union was in full measure their own struggle. It was precisely during the war that our peoples best understood that the fraternal Moscow- Belgrade alliance was the basic guarantee of their independence. The Commu- nist Party of Yugoslavia constantly pointed to these facts, for it always maintained the viewpoint that a clear understanding of international relations and a correct position on this question was an extremely important factor in the struggle for the mobilization of the masses, for shattering harmful illusions and for the isolation and liquidation of traitorous reaction in our country. In addition to this, all these facts taught our peoples something more. They taught them to differentiate between genuine democracy, genuine democratic power, and formal, alleged “democracy”, false “democratic” power. Opinions, for example, appeared to the effect that every government in which the Communists participated was already a government of the new, people’s democracy. Such a view is naturally wrong and very dangerous. Rich experiences show that reactionary forces were often prepared to cooperate with the Communists in a government as long as they felt weak, but as soon as they felt stronger they were ready to trample upon all democratic principles and all parliamentary forms, only to free themselves from the control of the working class and of the working people as represented by the Commu- nist Party. Precisely for this reason the democratic forces in Yugoslavia, headed by the Communist Party, took steps to safeguard the people’s power from all possible attacks by various imperialist agents and various anti- democratic and reactionary plots. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia maintained the view that new, people’s democracy begins where the working class, in alliance with all the other working masses, hold the key positions in state power which guarantee the stability of the people’s democratic power and which can prevent imperialist reaction from wresting from the people the democratic achievements of their liberation struggle. Naturally, the calum- niators—the agents of imperialism—clamoured and are still clamouring that this is dictatorship. Our peoples reply, however: It is only safeguarding genuine people’s democracy and our national independence from your anti- democratic plots and dictatorships and from your imperialistic expansion.

17 II THE ROLE OF THE PARTY IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW YUGOSLAVIA The policy of the Communist Party was victorious. The reactionary forces in the service of foreign imperialism were routed, while the enormous majority of the people’s masses already during the war firmly united in its People’s Front headed by the Communist Party. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the People’s Front and Comrade Tito, as leader and organizer of the struggle of the people for national independence and people’s power, enjoy the unbounded confidence of the people’s masses. The old system of state power was destroyed not only as far as its internal substance and personnel were concerned, but in form as well. What is essential in this change is the fact that the people’s power, founded on people’s committees and enjoying their active support, is a higher type of democracy as compared with parliamentary democracy. One sometimes hears from poorly informed people that the new democracy is actually an old parliamentary democratic form with a new substance. As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, such an assertion does not correspond to reality. What is characteristic for the development of people’s democracy in Yugoslavia is precisely the fact that it did not develop along the lines of bourgeois parliamentary democracy. People’s democracy in Yugoslavia is the result of a persistent and bloody struggle for the national liberation and independence of our peoples, a struggle in which the process of people’s democratic revolution developed simultaneously. It is actually a specific form of Soviet democracy which corresponds to our conditions and to the specific conditions of the development of our national liberation developed simultaneously. It is for this very reason that in the defence of our people’s power, such a unity of our working people has been attained that is unprecedented in the history of the peoples of Yugoslavia. All the administrative territorial units in the Federative People’s Re- public of Yugoslavia and in its people’s republics (towns, cities, districts and regions) are governed by the people of the territories themselves through their organs of power, that is to say, through the people’s committees, which they elect every three years by direct and secret ballot. People’s committees govern all affairs of local significance and at the same time they also carry out on their territories tasks of general significance, in keeping with the instructions issued by the higher organs of state power. They are, therefore, the sole and the highest organs of state power in their administrative territorial units. Thus a higher type of self-government has been embodied in our people’s committees, which differs radically from the self-government in the countries of bourgeois democracy. Together with the National Assembly and the Presidium of the people’s republics—that is, the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia—and with

18 the governments of the people’s republics and the Federal Government, the people’s committees represent the unification of state power, the unification of the system of new, people’s democracy which stands incomparably higher than any bourgeois parliamentary democracy, not only in substance but also in form. Thanks to the fact that already during the war the old state apparatus had been completely crushed, a mortal blow was dealt to the enemy, since this deprived him of every possibility of influencing state power even indi- rectly. We were able to build up a new apparatus within a relatively short time precisely because we were able to rely on the experience and cadres which the national liberation uprising and the development of the national liberation committees during the four years of war had given us. We consider the building up of the new state apparatus as one of the most important and greatest victories of the People’s Front and of the Com- munist Party. This victory to a great extent facilitated the speedy organizational consolidation and ultimate strengthening of the people’s power after the liberation, despite the stubborn attempts of the remnants of the routed enemy of the people, supported from abroad, to wrest from the people the achievements of their heroic liberation struggle. In addition to this the new Yugoslavia, immediately after the national liberation, unhesitatingly embarked upon a course of speedy realization of the national and democratic demands of the peoples of Yugoslavia, proclaimed in Jajce already in 1943. Yugoslavia soon grew up into a federative republic of free peoples with equal rights. The enemies of the people were thus deprived of one more weapon with which they had held the masses of the people in subjugation. These victories and the structure of the People’s Front were the foundation on which the People’s Republic was built. Today it represents the unity of the working masses headed by the working class. The people’s government reflects the interests of the working masses, it is the organ of these masses in the struggle against capitalist remnants and for the construction of socialism in Yugoslavia. * * * Having achieved such big victories, the peoples of Yugoslavia were able to pass on to the next stage of their struggle: laying the foundations for building socialism in their country. Such a policy on the part of the government was inevitable. A situation in which the working class in alliance with the other working masses holds power while the basic economic resources are in the hands of the overthrown capitalist bourgeoisie, cannot last long. Therefore, it is clear, that the government, which is the reflection of this alliance of the working people headed by the working class, could not restrict itself merely to liquidating the various

19 feudal remnants and capitalist monopolies but had to adopt a clear course leading to the elimination of capitalism in Yugoslavia generally and to the construction of socialism. The process of the development of the people’s democratic revolution interblended with socialist forms which have today become predominant. Whoever attempts to raise a wall between these two forms of parallel development will only prove that he is either badly informed or that he mechanically applies the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. The national liberation committees already during the war introduced a series of measures which considerably weakened the economic positions of traitorous capitalist reaction. It is understood that after the liberation and strengthening of the people’s power, the new Yugoslavia unhesitatingly set out upon the road of socialist reconstruction. Before fully embarking on this path it was necessary, immediately after the war, to carry out land reforms, consistently and resolutely. The Law on Land Reform, in conformity with the Constitution, proclaimed the principle that the land shall belong to those who cultivate it. According to this principle, there were confiscated, first and foremost, the large land holdings in the hands of non-agriculturists. The Law defines as large land holdings those which cover areas of 25 to 35 hectares of arable land, or 45 hectares of total area. Such estates are taken complete with their entire livestock, inventory, installations and buildings. Churches, monaster- ies and religious institutions are dispossessed of all land exceeding 10 hectares. Only religious institutions of historical or other significance may, as an exception, be left up to 30 hectares of arable land and up to 30 hectares of forest land. The lands of all the three enumerated categories are taken without compensation. Non-agriculturists, whose estates are small or medium, are dispossessed of the surplus exceeding the established 3 hectares and sometimes 5 hectares—depending on the financial standings of the owner. Landowners are dispossessed of land only in cases where their estate surpasses the maximum 20-30 hectares of arable land, fixed by the Law of the people’s republics, taking into account the nature and quality of the land. In these instances the government, under certain conditions, pays out compensation to the amount of the annual income per hectare. A land fund has been set up with the expropriated and confiscated lands. This fund amounts to 1,564,000 hectares, of which 1,075,000 hectares are arable and 489,000 hectares unarable. Of this fund 246,000 families of farmers received 438,000 hectares in accordance with the Land Reform Law while 60,000 families of settlers, mostly fighters in the Yugoslav Army, received 359,700 hectares. The remainder of the land was used to form state agricultural estates or estates belonging to some state enterprises or institutions. In this way the Law on Land Reform completely abolished large hold-

20 ings while agrarian holdings were restricted, so that their maximum limit was fixed at 30-35 hectares and in some republics even at 25 hectares of arable land. The Law also prohibits the future existence of private holdings which surpass this maximum limit. On the other hand, the number and area of state agricultural estates has increased considerably. The land reform has brought the people’s power even closer to the working masses and contributed to the isolation of certain rich profiteering elements in the village. This, of course, has dealt a powerful blow to all capitalist elements in the village, because this reform considerably weakened their pressure on the small peasant producer and narrowed the limits of their activity. The entire industry, excepting small local industry, was nationalized by the end of last year. Wholesale trade was nationalized as well, while only a part of retail trade remained in private hands. All banks and insurance com- panies, land, sea and river transport, etc. wore also nationalized. Naturally, all this radically changed the socio-economic structure of our country. We can give a few figures as illustration of this. This year the state will receive over 30 milliard dinars from state enterprises as tax on turnover, that is to say, as revenue on accumulation from our state production. The significance of this figure can be understood if we take into consideration that the entire budget of the old Yugoslavia never reached such a figure. That explains why our present budget amounts to 85 milliard dinars, that is to say, practically three times more than the budget of the old Yugoslavia in terms of the present value of the dinar. The following figures speak even more clearly of the present socio- economic structure of Yugoslavia. The state sector includes 100 per cent of banking, 100 per cent of the industry of federal and republican significance, 70 per cent of the industry of local significance (including the cooperative sector). The state sector, including the cooperative sector, embraces over 90 per cent of the value of industrial production. A part of its accumulation in the form of taxes on turnover, naturally, is also turned over to the state by the private sector. Practically 100 per cent of the big trade and mechanized transport are covered by the state and cooperative sector. Of the total number of retail shops, approximately 44 per cent are covered by the state and cooperative sector, while approximately 56 per cent are in private hands. However, as regards the volume of trade, the state and cooperative sectors considerably surpass the private merchants. In this respect, I have at my disposal figures only for the second quarter of this year. In this quarter, of the total amount of retail trade the state sector covered 33.95 per cent (in value), the cooperative sector 49.19 per cent and the private commercial sector 16.86 per cent. In view of these facts, we shall set ourselves the task of expanding the network of our state retail trade shops and improving and expanding the work of our cooperative trade network. Here it

21 should be noted that the wholesale-retail cooperatives in town and village alone supply approximately 11 million consumers. On the whole, the cooperative movement, although organizationally still rather weak and insufficiently active, occupies an extremely important place in the socialist construction of our country. In this connection a very important fact is that agricultural cooperatives alone, in one way or another, cover 3/4 of all the peasant holdings. It is also typical that the number of working cooperatives, that is to say, the collective agricultural holdings of the artel type, have reached the figure’ of 612 and that they include approximately 30,000 farmsteads. Of course, these peasant cooperatives are the product of the small, most progressive part of the peasantry and cannot be taken as a general characteristic of the development of our agriculture. There can be no doubt, however, that they will play an important educational role in the village and will be an important instrument in the socialist reconstruction of our agriculture. Finally, we must mention one more fact, perhaps the most important, namely, the enormous significance of the measures which have been carried into effect to ensure the economic independence of our country. Thanks to na- tionalization and other measures, the government of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia has in fact eliminated foreign capital in our country. Foreign capital held the most important branches of Yugoslav economy. It is characteristic, that, for example, of the total foreign capital invested, 52.1 per cent was invested in four branches, namely, in the mining and smelting industry, electrical industry, oil industry and in banking. It is clear that these were the positions from which foreign capital could best control the economy of Yugoslavia. Today, these positions of foreign capital have been liquidated; they are in the hands of the peoples of Yugoslavia. All these results, of course, do not in the least mean that the danger of the development of capitalist element in our economy has been completely done away with, or that the class struggle with the remnants of capitalism is no more. No; capitalist remnants are fighting for their existence and for their reinforcement. Commerce is the field of their activity. In addition to this, the small producer in the village represents a predominant form in agriculture and, as Lenin said, “capitalist trade tendencies” are developing parallel with him. All these tendencies, however, could become dangerous only if we failed to keep account of them. However, both the political and economic means which can prevent the revival of capitalist elements are in the hands of the people’s power, In the first place the “capitalist trade tendencies” of the small peasant holding do not yet mean that this holding is in itself capitalistic. It is a question of linking this holding, economically, organizationally and according to plan, with the state sector in the struggle against capitalist elements in the village, and in this way to change it from a reserve of capitalism into a

22 stronghold of socialist development. Such an organizational weapon, which is capable of leading us directly to this goal, is the agricultural cooperative. I shall speak of it later, however. If we bear all this in mind, then it is clear that Yugoslavia today is no longer a capitalist country, nor a country with a predominant capitalist sector, but a state typical of the transition from capitalism to socialism with predominantly socialist elements of economy, which are the result of the struggle waged so far by the working class and entire working people. On the other hand the people’s power, that is to say, the democratic power of the working people, headed by the working class, contains all the necessary elements and conditions for the further building of socialism in our country. All this is also borne out by the structure of our national income, which to a considerable extent reflects the significant socialist victories of our peoples. Of the total of the present national income of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (100 per cent)—according to approximately exact es- timates for general orientation—54 per cent represents the total state accumulation, 20 per cent the net income of civil servants and workers, 19 per cent the net income of peasants (including also the income of agricultural cooperatives), 3.5 per cent the net income of artisans (including artisan cooperatives), and the remainder of 3.5 per cent the private sector (including also the private capitalist elements and private professions, etc.), However, a more detailed analysis of the 26 per cent of the income which represents the small producer (including cooperatives) or the capitalist elements, shows that approximately 12 per cent of this income is realized in the relations between the private sector and the state sector, 5-7 per cent in the small-scale commodity exchanges of the producers among themselves, and only 7-9 per cent for capitalist commodity exchange. This, naturally, does not mean that these figures cannot from time to time show certain fluctuations. Taken as a whole, however, the line of development is clear and all these figures obviously con- firm what I have already said, namely, that present-day Yugoslavia is a country of transition from capitalism to socialism, with predominantly socialist elements. If we also bear in mind the significant successes in the development of the agricultural cooperatives, then this fact will become even more clear. In a word: the economic strength of capitalist elements in our country has been dealt a mortal blow. All this has made it possible for the peoples of Yugoslavia to embark on their Five Year Economic Plan already this year, a plan which will completely alter the face of Yugoslavia. The Law on the Five Year Plan formulates the tasks of this plan as follows: 1) The elimination of the economic and technical backwardness of the country; 2) The consolidation .of the economic and defensive strength of the country;

23 3) The consolidation and further development of the socialist sector of the national economy and of the new relations of production arising therefrom; 4) The raising of the general welfare of the working people. We shall not dwell here in detail on the Five Year Plan; we shall mention only a few figures by way of illustration. By 1951 the national income will have increased by 193 per cent as compared with 1939, that is to say, from 132 milliard to 255 milliard dinars. The national income per capita will have grown from 8,464 dinars to 15,625 dinars. The value of industrial production will have grown by nearly five times, that is to say, from 25.5 milliard dinars to 126 milliard dinars. The value of agricultural production will have increased to 151 per cent, that is to say, from 63.8 milliard to 96.7 milliard dinars. Whereas in 1938 new investments in the old Yugoslavia amounted to 13.5 milliard dinars, the sum of 69.6 milliard dinars will have been invested by the end of 1951, while total investments during the realization of the first Five Year Plan will amount to 278.3 milliard dinars. The production of electric power will have been raised from 71 KW to 72 KW per capita in 1951 and even more in 1952, as certain of the most important electric-power plants of the first Five Year Plan will have been completed by then. These figures alone show the magnitude of the Five Year Plan. It will actually transform the country and create firm foundations for our socialist construction. It will create the necessary material prerequisites for the final liquidation of capitalistic remnants in our country. At the same time, it will radically raise the living standard of our working masses. It is clear, that preparations for the realization of the plan demanded considerable preliminary reorganization of our entire state apparatus in the field of economic leadership. But, despite the difficulties and many errors, it can be said today—at the end of the third quarter of the first year of our Five Year Plan—that the plan is being successfully carried out. The best illustration of the labour enthusiasm of the masses is the fact that the value of present industrial production amounts to 167 per cent as compared to pre-war production. It goes without saying, that industrialization has also placed the problem of the further development of our agriculture on the order of the day. In- dustrialization demands a substantial increase of agricultural production. We cannot arrive at results such as will be necessary in the future on the basis of the existing backward small-holding structure of our agriculture. We are in danger of finding ourselves in a chronic crisis with respect to agricultural production if its development lags indefinitely behind the development of industry. It was, therefore, necessary, parallel to industrialization, to devote our attention also to the question of the reconstruction of our agriculture. The chief organizational means in the reconstruction of our agriculture

24 is the cooperative movement. Already today, the agricultural cooperatives, in one form or another, cover 3/4 of all the peasant holdings in Yugoslavia. The consumers’ cooperatives are the predominant-type in the cooperative movement. It is the policy of the state to give the greatest possible assistance to this movement in order to aid it in its further development towards higher forms, and in order to develop within its framework also other elements of the cooperative movement especially different types of processing and productive agricultural cooperatives in general. The state is striving to create in the village an organizationally uniform type of cooperative which will have its consumers section, its credit section with a savings fund, its workshops and possibly small enterprises for the processing of agricultural produce; furthermore, its machine-tractor equipment, its small electric-power house, if possible and necessary, etc. In a word, the present agricultural cooperative should become a vital economic unit which will be in the position to demon- strate to the peasant in practice the advantages of large-scale planned agriculture. Such cooperatives will get the necessary technical personnel. There is no doubt, that the development of such agriculture cooperatives will play an exceptional educational role in the village. To the same end the state is developing a network of machine-tractor stations and devoting great attention to the development of the state sector of agriculture. During the current year and especially during 1949, the state holdings: will already satisfy a considerable part of the demands of towns and villages for certain agricultural products and; will cover practically the entire demand for certain other products. The state has also of late been devoting great attention to the development of farm holdings which are directly linked with factories or institutions, and which have the task of supping these demands. All these are important means for the reconstruction of our agriculture. * * * * The great victories in the-field of economic construction, and especially the successes in the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan; have, naturally, strengthened the influence of the Communist Party and the People’s Front even more. In this struggle for the economic reconstruction of our country and in the preparations for and fulfillment of the Five Year Plan, the People’s Front has played an extremely important role. “The People’s Front”, said Comrade Tito, “has introduced into the rehabilitation of our country the enormous working, creative enthusiasm of our peoples, the ardour of our youth, the self-sacrifice of our workers, peasants, people’s intelligentsia. Thanks to the People’s Front alone our transport was re- established; destroyed bridges and railway-lines were rebuilt and

25 our river and maritime transport were restored within record time. Great credit is due to the People’s Front for the fact that the majority of our devastated villages and towns has been rehabili- tated. It is the merit of the People’s Front—and no small one at that—and in the first place of the workers in the Front, that our factories were restored so rapidly and that they commenced work so soon. The successful solution of the various social, cultural and educational questions in the new Yugoslavia is the great merit of the People’s Front. The governments, both federal and republican, would not have been able to solve these problems without the aid of such a strong, such a mass people’s organization as our People’s Front....” (Tito; Report to the Second Congress of the People’s Front of Yugoslavia) That is why the People’s Front in our country is ever increasing its influence. That is precisely why the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is constantly fighting for the broadest activity of the People’s Front, which today numbers approximately 7 million members and has its organization in every hamlet of our country. Especially now, in the fulfilment of our Five Year Plan, the People’s Front is playing an extremely important role in the mobilization of our working masses. It is clear, that all the successes we have achieved so far have further strengthened the internal unity of the People’s Front. It has taken, firm root as a united mass political organization of the working people in the struggle for the rehabilitation and socialist construction of our country; it has grown so strong that no attacks by imperialist agents were able to break this unity. There is no doubt that this People’s Front is one of the greatest victories of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and of the entire working people of our country. “As it best represents not only the political unity of our peoples, but also the brotherhood and unity in .a national sense,” stated Comrade Tito, “no bourgeois political parties can replace the People’s Front. For that reason the People’s Front becomes a permanent people’s political organization, for that reason it is ir- replaceable and differs from all hitherto political parties and fu- sions of parties”. (Tito: Report to the Second Congress of the Peo- ple’s Front of Yugoslavia) Naturally, the struggle against the routed’ anti-democratic reaction and capitalistic elements has assumed a completely different form. It no longer has the form of the political, interparty, platform struggle. The focal point of the class struggle has been transferred to the field of our economic and general state construction. In the sphere of economy the enemy’s activity is displayed primarily in his efforts to obstruct the fulfilment of our Five Year

26 Plan, all measures which the government is introducing; he is acting as the profiteer, saboteur and parasite, or as the propagator of-various harmful “theories” in connection with the construction of our country, etc. The class struggle is also expressed in the reactionary, anti-national activity of a part of the church hierarchy or profiteering elements in the village. On the other hand, the enemy is contacting espionage and .diversionist agents of the foreign imperialists. The internal balance of political forces in every country is today inevitably becoming a component part of the balance of forces on an international scale. The imperialistic expansion of the American monopolist circles is based today on an economic superiority unknown in the history of capitalism. Hence the tendency today, especially of American monopolists, to transform part of the national bourgeoisie of certain capitalist countries into their economic and political instrument, into an instrument for the enslavement of those countries, to transform them into semi-dependent, and even semi-colonial countries. American imperialist expansion is striving to colonize the civilized world, to “Africanize” Europe, or at least to transform Europe into something resembling South America for the benefit of American monopolists. Capitalist reaction, together with its right-wing “socialist” flun- keys in certain capitalist countries, is actually an instrument of this expansion, directed against the independence of its own and other peoples. The tendency of big imperialists to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries is today stronger and more obvious than it was ever before. This was attempted and is being attempted even today by certain foreign imperialist circles in Yugoslavia, where they rely on the remnants of routed traitorous reaction which is isolated from the people’s masses and from all genuine democratic elements in our country who, together with the Communist Party, are cooperating in the People’s Front in the great- work of socialist construction in our country. Directed from abroad in the interests of foreign imperialists, the action of the enemies of the people’s power has today lost all party or political character. The struggle- against them is actually assuming the form of a struggle for ensuring the peace and national independence: The peoples of Yugoslavia love their liberty and independence, are loyal to the traditions of freedom, that is why they do not want to be the slaves of the modern American “conquistadores’’. That is precisely why the agents of imperialist reaction in our country cannot be allowed to undermine the strength and unity of our peoples. Such are the results of the great and glorious struggle which the peoples of Yugoslavia began during the national liberation war; united in the People’s Front and headed by the Communist Party- Today, they are laying the firm foundations of their happier future and thus realizing that for which hundreds of thousands of fighters in the national liberation war gave their lives.

27 The Activities of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Poland By WLADISLAW GOMULKA (WIESLAW)

I As a result of the Second World War profound social and economic changes have taken place in Poland: The driving: force behind these changes was ‘the working class, headed; by the Polish Workers’ Party. Our Party holds the key positions in all the vital spheres of regenerated Poland from the very first day of the country’s liberation from the German invaders. Its membership today is close to 800,000. When we began to build the new Poland we only had about 20,000 members concentrated for the most part in partisan detachments, or among former partisans. The structural changes in Poland’s state, political, and economic order were introduced through peaceful channels, i.e., through a bloodless revolution. This was made possible by the Soviet Army which, with the support of the Polish patriots, routed the German troops and liberated the Polish people from the yoke of fascism. It does not follow from this, however, that .these changes took place without a struggle or sacrifices. We passed through a. period of an extremely- sharp class struggle, expressed first and foremost in the armed subversive activities of the fascist-reactionary underground. We lost 14,876 persons, the majority of them Party members, in fighting: against bandit and fascist assassins. We have, in the main, crushed the armed subversive activities of reaction, although not completely eradicated it. It is evident from the aforesaid that the process of the democratic re- generation of the country, following its liberation by the Soviet Army, was accompanied by a sharp class struggle in the course of which we suffered heavy losses. In Poland-the peaceful transition to social reforms and the revolution which had been carried out and now continued within the legislative framework, do not man at all that we have a class idyll; if anything, it is a sharp and bloody class struggle. When taking over state power, our Party did not have to overthrow the old state apparatus, for there was no such apparatus in general at the time. Our task was to build a new one, since the old, pre-war apparatus had been crushed and buried under the ruins of German occupation. As for the occupation apparatus it was liquidated simultaneously with the defeat of the Ger- man invaders. A similar situation existed, to a greater or lesser extent, in all the countries liberated from German occupation or from the domination of native fascism. It was the most important and decisive period in all the countries to build up a new apparatus of state power.

28 Although the revolutionary-democratic parties in Poland, and in the other countries liberated by the Soviet Army, undoubtedly were in a more favourable position to build up their own state apparatus than were the workers’ parties of the countries where Anglo-Saxon troops entered, it seems to us, nonetheless, that even there it was possible to carry out fundamental changes in the new state apparatus. This is particularly true of the countries where the workers’ parties organised a widespread national liberation .struggle and had armed partisan detachments at their disposal. The essence of the political and economic changes in Poland are not confined to reforms alone, reforms which have deprived the middle and big capitalist owners of their material base. The scope of these reforms should be gauged by the changes in the state order, the fundamental reorganisation of the whole state apparatus to meet the interests of the working class and the working people. The negative aspects of the old reactionary state apparatus are gradually being eliminated. Our Party has a decisive influence in the state apparatus which greatly facilitates its task in the development of social relations in Poland. This perhaps is the most essential factor in the structural reorganisation of Poland. In connection with this, I would like to note that, an understanding of the actual state of affairs with regard to the important question of the relation of forces in the state apparatus of Poland as a whole, and not only in its leading bodies, gives a true picture of the Polish road to socialism. The outstanding feature about it is that it is guided by a Marxist party and other genuine democratic, anti-imperialist parties, which constitute the main links in the state apparatus from top to bottom. ‘There is no doubt whatsoever that the working class: and the people can win and retain power only by fighting reaction, even if this power has been won as a result of parliamentary elections. Assuming that genuine democratic parties in some country receive the majority in parliament and form a government of the people, it can be taken for granted that reaction will start a vigorous struggle to overthrow such a government. Under such circumstances a state apparatus loyal to the interests of the working people and at the disposal of a people’s government will be of vast importance to repel and rout the forces of reaction. We know that reaction invariably directs its main fire against the communists in the government. The experience of Poland has shown how effectively the-people can defend themselves and pass over to an offensive against the enemy when the working class and the working-people are in possession of the most powerful and sharpest weapon—state power.

II The 1947 April plenum of the Central Committee of our Party characterised the structure of Poland’s economy and outlined measures for its fur-

29 ther development. It classified the country’s economy into the following three sections: 1. Small-scale production: this covers the bulk of the peasant farms, a considerable section of handicraft production and retail traders. 2. Private capitalist economy: this includes big peasant households em- ploying farm hands, private industrial enterprises, part of handicraft production, wholesale merchants and a large section of retail merchants, house proprietors, different kinds of speculators, etc. 3. The form of economy containing a considerable proportion of socialist elements: state industry, trade, credit, transport, etc. As far as cooperative trade is concerned it cannot as yet be included as a whole among the aforementioned economic divisions, but should be qualified in accordance with the actual role played by its separate branches. The Party plenum defined that our state sector, and especially our industry, contains within- itself important socialist elements, but that it is as yet not consistently socialist. We are of the opinion that our state economy is not a capitalist economy, but an economy of a democratic people’s state, and hence should not be qualified as state capitalism. However, cannot be regarded as a consistently socialist economy, inasmuch as only part of the surplus output produced within the framework of the state economy remains in the hands of the state and its planned distribution is made in conformity with public requirements. A considerable part of this production is intercepted by commercial capitalist elements. It is obvious that this can be achieved only by steadily developing the state sector and by increasing its weight in the national economy. The transformation of the state sector in our economy into a consistent socialist sector, and the transformation of private capitalist elements into state capitalist elements will form the basis for the further advance towards socialism. This can be attained only in sharp class struggle against capitalist elements who are trying to break away from the state. They are trying to inter- cept the maximum share of surplus output produced in the state sector and actually to transform this sector into a body catering to the capitalist class under the state trade mark. It is obvious that the realisation of these plans would ultimately signify the return from the people’s democracy to the capitalist system, with all the political and economic consequences arising therefrom. Thus, the general line of our Party is to curb the capitalist elements, to subordinate them to state control and transform them into state capitalist elements within the people’s democratic state. The low level of production in agriculture and essential goods makes inevitable, and in a certain sense even desirable, the development, under certain conditions and within certain limits, of big peasant households, of handi-

30 craft and private industrial enterprises in the city. We also do not set ourselves the task of doing away with private retail trade. It is clear, however, that the capitalist elements must be restricted, so that the main feature of our development be the increasing predominance of state economy. Experience has shown that in conditions of a people’s state, when the political power and the economic key positions are once in our hands, the task of getting the capitalist elements to conform to the policy of the people’s state, although difficult, is nonetheless possible and realistic. The subordination of capitalist elements to state control should be carried out in the following manner: 1. To ensure the state and cooperatives the decisive role in wholesale trade. Major results have recently been achieved in this field, especially in the marketing of grain. 2. To strengthen the position of the state and cooperatives in retail trade, particularly in the big industrial centres. Unless s this is done, it will be impossible to bring commercial capitalist elements under state control. We are carrying out this task by establishing state stores and extending the network of cooperatives, and especially stores with restricted numbers of consumers, in the big industrial centres. 3. To develop extensively rural cooperatives in the field of supplies and sales. We are far behind in this task. 4. To conclude agreements for the purchase of agricultural products. Such contracts have been successfully concluded for the purchase of technical crops—beets, tobacco, flax, hemp, vegetable fats, chicory. The object is to extend gradually the system of contracts to purchase other agricultural and livestock products. A corresponding price policy will make it possible, to a certain extent, to develop agriculture along the lines which are favourable for the state. 5. To organize agricultural associations which will lease agricultural machines to peasant households. The establishment of these associations will depend on the state’s plans for developing the production of agricultural machines and tractors, as well as on imports from abroad. 6. ‘To extend the cooperative network to handicraft production, first and foremost to small handicraft enterprises and village craftsmen, so as to supply them with raw materials and sell goods made by them. Experience in this field justifies hopes of its further successful development. 7. Economic control of private industry by regulating supplies of .raw .materials, electric power, fuel. The conclusion of agreements to supply the state with a definite assortment of goods in corresponding quantities. We already have positive results with private textile enterprises. Systematic elimination of illegal private trade, speculation in foreign currency, illegal transactions between the state and cooperative apparatus on

31 the one hand, and private elements on the other; measures against misuses, etc. 9. To control prices in private retail and wholesale trade, in accordance with fixed prices and profits limited by the state. This control is already being practised on a wide scale and yielding positive results on the whole. 10. To regulate private trade with the object of cutting out superfluous links and eliminating from the latter obvious speculators. 11. A corresponding tax policy in relation to private capitalist .elements; this is to be done not for the purpose of obstructing the possibility of their further development, but in order to restrict their exorbitant incomes. Great success has recently been achieved in this field as witnessed by the fact that budget returns from private capital have doubled during the last six months. I will not dwell in detail on the principal aspects of our Three-Year Plan for economic restoration. The plan has been made public and in all probability the comrades are acquainted with it. Great efforts will have to be exerted to carry out this plan, which aims to increase considerably the pre- war level of consumption by fully restoring and reconstructing industry, by cultivating the hitherto unsown areas which will greatly increase the yield. Parallel with this, large-scale measures have been taken to industrialise the country and develop its heavy industry. The first half of 1947 shows that, on the whole, the plan is successfully being carried out, although crop failure, caused by the drought, will present serious economic difficulties. The fulfilment of the Three-Year Plan depends on the following principal conditions: 1. The full utilisation of all reserves m our economy by observing a regime of economy. 2. Increased productivity of labour by applying rationalisation measures, and by giving every support to the mass emulation movement among the workers, spontaneously started in some of our industries at the beginning of 1947. 3. The formation of a labour army composed of the male population scheduled for military service. 4. The further extension of a sound financial base in order to carry out the economic plan without inflation upheavals—this to be done through a corresponding tax policy. 5. The extensive development of our exports, including agricultural, so as to increase imports of the necessary equipment and raw materials. Poland’s foreign trade is developing successfully, and in all probability will reach close to 300 million dollars in exports this year. This sum corresponds approximately to the average yearly sum of Polish exports in 1936- 1938 (taking into account the drop in the value of the dollar). Poland has

32 trade relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of the people’s democracy, and on an increasing scale with capitalist countries. Thanks to its coal exports Poland has succeeded in receiving big trade credits from a number of European states. Apart from the usual trade agreements, Poland has lately concluded a number of agreements with the Soviet Union and with several countries of the people’s democracy. These agreements provide for the reciprocal exchange of technical experience, joint restoration and reconstruction of economic objects, extensive reciprocal use of transit, etc. In order to have a picture of the national economy in 1945-47 and the level attained to date, it is necessary to outline in brief the enormous destruction caused by the war. As a result of the war Poland (in its present borders) lost 40% of its industry, 67% of its big horned cattle, 55% of its horses, 83% of its cattle, 20%: of its agricultural implements. To this should be added the- enormous losses due to the exhaustion of the soil, the destruction of transport on land, sea and river, communications, housing in the cities, cultural institutions, etc. Despite the rapid progress made in the past three years, Poland’s agriculture has still a long way to go to make up for the war losses. The same holds true for the acreage under crop, the harvest, the number of heads of horned cattle and hogs. Because of the big decrease in the yield per hectare, the increase in the harvest is comparatively insignificant, despite the rapid increase in the acreage cultivated. The decrease in the crop yield is due, primarily, to the lack of fertilizers, especially manure, and to the lack of draught animals. On the whole there is an acute shortage in agricultural production. Thus, for instance, the gross output of rye and wheat in Central Poland this year barely reaches 60- 70% of the per capita pre-war level. The industrial output of Poland (in its present state borders) exceeds the pre-war production of Poland at the time. However, this increase is un- even. With the output in heavy industry at 28.2% above the pre-war level, and that of electric power at 52%, we have barely reached 80% of the pre-war level in light industry. The output is even lower as regards a number of essential commodities (the production of shoe leather, for instance, is 23.9% of the pre-war level). This slow development of light industry is due, in the main, to the weak state of the country’s raw materials and agricultural: base, to the limited possibilities of importing raw materials from abroad. Hence the acute shortage of essential industrial goods of mass consumption. This shortage is further accentuated by the obvious regression in small-scale industry and handicrafts compared with the pre-war period, even though the number of registered handicraft enterprises increased from 88,700 on December 31, 1945 to 135,900 on April 1, 1947. However, this is far behind the pre-war figure of 250,000 enterprises. The general price index on the open market in August 1947 was 148

33 compared to April 1945. Taking real wages at the beginning of 1947 at 100, the index of real earnings of government employees in June 1947 was from 134 to 141. The real earnings of workers in middle and large-scale industry (bearing in mind the changes in social insurance and the introduction of paid vacations) reached 80% compared with the pre-war real earnings. Despite the as yet low level of agricultural and essential commodity production, the real earnings today are indicative of the major changes in the distribution of the national income to benefit the working class. The increase in real earnings far exceeds the growth in the productivity of labour which, for a number of reasons, such as the wear and tear of machinery, stoppages due to shortage of raw materials, lack of skilled workers, inadequate organisation and discipline in labour, etc. reaches two-thirds of the pre-war productivity. As a result of the agrarian reform and of populating the Western areas, the fertile acreage per peasant house hold in Central Poland will soon reach 7.7 hectares instead of the 5.5 before the war, i.e. an increase of 40%. We have not got as yet the exact data about the new agrarian structure of the country. However, it can be stated that the elimination of landlords and big estates has greatly increased the proportion of the middle-class household in the Polish countryside. The state still has about 10% of the total fertile acreage left, following the introduction of agrarian reforms and populating the Western areas. This acreage can and must be put to use in the near future in the interests of strengthening the national economy in general, and agriculture in particular. As a result of the nationalisation of industry the whole of the country’s large and middle-scale industry is owned by the state. Only about 15% of the general industrial output falls to the share of small private industry and handicraft trade. The state has taken over all the banks. At the same time the state and cooperative sector is to an ever greater extent taking over the key positions in wholesale trade. Up to now the state’s contribution to the wholesale trade turnover is 50%, that of the cooperative sector 26% and that of the private sector 24%. Here, however, it should he noted that because of the unorganised market a considerable part .of the agricultural production reaches the retailer directly from the producer, thus bypassing the wholesaler. As for wholesale cooperative trade, in present conditions of the cooperative sector, here too, it should be noted, it does not fully operate within the framework of planned economy. The state and cooperative network still play a small role in retail trade. At present the state’s contribution to the retail trade turnover is 2%, the cooperative sector is 11% whereas that of the private sector reaches 87%. In general the key positions in the national economy are in the hands of the state which owns large and middle-scale industry, the banking system and wholesale trade.

34 III The most characteristic feature of political relations in Poland is the leading role of the working class in the political life of the people and the outstanding role of the Polish Workers’ Party in the bloc of democratic parties. We were able to achieve this by organising a united front of the working class and by cooperating with the Polish Socialist Party. The united front of the workers and cooperation between the PWP and the PSP constitute the main driving force in Poland’s progress along the path to socialism. All the political and economic achievements gained, all our successes and victories are due to the united front of the working class and the cooperation between the two workers’ parties. The traditions of social-democratism weigh heavily on the Polish labour, movement. In the past the Polish Socialist Party maintained a hostile and clearly unfriendly attitude toward the former Communist Party of Po- land. The Communist Party of Poland, burdened with the traditions of Lux- emburgism, committed a number of errors in the past, especially on the national question. It was only during the German occupation that the members of the former Communist Party (disbanded as far back as 1938), and of other true democrats who joined the struggle for national and social liberation, came to the fore of the movement as a party fighting for the independence of Poland. This circumstance made it much easier for us to spread the Party’s political influence over the working class and other sections of the people. Already at the time of the German occupation, and when the new Po- land was coming into being, our Party full well realised that it would be extremely difficult to unite the ranks of the working class without cooperation with the Polish Socialist Party. Only such a unity could ensure the working class a leading role among the masses. On the other hand it was clear to us that unless the pernicious traditions of social-democratism and Pilsudskiism were uprooted from the ranks of the Polish Socialist Party, it would be impossible to create a people’s power and guide the regenerated Poland along the: path of socialist development. Hence from the very beginning of the liberation of Poland our cooperation with the Polish Socialist Party was closely linked with our strivings to bring about ideological unity on a Marxist basis. During the occupation, the Polish Socialist Party split into two groups: the one group, under the name of “Liberty, Equality and Independence”, represented the old ideology of the Polish Socialist Party, and had nothing but hatred for the Polish Workers’ Party and the Soviet Union. The other, which in the beginning called itself the “Polish Socialists” and later the “Workers’ Party of Polish Socialists”, constituted the Socialist Party. It was this left party that we started to cooperate with already at the time of the occupation. The Workers’ Party of Polish Socialists was the embryo of the present Polish Socialist Party which was later joined, in an unorganised fashion, practically en masse, by the “Liberty, Equality and Independence” group, with the ex-

35 ception of a dozen of the most reactionary leaders. Part of them are now abroad where they continue to conduct their disruptive activities. The Polish Socialist Party today is on the extreme left among the social-democratic parties of Europe. It full well realises that the country cannot be governed regardless of, or without the Polish Workers’ Party. However, it would be incorrect to draw the conclusion that the Polish Socialist Party co- operates with us only because of the strength of our Party. The PSP consciously desires this cooperation. The experience of history, and especially the experience of the last war has greatly influenced the policy of the Polish So- cialist Party. It is now in the process of overcoming the harmful traditions of anti-Sovietism, Pilsudskiism and social-democratism. This is being greatly facilitated by the general achievements in the political and economic life of Poland, the direct outcome of the existence of a united front and cooperation between the two parties. The three years’ experience of cooperation between the PSP and PWP, which has resulted in the united front of the working class, has yielded good results. We can confidently state that thanks to this, and this alone, we were able to save Poland from different political and economic upheavals and consolidate the foundations of the new, people’s Poland. As every political phe- nomenon, cooperation between the Polish Workers’ Party and the Polish So- cialist Party is subordinate to the definite laws of development and cannot remain stationary. We would like this collaboration to develop also in the future in the direction of the organic unity of the two parties. The united front greatly strengthened Poland’s’ working class, placed at the head of the people. But as long as the interests of this class are represented by two parties, as long as different ideological trends exist in its ranks the working class cannot display its full strength. Disagreements arise between the cooperating workers’ parties because of rivalry, incorrect understanding of party patriotism, on personal grounds. Experience in cooperation between the middle and lower party links has shown that for the most part differences on these questions have strained relations and have been utilised to disrupt cooperation. It is difficult for the 1,500,000 members of the Polish Workers’ Party and the Polish Socialist Party, who have joined the parties during the last three years, to understand the ideological differences between the two parties, all the more so since they are cooperating, and hold similar views on the principal question of state policy. In answer to our call for organic unity the Central Committee of the Polish Socialist Party adopted a resolution stressing the need to consolidate the united front and strengthen cooperation with the Polish Workers’ Party. Close to 1,500 joint meetings and conferences, attended by more than 300,000 members of the two parties, have been held during the last three months. A conference of leading functionaries of the two parties was held recently.

36 The object of these meetings was to popularise the idea of the united front of the working class and cooperation between the two parties. We shall continue to campaign for joint meetings, to which we hope to draw the members of the two parties and organize joint party meetings as a regular form of cooperation. We regard the campaign of the last three months as one of the biggest achievements of the united front. It would, however, be unwise to assume that there is no danger to the people’s power in the country and that under no circumstances can it be turned back. Reaction is still in a position to oppose us. It still holds some important positions in the country, especially since it has a strong economic base. A considerable part of the Polish intelligentsia is still imbued with reactionary sentiments. So far we have been unable to bring about radical changes in the teaching personnel and in the curriculum in the higher and secondary schools, and we have only taken the first steps in this direction. We face an acute shortage of qualified and loyal cadres in the sphere of science. The old hostile ideology and old conservative customs still predominate among certain strata of the population. There are still openings in other parties comprising the democratic bloc, which the class enemy tries to take advantage of. The youth is still organisationally scattered. All this goes to show that reaction is still able to preserve its influence among certain sections of the people and to organise further struggle against the existing order. Reaction is likewise taking advantage of the economic difficulties of the country. The economic structure and the political forms of the people’s democratic order in Poland do not in themselves preclude the possibility of the existence of parties representing the interests of propertied exploiting sections. However, such parties would inevitably become opposition parties and would not only fight against the people’s government, but also against the people’s social order. It should be borne in mind that old bourgeois ideology, which is the ally of every opposition party, still holds sway in the masses. The banning of the activities of the old reactionary and fascist parties results in the supporters of these parties concentrating in the legal opposition party. In pre- war Poland the reactionary fascist parties enjoyed great influence. In the people’s Poland we banned these parties, and as a result the reactionary elements flocked in great numbers to the opposition party, the Polsko Stronniz- two Ludowa. The opposition parties in the countries of the people’s democracy do not want to be in the opposition within the framework of that given order, and hence try to break it down. The propertied classes, deprived of political power, launch an offensive with the object of returning to their former social and political positions, taken away from them by the new order. Fight- ing against the people’s democracy they, as a rule, violate the law. This has been proved by the disruptive activities of Mikolajczyk’s party in Poland, and by the hostile actions of the opposition parties in the other countries of the

37 people’s democracy. The common feature of this opposition is its connection with international reaction, primarily with Anglo-American reaction. The opposition parties, sinking into the bog of national treachery, are paving the way for foreign reaction’s interference in the domestic affairs of the countries of the new democracy. The open ties between Polish reaction and the reactionary forces in Great Britain and the USA greatly helped to undermine the influence of Mikolajczyk’s opposition party, and to weaken the fascist underground. This was one of the principal reasons for the defeat of Mikolajczyk’s party in the elections. The negative attitude taken by Anglo-American circles on the question of Poland’s Western frontiers, on the one hand, and the positive stand taken by the Soviet Union, on the other, caused a rapid decline in pro-British ad pro-American sympathy in Poland, whereas sympathy for the Soviet Union greatly increased. The Polish people correctly identified the policy of Polish reaction and that of Mikolajczyk with the policy of British and American reaction. Apart from the harm caused by Churchill’s and Byrnes’ speeches, in which they demanded the revision of Poland’s frontiers in favour of Germany, they served also as excellent propaganda among the Polish people for the policy of the government, of the Polish Workers’ Party and of the democratic bloc. It was also excellent propaganda for strengthening the Pol- ish-Soviet alliance. We intend, also in the future, to base the power on the bloc of the democratic parties, on the alliance of workers and peasants, on cooperation with the progressive sections of the petty bourgeoisie. The present government relies on a five-party coalition, namely: the Polish Workers’ Party, the Polish Socialist Party, the Stronniztwo Ludowa, the Stronniztwo Democ- ratishne and the Stronniztwo Prazi. The Stronniztwo Ludowa, as the party of the toiling peasantry which constitutes the bulk of the Polish people, is the most important element in the bloc. The peasant-movement in Poland has old and deep roots. In the .course of its fifty-year existence this movement vacillated between the Nationalist Conservative Party of the people’s democracy, between the “sanatzi” which dominated pre-war Poland (from May 1926 to 1939) and the Polish Socialist Party at the time. Before the war the peasant movement was split into several parties, of which the Independent Peasants’ Party was disbanded because of social- radicalism. Several years prior to the war the peasant movement, which was completely isolated from power, suppressed and dissolved by the “sanatzi”, united into a single peasant party under the leadership of the conservative leader Witos. This party was known as the Stronniztwo Ludowa. During the war and at the time of German occupation, the leaders of Stronniztwo Lu- dowa formed a bloc with the right-wing parties in Poland proper as well as in emigration. The group of left- wing peasant leaders split away from the party and, although formally maintaining ties with it, established their own leader-

38 ship in 1943, and started to publish an illegal organ entitled “The People’s Will”. The group was headed by left-wing peasant leaders, the majority of them from the old Independent Peasants’ Party. The representatives of the left-wing of the peasant party, along with the representatives of the left-wing of the Socialist Party, joined the underground Kraewa Rada Narodova. Fol- lowing the liberation of Poland, the leaders of the “People’s Will” group took over the leadership of the Stronniztwo Ludowa (this did not include the right- wing peasant leaders). After the establishment of the Government of National Unity, in conformity with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, Mikolajczyk on his return to Poland formed his own party, the Polsko Stronniztwo Ludowa. This party united all the reactionary leaders of the peasant movement, and also part of the moderate leaders. The former members of the “sanatzi” and the “Endecs”, who had no party of their own, joined the Polsko Stronniztwo Lu- dowa, en masse. Calling itself the party of the people, the Polsko Stronniztwo Ludowa tried to win for itself the dominant role. Actually, however, it became the party of the urban bourgeoisie and the rural rich, as well as of the Anglo- American agents in Poland. In their struggle against the people’s democracy Mikolajczyk and his party resorted to cunning tactics. Outwardly Mikolajczyk agreed with the new social reforms introduced, as for instance, with the ex- propriation of the landed estates and the nationalisation of the key industries, formally he was in accord with the changes made on Poland’s Eastern frontiers. However, Mikolajczyk considered the overthrow of the people’s government and the removal of the Polish Workers’ Party from power as his prime object. Thus Mikolajczyk wanted to pave the way for the restoration of former, maybe somewhat reorganised, social relations in Poland. As a result of the decisive offensive, launched in the main by our Party, as a result of Mikolajczyk’s defeat in the elections, and the internal crisis in the party, expressed in the withdrawal of a group of the more democratically- minded prominent leaders, and the creation of a left-wing group inside the PSL, Mikolajczyk’s party lost considerable influence, and his position both in town and countryside were greatly weakened. Nevertheless, to this day his party constitutes a leading centre of anti-democratic forces. After the defeat of the PSL the radical peasant movement, organised by the Stronniztwo Lu- dowa, has noticeably increased its activities and spread its influence not only among the poor but also among the middle peasants. In the localities we have organised joint meetings of the functionaries of the Polish Workers’ Party and the Stronniztwo Ludowa and occasionally with the Polish Socialist Party. These meetings have yielded good political results, have helped to form the peasant movement by guiding it along lines of cooperation with the working class movement. They have also helped ideologically to crystallise the Stronniztwo Ludowa. As has earlier been pointed out, the scattered nature of the youth or-

39 ganisations is a serious shortcoming in the people’s democracy of Poland. There are several youth organisations in the country, and each of them is af- filiated to a corresponding political party, or to a definite political trend among the people. We are trying to unite the youth into one body, are elaborating plans for the establishment of a single leadership of all youth organisations. At the same time, following the example of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, we intend next year to organise labour battalions composed of the young men of conscript age, released from military service, as well as of voluntary groups of organised youth. These labour battalions would render economic help and would become a school for educating our youth in the spirit of people’s democracy. The student youth are as yet greatly influenced by reaction. This is explained by the social composition of the student body which we are gradually changing in the course of the enrolment of new student youth. Special student preparatory courses for working-class and peasant youth have been organised for the purpose. There are still weak spots in our political system of people’s democracy. Our main difficulties at present are cadres—the lack of the necessary people. This is the bottleneck in our Party. Our central Party school has been functioning since the first days of Poland’s liberation. Up to now this school has gradu- ated approximately 3,000 comrades from its three-month and six-month courses. We also have short-course district Party schools which have gradu- ated 10,000 comrades. In addition to the Party schools we have schools of the Youth League of Struggle. There are also trade union schools attended by many of our comrades. However, we still need many years to prepare political cadres. The recent plenum of the Central Committee of the Party advanced the task of raising the level of the ideological education of our Party members. We have consciously permitted the mass entry of new members into the Party, for it is easier in our conditions to work having the support of mass organisations. A party of functionaries cannot replace a mass party, all the more so because we have a small number of politically highly educated Party members. We often have to send several thousand Party members to carry out different campaigns such as the drive against speculators and high prices, campaigns to collect taxes in kind, etc. Almost all members participated in the election campaign. We could not have accomplished all this without a mass party. The April plenum of the Central Committee stopped mass recruiting into the Party, and now that permanent Party cards have been issued we are purging the Party of alien and superfluous elements. We presume this will reduce the Party’s membership by five per cent. If the question was asked; what is the all-important condition for the successful advance to socialism in Poland, we would reply: first and foremost, the quantity and quality of our Party cadres, and the ideological level of the whole of our Party.

40 IV In our informative report we cannot pass over in silence the question of foreign policy. We cannot separate our struggle for social, economic and political reorganisation for the complete rehabilitation of the country from the struggle for state sovereignty and for the security of our frontiers; we cannot separate it from our foreign policy. Alliance with the U.S.S.R. is the keystone of our foreign policy. We are explaining to the people the vital necessity of consistently strengthening this alliance; we are explaining the correctness of this from the point of view of the interests of the Polish state. We are endeavouring to destroy all anti- Soviet centres, to uproot the old anti- Russian sentiments prevailing since the 18th and 19th centuries, to eliminate anti-Soviet prejudices which reaction has used to poison public opinion within Poland from the very first days of the Great October Revolution. Realising that the complete elimination of this pernicious heritage calls for intensified efforts for many years to come, we can state that a big turning point has already been made in this direction. As already stated, the principal lever in this question is the problem of our West- ern territories and the knowledge that the Soviet Union helped Poland to settle its frontiers on the Oder and the Nysa. As is known, the Polish Workers’ Party was the first of the Polish parties to put forward the demand at the time of the war that the Western territories be returned to Poland. The territories wrested by the Germans are historically Polish, although after centuries of Germanisation only 15 per cent of the total population there, at the time the territories were returned, were Polish. The Germans, who for centuries tried to seize the Slav countries and who, in the last war, were defeated by the Slav peoples, are the most fitting tools in the hands of Anglo-American imperialist warmongers and the organisers of a new war, who are reckoning on a new crusade against the Soviet Union, against the Slav countries. They once again want to turn these peoples into slaves of capitalism. The Polish frontiers along the Oder and the Nysa are not only historically proved frontiers of the Polish state, but also constitute the Westernmost frontier of the people’s democratic social system in Europe. The working class of other countries, their Communist Parties, and all the progressive revolutionary and democratic forces fighting against imperialism, are just as interested in strengthening Poland’s Western frontiers along the Oder and the Nysa as are the Polish working class and the whole Polish people. Slav solidarity is the second-bulwark of our foreign policy. This solidarity is not only one of the underlying factors of our alliance with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and in future with Bulgaria, but is also a source of economic and cultural friendly rapprochement with other Slav countries.

41 However, it should be noted that, despite different traditions as, for instance, in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, Slav solidarity will gain an increasingly firm foothold in Poland as relations with the fraternal Slav peoples grow stronger and closer. In this respect, the pact of friendship between Po- land and Czechoslovakia has been most successful. The same holds true for the various economic communications and cultural agreements which strengthen the forces of democracy in our countries. The fulfilment of those treaties will sweep away the antagonism imbibed and supported for scores of years by reaction in the interests of Germany. The third bulwark of our foreign policy is the struggle for strengthening the peace, based on the principle of Potsdam; the struggle for the complete eradication of all centres of fascism, first and foremost for the denazification, demilitarisation and democratisation of Germany; the struggle against any likelihood of a new German aggression supported by its present defenders; against the menace to the sovereignty of the European people by American imperialism; against a Western bloc and all attempts to create an imperialist and anti-people’s coalition under the leadership of the U.S.A. Guiding ourselves by these principles, we are defending the United Na- tions Organisation against all attempts to turn it into an obedient weapon of the imperialist policy of the U.S.A. and their dependent states: we are defending the principle of unanimity of the great powers. These were our leading principles when we placed before UNO the question of Spain, when we defended the Greek people against the intervention of foreign imperialist forces and against the suppression of the popular and working-class movement, when we defended Indonesia against the aggression by Dutch colonis- ers supported by the American imperialists. While, stressing our goodwill and desire to maintain friendly relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries, we nevertheless vigorously opposed their persistent attempts at political interference, opposed their attempts to form a stable political base in Poland with the help of Polsko Stronniztwo Ludowa and the fascist underground. Proceeding from the above principles, we took a negative stand on the question of the so-called Marshall Plan. By no means rejecting the possibility of using American credits, we, however, under no circumstances regard the Marshall form of so-called American aid as a “life-belt” or as the “salvation of Europe.” On the contrary, we consider it as a form of expansion, threatening the sovereignty of the European states, by the U.S.A. which bases itself on the restoration of the Western German bastion. The American imperialists are trying to direct the economic development of the European countries along their own channels and to reduce the European countries to an Ameri- can semi-colonial state. We are consistently defending our position. We are counterposing the conception of Europe as a vassal with the conception of the solidarity of the

42 European nations, their cooperation in the economic and political spheres on the basis of the defence of their sovereignty. We are transforming Poland into a strong link in the general chain of the democratic, anti-imperialist and peace-loving nations. The Anglo- American imperialists are trying to thrust us behind an iron curtain, with the help of which they would like to separate the working class and the working people in the Land of Socialism and in the countries of the people’s democracy from the working class and the working people in the capitalist world. However, we are not alone. With us is the great and mighty Soviet Un- ion. With us are all the Slav peoples. With us is the world democratic and national liberation movement. We see that the capitalist states, despite their rending internal contradictions, are reaching agreement on the anti-Soviet and anti-democratic platform and are trying to unleash a new war. American imperialism in Greece strikingly reveals its intentions to enforce a reactionary-fascist regime on the other nations. We are of the opinion that we have been exposing U. S. imperialism much too inadequately. The Greek question must become the banner of struggle of all Communist Parties and all democratic forces against Ameri- can imperialism, and against the policy of their native reaction, which sells out the sovereignty of their countries to the American imperialists. The class struggle now being waged in all countries, with the exception of the Soviet Union, is clearly developing into a struggle of two worlds—into a struggle of the imperialist camp against the anti-imperialist camp. Such is our point of view. And since this is so, there is all the more reason why it is necessary to have an exchange of experience of the Marxist workers’ parties of the different countries, and to compare views so as to apply the best methods and the most correct tactics in order to defeat reaction in their own countries, and to paralyse the intentions of world imperialism.

43 The Activities of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) By G. MALENKOV Comrades, The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has instructed me to submit to the present Conference of Communist Parties an informative report on the activities of the CC CPSU (B). The work of the CC CPSU (B) is so many-sided that in order to fulfil my assignment successfully and not overtax your attention, I shall have to limit the scope of my report. I propose, therefore, to report on the activities of the CC CPSU (B) in the post-war period and deal, firstly, with the problems of directing the national economy of the USSR, secondly, with questions of building the Party, and, thirdly, with questions of foreign policy. DIRECTING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD The victorious conclusion of the Second World War, which we in the USSR call the Great Patriotic War, and the passage from war to peace, confronted the CPSU (B) with new and complex problems of liquidating the aftermath of the war and of securing the further development of Socialist construction. The Party had to make a serious turn— from solving wartime tasks to the solution of economic and cultural tasks. The tasks of the Party and of the Soviet state in this new period were defined with the utmost clarity by Comrade Stalin. “We must”, stated Comrade Stalin, “in the shortest possible space of time heal the wounds inflicted on our country by the enemy and attain the pre-war level of economic development, so that we can considerably surpass it in the near future, raise the material well-being of the people and further strengthen the military and economic might of the Soviet state.” Our Party took into account the fact that the successful accomplish- ment of these tasks involved overcoming serious difficulties, inasmuch as the recent war was for the Soviet Union the most cruel and difficult of all wars ever experienced by Russia. The war entailed many sacrifices for the Soviet people. As a result of the German invasion the Soviet Union lost some 7 million people, who were killed in action, perished during the occupation or were forcibly driven off to Germany. Tremendous damage was done by the German fascist invaders to the Soviet national economy. The fascist vandals destroyed and razed to the ground tens of thousands of industrial plants, state farms, machine and tractor stations and collective farms. They destroyed the entire network of rail-

44 ways in the Western part of our country, devastated and ruined whole districts, destroyed the fruits of many years of strenuous work by the Soviet people and left millions of Soviet people homeless. The damage done by the German fascists, by the outright destruction of property alone, amounts to 679 thousand million rubles. Any other country, even the biggest of the capitalist states of today, would, as a result of such losses, have been retarded in its development for dozens of years, and would have become a second-rate power. But that did not happen to the Soviet Union. The Soviet state and social system stood the severe test of the war and proved its superiority over the capitalist system. The great historic victories won by the Soviet Union during the war were possible only due to the preliminary preparations for defence made by our country under Comrade Stalin’s leadership in the pre-war years. It would be a mistake to imagine that a victory of such historic importance could have been achieved without preliminary preparations for active defence by the entire country, or that such preparations could have been effected in a short space of time, say in 3 or 4 years. To withstand the blows of such an enemy as Hitler Germany, to repel this enemy and then inflict utter defeat on him, required, apart from the un- exampled bravery of our troops, the possession of armaments that were quite up-to-date and, moreover, in sufficient quantities, and of a well-organised system of supplies, also available in sufficient quantities. To make that possible one had to possess metals, fuel, a developed engineering industry, grain and cotton. But in order to have all of this, our country had to be transformed from a backward agrarian country into an up-to-date industrial state. This historic transformation was effected in the course of the three Five-Year Plan periods, beginning with 1928. Even prior to its participation in the Second World War the USSR possessed the minimum of material resources necessary to meet the basic requirements of the battle fronts. These material resources were created as a result of the fulfilment of three Five-Year Plans of national economic development by our country and our Party under the leadership of Comrade Sta- lin. Thereby was established the economic base of the USSR that could be used for the conduct of a victorious war. As is generally known, the Party’s policy, aimed as it was at the industrialisation of the country and the collectivisation of agriculture—a policy without which it would have been impossible to prepare the country for active defence—met with the furious and active opposition of the enemies of Social- ism not only outside, but also inside the Soviet Union. This policy of the Party had to be carried out in bitter struggle against various counter-revolutionary Trotskyite and Bukharin-Rykov groupings, against these contemptible traitors and capitulators, who, being in the pay of foreign intelligence services, tried to undermine the strength of the Soviet Union from within and create a

45 situation favourable to our enemies in the event of war. The Party gave way neither to the threats nor to the hysterical howls of any of these elements, but confidently marched forward in the teeth of all odds. The Party did not adapt itself to backward elements, it was not afraid to go against the stream, always maintaining its position of a leading force. Had the CPSU (B) not possessed this steadfastness and stamina, it would have been unable to maintain its policy of industrialising the country and col- lectivising agriculture and, consequently, would have been unable to prepare the country for active defence, or to ensure the economic conditions necessary to achieve victory in the war against fascism. The Party routed all anti-Party and anti-Soviet forces, and thus nipped in the bud all possibilities of a “fifth column” appearing in the USSR. The war demonstrated the unprecedented unity of the Soviet people and their solid support to the Bolshevik Party. This constituted one of the major conditions of the Soviet Union’s victory in the war. However, the powerful economic prerequisites existing in the Soviet Union at the outbreak of the war could not of themselves ensure victory. They had to be efficiently utilised, rapidly mobilised to serve the needs of the war and reorganised to meet wartime requirements. In the difficult conditions of the war, in the face of the enemy’s blows during the first stage of the war, the Party managed, in an exceptionally short space of time, to place the entire economic life of the country on a war footing, in accordance with the needs of the front, and to subordinate all economic activities to the slogan: “Every- thing For The Front.” The hopes placed by our enemies on an internal instability of the Soviet political system proved to be groundless. The Hitlerites based their calcula- tions on the disintegration, during the war, of the Soviet multi-national state, on the development of strife and discord among the peoples inhabiting our country. They utterly miscalculated. The war demonstrated the indestructi- bility of the Union of Soviet Republics and the firmness and enduring character of the friendship binding its peoples. All the peoples of our country, headed by the great Russian people, rallied round the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government, rose in defence of their national independence and liberty, in defence of the achievements of Socialism in our country. The amity developed between the peoples of our country as a result of the triumph of the new Socialist system and our Party’s correct national policy, was for the So- viet Union a source of great strength. “The Soviet state system,” Comrade Stalin said, “proved to be a model multi-national state.... The Soviet state system represents such a form of organisation of the state, in which national problems and problems of cooperation among the nationalities are better solved than in any other multina- tional state.” Despite the sacrifices it made, the Soviet Union emerged from the war

46 with added strength and might. The superiority of the Socialist system of society and state, the establishment of a developed Socialist industry and the introduction of the collective farm system in the countryside brought us victory during the war. Today, also, when the Party has undertaken the work of rehabilitating and developing the national economy, this superiority is mani- fested with the utmost clarity. Whereas the conversion from war to peace is being accompanied in the capitalist countries by the further aggravation of the general crisis of the capitalist system and is leading to a sharp contrac- tion of markets, to a slump in production, to the closing down of; industrial- plants, to growing unemployment, to the impossibility of finding jobs for ex- servicemen and so forth—the Soviet Union, thanks to its-Socialist system of national economy, has been spared such post-war upheavals. In the Soviet Union there are neither crises nor unemployment, but a steady development of production and improvement in the material well-being of the people. The tasks involved in the post-war rehabilitation and development of the national economy are set forth in the new Five-Year Plan for 1946-1950. The basic economic and political task of the Five-Year Plan is to rehabilitate the war-ravaged districts, reach the pre-war level in industry and agriculture, and make a substantial advance above this level. The Five-Year Plan stipulates that the pre-war level of industrial output be achieved by 1948. For the subsequent years the plan visualizes a fifty per cent increase in industrial output over and above the pre-war level, and priority in rehabilitating the heavy industries and railways, without which the rapid and successful restoration and further-development of the country’s economic life is impossible. The rehabilitation of the heavy industry will serve to consolidate the country’s technological and economic independence. The Five-Year Plan sets out to achieve the development of agriculture and of the branches of industry engaged in producing articles of general consumption, in order to ensure the material well-being of the peoples of the So- viet Union and create within the country an abundance of basic items of general consumption. We have to surpass the pre-war level of national income and national consumption, eliminate in the near future the rationing system, replacing it by a highly developed system of Soviet trade. We have to devote special attention to extending the production of consumer goods, to raising the standard of living of the working people by steadily lowering prices and to consolidate money circulation and Soviet currency. The Five-Year Plan proceeds from the premise that it is necessary to ensure further technical progress in all branches of the economic life of the USSR, as the condition for a mighty advance in production and increase in the productivity of labour. With this aim in view, we have set ourselves the task not only of catching up with scientific achievements abroad, but of sur- passing them.

47 The Five-Year Plan outlines important tasks concerning the further enhancement of the material and cultural standards of the working people of the USSR. It provides for the rehabilitation and extension of the existing network of schools and universities, the improvement of the public health service, and the development of housing construction on a large scale, etc. As one of its chief aims the Five-Year Plan sets out to secure the fullest development of Soviet culture and art. The Five-Year Plan is aimed at the further enhancement of the Soviet Union’s defence capacity and at equipping its armed forces with the most up- to-date material. In order to safeguard our country against eventualities of every kind, defend the peace and avert fresh aggression against the USSR and its allies, we have to strengthen the armed forces of the Soviet Union, strengthen the military and economic might of the Soviet state. The fulfilment of the new Five-Year Plan, while ensuring the rehabilitation and development of our national economy, at the same time signifies the resumption of the path of development of Soviet society pursued by us before the war and temporarily interrupted by the war. This path is the path of consummating the construction of a classless Socialist society and of the gradual transition from Socialism to Communism. In this respect the new Five-Year Plan marks an important step forward. The results of the year 1946, and of 1947 so far, show that the fulfilment of the new Five-Year Plan is proceeding successfully. In the course of the first year of the new Five-Year Plan period our industry reverted to the production of civilian goods. The rehabilitation of the districts that suffered the German occupation is proceeding apace. The fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan is being accomplished amidst a mighty upsurge of labour enthusiasm. Throughout the entire country, in industry and the transport system, Socialist competition has developed for the fulfilment of the 1947 plan ahead of schedule, by the thirtieth anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution. Plan fulfilment in such key industrial centres as Moscow, Leningrad, the Donetz Basin, the Urals, Gorky, the Kuznetsk Basin and elsewhere, justifies our expectations that the targets for 1947 will be successfully fulfilled ahead of schedule: This will signify a speeding up of the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan as a whole. As a result of this work, production of coal, copper, aluminium, nickel, electric power, tractors, machine tools and certain other types of machinery had, in July 1947, approached the pre-war figure. Thus, 18 months of struggle for the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan have demonstrated the possibility of developing certain branches of industry at a more rapid pace than was originally anticipated. In view of this, certain original target figures of the Five-Year Plan for various branches of industry are being reconsidered and raised. Mention should be made of the importance of industrial development in

48 the Eastern parts of the country. The industrial base in the East, built up during the period of the Stalin Five-Year Plans, was greatly extended and strengthened during the war years in connection with the transfer there of over , 1,300 industrial establishments from the Western regions. This constituted one of the decisive factors in the victorious prosecution of the war. In the war years the Eastern regions provided tens of thousands of tanks, pieces of artillery, aircraft, huge supplies of munitions, etc. for the battle fronts. In the post-war period industrial establishments located in the Urals, Siberia, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia have been rapidly converted for peacetime production. Under the new Five-Year Plan the Eastern regions assume an ever more important role in the economic life of the USSR. It goes without saying that the post-war rehabilitation of the country’s economic life cannot proceed smoothly or spontaneously and without difficulties. No small number of difficulties has to be overcome in fulfilling the Five- Year Plan. The transfer of the national economy from a war to peace footing in itself entails many difficulties of economic, organisational and technical nature. Nor should it be forgotten that reconversion to peacetime production had to be effected amidst such additional difficulties as those created by the drought of 1946—one of the most severe droughts in the history of our country—which led to crop failures in the basic grain producing areas. That we were able in such conditions successfully to overcome these additional difficulties, to cope with the task of supplying the population with food and, moreover, to fulfill the programme set for the first year of the Five-Year Plan, is to be ascribed to the advantages afforded by the Socialist economic system and to the correct policy of the Party in the supervision of the national economy. Here I wish to point out how enormously important, as far as it concerns the strength of the Soviet state, is the fact of its possession of material and food reserves. Without reserves planned economic development would be impossible. Material reserves are a powerful means of overcoming all sorts of difficulties and serve as a sure guarantee against the eventualities and unex- pected development of all kinds which may confront us in the course of our economic progress. That is why the Party attaches special importance to the accumulation of state reserves. In dealing with the difficulties attending our development, mention should be made, first and foremost, of the difficulties encountered in procur- ing manpower for industry, building and transport. These difficulties arose even before the war and were aggravated by the war. The absence of unemployment in the USSR has created totally new conditions for the development of industry and transport from the point of view of the supply of manpower.

49 Under capitalism employers draw the manpower they require from the reserve army of unemployed, which swells during periods of crisis, contracts somewhat in boom periods, but never disappears so long as the bourgeois system exists. This army is a constant concomitant of capitalism. The reserve army of unemployed is swelled by impoverished peasants, driven into industry by the-fear of hunger, by impoverished urban petty-bourgeois elements— handicraftsmen, petty traders—compelled in the end to sell their labour power to the capitalists. Socialism has eliminated these sources of the replenishment of manpower reserves, that involve untold hardships for the working people. We no longer witness the flight of the peasant to the towns. We have no impoverished petty bourgeoisie in our towns. There is no longer any spontaneous in- flux of manpower. On the other hand, extended Socialist reproduction is unthinkable without the steady numerical growth of the working class. Our industry and transport require constantly increasing contingents of workers. In the Five- Year Plan period the number of workers and office employees in the USSR should increase by more than six million. The enrolment of new workers into industry, transport and building is therefore one of the decisive conditions for the fulfilment of our plan to rehabilitate and develop the national economy. This task, no easy one even under normal conditions, becomes all the more complicated in the post-war period when our losses in manpower during the war inevitably begin to tell, moreover since these losses were at the expense of the most active sections of the Soviet working population. That is why the Party and the Soviet state are devoting special attention to the planned distribution of manpower and to finding new sources from which the supply of manpower can be replenished. Unless the necessary reserves of manpower are built up, there can be no development of Socialist industry. Hence the building up of state manpower reserves, the training of fresh contingents of workers in vocational training establishments and factory schools, as well as their distribution in a planned fashion in accordance with the requirements of the various branches of the national economy—all those are questions of special concern for the Party. The Five-Year Plan makes provision for the training of four and a half million workers under this system. But we are also confronted with difficulties of another nature. In connection with the international situation as it has taken shape after the war, we cannot count on the import of any substantial quantity of the equipment we need, and must, therefore, to a still greater degree depend on our own resources. This entails additional efforts in organising the home manufacture of new types of industrial equipment which under more normal international conditions we could import from abroad. All these difficulties cannot but tend to retard the pace of our develop-

50 ment, the completion of new industrial plans and the carrying out of our plans of capital construction. Serious difficulties have also to be overcome in agriculture. The war temporarily held up the development of our Socialist agriculture and weakened its material and technical base. Our industry, diverted to the satisfaction of war needs, was compelled to discontinue the production of tractors and to greatly reduce the output of farming machinery, spare parts and fuel for agriculture. The war years saw a decline in the areas under crops and a dete- rioration in the quality of land cultivation; crop yields fell, the cattle population decreased and the yield of livestock likewise fell. To these difficulties en- gendered by the war there were added the difficulties arising out of the drought which gripped certain areas of the country in 1946. Faced with this situation the Party adopted a number of special measures designed to facilitate the development of agriculture and to consolidate the collective farm system. In February 1947 the Plenary Session of the Cen- tral Committee of the CPSU (B) adopted a detailed resolution on the measures for the development of agriculture in the post-war period. The Party’s main concern with regard to agriculture at the present time is to achieve the organisational and economic strengthening of the collective farms and to extend the material and technical resources available for agriculture. Violation of the Collective Farm Rules, which was detrimental to the collective farms, was resolutely cut short by the Party and steps were taken to improve the organisation and payment of labour on the collective farms. At the same time the Party is taking steps to increase the output of tractors, combine harvest- ers and other agricultural machines, as well as of mineral fertilizers necessary for agriculture. The Central Committee’s decision outlines a detailed programme for the development of agriculture in the post-war period. It enumerates ways and means of increasing the output of grain and technical crops (cotton, sugar-beet, hemp, etc.), of improving cattle-raising, of improving the quality of land cultivation, of improving the work of machine and tractor stations and state farms. The decision also formulates the tasks confronting Socialist industry in providing technical equipment for agriculture. All of these measures are designed to strengthen rapidly and develop agriculture in’ our country, and consolidate the collective farm system. Agriculture must be developed to a degree that will enable us in the shortest possible time to create an abundance of food for the population and raw materials for industry, and to accumulate the necessary state reserves of food and raw materials. The Soviet peasantry responded to these measures of the Party and the government by a mighty wave of labour enthusiasm which had a favourable effect on the fulfilment of the agricultural programme for 1947. Socialist competition for high crop yields in 1947 developed throughout the country, embracing the widest sections of collective farmers. The government estab-

51 lished special awards for foremost workers in agriculture and cattle farming, conferring on them the title of Hero of Socialist Labour and awarding them various decorations. This year’s spring sowing was carried out successfully and some 8 million hectares were added to the crop area as compared with last year’s figure. Harvesting this year proceeded with similar success, in a- more organised fashion and at a more rapid pace. The same can be said of the grain deliveries now in progress. Preliminary figures indicate that this year our agriculture has taken an important step forward in solving the grain problem, in building up state reserves of food and raw material. A new step has been taken in strengthening the collective farms. This creates the necessary conditions for the further improvement in the supply of food for the population of industrial areas. The successes scored by agriculture create the conditions for abolishing the rationing system throughout the Soviet Union this year. Rationing was indispensable during the war, fought on so large a scale, when we had to cut down consumption in the rear in order to ensure a regular supply of food for the army at the front. Now that the war is over and the army demobilized, the need for the rationing system has disappeared and it must be eliminated. The Soviet state can return to normal trade and to an all-round development of production and consumption. The drought in certain areas and the decrease in state food stocks made it necessary to postpone the abolition of rationing from 1946 to 1947. The Soviet government has already introduced a number of measures to eliminate the existence of different prices with a view to preparing for the abolition of rationing. Our work in fulfilling the Five-Year Plan constitutes the initial stage in the carrying out of the tasks which Comrade Stalin placed before the Soviet people. These tasks are to secure a new and mighty development of the national economy which would enable us to raise the level of industry approximately threefold as compared with the pre-war standard. In the next three Five-Year Plan periods we must make it possible for our industry to produce annually up to 50 million tons of pig iron, up to 60 million tons of steel, up to 500 million tons of coal and up to 60 million tons of oil. II

PROBLEMS OF BUILDING THE PARTY The chief and most characteristic feature in the life of our Party, the foundation of all its successes, is its indisputable authority among the people of our country and the unlimited support which the Party’s policy enjoys among the Soviet people. The Party’s correct policy made for the firm moral and political unity of the Soviet people. This enabled our Party to organise the defeat of the enemy in the Pa-

52 triotic War and to rally the entire nation to the successful fulfilment of the work of eliminating the terrible aftermath of the war. The moral and political unity of the Soviet people found profound and clear-cut expression in the victory of the bloc of Communists and non-Party people in the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR held last year and in this year’s elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union and Autonomous Republics. The elections were held amidst tremendous political enthusiasm, and once more demonstrated the unbounded confidence and support enjoyed by our Party among the people. The war demanded of our people enormous sacrifices and severe hardships. It is but natural that during the war the vital material and cultural requirements of our people could be met only to a limited degree. The transfer from war to peace makes it incumbent upon us, therefore, to introduce measures aimed at abolishing these limitations and at satisfying all the material and cultural requirements of the people. At the same time during, and since the end of, the war there has been a steady rise in the political and cultural level of the masses. The Soviet people want to be able to satisfy all their requirements, both material and cultural. All this makes new and more serious demands on the Party, as regards the level of Party leadership and the quality of the work of the Party organisations. In the light of these new demands and in connection with the conclusion of the war and the transition to peacetime conditions, it was necessary seriously to reshape the work of the Party organisations. This proved all the more necessary since certain shortcomings in the work of Party organisations came to the surface, which had remained unnoticed during the war. First and foremost, these shortcomings concern organisational and ideological activities. The successes of our Party and the test which Party and Soviet cadres withstood during the war do not in the least justify any attempt to rest and to be content with what has been achieved to date. On the contrary, the new tasks of economic and cultural development confronting our country after the war, as well as the entire international situation, insistently demand that the CPSU (B) constantly raise the level of the Party and ideological and educational activities. One of the prime tasks in this connection is improving the work of our Party organisations. During the war Party organisations performed a tremendous job in organising work behind the lines and in the transfer of industry to war purposes. Under wartime conditions Party organisations were often compelled to take upon themselves the work of economic administration. This was correct in the conditions then existing. However, we could not but notice that this gave rise also to certain negative phenomena in the work of Party organisations, led to a weakening of inner-Party activities, and at the same

53 time tended to have Party organisations perform the work of state and economic bodies. Thus one of the fundamental principles of Bolshevik leadership was violated. At present the Party has formulated as one of its major tasks that of strengthening local Party bodies and of improving the work of Party organisations. To raise the level of inner-Party work as well as the level of Bolshe- vik leadership in state and economic activities—this is one of the major tasks of inner-Party work in the present stage. The fulfilment of these tasks is intimately associated with the development of Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism which constitute a basic req- uisite for the development of our Party. The Party regards as a main task the further strengthening of the So- viet state, perfection of the administrative apparatus and improvement of its work. During the war the state apparatus contributed in no small share to the proper fulfilment of the directives issued by the Party and Soviet government. The results of the Party’s work in building up a flexible and effi- cient state apparatus, in training cadres of state officials devoted to the cause of the Party and possessing the necessary knowledge and organisational ability, were clearly brought out in this situation. At present the administrative bodies are bringing to the fore economic and organisational as well as cultural and educational activities; they are striving to achieve improved observance of Soviet laws, are combating the remnants of the proprietary outlook, and are working for the further consolidation of Socialist property and for higher discipline in all spheres of activity. In these conditions the Party has adopted measures for the further strengthening of the organs of state power, for increasing their organising role in the solution of economic and cultural tasks and for achieving still closer contact between Soviet administrative bodies and the masses. In the near future elections will take place to local Soviets of Working People’s Deputies. These elections should serve considerably to improve the work of local Soviet bodies. The new tasks in Party and state activities that have arisen after the war have placed higher requirements on Party cadres and have very sharply advanced the necessity of enhancing the ideological level and general effi- ciency of Party and Soviet cadres. The training and perfection of Party and Soviet personnel is one of the vital problems on the solution of which the Party is now working. This training is aimed at helping millions of Party and administrative workers to master Marxist-Leninist science, to equip them with a knowledge of the laws of social development, of the country’s economy and its economic policy, and also to give them an understanding of the problems of international politics and Soviet foreign policy. With the aim in view of providing means for a serious improvement in

54 the political and theoretical development of Party and Soviet workers, the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) has decided that in the coming three or four years the basic Party and Soviet cadres in the various republics, territories, regions, cities and districts shall be provided the opportunity of attending Party schools and study courses. In this connection much has been done to reorganise the network of Party schools and courses. We have established a higher Party school with a three-year term of study for the purpose of training Party and Soviet ‘workers for republican and regional institutions. At present some one thousand students attend this school. In addition study courses of nine months’ duration have been organised at the higher Party school for the purpose of providing additional training for young secretaries of regional Party committees, chairmen of regional Soviets, editors of regional newspapers, etc. These courses are attended by over 500 students. In the various republics and regions 177 two-year Party schools and nine-month courses have been organised. They have a total student body of some 30,000 Party, Soviet, Young Communist League workers and newspaper editors. The Central Committee of the CPSU (B) has established an Academy of Social Sciences for the purpose of training cadres, possessing thorough knowledge of Marxist theory, for central Party institutions, for the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics and for regional committees. The Academy also trains qualified university instructors and persons for scientific research institutions and scientific journals. The Academy’s curriculum provides for training specialists in the following sub- jects: political economy, economics and politics of foreign countries, the theory of state and law, international law, history of the USSR, general history, international relations, history of the CPSU (B), dialectical and historical materialism, history of Russian and West European philosophy, logic and psychology, literature, art. The term of study is three years. At present there are some 300 students in the Academy. Our Party’s membership substantially increased during and after the war. Despite very heavy losses of Party members at the fronts during the Patriotic War, the Party’s membership has increased rather than decreased. Before the war the Party totalled 3,800,000 members and candidates; at present its membership amounts to 6,300,000. Approximately half of the Party members joined the CPSU (B) during or after the war. The history of the Party affords no parallel for such a rapid growth. The overwhelming majority of new members joined our ranks at a time when our country was subjected to mortal danger, in other words, the most persevering elements of the people came to our ranks. The great numerical growth of the Party and its changed composition have advanced very sharply the question of improving the work of political

55 education of Party members A considerable section of Party members, particularly those who Joined the Party in recent years, have not as yet been able to receive the necessary political training. There appeared a certain dis- proportion between the numerical growth of the Party and the level of political education of members and candidates of the CPSU (B). In view of this the Party is now aiming, not at accelerating a further increase in membership, but rather at the political education of members and candidates, emphasising the need to raise the political level of Party members, for, in the final analysis, quality is more important than quantity. Of tremendous significance in the work of raising the ideological and political level of Party members and in providing Communist education for the working people, is the study of the biographies of V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin, which is now being developed on a wide scale. In 1946 we resumed the publication of the Collected Works of V. I. Lenin, interrupted during the war, and began the publication of the works of J. V. Stalin. Each of these editions is being printed in 500,000 copies. In addition, over 90 million copies of Marxist-Leninist classical works have been published since the end of the war. The Short Biography of J. V. Stalin has been published in an edition of one million copies. An edition of the History of the CPSU (B), Short Course, published since the end of the war, reaches 10 millions copies, thus bringing the total issue of this work, since it was first published, to over 30 million copies. The task of building Communism in our country is indissolubly linked up with the task of the Communist education of the working people. In conditions of the gradual transition from Socialism to Communism, Communist education and the overcoming of the survivals of capitalism in the minds of the people assume a decisive importance. Following the defeat and abolition of the remnants of the exploiting classes in our country, the international bourgeoisie were deprived of any base whatsoever within the Soviet Union for their struggle against the Soviet state. But they strive to utilise for their own purposes the survivals of capitalism in the minds of Soviet people—the remnants of a proprietary psychology, the survivals of bourgeois morals,, the obsequious attitude of certain individuals toward Western bourgeois culture, manifestations of nationalism, etc. Among the tasks of ideological and political work special mention should be made of the task of cultivating and developing Soviet patriotism. “The power of Soviet patriotism”, Comrade Stalin teaches us, “consists in that it has as its foundation not racial or nationalistic prejudices, but the profound devotion and fidelity of the people to their Soviet homeland, the fraternal commonwealth of the working people of all nations of our country. Soviet patriotism provides a harmonious combination of the national traditions of

56 the people and the general vital interests of all working people of the Soviet Union.” The development of Soviet patriotism is intimately connected with the struggle against manifestations of nationalistic narrowness and chauvinism. The Party educates the Soviet people in the spirit of respect for other peoples, and for their right to independent development. In the recent period the Party had to wage a resolute struggle against various manifestations of an obsequious and servile attitude toward Western bourgeois culture. Displayed in certain sections of our intelligentsia, this attitude represents one of the remnants of the accursed past of Tsarist Russia. The Party had to deal a resolute blow against several specific manifestations of this attitude, since these manifestations represent, in the present stage, a serious danger to the interests of the Soviet state, inasmuch as the agents of international reaction, in order to weaken the Soviet state, seek to utilise people infected with a feeling of servility toward bourgeois culture. The October Revolution liberated the peoples of Russia from economic and spiritual enslavement to foreign capital. Soviet power has for the first time made our country a free and independent state. Having carried out a cultural revolution and having created its own Soviet state, our peoples tore asunder the bonds of material and spiritual dependence on the bourgeois West. The Soviet Union became the bulwark of world civilisation and progress. How was it that under such conditions there were manifestations of servility and obsequiousness to everything foreign? The roots of such unpa- triotic conduct, manifestations and sentiments should be sought in the survivals of the accursed past inherited from Tsarist Russia—survivals which still exercise pressure on the minds of a certain section of our intellectuals. Foreign capitalists, who held such secure positions in Tsarist Russia, in every way supported and cultivated in Russia the conception that the Russian people were inferior in their cultural and spiritual development. The ruling classes of Tsarist Russia, divorced as they were from the people, had no faith in the creative abilities of the Russian people and ruled out the possibility that Russia by her own resources could emerge from her state of backwardness. This gave rise to the incorrect conception that Russians must, allegedly, always be the “pupils” of West European “teachers”. The survivals of these old capitalist conceptions are being used today by agents of American and British imperialism, who spare no effort in their attempt to find within the USSR support for their espionage and their anti- Soviet propaganda. The agents of foreign espionage services are bending every effort to seek out weak and vulnerable points among certain unstable sections of our intelligentsia who still bear the stamp of the old lack of faith in their own forces and are infected with the disease of servility to everything

57 foreign. Such people become an easy prey for foreign espionage services. The spearhead of the Party’s ideological work in present-day conditions is directed at undeviatingly overcoming the remnants of bourgeois ideology, at heightening Bolshevik irreconcilability towards ideological distortions of every nature. In this connection great importance should be attached to the decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) regarding ideological and political activities (the CC decision on the magazine “Zvezda” and “Lenin- grad”, on the repertoire of theatres, etc.), and to the discussion on problems of philosophy recently held on the initiative of the Central Committee. The measures adopted by the Central Committee have as their aim the triumph of a militant Soviet patriotic spirit among scientists and art workers. They are thus aimed at strengthening adherence to Party principles in science, literature and art and at raising to new and higher levels all vehicles of Socialist culture—the press, propaganda, science, literature and art. In emphasising the great role of literature and art as a means of social reorganisation, their role in the Communist education of the people, particularly in the correct education of the youth, in training a vigorous young generation imbued with faith in the cause of Communism, a generation un- daunted by obstacles and prepared to surmount all harriers, the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) stressed that Soviet writers, artists and cultural workers can have no other interests save the interests of the people and of the state. That is why all advocacy of art devoid of ideas, of art without politics, of “art for art’s sake,” is alien to Soviet literature, harmful to the interests of the Soviet people and state and must not find a place in our books and periodicals. The Central Committee of the CPSU (B) pointed out that in our country creative work in literature and art must be guided by Soviet policy, which constitutes the vital basis of the Soviet country. The decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) cautioned those active in the sphere of Soviet culture against a servile attitude towards bourgeois literature and art which are now in a state of marasmus and disintegration. The Central Committee particularly stressed the importance of developing to the utmost objective criticism based on principles, without which it is impossible to ensure the further development of Soviet literature and art. In order to foster the development of criticism of shortcomings in various fields of ideological activities, the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) established a new paper “Culture and Life”, the organ of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the CC CPSU (B). As a result of the discussion on philosophical problems recently held on the initiative of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B), in connection with G. F. Alexandrov’s book, “The History of West European Philosophy”, a number of defects in our work on the theoretical front were brought to the surface, particularly with regard to the elaboration of problems of the philosophy of

58 Marxism-Leninism. With a view to eliminating these defects and in order to facilitate the further improvement of scientific and. theoretical research in the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, publication was begun of a new magazine, “Problems of Philosophy.” At present the Central Committee is working on the preparation of a new programme of the CPSU (B) The existing programme of the CPSU (B) is clearly out of date and must be substituted by a new one. Together with elaborating a new programme, work is being conducted to introduce changes in the Party’s Statutes. The situation both in the country and in the Party has in recent years changed to such an extent that a number of articles of the Statutes have become obsolete. III THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE CPSU (B) As a result of the victorious war against fascism the positions of Social- ism and democracy have been strengthened, and those of the imperialist camp weakened. One of the major results of the Second World War is the strengthening of the USSR and the establishment in a number of countries of new democracy systems under the leadership of the working class. The defeat of Germany and Japan signifies the weakening of the imperialist camp and the further aggravation of the general crisis of the capitalist system. Of the capitalist countries, the USA emerged from the war considerably strengthened, while her partners, Great Britain and France, were weakened by the war. In a situation in which America’s chief competitors, Germany and Ja- pan, have been removed and Great Britain and France weakened, the USA adopted a new openly expansionist policy aimed at establishing American world supremacy. In these new post-war conditions relations between the war allies who collaborated in the war against fascist Germany and imperialist Japan, are changing. Two opposite trends in international politics have taken shape. One is the policy pursued by the Soviet Union and the new democracies. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union and of the democratic countries is designed to undermine imperialism, secure a stable democratic peace among the nations and generally strengthen amicable cooperation among the peace- loving nations. In following this line, our foreign policy is supported by the increased international significance of the Soviet state and the new democracies. The other trend in international politics is headed by the ruling clique of American imperialists. In their efforts to consolidate the position which American monopoly capital gained in Europe and Asia during the war, this

59 clique has taken the path of outright expansion, of enthralling the weakened capitalist states of Europe and the colonial and dependent countries. It has chosen the path of hatching new war plans against the USSR and the new democracies under the banner of combating the ‘‘Communist menace”. The clearest and most specific expression of this policy pursued by American capital is provided by the Truman-Marshall plans. Such are the two trends in present-day international politics. The wise Stalin foreign policy of the Soviet Union, both prior to the war and in the course of its conduct, enabled us correctly to utilise the contradictions existing within the imperialist camp, and this was one of the important factors making for our victory in the war. We proceed from the fact that the co-existence of two systems— capitalism and Socialism—is inevitable for a long period of time, and we follow the line of maintaining loyal good-neighbourly relations with all states manifesting a desire for friendly cooperation, on the condition that the principle of reciprocity is observed and that obligations undertaken are fulfilled. The USSR, true to its international treaties and obligations, pursues this policy with the utmost consistency and firmness. But at the same time we are prepared to repel any policy hostile to the Soviet Union, no matter from what quarter it comes. The Soviet Union, together with the democratic countries, invariably exposes all enemies of peace, all foes of friendship among the nations, all enemies of international cooperation on a democratic basis. It combats all attempts by hostile imperialist circles to discriminate against the USSR and the new democracies, belittle their importance or ignore them in the solution of major questions of international policy, weave intrigues against the USSR and the new democracies, and set up hostile blocs and groupings. The CPSU (B) clearly and distinctly sees the danger of the reorienta- tion now being effected by certain former war allies of the USSR. We see that the USA and Great Britain, having abandoned the obligations they under- took in the course of the Second World War, are playing a game fraught with great danger and are seeking new allies among anti-democratic sections in Germany and Japan, in anti-democratic Turkey, monarchist-fascist Greece, are condoning Franco Spain, encouraging the Dutch imperialists in Indone- sia, supporting the reactionary regime in China, etc. At the same time, with regard to such truly democratic countries which have made major contribu- tions to the defeat of Germany, countries as Yugoslavia and Poland, the USA and Great Britain are pursuing a terrorist policy of slander and discrimina- tion, of unceremonious bullying, of interference in the internal affairs of these countries, of openly supporting anti-democratic and anti-government elements within these countries, etc. Propaganda for a third world war is becoming ever more brazen and outspoken. Plans of fresh aggression, plans for a new war against the USSR and the new democracies, are being hatched. The

60 ruling circles of the USA are coming out as the initiators of new openly expansionist plans. It goes without saying that we must differentiate between the desires of these would-be aggressors to wage war and the possibilities of actually unleashing a war. Imitating the Hitlerites, the new aggressors are using blackmail and extortion as one of the principal means of influencing the weak-nerved and unstable. We counter-pose to the plans of American and British imperialists the friendly cooperation of the Soviet Union and democratic countries, primarily the new democracies. The USSR calmly and confidently rebuffs all attempts at blackmail and keeps a watchful eye in all suspicious manoeuvres of its erstwhile allies belonging to the imperialist camp, in order not to allow itself to be tricked. With regard to countries that have proven true friends and loyal allies of the Soviet state—the new democracies— the USSR is always prepared to come to their assistance, and actually does so by rendering them extensive aid and firmly defending their interests. The USSR and the new democracies pursue a policy of unswerving support with regard to colonial and dependent countries fighting for their national liberation from the yoke of imperialism. Such are the foundations of the foreign policy of the CPSU (B). Inasmuch as antagonistic classes have been eliminated in the USSR and the moral and political unity of Soviet society has been achieved, all the sharpness of the class struggle, as far as the USSR is concerned, has now been shifted to the international scene. Here we witness competition between two systems—the capitalist and Socialist systems. Here our Party has to test its arms in battle against case-hardened bourgeois politicians. The CPSU (B) devotes much attention to problems of foreign policy and shows special concern for the selection and proper training of cadres capable of putting into effect the Party’s line in the sphere of foreign policy. The Party devotes much attention to equipping its cadres with the knowledge of the laws of international development, with an understanding of the international situation. It teaches them to defend the interests of the Socialist state on the international scene, to distinguish between friend and foe, detect the insidious designs and methods of the imperialists and their agents. During the war and in the period following it, the political, Ideological and cultural contact of the USSR with the working class movement and genuine democratic progressive circles and organisations throughout the world, and particularly in Europe, grew and became stronger. After the war Soviet public organisations received extensive possibilities actively to participate in international trade union and other democratic organisations, and to develop friendly contact with national democratic or-

61 ganisations in the vast majority of countries. The active participation of the Soviet trade unions and other public bodies in international democratic organisations is of assistance to our fraternal Communist Parties in their struggle for the unity of the labour and democratic movement abroad. Our participation counteracts the splitting activities of the right-wing Socialists and other enemies of unity, facilitates the growth and consolidation of progressive organisations, and, at the same time, strengthens the international influence of the USSR. Our cultural and political contact with democratic organisations in various countries, exercised in different forms, helps to spread the truth about the Socialist state, strengthens the influence of the Soviet Union and facilitates the activities of democratic organisations. In concluding my report I wish to dwell on the question of contact between Communist Parties. As is generally known following the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, contact between fraternal Communist Parties was interrupted. Experience has shown that lack of contact between Communist Parties deprives both the CPSU (B) and other Communist Parties of the opportunity to exchange necessary and mutual information and elaborate common views on the cardinal questions of the labour and Communist movements. The absence of contact between Communist Parties is a hindrance in coordinating the actions of Communists in various countries in their resistance to the plans of the imperialists, particularly now, when American monopoly capital is organising an offensive against Communism and democracy, against the USSR and the new democracies, developing its expansionist plans with the intention, under the guise of “aid”, of enslaving a number of European and other countries, and when Communists are called upon to de- fine their attitude to these plans of American imperialism. In our opinion it is necessary to put into effect definite measures designed to eliminate the present abnormal situation in this respect. That is why we consider it necessary to discuss at the present conference both the international situation and the question of improving contact between Communist Parties, of establishing regular connections between them with a view to achieving mutual understanding, exchange of experience and voluntary coordination of activities of the Communist Parties whenever they consider this necessary.

62 The French Communist Party in the Struggle for the Independence of the Country, against American Expansionism

BY JACQUES DUCLOS

First of all, allow me on behalf of the Communist Party of France to express our joy and deep emotion at meeting with the representatives of the fraternal Communist Parties. We are particularly happy to salute here the outstanding leaders of the Bolshevik Party, the great Party of Lenin and Sta- lin, to which we owe so much. Before passing over to an analysis of the situation in which we have to work in France I want, in the name of the French Communist Party, to express our gratitude and boundless affection for Com- rade Stalin. The situation in France has changed during the last few months. Reac- tion has intensified its offensive against the working class and democracy. This is borne out by the following facts: the Communists have been removed from the government; the conditions of life of the working people have deteriorated; the rehabilitation of France is being sabotaged in order to help the American imperialists gain control of our economy; the government is pursuing a policy of colonial war; in its foreign policy France has actually joined the Western bloc and is showing a growing tendency of becoming a satellite of the Anglo-Saxons; considerable unrest and profound dissatisfaction prevail in the country, which is leading to a mass movement among the working class. Such are the conditions in which preparations for the municipal elections, to be held on October 19th, are taking place.

I THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY America’s interference in the political life of France is becoming ever more obvious and will, unquestionably, extend with the forthcoming elections. Having outlined the main questions I shall now dwell in detail on the development of industry since the liberation of France. Our Party, which was one of the leading forces in the resistance movement during the occupation and hence has won great authority among the masses of France, launched a nation-wide campaign at the beginning of 1945 to increase industrial output. This campaign was the underlying theme of the 10th Congress of our Party, held in June 1945. Maurice Thorez appealed to the miners, and the results were soon apparent. On the whole France’s industrial production has made giant strides compared with 1945, as can be seen from the following table. Taking 1938 at 100, we have the following index in

63 the development of industry. 1947 1945 1946 (first half) Electric Power 94 120 136 Iron ore 40 49 56 Bauxite 36 66 95 Pig iron 30 70 73 Steel 27 71 94 Locomotives 100 230 140 Railway cars 84 157 100 Automobiles 32.3 62.7 80.2 Lorries 73 145 170 Cement 42 95 105 Basic Chemical Products lowest index 22 58 86 highest index 40 100 136 Textile Industry lowest index 20 65 66 highest index 69 144 174 Thus France’s industry has practically reached 95% of the pre-war level. We could have topped the figure had we received more coal from the Ruhr. In the nationalised industries, which are forging ahead, we have the following index compared with the pre-war level electric power—136%; coal— 108%; railroads (national association .of railways)—120% (despite the shortage of rolling stock). However, it should be noted that starting in May there has been a certain downward trend in industrial output. The index for the first half of 1947 was extremely promising, thanks to the high productivity of labour for the first quarter of the year. However, the policy pursued by the government has dealt a blow to the production drive of the working class. The removal of the Communists from the government has heightened the dissatisfaction of the masses. Latest reports show that the reactionary policy of the government is responsible for the decline in production, a fact which is causing alarm even among certain employers. Thus, it can be stated that France’s industry was on the upward grade at the beginning of 1947, and had favourable perspectives. However, the same does not hold true for agriculture where the situation is critical. France is experiencing a serious food crisis.’ The bread ration has been reduced to

64 200 grams a day (only 2% of the flour is sifted and 20-30% of it is mixed with maize). Here it should be noted that even this inadequate ration can be preserved only if grain is imported. Instead of the 1,800,000 tons of grain requested, the International Office allocated France only 820,000 tons. This means that the problem of France’s grain supplies is by no means solved. The reduced bread ration has been the cause of strikes and demonstrations and generally speaking has evoked bitter discontent among the population. It will not be easy to get the grain deliveries from the farmers who have grown mistrustful. This is explained by the fact that after delivering grain last year they themselves remained without bread for many months. Prior to the war France had enough wheat to cover her own needs, even a surplus of it. The question naturally arises: why the present wheat shortage in France? When replying to this question it is necessary to note, first and foremost, that due to frosts and droughts the harvest has been a poor one, as can be gathered from the following figures: Wheat crops Amount placed (in centners) on the market 1930—1940 73,000,000 40,000,000 1940—1947 67,000,000 44,000,000 1947—1948 35,000,000 15,000,000 But there are other reasons, primarily the decrease in the area sown to wheat. On the average: 5,217,000 hectares were sown in 1930-1939; 3,783,000 hectares in 1944-1945; 4,131,000 hectares in 1945-1946; 3,326,000 hectares in 1946-1947. This decrease in the cultivated area is due to the low prices of wheat. In 1945 the price for wheat (fixed in agreement with the peasants on the basis of expenditures connected with its production) was 819 francs per centner. The official price was 700 francs. At the same time prices on cereals reached up to 900-1,000 francs per centner. In 1946 the farmers demanded 1,200 francs per centner for wheat; the official price was 1,003 francs, whereas cereals sold at 1,500 to 2,000 francs per centner and maize, imported from the United States, netted up to 1,400-1,500 francs per centner. In 1947 wheat is selling at 1,800 francs per centner (government price), and cereals at an even higher price than before. The government should have undertaken a drive to obtain five million hectares sown to wheat but it has failed to do it effectively. Actually our Party is leading the battle for five million hectares and we have made it one of the main slogans in our election campaign. We claim that the independence of our country is closely linked with the solution of this problem. The extension of the wheat area is obviously being sabotaged, which is in keeping with the pro-American policy. In 1944 Andre Phillip saw to the decrease of the sown area in Algiers, while the Minister of Agriculture, Tanguy-

65 Prigent was informed in September 1946 in Copenhagen by the American representatives that conditions in France favoured the cultivation of flowers rather than the production of grain. Thus, the present food policy meets the interests of the big wheat producing countries such as the USA and Canada, but does not in the least promote the interests of France, with the result that she is now dependent, to a certain extent, on the USA for bread supplies. Apart from grain France is also short of meat, which is exported and which is a source of the most outrageous speculation. What’s more, the increasing consumption of meat in the countryside has led to a decrease in meat in the city. France has also not got enough fats. As to wines it had just been placed on the free market. In view of the fact that the shortage of wheat has presented the problem of its purchase in USA, which means dollar payments, imports have been restricted to the following essential commodities: Cereals 138 million dollars Coal 92 million dollars Fats 15 million dollars The total sum on purchases, including other products, reached 293 million dollars for one quarter. As for our dollar expenditures for the purchase of coal, here it should be pointed out that these expenditures are due to the inadequate coal deliveries from the Ruhr, as illustrated by the following figures: Coal Deliveries to France Ruhr tons U.S.A. tons March 151,505 571,791 April 164,000 785,000 July 174,396 1,215,827 August 1,683,000 We are paying 2,400 francs per ton for American coal and 2,140 francs for Ruhr coal. What’s more, American coal does not meet the demands of our industry; we need Ruhr coke for our blast furnaces. Compared with 1938 our operating blast furnaces are working only at 73% of their capacity. Already then the saboteurs in the Comite de Forges (association of mining and metallurgical industrialists), as a means of helping Hitler, had only three-fourths of the total number of our blast furnaces operating. And so France has been placed at the mercy of the United States for everything that concerns bread for our people and broad for our industry. A campaign is under way in France to subordinate the country completely to the United States; among the reasons advances is that France will

66 not be able to pull through without American aid. This is a cardinal political problem, which I’ll return to later. I shall now give some examples character- ising France’s financial position. We have to buy wheat and coal, but France has no more dollars; the 80 million dollars we reckoned on are now lost to us because the convertibility of the pound sterling has been suppressed. In London our Minister of Finance asked for the remaining 250 million dollars o the 500 million dollar credit granted by the International Bank. John McCloy, the Director of the Bank, came to Paris to check up on how the 250 million dollars, earlier received, had been spent. As yet we do not know the answer to France’s request for the remaining sum, but it is obvious that it win not be satisfied. I think it would be of Interest to show the trend of France’s foreign trade. The following figures refer to the first half of 1947. Of the total imports to the sum of 125,978 million francs 15,000,000,000 fall on imports from the USA. Imports from other countries are distributed as follows: francs Belgium-Luxemburg Union 7,776 million Argentina 7,267 Germany 6,820 Great Britain 5,550 Australia 4,994 Switzerland 4,185 Canada 3,724 Brazil 3,232 Total 43,538 million

francs, Czechoslovakia 1,105 million Poland 385 USSR 345 Yugoslavia 137 Bulgaria 142 Hungary 504 Rumania 337 Total 2,955 million As far as France’s exports are concerned, they reached 64,558 million francs in the first half of 1947, of which 3,223 million fell on exports to the USA; this does not in the least compare with the imports from that country, to the value of 45,000,000,000 francs.

67 Exports to other countries are distributed as follows: francs Belgium-Luxemburg Union 13,526 million Switzerland 7,092 Great Britain 6,309 Holland 4,243 Sweden 3,166 Germany 2,896 Argentina 2,074 Norway 2,022

Total 41,328 mill.

francs Czechoslovakia 1,032 Poland 258 Yugoslavia 184 Rumania 40 Hungary 71 Bulgaria 14 U.S.S.R. 9.5

Total 1,608.5 mill.

Thus we have a deficit in our trade balance, whereas our gold reserves are almost completely exhausted. In 1939 the gold reserves of the French Bank totalled 2,159 tons; in 1947, before the removal of the Communists from the government, the gold reserves reached 618 tons. Today the figure is only 394 tons. Thus, since the removal of the Communists from the government the leakage of gold abroad has amounted to 224 tons, i.e., 30,000,000,000 francs. There is great uneasiness among the masses regarding the possible devaluation of the franc. This is most probable if we take into account the fact that the amount of money, in circulation is steadily increasing. In April 770,000 million francs were in circulation, on 4th September 854,000 million, i.e., an increase of 84,000 million francs. The discrepancy here is that the increased circulation of money does not correspond to the parallel rise in production. The state’s expenditures are great. Military expenditures amount approximately to 280,000 million francs; the war in Indo-China is costing 100 million francs a day.

68 The ordinary budget of 617,000 million francs is theoretically balanced but the rise in prices may lead to a deficit. As far as the extraordinary budget is concerned the deficit here is 126,000 million francs. Finally, in order to get an idea of the rise in prices the following figures are indicative; in April the price index was 837, whereas in August it reached 1068, that is to say, an increase of 27%. The policy of raising prices has been carried out systematically since the removal of the Communists from the government. The decision to raise prices is sometimes taken without any demand for this on the part of the employers, and occasionally even contrary to their wishes. Such was the case in August of this year when the rise in prices nullified the n% increase in wages, introduced at the beginning of the month. The price index has risen from 965 to 1068. What are the conditions of the working class in France today? The living standard of the French worker has dropped by 50% compared with the pre-war level. His share in the national income has steadily decreased, despite the fact that the biggest contribution to production has been made by the worker. The living standard of the worker has not risen parallel with the increase in production. The incomes of the capitalists, on the other hand, have increased. In 1945 the country’s industrialists and merchants netted a profit of 17,000 million francs and in 1946 110,000 million francs. This state of affairs has evoked justified discontent among the masses, all the more so because they have to bear the brunt of the taxes. Our proposal to increase the tax on high profits was rejected. A new income tax has been introduced in addition to the existing tax on the earnings of workers and employers. This measure has started a protest movement among the people. A certain section of the employers realises the full gravity of the situation to the future of industry and the rehabilitation of the country. With this in mind the Employers’ National Federation signed an agreement with the General Confederation of Labour (CGT) on August 1, to increase wages by 11% without a general corresponding rise in prices. The agreement simply aimed to readjust prices by bringing some of them down and slightly raising others. The government opposed this agreement. It raised the wages of the workers in the lowest brackets by 11%, regardless of the wage scale, and issued a decree raising prices by approximately 11%. Thus, the theoreticians of the vicious circle whom we combated adopted measures to show the futility of raising wages, to provoke the working people (Ramadier’s speech in Limoges) to sabotage the development of industry, and to pave the way for the domination of American monopolies in France. There undoubtedly are employers who fear for their capitalist interests. They are greatly alarmed by the fact that France is being prepared to play

69 the role of a third- rate power. We are closely following these developments and are making every effort not to neglect any and every assistance to frustrate the plans of the American imperialists, and to defend the independence of France. Such is the situation in France today, which is characterised by the following factors: the sharpening of the class-struggle; the resurgence of reaction; the open interference of American imperialists in the policy of France. In order to understand the reason for this state of affairs it is necessary to recall the march of events in France since its liberation.

THE RAMADIER GOVERNMENT IN THE HALTER OF THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS During the war the bourgeoisie made doubly sure of their position. Part of them followed Petain, the other part de Gaulle. At the time of the occupation de Gaulle did not for a minute lose sight of the struggle against the Communists. He feared the action of the popular masses; for he realised that the Communists were the only party capable of leading a mass movement. He therefore proclaimed the policy of wait and see. He did his utmost to deprive the Communists of arms. He took measures to turn the advance of the Allied troops not so much into effective operations against the invaders as into a means of safeguarding “order”. The question may be asked: why was it not possible at the time of liberation to develop the offensive against the Petain traitors in a wider scale? Here it should not be forgotten that in August 1944 the war was being fought on French soil together with the Allied armies and the war against Hitler got priority. It was impossible to remove de Gaulle at the time. The fact that he headed the government was an obstacle to continuing the active struggle against German fascism, as was proved by the dissolution of the French Home Forces (FFI) at the end of August 1944. Immediately on his return to France de Gaulle, basing himself on an alliance of Socialists and Catholics, attempted to isolate the Communists and remove them from the government. The Socialist Party facilitated the imple- mentation of this policy. After some timid efforts to establish unity of action with us they entered the municipal elections of 1945 in alliance with the MRP (the Catholic party) and tried, in vain, to defeat the French Communist Party. The defeat of the Socialists in the elections had a cooling effect on some of the leaders of this party, and they tried to come out against the MRP. However, Blum, who had just returned from Germany, addressing the congress of the Socialist Party in August 1945, called for an alliance between the Socialists and the MRP. To justify this alliance he cited a number of so-called

70 theoretical arguments. He opposed dialectical materialism and defended “humane socialism” as against the class struggle; he proposed that the statutes of the Socialist Party be revised so as to make possible an agreement with the MRP. By making the MRP a partner of the Socialists, Leon Blum enabled that party to-call itself a “left” party. Actually, however, the MRP is merely a new form of organisation of reaction. The MRP tries to draw the line between itself and the former parties of the right, by presenting itself as the party of the resistance movement, by using demagogic social phraseology and by con- cealing, as much as possible, its essence as a Catholic party. After coming to an agreement on joint action, the Socialists and the MRP then joined forces with de Gaulle and were thus able to restrict the rights of the Constituent Assembly. Taking advantage of the support of the Socialists, the MRP far outstripped the Socialist Party at the general elections in October 1945. However, despite the MRP’s successes, the Communist and Socialist Parties held the majority in the Constituent Assembly. Nonetheless, when de Gaulle resigned in January 1946, the Socialist Party refused to form a government of the Socialists and Communists and insisted on the inclusion of the MRP in the government, which became the arbiter in government policy. This policy could have been obstructed, firstly, by vigorous and consistent measures to nationalise the key industries in more favourable conditions than those permitting their partial realisation, and, secondly, by carrying out a real purge, which would have made it possible to reorganise the state apparatus fundamentally and to ensure against a new offensive by the forces of reaction. The position of the Socialist Party swung the vacillating elements in the MRP to the right, whereas a policy based on unity of action between the Socialists and Communists would have turned them to the left. As a result the Socialist Party lost its influence to a certain extent, not to mention a considerable number of its members. Some Socialist leaders, however, place the defence of the bourgeoisie above all party considerations. The Socialist Party lost ground at the elections of June 2, 1946. In view of the fact that in many departments no candidate of the extreme right parties ran for election, the MRP was able to increase its vote. The Communist Party came second, leaving the Socialists far behind. The MRP did not consider it possible at the time to form a government without the Communists. From the viewpoint of the internal political situation, such action would have caused too much unrest among the masses, including the rank and file of the Socialist Party, as well as among all democrats. In the sphere of foreign policy the MRP was not so subservient to the U.S. as it is today. At the elections of November 10, 1946 the Socialist Party suffered a

71 fresh defeat. The MRP lost some votes whereas the Communist Party emerged the victor. Under the circumstances the Communist Party claimed the premiership. The further course of events is known. Our candidate, Maurice Thorez, was not elected because twenty Socialists did not cast their vote. The MRP candidate received an even smaller vote than that polled by the Communist Party candidate. Reaction’s plan at the time was not only to prevent us from heading the government, but to remove us altogether from .it. As a result the one-party government of Blum was formed whose task was to introduce the period of governments without the Communists. In the sphere of foreign policy Leon Blum prepared the Franco-English agreement, the inclusion of our country in the Western bloc, and the war in Indo-China. After the election of the President of the Republic, the Blum government could not continue its existence. Ramadier formed a new government, which included also representatives of the Communist Party. On the home front the government proclaimed a policy of increasing the purchasing capacity of the masses. The foreign policy announced was most vague, but did not change the general trend pursued -by France in this sphere. As a means of increasing the purchasing capacity of the people Ramadier announced his intention to continue the policy of cutting down prices, earlier introduced by the Blum government for demagogic purposes. This policy could have been successfully put into effect only by mobilising the masses, and particularly housewives’ committees and industrial committees at the enterprises, to fight high prices. The French Communist Party mobilised the masses to combat high prices. But the government, sabotaging the measures of the Communist ministers, gained the upper hand and was able to shake the confidence of the masses in the effectiveness of these measures. In view of the failure of Blum’s experiment to lower prices, the General Confederation of Labour, supporting the demands of many big trade unions, favoured the introduction of bonuses in all branches of industry, which would have led to an increase in wages. Ramadier opposed this demand and in the beginning of May of this year raised the question of a vote of confidence. He utilised the question of bonuses as a pretext to remove the Communists from the government. It was a pretext similar to the one used on the occasion of the debate on the war against Viet Nam. It was obvious, however, that as far as Ramadier was concerned it was actually a question of carrying out the orders of the Americans, who demanded the removal of the Communists from the government. We should have from thence onwards brought the main emphasis to

72 bear not on the pretexts used to remove the Communists from the government, but on the essential factors determining this policy, namely, on the interference of-the American imperialists in the political life of France Here it should be recognised that this was not done by us vigorously enough, hence the somewhat uncertain position taken by our Party towards the Ramadier government after the May events. The recent plenum of the Central Committee of our Party, realising the danger inherent if we were to continue this unclear position, emphasised the need to intensify the struggle against the anti-labour, pro-American policy of the Ramadier government. A firmer stand by the French Communist Party toward the Ramadier government was all the more imperative since France’s foreign policy, after the removal of the Communists from the government, underwent profound changes. The role played by Bidault in convening the conference of 16 countries to put into effect the so-called Marshall Plan facilitated the transformation of our country, to our great regret and deep shame, into a mere instrument of American imperialist policy, which is directed simultaneously against the sovereignty and independence of nations and against the peace. Despite the fact that our enemies try to impose upon us that France cannot manage without American aid, there is a deep undercurrent of hostil- ity in the country toward the US expansionism. Speculating with this aid our enemies are trying to compel us to agree to France being subordinated to the USA which, by taking advantage of our economic difficulties, wants to turn France into a bridgehead of reaction in Europe. We are fighting against this policy, but unquestionably the struggle will have to be intensified. Without doubt the European countries could by their own efforts, reciprocal agreements and trade exchange, secure their rehabilitation without American aid. A demonstration of this would make a profound impression. III FOR A FREE, INDEPENDENT FRANCE I shall now speak or the conditions in which our Party is beginning the new election campaign. During the last few months our influence in the working class, in the peasant masses and among the urban middle classes has increased. That is why our enemies adopted an electoral law aimed at the Communists. By introducing proportional representation in the communes with a population exceeding 9,000 and the majority system in communes with a population below 9,000 they want to deprive us or the mayoralty even if we receive the majority of votes, and to effect on a local scale what was done on a state scale, namely, to remove the strongest party from leadership in the city councils.

73 We will have to wage a bitter struggle, all the more so because Ameri- can imperialism, backing the French government, is dictating to it an anti- communist policy which, by the force of events, is becoming an anti-French policy. But our Party is strong. It enjoys great influence among different strata or the working people; if we intensify our struggle against the government’s reactionary policy this can only further enhance our influence. Strong discontent prevails in France, which has spread even to the government where Ramadier received only a narrow majority; the thing that saved him was that the extreme right parties abstained from voting in the vote of confidence. Ramadier is clinging to power by pretending to favour a middle-of-the-road policy in relation to de Gaulle and the Communists. We are exposing this manoeuvre, by showing that Ramadier is in fact pursuing a policy in the interests of de Gaulle. De Gaulle is rallying former Vichy elements in his organisation, the “Union of French People”, and is using the people at his disposal in the different parties, that is, of course, except the Communist Party. De Gaulle has decided to run in the municipal elections—a fact which may cause serious damage to some of the parties. For our part this may afford us new possibilities to hamper the formation of an anti-Communist bloc, which is the dream of all, including Ramadier and de Gaulle, and to bring about the unification of the workers and other democratic forces. De Gaulle is calculating on disorders in the country, and is sanctioning assassinations, the use of bombs, arson, the destruction of the crop to meet his ends. He is being assisted in this by former members of the LVP (volunteers of the German army), by fascists released from prison, by Vichy’s former Gestapo police, by spies from BCRA (de Gaulle’s intelligence service), all of whom have joined forces with him. The objects of all these elements is to start disorders in the country and then to evoke a general desire for peace and order, which could be restored only by a “strong man”. We are fighting this policy and are, to an ever-increasing extent, being recognised by the masses as the party which upholds order, while Ramadier is being recognised as the man who is clearing the path for de Gaulle to come to power. Attempts are being made to distort the essence of the forthcoming political struggle. Ramadier is doing this by declaring: “de Gaulle or the Com- munists.” Our reply to this is: “Democracy or Reaction.” The can be no democracy without the Communists. Our tactic is to unite all the democratic forces who defend the national interests, to rally all elements who feel disturbed by the activities of de Gaulle. However, France’s domestic policy today is determined by its foreign policy. Every act of the government reflects the pressure of the American imperialists, who insisted on the Communists being removed from the govern-

74 ment so as to strengthen their domination over our country. We have not denounced this policy of constant interference by Ameri- can imperialism in the affairs of France vigorously enough. From the moment our Party was removed from the government on the insistence of the Ameri- can imperialists, we should have taken the policy of a strong opposition to the Ramadier government. This would have made it possible to draw the attention of the masses to the critical situation in our country and to the intoler- able pressure being brought to bear upon it from outside. Had we done so at the beginning of May we would have overcome the vacillation and indecision, which later expressed itself in the leadership of the mass movement. Our Central Committee pointed out these weaknesses and defined the line of our Party, calling upon it to head the movement of the masses resolutely and to spare no effort to make the movement a politically conscious one. We are faced with the serious problem of uniting the broad masses in order to check the policy pursued by domestic reaction, a policy which aims at doing away with national independence, and which is being put into effect under the leadership of the Socialist Ramadier. Ramadier’s policy was the target of innumerable critical remarks at the recent Congress of the Social- ists in Lyons, However, it should be emphasised here that this criticism did not affect such cardinal problems as the defence of the sovereignty and independence of France. There is not the slightest desire among the leaders of the Socialist Party to protect the national interests of the country; on the other hand, the policy of subservience to American imperialism is represented as an expression of progressive “internationalism”. In the struggle to save the country from enslavement by American monopolies we hope to find allies among the rank-and-file members of the So- cialist Party, as well as among its functionaries. We shall find also other allies, for there is no doubt whatsoever that the French people, and the same holds true for the peoples of other nations, will never agree to be shackled in the chains of slavery. The forces of our Party are growing, following a period of certain stag- nation; its great influence among the masses can be denied by none. Our Party recognises the full responsibility that falls upon its shoulders in view of the role France must play in international relations. . At its recent plenum the Central Committee decided to intensify the struggle on the ideological front. Measures have been taken to improve the work of the Party organisations and to raise the political level of the Party’s membership, particularly by developing criticism and self-criticism. Measures have also been taken to improve the contents of our newspapers and maga- zines, to increase their circulation. Plans have been drawn up for the systematic political education of our leading cadres, first and foremost of all the

75 members of the Central Committee. Thus, the Communist Party of France, rallying around its leadership, headed by Maurice Thorez, will spare no efforts to keep in step with the tasks facing the Party. We support the proposal to establish contact between the Communist Parties, and I can assure you that the French Communists, conscious of their role as vigilant defenders of the sovereignty and independence of France, will, under the banner of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, rise to the occasion.

76 The Activities of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia After the Liberation of the Country By R. SLANSKY

Czechoslovakia was the last country to be freed from fascist oppression. The liberation of Prague by the Red Army was completed on May 9, 1945, on the day victory over Germany was accomplished. After its liberation, Czechoslovakia started to carry out a series of structural changes in her economic and political life. Comrade Gottwald de- scribed these changes as a national and democratic revolution. In contrast to the national revolution of 1918, which was carried through under the leadership of the middle classes and which, finally, led to the formation of a bourgeois Czechoslovak state, the national and democratic revolution this time was headed by the working class and working people who were interested in putting into effect a consistent revolutionary policy, through the people. In the course of the revolution, the working class secured a number of key positions and several of the changes made even transgressed the limits of the national and democratic revolution. As a result of these changes a new democratic rule was established in Czechoslovakia, and we call it the People’s Democracy. Czechoslovakia is comparatively a highly developed industrial country and her industrial potential became even greater during the occupation. The specific importance of the working class is considerable. The Communist Party grew after the liberation into a mass party, and now numbers (at the end of September) 1,172,000 members. The Communist Party has a strong majority among the working class and is also the strongest party in the countryside. The leading role of the Communists in the National Front is based on the strength of the Communist Party and on its authority among the people. The Communist Party was the only one of all the political parties which not only bore no responsibility for the Munich capitulation but which was the sole force that consistently fought against the Munich policy. It was the main leading and organising force in the national resistance movement; almost one half of the pre-war membership of the Party fell in the fight against the Ger- man-fascist invaders—for the freedom of the people. The Communist Party was also the driving force in the national and democratic revolution, the initiator of the structural changes in the administration of the state, the organiser of the National Front and finally the guiding force of the country’s post- war reconstruction. The people approved the leading role of the Communist Party in the state during the May 1946 elections. The Communists received 38 per cent of

77 the votes for the whole of Czechoslovakia (in Bohemia and Moravia over 40 per cent). As a result of these elections a new National Front Government was formed in July 1946, headed by Comrade Gottwald.

I THE ROLE OF THE New DEMOCRACY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA The new regime was established in May 1945 on the principles laid down in the so-called Kosice Programme, which was worked out on the initiative of the Communist Party and signed by all the parties of the National Front. At the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Com- rade Gottwald spoke of the internal changes as follows: We have eliminated the clique of the bourgeoisie from the leadership in national affairs, and all state authority has passed into the hands of the National Front which is the political expression of the alliance of workers, peasants, artisans and intelligentsia. Fascist, openly reactionary parties which in matters of national liberty and independence of the state proved their treachery as collaborators with the Hitlerites, were banned. They were: the Agrarian Party, the so- called National Union, in Slovakia the (Hlinka) People’s Party and some other fascist and reactionary groups. The National Front in Bohemia and Moravia consists of 4 parties: the Communist Party, the Social-Democratic Party, the National Socialist Party and the Catholic “People’s Party”. The National Front in Slovakia consisted in the beginning of two parties: the Communist Party and the so-called De- mocratic Party. Since then, two small parties have been formed in addition and these have also entered the National Front. They are: the Social Democ- ratic Party and the so-called “Freedom Party.” But the National Front has a broader base than political parties. It can count on the support of the unified trade unions, the Farmers’ Union, the Youth League, the unified co-operatives and other organisations of the working people. The following measures in the economic and political life of the country have been carried out on the basis of the Kosice Programme: 1) National Committees have been established as organs of state authority. 2) Heavy industry and the credit system have been nationalized, 3) The Germans have been evicted. 4) An agrarian reform and a new land policy have been introduced. 5) New relationships between the Czechs and Slovaks have been established on the basis of equality.

78 National Committees The National Committees are an important support of the new democratic order. They originated during the struggle for national liberation as illegal organs of the nation. At Comrade Gottwald’s suggestion, the London Government at the time issued a decree concerning the National Committees as organs of state administration in a local, district and provincial capacity. After the liberation they played an important role in the construction of a new administrative apparatus. They nominated their delegates to industrial enterprises, organised food supplies, and were, in fact, the authority to which security bodies and the state apparatus of their district were subordinated. The National Committees took the place of the former system of district commissioners and provincial presidents who were reactionaries. As representatives of the people the National Committees have executive power, they introduce laws, issue orders and control state officials in a number of sectors: in the security organs, in agricultural policy, in the sphere of supply and price control, in local industry, commerce and small-scale (artisan) production. The Party’s position in the National Committees is strong: all the three chairmen of provincial National Committees are Communists; in 163 district National Committees there are 128 Communist chairmen (80 per cent). In 11,512 local National Committees there are 6,350 Communist chairmen (57 per cent). Almost 140,000 Communists are working in National Committees representing large sections of the nation and are learning how to manage state affairs. According to the law, the National Committees have to submit half- yearly reports of their work to the electorate. Plenary sessions of the National Committees are open to the public. The system of National Committees lends a new character to the state structure of Czechoslovakia. Although Czechoslovakia has not fully solved the question of eliminating the influence of the old bourgeoisie, this influence has been considerably restricted by placing the lower state apparatus under the control of the representatives of the people. In contrast to formal parliamentary democracy, where parliament passes laws but the executive power remains completely in the hands of the -bureaucracy, in our country the executive power in the localities is in the hands of the people’s representatives, i.e., the National Committees. The Nationalisation of Heavy Industry and the Financial Credit System In October 1945 the decrees on the nationalisation of heavy industry and the financial system became law. Nationalisation provoked a bitter struggle. Nationalisation was opposed by some people who argued that it should not be carried out all at once but by degrees. They suggested that a beginning should be made with the nationalisation of the health resorts and spas and then the mines, etc. It was clear that they wanted to save heavy in-

79 dustry from nationalisation. The National Socialists were in general against the nationalisation of banks. Our Party, supported by the masses, and above all with the help of the United Trade Unions, was able to ensure that nationalisation was carried out in one move. The nationalisation covered all the banks, all the so-called insurance societies, all basic and heavy industries. The proportion of the nationalised sector, reckoned according to the number of workers and employees engaged in it, amounted to about 61 per cent of all industry. In the spring of 1947 a decision was taken, by which enterprises confiscated from the Ger- mans and traitors which were not affected by the nationalisation scheme, were to be given over for the most part to the nationalised enterprises. This will give the nationalised sector 66 per cent of the workers and employees engaged in the whole industry and more than 75 per cent of the total volume of production. To all intents and purposes the mining industry, the metallurgical industry and the power industry are fully nationalised. Approximately three-fourths of the chemical, metal processing and machine-building industries have been nationalised. The non-nationalised sector is bigger in the food, flour mill, timber, wood working and shoe industries. There are also many non-nationalised enterprises in the building materials industry. Nationalisation has given the new democracy a real economic foundation, creating a state of a new type where the main means of production have been taken from the hands of the big bourgeoisie and handed over to the state. The nationalisation of industry facilitated the speedy liquidation of the effects of the occupation on the country’s economy. Although the consequences of the German occupation were not as damaging for Czechoslovak economy as they were for some other countries, there nevertheless remained 400 billions of uncovered banknotes, a scarcity of raw materials and a number of big industrial enterprises were in ruins. The Party had to contend with big economic difficulties—scarcity of coal, lack of manpower in various branches, and lack of experience among the workers in the new economic establishments. Reaction attempted at the time to rouse discontent in connection with the monetary reform and the difficult food situation. It propagated the idea that small private enterprises were working better than nationalised industry and predicted that the latter would go bankrupt. The Party did not yield in the face of these difficulties. It turned to the people, organising brigades of volunteers to rebuild the works destroyed by bombing, dispatched brigades to work in the mines, on construction jobs, to help load railway trucks and to the enterprises where labour was short. It organised nation-wide competition and raised the working morale of the people. The Communists were to the fore in setting an example. The Prague Party organisation mobilised 100,000 of its members to work on one Sunday under the slogan: ‘One million working hours to the Republic.’

80 In that way we gradually succeeded in developing and stepping up production and in supplying the market with an increasing volume of goods. In the beginning of 1946 the Party suggested the drafting of a Two- Year Plan. After the May elections this plan became law. The Two-Year Plan is not an overall plan; it only plans the work of the most important sectors of the national economy. It aims at an 11 per cent increase of industrial production by the end of 1948 as compared with the pre-war level, in some sections of the heavy industry it puts the increase at 13 per cent or even at 14 per cent The fulfilment of the Plan should at the same time increase the living standard of the population by 10 per cent compared with the pre-war level. The realisation of the Two-Year Plan strengthens nationalised industry—the economic foundations of the Czechoslovak people’s democracy Nationalised industry has improved its output. Although nationalised industry had suffered heavy damage, seeing that whole works were destroyed in Anglo-American air raids at the very end of the war (the Skoda Works in Plzen, Bata in Zlin, Ceskomoravska-Kolben-Danek in Prague) and although big capital investments were necessary in the earliest and most difficult stages, the fulfilment of the Two-Year Plan in the first half year saw our nationalised industry with a financial profit in many sections. In the first 8 months the Two-Year Plan has been 100 per cent fulfilled and industrial production has already reached 95 per cent of the pre-war level (1937). The weak spot of the Two-Year Plan now appears to be mainly in the building industry where the nationalised sector is very small. We hope that next year we shall make up for the ground lost. The lack of manpower is acutely felt in mining as well as in the building trade, and the main problem here is the organisation of labour reserves. The positive results of the Two-Year Plan are reflected in the living standard of the working people. The growth of industrial output and the si- multaneous decrease in the cost of production made it possible to lower retail prices this spring. Retail prices were brought down by means of a so-called price-equalisation fund. This action strengthened the unity between the workers and peasants as the prices at which the peasant sells his products were not lowered, whereas the prices of industrial products necessary to the peasant (agricultural machinery, naphtha, petrol) went down. An encouraging sign in the present economic situation of the population is that, notwithstanding the rationing system, the consumption per capita of certain products, such as sugar, potatoes, shoes, meat, etc. is already higher than before the war. Consumption is going up because we have been able to increase the real wage of the worker by approximately 34 per cent as compared with 1939. Our price policy was successful because of the monetary reform, carried out in 1945. We succeeded not only in maintaining the equilibrium of the price index and wages; the average wages also went up to 397 per cent (1939

81 equal to 100) while the price index of the workers’ expenditures went down to 286 per cent. At present the situation has deteriorated as a result of droughts. The harvest is considerably smaller than in previous years, and in spite of the help which we are receiving from the Soviet Union, Rumania and other countries of the new democracy, there are difficulties in supplying the population with agricultural products. But we are convinced that attempts by reactionary elements and speculators, who are trying to turn these difficulties to their own account and create dissatisfaction in the country, are doomed to failure. Our people will do all to overcome these difficulties. Economic success forms an effective political weapon in the fight against reaction. It shows that the new regime is better able to manage the economy than the capitalists. All this gives the working people greater confidence in their own powers. The idea of nationalisation has become deeply rooted in the minds of the people. The nation understands that the economic achievements are a direct result of nationalised and planned economy. This is understood not only by workers, whose living standard is now higher than it v/as before the war, but also by the small and middle peasants, whose living standard has reached approximately the pre-war level. The loss of ground suffered by reaction among the people as a whole is directly due to this fact. The private capitalist sector is still strong in the wholesale and retail trade. In retail trade 15 per cent of the trade is in the hands of the cooperatives. The purchase of grain, milk and other agricultural products is almost entirely (90 per cent) performed by agricultural co-operatives. Some nationalised enterprises have their own network of retail establishments— e.g., Bata, which sells all its output of shoes in its own shops. Prices are fixed by the government. The government decides the prices in the wholesale as well as the retail trade. This applies to all goods. Thus the flow of any surplus value of the private capitalist sector is government- controlled. In the spring of this year the surplus value was lowered by introducing an additional 2 per cent turnover tax in wholesale enterprises which goes into the price-equalisation fund. All the measures taken to strengthen nationalised economy and achieve economic consolidation within the country, are subject to sharp attacks from reaction which vigorously defends itself and finds support among reactionary forces inside the National Front and in the state apparatus. The Eviction of Germans, the Agrarian Reform and the New Agrarian Policy The eviction from Czechoslovakia of more than 3 million Germans was a deed of historical importance. The Czechoslovak people know that this was made possible only thanks to the support of the Soviet Union and especially

82 Comrade Stalin. All the land belonging to Germans and Czech and Slovak traitors was confiscated without compensation. Since May 1945, 1,700,000 hectares of agricultural land have been distributed. 170,000 families, mainly landless and poor peasants received this land. We have now passed a law revising the first land reform of 1920. On the basis of this law another 500,000 hectares of landed estates and church lands will be parcelled out. Our Party is paying great attention to the rural communities, for, although Czechoslovakia is predominantly an industrial country, there are nearly one million peasants living side by side with the 2.5 million workers and employees. Reaction pinned its hopes on gaining the backing of the peasants, for until 1938 the peasants were almost entirely under the influence of the reactionary Agrarian Party. The Party has been able to win staunch support among the peasants, and has introduced a price policy which helps the small and middle peasants. We have introduced a price scale for the purchase of agricultural products from peasants. The highest possible price is paid for agricultural products bought from small and middle peasants who have less than 20 hectares of land; peasants possessing between 20 and 50 hectares receive a lower price while the lowest prices are fixed for those having over 50 hectares of land. The difference between these prices represents several hundred million crowns which are used, according to the orders of the Ministry of Agriculture, for the establishment of kindergartens, communal laundries, cultural insti- tutes in villages, etc. On our initiative, in the spring of this year, the prices of agricultural machinery were lowered by 30 per cent, the prices of naphtha and petrol by 40 per cent, prices of working shoes and clothing by 20 per cent. The peasants are receiving more and more machinery. To ensure that this machinery serves the small and middle peasant, state and co-operative agricultural machinery stations are being established. There are already 30 such state stations, and 258 co-operative stations. By the end of the Two-Year Plan 94 more state and co-operative stations are to be established. These stations work to the advantage of the peasant. In addition, 2,200 local cooperatives for the purchase of machinery have been organised. In the course of the Two-Year Plan the peasants will receive farming machinery to the value of more than 2 billion crowns. We are overcoming the scarcity of manpower in agriculture too, with the help of brigades of volunteers during harvest time, and with machinery repair brigades. The Party is the main organiser of the brigades, and these help materially to strengths the alliance of workers and peasants. Almost half a million people took part in the work of the brigades this year. We are supporting a special programme of measures aimed at helping the small and middle peasant. The Ministry of Agriculture has prepared a se-

83 ries of draft laws for consideration by the people. These are: 1) The law concerning the new land reform, which provides for the allo- cation of all landed property exceeding 50 hectares. 2) The law on the reorganisation of the purchase and sale of agricultural products. The law establishes that the purchase and sale of all agricultural products be carried out by four state-monopolies in collaboration, with agricultural co-operatives. 3) The law on the democratisation of agricultural cooperatives. This is intended to give the small peasants easy access to co-operatives and increase their influence in the co-operatives’ administrative bodies. 4) The law on credits to peasants. 5) The law on a single agricultural tax which will lessen the burden of taxation on small and middle peasants. 6) The law on the mechanisation of agriculture, which will guarantee credits for the purchase of machinery for machinery stations and cooperatives. Because of the droughts we have been compelled to increase the prices of grain; in addition to this, we are giving half a million crowns to the small peasants who have no or very little marketable grain. Such is our agrarian policy. It is convincing the rural areas of the justice of the new way of life and is helping us to carry on a successful fight against reaction in the villages. We know that the position of reaction in the rural communities is still strong and that the ranks of the rich peasants provide the most vicious accomplices of reaction who are inciting the farmers to sabotage government measures and who are carrying on virulent anti-state agitation. The fight against reaction in the rural areas will be a long process. The sectarian attitude of some of our rural Party organisations towards the middle and small peasants is hampering our agricultural policy. We are doing our best to eliminate this shortcoming, for we realise that a correct attitude towards the peasants and the strengthening of the bonds between the peasants and workers are an important prerequisite for the further consolidation of the new regime in Czechoslovakia. The Situation in Slovakia The June plenum of our Central Committee dealt with the Slovak problem. The underground fascist Hlinka organisations are organising conspira- cies under the direct patronage of the so-called Democratic Party (which polled more than 60 per cent of the Slovak vote in the elections) and with the active participation of some groups of Catholic clergy. The state and economic apparatus swarms with reactionary individuals. The activities of the Bande- rite gangs make it easier for foreign intelligence services to carry on their disruptive work not only against Czechoslovakia but against all the countries of

84 the new democracy. Slovakia’s state structure today is of a specific character; the Kosice Programme has laid down new principles for the union of Czechs and Slo- vaks. The Slovaks are recognised as an independent nation and it has been resolved that the common state should be based on the equal rights of both nations. Executive powers in Slovakia rest with the supreme national organ of the Slovaks, the Slovak National Council. In June 1946 after the general elections, the Slovak representatives signed an agreement according to which the Slovak Commissioners were subordinate to the Ministers of State and the Government. However, in practice this agreement has not been kept. The execution of Tiso was a bitter blow to the reactionary elements in Slovakia. Immediately after his execution a series of facts were disclosed which testified to the seditious activities of certain Democratic Party representatives. Nevertheless, the solution of the Slovak problem is encountering difficulties, as Czech reactionary elements are- offering protection to the con- spirators. The disclosure of the new conspiracy in Slovakia demands that not only Slovak reaction be vigorously exposed, but also all those who protect it, and who conduct a double policy in relation to the treacherous Slovak groups. All those who try to sabotage the measures taken against anti-state elements must be made known to the people.

THE NATIONAL FRONT AND THE FIGHT AGAINST REACTION In order to conduct a successful fight against reaction and fully secure the new regime, the National Front, as the union of all working citizens, must be strengthened. A number of reactionary and treacherous political parties were banned in the course of the national and democratic revolution. The treacherous clique of big bourgeoisie and landowners was removed from the government, but reaction did not surrender. The reactionary groups wanted to establish a party of their own, but later rejected the idea and began to in- filtrate into the government parties. During the election campaign in 1946 reaction calculated on victory at the polls, but the elections were a great success for our Party which polled 40 per cent of all Czech votes. Had the Communists and Social Democrats acted together on all questions they could have had the absolute majority in Par- liament—154 seats of the total 300. In the recent past reaction has been be- having more and more insolently. The activity of the government has been obstructed, many bills proposed by us have been whittled down, and Parlia- ment has left a number of questions unsettled. As early as January 1947, at a meeting of the Central Committee, Comrade Gottwald raised the question of conducting a more vigorous strug-

85 gle against reaction and of relying on the support of the working class and all democratic elements to expose the reactionaries. When the question of subsidies over and above the prices paid to peasants was recently discussed, our Ministers proposed that a special tax be lev- ied on the property of millionaires to cover the cost. The other parties of the National Front voted against us. In order to mobilise public opinion against reaction our Party decided to expose their activities and draw the public attention to those parties of the National Front which give cover to the reactionaries. After the ballot in the government we published the names of the eleven Ministers who voted against the millionaires’ tax. This evoked the hearty response of the public. Factories, trade unions, local National Commit- tees and whole organisations from other political parties voiced their protest together with us. The leaders of the Social Democratic Party thereupon began discussions with the leadership of our Party and an agreement was signed to the effect that the Communists and Social Democrats would work out a common proposal on the millionaires’ tax. The Communist Party wants to unite all truly democratic and patriotic elements of every political party and thus strengthen the National Front. The preliminary condition for this is the expulsion of the representatives of reaction from the parties of the National Front. We must take into account that there is no unity in the leading circles of the National Front. Such is not the case in the lower bodies. The working citizens, members of the different political parties, are working in harmony to fulfil the Two-Year Plan. The people have learned how to work together in the factories, in the villages and towns. The idea of unity has preserved its mobilising force. The National Front is represented not only by political parties; it has the support of powerful national organisations: the trade unions representing 2,200,000 workers and office employees, the united youth organisation, the union of co-operatives, the union of peasants. These organisations, mainly the trade unions, could play a more active role in the National Front, and by so doing increase its strength.

III THE PARTY The Party worked underground during the occupation and lost 25,000 of its members, most of whom it could ill afford to lose (among them 42 members of the Executive Committee). After the occupation it was faced with the task of rebuilding its organisation. Three months after the country’s liberation the Party already had half a million members and a year later the membership topped the million mark. In addition, the Slovak Communist Party has 180,000 members.

86 The organisational structure of the Party is as follows: the basic organisations are in the towns, villages and enterprises. Each member of a factory or office organisation must at the same time be registered in the local organisation of his place of domicile, in order to take part in discussions of local importance. This strengthens the influence of the workers in the local organisations. The second link of our organisational system is formed by districts which correspond to the administrative districts of the state. Above these are the regions, which cover the electoral districts of the state administration. The Central Committee has 101 members and 33 deputy members, of whom 14 members are elected to the Presidium. Its auxiliary organs are the political secretariat and the organisational secretariat. An important factor in our Party organisation is the so-called “Ten-men group” system. The secretary of the Ten helps the committee of the basic organisation—he is in fact, the link between the committee and the members, whom he helps to take part in the-fulfilment of the Party’s tasks. The secretary works with eight-to ten members and carries out the following duties; he informs his members of the most important political campaigns, invites them to meetings, and collects Party dues and subscriptions for Party papers. The system of ten-men groups has fully justified itself and has helped to build up an active team of Party functionaries numbering 100,000 to 120,000 members. In addition to this, we have a system of district secretaries who are in charge of five to seven local organisations, and whose duty it is to inform and assist these organisations in their work. While throwing open the doors of our Party to the masses of workers, peasants and working intelligentsia we are careful to see that no unworthy person infiltrates into our Party. A new member must be recommended by two other members and he is admitted at a public meeting. At the end of 1946 a general check-up of the membership was carried out by re-registering the latter and exchanging their temporary membership cards for permanent ones. Considerable work was accomplished inside the Party during the check-up, which was completed in the spring of this year. The individual work and conduct of each member was examined and new questionnaires had to be filled in; these were reviewed and discussed by the leadership of the organisations. All those who had violated Party discipline were expelled. The new membership cards were issued at formal Party meetings where, after a report on the tasks and role of the Party, the members pledged to fulfil conscientiously all tasks as members of the Party. The re-registration campaign strengthened the Party. The preliminary conditions for a new recruiting drive were created which started at the beginning of this year. In the first eight months 130,000 new members joined the Party. The campaign is still on. The vast majority of new members are women (42.2 per cent) and

87 young people (47.7 per cent). 17.4 per cent of our members are under 25 and 51.6 per cent under 45 years. The new members do not know the history and the traditions of the Party and are not familiar with the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. We therefore attach great importance to the Party education not only of our functionaries but of all Party members. At the basic organisations a series of lectures are being held for all members on the main principles of our ideology and policy. We have ten district schools for local and district functionaries. A central school with a six-month course has been established. The graduates of this school are sent to important posts on the district committees or the Central Committee apparatus. In addition, courses of instruction for journalists, functionaries of the youth and women’s movements, for district secretaries and secretaries working in the villages are being organised at the central school. Party education is supplemented with the publication of Marxist- Leninist literature. The “Short Course of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)” sold 250,000 copies, the first edition of Sta- lin’s biography 80,000 copies, Stalin’s “The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union” 98,000 copies and 70,000 copies of a collection of Gottwald’s speeches and articles were sold. We have a Socialist Academy which apart from regular scientific work organises weekly public lectures. The popularity of these lectures can be gauged from the fact that the seven lectures arranged in the course of two months were attended by 15,300 people. A special paper “Funcionar” (The Functionary) is being published for our functionaries. “Svetove Rozhledy” (World Review) is a journal devoted to international affairs. We recently started publication of anew ideological magazine “Nova Mysl” (New Mind). The central organ of our Party, the daily “Rude Pravo” is the largest paper in Czechoslovakia. The Party also publishes four daily provincial papers and twenty-two weeklies. Naturally, however, very much remains to be done in the field of ideological and political education of our Party members and big work lies ahead.

IV FOREIGN POLICY The war which ended with the defeat of German and Japanese fascism strengthened the authority of the Soviet Union which bore the main brunt of the war, strengthened the progressive democratic forces in Europe. In a number of countries the people have established new regimes—the people s democracies. This victory of the progressive forces is a thorn in the flesh of international reaction as a whole and particularly of the reactionaries in Czechoslovakia, who are doing their utmost to weaken progress and regain their old foothold. Czechoslovakia, as the westernmost bastion of the new democracy, is

88 especially exposed to strong pressure from both American imperialism and internal reaction. Reaction attacks our alliance with the Soviet Union and with the other Slav countries. Every problem of foreign policy can be solved only after a sharp and bitter struggle with native reaction. An example of this was the recent alliance with Poland which was sabotaged by reactionaries for nearly a year; then there was the question of the so-called Marshall Plan, which Czechoslovak reaction depicted as the salvation of Czechoslovak economy. Here it should be noted that the Slav policy is supported by the vast majority of the Czech and Slovak nations which look with gratitude and love upon the Soviet Union as their liberator. Our nations realise that only the policy of the Soviet Union answers the interests of Czechoslovakia, and they strongly oppose any policy which aims to restore an imperialist Germany as a menace to the very existence of Czechoslovakia. Our close relations with the Slav countries are important for Czecho- slovakia’s economy. Co-operation with the Slav countries, which plan their economy, will help to avoid the economic crises which threaten the Western capitalist states. Thus for instance, economic co-operation with the Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria has made it possible for our factories to work at full capacity and has ensured the further development of our agriculture. The favourable effect of long-term agreements with the Slav countries has now become evident, when, as a result of the poor harvest at home, we are receiving 200,000 tons of grain and 200,000 tons of fodder from the Soviet Union. This at a time when we have received nothing beyond promises from the West. Our friendly policy with the Slav countries is the only lasting and effective guarantee of a peaceful future for the sovereignty and independence of Czechoslovakia. Comrade Gottwald recently once again spoke of this when he stated that anybody who slanders our Slav allies in any way and tries to weaken our alliance with them is a traitor to his country. * * * * In conclusion, I would like to emphasise that we welcome the initiative of our Polish comrades who gave us the opportunity to meet here and exchange views on our political problems. We heartily welcome the proposal that a basis for closer co-operation among the Communist Parties should be found. The outcome of the struggle with the reactionary forces in Czechoslo- vakia is far from solved. A bitter and stubborn struggle lies ahead. Reaction relies not only on its native political reserves; it is in contact with American and English reaction and their aggressive plans. In the sphere of foreign policy reaction is trying to change the orientation of the Czechoslovak state, to drive a wedge in the cooperation of the Slav countries with the countries of the new democracy. We must be prepared for a corresponding increase in

89 these attempts as the aggressive efforts of the Anglo-American warmongers redouble. In the sphere of domestic policy reaction is making every effort to bring about chaos and economic disaster in the country, to isolate the Communists and to form an anti-Communist and anti-democratic bloc. But a realistic as- sessment of the existing forces, however, leads us to believe that not only it is possible successfully to combat these plans but also to frustrate them. The Communists will take part in this fight not in their own name alone; they will defend the whole nation and their vital national interests—the independence and security of Czechoslovakia—against the threat of the revival of German imperialism. Our nation realises what the foreign policy of the So- viet Union means for its future destiny. To us this policy spells peace, security, and the equality of nations and determined resistance to the warmongers. Our nation also understands that reaction desires to return the nationalised industry, the banks and mines to foreign and home capitalists and bankers. And knowing this, the nation, already cognizant of the results of the new way and conscious of its own strength, will never allow this to happen. As the international situation becomes more strained, and the struggle between the forces of peace and war grows sharper, the process of the new regrouping of forces inside the parties of the National Front will intensify. We are sure that all the democratic elements of all parties will go with us. The National Front must be strengthened by driving out all reactionary elements. We can rely on the majority of the working class, on the alliance of workers and peasants which we shall continue to strengthen. By strengthening the position of the working class and the regime of new democracy we shall bury forever the hopes of international and native reaction to subordinate Czechoslovakia to their influence.

90 The Organisational Work of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia By M. DJILAS

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia developed in a difficult illegal struggle, in an armed uprising and intensive work to build and rehabilitate our devastated country. It is often thought abroad that only war conditions and certain specific favourable political circumstances during the occupation of the country, made it possible for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to achieve its great successes. This, however, is not true. As in every revolution, so too in the Yugo- slav revolution, definite historical circumstances were necessary. I shall not dwell on them but I should like to emphasize that, however favourable, such circumstances alone, as is generally known, are not sufficient to ensure the victory of the working people, unless there is a revolutionary, well organised party, capable of leading the people into the struggle. Such a party existed in Yugoslavia, a party that was well organised and fully prepared ideologically; it staunchly fought the enemy—the fascist invader and his henchmen. In 1941, when Hitler occupied Yugoslavia, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was well organised; its ranks were purged of alien elements; it was ideologically and politically monolithic. As can be seen from the Party documents which were published during that period, the leadership of the Party, headed by Comrade Tito, was fully aware of the strength and organisation of the Party; it knew full well that the Party was in a position to cope with the difficult tasks facing it. And, indeed, thanks to its organisational stability and ideological strength, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia organised an armed uprising immediately after the occupation of the country as the only effective form of struggle in conditions of war. How could the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have launched an armed uprising and led it unwaveringly, and without any outside material aid and under the most difficult conditions of four years of war, had it not been thoroughly organised, and had it not been ideologically and politically prepared? Naturally, such a struggle could have been launched and led only by a party sufficiently firm, both organisationally and ideologically, and sufficiently well disciplined. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was indeed such a party. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia entered the war after twenty years of illegality. There was no vacillation within the Party either at the beginning or in the course of the war. There were no anti-Party groups in the Party (we do not here refer to individuals or to certain isolated cases which could not influence the life or development of the Party, or the carrying out of its deci-

91 sions). The Central Committee quickly reoriented the activities of the entire Party on a military basis, taking the stand that the armed struggle against the invader was the ‘‘first and paramount task” (Tito). Indeed, the Party organisations reorganised themselves in a very short time and began to form partisan detachments. The armed uprising against the invader and his hirelings flared up throughout the whole of Yugoslavia under the leadership of the Communist Party. Thanks to the sound political orientation of the Party and thanks to the unwavering course of the armed struggle against the invader, the ranks of the Party were rapidly reinforced by new fighters and new cadres, despite losses. Embracing ever wider masses of the people and drawing them into the armed struggle, the Party began to create the organs of people’s power from below, to extend and strengthen the organisation of the People’s Front. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia has become a truly militant party, the vanguard of the popular masses, because it has always, under all circumstances, resolutely followed the organizational principles of Bolshevism, always constructively applied the rich experience of building the Party. As was the case during the period of the Party’s illegality, at the time of the war and now after the liberation of the country, new members are admitted in keeping with strict demands. In admitting members into the Party, account was, and is still, taken as to whether every candidate has been tested in struggle, his loyalty to the cause of the Party and his moral record, A period of candidacy is obligatory. Otherwise, any person who pays the regular membership fee, recognises the Party’s programme and actively works in some Party organisation, may be a member of the Party. The Party is organised on the principle of cells in factories, villages, institutions and streets. The leadership of the Party is elected in a democratic manner. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia did not have to take any special measures against individual organisations either during, or after the war. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia is composed of the national Com- munist Parties, which are organised in the different republics. These parties have their own leaderships which, however, are subordinate to the CC of the CP of Yugoslavia. Thanks to the integrity of its ranks, thanks to its internal strength and organisation, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was able to rally the majority of the people in such a mass organisation as the People’s Front, the People’s Youth, etc., and to rely upon them in its work. Had the Communist Party of Yugoslavia not been so firmly organised, it would have disintegrated under the first heavy blows and would not have been able to create auxiliary mass organisations or to organise and lead the masses in the struggle. At the outbreak of the war the Communist Party of Yugoslavia numbered some 15,000 members, tested in the difficult illegal struggle and splen-

92 didly organised. About 80% of this number fell in the uprising. Losses among the members whom the Party admitted during the war were also heavy. But, despite this, the ranks of the Party steadily grew. In the course of the war (up to January, 1945), its membership increased by more than 100,000. At the time (January, 1945), it already led an army of nearly half a million as well as mass organisations, such as the People’s Front and the Peoples’ Youth, numbering several million members, and directed the life of the state on more than half of the liberated territory. These data illustrate how the Com- munist Party grew gradually, not in leaps and bounds, but steadily strengthening and expanding its ranks. The growth of the Party was more rapid immediately prior to and after the liberation of the country; today the Party numbers approximately 400,000 members. The nucleus of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is made up of cadres which passed through the stern school of the uprising and the four years of war. The social and national composition of the Party is satisfactory. All the working people of Yugoslavia, the workers, peasants, people’s intelligentsia, as well as the nationalities are equally represented in the Party. Similarly, the number of women and candidates for Party membership is also satisfactory. Ideological and political work is obligatory for all members of the Party. The Party has one higher (two-year) Party school and six secondary schools, and a large number of courses and lectures. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia relies on mass political and other organisations. Particular stress should, in the first place, be laid on the People’s Front which in Yugoslavia has, in the true sense of the word, become a front of the people. It rallied the overwhelming majority of the people during the war, in the struggle against the fascist invader and domestic reaction and today, we might say, in the struggle for the construction of a new socialist order. In the course of the war the People’s Front which rallied the broad masses of the people on the liberated, and also on the occupied territory, developed into a mass organisation with millions of members. The People’s Front was joined by the mass organisation of women (AFZ) and youth (USAOJ) which later developed into the People’s Youth of Yugoslavia and, towards the end of the war, by the newly organised United Trade Unions of Yugoslavia. Various political groups as well as prominent political and cultural figures also joined the People’s Front. The organisations of the People’s Front in the localities are monolithic, that is, in the village, factory, street, the organisations of the Front are unified, are not split by Party groups. All the members of the People’s Front in their respective sectors meet at joint conferences where they discuss various questions, political and economic, questions relating to the state, and outline

93 their tasks. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia applies such methods of work which help to strengthen the Front as a united mass political organisation, an organisation upon which the Party relies, in the first place, for the execution of its programme. Comrade Tito in his report at the Second Congress of the Front, particularly stressed the leading role of the Party in the Front as well as the fact that there was no difference between the programme of the Front and that of the Party—that their programme was in fact one and the same. In this connection new prospects unfold before the Party and it is faced with the task of strengthening the People’s Front and using it as the main organisational form for the political enlightenment of the broad masses. The Party will now have to redouble its activity to consolidate the Front organisations ideologically, to strengthen them politically and organisationally, so that they might steadily change into a united collective of many million strong in which existing differences will gradually disappear. It goes without saying that the Party will have to handle this process with the utmost care, not rush forward, but move in the vanguard of the masses, in every way contribute to their further political development, to their consolidation in the People’s Front. The People’s Front played an outstanding role not only in the war; as the struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia to build a new life develops, its post- war role is increasingly greater. In accordance with this, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia today lays down as one of its most important tasks the further political and organisational strengthening of the Front. How deeply rooted the Front has become, and of what enormous significance it is, is best borne out by the fact that it today numbers, as shown by the membership cards issued so far, 4,200,000 members. This number does not include the People’s Youth of Yugoslavia, which has close to 1,250,000 members and which, as a separate organisation, also belongs to the People’s Front. Accord- ingly, if we bear in mind that all the members of the Front could not have been registered, the number of members of the People’s Front of Yugoslavia today may total approximately 7 million persons. This represents an enormous force with the aid of which all difficulties that might appear during the struggle for the reconstruction of our country can be overcome. The People’s Front today plays a mobilising role in the struggle for the realisation of the Five Year Plan. It also serves as a very favourable form for mass political enlightenment and development, as well as for mass political work. It can be said that the Front is a disciplined organisation which efficiently and unhesitatingly carries out all tasks with which it is entrusted by its leaders.

94 A member of the Front may be any person who works in one of the existing Front organisations, who has not besmirched himself through collaboration with the enemy and does not damage the prestige of the Front by his behaviour. There are no ideological, religious or any other obstacles to enrolment in the Front. Youth of Yugoslavia grew out of the United Federation of the Anti- Fascist Youth of Yugoslavia, as its higher form. The basic principles of the organisation of the People’s Youth of Yugoslavia are similar to those of the People’s Front with the difference that the People’s Youth is to date stronger and more stable organisationally. Special mention should be made of the trade unions which have 984,200 members and cover 80% of the workers and employees. The trade unions play an enormous role in raising the labour morale, in introducing order in work, in the struggle for the fulfilment of the plan and, in general, in improving the economic and cultural conditions of the country. There are no currents in the trade unions of Yugoslavia hostile to the interests of the working class, that is to say, opposing the Party line in trade union work. The trade unions of Yugoslavia today are an expression of the complete unity and militant élan of the working class and working masses of Yugoslavia. In our work we also rely on the mass organisation of women—the Anti- Fascist Women’s Front (AFZ)—which played a very significant role during the war, especially in the struggle to organise the rear and to aid the army, and also after the war in the struggle to rehabilitate the devastated country. Finally, mention should be made of the newly founded Federation of Fighters of the Liberation War, as one of the leading organisations to preserve and develop the achievements of the national liberation struggle. The entire state apparatus of the new Yugoslavia has been built up from below, with the destruction of the old state mechanism from top to bottom and with the creation of a new, democratic state, with the establishment of people’s committees and other representative people’s organs and the Na- tional Assembly. It is necessary to stress this in order to get a true picture of the organisational state of the Party, and its role today in the new Yugoslavia. If we were to speak of our organisational weaknesses, we could reduce them to the deficiencies of expert and ideologically developed cadres. Regardless of the fact that the intelligentsia in their overwhelming majority maintain a positive attitude toward the new order in Yugoslavia, there is still a section which has not adjusted itself to the new order. We shall have to overcome this barrier and to remove all deficiencies, especially in connection with the economic tasks. The membership of the Party, although satisfactory on the whole as far as loyalty and militant readiness go, is still young and of a rather low ideological and political level. That explains why there are occasional digressions

95 in the localities—either by tightening certain state measures or by showing leniency toward the enemies of the people. The Party leadership is combating this and correcting mistakes. In the field of cultural life, we have succeeded in starting certain branches along the right road, and even in finding and organising sound, although ideologically insufficiently experienced, cadres. Our work in the field of science and philosophy, however, is still in embryo. We have practically no cadres who could correctly interpret various philosophical and scientific questions in schools and at the universities. Thus, owing to the lack of such cadres, many positions in these fields are occupied by alien and even hostile elements. True, we have taken a series of steps to improve this situation. But speedy results cannot, unfortunately, be expected, especially because we have suffered heavy losses in leading cadres and because the best and theoretically prepared cadres have had to take over various state and economic functions. The rich ideological and organisational experience acquired by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia serves us as a stable foundation for the closer consolidation of all working people in the struggle for a genuine people’s democracy, for Socialism.

96 The Activities of the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Communists) By V. CHERVENKOV

For more than twenty years our Party carried on an incessant, coura- geous struggle against fascism in conditions of complete illegality. Despite enormous sacrifices and losses, especially in leadership, the Party maintained its ties with the broadest masses of the people, drew the necessary lessons from the struggle, overcame right-wing opportunist and left-wing sectarian tendencies. Reinforcing itself politically, tactically and organisationally as a revolutionary party, rallying around itself the genuine democratic forces in the country, the Party prepared, and then successfully effected the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship, and established the power of the people. A decisive role in the Bolshevik development of the Party was played by the fact that the Party, after the fascist coup d’état of June 1923, found the strength and courage to rectify its serious mistake, when it took a neutral position at a time when civil war swept the country. In September 1923 the Party called upon the masses to take up arms against fascism and headed the uprising. Although the September uprising was crushed, it played an exceptionally important role in the destiny of the country, in the sense that it strengthened the alliance of workers and peasants and formed a deep gulf between the working people and fascism, which the latter could not span in the subsequent twenty years, no matter how much it tried. Our Party met the Second World War as a tempered militant party, the only organised force in the country, capable of rallying and leading the Bul- garian people in the struggle against the German invaders and their agents in the ruling circles. In the winter of 1940-41 our Party headed the broad popular movement for a pact of friendship and non-aggression between Bul- garia and the Soviet Union. On March 1, 1941 the King Boris-Filoff clique joined Bulgaria to the Axis countries, and immediately thereafter opened her frontiers to the Gor- man troops. They hastened to get the support of the German armed forces, for they feared the people and the Communist Party, The Bulgarian agents of German imperialism circulated the legend about the German “allies” with whose help Bulgaria would allegedly realise her age-old aspirations of “national unification”. The occupation of’ Macedonia, Thrace and part of Serbia by Bulgarian troops with the sanction of the Hitlerite bandits, was presented as the creation of a “Greater Bulgaria”. Through this hullabaloo Hitler’s agents in Bulgaria strove to confuse our people and disarm them, morally and politically, in the face of Nazi aggression. Certain sections of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia were temporarily influenced by this. This invasion of German troops in Bulgaria was not accompanied by the destruction of

97 state apparatus, nor by the introduction of purely German rules and regulations. Actually, however, the Germans held sway in Bulgaria, which they turned into a base for their robber war against the USSR, Yugoslavia and Greece. In Bulgaria they had the native fascist rulers to do their work for them. Thus, for instance, they paid handsomely for goods purchased in Bul- garia, but the people were ignorant of the fact that the money for this was taken from the Bulgarian National Bank, Our Party sharply opposed the incorporation of Bulgaria in the Axis, the entry of German troops into the country, and branded this act as betrayal of the vital interests of the country. It exposed the hypocrisy of the so-called national unification, and called upon the people to rally all democratic forces in defence of the national independence of the country, and to fight against Bulgaria being drawn into the war. After the treacherous attack of Hitler Germany on the Soviet Union our Party appealed to the workers, peasants, artisans, patriots in the army, intellectuals loyal to the people, to launch an armed struggle against the Nazi invaders and their Bulgarian agents—a struggle which eventually had to develop into an armed uprising of the people and lead to the overthrow of the fascist government, to the expulsion of the Germans from the country, and to the establishment of a government of the people. Despite the reign of military and political terror in the country in 1941, already the first partisan detachments were formed, as well as combat groups composed, in the main, of members of the Party and of REMS (Young Com- munist League), which carried out diversion and sabotage activities. How- ever, partisan detachments were not operating on a wide scale during 1941- 42. The fascist government, which still possessed a strong state apparatus and all the armed forces of the country, realising the danger of a partisan movement, took drastic measures to suppress this movement in its early stages. The prisons and, concentration camps were overcrowded with Com- munists; death sentences were the order of the day. Despite all this, however, the struggle continued. Developing the partisan movement the Party consolidated the democratic forces in a common front of struggle against German aggression and. fascism. On the initiative of Comrade, Dimitroff, the foundation of the People’s Front was laid in the summer of 1942, and its programme published. The programme aimed to prevent drawing Bulgaria -in the war against the Soviet Union, to wrest Bulgaria from the countries of the Axis. The programme called for the overthrow of the fascist government and the establishment of a genuine national government capable of securing the freedom and independence of the country. The-communists were the initiators in forming the. People’s Front committees and constituted the overwhelming majority in these committees in the localities. The turning point in-the Patriotic War, brought about by the great bat-

98 tle of Stalingrad, marked the turning point also in the development of the resistance movement in. Bulgaria. In the second half of 1943 the resistance mounted. However, it was only in 1944 that it acquired a mass character, when separate partisan detachments formed into brigades. The country was divided into military operative zones in each of which big partisan forces operated. -The partisan movement had its General Staff headed by such outstanding Party figures as Hristo Mikhailoff (killed), Anton Jugoff, Dobri Terpesheff and others. The armed resistance grew into such a force that the government gendarmerie, specially formed for defence against the resistance movement and reinforced with regular troops, proved of no avail. In the meantime the network of the People’s Front committees, headed by the Na- tional Committee, which, in addition to Communists, included representatives of other democratic organisations, extended far and wide. The glorious liberation movement of fraternal Yugoslavia greatly influenced the growth and development of the resistance movement in Bulgaria. The example of the Yugoslav fighters inspired the Bulgarian partisans. The emergence of the Soviet Army at the Danube and north-eastern frontiers of Bulgaria, the Soviet Union’s declaration of war on the Bulgarian fascist government, hastened the popular uprising, prepared and led by the Bulgarian Communist Party. On the 5th and 6th of September mass strikes of miners, tramway workers, cotton spinners and other workers in the industrial centres swept the country. Partisan detachments left the mountains and took possession of the different cities. On the night of September 9 the victorious armed uprising of the Bulgarian people, under the direct leadership of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army and under the general leadership of the Cen- tral Committee of the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Communist), was effected in Sofia and other big cities of Bulgaria. This uprising overthrew fascism and established the power of the people in the form of the People’s Front.

I THE STRUGGLE FOR PEOPLE’S POWER IN BULGARIA A historic change took place in the internal and international development of Bulgaria as a result of the people’s armed uprising on September 9, 1944. Radical changes were effected in the alignment of social forces and in their role in the state, social, political, economic and cultural life of the country. The state power was wrested from the big capitalist groups rallied around the monarchy and closely linked with German imperialism and was given over to the people—to the militant alliance of workers, peasants, artisans and progressive intelligentsia embodied in the People’s Front. The Communist Party spearheaded this alliance. Thus, the state power in our country became the power of the people.

99 The government of the People’s Front mobilised all the material and moral resources of the country for the war against Hitler Germany. For eight months the Bulgarian army, under the leadership of the Soviet Army and together with the People’s Liberation Army of fraternal Yugoslavia, fought for the expulsion of the German hordes from the Balkans. On September 9, 1944 the fascist forces in Bulgaria were routed. A most positive role in this was played by the specially formed people’s courts. The most dangerous fascist criminals and other enemies of the people were rendered harmless. The foundation of the monarcho-fascist dictatorship was virtually liquidated soon after September 9. The referendum held two years later, that is, on September 8, 1946, in which 92 per cent of all the Bulgarian electors voted for the abolition of the monarchy and favoured a people’s republic, sanctioned the actual elimination of monarchy, this most dangerous hotbed of German agents in the country. After striking a crushing political blow at fascism and reaction on Sep- tember 9 and in the subsequent weeks, and after routing their organisations, the new power was unable, nonetheless, to deprive them of their economic base and to completely uproot them. Reaction’s first reconnaissance was undertaken in December 1944 by the notorious Dr. G. M. Dimitroff-Gemeto, the hireling of the British and Americans, who during the war was in one of the British possessions in the Near East. When he returned to Bulgaria after September 9, he headed the Landowners’ Union and rather crudely tried to counterpose the Landowners’ Union to the Communist Party; he also tried to proclaim the slogan of independent power to the peasants and that the Communists be stopped from taking a decisive part in the People’s Front and in governing the country. Dr. G. M. Dimitroff-Gemeto’s group took a defeatist stand on the question of the Patriotic War and tried to operate in this direction. Energetic measures had to be taken and the masses called upon to combat this group. Reaction’s first attempt after September 9, 1944, to split the People’s Front, this genuine people’s movement, and to set the peasants against the workers by bringing forward the old slogan of Alexander Stamobolisky of the independence of rural power, suffered a crushing defeat. G: M. Dimitroff-Gemeto fled to America with the help of the American Ambassador in Sofia, Barns. Another and more serious attempt by reaction to oppose the People’s Front was made in the summer of 1945. This was connected with the outright interference of the governments of the USA and Great Britain in the internal affairs of Bulgaria. Under foreign influence the reactionary wing in the Bul- garian Landowners^ Union, headed by Nikola Petkoff, and also the reactionary wing of the Social-Democratic Party broke away from the People’s Front. These two reactionary wings formed an opposition and openly opposed the People’s Front on all questions of home and foreign policy. Behind democratic phrases about the struggle for democracy and freedom, the opposition tried in

100 every way to take advantage of the temporary difficulties in the country and especially of the unstable international position of the new Bulgaria at the time. At the elections to the People’s Assembly the reactionary opposition polled 39 per cent of the total votes. The representatives of the opposition used the People’s Assembly to launch an unbridled campaign against the People’s Front, openly calling upon the population not to heed the orders and laws issued by the government; they placed all their hopes on aid from abroad, on the interference of the Western powers, and especially of the USA, into our home affairs. Our Party as the most active and main force in the People’s Front started a stubborn fight together with its allies to isolate the opposition leaders from the masses of electors who had voted for their lists. This struggle was crowned with major successes. Bulgaria has signed the Peace Treaty, Great Britain has been compelled to recognise us de jure. With the help of the Soviet Union the People’s Front government has saved the population from starvation and has introduced fundamental reforms envisaged in its programme. When the plans of the opposition began to collapse, when the electors, who had cast their vote for the opposition leaders, gradually began to take part in building up the country and thus, actually to draw away from the opposition, the opposition leaders took the path of conspiracy, of sabotaging the measures of the people’s power, took the path of organising reactionary plots to sow confusion in the country and in this way create conditions for outside interference. Our Party, educating the masses to be vigilant, led them in struggle against the saboteurs and wreckers. One after another, the conspiracy organisations in the army, which were linked with Nikola Petkoff’s headquarters, were exposed. Thus the opposition degenerated into a centre of plotters against the people’s power and into arrant agents of Western imperialism. It had to be utterly routed in the interests of peace and democracy in the country and in the Balkans. The rout of Petkoff’s opposition was a blow not only against the fascist and reactionary forces in Bulgaria, but also against the reactionary plans of the Anglo-Saxon imperialists in Bulgaria and in the Balkans. This undoubtedly is a victory for the People’s Front and for people’s democracy, a victory which will bring favourable results in the further democratic development of our country. This victory, however, must under no circumstances lull the vigilance of our Party and of the People’s Front, for reaction has not been completely uprooted and the foreign patrons of the Petkoff group still continue to provoke the people’s republic of Bulgaria. The democratic constitution of Bulgaria, which will be finally adopted by the People’s Assembly in the near future, reflects the profound changes which have taken place in the political, social and economic structure of the

101 country as a result of the overthrow of fascism. The main points of the new constitution were formulated by Comrade Dimitroff prior to the referendum on the question of the abolition of the monarchy and the creation of the people’s republic. “Firstly,” said Comrade Dimitroff, “Bulgaria will not be a Soviet republic; it will be a people’s republic in which the leading role will be played by the overwhelming majority of the people—by the workers, peasants, artisans and people’s intelligentsia. There will be no dictatorship in the republic, but the basic and decisive factor in the people’s republic will be the majority of the working people, socially useful people and not the capitalist minority of the politically and morally rotten bourgeois upper strata. “Secondly, Bulgaria will be a people’s republic in which private property, acquired by labour, will be protected by the state authorities against all sharks and profiteers, but in which big capitalist profiteering private property will not be allowed to doom the labouring people—workers, peasants, artisans, employees and people’s intelligentsia—to hunger and poverty. ‘‘Thirdly, Bulgaria will be a people’s republic, which will leave no open doors for the return of the shameful past—monarchism, fascism and the Greater Bulgarian chauvinism and which will provide all the necessary constitutional, political, economic, material and cultural guarantees for the development of our country along the path of progress, right up to the elimination of all exploitation of man by man. “Fourthly, Bulgaria will be a people’s republic, a free and independent state with its national and state sovereignty. It will not dance to the tune of capitalist concerns and trusts, which would like to enslave the small nations politically and economically. “Fifthly, Bulgaria will be a people’s republic—a factor of Slav unity and fraternity against any possible aggression. It will not be the chorus of anti- Slav and anti-Soviet policy that leads to enmity between nations. “Sixthly, Bulgaria will be a people’s republic which, together with the other democratic and freedom-loving nations, will constitute a strong factor of peace and democracy in the Balkans and in Europe and will not be a tool of military adventures and aggressive wars.”

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY The biggest problem that faced the People’s Front from the very outset was the rehabilitation of the country’s economy plundered by the Germans. Of course, it is not a question of merely restoring the economy, it is a question of its rehabilitation and further development on new democratic lines. The economic policy of the People’s Front Is based on the principle of combining the state, cooperative and private sectors in the economic life of the country

102 (here the predominant and leading role is played by the state sector); on the principle of planning, state and public control of production, exchange and credit; on the principle of the rapid industrialisation of the country. The People’s Assembly has approved a two-year economic plan, the carrying out of which is now of paramount interest to the government and the people. The main tasks of the Two-Year Plan are: 1. To surmount the economic difficulties caused by fascism and the war and further aggravated by the two subsequent droughts; to attain and surpass the pre-war level of production in agriculture, industry and other branches of the economy. 2. To rapidly industrialise the country by building new works and factories with state funds, bank credits, internal loans, with funds supplied by rural and urban councils, cooperatives and private savings and, where possible, with foreign credits and also by expanding and rationalising existing industry. 3. To rapidly surmount the crisis in electric power supplies and the lag- ging behind in coal production by building new hydro-electric power stations, by exploiting new mines and reconstructing the old mining equipment. 4. To radically improve the technique of production and to use it to the maximum in all existing industries as the most important condition for increasing production and raising the productivity of labour. 5. In every way to support the development of agriculture, livestock- raising, forestry and the fishing industry; to promote agronomy, veterinary and other measures in agriculture; in every way to support the productive agricultural cooperatives which are being founded voluntarily. 6. To improve the development of railway, automobile, water and air communications. 7. To modernise handicraft industry and supply the craftsmen more regularly with materials; the establishment of handicraft cooperatives will be encouraged in this connection. 8. To strengthen and extend home and foreign trade, to eliminate the socially harmful practice of mediation, to regulate prices of agricultural and industrial goods, these prices to be fixed in accordance with prices on the world market. 9. To carry out a strict regime of economy and to cut down the cost of production. 10. To train the necessary skilled cadres. 11. To raise the general material and cultural level of the population. The Two-Year Economic Plan must lay the foundation for the industrialisation and electrification of the country, facilitate the reorganisation of agriculture and considerably increase the role of the social sector in production and exchange. Industry in our country is weakly developed. Industrial production con-

103 stitutes 26 per cent of the total national output. Industry is particularly lag- ging behind in the output of iron ore, electric power, in the production of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, in the engineering, chemical and coal industries. In 1946, industrial production reached 91 per cent compared with 1939. It is planned to increase industrial production by 34 per cent in 1947 and by 67 per cent in 1948 compared with 1939. There are 6,250 large and small-scale industrial enterprises in our country, of which 492 are considered to be key enterprises. 16.6 per cent of the key enterprises are owned by the state, 2.6 per cent by cooperatives, 77.3 per cent by capitalists. Transport, the mines and banks are in the hands of the state. Apart from this the state has the monopoly on the production of tobacco, spirits and in insurance. A considerable part of the home trade is in the hands of the state and cooperatives. The state has also the monopoly on essential goods. Foreign trade is controlled by the state. By developing state stores and the “‘Horemag” municipal enterprises we shall gradually force out private retail trade. In the course of the last three years the cooperative movement in Bul- garia has become a powerful factor in the country’s economic life. The cooperatives, stated Comrade Dimitroff, must play the same role in the economic life of the country as that played by the People’s Front in her political life. In April of this year all the cooperative unions amalgamated in the Central Coop- erative Union. This union numbers about 5,000 cooperative organisations with a membership of one million. In 1947 the cooperative share in the country’s trade turnover will amount to 99,000 million ley which is 60 per cent of the total trade turnover. In foreign trade their share will constitute 14 per cent. Certain branches of industry, such as sugar refinery and wood-working, are almost entirely in the hands of the cooperatives. In the canning industry the cooperatives in 1947 will contribute, according to the economic plan, 48 per cent of the entire output, in the meat industry 50 per cent, in the dairy industry 90 per cent. In the period of the Two-Year Economic Plan the cooperative movement will steadily develop, especially in the field of handicraft production and agriculture. The Two-Year Plan likewise provides for the increase in agricultural production. The Plan envisages the increase of arable land by tens of thousands of hectares which will be made possible mainly by draining the Danu- bian marshes. The Plan provides for the increase of agricultural production by 13 per cent in 1947 and by 34 per cent in 1948 compared with 1939. As a result of the agrarian reform carried out by the government of the People’s Front 88,358 peasant households have received land totalling an area of 100,000 hectares. However, the real salvation for Bulgaria’s scattered small households lies in organising into labour productive agricultural cooperatives, which will create the conditions for the mechanisation of agriculture

104 and will do away with the backwardness of the countryside. We shall help to organise such cooperatives, which already number 565 and possess some 200,000 hectares of land. In accordance with the economic plan, in 1948 there will be 800 such cooperatives and this will mean that one-fifth of Bulgaria’s villages will be covered by the cooperative network. Although these labour cooperative households are as yet inadequately mechanised, and although there are still many difficulties due to the lack of experienced and skilled cadres, they have, nonetheless, proved their vitality. The labour cooperative agricultural households are not collective farms. They retain the peasants’ ownership of the land. Moreover, part of the incomes of the cooperative households goes to the owner in the form of land rent. Never- theless, the advantages of these cooperatives, from the economic point of view as well as from the point of view of educating the peasants in the spirit of col- lectivism, are considerable. The development of agriculture is also facilitated by the machine-tractor stations of which there are now 30. In 1948 their number will reach 50 with 1,317 tractors, not to mention a number of other agricultural machines. The difficulties in carrying out the economic plan are major ones. They are due not only to objective circumstances (lack of raw materials and machines), but also to poor organisational work, to the still existing bureaucracy, stagnancy, as well as to sabotage and wrecking activities by reactionary and hostile elements. However, the fulfilment of this plan is guaranteed by the response of the masses to it, by their unremitting labour enthusiasm. In this respect the youth are in the vanguard. They are organised in youth brigades which voluntarily contribute their share to building the new Bulgaria. The Dimitroff Youth Brigade this year numbered 80,000 persons. Ever greater sections of the working class are involved in labour competition and shock-brigade work. Labour discipline is steadily improving. The productivity of labour is increasing. Of exceptional importance in this respect is the role of the trade unions. Particular note should be taken of the cultural labour brigades, which are being organised in the cities to help the countryside. The scope of this movement and its results can be gathered from the following figures: in the first quarter of 1947, 9,543 brigades numbering 1,061,000 persons were sent to the countryside. These brigades worked 1,067,000 working day units, thus performing useful work to the value of 348,000,000 ley. In carrying out her economic plan our country relies first and foremost, on her own resources and on the aid rendered by the fraternal Slav countries, particularly the extensive aid of the Soviet Union, which we are getting to this day. We embarked on the fulfilment of our Two-Year Plan only on April 1, 1947.

105 III QUESTION OF FOREIGN POLICY Bulgaria’s international position can be regarded as established. She has normal diplomatic relations with practically all states, barring the United States of America and monarchist Greece. Thanks to the support of the great Soviet Union and the other fraternal Slav countries, Bulgaria has received a Peace Treaty which, although it contains certain onerous conditions, especially as regards reparations to Greece, preserves the integrity of the country’s territory, the inviolability of her national independence and state sovereignty. However, even though the Peace Treaties have been signed and the government of the People’s Front pursues a policy of peace, the Party and the people have to be most vigilant, for Bulgaria borders with such states as Greece and Turkey. Monarcho-Fascist Greece and reactionary Turkey are the hotbeds of perpetual danger to the democratic states in the Balkans. This is borne out by a number of provocations on the Greek border lately, by the attempts of the Anglo-American imperialists to interfere in our internal affairs. The pressure brought to bear on the government of the People’s Front by the British and Americans to save their agent Nikola Petkoff, lays bare their aggressive plans against the freedom and independence of Bulgaria, not to mention the other democratic Balkan states. The underlying principle of our foreign policy is to preserve, at all costs, the national independence and state sovereignty of the country in cooperation with all the freedom-loving nations. As has been repeatedly stressed by Com- rade Dimitroff the essence of this policy is lasting friendship with our liberator, the great Soviet Union, fraternal alliance with the new Yugoslavia, close cooperation with the rest of the Slav countries, and the other democratic nations. The conference in Bled and the decisions taken there spell the beginning of a new phase in the relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; they mark a big step forward in establishing close ties between the two countries. The Bled conference took a decision on concerted action and joint defence of the peace in the Balkans. Agreements of friendship and mutual assistance will be concluded with Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, which will further strengthen the international position of Bulgaria. Bulgaria emphatically refused to take part in the Paris conference, convened to put the “Marshall Plan” into effect, for she does not want to cede her political and economic independence in the slightest degree. Our Party regards consolidation of the national independence and state sovereignty of the people’s republic as the paramount task in the country’s home and foreign policy.

106 IV The POLITICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL Work OF THE PARTY Our Party plays a leading role in the state, as well as in the social and political life of the country. The first Parliamentary elections in the autumn of 1945 were carried out in agreement with our political allies and on the basis of a common list. We agreed to the parity principle for Agricultural Party in the distribution of mandates. Elections to the Great People’s Assembly were conducted on a common platform, although we introduced different col- oured voting papers. We carried out the election campaign together with our political allies, addressing meetings jointly. At the meetings of the National Committee of the People’s Front, a special decision was taken, in conjunction with the leaders of the parties in this Front, to the effect that the parties refrain from attacking one another during the election campaign. As is known our Party scored a victory in the elections. It received 54 per cent of all the votes and 286 mandates, i.e., 60 per cent of the seats in Parliament. Our Party thus received the absolute majority. In keeping with parliamentary procedure our Party could have formed a purely Communist government. However, being interested in strengthening the People’s Front and national unity, it afforded all parties of the People’s Front, regardless of the number of votes polled by them, the opportunity to take part in the government. In this way the Party helped to strengthen the People’s Front still further, and increase the confidence of our allies in it. Our Party is the principal, most active and leading force today in the People’s Front and in the administration of the country. The People’s Front is not a simple coalition of parties. It is, above all, a popular movement, a militant alliance of workers, peasants, artisans, office employees and the people’s intelligentsia, to build the country on truly democratic foundations. Our Party works to strengthen the People’s Front, the militant alliance of the vigorous forces of the people. On our initiative the Na- tional Committee of the People’s Front, together with the leaders of the parties, adopted a number of essential measures defining the statutes and internal discipline of the People’s Front, obligatory for all its members, The Na- tional Committee of the People’s Front operates as a united centre of the united democratic forces of the country. We frequently hold joint meetings of the National Committee of the People’s Front with the leadership of the parties and mass organisations, at which important questions of domestic and foreign policy are discussed. The People’s Front committees’ are still composed on the parity principle. Every political party, and also the mass organisations, are represented in the committees. Decisions are adopted unanimously. However, this composition of the committees does not correspond to the underlying principle of the People’s Front.

107 The People’s Front consists of five political parties: our Party, the Bul- garian People’s Agricultural Union, the People’s Union ‘‘Zveno,” the Social- Democratic Party, and the Radical Party. Also all the trade unions, economic, cultural, women’s, youth and other organisations are represented in the Peo- ple’s Front. Our Party has (according to figures for June 30, 1947) 510,000 members. After September 9, 1944, the composition of the Party radically changed when it opened its doors to hundreds of thousands of new members from among workers, peasants, intelligentsia, who had come into contact with political life for the first time. It was necessary to re-educate this membership mass politically and ideologically in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Hence, the colossal tasks of our Party on the educational front. The Party has now actually restricted admittance into its ranks. We are now devoting our attention to the political, Marxist-Leninist education of Party members, to tightening discipline in the Party organisations, particularly in the countryside. We are now purging the Party of chance and alien elements who joined it for their own ends or in order to cover up traces of their shady activities in the past. The social composition of the Party shows the following picture: 132,153 workers, 223,386 peasants, 82,345 office employees, 72,108 artisans, small merchants, students, pensioners, housewives, etc. In all, more than 609,000 members, including 67,105 women. There is not a single big village in which our Party organisation is not functioning. In speaking of Party cadres the following should be stressed: during the fascist dictatorship the Party’s present cadres found themselves in different conditions and did not all move along the same path. The first category of our cadres joined the ranks of the Party prior to September 9, some of them have been in the Party since 1923, took part in the struggle against fascism, in the partisan movement, in the uprising of September 9, 1944, and are now active in the Party. Among them are members who were in prison or concentration camp for a long period of time, others who were forced to emigrate for years. The first is the main category of our Party cadres. The second category includes Party members who, prior to September 9 were not active, were not Party members, but who helped it to the best of their ability, sometimes sheltered Party functionaries, rendered material assistance. They are people who were afraid to join the Party during the fascist dictatorship, but were Party sympathisers. The third category covers those who were Party members prior to 1923, when the Party went underground. During the fascist regime they deserted the Party, and became preoccupied with their own personal affairs. Although they did not help the Party, they were not hostile to it, did not go over to the enemy, did not assist fascism.

108 The fourth category consists of persons who joined the Party after Sep- tember 9, when it threw its doors wide open for political activity. They began to work as new cadres of the Party in the state apparatus, in public organisations and in the Party itself. Such are the outstanding features of the four categories of our cadres. Our policy is to utilise all these categories rationally for work in the Party, in the state apparatus, in the different public organisations—in a word, everywhere. We have set ourselves the task to hasten the process of consolidating these different categories into one whole. However, we do not handle all the categories alike. The Party leadership in the centre, in the regions and provinces consists for the most part of persons in the first category. This category is the backbone of the Party. They are the guarantee of its proper development. Then follows the second category, i.e., those who in one form or another helped the Party during the fascist regime. We are somewhat cautious with regard to the third category, that is to the extent that it cannot guarantee sound leadership. As a rule the people in this category are at least 20 years behind the times, are still imbued with sectarianism. We use these cadres mostly in the state apparatus, in the mass organisations, in the economic field, but under the leadership of the Party. They are primarily lawyers, physicians, engineers, teachers. Our policy towards the fourth category is to help them in every way to master the experience of the Party up to September 9, the principal lessons in the history of the Party, to solder them politically and prepare them as potential Party cadres. The prime task when educating all our cadres is to teach them to govern the state in cooperation with our allies. Comrade Dimitroff sharply raised this question at, the beginning of 1946 in his speech to the Sofia regional Party conference, when he said: “We were not the ruling party, we were the opposition party; we criticised and fought at the time, but did not govern. Now, after September 9 we are acquiring experience as the ruling party. We need this experience. No matter where they be, our Party cadres must learn.... We must all learn to build together with our allies in the People’s Front, must learn to work in harmony with them, to compete with our allies so that can give the best experts, and so that our cadres always be in the forefront and always justify the confidence shown. This demands labour, knowledge, ability; there can be no laxity, complacency, sectarian self-satisfaction and resting on our laurels; this demands study and once again study, demands tireless self- study….” Unquestionably, we have scored big successes in this direction since then. Our cadres are learning to govern the state, to guide the work in the

109 economic, cultural and other spheres However, Comrade Dimitroff’s slogan “learn to govern”‘ remains in the fore. Our Party cadres in the countryside (secretaries and members of the Party committees) are for the most part politically weak. The further development of the Party as a leading force in the Peoples Front and in governing the country today depends on how soon this is overcome. That is why the Central Committee has placed on the order of the day measures promoting the ideological and political education of our cadres, particularly in the countryside. From 4,000 to 5,000 circles, attended by 50,000 persons, have been organised at which the history of the Commu- nist Party of the Soviet Union, the history of the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Communists) and current politics are being taught. We are arranging numerous one-month and fortnightly evening courses, Three-month courses are functioning in Plovdiv, Plevne and Sofia. We also have a one-year school in Sofia attended by 60 persons. All these measures are yielding positive results, but they are inadequate. Bearing in mind the Party’s pressing need for qualified and trained cadres the Central Committee of the Party has taken steps to improve the Ideological and political education of its cadres. The Party has a big agitational apparatus at its disposal. Together with the REMSists (YCLers) we sent out hundreds of thousands of agitators during the elections. We are now strengthening the Party’s permanent agitation department to enable our agitators to be in regular contact with the population of their section where they can carry on daily explanatory work. As a rule we carry on agitational work among the population together with our allies. Usually joint instructive conferences of the agitators of all the parties in the People’s Front are convened. The agitational centres where propaganda material is circulated and instructions given, are organised on one and the same principle for the whole People’s Front. The Party’s publishing activities are extensive, and it is the biggest publisher in the country. We publish Marxist- Leninist literature on a mass scale, have translated into Bulgarian and published the important works of Lenin and Stalin, and also several volumes of the selected works of Lenin. Stalin’s biography will soon come out of the press, and the works of Comrade Stalin are being prepared for publication. The central organ of the Party “Rabocheye Delo” is printed in 240,000 copies. The Party issues its theoretical magazine “Novoye Vremya” (“New Times”) in 25,000 copies, as well as “Filosofskaya Mysl” (“Philosophical Thought”) in 10,000 copies. In addition to this the Central Committee publishes the magazine “Partinyi Rabotnik” (“The Party Worker”), which deals with questions of Party organisation, agitation and propaganda (10,000 copies) and “Bloknot Agitatora” (“The Agitator’s Note-Book”) (10,000 copies). We have no Party papers in the provinces where the committees of the People’s Front circulate their press. Our regional Party committees have print shops which turn out only leaflets and other such materials.

110 The ideological work of the Party is still weak. The experience gained in new organisational work has not as yet been theoretically elaborated and generalised. The number of Marxist forces is still small. We are trying to group them around the magazine “Novoye Vremya.” The remnants of the fascist ideology have not yet been completely exposed and uprooted. Our Party has considerable influence among the country’s intelligentsia, the overwhelming majority of whom have turned to the People’s Front. Prominent representatives of Bulgarian art, science and technique are members of our Party. The opposition has never had a single outstanding representative of Bulgarian art or science. The Party is devoting great attention to the cultural front. The trade union movement in Bulgaria is united and is known as the General Worker’s Trade Union with a membership of 576,000 out of the 747,000 persons engaged in industry. The General Workers’ Trade Union unites 77 per cent of all employed persons. Here mention should be made of the organisation of farmers, which is of particular importance to us. Known as the General Agricultural Trade Un- ion it has 1,200,000 members, of whom nearly half are women. The tasks of this organisation are, firstly, to help improve the conditions of the farmers, with the aid of all other public organisations such as the cooperatives, credit institutions, committees of the People’s Front, the municipal councils; secondly, to introduce measures to raise the cultural level of the countryside; thirdly, to contribute to strengthening the alliance between workers and peasants. REMS (the Young Communist League—500,000 members), which is now developing extensive activities on the labour front is closely linked with the Party. REMS is the initiator and organiser of the labour brigades in different fields of construction. It is the organiser of the Dimitroff National Bri- gade, earlier mentioned, as well as of a number of local youth brigades in the countryside and at the enterprises in the city. Under the leadership of the Party REMS is fighting for the unity of all the democratic youth of Bulgaria in which sphere it has already made big strides forward. Committees of the democratic youth have been formed throughout the country. The existing 4.000 committees coordinate the joint work of the youth leagues, head the brigade movement of the youth. Apart from the different youth leagues such as ZEMS—100,000 members, SSM— 15,000 members, “Zveno”—10 000 members and the radicals, the democratic youth committees also unite the vast mass of non-party youths. REMS is gradually transferring the emphasis of its educational work to the committees of the democratic youth. The urge to unite and establish a single youth organisation is great. The forthcoming congresses of REMS and ZEMS in October of this year will take place in conditions of close cooperation.

111 The student youth of the secondary schools are united in one organisation (180,000 members). The People’s Front has succeeded in breaking the pernicious influence of the reactionary elements in the secondary schools and in gaining control there. It goes without saying that much work will have to be accomplished to develop and educate the youth in the secondary schools in a truly democratic spirit, to completely uproot the reactionary ideology. The youth organisation in the elementary schools has a membership of 600,000. A characteristic feature of the new democracy is the great political activity of the women. Our Party has taken the initiative in organising a Women’s League which is to unite all the democratic women of town and country. The present membership of this League is 407,000. The Party is paying great attention to the physical culture movement (362,000 persons are engaged in sports activities). It is also keenly interested in the Bulgar-Soviet societies which have a membership of a million and which are very active in popularising the Soviet Union and in strengthening Bulgar-Soviet friendship.

V THE PRINCIPAL TASKS OF THE PARTY What are the cardinal tasks facing the Party? They can be formulated as follows: 1. In every way to defend and treasure the independence and state sovereignty of the country against all and every interference by foreign imperialism in our internal affairs; to universally strengthen our friendship with the great Soviet Union, with fraternal Yugoslavia, with all the Slav peoples and other democratic states; not to slacken our vigilance with regard to the intrigues of reaction, which has not yet been destroyed. 2. To spare no efforts to secure the fulfilment and over-fulfilment of the Two-Year Economic Plan. 3. To observe the strictest regime in economy, bearing in mind that we have to rely primarily on ourselves, on our own forces to carry out our plan. 4. To carry out the autumn sowing in an organised fashion so as to ensure our people with bread next year. 5. To adopt the final text of the new constitution, after certain fundamental changes have been introduced (to establish a presidium, subordinate to the People’s Assembly, instead of a president of the Republic, to elaborate the question of local organs of state power, etc.), and to carry out legislation in keeping with it. To reorganise the state apparatus on the basis of the constitution (to establish an organ of state control, a planning organ, etc.). 6. To take measures to strengthen the alliance of workers and peas-

112 ants. 7. To still further consolidate the People’s Front, by turning it into a united political organisation of the democratic forces in the country with a new programme. We regard the People’s Front as the most appropriate form of the movement toward strengthening democracy and toward socialism in our conditions. The Party’s point of view on this question has been formulated by Comrade Dimitroff as follows: “What, strictly speaking, does our policy represent at this stage of social development, i.e., in the era of the People’s Front? Briefly, it can be de- scribed thus: From the viewpoint of our Party, as a party of the working class, as a party of the working people today and in the future, full realisation of the programme of the People’s Front means providing the necessary conditions which would allow our people to pass over to socialism. As is known the future of all nations eventually lies in socialism. But today the struggle for socialism is different from what it was in 1917-18, in tsarist Russia, when the October Revolution was carried through. Then it was necessary to overthrow tsarism and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to pass over to socialism. Since then, as you know, nearly thirty years have elapsed, and the Soviet Union, as a socialist state, has grown into a great world power. In the Great Patriotic War that country of socialism displayed the greatest vitality, made the biggest contribution to the victory over fascism, to save civilisation in Europe and throughout the world. It was precisely this war which bril- liantly confirmed the strength, power and superiority of the socialist social order. This profoundly influenced, and still does, the international development. Fundamental reforms were introduced in many countries, among them Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Bulgaria, as a result of the war and under the influence of the great deeds of the Soviet Union. We observe these democratic changes, this development along the path of progress against the old, reactionary regimes, against the regimes of big profiteering capital, cartels, concerns, imperialism; we observe it also in the colonies and semi-colonies, in Indonesia, India, and in other parts of the world. The existence of such a great socialist state as the Soviet Union, and the historical democratic transformations that are taking place since the war, confront many countries with the question of socialism, as a question of working class cooperation with the peasantry, artisans, intelligentsia and other progressive strata of the people. “When we in Bulgaria will be faced with the question of transition from the present social order to the new, socialist order, the Communists, relying on the people will build the new, socialist society together with the peasantry, artisans and intelligentsia as a common historical undertaking.”

113 The Communist Party of Rumania in the Struggle for the Democratisation of the Country By G. GEORGIU-DEJ

As a result of the Act of August 23, 1944, Rumania which had been an ally of Hitler Germany, withdrew from the war, joined the anti-Hitler coalition and turned her weapons against the Germans. This was made possible by the breakthrough of the Hitler front in Moldavia by Soviet troops, which disintegrated and spread panic in the army and in Antonescu’s state apparatus. Although there were no widespread anti-Hitler activities in the country when she was fighting on the side of Nazi Germany, the patriotic forces, headed by the Communist Party, which organised an armed workers’ guard and appealed to the working people to oppose the Hitler regime of Antonescu, were the initiators of the Act of August 23, 1944. I THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW REGIME IN RUMANIA Our Party began the struggle for a democratic regime in Rumania in difficult conditions. Although numerically small when Rumania withdrew from the Hitler war, our Party enjoyed considerable authority and influence in the country. It immediately rallied the democratic forces in the country, reorganised the Party organisations, formed united trade unions which, in a short space of time, grew to be an influential social force. To date the trade union membership is close to one and a half million and covers the overwhelming majority of workers and office employees. The Social-Democratic Party, with whom our Party concluded a united front agreement as far back as May 1944, helped, to organise the trade unions. The organisation of the toiling peasantry the Agricultural Workers’ Front, headed by Petru Groza, gained influence throughout the country. On the initiative of our Party a Na- tional-Democratic Front was formed composed of all the democratic parties— the Communist Party, Social-Democratic party, the Agricultural Workers’ Front, and others. As the initiator of the united action of forces our Party considerably enhanced its authority among the popular masses. It organised a number of monster demonstrations in all parts of the country, in the first place in Bu- charest, to hasten the democratisation of Rumania’s internal regime. The Sanatescu government, which came to power after August 23, was composed in the main of reactionary generals, who acted on the instructions of reactionary leaders—Maniu, Bratianu, and others. The Communist and Social- Democratic parties had each only one minister without portfolio in this government whereas the other democratic parties were not represented at all. The people publicly voiced their demand for a government representing all

114 the political parties. The Communist Party demanded the introduction of a land reform, civic liberties for the working people, the defascisation of the country and, above all, active participation together with the USSR in the war against Nazi Germany. The democratic forces scored their initial successes as a result of this campaign. The government of generals was compelled to give way to a government representing the political parties in the country. The Communist Party received the Ministries of Justice and Com- munications in the new government, as well as the post of Deputy Minister of Home Affairs. However, the reactionary parties—Maniu’s National Tsaranist Party and the National Liberal Party—continued to play the leading role in the government. Following up the successes achieved, the democratic camp, led by our Party, mobilised the people to implement democratic reforms. We denounced the Minister of Home Affairs who took repressive measures against the workers’ organisations and against the peasant movement. A new wave of demonstrations forced this government also to resign. The position of the National Democratic Front was much stronger in the third government. The democratic parties won their demand to have the Chairman of the Agricultural Workers’ Front, Groza, appointed Deputy Prime Minister. The reactionary parties, however, retained the dominant role even in this government; they sabotaged the armistice with the USSR and conducted a bitter struggle against democratic reforms. This government was headed by General Radescu, who was closely linked with Anglo-American imperialist circles. The struggle of the democratic forces against the domination of reaction in the government and for the introduction of democratic reforms grew sharper after General Radescu came to power. Reaction organised fascist gangs who openly attacked workers’ clubs and leaders of the workers’ movement. Radescu recalled infantry, and even tank units from the front, which he then concentrated in Bucharest. The troops opened fire on workers’ demonstrations. In Transylvania pogroms were carried out against the Hungar- ian population. Or Party applied new methods of struggle in this situation. In answer to Radescu’s refusal to replace the provincial prefects and chairmen of the municipal councils, who were the puppets of Antonescu, we appealed to the population to make this change themselves by appointing new leaders, elected by the masses, to take over the provincial and municipal councils. This was done despite the fact that in a number of instances Radescu’s hirelings resorted to arms. In answer to the measures aimed at sabotaging the land reform, the Communist Party, jointly with the Agricultural Workers’ Front, called upon the landless and poor peasants to divide the landed estates among themselves. The peasants responded by putting into effect the land reform In keeping with the regulations established in the government pro-

115 gramme, published by the National Democratic Front. When Radescu or- dered the removal of the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, the latter, on instructions from the Party, refused to leave his post and, ignoring the government, sent a circular letter to the administrative organs, informing them that he was continuing his duties. The National Democratic Front launched a struggle to overthrow the Radescu government, which had the full support of Anglo-American reaction, as well as of the reactionary parties. The mass movement, which culminated in a 24-hour demonstration in front of the palace compelled Radescu to resign. He was given shelter by the British Mission and later taken abroad by the Americans, where he is now conducting a vicious campaign against democratic Rumania. As a result of the mass demonstrations the King con- sented to the formation of a coalition government of the democratic parties, headed by Dr. Groza. The reactionary parties were excluded. Our Party as well as the parties of the National Democratic Front (the Agricultural Workers’ Front, the Social-Democratic Party, the People’s Na- tional Party, etc.) received important posts in the new government, which came to power on March 6, 1945. The Communist Party received the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Communications. With Tatarescu’s party represented in it, the new government had a bigger political base than did the National Democratic Front. Despite the difficulties presented by Tatarescu’s party in the government (this party tried to restrict the land reform, attacked the government’s finance policy, etc.), the extension of the government’s political foundation was a positive factor under the circumstances. We had to surmount great economic difficulties in the period between the Groza government and the Parliamentary elections on November 19, 1946. The country’s economy ‘was in a state of chaos and decline; there had been two successive years of drought. However, despite all these difficulties, a number of reforms and measures were undertaken, which marked a big step forward in the democratisation of Rumania. The land reform was completed and made law. One million four hundred thousand hectares of land were distributed among 726,000 peasants. Under the leadership of the peasant committees the poor peasants, in response to the Party’s call, which cooperated with the Agricultural Workers’ Front, actively helped to carry out the reform. An important role here was played by the workers’ brigades sent to the villages by the Party and the trade unions to render assistance to the peasants. The brigades helped the peasants to carry out the spring sowing, to repair agricultural machinery, etc. In many enterprises workers sent agricultural implements to the peasants as gifts. The support given to the poor peasants by the proletariat, mobilised by the Communist Party, consolidated the alliance of workers and peasants and

116 strengthened the leading role of the working class in this alliance. When the democratic government came to power Rumania took an active part in the anti-Hitler war, dispatching 14 Rumanian divisions to the front, which fought shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet troops. After the reactionary governments, which sabotaged the armistice terms with the USSR and Rumania’s participation in the anti-Hitler war, were removed, Rumania’s foreign policy underwent a historical change with the establishment of friendly relations with the USSR. Democratic Rumania enjoyed the support of the USSR. When the reactionary governments were in power the Soviet government, in answer to the outrages perpetrated by the fascist reactionary bands in Transylvania, demanded that Rumania’s reactionary administration be recalled from Tran- sylvania. On the third day after the establishment of the Groza government, Comrade Stalin, in reply to the letter of the Rumanian government, gave his consent to the restoration of a Rumanian administration in Transylvania. The new Rumanian government pursued a democratic national policy based on the equality of all nationalities. This afforded the conditions for eliminating the age-old antagonism existing between the Rumanians and Hungarians in Transylvania. Our government openly condemned the imperialist seizure of South Dobrudja by Rumania in 1913. It thus removed all dis- putable questions between Rumania and Bulgaria. The government took measures to remove fascists from the state apparatus. The principal war criminals were tried and executed. The apparatus of the Home Ministry was reorganised; its personnel was renewed with active democratic elements from among the working class. Many reactionary generals and officers were removed from the army. A political education apparatus was formed in the army. Reforms were introduced in the electoral systems which disposed of the two-chamber system and gave vote to women and the military. The government set about to restore the country’s economy and scored big successes in railroad transport, which had suffered heavily in the war. Our Party was the initiator and most active party in the campaign to help the famine-stricken districts. A special organisation was formed for the purpose with representatives of the state organs and mass organisations in which the Party played the leading role. Positive results were scored in sav- ing children in the famine-stricken areas and checking starvation. These reforms and measures were effected in conditions of a sharp struggle between the forces of democracy and native reaction, which was inspired by foreign reactionary circles. Under the influence of the latter the King demanded that the Groza government, soon after its formation, resign. The King declared that he no longer recognised the Groza government, broke off all relations with it and refused to sign government laws and decrees so as to make them “unconstitutional.”

117 The Groza government continued to rule the country for five months under these conditions, and pursued its programme of democratic reforms. Parallel with this, Anglo-American reactionary circles tried, through channels of diplomatic pressure, to get the new government removed as “un- representative” and to put the reactionary parties back in their former dominant positions. Thanks to the energetic support of the Soviet government the British and U. S. representatives were compelled to agree to the decision adopted in Moscow in January 1946. The Groza government remained in power. The reactionary parties were allowed each only one minister, without portfolio, moreover these ministers had to be approved by the government. Following this decision the King renewed his contact with the democratic government. The governments of Britain and the USA once again attempted to interfere in the internal affairs of our country on the eve of the elections, when the two governments demanded a revision of the electoral law. This demand was emphatically rejected by our government. At the Paris Peace Conference the British and American delegations, including other delegations, acting on their instructions, tried to introduce onerous conditions in the Peace Treaty, conditions which would have threatened our political and economic independence. However, they succeeded only in part, thanks to the stand taken by the Soviet delegation. The Anglo- Americans won their point with regard to reparations for losses suffered by Anglo-American capital in Rumania, etc. Inside the country the National Tsaranist Party was the main weapon in the struggle of the reactionary forces against the democratic regime and its reforms. The reactionary parties practised extreme methods in their drive against the new regime. Apart from widespread anti-Communist, anti-Soviet and chauvinist propaganda and provocative rumours, these parties resorted to assassinations, armed attacks on Party, trade union and peasant functionaries, etc. In November 1945 the fascist bands opened fire on a workers’ demonstration, killing nine persons. The security organs discovered a ramified network of underground fascist organisations, which were preparing for an armed uprising. Drastic repressive measures were taken against the activities of the reactionary parties. We succeeded in smashing the manoeuvres of reaction—both native and foreign—which aimed to provoke a split in the government coalition and to isolate our Party from its allies. Reaction pinned its hopes on the former Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party, Titel Petrescu, who openly opposed cooperation between the Social-Democratic and Communist parties, and who concluded a secret agreement with the reactionary parties. At the congress of the Social-Democratic Party in March 1947, Petrescu was denounced and ex-

118 pelled from its ranks. He tried to form a new ‘‘independent” Social- Democratic Party but only a small number of right-wing Social-Democrats followed him. The united front and government coalition remained in force. Petrescu and his group were isolated and exposed as direct agents of reaction. Home and foreign reaction exerted strong pressure also on the Tatarescu party. A group of the Party’s leaders broke away and went over to the reactionary Liberal Party, opposing participation in the bloc of democratic parties. However, the attempt to split the government failed. The fact that the masses actively supported our policy of decisive struggle of the democratic forces against reaction, enabled us to preserve our political stability and avert a government crisis, in spite of the difficult economic situation. In April 1946 the democratic parties formed a bloc to carry out the elections jointly. It was decided that all government parties enter the elections with a joint list of candidates. Here again the Soviet government came to the support of the Rumanian people in this difficult period. Apart from diplomatic support, which off-set the brazen interference of Anglo-American imperialism in our internal affairs, the Soviet government made the armistice terms easier for Rumania, and also gave us economic assistance, which enabled us to emerge from the difficult situation caused by the drought. Such were the conditions in which we launched one of the most important campaigns carried out by our Party during the past three years, a campaign which aimed to strengthen the democratic regime by a victory in the Parliamentary elections, to win a solid democratic majority in Parliament.

II THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE COUNTRY The victory won by the democratic parties at the Parliamentary elections in November 1946, helped to facilitate the process of Rumania’s democratic development. The Communist Party ran in the elections in a bloc with other parties— the Social-Democratic Party, the Agricultural Workers’ Front, Tatarescu’s party, the National People’s Party, the National Peasants’ Party of Alexan- drescu. Our Party secured cooperation with the other parties on strict issues of principle. We elaborated the platform of the democratic party bloc which was adopted by all the other parties. The programme called for government activity in all spheres of the country’s life. It outlined a number of important reforms—the handing over of the National Bank to the state, the democratisation of the system, reforms in jurisdiction, shortening the term of military service, etc. We had to conduct a bitter struggle during the election campaign against the coalition of reactionary parties, which availed themselves of the open support of certain British and American representatives in Rumania.

119 These parties still had some influence, especially among the well-to-do sections of the peasantry. They tried to take advantage of the difficult material conditions of the population. The election campaign extended to the broadest sections of the people, with more than 20,000 agitators working among them. All forces of the Party, as well as of the other democratic parties, were mobilised to ensure victory. The election victory showed the strength of the democratic regime and the government. The bloc of democratic parties was preserved, despite the attempts made, within and without, to disrupt it. The election campaign once again proved that the main force in our country is represented by the working class, the toiling peasantry and the progressive intelligentsia, headed by the Communist Party. The new Parliament has a solid democratic majority. The Party has consolidated its position in the government. In addition to the previously mentioned Ministries it now holds the Ministry of Industry and Trade, formerly in the hands of Tatarescu’s party. After the elections the Party and the people tackled the task of restoring the national economy. It was necessary to take radical measures against the activities of capitalist circles aimed at undermining the currency system. It was also necessary to check the inflation and chaos in the economy. A number of important laws were adopted in a comparatively short space of time. The Emission Institute of Rumania—the National Bank, which was in the hands of Bratianu’s reactionary capitalist group, went over to the state. The law reorganising the Ministry of Industry and Trade went into effect, this considerably extending the Ministry’s sphere of activity. Parliament passed a law establishing industrial councils for the key industries. This enabled the state to extend its control over the industrial and commercial operations of private enterprises. In July 1947 the Party published its proposals to improve Rumania’s economic and financial system. These proposals, later adopted by the government, outline a six-month programme for industry, a programme which sets thee target for industrial output at 70 per cent compared with 1938, The proposals consider the introduction of a monetary reform and stabilisation as the cardinal task of the government of democratic forces. A number of new democratic laws cover agriculture. This year’s favourable harvest will have a beneficial effect on the country’s economy. Grain deliveries have been organised so as to supply the urban population with bread. A law has been adopted regulating the sale of landed property, and thus pre- venting the concentration of land in the hands of the rich peasants; it gives priority to the state in land purchases. The sale of land by the peasantry, allowed during the period of famine, has been annulled. Corvée, one of the remnants of feudalism in our agriculture, has been abolished. A special insti- tution has been established to strengthen the agricultural property (state farms, etc.) of the state and their rational utilisation by the latter.

120 Additional measures to democratise the state apparatus have been adopted simultaneously with the above-mentioned laws and measures, which aim to consolidate our democracy in the sphere of economy. The curtailment in the staff of civil servants has cleared the state apparatus of a number of reactionary and mercenary elements. The elections have strengthened the ties between our Party and its allies. The election campaign was a battle of the working class and the Com- munist Party for allies, especially for the principal ally—the toiling peasantry. The Agricultural Workers’ Front played an important role in this battle. In a number of places kulak, anti-labour and anti-Communist elements infiltrated into the organs of the Agricultural Workers’ Front. After the elections the leadership of the Agricultural Workers’ Front took a decision to remove the kulak elements from the Front’s leading organs and to transform the latter into a party of the toiling peasantry. In its resolution the leadership of the Agricultural Workers’ Front stressed the need of an alliance between the workers and toiling peasantry, recognised the leading role of the proletariat, and the need for close cooperation between the Communist Party and the Front. Democratisation of the leading organs also took place in the Hungarian People’s Union—the democratic group of’ Transylvanian Hungarians have 29 deputies in Parliament. Work among the youth was for a long time neglected in the activity of the democratic forces. The League of Working Youth, formed this year, has in a short space of time become the biggest and most influential youth organisation in the country. The League of Working Youth, the Youth of the Agricultural Workers’ Front and the democratic student organisation predominate in the National Youth Federation, which unites all the youth organisations in the country. As regards the women’s movement, all women’s organisations in Ru- mania are united in the Democratic Women’s Federation. The Anti-Fascist Women’s Union is the biggest and most influential women’s organisation in the country. Reaction still has deep roots in the intelligentsia. Quite a number of reactionary professors have remained in the universities. However, the progressive trend among the intelligentsia is gaining momentum. A large number of prominent representatives of the intelligentsia—scientists, writers, artists, actors have joined the Party, or are close to it. The measures to strengthen democracy’s positions were effected in conditions of a sharpening struggle against reaction. The National Tsaranist Party started underground activities, made fresh attempts to provoke foreign intervention. In an interview with an American journalist, Maniu openly called for armed intervention against the Groza government. A group of the party’s leaders tried to escape abroad

121 where they planned to put up an émigré “government.” The activity of the National Tsaranist Party was obstructing the democratic development of Rumania, which could not be tolerated. The government recently banned this party, annulled the mandates of its deputies, and arrested several of the deputies and the party’s leadership. The trial of Maniu will deal a heavy blow not only at native reaction, but Anglo-American reactionary circles as well. The dissolution of the National Tsaranist Party was a crushing political blow at the most aggressive and reactionary section of big capital and the expropriated landlords, whose interests were upheld by the National Tsaranist Party. Inside the bloc of the democratic parties the Communist and other democratic parties had to combat the anti-democratic actions of the liberals in Tatarescu’s party. Judging by Tatarescu’s statements, he plans to turn his party into a rallying centre for bourgeois groups hostile to the democratic regime. How- ever, he is meeting with no success in his attempts to manoeuvre inside the government bloc, to disrupt the unity of the democratic forces and to isolate the Communist Party. Already, at the Paris Peace Conference, Tatarescu opposed the government’s home and foreign policy, and tried to impose his point of view on the other members of the Rumanian delegation, who had been sent by the government to defend the national, economic and political interests of the Rumanian people. After the Peace Conference Tatarescu redoubled his activities inside the government bloc and beyond its confines. He outlined his position as chairman of the liberal party in a “memorandum”, which he was inspired to draw up by the same circles, which are responsible for the removal of the Communists from government in France and Italy. This “memorandum” defends the enemies of the democratic regime and advocates a revision of Ru- mania’s home and foreign policy. Although this ‘‘memorandum” was presented formally as a basis for discussion inside the bloc, actually it was designed for reactionary Rumanian and foreign circles, to be used as-a weapon against the government and the Rumanian state. In August 1947 Tatarescu held a meeting in Kraiova, on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of his open letter to his supporters. Here it is appropriate to note that in this letter Tatarescu refrained from attacking the Ger- mans and advanced a number of demagogic slogans. The letter was circulated through the good offices of the authorities of General Antonescu. At the meeting in Kraiova Tatarescu clarified his views regarding Rumania’s foreign policy: whereas geographic conditions link us to the Soviet Union, age-old traditions and sympathies link Rumania to the Western powers. It is obvious, therefore, that cooperation with the Tatarescu group is

122 coming to an end. There has been a new re-alignment of forces in the government camp, which is now following a firmer line. Our cooperation with the Social-Democratic Party encountered certain difficulties due to the anti-Communist, reactionary and anti-Soviet position of the right elements. For a time there was actually no united front of the two parties because of these elements. The Communist Party denounced the right wing in the Social-Democratic Party. Social-Democratic workers in a number of industrial centres, on the other hand, sharply opposed the right wing. The Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party expelled a number of right-wing leaders and recalled two of them from the government. These measures strengthened the united front of the Communists and Social- Democrats. Trade union elections were recently held in Rumania on the basis of trade union autonomy. The majority of the workers voted for the Commu- nists, who are in the forefront in production and social activities, and who have won authority and popularity among the working masses. Here it should be pointed out that despite certain obstacles in our relations with the Social-Democratic Party, both parties acted in unison on all decisive questions. The joint activities of the Communist and Social-Democratic parties, the denouncement of the right wing of social-democracy and, finally, the leading role played by our Party in ensuring the democratic regime’s cardinal successes, led to a widespread movement in the ranks of the Social- Democratic Party in support of unity with the Communist Party. This movement among the Socials Democratic masses gained momentum, especially among the workers, after the success of the monetary reform. The desire for unity among the working masses raises the question of a united party of the working class. The establishment of such a party will be preceded by a nationwide explanatory, ideological campaign. The establishment of such a party, based on the teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, will further strengthen the leading role of the working class; will facilitate the task of eliminating alien influences in the working class movement and create the prerequisite for the development of Rumania along the path of socialism through a people’s democracy. We plan to draw up a draft programme for a united workers’ party, which will be submitted for public discussion. The monetary reform, recently introduced, has further enhanced the prestige of our Party. This reform, which marks an important step toward carrying out the Communist Party’s proposals for the economic restoration of the country, struck heavily at profiteering capital which had accrued excessive profits during the inflation. The monetary reform helped to improve the standard of living of the working people, and what is particularly noteworthy, it was accomplished without Anglo-American credits, despite the claims of

123 reactionary parties and the Tatarescu liberals that Anglo-American credits are an absolute condition for the economic recovery of Rumania.

III FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW DEMOCRACY New political and economic tasks face us today, following the success of the monetary reform and the growth in the prestige and influence of our Party. Much has to be done. The state sector in industry and trade is weak, the level of production and the productivity of labour are still low; only part of the administrative apparatus has been democratised, etc. I shall: mention some of the tasks we have started to carry out. They include: The completion of stabilisation, increase of industrial output, gradual improvement of the living standard of the working masses by lowering prices; consolidation and extension of the state sector in industry; control and leadership of the private sector through industrial councils; measures against excessive profits by taxation, credit policy, state economic control and the law against sabotage; Concentration of the banks; control of credit and private investments through the nationalised National Bank; Supplies of agricultural machinery and implements to the peasants, especially to peasants who have received allotments in accordance with the land reform; development of state farms; application of the government’s priority rights in purchasing land; extension of the network of consumer and producer cooperatives; State direction of foreign trade; state stores in domestic trade; the extensive development of workers’ consumer cooperatives; Administrative reforms; Reforms in the judicature; the introduction of people’s assessors in all bodies of the judicature; Democratisation of the educational system; Tax reforms; The adoption of a new constitution in keeping with the changes that have come to pass. The last question I would like to dwell on is our foreign policy and the strengthening friendly ties with our democratic neighbours. Our foreign policy is a policy of a new type. It is no longer the policy of vassal Rumania in relation to the imperialist countries. It is based on friendship with the Soviet Socialist State. Our people regard the prospects of an agreement of amity and mutual aid with the USSR as a guarantee of our independence and sovereignty, as a valuable contribution to the cause of peace.

124 We are carrying on constant work among the masses to imbue them with affection for and gratitude to the Soviet Union. The Rumanian Associa- tion for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union is one of the biggest and most active organisations in the country. As regards our other neighbours, Rumanian government delegations have recently visited Sofia, Belgrade and Prague where the question of ce- menting our ties with these countries was discussed. There are prospects of a further strengthening of economic and cultural ties with all our neighbours— Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Major tasks face us in the sphere of Party work. From a numerically small party we have grown into the biggest political party in the country. The Communist Party of Rumania today has a membership of 710,000, of whom 44 per cent are workers, 39 per cent peasants. In the industrial areas the percentage of workers reaches up to 60-70. This big number of young cadres has to be educated and politically trained. This is being done through our network of Party schools, such as: the higher Party school which has a six-month course, the four-month central school for cadres; the three-month school for newspaper workers, the Hungar- ian central school, the central women’s school, the central youth school, not to mention the 21 schools for cadres in the provinces. We have some 32,000 agitators who are attending short-term schools, without interrupting their work. The Party publishes a number of weeklies and dallies. Its central organ, “Skynteija” (“The Spark”), has the biggest circulation in the country. Our Party has developed extensive activities in the publishing field. It has published a number of the classics of Marxism-Leninism. In August of this year Marx’s “Capital” appeared for the first time in the Rumanian lan- guage. Soviet literature is widely published. The Party is devoting its attention to combating alien ideological influences, particularly the reactionary ideological influence of imperialist circles on literature, art, the cinema, radio and the press. There are serious shortcomings in our Party work, which are the outcome, primarily, of the low ideological and political level of our cadres. Not infrequently our middle and lower functionaries apply administrative methods which are detrimental to us. A section of our functionaries, including even those who have just recently been promoted from the enterprises, have poor ties with the masses, have lost contact with them. In some regions of the country, especially in Transylvania, the remnants of chauvinism, still current among certain members of the Party, have not been totally eliminated. Our functionaries have committed mistakes in carrying out the united

125 front policy in some areas; there have been instances when relations were broken off with the Social-Democratic organisations for secondary reasons. Finally, it must be acknowledged, that criticism and self-criticism are not sufficiently practised in the work of our Party organisations. The cardinal task of our Party organisations is to consolidate organisationally the increased influence of the Party, and simultaneously with this to continue work to remove alien elements from the ranks of the Party. This will help us more successfully to surmount the shortcomings in Party work. We are of the opinion that a new democracy is in the making in Ruma- nia as well. The strengthening of the Party and its influence will hasten this process. Our Party received the news of the initiative of our Polish comrades to convene an informative conference of the Communist Parties with a feeling of deep satisfaction. We welcome the proposal to find forms for a regular exchange of experience and coordination of activities between the Communist Parties, and believe that this will be of valuable help to us in the struggle for democracy and peace.

126 The Activities of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party By J. REVAI

I THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN HUNGARY I shall begin my report on the situation in Hungary with a review of the Parliamentary election results, for they disclose the cardinal political problem’s and show the relation of forces in the country. Hungarian reaction, supported by American imperialism, was in general opposed to new elections. Its plan was to utilise the Parliamentary majority of the Small Landholders’ Party, after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, and after the Allied Control Commission had finished their work, to form a new government of the Right without the Communists and to hold elections, with the help of this government, in an anti-Communist and anti- Soviet atmosphere. The reactionaries thus hoped to secure a majority in Par- liament, radically change the home and foreign policies and get the country to support American imperialism. The very fact that we were able to hold the elections defeated the plans of reaction. Even at the time of the election campaign the Americans tried to get the Small Landholders’ Party as well as the Social-Democrats to boycott the elections. Our plan was to carry out the elections and thus strengthen the Party, to win a majority of Left democratic parties and thus secure the predominance of the Left parties in Parliament and in the government. We concluded an election agreement of the four government parties, for our proposal to form a 4-party bloc with a common list of candidates was rejected by the Social-Democrats and Small Landholders. The election agreement pledged these parties to abstain from attacking one another and to carry on a joint struggle against the reactionary parties. However, it was more of a formal agreement since the democratic parties were conducting an election struggle also among themselves. That is why the Hun- garian National Front of Independence (formed in March 1944 during the German occupation when both the Social-Democrats and Small Landholders were underground parties), formerly a militant alliance of the democratic forces, based on the popular movement became a Parliamentary coalition. Here it should be noted that at the time of its establishment already the Hungarian National Front of Independence was more of an alliance of leaders of the democratic parties rather than an organisation which reflected popular resistance to the Germans and their Hungarian agents. In 1944-45 national committees were established on the territories liberated by the So-

127 viet Army. These committees, however, were based on the parity principle, were weak and the provisional government, formed in Debretsen in Decem- ber 1944, could not rely on them. The reactionaries infiltrated into the Front of National Independence and succeeded in using the Party of Small Landholders to further their own ends. The Front thus simply became a coalition in which an incessant struggle was carried on. What are the positive results of the Parliamentary elections? We became the leading party after twenty-five years of illegality, when our Party actually constituted only a small group. After the country’s liberation by the Soviet Army we became the first party in the country as a result of constructive work and a resolute struggle against the enemies of the people. In 1945 the Communist Party received 800,000 votes, i.e., 17 per cent of the total vote; in 1947—1,118,000 votes, i.e., 22.3 per cent of the total vote. The social composition of the votes polled by the Party is as follows: peasants 500,000 workers 450,000 intelligentsia and petty bourgeoisie 160,000 The following figures are also most interesting: the Communist Party’s candidates polled 70-80 per cent of the miners’ vote, 65 per cent of the vote in the heavy industrial centres and 27.5 per cent of the vote in Budapest (as against 22 per cent in 1945). Whereas in 1945 we were in the minority in the provincial towns, today we are ahead of the Social-Democrats. That same year the Communists received 145,000 votes in the six biggest cities and the Social-Democrats 207,000; in 1947 the figure was 203,000 for the Communists and 186,000 for the Social-Democrats. However, it would be incorrect to overestimate our increased influence among the working class. Facts and figures go to show that we have as yet not won the decisive majority among the working class. There are important industrial centres and cities where the forces of the Communists and Social-Democrats are equally balanced, and in some cases the Social-Democrats predominate, as for instance, in the capital’s sub- urbs. A new and positive factor in Hungary is the turn of the peasantry to the Left. This, of course, is not as yet a common feature; it does not as yet effect even all the poor and middle peasants. There is still considerable dissatisfaction among the peasantry. They are still greatly under the influence of the church. However, note should be taken of the positive fact that 1,450,000 peasants, that is to say, two-thirds of the whole peasantry, cast their vote for the 4-party coalition. Of the 1,450,000 peasant votes the Communist Party

128 received 500,000, the Social-Democrats 200,000, the Peasant Party 350,000, whereas the Left parties together polled 1,050,000 votes. This fact is particularly important when one bears in mind that the Hungarian reactionary bourgeoisie is trying to set the peasant against the worker and with the help of the former, to isolate the working class, headed by the Communists. This plan of the bourgeoisie has not been completely frustrated. The fight for the peasantry continues and we have scored certain successes in this field, as evidenced by the election results. The National Peasant Party grew stronger in the course of the elections and received 420,000 votes, i.e., 90,000 more votes than in 1945. It should not be forgotten that this party is the party of the poor peasant. Thus, the coalition as a whole received 60.8 per cent of the vote, or 65 per cent of the mandates, and the three Left parties, which polled 40 per cent of the vote, received 50 per cent of the mandates. I shall now pass over to the factors which show that we have, nonetheless, not fully succeeded in achieving our aim, namely, that of creating a firm majority of the Left in Parliament, and thus ensuring the development of Hungary along the path of a people’s democracy. The situation inside the government coalition is complicated by the fact that the Social-Democrats and Small Landholders have sustained heavy losses: the Social-Democrats lost some 80,000 votes in the elections and the Small Landholders nearly two million votes. In view of this the right-wing groups in these parties staged a revolt and tried to seize the leadership. As for the Social-Democrats, their policy in the election campaign was dictated by the right wing. They wanted to become the successor in the Small Landholders’ Party and hence took the line of winning the votes of the reactionary elements. To achieve this they propagated the anti-Communist and, occasionally, anti-Soviet slogans and arguments of reaction. Thus, for instance, the provocative rumour was circulated throughout the country that if the Communists emerged victorious in the elections collective farms would immediately be instituted. By conducting anti-Communist and anti-Soviet agitation they did a service to the right-wing parties and a disservice to themselves. The Social-Democrats failed in their plan to become the strongest party in the country. Firstly, because the leader of the right wing, Karl Peijer, withdrew from the Social-Democratic Party and ran on the ticket of one of the bourgeois parties. This, of course, gave rise to confusion among the Social- Democrats. Secondly, because the Social-Democrats and bourgeois parties fought for the vote of petty bourgeoisie, with the result that the Social- Democrats lost heavily in this struggle. The Social-Democrats not only failed to gain a foothold among the peasantry, they also lost their influence in the central agrarian areas, lost many votes in the very places where the peasantry, as a whole, is democrati-

129 cally inclined. As for the Small Landholders, they suffered a complete fiasco. As earlier stated this party lost some two million votes. It was the bulwark of Hun- garian reaction. American and British imperialism, particularly, placed high hopes on this party, all the more so since it held 57 per cent of the vote, was known for its democratic traditions in the past, relied for much of its support not only on the kulak but also on the middle peasant, was in the opposition to the government at the time of the Horthy regime. All forces of reaction, including the landlords and bourgeoisie, unanimously supported this party at the 1945 elections. We succeeded, as the result of a two-year struggle, in offsetting, to a considerable extent, the influence of the reactionaries on the democratic core and peasant mass of the party. You know of reaction’s plot, which was headed by the leaders of this party. Reaction, which took cover in this party, was dealt a crushing blow when we exposed Nadj Ferenc, former premier of the government and leader of the Small Landholders’ Party, as one of the ring-leaders in the plot. This took place while he was vacationing in Switzerland. Although advised by the Americans not to resign and to return to Hungary to further the plot, Nadj Ferenc lacked the courage to face trial. What is the situation today in this party? After the Small Landholders’ Party compromised itself in the conspiracy and left-wing elements took over leadership, a large number of the reactionary forces withdrew from the party. The struggle for leadership between the democratic and reactionary forces inside the party, started at the time of the elections, continues. As a result of the disintegration in this party the reactionary elements in its ranks and outside the party realised that it could no longer be used as the principal tool in the struggle against Hungarian democracy. That is why they formed new reactionary parties. I have in mind two parties mainly. They are: 1. The so-called Democratic People’s Party, headed by Barankovich. - This party actually represents in the main the Catholic clergy.* In the elections it received 800,000 votes. Politically it relies on the most backward sections of the peasantry, and above all, on the women. 2. The pro-fascist Pfeiffer party, the so-called Hungarian Independence Party, which is the principal enemy of Hungarian democracy. In the last Par- liamentary elections this party polled more than 600,000 votes, mostly in the cities. It is the open agent of American imperialism which is using this party

* Apart from the enemies of Hungarian democracy this party also has elements who are opposed to following the path of reaction. It is therefore possible to make certain differentiations in its ranks.

130 mainly to interfere in the internal affairs of Hungary. It must be acknowledged that we underestimated the strength of these two reactionary parties. It was, therefore, only in the last stage of the election struggle that we opened fire on them. Before passing over to my report on the present situation in Hungary allow me to summarise the aforesaid, briefly. 1. The democratic forces, and above all, our Party, have grown stronger, that is to say, Hungarian democracy has a more solid foundation today. 2. The differentiation of forces in the country continues. This, in its turn, means that the struggle between the democratic and reactionary forces of Hungary is growing sharper. We know just how strong we are, that we are consolidating our positions. However, we are not blind to the enemy and under no circumstances mean to under-estimate his strength. 3. Parallel with the general alignment of forces a differentiation is taking place in the camp of democracy itself, where right-wing groups are being formed which intend to collaborate, up to a point, with the anti-Communist forces; on the other hand the left-wing elements in the democratic parties are gradually moving over to us in order to combat reaction jointly. Bearing all this in mind, as well as the acute international situation, it can be said Hungarian democracy is advancing toward major political battles.

II THE STRUGGLE AROUND THE FORMATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT The sharpening of contradictions, earlier mentioned by me, became evident during the negotiations to form a new government. 1. The right-wing group in the Small Landholders’ Party tried to cap- ture the party leadership with the object of having their representatives in the new government who would, actually, have been the trusted agents of the pro-fascists. Moreover, these same groups made stipulations which, once ac- cepted, would have signified the adoption of a virtually reactionary programme by the new government. The right-wing Social-Democrats held the left wing responsible for their defeat in the elections; in order to seize the party leadership they held mass demonstrations against the left-wing leaders. Under this pressure the Social-Democratic leadership adopted a decision that Social-Democrats would participate in the government only under certain conditions, that is, only if they were given a number of key positions in the state apparatus. This would have threatened our Party with isolation would have retarded the formation of the new government. Even more. It would have jeop- ardized the very possibility of its formation, or made it possible only by major concessions on the part of the democratic forces. How did we avert this danger?

131 By mobilising the masses to combat the danger of reaction and by publishing our government programme Three hundred thousand persons attended the mass meeting on the Square of Heroes in Budapest. Our slogans were: Immediately form a new, strong, democratic government! Put a stop to the political, intrigues started in connection with the formation of the government and set to work! Down with the enemies of democracy! Our government programme contained the demand for a three-year economic plan; we proposed a series of measures to cover the deficit in the government budget, to combat high prices and corruption, and to provide the working people with provisions. We organised a popular movement around these slogans and our government programme. At the same time the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party resolutely declared that the Communist Party does not intend to extend the government coalition to the Right; that it does not intend to include right-wing elements of the democratic parties in the coalition. We succeeded in this way in reaching agreement on the formation of the new government. Of the 15 members in the new government 5 are Communists, 4 Social- Democrats, 4 Small Landholders, 2 members of the Peasant Party. The composition of the present government precludes the possibility of decisions being taken detrimental to the Left democratic forces. It is clear that the attempts of the right-wing elements to establish a united front against the Communists have suffered only a temporary setback, and that these attempts will be renewed.

III THE LINE OF THE PARTY IN THE NEW CONDITIONS AND ITS PROSPECTS We have won one of the battles with the formation of the new government, but we are aware that the cardinal question of Hungarian democracy, that is, whether this democracy will, ultimately, be a popular democracy or a bourgeois democracy, has not yet been settled. In connection with this also the second major question—whether Hun- gary will join the ranks of the neighbouring people’s democracies, or whether she will, in one form or another, become the bulwark of Anglo-American imperialism—has not been settled. In order to understand the internal political struggle in Hungary account must be taken of the policy of American imperialism, which is aimed at turning Hungary into a base of struggle against the USSR and the countries of the people’s democracy. Hungarian democracy contains the elements of popular and bourgeois democracy.

132 What are the economic elements of the people’s democracy to date? 1. Feudal relations have been eradicated in the country, and a radical agrarian reform introduced; 650,000 poor peasants and land labourers have received allotments at the expense of manorial and church estates; the democratic government is helping them in every way to develop their farms. 2. Heavy industry—iron and steel, mining, electric power—has been nationalised. Also the bauxite and aluminium industries will be nationalised in the near future. 3. The big banks, which control about 60 per cent of Hungary’s industry, will be nationalised.* 4. State control of the country’s economic and financial life through the Supreme Economic Council where Left democratic elements predominate. 5. The introduction of a three-year plan to restore the national, economy. This plan is promoting the development of the state sector and curbing the activities of the capitalists. What are the political elements of the people’s democracy? 1. The decisive role of the working class in the country’s political life has been secured by the united front, even though cooperation between the two workers’ parties is passing through a crisis now. 2. The alliance of the working class with a considerable section of the toiling peasantry. This has been achieved primarily through the close alliance of the Communist Party with-the National Peasant Party and with the democrats in the Small Landholders’ Party. 3. The-Communist Party is the biggest party of workers and peasants in the country. 4. The decisive influence of the workers’ parties in the armed forces, and the police. What are the elements of bourgeois democracy? 1. A considerable part of industry and practically the whole of commerce are still in the hands of-the capitalists. 2. The kulak farms, which obstruct grain deliveries, are supplying the black market. 3. The administrative apparatus is made up, for the most part, of old officials. 4. The influence of reactionary clericalism, which constitutes a serious force, is far from having been eliminated. 5. The existence of reactionary parties and of a pro-fascist party in Par- liament. 6. The existence of right-wing anti-Communist groups in the democratic parties.

* The Hungarian Parliament has already adopted laws nationalizing heavy industry and the banks—ED.

133 Since the country’s liberation by the Soviet Army the conflict between the two elements in Hungarian democracy has sharpened. The course of this conflict shows that the elements of the people’s democracy are growing and already outbalance the elements of bourgeois democracy. What are the facts that prove this? The introduction of the agrarian reform in 1945, the stabilisation of the currency system in 1946, the denouncement and liquidation of the plot against the republic, the adoption of the Three-Year Economic Plan in 1947 and the formation of a democratic government after the elections in August of this year. The conflict between the two trends continues and is growing sharper. Hungary has scored major successes in the field of economic restoration. Our industry has reached 80 per cent of the pre-war level. Transport, destroyed by the war, has been restored, thanks to the effective measures taken by Comrade Gere, the Minister of Communications. The country’s coal mines are producing 85 per cent of the pre-war output. The stabilisation of the monetary system in August 1946 enabled the Hungarian economy to develop rapidly and raise the standard of living of the working people. Thus, for instance, on August 1, 1946 workers’ earnings did not exceed 50 per cent of the pre-war figure. In the succeeding year, however, real wages averaged 60 per cent of the pre-war level. Stabilisation of the economic base strengthened democracy’s political foundation. However, it also strengthened the position of the capitalists, especially in commerce. Here it should be mentioned that the country’s economic and financial difficulties have resulted in additional hardships. For three successive years, Hungary suffered a drought. This means that this year the grain crop was only 30 percent of the estimated harvest, i.e., five million centners less than was expected. Because of this the government has been compelled to cut the bread ration. The national income this year will be 150 million American dollars less, i.e., a cut of 10 per cent of the total income. It follows from this that the stabilisation measures introduced last Au- gust have not yet taken firm report and that we have to continue the struggle to accomplish this. The Central Committee of the Party has outlines a series of measures to cope with the difficulties in the spheres of economy, finance and supply. The most important of these are: 1. Increased productivity of labour in industry. Industrial output aver- ages approximately 80 per cent of the pre-war level, and in certain branches as, for instance, in the textile, 100 per cent. However, the productivity of labour is very low, which explains why the net cost of production is comparatively high, resulting in a deficit in nationalised industry.

134 2. To eliminate the deficit by introducing rationalisation measures, especially in the state enterprises, by tightening labour discipline, etc. 3. To combat high prices by means of economic and administrative measures. 4. A substantial tax increase on the incomes and property of capitalists. 5. A strict economy regime in the state apparatus. To accomplish this we have even decided to cut capital investments, provided for in the Three-Year Plan, by 25 percent in the initial stages of the Plan in order later, when the economic situation is more favourable, to speed up the realisation of the Plan. The paramount task of our Party in its economic and financial policy is to support the stabilisation measures, to counteract the inflation tendencies and, at the same time, more vigorously to curb the capitalists. Our experience has shown that inflation saps the foundations of democracy, economically and politically. We cannot cope with our political tasks unless we preserve democracy’s firm economic base. Experience has also proved that it is not easy to advance and secure the victory of the people’s democracy in Hungary so long as right-wing elements exist in the democratic parties. The 4-party coalition which, at the close of 1944, formed a provisional national government on the basis of the National Front of Independence, has actually dwindled down to Parliamentary and government cooperation. The right-wing elements consider the policy of cooperation with the Communists a temporary evil, and at the first opportune moment will try to oppose the Communists and break off contact with them. Our Party must strengthen/the alliance with the democratic forces which can solve the cardinal question of developing the people’s democracy in Hungary. How can the people’s democracy be further developed? The following is imperative: 1. To help the Left elements in. the Social-Democratic parties in successfully counteracting the aggressive policy of the right-wing Social- Democrats; to strengthen the united front and thus bring closer the prospects of establishing a united party of the Hungarian working class. 2. To help the democratic elements in the Small Landholders’ Party, which rely on the peasant masses in this party, in strengthening their cooperation with the workers’ parties. 3. To strengthen the alliance with the National Peasants’ Party in every conceivable manner. 4. To further extend the mass base of the Communist Party. 5. We consider the disbandment of Pfeiffer’s pro-fascist party, which serves as a legal cover for Hungarian fascism* an important step toward con-

* The Hungarian government has disbanded Pfeiffer’s pro-fascist party, and Par- liament has annulled the mandates of this party’s deputies—ED.

135 solidating the people’s democracy.

IV PARTY ACTIVITIES The Party has won great authority in the past two and a half years since the liberation of Hungary by the Soviet Army. Even our enemies admit that the Communist Party is the driving force in the country’s state life. Be- fore the elections the Institute of Public Opinion asked the question: who is the most popular government figure in the country? Comrade Rakosi received the majority of votes. He enjoys the greatest authority and popularity of all the leaders of Hungarian democracy. Our Party today has more than 750,000 members. During the election campaign in August 1947 100,000 new members joined the Communist Party. The social composition of the Party is as follows: Workers 420,000 Peasants 280,000 Intellectuals, artisans, small traders, etc. 50,000 Twenty-five to thirty per cent of the membership are women. We have 4,700 primary organizations at factories, in the countryside and in the cities. Of the 3,200 villages only 60 have no Party organisation. Some 10,000 of the 750,000 were in the Party at the time of its illegality. Nearly 50,000 were former members of the legal Social-Democratic Party or the trade unions, persecuted by the Horthy regime. After the liberation of Hungary the Party found itself in conditions similar to those existing in the other countries, earlier mentioned by the comrades from the fraternal Parties, The increase in the Party membership meant that it had been joined by people lacking practical experience and ideological training. With regard to cadres our Party has the same shortcomings as the other fraternal Parties. However, I do not intend to start with the shortcomings; I shall speak about the successes and strength of the young Party members. The Party would not have been able to successfully solve the tasks of the last two and a half years with the help of old cadres alone. Thanks to the assistance of the young cadres we were able at the beginning of 1945 to divide up the landed estates virtually in the space of a few weeks; the Budapest Party organisation dispatched hundreds and thousands of workers to the villages to assist the peasant committees in this work, with the result that the peasants received three and a half million morgens of land. Furthermore, the alliance between workers and peasants was formed and consolidated. With the help of the young cadres the Party was able to advance and put into effect the slogan to restore transport. Thanks to the fact that 10,000

136 railway cars and 500 locomotives were repaired by December 31, 1945 our cities were not caught in the vice of hunger in the winter of 1945-46. By relying on the assistance of the young cadres the Party was able to spearhead the popular movement for the economic rehabilitation of the country, which started immediately after the liberation of Hungary. The young Communists inspired the workers in the difficult period of inflation when it was impossible to purchase anything on their earnings and the workers went hungry. Together with other Party members they tightened discipline in the labour, with the result that the country’s industrial output increased from month to month, and in August 1946, at the time-of stabilisation, reached 60- 70 per cent of the pre-war level. With the help of these young cadres we were able in the two years to mobilise the popular masses against reaction and emerge victorious in the struggle. We do not mean to conceal the shortcomings of our young cadres, shortcomings which are sometimes reflected in a certain lack of understanding of the democratic and national policy of our Party. The broad masses looked upon the Party as the Party of 1919, as the party of the dictatorship of the proletariat. There were many “old Commu- nists,” who thought that the Soviet Army had liberated in order to establish Soviet power, in order to continue what had been started in 1919. These people did not understand the policy of cooperation with the other democratic parties, and acted like “small dictators” in the villages and regions where they caused considerable harm to’ the Party. Left sectarianism, particularly in relation to the Social-Democrats, still exists, even though we have removed many comrades with left-wing tendencies from responsible positions. Our organisations have started everyday explanatory work among the working people, to display interest in municipal questions and to visit villages on Sundays. Thanks to this change we were successful in the last election campaign. We are striving to overcome the theoretical and political weaknesses of our cadres. Our Party education is organised as follows: in every area we have 3-week courses; there are two 3-month Party schools and one 6-month central Party school. Apart from this we have organised hundreds of lectures and special courses for officers, students, municipal workers, etc. In preparation for the elections our special courses trained thousands of agitators. Over 150,000 Communists have received their training at various Party schools, courses and circles. Our theoretical organ, which has a circulation of 15,000 copies, plays its part in the education of our Party cadres. The Communist daily press has a big circulation in the country. The Party’s central organ with a daily circu-

137 lation of 110,000 copies, and Sunday issue 160,000 copies, is the biggest paper in Hungary. In addition there are 3 popular papers in the country with a total circulation of 180,000 copies. We publish 15 dailies and 45 papers which appear 1, 2 or 3 times weekly. The Party Publishing House has issued a considerable amount of political literature and fiction. Our influence on the cinema and radio is extensive. The Party’s influence also among the intelligentsia is widespread: nearly 20 per cent of the country’s physicians and engineers are Communists; many prominent writers, actors, scientists and artists are members of the Party. There are a number of mass organisations in Hungary of which the trade unions are the most important. Their membership is close to 1.5 million. The influence of the Communists in the leading trade unions is increasing. The mass organisation of women (the Democratic Union of Hungarian Women) and of the youth (the Democratic Union of Hungarian Youth) are not as yet playing their appropriate role. The Union of New Landholders, the organisation of the peasants who received land in keeping with the agrarian reform, is the most important mass organization in the countryside. Formed on our initiative, its leadership consists of peasants belonging to different parties. The Party also enjoys influence among the democratic organisations of handicraftsmen and small merchants. Regarding the further tasks of our Party it should be pointed out that it must still further strengthen its contact with the masses, raise the ideological level of its members, remove careerists and alien elements from office and promote to leading positions Communists who have the confidence of the people and are popular among them.

V FOREIGN POLICY The questions of home and foreign policy of Hungarian democracy are closely interlinked. The reactionary section of Hungarian society—the big capitalists, former landlords, kulaks and the Horthy bureaucracy, are enemies of the people’s democracy and the proponents of Anglo-American orientation in the country. The weakening and eradication of native reaction nar- rows down Anglo-American imperialism’s base in the country and guarantees the democratic orientation of Hungary’s foreign policy. Hungary’s former ruling classes were the vassals of German fascism and fought on its side up to the very last. Thanks to their policy Hungary remained Hitler’s vassal; they led the country to catastrophe. The Hungarian big capitalists and landlords were linked with Germany; in German fascism

138 they saw their champion against the Hungarian workers and peasants. The desire to dominate the Slav peoples and the Rumanians of Tran- sylvania turned Hungary’s ruling classes into a vassal of German fascism. Chauvinism and revisionism always served as the tools in the Greater Hun- garian policy to distract the attention of Hungarian working people from exploitation inside the country, from the national treachery of the ruling classes and for instigating the Hungarian working masses against the neighbouring nations. The struggle against the German menace to the independence of Hun- gary has always been closely linked with the struggle for Hungarian democracy and for an alliance with the Slav peoples. The history of the Hungarian movement for independence knows of innumerable attempts to establish contact with neighbouring Slav peoples. Already during the war the Hungarian Communists declared that the struggle against the German invaders was linked with the struggle for independence in alliance with the neighbouring Slav nations fighting for their freedom, that it was linked with the struggle to reject the chauvinism of a Greater Hungary. We defended this viewpoint also after the country’s liberation, at the time of the preparations for the Paris Peace Conference, when chauvinism was again rearing its head in the country. While opposing these chauvinistic tendencies we at the same time supported certain moderate national demands at the Peace Conference, since this corresponded to the just national sentiments of the Hungarian people. After the Peace Treaty was signed, however, the Communist Party resolutely declared that it was necessary to put an end to revisionism, that Hungarian democracy could not-tolerate any measures aimed against its democratic neighbours. We are guided by the teachings of Lenin and Stalin that the national question must be subordinated to the general questions of democratic progress. The Greater Hungarian chauvinism is still evident in Hungary. Today it is being fostered by Anglo-American imperialism, instead of by the Hit- lerites. However, Hungarian chauvinism is losing influence among the popular masses. The working class is grateful to the USSR for its liberation. Six hundred and fifty thousand Hungarian peasants will always remember that they received land thanks to the Soviet Army. When land allotments were being made the following inscription was a common sight in the countryside: “We thank Stalin for the land.” The sympathy of the Hungarian people for the new Yugoslavia is explained by the fact that they know that Federative Yugoslavia has given the Hungarians inside that country freedom and the opportunity to develop their own national culture. For the same reason Hungarian reaction finds it very difficult to incite anti-Rumanian sentiments, for the Hungarians in Transyl-

139 vania have received national rights. The policy of American imperialism, which applies the methods of German imperialism—the life-long enemy of Hungarian independence— makes it easier for us to combine the defence of Hungary’s independence with the struggle against American imperialism and for an alliance with the neighbouring democratic nations, above all, with the Soviet Union and Yugo- slavia. The Hungarian people are interested in joining the union of democratic peoples fighting for freedom and independence. The democratic peoples, for their part, are interested in helping Hungary achieve this so as to prevent her from being used as a wedge of Anglo-American imperialism in the valley of the Danube. We Hungarian Communists, as the party of the people, represent the interests of the people. We cannot accept the fact that the Hungarians in Slo- vakia have been deprived of civil liberties. We hope that ultimately an agreement will be reached on this question. Hungarian democracy has also displayed its strength on questions of foreign policy. The Communist Party successfully opposed Hungarian chauvinism in connection with the Peace Treaty. The government unanimously decided not to participate in the Paris Conference on the question of the “Marshall Plan.” Despite Anglo-Saxon intrigues Hungary has concluded a Hungarian- Yugoslav treaty of mutual economic assistance which was welcomed by the people. Our government programme envisages the conclusions of treaties of amity and mutual aid with our democratic neighbours and we hope to settle these questions without delay. We are educating the Hungarian people to despise the Anglo-Saxon and, particularly, the American imperialists, and are combining this with the struggle for Hungarian independence; we are exposing the reactionary classes as the traitors to the people and as the servitors of foreign imperialism. Hungarian democracy needs the assistance of the neighbouring democracies to carry out its home and foreign tasks. This assistance can be either economic, as for instance, the trade agreement with the Soviet Union or the economic assistance with Yugoslavia, or in the form of moral-political help. But we do not only seek assistance. The Hungarian Communists realise their responsibilities. We also realise that we can render invaluable assistance to our comrades in the neighbouring countries by eradicating native reaction and building up a state in Hungary which the neighbouring nations need not fear and which they could rely upon as an ally. To cope with this task we need the advice, consultation and exchange of experience of our fra-

140 ternal Parties. The Hungarian Communist Party therefore greets this conference, all the more so since the international situation, in our opinion, is becoming more complicated with every passing day and the coordination of policy of the Communist Parties is imperative. There are a number of international questions which can only be solved by a collective effort. I greet the conference on behalf of the Central Commit- tee of our Party.

141 The Activities of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy By LUIGI LONGO I THE STRUGGLE TO OVERTHROW THE FASCIST REGIME. ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT. GUERRILLA WARFARE

The fascist regime in Italy lasted for nearly twenty years, from the end of 1922 until July 25, 1943. When fascism came to power, the Communist Party was savagely persecuted and was the first party to be outlawed. It was the only Party which continued its anti-fascist activities in conditions of absolute illegality. In 1934 the Communist Party concluded an agreement on the basis of unity of action with the Socialist Party. The two parties pledged to conduct joint activities against the fascist dictatorship. This agreement, which was subsequently revised and changed in keeping with the new conditions, continues to serve as the basis of united action by the two parties. When Mussolini was deposed, the Communist Party had from 5,000 to 6,000 organised members. In addition to this there were numerous scattered Communist groups, which were not connected with one another or with the leading Party centre. The varied activities of the communists Italy were guided by comrades who were active in the country throughout the twenty of the fascist regime; many of them had been in prison or exile where the maintained contact with the imprisoned Party leaders. Prior to imprisonment, a large number of these cadres had been active in the illegal organisations or attended Party schools in Italy or abroad. Finally, the Party membership included hundreds of veterans of the Spanish civil war, who had been handed over by the Vichy government to Mussolini. Once out of prison these veterans became the best organisers and leaders of the guerrilla movement. Twenty years of fascism worked profound changes in the political con- sciousness of the working people of Italy. The Communist Party, which was a small opposition party when fascism came to power, and which enjoyed influence mostly in the big industrial centres and in provinces with a large population of agricultural labourers, enhanced its prestige and authority among all sections of the Italian people by its loyalty to the ideals of freedom, by its heroic and staunch struggle. Despite the difficulties of illegality, the Communist Party was able to preserve a considerable and stable organisation. This enabled the Party to keep up with events inside the country, to maintain uninterrupted contact with the masses. It enabled the Party, even in illegality, to win a firm foot-

142 hold in all the big centres and to engage in widespread activities during the war and to organise systematic resistance to fascism and the war. Toward the end of 1942, strikes organised by our Party took place in certain centres of Northern Italy. A wave of political strikes gripped Turin, Milan and Genoa in the spring of 1943. The defeat of the Hitler armies on the Eastern Front and the landing of the Allied troops in Sicily accelerated the course of events and compelled the Italian bourgeoisie to seek a way out of the situation: They reckoned that if Mussolini were replaced by a less compromised representative of the bourgeoisie, they would avert a popular revolt. Hence their choice of Marshal Badoglio who, by relying on the less extreme section of fascism and the non-fascist conservative elements, was to find the solution to the difficult military, political and economic situation in Italy. The news of Mussolini’s resignation was greeted with monster demonstrations. The people demanded an end to fascism and the war. Political parties were restored. The leadership of the former fascist trade unions passed into the hands of commissioners, elected for the most part from among the Communists, Socialists and Christian-Democrats. “Resistance Committees”, representing the different anti-fascist parties—the Communists, Socialists, Christian-Democrats, Liberals—were formed in all the cities. After some pro- crastination all political prisoners, including the Communists (whom the authorities still wanted to keep in prison), were released. After July 25, 1943, a nation-wide agitational and organisational drive was launched, despite opposition from the Badoglio government, to form a genuine democratic government which would break the alliance with Ger- many and conclude an immediate peace with the Allies. Under pressure of this campaign and the advance of the Allied armies Marshal Badoglio was compelled to sue for an armistice, which was announced to the Italian people on September 8, 1943. But the day the armistice was announced the Badoglio government and the Royal Court, instead of calling upon the people to resist and fight the Germans, left Rome and-fled to the South to meet the Allied armies. The Italian army, which still consisted of a large number of divisions at the time, and the people, who were imbued with strong anti-fascist sentiments were abandoned. The army, saturated with fascist officers, fell to pieces. The people thereupon took up the banner of resistance and struggle. The anti-fascist committees, formerly united in the “Resistance Committees”, established “Committees of National Liberation” (CNL), which set themselves the task of coordinating and leading the struggle for the liberation of the country. A large part of the country was occupied by the Germans together with Italian fascists who, presenting themselves as Republicans, reorganised their forces under the leadership of Mussolini, who had been restored to freedom by the Nazis. Thus, Italy was split into two parts: on the one side the regions of the

143 extreme South, liberated by the Allies, where the labour and popular movement was weakest due to historical traditions and prevailing economic and social conditions; on the other, German-occupied Central and Northern Italy, i.e., the regions where the most progressive and militant section of the population was concentrated, especially in the North. In the regions occupied by the German and Italian fascists the struggle rapidly spread and developed into mass resistance to the fascist yoke, into armed guerrilla warfare against the occupation forces. In the northernmost part of Italy this struggle, waged by hundreds of thousands of armed men, lasted for more than twenty months. The cardinal task of all anti-fascists on the occupied territory was to resist and conduct a relentless armed struggle against the invader. The Com- munist Party headed the resistance movements from the very outset. It organised the soldiers in the disintegrated military units, collected arms abandoned by the soldiers, mobilised the workers and progressive soldiers for the first guerrilla detachments. As distinct from all the other parties, the representatives of the Communist Party in the CNL and in the military committees, formed by the latter, from the very beginning raised the question of the need for a relentless armed struggle against the German-Italian fascists. The Communists had to put up a stiff fight—and even so they were not always successful in breaking down the opposition of the Liberals and Chris- tian-Democrats to active struggle against fascism. These parties favoured restricting the struggle merely to giving assistance to the officers and soldiers who had left the army, and were of the opinion that liberation was the exclu- sive concern of the Allied military forces. While the representatives of the Communist Party in the CNL and in the military organs of the resistance movement tried to draw these bodies into more vigorous struggle against the enemies of the country and thus extend the front of struggle, the Communist Party independently set about organising partisan detachments, in cooperation with all who shared its point of view; it organised raids on barracks and military units of the invaders and their representatives. The Party rallied the people for widespread resistance and called upon them to sabotage the attempts of the Germans to use Italy’s industry and agriculture for war needs. In the course of the struggle we secured the necessary weapons and won a leading and dominant role on all sectors of the struggle for national liberation. We organised the Garibaldi shock brigades, which served as model units in the armed struggle; we formed the “GAP” and “SAP” (“Groups of Pa- triotic Action” and “Detachments of Patriotic Action”), which operated in the towns and villages. Soon we united all these formations under the leadership of local, provincial and regional staffs, which had their auxiliary services: first aid, liaison, etc. The other parties, following our example, based their military organisations on similar principles. We developed our political and military activity under the slogan of cooperation with all the political anti-

144 fascist organisations and military formations. Throughout the struggle we insisted on the need to unite the scattered partisan formations under a single command and gradually succeeded in establishing a united military command over all the partisan detachments. In occupied Italy our Party closely linked the armed partisan struggle with the struggle of the workers and peasants, who were resisting the violence of the occupation forces and collaborators. Beginning with November 1943 the Party organised and led big strikes in Piedmont, Lombardy, Ligurie and Toscane. At the beginning of March 1944 a general strike, organised on the initiative of the Communist Party and supported by the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy, was staged in the German-occupied territory. This strike of over a million workers lasted a week. This mass movement created favourable conditions for further developing guerrilla warfare and other forms of mass resistance. During the whole period of the German occupation the invaders and fascist authorities encountered popular resistance in different regions of Italy. As a result of the mass movement dual power actually existed in many of the occupied regions: the organs of the official fascist authorities, which were becoming discredited to an ever greater extent, and the Illegal anti-fascist organs, which enjoyed the confidence of the people. Apart from these regions there were a number of zones in Northern Italy, which had been completely liberated from the Ger- man occupation or Italian fascist regime. These zones were governed by democratic organs of power, freely elected under the protection of partisan forces. During the winter of 1944-45 the partisan movement suffered great hardships, as a result of the rigours of winter, the atrocities of the German troops and the attempts of those parties and trends which, following a “wait and see” policy, wanted to disorganise the partisan movement. General Alex- ander, Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-American troops, in an order of the day to the partisans requested them to lay down arms, return to their homes and wait for “more favourable weather”. Our Party vigorously opposed this demoralising and demobilising campaign. It appealed to the people, organised the collection of provisions, clothing and everything else necessary for guerrilla warfare in winter conditions. This campaign not only helped preserve the partisan organisation intact, it also helped to cement new ties of solidarity between them and the people. Following the example of the Garibaldi Brigade the other partisan detachments decided to fight through the winter. The results were favourable: by spring the Italian partisan movement was in full possession of its cadres and formations. At the beginning of April 1945 more than 300,000 partisans in Northern Italy went into action and liberated the cities of Bologna, Modena, Parna Plaisance, Genoa, Turin, Milan, and the whole Venezia re- gion. Before the arrival of the Allied troops the partisans saved the industrial

145 enterprises and communications from the destruction prepared by the Ger- mans; took tens of thousands of war prisoners and captured considerable war equipment. They set up Committees of National Liberation, executed the Ital- ian fascist leaders. Nearly all the members of the fascist government, including Mussolini, were captured and executed by the Garibaldi partisan brigade. During the war the Committees of National Liberation in occupied It- aly were the coalition bodies uniting all the anti-fascist parties. But above all, they were the organs which mobilised the masses for armed struggle. They also were the genuine organs of power in certain regions and at a definite period were officially recognised as such by the Allied authorities and the central Italian government, on whose behalf they governed. Under the leadership of the Central Committee of the National Libera- tion of Northern Italy and the CNL the latter drew up plans for reorganising industry and the administrative apparatus. The CNLs formed people’s courts to try the fascist traitors; they appointed commissioners to supervise the enterprises abandoned by their fascist owners; they appointed mayors, prefects, police commissioners, who were to take up their posts immediately following the abolition of the fascist organs of power. In keeping with the decree of the Central Committee of the National Liberation of Northern Italy, issued on the eve of the uprising, Production-Management Councils were established, where the workers, office employees and the technical personnel helped run the en- terprise together with the employer and government commissioner. For ten days, i.e., until the arrival of the Allied troops and government authorities, the CNL guided the political, social and economic life of Northern Italy. Partisan detachments not engaged in pursuing and disarming the German fascist units, took over police duty. As soon as the Allied authorities together with their troops reached the North they removed members of the resistance movement from the responsible posts, to which they had been appointed by the CNL, and replaced them with officials of the old State apparatus. As for the government in Rome it lost no time, after the Allies had entrusted it at the end of 1945 with the administration of the country, in replacing all the responsible officials, appointed by the CNL, with so-called experts, that is, with officials of the old administrative apparatus. II THE ACTIVITY OF THE PARTY DURING THE PERIOD OF AMERICAN OCCUPATION In order to understand the development of events in Italy it should be remembered that our people had no choice in the election of a government. All governments formed in Italy required the sanction of the Allies, both with regard to composition and political orientation. Clearly, in such conditions the more conservative trends in the anti-

146 fascist movement had every chance to paralyse and sabotage the genuine democratic initiative of any party or group of parties. These conservative trends enjoyed the direct support of the Allied political and military authorities, who controlled the government and the key positions in the national life of the country. All efforts to eliminate the obstacles which the Right groups put in the way of the Left elements who were interested in the recovery of the country, encountered the resistance of the Allied forces. Thus, during the Allied occupation of Italy it was a question of choosing one of two paths: either the path of a decisive struggle to crush all resistance by the conservative elements, which might have provoked an armed clash with the Allied forces; or the path of utilising the relative freedom won for further extending and consolidating the bloc of the democratic forces before the elections to the municipal councils and Constituent Assembly. On the latter depended the solution of the more important constitutional problems, as well as the question of structural changes. We chose the second path, which was the logical and natural development of the Party’s policy during the war for national liberation. In order to understand why the Party chose this second path it should be remembered that Italy had just emerged from twenty years of fascist dictatorship, during which the Party had worked in deep illegality. After the liberation, work had to be done to develop and consolidate all the democratic organisations, to develop and consolidate the Party itself; it was necessary to propagate democratic and progressive ideas among the masses in Southern Italy who, in their majority, remained aloof from the struggle for democracy in the defascisation period and who, as a result of the development of events during the war, took no part even in the struggle for national liberation. Such was our political orientation when we prepared for the municipal elections, for the referendum on the structure of the State and for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Even though we were not able to carry out major structural changes after the uprising, such as the nationalisation of the industrial monopolies and banks, an agrarian reform, etc., we, nevertheless, made considerable head- way in improving the conditions of the working people in town and country. We won our demand that workers were not to be dismissed from the enterprises. This saved them from unemployment during the difficult period of the conversion of industry. We also succeeded in having progressive wage rates introduced, and an automatic revision of wages corresponding to price in- creases. This was an important achievement, specially in the period of the devaluation of currency and shortage of goods. On the initiative of the Com- munist Minister of Agriculture, a law was issued whereby the uncultivated and poorly cultivated land was handed over to the landless peasants. Despite the sabotage and resistance of the landlords, this law radically changed the old social, semi-feudal relations existing between the landlords and peasantry

147 in many parts of Southern Italy. As a result of widespread peasant movement, changes were introduced in the- agreements between the landlord and peasant which were dictated by century-old traditions. These changes compelled the government authorities to abolish the previous 50-50 distribution of produce harvested, and entitled the peasant to 53 per cent of the crop plus 4 per cent for reclamation work. The Production-Management Councils—set up by the National Liberation Committees—which practise the principle of control and participation by workers in the administration of production, have not, as yet, received legal recognition in all parts of Italy. Nonetheless, these Councils are operating at all the big enterprises, in the North, and in Naples, Toranto, etc. The Communist Party won major successes in all the elections held during the first six months of 1946, when it ran independently or jointly with the Socialist Party. Italy was proclaimed a republic as a result of the referendum on the question of the structure of the State, when more than 12 million people cast their vote. This was an important political victory for the Party, which had fought for this during the struggle for national liberation. In the municipal elections the Communists, together with the Socialists, received the majority of the seats in 35 per cent of the communes. Socialist mayors are predominant in the small municipalities and Communist mayors in the big cities. In the general elections to the Constituent Assembly on June 2, 1946, our Party polled 19 per cent of the total vote, the Socialist Party 23 per cent, the Christian-Democrats 37 per cent. The remainder of the votes were cast for various political groups of secondary importance. However, at the subsequent elections held at the end of 1946 and at the beginning of 1947, the Communist candidates considerably increased their vote. The Christian- Democrats, on the other hand, lost considerable ground, especially in the South. Southern Italy, which in the past had been the centre of ultra- conservative and reactionary forces, is now developing on a par with the most progressive social and political regions in Central and Northern Italy. After the uprising and liberation of Northern Italy the mass organisations began to develop apace. By the beginning of 1947 the Italian General Confederation of Labour had more than 6,000,000 members. In the recent elections to the executive organs of the Confederation the Communist candidates polled 58 per cent of the vote, that is, an absolute majority, while the Socialists received 22 per cent and the Christian-Democrats a more 19.5 per cent. In the big trade unions the Communist wing scored even bigger successes. For instance, in “Confederterra” (“Confederation of Agricultural Workers”) the Communists received 67 per cent of the vote, in the Metal Workers’ Federation 63 per cent, in the Building Workers’ Union 71 per cent, etc. With the liquidation of fascism the cooperative movement developed and grew stronger. There are over 3,000,000 cooperative members organised in the “National Cooperative League,” which is in opposition to the cooperative organisation under the influence of the Christian-Democrats. In the re-

148 cent cooperative elections in the “National League” the Communist wing received over 70 per cent of the vote. Apart from the trade union and cooperative organisations there are influential organisations of women, youth and the veterans. The “Union of Ital- ian Women” has close to half a million members. The “Youth Front” unites 273,000 young men and women. Here, too, this organisation enjoys great popularity among the young people of the country. The “National Association of Italian Partisans” unites more than 200,000 partisans. The Influence of the Communists is predominant in all these organisations. It has also spread to other popular organisations, such as the association of war veterans, invalids, mutual-aid societies, cultural and sport organisations, etc. Thanks to the firm anti-fascist line of our Party throughout the fascist regime, thanks to its heroic struggle against German and Italian fascism, thanks to its vigorous defence of the democratic interests of the working people, thanks to its tireless work in the various popular organisations the membership of the Communist Party increased from 5-6,000 on July 25, 1943, when Mussolini was overthrown, to 1,800,000 at the end of 1945, 2,145,000 at the end of 1946 and 2,279,000 at the end of July 1947. The proportion of the Communists in the Northern and in some of the Central regions is considerably higher than in the South. Over 5 per cent of the population in seven regions are members of the Party (12 per cent in Emilie, 9 per cent in Tuscany, 7 per cent in Ombrie, etc.). In Sienne, Toscane Province, 20 per cent of the people are members of the Communist Party. The central organ of the Party, “Unita,” appears in four editions with a circulation of about 340,000 copies. In addition the Party publishes over 50 weeklies with a total circulation exceeding 400,000 copies. A national weekly has a circulation of 65,000 copies and the monthly Party journal sells 40,000 copies. However, the Central Committee considers that the Party’s organisational influence among the masses does not correspond to the possibilities of a big mass organisation such as the Italian Communist Party, with its more than 2,000,000 members. This weakness of our Party is the outcome of certain shortcomings in its political line, a shortage of cadres and their incom- plete political education. The Central Committee, aware of these shortcomings, has taken the necessary measures to overcome them. Without being over-optimistic it can be said that our Party is linked closely to all the decisive sections of the Italian population, and that its influence and prestige are steadily growing. Apart from its direct influence among the different sections of the population, the Party maintains close ties with other political trends and social strata, which have not yet decided to accept our principles of struggle without reserve. We have an agreement on unity of action with the Italian Socialist Party; our functionaries in the trade unions and in some of the mass organisations are cooperating with the Socialists, as

149 well as with the representatives of the Christian-Democrats, the Action Party and the Republican Party. The reactionary anti-Communist elements are trying in every possible way to split this unity of the democratic forces, achieved during the liberation war and still existing in a number of regions, despite attempts to undermine it. The more reactionary wing of the Christian-Democrats is sparing no effort to break the unity of the popular forces. It succeeded gradually in restricting the activities of the Committees of National Liberation, formed in the process of the struggle, and finally had them dissolved. This party is now trying to split the unity of the trade unions, and for this purpose has set up the “Christian Asso- ciation of Italian Working People” and the “Peasant Proprietors of the Soil”. They have succeeded in splitting the cooperative movement and also the women and youth organisations. Enemies of democracy and national unity operated also inside the So- cialist Party, where they tried to get the latter to annul the agreement on unity of action with the Communists and to form a bloc with the reactionary anti-Communist forces. They failed, however, and had to rest satisfied with a split in the Socialist Party. The right-wing Socialists and some groups of Trotskyite adventurers broke away from the Socialist Party, and, headed by Saragat, formed a new party called the “Italian Workers’ Socialist Party.” This party claims that it is fighting for “Socialism, independent of the Communists and all foreign’ influence”. Actually, it is “independent” of the working class only and has nothing in common with Socialism; it is the paid agent of American imperialism, as has been revealed by the publication of certain irrefutable documents. It is the vanguard of anti-communism in the ranks of the working class. It was not long before Saragat’s party exposed itself to the democratic forces, at whose expense it had hoped to grow rich. True, it succeeded in splitting the Parliamentary group of the Socialist Party. But in the elections Saragat’s party received an inconsiderable number of votes formerly cast for the Socialists. It can be confidently stated that the attempts of Saragat to break up the Socialist Party and to force the Socialists to abandon unity of action with the Communists, have met with utter failure. There still are a number of representatives of the reformist and anti- Communist wing in the old Socialist Party, who still have hopes of turning the Socialist Party away from the Communists and of provoking a new split. However, thanks to the failure of Saragat’s initial attempt, thanks to the evident success of the unity of action, the reformists still in the Socialist Party are being isolated and are losing their influence. The split in the Socialist Party, caused by Saragat’s activities in Janu- ary 1947, made it easier for de Gasperi to manoeuvre the Socialists and Communists out of the government. Meeting with defeat in the January crisis, de Gasperi, under the direct

150 pressure of the USA and the Vatican, provoked a second government crisis in May 1947. This crisis was effected on the pretext that Italy could not exist without American aid. The US, on the other hand, refused to assist a government which included the Communists. Hence the Communists had to be removed from the government. In this way de Gasperi actually carried out a coup d’état. He disrupted the cooperation between the big mass parties, established during the liberation war. This cooperation proved its vitality during the elections to the Con- stituent Assembly. After breaking off the alliance with the Left, de Gasperi, ignoring his pre-election political programme, formed a bloc with the Right. The removal of the Communists and Socialists from the government radically changed the political situation in Italy. Comrade Togliatti stated in Parliament that this solution of the crisis signified a split inside the democratic forces of Italy. The Communist Party openly exposed the internal and external reasons for its expulsion from the government. After removing the representatives of the Left parties from the government, reaction was given a free hand in foreign policy and it tried to place Italy in the service of Anglo-American imperialism. The very first actions of the new de Gasperi government immediately exposed its reactionary anti-democratic character. Because of the way in which the Christian-Democrat deputies voted in the Constituent Assembly, the Parliamentary elections, scheduled for Autumn 1947, were postponed until Spring 1948. All the democratic liberties won in the liberation struggle are now threatened. While the Communist Party premises are raided, partisans arrested, while measures are taken to ban factory wall-newspapers and workers’ meetings, fascist newspapers are allowed to appear and fascist criminals are released from prison. Police repressions have not intimidated the Communist Party. On the contrary, they have stimulated its work, made it more militant. New members are joining the Party. An increasing number of people are attending our meetings and taking part in our demonstrations. Conciliation committees of the different political trends, and Committees of Struggle in Defence of De- mocracy and the Republic, are being set up in a number of centres. The economic policy of the de Gasperi government is bringing down the standard of living of the working people. There have been new price in- creases; the depreciation of the lira continues; employers are trying once again to dismiss workers and office employees en masse. They want to abolish the progressive wage scale. The government is trying to destroy the political gains won by the working people in the uprising. The employers, for their part, are trying to do the same in the economic sphere, with the support of the government.

151 III FOR THE CREATION OF A BROAD POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT OF STRUGGLE, FOR PEACE AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE The struggle between democracy and reaction, between the workers and employers, is growing sharper. For the first time since the liberation, It- aly has been swept by a wave of mass actions and strikes. Over a million agricultural labourers went on strike in the valley of the Po. 600,000 metal workers struck work for 24 hours. The peasant movement to appropriate the uncultivated and poorly cultivated land has spread throughout the country. On September 20 big protest demonstrations against high prices were held in all cities. These demonstrations were organised by the Communists, together with the Socialists, the Action Party and the Party of Labour Democracy. As the political and economic struggle intensifies the Christian- Democrats are redoubling their splitting activities in the trade unions and are trying in every possible way to hinder and paralyse the work of these trade unions. At the trade union congress in Florence, in June 1947, the Christian-Democrat trade union leaders refused to vote for a resolution fa- vouring political strike action. The resolution, however, introduced by the Communists and Socialists, was carried by an overwhelming majority. The Christian-Democrat leaders made a number of stipulations but they did not dare go so far as to split the Confederation. They have become the initiators and champions of the anti-popular policy of the de Gasperi government. They are trying to sabotage the action of the masses and are trying to split their unity. In foreign policy the de Gasperi government has announced its readiness to come to any agreement with America. It encourages and conducts a vicious campaign of lies and slander against the Soviet Union and the countries of the new democracy. This campaign, inspired by the Vatican and American agents, serves as a cover for the manoeuvres and war policy of the American imperialists and Italian chauvinists. Taking advantage of Italy’s need for foreign assistance, reaction is trying to prove that this assistance can come from America alone, and only on the condition that an anti-Communist policy is pursued, a policy of subservience to the striving and plans of the American imperialists. The Marshall Plan is the principal weapon in the struggle of native and foreign reaction against democracy, freedom and the independence of the country. Our Party’s stand on the question of foreign aid and relations with the USA is clear. It is: defence of the freedom and independence of Italy; defence of peace, friendship and cooperation not only with the Anglo-Americans but also with the USSR and the countries of the new democracy. We need Amer- ica, but America also needs us. We need America’s assistance, but we also need economic cooperation with all the other countries, particularly with the

152 countries of Eastern Europe. We reject any plan that ties our hands and places us in foreign bondage. The Italian Communist Party exposed the Marshall Plan as being detrimental to our economy and dangerous to our national independence, since It leads: a) to the formation of a bloc of the countries which are pursuing a policy hostile to the. Soviet Union; b) to a division of Europe Into two blocs; c) to the interference of a group of Great Powers in the economic life of other countries; d) to political interference in the internal affairs of the European countries, as vividly seen in Greece. We are explaining to the Italian people that it is a question not of “assistance’’, but of economic cooperation. The word “assistance” suggests char- ity and bondage. We have the means and resources to negotiate with the USA on an equal footing and not as poor relations. In his speech to the plenum of the Central Committee of the Commu- nist Party, Comrade Togliatti stated that, despite the new situation brought about by de Gasperi’s coup d’état, the principal strategic aim of our Party continues to be a regime of progressive democracy. This can be achieved by forming and preserving a wide and stable bloc of the democratic and popular forces, capable of barring the way to reaction and capable of guiding the activities of the government along new, democratic and constructive lines. The political aim of our struggle today is the overthrow of the de Gasperi government. We are fighting for the establishment of a government representing all popular and left-wing Republican forces. But we realise full well that this can be brought about only by the pressure of broad democratic forces. The Party has no intention of remaining on the defensive, with reaction and the de Gasperi government attacking it on all sides. We will not allow them to drive us underground. We shall defend ourselves and will counterat- tack; we will remain at the head of the popular masses, who are fighting for bread and work, for peace and freedom. We shall appeal to all parties, all organisations, which call themselves Left and democratic, to join this struggle; we will expose all those who represent Christian-Democratic and American reaction in the ranks of democracy. We will work in the local organisations and executive bodies, will conclude agreements with the different parties and organisations. We will start a movement for unity in the factories and villages, will build up a powerful united front, composed of all genuine democrats, of all sections of the working people, and lead them in the struggle against the de Gasperi government, in defence of democracy and freedom. Such are the main features of our Party’s activities at present. At the recent plenum of the Central Committee we discussed the political line of the Party and its practical work. The Central Committee noted the serious shortcomings in the political orientation of the Party and in its practical work. The Party displayed great weakness when we were expelled from the government

153 and became an opposition Party. This opposition expressed itself primarily in the press and public speeches. Our opposition has grown more effective lately as a result of a number of economic struggles and mass actions. However, these activities do not reach beyond the framework of trade union economic demands, and have not developed into a widespread mass movement, with definite political aims. The Central Committee also noted a certain tendency on the part of our organisation to confine our work to the sections already under our influence, thus neglecting the groups isolated from us, vacillating or passive in the political struggle. It likewise drew attention to the tendency to let the relations between our Party and the other democratic parties develop on their own accord, to the weak struggle to prevent a gap between us and the working-class elements in the Christian-Democratic Party. The Central Committee of the Party has emphatically stated that it is impermissible passively to await the downfall of the de Gasperi government as a result of Parliamentary combinations. If we really mean to bring about a change in the political leadership of the country we must, above all, get the population to accept the aims of our struggle. This can be achieved only by persistent agitation and propaganda. Proceeding from this the Central Com- mittee has decided to concentrate its activity around the following questions: 1. defence of democratic liberties; 2. defence of the standard of living of the people; 3. protection of the small and medium proprietors against excessive taxation; 4. the struggle against all and every injustice, violence and profiteering. In order to wrest industry and agriculture from the influence of the big monopolies and landlords the Party will agitate for workers’ control in industry through the Production-Management Councils, and for the immediate introduction of agrarian reform, which will meet the pressing demands of the Italian countryside. Our Party, to ensure the carrying out of this line, rallied around its Central Committee and its leader, Comrade Togliatti. We know our strength and our shortcomings, are aware of our tasks and of the possibilities open to us, with the existing relations of forces among the various special groups and political movements in Italy. We shall overcome our shortcomings in this struggle. We know that we are moving towards sharpening social and political relations in Italy and in Europe and we shall meet the situation ideologically, politically and organisationally prepared. That is why I support Comrade Duclos’ statement and on behalf of the Italian delegation welcome this conference, which has given us the opportunity to exchange our experience of common struggle with the leading fraternal Communist Parties of Europe. This exchange of experience will help us to improve our political and

154 organisational work. It will help the Party to lead the Italian people in the resistance movement against reaction and American imperialism, which want to use our country as a pawn in their plans to enthral Europe. We are confident that if we spearhead this struggle of the Italian people for their freedom and national independence we shall secure new political and social gains on the road to Socialism.

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