NAVY NEWS WEEK 7-2

13 February 2017

US, Japan Successfully Conduct First SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test Release Date: 2/4/2017 10:15:00 AM From Missile Defense Agency

PEARL HARBOR (July 27, 2015) The guided- missile USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) departs Joint Base Pearl-Harbor-Hickam for a scheduled underway. John Paul Jones replaced USS Lake Erie (CG 70) in as the nation's ballistic missile defense test ship. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Nardel Gervacio/Released)

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- The U.S. Missile Defense Agency, the Japan Ministry of Defense, and U.S. Navy Sailors aboard USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) successfully conducted a flight test Feb. 3 (Hawaii Standard Time), resulting in the first intercept of a ballistic missile target using the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). The SM-3 Block IIA is being developed cooperatively by the United States and Japan to defeat medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The SM-3 Block IIA interceptor operates as part of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system and can be launched from Aegis-equipped ships or Aegis Ashore sites. At approximately 10:30 p.m., Hawaii Standard Time, Feb. 3 (3:30 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, Feb. 4) a medium-range ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Kauai, Hawaii. John Paul Jones detected and tracked the target missile with its onboard AN/SPY-1D(V) radar using the Aegis Baseline 9.C2 weapon system. Upon acquiring and tracking the target, the ship launched an SM-3 Block IIA guided missile which intercepted the target. "Today's test demonstrates a critical milestone in the cooperative development of the SM-3 Block IIA missile," said MDA Director Vice Adm. Jim Syring. "The missile, developed jointly by a Japanese and U.S. government and industry team, is vitally important to both our nations and will ultimately improve our ability to defend against increasing ballistic missile threats around the world." Based on preliminary data the test met its primary objective. Program officials will continue to evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during the test. The flight test, designated SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development (SCD) Project Flight Test, Standard Missile (SFTM)-01, was the third flight test of the SM-3 Block IIA guided missile, and the first intercept test. This test also marks the first time an SM-3IIA was launched from an Aegis ship and the first intercept engagement using the Aegis Baseline 9.C2 (BMD 5.1) weapon system. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is the naval component of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System. The MDA and the U.S. Navy cooperatively manage the Aegis BMD program. The Missile Defense Agency's mission is to develop and deploy a layered Ballistic Missile Defense System to defend the United States, its deployed forces, allies and friends from ballistic missile attacks of all ranges in all phases of flight. Source: www.navy.mil The Arleigh Burke class destroyer really is a very capable ship!

ON THIS DAY 10 February 1906: HMS Dreadnought, the ship that changed the face of maritime warfare and strategy in the 20th century, was launched by King Edward VII after only four months on the ways. She went to sea on 3 October 1906 for her sea trials, only a year and a day after construction started and was formally commissioned on 11 December 1906, fifteen months after she was laid down. The ship cost £1,783,883 to build (approximately £200m in today‘s money). See the video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OgrBL0zjYZU&feature=youtu.be&utm_source=Website+Subscribers&utm_campaign=df a609a812-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_02_10&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d64f016b1a-dfa609a812-185448553 I hope that the readers noted one of the earliest steaming next to HMS Dreadnought in one of the early pictures.

Plymouth warship HMS Argyll sets sail again after 20-month refit By Carl_Eve | Posted: February 07, 2017

HMS Argyll at sea after refit

The warship HMS Argyll has set sail again following a 20-month refit at its Devonport dockyard base. The Type 23 sailed with the very latest Royal Navy sensors and equipment newly fitted, in particular the new Sea Ceptor air-defence missile system, for which she will lead the first acceptance trials for the class of warship in the Navy later in the year. Her crew, led by the captain Commander Toby Shaughnessy, has been working hard with the MOD's industrial partner Babcock, who delivered the refit to get her ready for sea. Recently completing the last of her pre-sailing machinery trials and a busy period of safety drills, the 171-man crew is delighted to be back at sea. Commander Shaughnessy said: "It is always extremely challenging to re-generate our ships following their routine periodical refits. "They are complicated machines and the vast array of equipment needs close attention when we turn them on again after such a long period in dry dock. "I am very proud of the determination and professionalism of my crew throughout this busy period in getting the ship ready to return to sea. "We look forward to rejoining the fleet and contributing to its global operations once again." She will return to full operations with her sister Devonport ships thereafter. Babcock warship director, Mike Whalley, said: "We are delighted to play our part in returning HMS Argyll to sea in a significantly improved material state and with enhanced capability. "This has been the most complex Type 23 upkeep ever undertaken in Devonport – and the first UK warship class to have its missile system changed mid -life since the 1970s. "Key learning gained throughout the project will enhance our ability as class lead to life extend the rest of the class.'' A Royal Navy spokesman said the latest launch of HMS Argyll represents the culmination of more than 600,000 man hours of work at the Babcock Frigate Support Centre in Devonport Royal Dockyard. They noted that this is Babcock's completion of the first Type 23 'life-extension' upkeep, designed to extend the ship's operational life from 18 to 35 years: maintaining, updating and upgrading capability for the 21st century. Source: http://www.plymouthherald.co.uk China ready for MASSIVE missile barrage „to cripple the US‟ CHINA is preparing for a global war and has been readying its military for a “massive preemptive missile strike” against the US, it has been revealed. By Henry Holloway / Published 9th February 2017 Satellite imagery reveals the superpower's huge missile testing grounds appear have been laid out to mimic American military bases in the Pacific. Missile targets seem to have been drawn up to resemble airfields, destroyers, aircraft carriers and fuel depots. Chilling images of the giant ranges are unveiled in a report by Commander Thomas Shugart, a warfare officer in the US Navy. Beijing‘s mouthpiece media have openly talked up war with the US and the People‘s Liberation Army called war ―reality‖ in a recent statement. Commander Shugart‘s report, written for military analysis publication War on the Rocks, details the shocking reality of war in the Pacific. Photos reveal mock airfields, fake harbours, naval base targets, and shapes laid out like moored ships litter China‘s missile testing ranges. Layouts eerily match up to US bases in Japan such as the US Navy base in Yokosuka, Misawa Air Base, Kadena Air base and fuel depots in Hachinohe. Ships targets are almost identical to vessels such as the US Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and the US‘s aircraft carriers.

WARONTHEROCKS Donald Trump today finally was revealed to have made contact with the Chinese adminstration after weeks of silence between Washington and Beijing. The new US President penned a letter to Xi Jinping asking for a "constructive relationship". Meanwhile, the Republican's top man Steve Bannon, his chief strategist, said he believed war with China was inevitable within "five to ten years". "US leaders and policymakers should understand that a preemptive Chinese missile strike against the forward bases that underpin US military power in the Western Pacific is a very real possibility,‖ writes the commander. Shugart added: "The United States and its allies should take action now to ensure that China does not think that it can gain the upper hand in a conflict through successful missile strikes against US bases in Asia. "They must ensure that China is not tempted, as some of the United States’ previous adversaries have been, into making the grave error of trying to knock the United States down, expecting it not to get back up.‖ US military leaders must practice ―rapid execution‖ drills to make sure China cannot gain the upper-hand should war come to the Pacific, he warned. Experts have claimed the US has as many as ―400‖ military bases surrounding China in a pincer movement designed to provoke Beijing. Beijing and Washington have been at loggerheads over the disputed South China Sea and new US President Donald Trump has slammed China of ―raping‖ the US. The US has talked up cutting trade as he squared up to the Asia-Pacific powerhouse as warships, missiles, bombers and fighter planes flood the region. Jack Ma, chief executive of online retailer Alibaba, warned ―if trade stops, war starts‖ when speaking at the launch of his company's Australia and New Zealand HQ in Melbourne. Source: http://www.dailystar.co.uk

US, Chinese Military Aircraft See Close Encounter Over South China Sea The incident reportedly took place in airspace near Scarborough Shoal. By Ankit Panda February 10, 2017

Image Credit: Mark Wagner via Wikimedia Commons

A U.S. Navy P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft and a Chinese military surveillance aircraft came within 1,000 feet of each other over the skies of the South China Sea, according to an unnamed U.S. official who spoke to Reuters. According to the report, the incident took place near Scarborough Shoal, in the eastern reaches of the South China Sea, 124 nautical miles off the Philippine coast. Scarborough Shoal is claimed by both China and the Philippines and the Chinese Coast Guard has maintained a presence there since seizing it from Manila in a stand-off in 2012. A spokesperson for U.S. Pacific Command, Maj. Rob Shuford, confirmed to CNN that the U.S. Navy is describing the incident as ―unsafe,‖ though CNN notes that this doesn‘t mean the Navy is ascribing ―malign intent‖ to China just yet. ―The U.S. Navy P-3C was on a routine mission operating in accordance with international law,‖ Shuford noted. ―The Department of Defense and U.S. Pacific Command are always concerned about unsafe interactions with Chinese military forces,‖ he continued. ―We will address the issue in appropriate diplomatic and military channels.‖ The U.S. P-3 aircraft reportedly had to alter course to avoid an aerial collision with the Chinese aircraft, which was reportedly a not a fighter designed for interception, but a KJ-200 aerial early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft. PACOM, accordingly, has not described Thursday‘s incident as an interception attempt. China‘s People‘s Liberation Army Air Force has usually used its Shenyang J-11 and Chengdu J-10 fighters for interception in the East and South China Seas. The most recent ―unsafe‖ encounter took place last June, between a U.S. Navy Boeing RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese J-10 fighter over the East China Sea. Additionally, last May, a U.S. Ep-3 Aries signals reconnaissance aircraft was intercepted by two Chinese fighters over the South China Sea in an incident that the U.S. Department of Defense described as ―unsafe.‖ With details still slim, it‘s unclear if this incident is the sort of ―test‖ of resolve that China may have been looking to subject the Trump administration to early on, mirroring the 2001 Hainan incident and the 2009 USS Impeccable incidents. A December seizure of a U.S. underwater research glider by a Chinese People‘s Liberation Army-Navy vessel was seen by some South China Sea analysts as a test of then-President-elect Trump. If the initial impression of Thursday‘s incident holds up, it may not quite be as serious as the two intentional intercepts observed in 2016, but it could nevertheless corner the Trump administration into issuing a stern rebuke toward China — something we haven‘t observed publicly just yet since Trump‘s January 20 inauguration. As I‘d discussed yesterday, there‘s considerable potential this year for U.S.-China tensions to spike in the South China Sea and elsewhere. Source: http://thediplomat.com

NATO Submarine Rescue System goes to Norway

Photo: Royal Navy

NATO‘s Submarine Rescue System (NSRS) was recently transported from its headquarters at Royal Navy base Clyde to Norway for exercises. The exercise is called Northern Sun and is designed to test the mobilisation of the NSRS and exercise its capabilities in the frigid waters off Norway. The system, which is jointly-owned by the UK, and Norway, is in three main parts – an Intervention Remotely Operated Vehicle (IROV), a Submarine Rescue Vehicle (SRV), and the Transfer Under Pressure System (TUP). On Wednesday, January 25, the final piece of the puzzle – the Submarine Rescue Vehicle – rolled-out of HM Naval Base Clyde on the back of a Galt transport lorry. Some 25 trucks were used to transport all the equipment to Prestwick airport where it was unloaded and then re-packed into the back of giant C17 and Antonov aircraft. Flights to Norway followed, after which the system was once again unloaded, placed onto yet more trucks and driven to a waiting Norwegian Coastguard ―mother-ship‖. According to the Royal Navy, the NSRS can be transported anywhere in the world within just 72-hours – a target time which the team have practiced, and achieved, during training exercises with 23 different in eleven countries. This quick response time is vital in their life-saving mission to save stricken submariners. The tri-nation NSRS was introduced in 2006, is based at the home of the UK submarine service at HM Naval Base Clyde, and project managed on behalf of the three nations from MOD Abbey Wood in Bristol. In the highly unlikely event of a sinking incident involving a submarine the IROV would be first to deploy with the aim of getting to the stricken vessel within the first 52-hours. The small, remote-controlled, vehicle can then be used to deliver vital supplies to the submarine and prepare the way for the next stage – the SRV. The Submarine Rescue Vehicle has the ability to dive to a stranded submarine, engage with the vessel‘s escape hatch and begin the gradual process of ferrying the crew off the vessel to the waiting TUP system. From the outside the 360 tonne Transfer Under Pressure system resembles a series of giant shipping containers, but its actual purpose is to cleanse the rescued crew from contaminants and crucially, re- compress the oxygen-saturated sailors. Royal Navy Divers from the Clyde-based Northern Diving Group operate this part of the system. Exercise Northern Sun is set to continue until mid-February. Source: Naval Today

French built (DCNS Lorient 2009-2012) in service 2015; Egyptian Anti Submarine Frigate Tahya Misr, Alexandria roads Photo : René van Quekelberghe (c)

Indian Navy Can't Wait For Naval LCA Anymore, Looking For 57 New Fighters For Aircraft Carriers The LCA Tejas program has taken a long time to develop an indigenous fighter for India's armed forces. Though the Indian Air Force has inducted the plane, it's still to clear FOC (Final Operational Clearance) stage. The naval variant being developed alongside to operate from aircraft carriers was taking even longer. Too long for the Navy to wait. The peremptory rejection of the shipborne variant of the Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) by the Indian Navy seems to have surprised most navy-watching analysts. Their confusion has been compounded by the near-simultaneous issuance of a global request for information (RFI) for procurement of "57 multirole fighters for its aircraft carriers" by Naval HQ. One can deduce two compelling reasons for this, seemingly, radical volte face by the only service which has shown unswerving commitment to indigenisation (lately labelled 'Make in India') for the past six decades. Firstly, by exercising a foreclosure option, the navy has administered a well-deserved and stinging rebuke to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for its lethargic and inept performance that has again disappointed our military. The second reason arises from the navy's desperate hurry to freeze the specifications of its second indigenous (IAC-2). The choice of configuration, size and propulsion of a carrier has a direct linkage with the type of aircraft that will operate from it. This constitutes a "chicken and egg" conundrum -- should one freeze the carrier design first or choose the aircraft first? The Indian Navy has obviously decided the latter. The IAC-2 will enter service in the next decade, at a juncture where a balance- of-power struggle is likely to be underway in this part of the world -- with China and India as the main players. It is only a matter of time before China's carrier task-forces, led by the ex-Russian carrier Liaoning and her successors, follow its nuclear submarines into the . Since the Indian response to such intimidation will need to be equally robust, the decisions relating to the design and capabilities of IAC-2 (and sisters) assume strategic dimensions. Essentially, there are three options for selection of aircraft for the IAC-2. * Conventional take-off and landing types like the US F/A-18 Super Hornet and French Rafale-M that would require a steam catapult for launch and arrester-wires for recovery. The relatively large ship would need either a steam or nuclear plant for propulsion. Next * Types like the Russian Sukhoi-33 and MiG-29K would require only a ski-jump for take-off and arrester-wires for landing. This would mean a smaller ship, driven either by gas turbines or diesel engines. The LCA (Navy) could have been a contender in this category. * The F-35B Lightning II version of the US Joint Strike Fighter, capable of vectored-thrust, would require only a ski-jump for take-off, but no arrester wires since it can land vertically. This would result in the simplest and cheapest ship; a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) carrier. Once the navy has selected an aircraft, the ship and its operating and maintenance facilities can be designed around it, avoiding some of the pitfalls encountered on IAC-1. Reverting to the LCA saga -- as far back as the early 1990s, the navy had initiated a study for examining the feasibility of adapting the LCA to shipborne use. While confirming feasibility, the study had revealed some major problem areas, which included lack of engine thrust, requirement of an arrester hook and stronger undercarriage, and need for cockpit/fuselage re-design before the LCA could attempt carrier operations. Undaunted, the navy re-affirmed its faith in the programme by contributing over Rs 400 crore as well as engineers and test pilots to the project. The IAF accepted the Tejas into service, in July 2016, with considerable reservations because it had not been cleared for full operational exploitation and fell short of many qualitative requirements. The prototype LCA (Navy) had rolled out six years earlier, in July 2010, raising great hopes. However, it is obvious that the DRDO failed to address the problems listed above with any urgency, leading to ultimate rejection of this ambitious project. By its failure to deliver on the LCA (Navy), the DRDO has let down its most steadfast supporter amongst the armed forces -- the Indian Navy. A little introspection by those at the helm of this organisation would reveal to them three reasons for its abysmal performance despite a wealth of talent and a network of sophisticated laboratories -- an exaggerated opinion of their capabilities; a lack of intellectual honesty in denying obvious failures and an unwillingness to seek external help when required. Today, India has the ignominious distinction of being the world's biggest importer of military hardware, whereas China counts amongst the world's leading arms exporters and its aeronautical establishment has delivered aircraft ranging from UAVs to 5th generation fighters, helicopters and transports to the PLA. While one would be justified in blaming the scientists and bureaucrats responsible for defence research and production, the root cause of this colossal failure lies in political indifference and the inability to provide vision and firm guidance to our massive but under-performing military- industrial complex. Source : Indiatimes

HMS Somerset left Devonport dockyard Feb 1 in rare sunshine to join her sister Type 23 Westminster, Monmouth and Richmond at exercises in the Channel. Photo : Raymond Wergan ©

Flying the swallow-tailed Danish ensign at the stern, the heavy patrol ship Esbern Snare leaves Sound Feb 6 for another week‘s intensive crew training. HDMS Esbern Snare (L17) is an Absalon-class support ship and is, along with her sister ship, the HDMS Absalon, the largest combat vessel currently commissioned in the . Esbern Snare is part of the first stage of a strategic realignment within the Royal Danish Navy, which is transitioning to focus on international operations, in which Absalon-class vessels will form the backbone. The ship is designed for command and support roles, with a large ro-ro deck, and is to be complemented by the Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates, a derivative of the Absalon-class designed specifically for combat operations. Esbern Snare was involved in the Beluga Nomination Incident, when she and a Seychelles Coast Guard engaged in a failed rescue operation which left four or five Somali pirates and civilians dead. Later she captured a mother ship on 12 February 2011, capturing sixteen pirates and their weapons, as well as freeing two hostages held by the pirates While patrolling on 12 May 2011 she encountered the pirated dhow NN Iran and attacked her, killing four pirates and wounding ten. Sixteen Iranian hostages were rescued and 24 pirates captured, but the dhow was in a sinking condition and had to be abandoned In December 2013 HDMS Esbern Snare and the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen-class frigate HNoMS Helge Ingstad were sent to the Syrian port of Latakia to escort the Norwegian-registered RoRo cargo ship MV Taiko and the Danish cargo ship ARLK Futura, which will transport Syrian chemical weapons to Italy where they will be handed over to a ship for destruction in international waters. Photo : Raymond Wergan©

India‟s Submarine Arm — Returning to Even-Trim February 9, 2017 Guest Author

INS Khanderi gets launched at the Mazagon dock in Mumbai.(Kunal Patil/HT Photo)

This article originally featured in Geopolitics and is republished with permission. By Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan, AVSM & Bar, VSM, IN (Retd) The Indian Navy‘s Submarine Arm will celebrate its Golden Jubilee Year in 2017. The imminent commissioning of the Kalvari — in her new avatar as India‘s first Scorpène Class submarine — is, therefore, an especially timely portent of happier times for the underwater sentinels of our freedom. For some time now, much media-time has been devoted to lamenting the several perceived inadequacies in the country‘s submarine prowess, especially after the tragedy that struck INS Sindhurakshak in Mumbai on 14 August 2013, resulting in the loss of 18 precious lives and the loss of an invaluable combat platform. As the Scorpène program ran into time overruns and as the People‘s Republic of China began submarine forays into the Indian Ocean, breathless TV anchors defense correspondents have invoked ‗Upgrade’ as a new and urgent mantra against Chinese machinations. The truth is, of course, somewhat more prosaic. ‗Upgrades’ are part of a normal naval response to the technological and tactical changes wrought by the evolution of naval operations through which armed combat is prosecuted upon, over or under the sea. Can technological upgrades make up for numerical limitations? The answer is not straightforward. Although quantity does have a quality all of its own, in undersea warfare, technology has an inordinate influence upon the outcome of combat. So how do we currently fare in terms of both, absolute quantity, and the quality of the quantity that we do have — and what is the prognosis for the immediate future? Before answers to these questions can be attempted, it is important to understand that warfare at sea differs markedly from that of armed combat upon the land. Terrain is arguably the most important determinant of land-based combat and, as a consequence, armies have goals of ‗occupation’ or ‗possession’ or ‗eviction.‘ At sea, however, the effect of terrain diminishes sharply as the distance from the coast increases. The sea is fundamentally a medium of movement and cannot be ‗fortified’ or ‗occupied’. Navies cannot ‗dig-in‘ and ‗hold’ sea areas that have great intrinsic value. Consequently, the aims of naval operations revolve around the ‗use’ or ‗denial-of-use’ of specific areas of the sea for a specific period of time. If we want to use a specific area of the sea for a specific period of time AND we don‘t want the enemy to interfere with our use, we must exercise what is called ‗Sea Control’ in that sea area and for that period of time. If, however, we do not have any interest in using a specific area of the sea for a specific period of time, BUT we merely do not want the enemy to use it, we must exercise what is called ‗Sea Denial’ — once again in that sea area and for that period of time. Submarines (along with sea- mines) are classic platforms for sea-denial operations. Another feature of combat at sea is that the hunter and the hunted can operate in totally different mediums (surface, sub-surface, air/aero-space), each pretty much oblivious of the presence of the other — as in the case of submarines versus ships or submarines pitted against aircraft — whether fixed-wing or rotary-wing, manned or unmanned. Submarines have traditionally been used as a counter to surface ships — both, merchantmen (easy pickings) and warships (far riskier an endeavour). This is where they have the most advantage, operating in a different medium from their adversary and being able to vary their depth to take advantage of the various density-layers that lie between the surface and the sea-bed and affect the propagation of sound underwater. Weapons employed in such cases are typically anti-ship torpedoes and/or anti-ship cruise (i.e., non-ballistic) missiles. Submarines can also be used against targets ashore (on the land) — i.e., for land-attack. They must then be equipped (or be retrofitted) with suitable land-attack missiles with either conventional or nuclear warheads. Naturally, this impacts the size of the submarine‘s hull and imposes restrictions upon how close it can approach the coast. When submarines are designed or deployed to operate against other submarines, the advantages accruing from disparity of medium no longer apply, for both opponents are now within the same (underwater) medium and torpedoes become weapons-of-choice. Since submarines generate underwater sound in a variety of frequencies, the factor determining surprise is relative noisiness — more usually expressed as ‗stealth.‘ SSBNs are inherently noisy. Consequently, smaller and equally speedy but much quieter SSNs, equipped with missiles and torpedoes instead of nuclear-tipped, long-range ballistic missiles are deployed to detect and continuously track an adversary‘s SSBNs. Likewise, modern diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) are often far quieter than an SSN and are designed to track and, where necessary, attack not just surface ships but also SSNs — or even other, relatively-noisier diesel-electric submarines. Nuclear propulsion maximizes underwater speed and endurance, but demands a larger hull and constrains the submarine in littoral waters. Diesel-electric submarines are far smaller than SSNs and SSBNs and can, consequently, operate both, in the deep seas and in relatively-shallow littoral waters. They make-up for their relative lack of underwater-endurance by one or another type of Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) package, but nevertheless yield enormous underwater speed-advantages to SSNs/SSBNs. It is against this very rudimentary and fairly simplistic backdrop that one should review the state of Indian submarines (aka boats) and their upgrades. India currently operates two classes of nuclear-propelled boats: SSBNs (the Arihant) and SSNs (the Chakra), and, two classes of diesel-electric SSKs (the KILO or Sindhughosh Class, and the Type 209/1500 Shishumar Class), with the commissioning of the lead boat of a third class — the Scorpène Class (which will thereafter be known as the Kalvari Class) — imminent. Current upgrades to the Arihant revolve about the replacement of its twelve ‗K-15‘ submarine-launched ballistic missiles (which have a range of 750 km) by four longer-range (3,500 km) ‗K-4‘ Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM), which have already been successfully test- launched (in April 2015) from the Arihant. This weapon-upgrade is well in hand. However, as India takes the next step in the K-series and begins to produce K-5 — a true submarine-launched inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) — the submarine will need to be correspondingly larger with a greater displacement-tonnage. Consequently, for the next boat of the Class, the Arindham, there is a clear need to upgrade the reactor. The Arihant has an 85-MWt reactor (≈17 MWe, since in a naval reactor, roughly 5 MWt = 1 Mwe). The one for the larger and heavier Arindham will need to be somewhere between 160-190 MWt (32-38 MWe) and this is an upgrade that is ongoing. There is no immediate equipment upgrade planned for the Chakra whose 10-year lease is at the halfway mark. However, the fact that in February 2015, the Modi government accorded political approval for six SSNs, makes a training and manpower upgrade for the Navy a critical objective over the next decade. Turning now to the central issue of upgrades to India‘s conventional submarines, two overarching aspects need to be borne in mind:  The first is that contrary to some mildly hysterical reports in the electronic media, these upgrades are not a knee- jerk reaction to the large Chinese submarine inventory or Pakistan‘s submarine program. Nor are they some desperate measure being taken to counter inadequacies in the numbers of submarines held by India. Even if the Indian Navy had three times as many submarines as it does, periodic upgrades would still be the norm.  The second is that contrary to the alarmist lament that India‘s diesel-electric submarines — especially the nine surviving boats of the Sindhughosh Class — have crossed their designed-life and are not much better than floating coffins the truth is much more reassuring. The authorized total technical service life of each submarine is actually 35 years. At or around the 13th year of service, each boat undergoes what is known as a ‗Medium Refit‘ (MR). This takes two-to-three years, during which time, major upgrades are effected and the submarine is made ready to operate in the contemporary environment for another decade-plus. Then, around the 26th year of service, each boat undergoes a 27-month Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), which enables it to be materially and operationally viable — once again within the prevailing contemporary environment — for the next 9-10 years. Most MRs of the Sindhughosh Class, have been undertaken in Russia. However, two — Sindhudvaj and Sindhuraj — underwent MRs at the Naval Dockyard, Visakhapatnam, while the Sindhukirti suffered a dreadfully protracted MR in HSL. The Sindhukesari is the first to have commenced her SLEP. The residual life of the Class may be assessed through the following tabulation: Medium 13th 26th 35th Submarine Commissioned Refit MR done in: SLEP (done in) Year Year Year (MR) Sindhughosh 30 Apr 86 Apr 99 2002-05 Russia Apr 12 Apr 21

Sindhudhvaj 12 Jun 87 Jun 00 2002-05 India (ND[V]) Jun 13 Jun 22

Sindhuraj 20 Oct 87 Oct 00 1999-01 Russia Oct 13 Oct 22

Sindhuvir 26 Aug 88 Aug 01 1997-99 Russia Aug 14 Aug 23

Sindhuratna 22 Dec 88 Dec 01 2001-03 Russia Dec 14 Dec 23

2016-2018 Sindhukesari 16 Feb 89 Feb 02 1999-01 Russia Feb 15 Feb 24 (Russia) Sindhukirti 04 Jan 90 Jan 03 2006-15 India (HSL) Jan 16 Jan 25

Sindhuvijay 08 Mar 91 Mar 04 2005-07 Russia Mar 17 Mar 26

Sindhushastra 19 Jul 00 Jul 13 2013-17 India (ND[V]) Jul 26 Jul 39

The corresponding tabulation in regard to the Shishumar Class (Type 209/1500) SSKs is similarly instructive: 13th Medium Refit MR done 26th 35th Submarine Commissioned SLEP (done in) Year (MR) in: Year Year Shishumar 22 Sep 86 Sep 89 Jun 98-Mar 01 Mumbai Sep 15 Sep 24

Shankush 20 Nov 86 Nov 89 Aug 00-Mar 06 Mumbai Nov 15 Nov 24

Shalki 07 Feb 92 Feb 05 Mar 07-Jul 10 Mumbai Feb 18 Feb 27

Shankul 28 May 94 May 07 Feb 08-Jun 12 Mumbai May 20 May 29

With ‗alarm’ having been removed from the equation, it is possible to dispassionately examine a few major thrust lines relevant to ongoing and planned upgrades. For the professional naval submariner — planner and practitioner alike — upgrades-of-choice are those that enhance:  Stealth  Endurance  Sensor Performance: Radar Sonar ESM  Communication  External Situational Awareness (Combat-Information Management Systems)  Internal Situation Awareness and Control of the Internal-Environment (Platform-Management-and-Control Systems)  Weapons and weapon-delivery systems  Safety and Survivability Systems These upgrades may be either through indigenous or foreign replacements of the original equipment. Obviously, the former is preferable and, indeed, has yielded laudable results. Stealth-Enhancement. Although such upgrades are often considered by our breathless media analysts as not being ‗sexy‘ enough to merit focused-attention, in truth, stealth is always a life-and-death issue in submarine combat. With the hull design being resistant to any modification or change, these upgrades pertain to the reduction of vibrations and the underwater transmission of these vibrations as sound waves that can be picked up by an adversary‘s passive listening devices. Thus, engineering-improvements to propulsion equipment such as speed-governors, bearings, fuel racks, supercharges clearances, and rotating machinery such as superior bearings, pumps, rubber-mounts, etc., count as major— albeit largely unacknowledged — upgrades. Indigenization has been both successful and invaluable, with the increasing involvement of the Indian private sector companies such as L&T, Mahindra, Reliance, Tata, Siemens, Yeoman, Exide, Elcome, etc., being most encouraging. Endurance-Enhancement. Although enhanced submarine endurance is almost invariably associated with the provision of AIP systems or nuclear-propulsion, habitability is another factor that directly impacts submarine endurance. For instance, the original air conditioning plants (35 TR capacity) aboard the Sindhughosh Class, which were grossly inadequate in Indian conditions, have been upgraded by indigenous (KPCL) plants of 67 TR capacity. This upgrade has increased the life of the on-board weapon-sensor suites and allied equipment, and, has enhanced operational endurance by improving habitability and reducing environmental human-fatigue. Where batteries are concerned, the upgrade to indigenous production by Exide Industries is stable and world-class — so much so that exports to Algeria and Iran have also been achieved. HBL-Nife is another success story in battery-production. Sensor-Performance Enhancement Sonars  The NSTL-developed and BEL-produced Panchendriya FCS and USHUS bow-mounted cylindrical array — have certainly had their share of protracted teething troubles but the systems have settled down and are delivering world-class performances on each of the six retrofitted boats of the Sindhughosh. This upgrade is in progress as part of the ongoing MR of Sindhukirti, leaving only Sindhuratna and Sindhuvir with the original (Russian) MGK-400 sonar.  Likewise, all four boats of the Shishumar Class have been upgraded with the ATLAS Elektronik‘s ISUS-90 combat management system, the CSU-90 cylindrical active/passive bow-mounted sonar, passive planar flank arrays and intercept arrays (for providing warning against approaching torpedoes), passive ranging array, a three-dimensional mine and obstacle avoidance sonar.  As part of their SLEP, the Shishumar Class boats Shalki and Shankul are being retrofitted with thin-line towed- array sonars.  Electronic Warfare (EW) systems — especially Electronic Support Measures — are crucial to submarines. The upgrade of the originally-fitted ESM suites of all 13 Indian submarines, through their replacement with the indigenously-developed Porpoise EW system, represents a significant enhancement of combat capability. Optronics. By and large, the Indian media has a suboptimal understanding of the criticality of optronics aboard submarines and, consequently, little interest in periscope-upgrades. This notwithstanding, the fitment of new optronic periscopes onto the Shalki and the Shankul as part of their SLEP is an extremely significant upgrade. Communications. Within the many criticalities of submarine warfare, communications enjoy a degree of centrality that is underappreciated. The upgrades provided by the retrofitment of the indigenously-developed CCS-Mk2 communications- suite are hugely significant. Where shore-to-submarine VLF communications are concerned, on-board upgrades by way of receiving equipment and Trailing Wire Antennae (TWA) have resulted in noteworthy improvements in combat deployments of all classes of our submarines. Weapon Upgrades Missiles. The most telling upgrade to the weapon-suite of Indian Naval SSKs has been the addition of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and land-attack cruise missiles aboard the Sindhughosh Class. Of the nine boats of this Class, six now have land-attack missile capability by way of ‗Klub-S‘ [3M-14Э] missiles, while seven have anti-ship cruise missile capability by way of ‗Klub-3M-54Э. Likewise, the two boats of the Shishumar Class (Shalki and Shankul) that have commenced their SLEP in Mumbai by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) are being retrofitted with 12 x UGM-84L Block II Encapsulated Missiles and 10 x UTM-84L Harpoon Encapsulated Training missiles. Torpedoes. India‘s investment in infrastructure for the development and testing of torpedoes notwithstanding, each such program is time-consuming and can take upwards of 15 years. However, the successful induction of the Varunastra heavyweight torpedo aboard the IN‘s surface combatants has led to an ongoing development of a submarine-launched version (an upgrade of DRDO‘s now-defunct Takshak project). An unfortunate spinoff from the Sindhurakshak tragedy (and that of the Russian Kursk) is a loss of confidence in thermal torpedoes and consequent uncertainties in respect of DRDO‘s development of the Shakti thermal heavyweight torpedo, which was expected to be the main armament of India‘s nuclear submarines and additionally represented an upgrade-option for the Sindhughosh Class. External Situational Awareness. The Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) of all boats has received a significant fillip with the upgraded communication-and-data capability provided by the Navy‘s Rukmini satellite, coupled with excellent progress in VLF communication and its remote keying by naval Long-Range Maritime Patrol-cum-ASW aircraft. Moreover, the indigenous Combat-Information Management Systems (CMS) developed by WESEE represents another critical combat- capability and is fitted aboard all boats. Internal Situation Awareness and Control of the Internal-Environment (Platform-Management-and-Control Systems). The motion-control system of the Sindhughosh Class has been upgraded from the PIRIT-2E to the PIRIT-M. Likewise, the diving-and-surfacing control system has been upgraded from the PALLADI-2E to PALLADI-M. Functionally- corresponding systems are being upgraded as part of the ongoing SLEP of the Shalki and the Shankul. Safety and Survivability Systems. Critical upgrades in terms of safety and survivability include the installation of the AIDSS (Advanced Indigenous Distress Alert Sonar System) on the nine boats of the Sindhughosh Class submarines, as also the ongoing retrofit of the Shishumar Class boats Shalki and Shankul with the Alenia Sistemi Subacquei‘s C-310 submarine-fired torpedo decoy dispensers and a self-noise monitoring system, being part of their SLEP. Seldom recognized but hugely critical nevertheless, are rubber sealants, O-rings, gaskets, etc., that are used to seal the various periscopes and retractable masts that every submarine operates. There have been past incidences of an otherwise fully-operational submarine being rendered unseaworthy for the lack of rubber sealing devices! Consequently, indigenous upgrades under the aegis of the Indian Rubber Board and the Indian Rubber Institute, are far more significant than most media analysts are aware. Conclusion Even as the country awaits — with bated breath — the arrival of the Indian Navy‘s Scorpènes, the process of upgrading the combat capability, safety and survivability of our existing sub-surface assets is continuing apace. The truth of the Indian Navy‘s subsurface capability lies somewhat removed from the breathless Cassandran prophets of doom that currently crowd our media airwaves. Perhaps this is because of the abiding belief that bad news — even alarmist bad news — sells. On the other hand, perhaps our countrymen and countrywomen should be considered mature enough to decide for themselves based upon the facts as they are. Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan retired as Commandant of the Indian Naval Academy at Ezhimala. He is an alumnus of the prestigious National Defence College. Source: http://cimsec.org