International Studies Quarterly (2010) 54, 335–359
Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers1
Abel Escriba`-Folch Universitat Pompeu Fabra and IBEI (Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals) and
Joseph Wright Pennsylvania State University
This paper examines whether economic sanctions destabilize authoritar- ian rulers. We argue that the effect of sanctions is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Because personalist regimes and monarchies are more sensitive to the loss of external sources of revenue (such as foreign aid and taxes on trade) to fund patronage, rulers in these regimes are more likely to be destabilized by sanctions than leaders in other types of regimes. In contrast, when dominant single-party and military regimes are subject to sanctions, they increase their tax revenues and reallocate their expenditures to increase their levels of cooptation and repression. Using data on sanction episodes and authoritarian regimes from 1960 to 1997 and selection-corrected survival models, we test whether sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers in different types of regimes. We find that personalist dictators are more vulnerable to foreign pressure than other types of dictators. We also analyze the modes of authoritarian leader exit and find that sanctions increase the likelihood of a regular and an irregular change of ruler, such as a coup, in personalist regimes. In single-party and military regimes, however, sanctions have little effect on leadership stability.
During his inaugural address in 2005, US President George W. Bush proclaimed that ‘‘it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of dem- ocratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.’’2 The general goal of ending tyranny has been shared by many of Western advanced democracies since the end of the Sec- ond World War. Yet there is little consensus over the most effective means to promote regime change and democratization.
1 The authors thank Irfan Nooruddin, Adam Przeworski, Armando Razo, and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions on this project. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the conferences, ‘‘Dictatorships: Their Governance and Social Consequences,’’ (Princeton University: April 25–26, 2008) and III Conferencia de Doctores (Juan March Institute: June 18–19, 2008). Replication material is available at http:// isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/data_archive.html. 2 http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/ (accessed June 2008).