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Why Does Israel Support the Kurdish Independence? Publish Date: 01/10/2017

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Why Does Israel Support the Kurdish Independence? Publish Date: 01/10/2017 Artical Name : Isolating Threats Artical Subject : Why does Israel Support the Kurdish Independence? Publish Date: 01/10/2017 Auther Name: Mona Soliman Subject : 9/30/2021 3:40:09 PM 1 / 2 The statement of the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, issued supporting the independence of the Kurdistan region, revealed that the Israeli position runs contrary to most regional and international powers opposing the referendum. Tel Aviv seeks to use Iraqi Kurdistan to pressure Iran, incite the Kurds in Iran, Syria and Turkey to secede and create a geographical buffer zone against Iran. The Israeli stance is inseparable from the history of close cooperation between Israel and Iraqi Kurds.Secession¶s SponsorshipThere are several indicators, which demonstrate Israel¶s support for the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan: 1. Official statements: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu voiced, more than once, his support for the secession of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraq and the creation of a Kurdish State in the North of the country. In a speech in 2014 at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, Netanyahu called the Kurds ³a nation of fighters [who] have proved political commitment and are worthy of independence´a statement that angered Baghdad at that time. He also reaffirmed his stance during a meeting with a delegation from the US Congress, on August 13, 2017, stressing that he backs Iraqi Kurdistan¶s independence from Iraq, because the Kurdish people are brave and loyal to the West, as well as they share the same values with Israel. On the other hand, the Kurds cheered those remarks by raising the Israeli flag during their demonstrations in favor of independence in Erbil and several European capitals, where there are Kurdish communities such as Paris, Brussels and Berlin.In addition, several Israeli politicians declared their support for the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraq. Former Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, in 2014 telephoned his American counterpart John Kerry, urging him to change Washington¶s stance with regard to the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, considering that Iraq is already divided. Likewise, Israeli Minister of Justice, Ayelet Shaked (a leader in the Jewish Home party) said in September 2017, that it was in the interest of Israel and the United States to have a statehood for Kurds in the region, beginning in Iraq.2. Continuous contacts: There are long historical relations between Erbil and Tel Aviv confirming their support to one other. Israel began secret contacts with Iraqs¶Kurds since 1948, which later shifted to direct ones in 1965 between the Kurdish leadership in Iraq and David Kimche, one of the most prominent Israeli diplomats, who said that Israel was ready to offer military and financial backing for the Kurds to separate from Iraq. Israeli media disclosed in 2004 that meetings took place between former Israel¶s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and two Kurdish leaders, Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani to discuss cooperation between the two sides. In 2006, Barzani welcomed the opening of an Israeli Consulate in Arbil, the capital of Kurdistan. Some estimates suggest that Kurdistan is home to 400 to 730 Jewish families. During 2014 and 2015, IsraAID, Israeli relief agency, provided aid to refugees in Iraqi Kurdistan, and Erbil hailed that.3. Media support: Israeli newspapers and other media outlets have recently launched campaigns to show support for the secession of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraq. Maariv newspaper emphasized that Kurdistan is the only place in the Middle East, which raises the flag of Israel, and the Tel Aviv should help them get their independence. Moreover, the Israeli press began a blistering attack on Turkey for opposing the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan; the Jerusalem Post accused Turkey of being ³undemocratic and does not respect the principle of division of powers´and that is why it strongly opposes the independence of the territory. The Kurds are divided concerning the Israeli support for their independence. Some reject Israeli interference in the Kurdish issue because it will weaken the Kurdish position and will antagonize Arab states against the Kurdish state, while others welcome it and find in Israel a future ally to resort to.Tel Aviv¶s InterestsThere are numerous motives that incentivize Israel to back the secession of Kurdistan from Iraq: 1- Expand regional influence: Tel Aviv always seeks to expand its regional influence in new regions, thus it supports the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, which would guarantee Israel a permanent ally in the Middle East. None of the Arab or Middle-eastern countries endorses the independence of Kurdistan but Israel. Israeli support portends forging future alliance between Erbil and Tel Aviv, which is in the interests of both sides, as Israel seeks to establish with the new Kurdish State to ensure having a strategic partnership with the aim of reducing its isolation, increasing pressures on the Arab and regional powers, encircling Syria and Iraq as well as Turkey and Iran.2- Continue intelligence cooperation: Some analyses indicate the presence of intelligence and security cooperation between Iraq¶s Kurds and Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, since 1960s, which aimed to use the Kurdish region in Iraq as a buffer zone between Israel and Arab countries. This cooperation continued over the past decades and Iraqi Kurdistan became one of the active arenas for Israeli security and intelligence elements, because the high territory of the region, thanks to its mountain nature, enables Israel to keep an eye on the situation in Iran, Syria and Turkey.Some Israeli newspapers suggest that many Israeli companies in Iraqi Kurdistan are run by retired Israeli intelligence officers. Israel-Kurd, a magazine published in Erbil with headquarters in Israel, revealed that an agreement was hammered between Massoud Barzani and Netanyahu, under which Israel would move 200 thousand Kurdish Jews to the territory immediately after the declaration of independence from Iraq, to invest and work in nation-building.3- Pressure Turkey and Iran: Israel seeks to apply pressures on Iran through its encirclement via Kurdistan, and support the Iranian Kurdish movement, which suffers from continued repression under the regime of Iran. There is also a growing hostility between Israel and Iran on one hand and its allies in the region, especially Hezbollah, on the other hand. In the event of renewed war between Israel and Hezbollah, Tel Aviv will get military support from the nascent Kurdish state. Despite the declared good relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv, their rivalry continues in secret.Iran opposes the establishment of a Kurdish state because Iraqi Kurds control the border areas between Iran and Syria, areas Iran tries to control to create a land corridor for itself. For its part, Turkey objects to Kurdistan secession fearing that it could fan separatism among its own ethnic Kurdish populations with the support of the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Some analysts expect that Israel would back separatist movements in the two countries and secure their support through the new Kurdish state, which is expected to immediately cement its ties with Israel.4- Secure strategic depth: Israel will work to reinforce security cooperation with the nascent Kurdish state, which would enable it to secure its borders, countering creeping terrorist threats from Iraq and Syria. For this purpose, Israel might build security and logistical - may be military- bases in Kurdistan, allowing Israel to bomb Iran and Syria more easily in the event of war with either of them. 5- Strengthen economic cooperation: Israel seeks to maximize the benefit of economic cooperation projects in the areas of agriculture, mining, oil exploration, tourism. In addition, Israel is willing to invest in the industrial infrastructure in the region, particularly manufacturing. Israeli companies are implementing housing, infrastructure, public utilities and roads projects in Kurdistan.In conclusion, it can be stated that an independent Kurdistan is a matter of time, as the referendum will be held as scheduled, followed by US-sponsored negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil for one to two years as Barzani announced, for solving conflicts and contentious issues. He insists on holding the referendum on schedule because he guarantees the result in advance, the approval of the Kurds on separation, which gives him a new pressure tool on Baghdad and a strong stance in the negotiation on the future status of the region. Therefore, Iraq will have two options; either establishing a federal system in which Iraqi Kurdistan enjoys more rights and privileges vs the central state, or separation and the declaration of the Kurdish state, which will probably be in the interests of Israel, perhaps more than the Kurds themselves. 9/30/2021 3:40:09 PM 2 / 2.
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