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items-in-Africa - Question of - Secretary-General's meetings and notes for the file

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Container s-0902-0001 : Peacekeeping - Africa 1 963-1 981

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit V"

Mote of Consultation Meeting of the SecuricyounciJ,, held/ ofc Friday, 2 March 1979^

The President stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider the letter of the Secretary-General of 28 February containing his proposals regarding the composition of the military component of UNTAG. The Secretary-General told the Council that he had Just received a cable from SWAPO giving its formal answer to his report. The answer was some- what negative. There had been no formal answer as yet from South Africa; though there had been some public noises. The Secretary-General then read SWAPO 's cable to the Council. He said that he would also inform the Council that he had tried to clarify the position of the neighbouring countries in regard to the matter of monitoring by confirming that res- ponsibility for such monitoring lay with the neighbouring countries. He had also sought their agreement to establish UJJTAG offices there. He said that President Kaunda had agreed to the proposal that SWAPO forces in be monitored by Zambian forces. A similar answer had been received from Botswana. For technical reasons he had been unable to contact President Neto but was now in touch with the Angolan Ambassador with a view to clarifying the situation. He said that his proposal respected the sovereignty of the neighbouring countries while also providing for contacts with the UN forces. He said that SWAPO' s proposal contained nothing new in regard to troop composition; as always it was the opposite of South Africa's position. However, he also felt that as there was no answer from South Africa he was for the time being unable to proceed any further. He would wish to have the Council's views on these matters as also on his proposed timetable. The representative of Zambia said that he would like to put some questions: SWAPO was negative in regard to the proposals for countries providing logistics support. Did their response extend to the countries providing infantry battalions? Had the Secretary-General received any other offers in regard to logistical elements? The Secretary-General referred to his letter of 28 February and read the list of infantry battalions set out there. He noted that Rumania had, the previous day, informed him that it would be unable to provide a battalion. He noted that the SWAPO list was for battalions and that only Finland and Panama were contained in his and SWAPO's lists. Regarding logistics, he had encountered tremendous difficulties. He said that with the exception of Australia and Sweden all the countries offering logistical support were NATO countries. If there were any further offers, he said, he would be glad to hear of them. It would also be necessary to evaluate such offers from the standpoint of practicability. The United States Ambassador said that SWAPO's cable did not mean that the efforts of the Secretary-General or the consultations should cease. Nothing, he said, has changed. The UN had a continuing responsibility to seek a solution to the matter. The UN should press parties for a basis for proceeding. He said that there was a Jockeying for position on the part of the parties. This would not cease but would rather increase. At the same time problems would get more difficult rather than become easier. He said that he did not accept the possibility of any one party vetoing the present proceedings. He said that he accepted the importance of SWAPO but that the Council had not anointed SWAPO. SWAPO was Just one of the parties which was to compete for political power.

Circulation: The Secretary-Ge neral Mr. Urquhart Mr. Ahtisaari Mr. Thornberry «* i i I

- 2 -

The USSR Ambassador said that he also believed there should be further efforts to come to an agreement but that there vere evident objections __. by the parties, not only to the proposed composition but also to the report. He said that he could not see how the Security Council could as such take any further action until there had been further contacts •with the parties concerned. For the Soviet delegation SWAPO's position vas very important if not decisive, having regard to the UN's stance as to their position. .It would therefore be difficult for the Council to come up with any decisions until there had been fertile efforts to bring about agreement on all these issues.

The Ambassador of Kuwait said that from the legal point of view Namibia was an international territory for which responsibility is based in the Council for Namibia. Thus, it was quite correct that neither side had a right of veto. However from the practical point of view the Plan necessitated the co-operation of the parties. He wondered therefore, whether the Council could now proceed, given the negative response from SWAPO. He asked whether the Council could impose its will on the two parties. He foresaw great risks and pitfalls unless there was a concurrence of the parties. He suggested that the discussion should be adjourned until the other party responded.

The Ambassador of France said that the Secretary-General's list of battalions as set out in his letter of 28 February would not include any NATO countries. It surely seemed, therefore, that SWAPO's rejection related to the list of countries for logistics.

The Ambassador of Zambia said that it was important to see the matter in perspective. SWAPO had not rejected the Secretary-General's report, it had objected to a few elements in it and in part to the Secretary- General's proposal in regard to logistics. Even then it was objecting to only two or three of the five countries concerned. He said that the whole question of monitoring in neighbouring countries was being considered. The main issue, therefore, was composition, especially as to logistics. He thought it to be unfortunate for the Security Council to give up on this important matter. Consultations should determine whether"equitable geographical distribution could be complied

with. He said that it might not in the end be possible to satisfy all the parties. Neither could have a veto power. However, SWAPO was recognized by the United Nations while South Africa was illegally occupying Namibia. The Council should be the arbitrator in these matters.

The Ambassador of France asked whether any of the countries named by SWAPO had made an offer on logistics.

The Secretary-Genera\ said that it was clear from the cable that SWAPO was preoccupied with NATO participation in logistics. However, in the same cable it had also reiterated its position setting out a. list of acceptable countries which, for battalions, included only Panama and Finland. This impossible situation had now gone on for several months whatever one party accepts the other rejects. He had finally tried to cut this gordian knot by making honest efforts to achieve some sort of settlement. From SWAPO's list only Sweden had offered logistic support. He said that the concurrence of the parties was necessary in - 3 -

going forward. The UN could not impose its will because that would end up in a shooting match with UN forces between the parties. He believed that SWAPO's negative answer set out in the cable would not involve a general rejection of his report and his proposals. The Secretary-General reiterated the last sentences of SWAPO's cable. However, it would raise the monitoring aspect once again. He said that there were three problems - composition, monitoring of SWAPO forces outside the country and the way the ceasefire would come into force. He would sum up by saying that he felt that he should continue with his contacts and various efforts to clarify the open questions, while having no illusions as to the difficulties. However, he said, his time-table could not be implemented for the objective was to have . , a ceasefire enter into force on 15 March 1979 and the ceasefire letter/to be sent out in the next few days. He said his time-table would now depend on how quickly he received answers from the parties on the matters for clarification.

The UK Ambassador said that both sides were jockeying for position and both were trying to get things they were not able to get in the last few years. Neither expected to have a peace-keeping force along the lines it now proposed. The Secretary-General's report was an extremely balanced document. He thought the Council should give the Secretary-General an indication that his manner of proceeding so far had been acceptable. He thought that the test should be, not what the parties would like but what they would both finally acquiesce in. The Secretary-General could not go and seek agreement between the parties for this would not happen. He said also that it would be impossible to get the parties to face up to matters until they were obliged to take decisions. The UK felt that the Secretary-General's letter should go out. That would be when an answer would be forthcoming, not at the present stage.

The USSR Ambassador said that the question raised by SWAPO related not only to composition but also to the report. The proceedings on ITtu/dbia had always been conducted on the assumption that the parties' co-operation would be obtained. In his view, to send out the ceasefire letter now without knowing the conditions in which the ceasefire would take place, would be to put the cart before the horse. He thought that the logical thing would be to request the Secretary-General to continue consultations. He wished to raise another question; he thought that the question of civilian personnel was also equal in significance. Some African countries have doubts regarding the people who would be at voting stations and checking the correctness of what was going on. He said that given the size of the undertaking, the largest and most complex since the Congo, and in the light of experience since the Congo, he would associate himself with those who would ask the Secretary-General and Ahtisaari to continue their efforts. The U.S.- Ambassador said that it was necessary to have the cooperation of the parties. There was a difference between approval and co-operation. -li-

lt would be a formula for disaster to seek approval all along the line. The report of the Secretary-General had recognized the difficulties presented by the parties. He had given his ideas on how to proceed. He thought that the parties should be faced with the need to make decisions instead of allowing them to postpone and say "yes, but". He also said that the longer the matter continued the more difficult it was likely to become; and perhaps even impossible.

The Norwegian Ambassador said that he accepted fully the SG's report and its outline of composition. He said that the SG deserved all credit for these matters. He said that he was intrigued by the distinction between agreement and acquiesensce. He thought acquiesensce should be the standard.

The Ambassador of France said that agreement was virtually impossible to get. It was very hard for either of the parties to give up their previous public positions. He felt that this was one of the areas in which the UN had an important role. He said that he would not think that the Council could get any written paper endorsing the SG's proposal but that it might get something indicating acquiesensce. The USSR Ambassador asked how the Council would find out whether it had obtained such acquiesensce ?

The Secretary-General again quoted the cable from SWAPO and in particular the phrase which contained the words "it will be difficult for SWAPO". He said that probably the question was to find out what SWAPO meant by "difficult". He said that he felt it was necessary to await an answer from South AFrica.

The Jamaican Ambassador said it was vitally important to get a response from South Africa. The situation arose from South AFrica's continuing illegal position. One object of what was going on was to impose pressure on South Africa. Any acquiesensce of the parties must be constructive acquiesensce. The UK must aim to put the Hamibian people back in posession of their territory. The Ambassador of Bangladesh said he felt that progress had been made. His Government felt that it could make contribution in its offer of infantry battalion.

The Ambassador of said that the Secretary-General would inform members of the Council when he had received a reply from South Africa and the Council would then resume its consultations as soon as possible thereafter. He hoped that South Africa would pay attention to the decisions of the Council in sending a reply.

The meeting adjourned at 1257 hours. CONFIDENTIAL

Note for the file

The Secretary-General called President of Zambia today with reference to the proposal in his report to the Security Council concerning the monitoring of SWAPO bases in neighbouring countries by the concerned Governments and the establishment in those countries of UNTAG liaison offices. He explained the reasons which had lead him to make these proposals. President Kaunda expressed full understanding for them and gave a positive response of his Government on both issues.

Rafee*uddin Ahmed 1 March 1979

cc. Mr. Ahtisaari Mr. Urquhart Mr. Parah HP/LH b/f: RA / FMG cc.: Mr. Drquhart

NOTES TAKEN DURING A MEETING HELD IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OFFICE ON FRIDAY,23 FEBRUARY 1979 AT 2.55 PM

Presenti Secretary-General Mr. B. E. Urquhart General Hannes Philipp

General Philip stated that during a meeting with the Prime Minister of South Africa in Cape Town, at which the following persons were presents The Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Malan and General Philipp, the Prime Minister said we are responsible for the security of the people in Namibia until the elections and I charge my General with this responsibility. Please tell the Secretary-General, if we have to chose between sacrificing the security of the people in Namibia or the sanctions of the five Western Countries, we choose the sanctions. Later General Malan said the essential thing for the reduction of the South African defense forces is that SWAPO forces will be restricted to bases wherever they are and monitored by the United Nations. The restruction to base is the essential point, the monitoring could be done also indirectly — i.e. the restriction of SWAPO forces in and Zambia are directly monitored by Angolan< and Zambian forces and the United Nations will monitor those. $ 6 ^ '''

CONFIDENTIAL X"" ' 24 /January 1979

NOTE FOR THE FILE

At his request, I met with Ambassador Blankson, Deputy Permanent Representative of Nigeria, who is a personal friend, in the morning of 24 January. He indicated that he would like to review with me informally the issue of the composition of the military component of UNTAG. It appeared that he had been previously briefed on the list which the UN had passed on to both South Africa and SWAPO. He asked specifically about chances of Nigeria participating as members of the military component. Responding to this request, the various factors which led to the tentative exclusion of Nigeria from the list were explained in detail. He informed that his Government was aware of these factors and in fact had indicated to the Secretary-General previously that Nigeria would not insist on its participation if by doing so no agreement would be reached on the question of the composition. In the course of our conversation, he conveyed the reaction of SWAPO to the UN list given to Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab. He underlined that the information he was about to give to me should be kept strictly confidential. According to Ambassador Blankson, SWAPO would prefer the following list: 1. Africa Angola Nigeria Tanzania 2. Asia Bangladesh India - 2 -

3. Latin America Panama Venezuela If these were not available, Jamaica 4. Europe

It was underlined that SWAPO had given no indication of its reaction to the list on logistics.

James O.C. Jonah I..V ? A, A;• r i [v frj} \ l ' 'jj/sd - | TV ' .--.- 4 .,...,.', CONFIDENTIAL 1 —''"" 24 January 1979

Notes on a meeting with the South African representative on 24 January at O945 hours

Present: Mr. J. Adriaan Eksteen The Secretary-General Mr. James O.C. Jonah

Mr. Eksteen thanked the Secretary-General for agreeing to receive him so soon after his return from the talks in Namibia and South Africa. He assumed that Mr. Ahtisaari had already briefed the Secretary-General on the nature and conclusions of the discussions with South African officials. His current main purpose was to articulate his own impressions of the talks. Foreign Minister Botha, following his talks with Mr. Ahtisaari, had already briefed the Ambassadors of the five Western powers. From the South African point of view, there were three main areas to be "ironed out": (i) The emplacement date for UNTAG and the final date for the elections. (ii) The composition of the military component of UNTAG. (iii) The document worked out between Major-General Philipp and senior South African military officials. In that connexion, it was his understanding that Prime Minister Botha had found the document acceptable. However, he would have to check further on that point. Mr. Eksteen added that the following points should be dealt with, although they might not prove to be "stumbling- blocks" : 1. Status of agreement. On this point, he observed that the outstanding problems could easily be resolved. - 2 -

2. Strict interpretation or implementation of certain words in the proposal. With respect to this point, he stated that Messrs. Ahtisaari and Justice Styn could deal with this matter. Mr. Eksteen emphasized that the South African Government was anxious to receive a report from the Secretary-General and that they were looking forward to the visit of Mr. Ahtisaari to the front-line States. In any event, the South African Government would like to see all consultations concluded before 26 February, which is the date for the emplacement of UNTAG. The South African Government was aware of the several practical matters, such as arrangements for a cease-fire, which should be resolved. He affirmed, nevertheless, that the consultations should move expeditiously so as to get UNTAG in motion. With respect to the composition of the military component of UNTAG, Mr. Eksteen reviewed the various contacts he and Mr. Steward of his Mission had had with Messrs. Urquhart and Jonah. In that regard, he reiterated that the South African Government would have difficulties with countries giving "active support" to SWAPO. In that context, he examined the preferred list that was communicated to Mr. Jonah on Saturday 20 January by Mr. Steward. Mr. Eksteen elaborated on the reasons why the South African Government would like to exclude both Finland and Sweden from the list given to them by- Mr. Urquhart. Of crucial importance to the South African Government was the fact that there exists a large Finnish community, mainly Finnish missionaries, in Namibia. These missionaries were very active in the internal . Already there had been some concern expressed in Namibia when the South African Government had agreed to the appointment of Mr. Ahtisaari as the Secretary-General's - 3 -

Special Representative. Accordingly, the South African Government believed that there would be difficulties should Finland be included in the military component of UNTAG. In so far as Sweden is concerned, Mr. Eksteen noted that that country was actively supporting SWAPO in every conceivable way. There would be an outcry in the territory if Sweden were included. Although the South African Government did not want to be difficult, it was most anxious that UNTAG should succeed on the ground. Furthermore, the South African Government was not anxious to delay things. The Secretary-General,, in response to Mr. Eksteen, indicated that he appreciated the frankness with which Mr. Eksteen had outlined his Government1s views. The Secretary-General stressed that the list on the composition which had been given to the South African Government by the United Nations was a fair one that was based on the principle of wide geographical representation. In that context, he would like to offer his preliminary reaction to the list submitted by the South African Government. He was happy to know that Ghana was acceptable. However, he was doubtful whether Morocco would be acceptable to all concerned. In any case, we would have to see how the matter could be resolved. While he had no objections to Indonesia, he had felt that Bangladesh, as a small and neutral country, would not present difficulties. He regretted that Sweden and Finland were not acceptable to the South African Government. Both countries had performed and were performing well in United Nations peace-keeping operations. They had always behaved correctly in carrying out their tasks. Therefore, it was with deep regret that he learned of South Africa's attitude toward them. As far as Austria was concerned, he was aware that the Austrian Government was not prepared to put military units at his disposal for UNTAG, primarily because of its other peace-keeping obligations. They were of course prepared to provide personnel for civilian activities of UNTAG. With respect to Latin America, he regretted that Panama was not acceptable. Panama had previously participated in UNEF along with Peru and they had performed very well. The main difficulty was to get contingents from Latin America. Venezuela had indicated some interest and it may be necessary to pursue the matter with them, although he did not believe it would be easy. The Secretary-General noted that he was always happy when a Latin American country such as Panama was prepared to provide military contingents for peace-keeping operations. Summarizing his preliminary reaction to the South African list, the Secretary-General pointed out that as a result of further consultations with all the parties concerned, it might prove necessary to return to the original list which he had suggested. In that context, he intimated that SWAPO's response to the UN list might be quite different from that of South Africa. Mr. Eksteen interjected that the South African Government did not want to be difficult but that it felt obliged to point out the problems that could arise with Finland and Sweden. Mr. Ahtisaari intervened to observe that the date of 26 February was actually put forward by him and not a South African proposal. Mr. Eksteen acknowledged that that was so and recalled that the South African Government had agreed to that date. Mr. Ahtisaari continued by noting that the views outlined "by Mr. Eksteen on the composition of the military component of UNT&G wo-id cause practical as well as political problems. He went on to suggest that the date for the - 5 - emplacement of UNTAG and the date for the elections would have to be determined definitively only after agreement had baen reached on the composition. In that connexion, the Secretary-General appealed to the South African Government to be more flexible on the question of the composition in light of the practical and political realities. He added that the UN list was formulated after the most careful consideration. In response, Mr. Eksteen remarked that South Africa itself had made considerable progress in compromising its position. Only a few weeks before, no one could have predicted the progress that had been made. The Secretary-General further referred to the question of the monitoring of SWAPO bases in neighbouring countries. He felt that that issue should be clarified since it was most important. He was placing reliance on the co-operation of the South African Government, and indicated that he had detected some uneasiness on the part of SWAPO. Mr. Eksteen sought clarification on the timing of the Secretary-General's report. The Secretary-General said that he had not yet decided on the nature or the timing of a report. In any case, he would have to go to the Security Council on the question of the composition. He went on to expound on the procedure to be followed in obtaining the endorsement of the Security Council on the composition. Should the routine procedure prove impractical, the whole matter would have to be discussed formally by the council. In response to a question by Mr. Eksteen about whether he intended to report to the Security Council at the present time, the Secretary-General said that he did not intend to do so. However, he was considering t:v

A more formal report to the Council was conceivable after the return of Mr. Ahtisaari. In any case, he did not want to commit himself on the manner and timing of the report to the Security Council. A lot would have to depend on the developments. He undertook to keep Mr. Eksteen informed about such matters. ih

JJ/sd CONFIDENTIAL 11 January 1979

Notes on a meeting with the South African delegation held on 10 January 1979

Present: Mr. J. Adriaan Eksteen Mr. David W. Steward Mr. Brian E. Urquhart Mr. Martti Ahtisaari Col. Timothy K. Dibuama James O.C. Jonah

At the start of the meeting, Mr. Urquhart observed that Mr. Ahtisaari was about to leave for South Africa and Namibia for consultations relating to the emplacement of UNTAG. He also noted that Mr. Eksteen was about to leave for South Africa for consultations. In those circumstances, he felt it might be useful to start consultations on certain military aspects of UNTAG. Mr. Urquhart affirmed that the exercise was intended to look at a working model for determining the composition of the military component of UNTAG. In that connexion, he suggested that three factors ought to be borne in mind: 1. It would be necessary to determine which Member States of the United Nations would be acceptable to the parties concerned. 2. Whether any plan of composition would prove feasible. 3. It would be essential that the agreed composition should prove military workable. Mr. Urquhart went on to emphasize the tentative nature of the consultations as well as the desirability to observe the utmost confidentiality. In that context, he drew attention to the fact that consultations would be carried out with (a) South Africa, (b) with other parties, and (c) with the members of the Security Council. Obviously, it would be premature to disclose details of the present discussions when consultations have not yet been carried out with the other parties involved. He therefore sought an undertaking from Mr. Eksteen that the names of countries to be discussed would not be published. - 2 -

Mr. Urquhart recalled that in accordance with the Secretary-General's report, seven contingents should make up the military component of UNTAG. It has subsequently been agreed by the Secretary-General that one of the seven contingents will be held in reserve in its home country. In deciding on a possible composition of the military component of UNTAG, the Secretary-General would have to take into consideration not only the acceptability of the contingents and their ability to function effectively, but also the important issue of a broad geographical representation. In that context, the Secretary-General had the following tentative list in mind: i. Ghana ii. Finland iii. Bangladesh iv. A Latin American contingent; (Panama is being seriously considered but if it proved difficult to get Panama or any other Latin American country, India may have to be considered). v. Yugoslavia. Here it was observed that Romania had also indicated its readiness to serve, but it was not known what would be the reaction of the to Romania, vi. Consideration is also being given to a second African contingent. In this regard, Sudan might be approached to provide such a contingent, vii. There will be a reinforcement battalion which will not be deployed in Namibia but will be held in reserve in its home country. For the present time, Canada is being considered for this battalion. Mr. Eksteen then raised some questions which were responded to by Col. Dibuama. The questions related to the size of the various contingents and the strength of the military component of UNTAG. With respect to the overall size, Col. Dibuama stated that, excluding the reinforcement battalion (700) and the logistics component, it was 1|,200. The overall strength of the logistics component was 2,300; half of these would be civilian. In commenting on the remarks made by Mr. Urquhart with respect to the composition of the military component of UNTAG, Mr. Eksteen stated that he would refrain from making substantive comments since he would have to - 3 -

submit the list to his Government for its consideration and decision. In any event, he said that he felt obliged to note two factors that vould influence South Africa's decision on the composition: 1. South Africa would prefer that countries providing contingents for the military component of UWTAG should be drawn from countries familiar with the democratic process. 2. Troops should not come from countries that recognize SWAPO as the sole representatives of people, nor should these countries be those giving active military support to SWAPO. In response, Mr. Urquhart pointed out that, as has been previously conveyed to Brig. Huyser, units composing any UK peace-keeping force are under UN command. They would take their instructions from the Special Representative, Mr. Ahtisaari, and the Force Commander, General Philipps. Accordingly, it should be borne in mind that the separate units generally do not reflect the political position of their respective countries. In continuation of the consultation on the composition, Mr. Urquhart gave details of the distribution of functions for the logistics component as follows: 1. KAusJ^ralia would provide personnel for a maintenance unit, an engineer unit, and an engineer plant and work services troop. Possibly, part of this could come from West Germany. These could be civilians. 2. yljejamark might provide an administrative company which would also be civilian. 3. vWesi^ Germany and The Netherlands have offered to provide a medical company. U. Sweden has been requested to provide the following services: a supply company, a transport company, a movement control unit, and a postal unit. 5. |U.K.-'has offered to provide the signal unit, which is one of the S'%- W^ ^"^ '•' ^ most difficult to obtain. Mr. Eksteen raised further questions relating to the phasing of the military components in Namibia. In response, Col. Dibuama stated that the Force Commander and the initial logistics and headquarters units would arrive in Namibia during the first three weeks. Thereafter, the remaining six battalions would arrive as quickly as possible on a scheduled time- frame of one battalion a week. In any case, after D-day plus 70 the military component of UNTAG, with the exception of the reinforcement battalion, would be fully deployed in Namibia. CONFIDENTIAL

Note on a Meeting with Mr. A. Eksteen, Charge d'Affaires of the Republic of South Africa, held on 15 November 1978.

Present: Mr. A. Eksteen Mr. M. Ahtisaari Mr. H. Omayad Mr. B. Muganda

Mr. Ahtisaari asked Mr. Eksteen to meet him for the purpose of passing on the appended message from the Secretary-General to Foreign Minister Botha.

After Mr. Ahtisaari communicated the message, Mr. Eksteen wanted to know: -

(a) If the South African government sent a high ranking official, "What would happen to the Foreign Minister's appointment with the Secretary-General on

27 November 1978?"

(b) Could the Secretary-General's report of 25 November 1978 mention that the

Secretary-General was due to meet with the South African Foreign Minister on

27 November 1978?

Mr. Eksteen indicated that Foreign^Minister Botha had a commitment in South

X Africa on the 25th of November. ^v (c) When should these officials come?

Mr. Ahtisaari: - » (a) repeated that he was instructed to pass the message contained in Annex I concerning the meeting before the 25th of November;

(b) emphasized that the Secretary-General was obliged to submit his report to the Security Council by 25 November 1978. In this connexion, Mr. Ahtisaari also emphasized to Mr. Eksteen the importance of a meeting well before the 25th of

November;

(c) expressed the hope that the South African participants could come well before the 25th of November.

Mr. Eksteen promised to transmit the message to Foreign Minister Botha. UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

15 November 1978

The Secretary-General is grateful to Foreign Minister Botha for his suggestion, in response to the Secretary-General's request, of a meeting with him in New York.

While the Secretary-General welcomes the opportunity to discuss various questions concerning Namibia with the Foreign Minister, he

£ would like to draw his attention to the deadline of 25 November for the submission of the Secretary-General's report to the Security f *• Council on the-progress of the implementation of Resolution U39- . It

& was for this reason that the Secretary-General hoped to hold such discussions with the Foreign Minister or with a high-ranking repre- sentative before this deadline in order to clarify certain points in this connexion. *

The Secretary-General, therefore, wishes to suggest an earlier meeting with the Foreign Minister or, should this not be possible, with a high-ranking representative of the South African Government for the purposes outlined above. X

Note for the File

Subject: Meeting with the Chairman of the African Group

A meeting took place in the office of Mr. R. Ahmed at 1730 hours on 25 August 1978 between:

Mr. Patrice H. Houngavou (Benin) Chairman of the African Group Ambassador D. Ouattara Executive Secretary of the OAU Mr. R. Ahmed, Executive Assistant Offices of the Secretary-General Mr. A.A. Farah, Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Questions

Mr. Hounqavou said that the meeting had been requested in order to inform the Secretary-General that the African Group had decided to call for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the serious situation which has arisen as a result of continued air attacks. A request had been submitted to the President of the Security Council and it was the hope of the African Group that the meeting would take place on Saturday, 26 August 1978. Mr. Hbungavou said that during the discussion of the matter within the African Group, some members had expressed concern over a press statement which the Secretary-General had issued the previous week concerning the situation in Namibia. Those members considered it unfortunate that the Secretary-General should have issued the statement on the basis of complaints submitted by South Africa. It gave the impression that the Secretary-General had accepted the South African version of alleged events. It was important that the position of the Secretary-General not become controversial, and that statements be issued only after a careful assessment of the facts. He enquired whether the Secretary-General would now be disposed towards issuing a press statement condemning South Africa's aggression against Zambia. - 2 -

Ambassador Ouattara said that the situation in Namibia was a complex one, and likely to give rise to charges and countar charges. It might become counter productive for the Secretary-General to issue press statements on the strength of each complaint received. As the Secretary- General's position in the Namibian situation was a prime one, and needed to be protected, he thought that the best solution would be for the Secretary-General to adopt a neutral stance and not issue any statements in the future. Mr. Houngavou did not think that the Secretary-General should become neutral through silence, but should issue statements, as the situation required, in as an objective a manner as possible. Mr. Farah, referring to the press statement of the Secretary-General, explained that it had been issued after a most careful assessment of the situation. The statement was based not on the complaint made by South Africa but on a number of reports that had reached the Secretary-General from various sources, including African sources in Namibia, and on information submitted by his Special Representative while in Namibia. The statement had been carefully worded so as not to assign blame to any particular party. It was directed at all parties, particularly South Africa, since reports suggested that South African forces might, again, launch a pre-emptive strike against SWAPO bases and Namibian refugees in Angola. He had explained the matter to Mr. Ben Gurirab. Moreover, the reference to "heightened tensions" in the press statement was also directed at South Africa. It was meant to cover tha reaction of the Namibian people to the repressive policies of the Administration, including the detentioB?-and mistreatment of SWAPO leaders and supporters. Finally, the Secretary-General felt compelled to issue the statement to prevent any untoward development which might delay or harm the efforts of the United Nations towards a speedy solution of the problem. With regard to the alleged incidents in the , as well as the air attack on Sesheke in Zambia, Mr. Farah said that both the Permanent Mission of Zambia and the Permanent Mission of South Africa had sent communica- tions to the Secretary-General giving their versions of the alleged incidents. Arrangements were in hand to transmit their texts to the Secretary-General in Europe. The Sacratary- General would, no doubt, consider the advisability of issuing - 3 -

a press statement after he has taken all aspects into account, and if he felt that such a statement would be of help. Ambassador Ouattara said that the explanation of Mr. Farah had provided a batter understanding of the situation and this would enable them to inform the African Group accordingly. Ambassador Quattara then raised the question of recruitment for the United Nations operation in Namibia. He said that some concern had been expressed among African members about the composition of staff for the United Nations operation in Namibia. They had heard that coloured candidates were not being considered. They hoped the report was not true as it would be against the universal nature of the Organization. Mr. Ahmed assured them that, as far as he was aware, that was not the case. However, he would inform the departments concerned. He was confident that recruitment would be made on the basis of merit and suitability to the job requirements.

25 August 1978 cc: SG RA/AR ' -..!_< "7f c t.

Notes of a Meeting held on 16 February 1978

PRESENT: The Secretary -General Mr. Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues, Head, Angolan MPLA Central Committee Miss Olga Lima, Member of delegation, Angolan MPLA Central Committee Miss Celeste de Carvalho, Member of delegation, Angolan MPLA Central Committee Ambassador ELisio de Figueiredo, Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Angola to the United Nations Mr. A. A. Farah, Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Questions

Mr. Rodrigues said he had asked for the meeting vith the Secretary-General to give him the Angolan assessment of the outcome of the recent Namibian talks. He said that Angola had attended as observers. The Angolan Government had been briefed on the substance of the proposals by the Group of Five when their representatives visited Luanda recently. The position of Angola had been made clear then. It supported the views of SWAPO on all points, in particular the demand that South African troops be withdrawn to the southern border of Namibia and not kept in the northern sectors. SWAPO had made important concessions during the talks in New York vis-a-vis withdrawing its opposition to the presence of a small number of South African troops during the transitional period. Referring to the Rhodesian situation, Mr. Rodrigues said that the news from Rhodesia yesterday announcing an internal settlement had not come as a surprise. However, a settlement without the participation and agreement of the Patriotic Front would not lead to peace. In Mr. Rodrigues1 view, the Secretary-General had an important role to play in the solution of the problems of southern Africa. Angola, he said, was willing and prepared to co-operate with the Secretary-General and the United Nations in effecting speedy and just solutions.

The Secretary-General then gave a summary of the principal areas where agreement has yet to be reached:

•*•/••• - 2 -

(1) The number and location of South African troops in Namibia. (2) . (3) Relationship between the Secretary-General's representative and the Administrator General. (k) Questions relating to the release of political prisoners. The Secretary-General then gave a resume of his talks with the Government of South Africa on those matters. The Secretary-General had warned Foreign Minister Botha of the dangers which would result if South Africa decide to go ahead with an internal settlement which excluded SWAPO. Referring to the situation in Rhodesia, the Secretary-General said he had always maintained that the Patriotic Front must have a role in any settlement talks on the question of Rhodesia's independence. The Secretary-General was in favour of an overall settlement which included the participation of the Patriotic Front and which had as its objective the achievement of majority rule. Mr. Rodrigues said he wished to make clear that Angola had not launched any attacks against Namibian territory. South African forces were the cause of all incidents along its borders with Namibia. There no would be/problems along the border if it was patrolled by United Nations forces instead of by South Africa. Angola was prepared to co-operate with a United Nations force. He emphasized that so long as South Africans were kept on the Angolan border there would be no peace, nor would there be a peaceful transition to independence in Namibia. The Secretary-General thanked the delegation for their visit and for the opportunity to exchange views. He asked them to convey to President Neto his warm regards.

A. A. Farah 16 February 1978 Notes of a Meeting held on 13 February, 1978

PRESENT: The Secretary-General Foreign Minister Dr» S. G. Mwale of Zambia Ambassadress Gwendoline Konie, Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations Mr. A. A. Farah, Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Questions

Dr. Mwale expressed disappointment that Foreign Minister Botha should have walked out of the Namlbian talks over the weekend. The trend of the talks reminded him of the pattern of actions that had taken place over the question of Southern Rhodesia. On the surface the South Africans give the appearance that they are prepared for a settlement; when substantive issues are discussed, their representatives abruptly end the talks and walk out. The Secretary-General said that there were four major matters which could present problems: (1) Number and location of South African troops in Namibia. (2) The respective roles of the Secretary-General's representative and the Administrator General. (3) Walvis Bay. (U) The size of the United Nations Force. Other questions vhich remain to be solved relate to the return of refugees and the return of prisoners. Dr. Mwale said he was amazed by the number of detainees which South Africa had alleged were under detention in Zambia and Tanzania. One source had claimed it was 1,000. Dr. Mwale said that the few who were under detention were being held for their own safety. Referring to the proposal for a United Nations Force of 5,000 troops, Dr. Mwale thought that a compromise could be reached if the figure included the civilian personnel required for the interim administration. - 2 -

Regarding the role of the United Nations representative, he felt that it must be paramount. Namibia was a United Nations trust territory. The United Nations representative should have the final word in decisions, otherwise the Administrator General would do whatever he wished. The Secretary-General said that he had met with both Secretary of State Vance (USA) and Secretary of State Jamieson (Canada). They did not consider the talks had been a failure and that negotiations would continue. Mr. Botha had told the Western group that he had not broken off the talks, but that he had to return to South Africa to consult with his Prime Minister on a number of fundamental issues which had arisen during the course of discussion. The two Secretaries of State hoped to receive the reactions of South Africa on those issues by the middle of the current week. The Secretary-General said he had the feeling that the Group of Five were anxious to avoid giving the impression that the talks had failed. They were anxious that the talks should continue until agreement was reached. The matter would then be taken to the Security Council. Dr. Mwale shared the feeling that the Group of Five were anxious to reach a settlement. He said his Government was particularly impressed by the position taken by Canada on its intention to phase out economic involvement in South Africa. It appeared too that the United States were also intent on seeking change in South Africa, and that the Foreign Minister of West Germany also seemed determined in that respect. Dr. Mwale had assured the Western group of Zambia's willingness to co-operate to find a solution but made clear that any agreement must be within the context of resolution 305. Furthermore, the Council for Namibia must be allowed to play a part. Referring to Rhodesia, Dr. Mwale said that Smith was taking a dangerous course, which could bring disaster to the country. He was endeavouring to capitalize on the differences between the black

»•«/*•• - 3 - leadership and to bring about a bogus solution in the form of an "internal settlement". There would be no peace, he said, so long as Smith pursued a solution along the lines of an internal settlement. It would bring about a bloody civil war. The situation was of particular concern to Zambia because of Zambia's geopolitical position. Zambia had already suffered considerable loss of life and destruction of property at the hands of the armed forces' illegal regime. Dr. Mwale again referred to the economic problems which Zambia was suffering as a result of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. He said that the economy had been severely damaged, not only by events in Southern Rhodesia, but also by developments in other neighbouring countries. He cited, as an example, the stranding of hundreds of wagons in Angola because of the disruption of the Benguela railway system and the importance of exporting copper through Angola. He said that the economy had also suffered adversely by a drastic fall in copper prices. The market had reached a record low and copper exports would not bring in revenue this year. Dr. Mwale welcomed the arrangements which were being made to send a mission to Zambia during February for preliminary discussions with the authorities for the purpose of reorienting the United Rations assistance programme. The Secretary-General described his meeting with Dr. Owen (UK) on the Malta talks. Dr. Mwale commented that while Dr. Owen was endeavouring to stick to the UK/US proposals, the British Parliament was not helping the situation by laying undue emphasis on the "internal settlement" talks that were taking place in Rhodesia. He added that,the situation in Southern Rhodesia had reached its present dangerous state because the United Kingdom had allowed it to drift from the very beginning.

A. A. Farah 16 February 1978 •V

Motes of a Meeting held on Saturday, 11 February 1978

PRESENT: The Secretary-General Dr. Sergio Vieira, Special Envoy of the President of Mozambique Ambassador Jose Carlos Lobo, Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations Mr. A. A. Farah, Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Questions

NAMIBIA Dr. Vieira handed the Secretary-General a written message from President Machel. He explained that his visit to New York was for the purpose of observing the Namibian talks, and to brief the Secretary-General on the position of Mozambique vis-a-vis Namibia and Southern Rhodesia. On the question of Namibia, Dr. Vieira said that his Government had studied carefully the Western proposals and had also maintained close contact with SWAPO and the Front Line States on their substance. The proposals had positive aspects, as well as some which could jeopardize attempts for a solution. The negative aspects were: 1. The reduced role and status of SWAPO in the settlement proposals. The proposals would make SWAPO equal to any other organization in Namibia and ignores the fact that the General Assembly has always accorded it a special status. 2. SWAPO has an armed force which has been waging a successful war of liberation against South Africa. Yet the proposals would require the disarming and disbandment of those forces immediately the elections have taken place. In a post-independent Namibia the country will require its own army. Moreover, should a democratic Namibia emerge, SWAPO's armed forces could be transferred from the control of the party and placed under the legally established •**

- 2 -

government. These points are disregarded by the proposals and SWAPO's armed force has been treated as if it vere a defeated army* 3. The police in Namibia is an armed force and not a civilian force. Under the proposals the police would be responsible for maintaining lav and order. It disregards the fact that the police force is a South African force and has been responsible for continued acts of repression against the population. Furthermore, the force vould be subject to the authority of the Administrator General and not to the United Nations, and would continue in control until the elections are completed. h. The role of the United Nations, under the proposals, would be to monitor the activities of the South African military. He considered the term "monitor" was too vague to have any real meaning and that the task and responsibilities of the force should be spelt out with more precision and detail. Dr. Vieira said it should be made clear that the United Nations Representative in Namibia should have two primary powers - (a) the power to initiate new measures, and (b) the power to block any measure with which he does not agree. These two powers should be explicit in any understanding of the term "to satisfy himself". On the question of buffer zones, Dr. Vieira said that the proposals would envisage the United Nations Force patrolling Angola territory bordering South Africa. This would imply that Angola was part of the conflict - a thesis which is quite unacceptable. Furthermore, if it is considered necessary to patrol the territories of countries bordering Namibia why has no provision been made for patrolling inside South Africa? On the question of internal security, Dr. Vieira said that it was important to effect the immediate disarming of civilians. In that regard he cited the experience of Mozambique immediately after independence - 3 - and also felt th-hat the same concern related to the situation in Southern Rhodesiia. Dr. Vieira argued that if white settlers were allowed to retaiin their weapons, then there could "be no refusal to the black population enjoying the same right. Such an eventuality would lead to cisiaos. In the view of Mozambique, the disarming of the civilian population must be accorded top priority and such provision shoulci be included in any settlement proposals. On the quesstion of Walvis Bay, Dr. Vieira wanted to know whether the population o£f Walvis Bay would be consulted about their future. He emphasized tlz& unacceptability of South African troops being withdrawn from cither parts of Namibia and concentrated in the Walvis Bay area. Referring tcp the earlier question of the role of the United Nations in Namibia, Dr. Tieira said that if South Africa found it difficult in making public any details of that role, it might perhaps agree to a. "secret protocol™-

SOUTHERN RHODESIA Dr. Vieira said that his Government had been surprised at the reluctance of Britain to permit the presence of representatives of the Front Line States to the recent Malta talks. Britain eventually agreed after the Patriotic Front had made the matter an issue. Dr. Vieira said that his Government could not understand the approach of the United Kingdom to the proposals which they had presented to the Patriotic Front. It appeared that the proposals were being used simply to obtain the views of the Patriotic Front and not as a serious basis for an agreement. The Patriotic Front had come prepared to have a discussion on substance and to dispose of matters as they were presented. It transpired that Britain did not want to commit themselves to any outcome of the discussions. They gave the impression that they were simply testing the reactions of the Patriotic Front without committing themselves. Furthermore, it was apparent that the British also had their eyes on the internal settlement talks that were taking place inside Rhodesia. Dr. Vieira said that the Front Line States had warned the United Kingdom that they were playing a dangerous game. For example, a few days earlier the United States Ambassador in Maputo had approached him for an assessment of Mozambique's reactions to Rhodesia's internal settlement talks. Dr. Vieira had replied that if the United States/United Kingdom wish to avoid a "Vietnamization" of the situation, they should not give any form of recognition to the talks that were taking place inside Rhodesia. Dr. Vieira said that Mozambique was disturbed to see the reinforcement of Smith's armed forces. That was apparent by the Chimoio attack, in which Mirage planes were employed. Furthermore, there had "been an increase in the recruitment of mercenaries by the Smith regime. Dr. Vieira said that Mozambique had endeavoured, as far as possible, to respect international borders, but that it could not be expected to remain passive for long if the attacks against Mozambique territory continued. Replying to a question "by the Secretary-General, Dr. Vieira said that it was the Patriotic Front which had proposed the establishment of a Governing Council during the interim period. It was made clear to the British that Lord Carver could not exercise sole control over the affairs of Rhodesia during the interim period. There were a number of highly sensitive issues such as that relating to internal peace and security which demanded the sharing of power with the principal parties of the country. Unfortunately, he said, the British had transformed the idea of a Governing Council to an Advisory Council and had broadened the proposed membership to include representatives of all political organizations. The Secretary-General thanked Dr. Vieira for presenting him with the position of Mozambique on the questions of Namibia and Southern Rhodesia. J '

- 5 -

Referring to Namibia, the Secretary-General commented that the Western proposals were not explicit regarding the powers of the United Nations Representative. SWAPO, he said, wanted a clear-cut mandate for the United Nations, but South Africa was only willing to concede the right "to satisfy". The Secretary-General explained that any arrangements agreed upon would have to go before the Security Council before the Secretary-General could take action on them. Replying to a question by Dr. Yieira, the Secretary-General said that he had proposed Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Commissioner for Namibia, to be his representative in Namibia should a United Nations presence be established in the territory. Concerning the United Nations Force, the Secretary-General said that he had discussed the matter earlier in the morning with Mr. Sam Njoma. Mr. Njoma had suggested the names of several countries which were willing to send contingents to participate in the United Nations Force. Regarding Walvis Bay, the Secretary-General considered it a highly complex and sensitive issue. However, he had made his position clear on the matter and had said that it should be part of Namibia. South Africa contended that their case was based on an internationally recognized treaty. Concluding the meeting, the Secretary-General thanked Dr. Vieira for the analysis of the situation. He said that he had taken careful note of the position in Mozambique on various aspects of the problem and that he would continue to search for a solution to the two problems in line with the resolutions of the United Nations.

A. A. Farah 16 February 1978 Notes of a Meeting held on Saturday, 11 February 1978

PRESENT: The Secretary-General Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania Ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim, Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations Mr. A. A. Farah, Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Questions

NAMIBIA The Foreign Minister said that President Nyerere had been encouraged by the Western proposals and considered that they offered a basis for a possible settlement of the Namibia question this year. However, there were two matters of concern to Tanzania. The proposals were not specific on - (a) the size of the proposed United Nations Force. He considered that the United Nations should have a noticeable presence and this could best be indicated if the numbers were given. (b) the role of the United Nations representative of the territory. It was most important for the role to be spelt out in clear and greater detail, so that there would be no misunderstandings about his powers of authority. The Secretary-General agreed that it was most important to clarify the proposal of the United Nations in Namibia. He did not consider that it was necessary to mention the specific number of troops which should constitute the United Nations Force. In other peace-keeping situations, he said, such practice had not been followed. The mandate, so long as it was clear, would determine the number. The Secretary-General also agreed that the term "to satisfy" was vague, but it had been explained to him by the Group of Five that it was deliberate. It appeared that any detailed explanation of the term would present a problem for the South African - 2 -

Government in the South African Parliament. He said that the Mozambique delegation had suggested that South Africa agree to a secret protocol vhich vould spell out the mandate of the United Nations in Namibia. Such a protocol, it vas suggested, vould cover such questions as special representative's veto power, as veil as his pover to initiate nev measures. The Secretary-General said that it vas his intention to appoint Mr. Martti Ahtisaari as his Special Representative in Namibia should an agreement be reached. He had discussed the matter vith Mr. NJoma, vho had expressed satisfaction vith the proposal. The matter had also been raised vith Mr. Botha, vho had indicated that South Africa vould go along vith the proposal. Referring to his talks vith Mr. Botha, the Secretary-General said that South Africa vould not accept a reduction of South African troops in Namibia from a figure of 3,000 to 1,500 as suggested by the Western group. On the question of Walvis Bay, Mr. Botha vas adamant on keeping Walvis Bay under South African sovereignty. Mr. Botha referred to the Treaty of 1892 vhich, it vas claimed, ceded Walvis Bay to South Africa. The Foreign Minister said it vas important for the United Nations to have firm control over the electoral commission by having the pover to initiate nev measures. The United Nations, he continued, should be involved in the delimitation of constituencies and the registration of voters. Both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Salim considered it vital for the United Nations to be given a clear-cut mandate in Namibia. Othervise, the Secretary-General vould be caught up in political cross-fire.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA Referring to the Malta talks, the Foreign Minister said that it had nov been made clear that the Patriotic Front vanted elections before independence. Secondly, the Patriotic Front also vanted the establishment of a Governing Council during the interim period in vhich it can participate.

»«*/>«• - 3 -

While it was reasonable for the British Resident Representative to retain responsibility for defence and external relations, the maintenance of law and order should be a shared responsibility and not the sole responsibility of the Resident Representative.

A. A. Farah 16 February 197° / •_-<\

Note for the File

Subject; Namibia

Mr. Ben Gurirab. the SWAPO Representative to the United Nations, came to my office today. Present at the meeting was Mr. Martti Ahtisaari. Mr. Gurirab said that the purpose of his visit was to brief me on the meetings which had taken place from 8-11 August between SWAPO and the representatives of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. Mr. Gurirab described the developments leading to the meetings saying that it had taken place at the request of the five western states. He said that SWAPO approached the meetings with an open mind since it would prefer the problem of Namibia to be decided by peaceful means rather than by armed struggle. Furthermore, SWAPO was aware that the five states had in the past always frustrated attempts by the international community to bring about a quick solution to the problem. Mr. Gurirab said that SWAPO submitted to the meeting a document outlining its views on basic aspects of the problem (He handed a copy to Mr. Farah for the information of the Secretary-General). He said-that the document touched upon the following questions: 1. territorial integrity 2. withdrawal of all troops before elections 3. unimpeded progress towards independence 4. an insistence that South Africa should refrain from interrupting t±ie political process and the transfer of power. 5. South Africa to respect the public property of Namibia and not to have any part removed. 6. full respect by South Africa of the sovereignty of an independent Namibia. Mr. Gurirab said that also during the meeting there was a discussion about the withdrawal of South African troops. In SWAPO's view the withdrawal should be phased over three months. Each contingent of troops withdrawn should be replaced by U.N. troops. It vould be necessary for a contingent of U.N. troops to arrive before the withdrawal began in order to monitor the operation from the start. - 2 -

Mr. Gurirab said that in SWAPO's view the U.N. troops and the administration should be under the direction of the United Nations Special Representative. During the meetings, SWAPO had suggested a U.N. force of between 4,000 - 5,OOO men. Mr. Gurirab said that SWAPO was in full agreement with free elections on the basis of one man one vote. Furthermore, SWAPO had no obj ection to the pr esence of an administrator- general appointed by South Africa. However, the U.N. Special Representative must be regarded as the highest authority in the territory. The South African administrator-general should be concerned with the day-to-day administration. Policy, how- ever, should be the responsibility of the United Nations. Mr;. Gurirab said that SWAPO had agreed to a "cooperate" approach". He'"handed to Mr. Far ah, for the information of the Secretary-General, a copy of the agreed notes of the meetings. In reply to a question, Mr. Gurirab said that the question of contingency planning by the Secretary-General was raised with SWAPO by the Representatives of the five western states SWAPO had replied that formal action by the Secretary-General could only be taken through a decision by either the Security Council or the General Assembly. However, if the Secretary- General wished to engage on an informal planning exercise within the Secretariat, SWAB would have no objection. He referred to paragraph 15 of the agreed notes of the meeting. Mr. Farah thanked Mr. Gurirab for the information he had given and undertook to bring it to the attention of the Secretary-General.

cc: Office of the Secretary-General^,^/ Mr. Ahmed/Mr. Hayrhofer CC Note for the File

Subject: Namibia

On my return from Libreville, Ambassador McHenry, accompa- nied by a State Department aide, visited my office on 5 July 1977 for an exchange of views on the 'Western initiative on Namibia. I informed him at the outset that it was the Secretary- General's intention to brief the Group of 5 on his talks at the OAU Summit Conference when he returned to New York on or about July 15. I stated that although the consensus of opinion in L-ibreville was in favour of the continued exploratory talks, the proposals that had emerged from the Cape Town meetings did not satisfy African demands. I said that the three major questions which required clarification related to the presence of South African troops in Namibia, the status and functions of the Secretary- General's representative and the relationship between the Secretary- General's representative and the proposed Administrator-General. I also mentioned that there was a strong tendency among African leaders in support of a United Nations police force to replace South African troops. Ambassador McHenry expressed disappointment that African leaders did not fully appreciate the opportunities which the Cape Town proposals provided. He believed that the proposals provided a framework which could accommodate, in essence and in practice, all the demands that the Africans sought for adequate safeguards and the creation of a proper political climate for the expression of their legitimate rights. Ambassador McHenry considered that the Secretary-General should initiate action within the UN for contingency planning in the event that the UN should be called upon to assume responsibilities in the Territory. He enquired whether any form of contingency planning had been done in the past by any of the organs or bodies seized with the problem. Ambassador McHenry stated that the Group of 5 had extended an invitation to to visit New York on 11 july« He believed that Mr. Nujoma would accept the invitation but that his arrival would not be until July 18. He hoped that both the Secretary-General and myself would be available for contact during the course of Mr. Nujoma1s stay.

8 July 1977 CONFIDENTIAL

Note of a Meeting held on 3 July 1977 in Libreville, Gabon

Present: The Secretary-General President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia Dr. S.G. Mwale, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia Mr. A.A. Farah

The Secretary-General gave details of the briefing he had received from the 5 Western powers on results of the Cape Town talks. The Secretary-General also gave details of his meetings with Foreign Minister Botha in New York as well as with African members of the Security Council and members of the Steering Committee of the Council for Namibia. The Secretary-General said that he had reached a cross road concerning the direction he should take in the light of current developments. In his view the 5 powers had achieved some success in persuading Vorster in giving up the approach and. to secure agreement on a UN presence in the territory. Yet, despite those developments, the Secretary- General did not feel that they provided an adequate basis for a settlement. He considered that clarifications were needed on the terms of reference of the Secretary-General's representative and of the Administrator-General, and on the question of South African forces in Namibia.

The Secretary-General said that Mr. Botha did not contemplate any withdrawal of troops on the grounds that their presence was necessary to ensure protection of the public services and a secure political atmosphere. Mr. Botha did not respond to a suggestion by the Secretary-General that South African forces could, perhaps, be replaced by United Nations forces. The Secretary-General said that the reaction of Mr. Sam Nujoma to the Cape Town proposals were not positive. Mr. Sam Nujoma had told him in Libreville that any settlement of the Namibia problem should be based on Security Council resolution 385. Mr. Nujoma was also emphatic about the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia. Mr. Nujoma considered that the precise role of the Secretary-General's representative should be clarified before any decision was taken on the proposals. He felt that the Secretary-General should ascertain whether the Secretary-General's representative would have responsibility for the administration of the territory or would serve only as an observer. - 2 -

President Kaunda said that he had been briefed on the latest round of the Cape Town talks by Prime Minister Callaghan during his recent visit to the United Kingdom. President Kaunda said his first reaction was that if the South African Government was genuine in its motives why was it not prepared to agree to the appointment of the Secretary-General's representative as the Administrator-General of the territory. In his opinion the Namibian situation seemed to be following a course of "a little too late". Prime 1-linister Callaghan had told him that he intended to ask the British Ambassador in Pretoria to contact Vorster before the latter made a formal announcement on the matter. President Kaunda said that there would be no problem if the Administrator-General was appointed by the Secretary-General. In his view the Secretary-General's representative should be the man in charge. On the question of South African troops in Namibia, President Kaunda said that their withdrawal was "absolutely necessary". He explained that many of these troops were currently engaged in fighting SWAPO. Under such circumstances it could not be expected that they would act impartially towards SWAPO. By the same token SWAPO could not be expected to trust South African troops for their security. President Kaunda said that the Namibia solution must ensure the free expression of the people in all of the political process. For that reason responsibility for law and order should not be entrusted to a partisan force, such as the , but to a neutral force - the United Nations. President Kaunda said that no state would quarrel with the presence of UN troops in Namibia, and SWAPO would have no grounds to contest their presence. President Kaunda summarised his views on Namibia by saying a) that the Administrator-General must be appointed by the Secretary-General and must be in complete charge of the interim administration in Namibia, and b) that the presence of the South African troops in Namibia should be ended, and should be replaced by UN troops. The Secretary-General observed that from information he had received, South Africa was not prepared to go beyond the limits o£ the Cape Town proposals. President Kaunda said that no African state would accept a situation whereby South African troops mantained a presence in Namibia. He promised to write to the Heads of Government of the 5 Western powers to point out the realities as Africans saw them. - 3 -

The Secretary-General said that he would discuss the two points with the Contact Group before going further. He would also discuss with the Legal Office the question whether he could appoint a representative in Namibia or whether such an appointment required the prior approval of the Security Council in view of financial and other implications. The Secretary-General recalled that Mr. Nujoma had stated that it was his intention to call for a special session of the General Assembly to discuss Namibia. The Secretary-General said that the timing could raise technical problems as the UN was currently involved with the Law of the Sea and the Economic and Social Council, and that a resumed 31st session of the Gene- ral Assembly was scheduled to begin during the first two weeks in September. President Kaunda commented that a Special Conference on Namibia at the present stage might not be wise. In his view it was necessary to persevere with the quiet diplomacy approach. A conference would detract from the practical effects which quiet diplomacy could bring about.

11 July 1977

AAF/aa cc: SG RA/AR IV,

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES ON A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OP SWAPO HELD IN LIBREVILLE (GABON) ON 1 JULY 1977

Present: The Secretary-General Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of SWA1/0 Mr. Antony Katamila, Vice-President of SWAPO Mr. Lukas Pohamba, Special Assistant to the President, Mr. A.A. Farah Mr. K.K. Pe'danou

The Secretary-General referred to the meetings which he had had with representatives of the African Group (the 3 African members of the Security Council and the current Chairman of the African Group), the members of the Steering Committee of the Council for Namibia, representatives of the frontline states and Mr. R. Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, to discuss the initiative of the Five"Western members of the Security Council regarding Namibia.

As a result of those meetings, it appeared that the main which problems/remained to be solved were the question of the relationship between the Administrator-General to be appointed by South Africa and the Special Representative of the Secretary- General, the terms of reference of the Special Representative and the question of withdrawal of South Africa's armed forces from Namibia. Moreover, the African members of the Security Council and the Steering Committee of the Council for Namibia has questioned the legality of the approach of the Five. The question that arose therefore was whether one should insist on the legal aspect of the problem or whethes it was worth trying the pragmatic approach followed by the Five.

A.. Implementation of Security Council resolution 385 Mr. Nujoma said that the approach of the Five was not too serious considering the critical stage that had been reached in the liberation struggle. Elections and withdrawal of South African armed forces; The South Africans, he said, were determined to go ahead with the elections which they intended to hold by 31 December. The Five seemed to acquiesce, giving the impression that they were more interested in the provisions of Security Council resolution 385 concerning elections than in the other provisions, particularly with regard to South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia. For SWAPO, the idea of elections before South Africa's withdrawal was not acceptable. South Africa was the enemy and/was unthinkable for SWAPO to participate in elections while the enemy was still occupying the Territory. Other conditions for participation in elections; SWAPOfs conditions for participation also included complete cease fire, restoration of climate of peace and United Nations presence which was required for adequate preparation of the elections. The elections should be the last stage of a well-prepared process. SWAPO leaders did not dsiuand that the Territory be handed over to them? they agreed to the electoral process provided that the conditions were acceptable.

Appointment of an Administrator-General This was unacceptable to SWAPO because it would merely be the continuation of the colonial set-up in Namibia. According to the French ambassador in Luanda, the Administrator-General would be a South African judga. Cn the other hand, while it was true that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would have to satisfy himself at all stages with the fairness of the political process, it was clear that he would ba only an observer while the Administrator-General would wield the real power. - 3 -

United Nations presence Any special representative of the Secretary-General should have enough staff and troops to protect him and his staff, for South Africa regarded the United Nations as the enemy. The appointment of the Special Representative should be made taking into account the role which the Council for Namibia should play. The Council should not be by-passed. Following an exchange of views on the question of South Africa' s unwillingness to hand over the administration of Namibia to the United Nations and to withdraw its troops, the questions of phased j withdrawal, the withdrawal to border areas and of mixed presence (UN and South African troops) were discussed. Sam Nujoma stressed the importance of complete withdrawal of South African armed forces and their replacement by a United Nations force. He pointed oxxt that S«APO had five batallions in the field and that he could not order his men to lay down their arms while the enemy was still in the Territory. In conclusion, I-lr. Nujoma said that he would agree that the Five should continue their demarche if it was meant to assist the UN to implement Security Council resolution 38 E and if the Five were determined to exert enough pressure on South Africa so as to bring about a genuine settlement of the problem. SWAPO would never accept that the United Nations, particularly the Council for Namibia, be by-passed as a result of the initiative of the Five. Special session of the General Asserably Following an exchange of views on the question of a special session of the General Assembly referred to in the draft resolution which had been circulated by SVIAPO, it was agreed that the session might be requested to commence on 29 August 1977.

HKP/-J eb 15 July 1977 cc: Mr. A. Farah RA AR/FMG AAP/aa

Note of a meeting held on 28 September 1976

Present: The Secretary-General Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO Mr. A. A. Far ah

Mr. Sam Nujoma said that in his talks with President Nyerere of Tanzania he had made clear the position of SWAPO and that position had been conveyed to Mr. Kissinger. However, there was resistance to acceptance of the conditions which SWAPO had set out. These conditions were: 1. That a constitutional conference should be convened outside Namibia without delay. Such conference must not be regarded as a continuation of the constitutional talks in and must commence afresh. 2. The conference must be held under the auspices of the United Nations. 3. That participation should be confined to representa- tives of South Africa, SWAPO and the United Nations. 4. SWAPO would not accept that the conference be composed of representatives of tribal groups and SWAPO. South Africa's presence was essential since it would be required to discuss modalities for the transfer of power and answer any questions which might arise. 5. South Africa must release all political prisoners. Such an act would create a favourable political atmosphere and would enable some of the released prisoners to join SWAPO at the conference. 6. South Africa must make a commitment to the withdrawal of its armed forces from the territory. The timing of the withdrawal could be discussed.

The Secretary-General referred to a proposal by Mr.MacBride concerning the chairmanship of the proposed conference. It had been suggested that while the Secretary-General should open the proceedings all working sessions should be entrusted to a personal representative. Mr. S. RoJnphal, Secretary General of the Commonwealth Secretariat, had been suggested as a candidate for that post. - 2 -

-n Nujoma said that Mr. MacBride had also informed proposal. However, Mr. Nujoma did not consider ±iter should leave UN hands, and that it would be 3ffhen the Secretary-General was unable to chair :gs, to appoint an official from within the , za to perform that function. rgoma remarked that South Africa was opposed to zing any role in the Namibian negotiations, and =>dby some states. SWAPO attached great importance rivement of the UN at all stages of negotiations, ss Secretary-General would raise the matter with =*r when they next met to secure his Government's -.negotiations to be conducted under the umbrella =d Nations.

1976 UNITED NATIONS mm NATIONS UNIES

REFERENCE: sO

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

NAMIBIA - 28 SEPTEMBER 1976

The most satisfactory outcome of present discussions would be agreement

that: 1. The Secretary-General would convene a small conference consisting of only representatives of the South African Government and SWAPO. The venue of the conference should preferably be Geneva. The function of this small preliminary meeting presided over by the Secretary-General should be two-fold:

a. The convening of a larger conference to discuss the transfer of powers to the people of Namibia and to arrange the date and modalities of such

conference. b. To draw up the agenda for the larger conference.

2. The larger conference could be called the Namibia Independence Conference. It should be held under the auspices of the United Nations and pre- sided over by a chairman and mediator chosen by the Secretary-General. In this connexion I would suggest Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal who is also Secretary-General

of the Commonwealth but who could be your personal representative.

3. I think that SWAPO is likely to insist that the conference should be

convened and held under the auspices of the United Nations.

h. The fact that the preliminary conference between South Africa and SWAPO was being convened to discuss the composition of a larger conference would, UNITED NATIONS WmM NATIONS U N I E S

I think, make it easier for South Africa to accept to meet SWAPO and would enable South Africa to ensure the participation of some of their African adherents (e.g., Chief Kapuuo). It would also enable SWAPO to secure the invitation of some of their friends.

5. The main conference would be likely to be somewhat protracted. The

issues would involve not only elections but also such issues as protection of minorities, human rights, Waivis Bay status frontier adjustments and transfer of sections of the German population. Tang Mr. MacBride Mr. Farah CONFIDENTIAL KH/FMG/MP/TR/IL

Notes on a meeting held in the Secretary-General's Office _ on 29 October 1975 at 5 p.m. _

Present: The Secretary-General Mr. Jacques Lecompt, Deputy Permanent Representative of France Ambassador Ivor Richard, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, Permanent Representative of the United States Mr. R. Ahmed

Speaking also on behalf of his two colleagues, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom informed the Secretary-General that on 23 October the three Powers had given a joint aide memoire on Namibia to the Government of South Africa as a follow-up to the demarche they had made in April of this year. The joint aide memoire emphasized the following points: (1) South Africa should announce that the consultations with the ethnic groups in Namibia were advisory rather than definitive; " (2) South Africa should consult with the Secretary-General regarding the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of Namibia. There should be United Nations supervision of the process under which this should take place,- (3) Namibia should achieve independence as one State unless the inhabitants were to decide otherwise. South Africa should not influence them in making their choice; (4) South Africa should release all Namibians arrested for political reasons and permit all political exiles to return to Namibia; (5) South Africa should abolish all racial laws in Namibia. The Secretary-General thanked the three Permanent Representatives for informing him of the initiative of their Governments. He expressed the hope that their joint action would lead to a taoro flexible attitude on the part of South Africa. He enquired about the position of their Cover- ments regarding SWAPO which is mainly active outside Namibia. Ambassador Richard said that, as mentioned in the aide memoire, they wanted South Africa to permit all political - 2 - exiles to return to Namibia. This should allow SWAPO to freely participate in the political process inside Namibia. He added that what in effect the three Governments were asking South Africa to do was to provide a prompt, clear and comprehensive response to Security Council resolution 336. "Substantial further progress would be required on the part of South Africa if this were to be secured. The Secretary-General again thanked the three Permanent Representatives for the information and clarification provided and stated that it was his understanding that no immediate action was required of him but rather that he would wait to be contacted by the South Africans. This was confirmed by Ambassador Richard.

R. "Sfimed CONFIDENTIAL .

Note on a Meeting held in the Secretary-General1 s Office on 2 September 1975, at 6,30 p.m.

Present: H.E. Mr. S. S. Raraphal, Commonwealth Secretary General and a member of his Secretariat The Secretary-General Mr. R. Ahmed

Mr. Ramphal formally handed the Secretary-General a copy of an Interim Report by a Group of Experts entitled "Towards a New International Economic Order" which had been examined at a special Ministerial Session on the occasion of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting in Georgetown on 26 August. The report provided a broad consensual basis for moving towards the implementation of the Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the Sixth Special Session, even on some of the delicate issues such as indexation and transfer of technology. He however emphasized that they view their efforts as being complementary to the work of the United Nations. Cyprus Mr. Ramphal said that the Committee which had been set up by the Heads of Government Meeting "to follow developments concerning Cyprus, make recommendations and assist in every possible way towards the early implementation of the relevant UN resolutions" wants to assist in the efforts of the Secretary-General in resolving the issues. They had followed with great interest and admiration the progress which had been made under the Secretary-General's leadership in moving towards a solution. Mr. Ramphal had seen the Foreign Minister of Cyprus and he would join in the plea that Mr. Christophides had addressed to the Secretary-General to do all he could to encourage Mr. Deriktash to move forward in the next round. The Secretary-General, in thanking Mr. Ramphal for his offer of support, mentioned that the last round of talks had achieved important, although - in some respects - limited, results. In fact it could be regarded as representing a breakthrough. He outlined some of the results which had been achieved. As regards Mr. Denktash, the Secretary-General mentioned that he had a difficult task inasmuch as he was under continuous Turkish pressure. Mr. Ramphal stated that the Commonwealth initiative had no other purpose than to help the Secretary- General; they would not wish to do anything which might adversely affect his endeavours. - 2 -

The Secretary-General appreciated this cautious and careful approach emphasizing that the Turks in particular resented any outside intervention as had been shown recently in the case of the initiative taken by the European Economic Community. Assuring the Secretary-General that this would not happen in the case of the Commonwealth Secretariat, Mr. Ramphal said they would take further steps after the next round only if the Secretary-General felt their assistance might help to advance the negotiating process. The Secretary-General promised to keep him informed and stated that if nothing tangible emerged from the next round he might need their assistance in pressing towards a solution. It was essential to keep the negotiating process moving as there was no other alternative but he was not too optimistic about the next round. Turning to Rhodesia, Mr. Ramphal said that the Commonwealth Heads of Government had been very anxious to take whatever action was necessary in support of Mozambique in the event that the country decided to support the sanctions policy against Southern Rhodesia. Nothing, however, had happened so far as the new regime was understandably hesitant and might be waiting to see the results of the efforts which had been initiated by President Kaunda. They might also be concerned about the magnitude of the financial impact on their economy of applying the sanctions policy. If and when Mozambique decided to follow this course, the Commonwealth action in support of Mozambique in terms of com- pensating it for the adverse effects of the sanctions policy might take the shape of an initiative at the UN level. He mentioned that President Samora Machel of Mozambique might be coming to the 3Oth Session of the General Assembly, in which event the Secretary-General would, of course, receive first hand his views on the position Mozambique might take on the sanctions policy. President Nyerere had asked the Secretariat to assist the African National Congress at the technical level in the negotiations with the Smith regime. The staff members he had deputed for this purpose had not, however, returned before his departure from London. He would keep the Secretary-General informed of any developments in this regard. He also was very much concerned about any setback which might arise from the failure of the - 3 -

current efforts to open a dialogue because it could seriously affect the political future of some of the best people in Africa and in fact the failure to reach a settlement might lead to a racial conflict having ramifications far beyond Africa.

On Namibia, the Commonwealth Secretariat had been helping the efforts of the UN, particularly in the setting up of the Institute. For historical reasons, the Commonwealth members woold be prepared to welcome Namibia as a member when it eventually attained independence. They would continue to co- operate with the UN in any way they could be helpful. Mr. Ramphal finally raised the question of the r elation ship of the Commonwealth Secretariat with the UN. He mentioned that so far they had not formalized it. He had been considering the matter and hoped to be in touch with Commonwealth Governments in the next few months and might come back next year in the light of those consultations. Meanwhile he would hope very much that the contacts at the personal level which had been so happily established with the Secretary-General would be maintained and strengthened. The Secretary-General fully reciprocated Mr. Ramphal's sentiments and hopes.

R. Ahmed

SG GH/FM Extract on Cyprus given to Mr. Guyer/Mr. Urquhart / v'w V.UA '• •.., AAF/BFJ cc: SG \/ GH/AP IK

Minutes of a meeting held in the office of the Secretary-General on 23 llav 1975

Present: The Secretary-General Ambassador Sanda, Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations 1-lr. Sam Hujoma, President of SV7APO Mr. A.A. Farah

Mr. Nujoma expressed appreciation of the role played by the United Nations on the Namibian question. He was particularly encouraged by the action taken by the General Assembly at its last session, and by various United Nations bodies. The Nanibian people felt they were not alone^in the struggle, and despite repressive measures by South Africa, they would continue demonstrating for self- determination and independence.

Referring to Prime Minister Vorster's statement on 20 May, Llr. iTujorna remarked that it contained no nev/ elements. It v;as a repetition of earlier positions and attitudes, and implied. South Africa's determination to proceed v/ith the division of the Territory into . The statement was both ambiguous and contradictory. For example, Mr. Vorster said he was in agreement with the position of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity on basic issues; yet, he maintained that all options should remain open. In other words, while South Africa v/ould not oppose -ihe formation of a unitary state, by the same token, it v/ould not oppose the fragmen- tation of the state.

Mr. Hujorua said the statement attempted to give the impression that democratic and constitutional processes were at work in Hamibia and that the people were free to express their will. Yet, during the recent so-called elections in Ovamboland, South Africa resorted to all forms of political, economic and criminal pressures to compel people to participate in the elections and to vote according to its dictates. The open manipulation - 2 -

of elections had enabled Vorster to^ claim that 75% of t2ie electorate were in favour of" the constitutional measures advocated by South Africa. South Africa's policy was to affect a permanent control over Namibia throrugh the tribal system and through the appointment of tribal chiefs who were prepared to work at its bidding. South Africa would not allow political parties or movements to operate within the country, except that of t2ie 'white' National Party. In the view of Mr. Nujoma, South Africa's policies had created conditions between the white and black communities which resulted in racial hatred. Basically, the situation within the country had deteriorated over the past two years and South Africa's military presence had Ibeen strengthened and extended throughout the Territory.

Mr. Nujoma said that SWAPO remained solidly opposed to ifhe continued presence of South Africa in Namibia. In its view, elections within the Territory could only b"e considered valid if they were held under the supervision of the United Nations and conducted in accordance with normal democratic principles e.g. one man, one vote. Mr. Hujoma hoped that the Security Council, when it met on 3O May, would take appropriate action against South Africa in the light of its refusal to comply with Security Council resolution 366. He envisaged such action as the application of articles 39 and 41 of Chapter 7 of the Charter. In reply to a question by the Secretary-General, Mr. Nujorna said that SWAPO would be prepared to participate in a constitutional conference on Namibia provided it was held under United Nations auspices. SWAPO would also take part in political provided the elections were under United Nations supervision and organized on party and not tribal lines. While he would prefer to see an immediate withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia, Mr. Nujoma did not exclude a situation whereby South Africa would continue its presence in Namibia along-side that of the United Nations. Mr. Nujoma drew an analogy with that prevailing in Mozambique and Angola where the colonial power continued along-side that of the transitional government pending independence. He considered the role and involvement of - 3 - the United Nations indispensable in any solution affecting the future of ITamibia. Mr. rTujorna recognised that South Africa was attempting to create black governments in ITamibia favourable to South African interests. With the support of the people of Namibia, SWAPO would continue its struggle for real and true independence, even if it neant resorting to arras against the puppet governments that were being installed. Secretary-General said he appreciated the information which l!r. ITujoma had provided as it enabled him to have a fuller view of the issues involved. Referring to the official communication which Foreign Ilinister Iluller had addressed to tiie Security council in response to resolution 3GG, the Secretary- General said that the position taken by South Africa did not differ from -the position which it had adopted in the past. Although South Africa spoke of self-cletermination, independence and territorial integrity, its concept and interpretation of those terns were vastly different from those held by the United ITations. The Secretary-General said that difference became evident during -the course-of his talks with the South African Government two years ago. Mr. Hujoma thanked the Secretary-General for his interest and assistance in the matter and Io63;ed. forward to further co-operation with him in the future. URC"P ROUTINpSUP-i fTf!•^•i FICKE DE TRANSMISSION ^

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c9 Ambfeissador Banda of Zambia is/ aitxious tc>-meet with you| 1 le^cpuestion of Namibia, ijE J poss Jfie jfcoday. - It is In A ' conri

to S

stateament of Prime Minister f

Vorslber^oade on r2O May 1975. / /. + *: * - * ^ / x Date! ~ BIT,.? ! jrar -"^7,>^; 22/5/7< 5 1^ |pp.A. Farah - - "*•^• i CR.J3 (7-73) I •* ^t •'

FOR,YOUR MEETING WiTH AMBASSADOR BANDA OF ZAMBIA AT 10.00 A.M. TODAY (_.;.

Hote for the Secretary-General

Herewith is the complete text of the address given by Prime Minister Vorster in Windhoek yesterday, 2O May 1975, on the question of Namibia. Hie significant parts of the statement follow.

1. South Africa maintains •"""""" ~~ i a. that it has never acknowledged that the United Nations has the right to exercise any supervision over the Territory; b. that constitutional discussions v;ill take place (within Namibia) as quickly as possible and that the representatives at those discussions will decide upon their future; c. that it cannot and shall not interfere in the taking of decisions on the constitutional future of the peoples of ; d. that it does not occupy the Territory as implied by the United Nations demand for South Africa's withdrawal from the Territory. It is there at the request of the peoples of .the Territory and, consequently, any arrangements for withdrawal and transfer of power must be made according to their wishes.

2. New shifts in policy a. Political activities Prime Minister Vorster agrees "that all political groups be allowed to propagate their points of view and to participate without hindrance in peaceful political activities in the process leading to self-determination. - 2 -

b. Homelands Prime Minister Vorster maintains that "nothing will occur in the Territory which is not in accordance with the f,ree choice of its population groups. It is for them and nobody else to choose and all options are open to them." Prime Minister Vorster confirmed that it is South African policy that "the inhabitants of South West Africa should, as early as possible, be given the opportunity to

express their views freely on; their constitutional future. In this respect , he spoke of initiatives already in progress within Namibia and hoped that constitutional discussions would take p.\ace soon.

3. Prime Minister Vorster considered that in substance South Africa was "in agreement with the most important aspects of the points of view which are put in the United Nations."

4. Concerning QUA, he said that South Africa had "no quarrel with their points of view concerning self- determination of the territorial integrity of the Territory. However, it differed strongly in regard to the role claimed for the United Nations and SWAPO.

5. Proposals a. South Africa would like African leaders or their representatives to visit South West Africa to see conditions for themselves. b. Prime Minister Vorster is prepared to exchange ideas with the OAU Committee on the basis of the points of view which he has expounded in his statement. - 3 -

c. South Africa cannot accept the role which is proposed for SWAPO.

6. Modalities for visits and talks a. In the event of the African Chairman of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the OAU Special Committee expressing an interest in discussing with him the progress of the peoples of the Territory, he would arrange for "the real leaders" of the Territory to talk to them. b. If the Chairman of the Special Committee would like to receive those leaders in their own countries in order to obtain first-hand information, they are free to invite them. c. Eor other matters South Africa is prepared to enter "into an agreement with the Secretary-General that he would appoint a personal representative so that he may acquaint himself with the progress of the process of self-development here in South West Africa."

21 May 1975 A.A. Farah

cc: IK GH/AP . THE HON.

I clo not '.rant t:> elaborate "-ere :-.n details of the internal political developments in tT-e Territory. T..e

Government's attitude in t':is connection is './ellJOT:.",mt viz. , tkat it is i\ r t". e pe-rples of Scut'. . est Africa f euselves and for nobody else, t•:> decide upon t" eir c-.jn political future. 'it; t is in viev t'.c process of i-utual consultation anong ti.c peoples of t'.e Territory "..as already begun. Nobody, surely, is under ti.y iliuGion t: .at it '.vill be an easy process, but tT.-e prf-nncct cl-:es exist t. at agreement can be reached ai-i.-iig all t .s population groupGo In t;.is c^-unecti; 11 I r«fer once again tc t.>e ouotation, at page ^9, fror.i tl.e SoLit:. 7cat Africa Survey of 1^6? Vi..ic:i v;as -.iade available to t"' e United Nations Organisation and to Many nations, and V7::icl» reads as follows:

"/Uiotber inpcrtant consideration is t'-at as t'.e political and econo:iic .irgans and institutions develop amongst t:.e non-vrliite peoples, ti.e inportance of contact and consultation between t'.ei.i and tx.e central governing authority uust necessarily gr:ii:, and in increasing ucasure t -'eir i/ishes i.'ill j.ave to be taken into account on natters of mutual concern. ilimever, at t'l-is stage it is i;.;pc ssiblc to foresee v;it> any degree of accuracy t"'.:e ultinate interactions of t'.e various population groups. Circunstaiices -.Till alter radically. ".r;;at is considered anat'/ena tc>d.ay nay v/ell becv:-;.;e sound practical politics touorrow, and vice versa. Nor is it necessary to embark on / / speculation as to ^r':at t'-.e ultii.iate future political / / pattern i/ill" be - i»e. './-.et'.er and tc v/!iat extent t'.ere i^ay IDC ar.:alga; latir-ns or unions of soi-ie kind, federations, cour/ion'/ealt!. or c^-;.i-.:cn market arrangements, etc. T_-e peoples t'iiet.iselves vill ultimately decide. r.eantjhile, Scut", Africa' s task and soleun duty is to help the diverse peoples of the Territory advance economically, socially and politically, to the stage T'Th-en they themselves T.rill be able to decide their OVTTI future v.Tisc-ly, protecting, guiding and ', elping then, in a spirit of trusteeship, until their emancipation has been attained."

You will ta!:c ncte t. at those -.-rords vere inritten, printed and distributed in 1967°

./ithout wishing to anticipate the results of these consultations, 1 nevert] eless i-.'ant to put to you rjy firn c<::nviction that the peoples of South/ .'cst Africa vrill not be so shortsighted as to pursue a course \.rhich will disrupt the foundations of t; e ecrn-nic systesi of the Territory, to the Material detriment >;f all the population srcmps vrhicli have their hoi.es t;.cre.

l) Then I i.'ant to state t! at although. \?e *> a v e n eve r at any stage a c kiio -.rl e d .^ e d that the United Nations J:as the right to exercise any supervision over our administration (of the Territory), v.Te have over the years repeatedly tried to find an acceptable basis for negotiations v/ith the United Nations with a view to solving the problen. '.'e have al\^ays been Trilling t.) furnisli inf on :ati'.n on the Territory and its peoples t.' anybody -./; o v:as really interested in circumstances and living conditions in the Territ'-ry. In his stater.ieiit tw t:.:e Security Council on 2ll October 197^ » our Ambassador at tT:e United Nations net out so;:e of the results of our administration of the Territory as '.re 11 as Sv.uth Africa's uany efforts frci: early on to co-operate ^;ith the United. Nations in finding an acceptable basis for negotiati- n on the issue. I need only mention in passing the Arden-Clarke - 3 -

Commission, the Carpio-De Alva CoitiMission, invitations to us-- U Thant, which he did not accept, and lastly, Dr. Escher's appointi.ient as Personal ^Representative of the Secretary- General, Dr. V/aldheim, to which I shall presently revert. The question may now be put to Lie: 2) Where do we stand at present? '/hat in broad outline are the fundamental issues in regard to this situation and this problem as enunciated at the United Nations? A) Firstly much emphasis is laid upon the separate international status of the Territory. \Jc respect the separate status of the Territory. 1 again v:ant to put it very clearly: we, that is to say South Africa, do not claim for ourselves one single inch of South Uest Africa's soil. B) It is demanded that the human dignity and rights of all peoples, irrespective of colour or race, be tnainteined and promoted. Once again, we agree, but I have every right on th-is occasion to aslt:

"... Is it not time that some of our critics should also do so? — particularly those who invoke these rights for them- selves but deny to other peoples the right to decide upon their own future".

Indeed, an important recent development in this area was the adoption by the Legislative Asscubly in '/indhoek of a notion giving unanimous support to the endeavours of the Executive Council to promote good hunan relations among the inhabitants of the Territory. The Legislative Assor.ibly furthermore requested the Executive Council to give attention to measures and practices standing in the way of good relations between i/hite and non—white, Pursuant to this notion the Executive Council has appointed a study group consisting of five r,ienbers of the Legislative Assembly to investigate this r.:attcr fully and to report on it to the /

Executive Council. We in South Africa welcome those initiatives because we "believe that relations among nil the inhabitants of trie Territory can thereby be much improved. I would like to conuend all those who are taking part and have taken part in this positive action and I do not doubt that their efforts will be crowned with success. C) It is required that the inhabitants of South Vest Africa should, as early as possible, be given the opportunity to express their views freely on their .. "• ' ' ' " ' "' " * , -f constitutional future. This too is in accordance with our policy. And as I have said, we had already forrmlated i.t in 1967 in the clearest possible terns. The South African Government earnestly trust that constitutional discussions will take place as quickly as possible and also that the Representatives at these discussions will decide upon their future as soon as possible. Indeed, we shall do everything in our power to encourage then to reach early agreement in this natter. But, I want to put it clearly: we cannot and shall not, interfere in the taking of decisions on the constitutional future of the peoples of South West Africa. The inhabitants of South West Africa thei.iselves and nobody else will decide upon their future. The indications are that the proposed conference will take place in the near future. We for our part have not brought and shall not bring pressure to bear upon then as to how they must go about this. Our sole interest is that they should freely and voluntarily reach agreement on their constitutional future as soon as possible. D) Another important point which is emphasized on the jJnit ed Nations, side, is that South Africa should withdraw from the Territory and that the arrangements for withdrawal and transfer of power r:ust be i.iade according to the wishes of the inhabitants. In regard to this matter I want to put it very clearly: we do not occupy the Territory. We are

/ 5 / - - 5 - »

there because the peoples of the Territory v:ant us there. ~t>e do not force ourselves upon the peoples of the Territory and in this regard we take cognizance only of the wishes of the peoples of South West Africa. E) Another demand which is nade, is that all political groups be allowed to propagate their points of view and to participate without hindrance in peaceful political activities in the process leading to self-determination. With this too we agree. As a uatter of fact, where elections have already taken place an open invitation was issued to all to participate therin= In the latest case of the election in Owar.jbo even those abroad who wished to come peaceably to participate were invited, and the majority of the Owaabo ' s freely elected their Government and appointed Chief Minister Elifas as their leader. There is thus no impediment in the way of anydoby to propagate any constitutional forn of government in a peaceable manner and to win majority support for his point of view. F) A further point which is insisted upon is that the Territory should not be split up in accordance with the policy of and that it should become independent as one state, unless the inhabitants should freely choose otherwise* Anybody who knows South West Africa will know that the different peoples in South West Africa were there long before the present South African Governncnt cane to power and it is r.?y position that nothing will occur in the Territory which is not in accordance with the free choice of its population groups „ It is for then and nobody else • to choose — and, as I have repeatedly said: all options are * open to then. 3) From this exposition it thus appears that in substance we are in agreement with the i.iost important aspects of the points of view which are put in the United Nations. As far as the OoA.U. is concerned, in principle, and bearing in mind

/. . . . 6 - 6

what I have already said, we have no quarrel with their points of view concerning self-dottrnination, independence and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Territory. VJherc we do differ and very clearly differ, is in regard to the role claimed for the United Nations and SWAPO. We do not hide, nor have we ever been ashamed of, our administration of the Territory. Indeed, we go out of our way to tualce information concerning the Territory and its people freely available. I also -want to repeat here what I have said in the House of Assembly, vis,, that leaders of Africa who nay be interested in visiting the Territory in order to acquaint themselves with conditions there, are very welcome to do so, II either personally or through their Representatives. J. would • also be prepared, as I have said before, to exchange ideas with a Co remittee of t/.-a O.A.U. on the basis of the points of view which I have expo-.ndcd here, but as I have already stated in the clearest possible terns, I cannot accept the role which is proposed for S'./APO. If the African Chairman of the Council for South West Africa, and the Special Committee of the O..A.U., are therefore really interested in discussing with me in South Africa the progress of the peoples of the Territory, I shall also ask the real leaders of the peoples of the Territory to talk to then. Furthermore, if they would like to receive these leaders in their own countries in order to obtain fron thea \ first hand information, they are free to invite thea, and . I we shall do all we can to help make the visit or visits possible. For the rest, we entered into an agrecncnt with the Secretary—General that he would appoint a Personal Representative. Dr. Escher was appointed. s'7e are still prepared to negotiate further with hin or, if he is no longer acceptable to Dr.Waldheia to consult with the latter on the appointt.ient of another acceptable person so that he ;.;ay acquaint himself with the progress of the process of self—development here in South West - 7 - • Africa. It will be understood, however, that we will not accept United Nations supervision. 1 n.1" • - — The peoples of South Ucst Africa have already chosen their own leaders or are in the process of doing so. They are • rightly pro--d of their leaders, their institutions, their traditions, their identities, and their rights. These cannot and nay not be interfered with, and South Africa will decidedly not be party to such interference - nc natter by whoa. If then the countries and nations of the world are anxious to find a solution for this problem and to avoid confrontation in the matter, each and every one of these reasonable proposals which I have here enunciated t.iust be accepted by then. May I in conclusion make an earnest appeal fron this platform to all countries and leaders not to disturb the peace and progress of South West Africa jsrid^without on this occasion mentioning names, I"say to then: just look at the chaos and misery in certain countries and be assured that South Africa, together with the leaders of the Territory, does not see its way to allowing such chaos and misery ever to occur in this Territory. I once again give that plain assurance to the Territory of South V.Test Africa and to its peoples.

0 O 0 Crr'-l U'..: U;:x^..a t., "*

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

NATIONS, N Y. 1O017

REFERENCE: 22 May 1975

Dear Secretary-General, I think that it might be useful if we could have a discussion, possibly with Ambassador Farah, on the subject matter of the enclosed letter concerning Mr. Vorster's latest proposals. I have also written, in terms identical with the enclosed letter, to Ambassador Banda as I think you will be seeing him soon. I thought the enclosed letter might be of assistance.

Yours sincerely

Sean Mac Bride United Nations Commissioner for Namibia

Mr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General Room 3800 United Nations UNITED NATIONS mm NATIONS UNIES

N.Y. 1OO17

REFERENCE: CONFIDENTIAL 22 May 1975

Dear Secretary-General:

I thought that you might wish to have some comments on the extracts from the address made by the Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. B. J. Vorster, at Windhoek on 20 May, which has been circulated by the Permanent Mission of South Africa at the United Nations today. These extracts differ significantly from the text circulated by the wire agencies yesterday afternoon. Accordingly, I would suggest that the news agency reports of the extracts should be disregarded for negotiation purposes. Indeed, it may well be that the somewhat different statement circulated by the wire agencies was based on a different text intended for local circulation in Windhoek. Or else, the differences may have resulted from translation variations: I assume the speech was delivered in . I will try to obtain the full text in Afrikaans and have it checked against the version available to me. In my view, there are some very important statements in Mr. Vorster1s speech which certainly represent an advance on his earlier statements. To a certain extent, the positive portions of Mr. Vorster's speech are somewhat concealed in a mass of statements intended either to justify South Africa's past posture in regard to Namibia or in order to make more palatable to his own supporters in Namibia and South Africa the proposals he is addressing to the OAU and to the United Nations organs. These considerations render it necessary to read Mr. Vorster's statement with great care.

Mr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General Room 3800 United Nations UNITED NATIONS Wm& NATIONS UNIES

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In accepting the concept of self determination, -independence and territorial integrity for Namibia Mr. Vorster is reversing attitudes which he and his Party had adopted and pursued with intransigence since the revocation of the mandate by the General Assembly in 1966. He has been under criticism by the right wing of his own party for wishing to compromise and has suffered some political defections as a result. Inevitably, therefore, his statement is couched in language intended to make as palatable as he can the concessions which he now appears to be willing to make. The following portions of his statement on pages 5 and 6 of the extracts are, I think, of some considerable importance: "From this exposition it does appear that in substance we are in agreement with the most important aspects of the points of view which are put in the United Nations. As far as the OAU is concerned, in principle, and bearing in mind what I have already said, we have no quarrel with their points of view concerning self-determination, independence and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Territory." The first sentence may, or may not be an acceptance of paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of Security Council resolution 366 (17 December 1974) ; the ambiguity may be deliberate or it may be due to translation. As far as the second sentence is concerned, it appears to me to be an absolute acceptance of the right of the Namibian people to self-determination, independence and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Namibia. He does go on to differ with what he alleges to be "the role claimed for the United Nations and SWAPO" but in a later portion of the same statement, on page 6, he indicates a willingness to discuss or "to exchange ideas" with a committee of the OAU on all matters except "the role which is proposed for SWAPO". I take it that by this he rejects the claim that SWAPO is to be ^^r**:?":«*--'^.. accepted by him as the sole authentic representative of the people of Namibia iut he does not appear to reject the possibility of SWAPO representation in :he Committee of the OAU or in any discussions. •-- "•" UNITED NATIONS ||p| NATIONS UNIES -*?**?— -3-

In the following paragraph Mr. Vorster, I think, clearly acknowledges the role of the United Nations when he invites the "Chairman of the Council • -r-yr-' T.-L •-r.-iMf ••-•-I'.'.C'-..-!,-:;.', l^j".' "" ' '"' " -•-*..«. -^. ->';''.j:i=vrt of South.JfesXJSJxlealL. (which is clearly intended to be the Chairman of the United Nations Council for Namibia), as well as the special committee of the OAU to discuss with him in South Africa the progress of the "peoples of the Territory". True, he uses the expression "progress of the peoples", which is an ambiguous term that can cover nearly any grouping of Namibians and which is probably intended to make the proposal more palatable to those Namibians who are unfortunately collaborating with him. He does not appear to impose any limit to the scope of the discussions which are envisaged in the second and third paragraphs of page 6. In the following paragraph, the last on page 6, he recognizes that Dr. Escher may no longer be acceptable and expresses willingness to diVcusS the appointment of another acceptable person to negotiate: "...we are still prepared to negotiate ...". Mr. Vorster, however, includes a last sentence to that paragraph in which he categorically states: "...we will no.t, accept^ •L~ •'••'' United Nations supervision ...". He does not clarify whether this is intended ^^:^..,w^1,,J.__ai.^^ to be supervision of the present administration, as demanded in United Nations resolutions or whether it is intended to refer to supervision in any elections to be held in Namibia. In this context it is well to refer to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) of 1967 which defines the functions of the Council for Namibia as being: " (a) To administer South West Africa until independence with the maximum possible participation of the people of the Territory; " (b) To promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative regulations as are necessary for the administration of the Territory until a legislative assembly is established following elections conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage; " (c) To take as an immediate task all the necessary measures, in consultation with the people of the Territory, for the establishment of a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution on the basis of which elections will be held for the establishment of a legislative assembly and a responsible government; UNITED NATIONS |^p| NATIONS UNIES

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" (d) To take all the necessary measures for the maintenance of law and order in the Territory; 11 (e) To transfer all powers to the people of the Territory upon the declaration of independence."

While these four paragraphs are somewhat indefinite, they certainly envisage "a legislative assembly established following elections, conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage" and also "the establishment of a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution on the basis of which elections will be held for the establishment of a legislative assembly and a responsible government". This would, I think, presuppose the holding of elections under United Nations supervision and control. In the light of the various abuses and complaints made regarding the recent "elections" held in Ovamboland, it does appear to me that no elections organised and held by the South African Government in Namibia would be regarded as acceptable to the people of Namibia or to the African States. In the light of the foregoing analysis , it appears to me that it would '' be open to either the Secretary-General, or his nominee and/or the President ^.W^.K*^^^^ Nations Council for Namibia and the African members of the «^^ --— ^«*^--»^'^'v. V.-^^.^»..™«»-^^ uncil for Namibia (who are identical with the special committee of the OAU set up to deal with Namibia) to enter into discussions with the South African

___ .-.-.L __ . Government. Having regard to all the circumstances, I think that it may be or l •ljSiHHji.111 ,njt.nrfV* **mZ1' &®$l preferrable if such discussions were undertaken by the President of the Council iararaMnwwoTO,rm^,re^rowre^^ for Namibia and the African members of the Council than by the Secretary-General. 2 Sfei3lB

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of drawing up a constitution for the establishment of a legislative assembly and a responsible government for the sovereign independent State of Namibia. It should be clearly understood that such dis- ~ cussions should envisage the control and supervision of the elections

_-ml_ l^a< ««w.>-i*i.»« by the United ^Nj^jxinj,.. and that the discussions should lead to a fixed time-^ahle for every step leading to the elections.

Naturally, the above analysis and suggestions involve political decisions which only the Security Council, which has seisin of the current Namibia issue, r f y r tr<*" *'*~' '* " '"~ „ .... ,- .••--s-f-- -. could take. This analysis and very preliminary tentative suggestions are made merely in order to facilitate your consideration and discussions of the issues raised by Mr. Vorster's statement. Perhaps it might be wise to await the full official text of Mr. Vorster's declaration before taking any final decision. I would suggest that some consideration should also be given to the South African Government's probable contingency plan if its proposals are rejected. They must naturally have made such contingency plans. It appears likely that they would proceed to implement their own proposal to set up some sort of "elected" legislative assembly for an "independent" South West African multi-racial State, ruled over by collaborating Namibians. This would severely confuse the issues, intensify existing divisions and lead in some areas to internecine dissension and, possibly, even conflicts. With warm respects ,

Yours sincerely

<*> -a- ess. *z~ Sean Mac Bride United Nations Commissioner for Namibia AAF/BFJ cc: SG^ IK GH/AP bef. fil: 3ET Minutes of a Meeting held in the Office of the Secretary-General on 8 Kay 1975

Present: The Secretary-General Mr. Vernon J. li?aanga, Foreign 1-Iinister of Zambia Mr. G.R. Zimba, Deputy Perraanent Representative of Zarribia to the United Nations Mr. A.A. Farah

The Zambian Z-Iinister said he had been aslced by President Kaunda to brief the Secretary-General on various questions concerning Souvihern Africa v/hich had been discussed at the Commonwealth Conference in Jamaica. He remarked that the Conference had been successful in achieving agreement on natters affecting Southern Rhodesia and namibia. in the past the Conference had not only refused to discuss those problems but had even opposed their inscription in its agenda. This year there v/as no opposition whatsoever to their discussion. Southern Rhodesia Minister Hwaanga said that the Commonwealth Conference had agreed to the establishment of a fund to help l-Zosambicrue, when it became independent, '"to enforce sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. The proposal anticipated a sun of between £3O - £4O million. A coniraunication on that natter had already been sent to the United Nations Secretary-General. It now remained for the United Nations to consider the modalities and procedures under v/hich -that fund could be raised and operated. The Minister also said that in the event of l-losambique agreeing to close its frontiers with Southern PJiodesia, Botswana would also tighten the sanctions net by preventing Southern Rhodesian rail and road traffic from crossing her territory into South Africa. He noted that the Conference had agreed to "the extension of sanctions" and for the first time had described -die Snith Government as being "racist and illegal" rather than "unlawful", as had been the practice in the past. Equally important was fc

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unanimous conviction of the Conference that an intensified arms struggle was inevitable if a peaceful settlement was blocked by the Snith regirae. He said that Prime I-linister Wilson, at the request of the'African delegations, had agreed to call a constitutional conference regardless of whether Smith agrees to it or not, and that the conference would proceed to draw up a constitution for the Territory.

Namibia The Zambian Foreign Minister said that at the OAU meeting in Dar-es-Salaamv agreement was reached on four main points: 1. that the system of bantustans or homelands was unacceptable; 2. that South Africa must accept the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia; 3. the appointment of a sub-committee of the OAU, consisting of the African members of the United Nations Council for Namibia, to deal with all matters relating to Namibia; if need be, the sub-committee would make contact with South Africa on matters of transferring power to the Namibian people; and 4. that South Africa must accept ST7APO as being the authentic representative of Namibia.

Minister Hwaanga said that while in Kingston, Jamaica, President Kaunda had received a message from the South African Government indicating that it could accept points one, two and -three. However, it could not accept point four. The fact that South Africa found three of the points acceptable led Zambia to believe that there was a basis for further discussion with South Africa on the matter. Zambia considered -the South African message important because it signified a departure by South Africa from previously held positions. The Foreign Ilinister planned to return to New York when the Security Council resumed its debate on Namibia and hoped he would be in a position to clarify -the situation further. Minister Zlwaanga expressed concern on the decision by the OAU to set up a small committee to deal directly with South Africa. He felt that its mandate would conflict with the mandate of the United Nations Council for Namibia and wondered what the reaction would be among the Council members. He said he had raised that point during the OAU debate, but - 3 - no one seemed to Ibe concerned. He suggested that a solution could be found if: the United Nations Council for Namibia could also be persuaded to set

The Secretary-General thanked. Minister Llv/aanga for having briefed him on developments in Southern Africa and said he found the information most valuable. The Secretary- General said he was glad to have had an opportunity of speaking to President Kaunda by telephone during the latter's visit to Washington. CONFIDENTIAL 5 December 1973 AP/dm

Note for the File on a Meeting with the Group of Three on Namibia on 3 December

Present were: The Secretary-General The Ambassadors of Yugoslavia, Sudan and Peru Mr. A. Farah Mr. A. Prohaska A /\(

Various approaches to the forthcoming meeting of the Security Council on Namibia were considered. The representative of Yugoslavia explained that it would be most useful to separate the procedural aspect from the substantive problem. Accordingly, two resolutions could be prepared: One on the procedural aspect by Peru, who after all was taking the place of Argentina, the original author of Security Council resolution 309. This pro- cedural resolution could contain the following -tfer^e operative paragraphs: 1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General* 2. Takes note with appreciation of the efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General to carry out Security Council resolution 3O9; 3. Considers in the light of the reply given by the South African Government as contained in document - ... that there was no usefulness or necessity to continue the policy envisaged by Security Council resolution 3Q9; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council any initiative on the part of the South African Government to reconcile its position with that of the United Nations. The procedural resolution should be adopted by a con- sensus. The substantive resolution could take up various aspects of the issue and could have a variety of cosponsors. AAF/BFJ cc: Mrs. E. Mira K Mr. I. Kittnni CONFIDENTIAL GH/AP

Minutes of a meeting

held in the Office of the Secretarv-General

on lj December 1973 at 12:30 tj.ra.

Present: 1. The Secretary-General 2. Ambassador Diallo of Niger (Chairman of the African Group) 3. Mr. Ouattara It. Mr. Farah

Ambassador Diallo said that he had asked for the meeting as Chairman of the African Group to pay his compliments and to inform the Secretary- General on certain developments affecting matters about which the Secretary- General vas concerned. He said that the African Group had decided to call for a meeting of the Security Council on the question of Namibia for Monday, 10 December. He said that the Group vould take a position consonant with the decision adopted at the recent OAU Summit Conference. The Secretary- General said that he had recently met with the Group of Three of the Security Council and had also scheduled a meeting with the President of the Council for Namibia. The Secretary-General said he had had contacts with many African heads of state on the question of wamibia since the submission of his report to the Security Council, and had been able to keep abreast of their views.

The Chairman said that the African Group had not yet resolved the question of recommending a candidate for the post of Comaissioner for Namibia. This was one of the questions which he hoped to finalize within the next week and he would seek a further meeting with the Secretary-General to keep him informed of developments.

The Chairman of the African Group discussed the status of Guinea-Bissau and of its relationship with the United Nations'. He said that there were proposals in mind for Guinea-Bissau to seek observer status as a preliminary step towards its application for full membership. The Secretary-General observed that Guinea-Bissau had been admitted to full membership of FAO and this should facilitate its application for observer status.

The Chairman said that the African Group had received the report of Ambassador Zentar of Morocco (outgoing chairman) on the discussions he had had with the Secretary-General with regard to the question of African representation in the Secretariat, particularly in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and on the future of the Division of Public Finance. He said that the Group endorsed the understanding reached between Ambassador Zentar and the Secretary-General and considered that the question had now been satisfactorily resolved. - 2 -

Mr. Ouattara informed the Secretary-General that he would be proceeding to Addis Ababa the following day and would not return to New York until the beginning of January. He exoressed appreciation of the close co-operation and understanding which he had received from the Secretary-General and other senior officers of the Secretariat in the short time he had been working as Executive Secretary of the OAU. Chronology of negotiations between the Secretapy-rGeneral and South Africa concerning the appointment of a Representative for Namibia 16 August to £0 September 1972

On 2 August, the Secretary-General suggested to South Africa a list of five names as follows: Ambassadors Hambro, Borch, Schnyder, Thalmann and Beaulne. Subsequently, the Secretary-General was informed that the South African Government did not intend to comment on the five names mentioned but preferred a person not engaged in government or international organization. At that time, the South African Government suggested two names for the Secretary- General's consideration as follows:

On 16 August, the South African Government submitted for consideration the name of Mr. von Moos, former Minister of Justice of Switzerland. On 18 August, the Secretary-General informed South Africa that he did not feel that Mr. von Moos was suitable. The Secretary-General proposed the name of Mr. Micheli, a Swiss national. On 24 August, South Africa proposed the additional name of Mr. Juracy Magalhaes, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil. South Africa did not, however, comment on the candidate suggested by the Secretary-General. On 25 August, in response to an inquiry from the Secretary-General, South Africa stated that it had not yet concluded its investigation of Mr. Micheli. On 26 August, the Secretary-General suggested the additional name of Mr. Willy Sptihler, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland. This name was transmitted to South Africa on Monday, 28 August. On the same day, the Secretary-General informed South Africa that after carefully considering the candidature of Mr. Magalhaes, he had decided that he would prefer a nationality other than Brazilian. The Secretary-General suggested, as an additional candidate, Mr. Max Petitpierre of Switzerland. He wished that the South African Government would find it possible to give favourable consideration to one or the other of the Swiss citizens whose names he had suggested. - 2 -

On 29 August, the Secretary-General was informed that the South African Government was considering the three Swiss candidates and hoped to be able to inform the Secretary-General of its views by the end of that week. On 1 September, South Africa agreed to the designation of Mr. Max Petitpierre. This message was conveyed to the Secretary-General in Geneva on 2 September. Mr. Petitpierre could not accept because he is not fluent in English. South Africa then agreed to Mr. Wahlen, who, however, was not available for some time. On 5 September, the Secretary-General asked Amb. von Hirschberg again about Amb. Schnyder. On 7 September, South Africa agreed to M. Schnyder. On 9 September, the Secretary-General -was informed that M. Schnyder could not accept due to health reasons. The names of the following Swiss nationals: Mr. Fischer Mr. Keller Mr. Thalraann Mr. Freymont Mr. Zellwecker were put to Amb. von Hirschberg. On 15 Septmeber, South Africa agreed to Mr. Zellwecker, whose health, however, did not permit him to accept. Mr. Fischer would not be welcome by South Africa. Minister Graber informed the Secretary-General on 15 September that Switzerland could not put at the disposal of the Secretary-General any government official in active service and suggested Amb. Troendle, also Amb. Escher. Amb. von Hirschberg was informed immediately that the Secretary-General would wish to appoint Amb. Troendle in the first place. On 20 September, Amb. von Hirschberg informed us that South Africa would prefer Mr. Escher to Mr. Troendle. %•#*'*

1 December 1972 AP/dm

Note for the Secretary-General

Mr. Chacko called me and pointed out that the new version of the Namibia resolution contains a new paragraph 6, apparently included upon a request of the Council of Namibia, which is tantamount to changing the mandate of the Secretary-General./s^Paragraph 6 reads as follows: '' 'c ^^

"Calls on the Government of South Africa to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution in order to bring about the peaceful transfer of the administration of Namibia, transitionally, to the United Nations."

It will be extremely difficult to carry on negotiations on this basis, since the previous mandate was:

"Create conditions for the exercise of self-determination and independence." UNITED NATIONS WWS NATIONS UNIES >gfc&jgr ^ <*' NEW YORK 10017 S. Mac Bride Room 326k

Mr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General Room 3800 United Nations