UN Secretariat Item Scan-Barcode-Record Title Page 3 Date 06/06/2006 Time 11:29:18 AM S-0902-0001 -02-00001 Expanded Number S-0902-0001 -02-00001 items-in-Africa - Question of Namibia - Secretary-General's meetings and notes for the file Date Created 01/12/1972 Record Type Archival Item Container s-0902-0001 : Peacekeeping - Africa 1 963-1 981 Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit V" Mote of Consultation Meeting of the SecuricyounciJ,, held/ ofc Friday, 2 March 1979^ The President stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider the letter of the Secretary-General of 28 February containing his proposals regarding the composition of the military component of UNTAG. The Secretary-General told the Council that he had Just received a cable from SWAPO giving its formal answer to his report. The answer was some- what negative. There had been no formal answer as yet from South Africa; though there had been some public noises. The Secretary-General then read SWAPO 's cable to the Council. He said that he would also inform the Council that he had tried to clarify the position of the neighbouring countries in regard to the matter of monitoring by confirming that res- ponsibility for such monitoring lay with the neighbouring countries. He had also sought their agreement to establish UJJTAG offices there. He said that President Kaunda had agreed to the proposal that SWAPO forces in Zambia be monitored by Zambian forces. A similar answer had been received from Botswana. For technical reasons he had been unable to contact President Neto but was now in touch with the Angolan Ambassador with a view to clarifying the situation. He said that his proposal respected the sovereignty of the neighbouring countries while also providing for contacts with the UN forces. He said that SWAPO' s proposal contained nothing new in regard to troop composition; as always it was the opposite of South Africa's position. However, he also felt that as there was no answer from South Africa he was for the time being unable to proceed any further. He would wish to have the Council's views on these matters as also on his proposed timetable. The representative of Zambia said that he would like to put some questions: SWAPO was negative in regard to the proposals for countries providing logistics support. Did their response extend to the countries providing infantry battalions? Had the Secretary-General received any other offers in regard to logistical elements? The Secretary-General referred to his letter of 28 February and read the list of infantry battalions set out there. He noted that Rumania had, the previous day, informed him that it would be unable to provide a battalion. He noted that the SWAPO list was for battalions and that only Finland and Panama were contained in his and SWAPO's lists. Regarding logistics, he had encountered tremendous difficulties. He said that with the exception of Australia and Sweden all the countries offering logistical support were NATO countries. If there were any further offers, he said, he would be glad to hear of them. It would also be necessary to evaluate such offers from the standpoint of practicability. The United States Ambassador said that SWAPO's cable did not mean that the efforts of the Secretary-General or the consultations should cease. Nothing, he said, has changed. The UN had a continuing responsibility to seek a solution to the matter. The UN should press parties for a basis for proceeding. He said that there was a Jockeying for position on the part of the parties. This would not cease but would rather increase. At the same time problems would get more difficult rather than become easier. He said that he did not accept the possibility of any one party vetoing the present proceedings. He said that he accepted the importance of SWAPO but that the Council had not anointed SWAPO. SWAPO was Just one of the parties which was to compete for political power. Circulation: The Secretary-Ge neral Mr. Urquhart Mr. Ahtisaari Mr. Thornberry «* i i I - 2 - The USSR Ambassador said that he also believed there should be further efforts to come to an agreement but that there vere evident objections __. by the parties, not only to the proposed composition but also to the report. He said that he could not see how the Security Council could as such take any further action until there had been further contacts •with the parties concerned. For the Soviet delegation SWAPO's position vas very important if not decisive, having regard to the UN's stance as to their position. .It would therefore be difficult for the Council to come up with any decisions until there had been fertile efforts to bring about agreement on all these issues. The Ambassador of Kuwait said that from the legal point of view Namibia was an international territory for which responsibility is based in the Council for Namibia. Thus, it was quite correct that neither side had a right of veto. However from the practical point of view the Plan necessitated the co-operation of the parties. He wondered therefore, whether the Council could now proceed, given the negative response from SWAPO. He asked whether the Council could impose its will on the two parties. He foresaw great risks and pitfalls unless there was a concurrence of the parties. He suggested that the discussion should be adjourned until the other party responded. The Ambassador of France said that the Secretary-General's list of battalions as set out in his letter of 28 February would not include any NATO countries. It surely seemed, therefore, that SWAPO's rejection related to the list of countries for logistics. The Ambassador of Zambia said that it was important to see the matter in perspective. SWAPO had not rejected the Secretary-General's report, it had objected to a few elements in it and in part to the Secretary- General's proposal in regard to logistics. Even then it was objecting to only two or three of the five countries concerned. He said that the whole question of monitoring in neighbouring countries was being considered. The main issue, therefore, was composition, especially as to logistics. He thought it to be unfortunate for the Security Council to give up on this important matter. Consultations should determine whether"equitable geographical distribution could be complied with. He said that it might not in the end be possible to satisfy all the parties. Neither could have a veto power. However, SWAPO was recognized by the United Nations while South Africa was illegally occupying Namibia. The Council should be the arbitrator in these matters. The Ambassador of France asked whether any of the countries named by SWAPO had made an offer on logistics. The Secretary-Genera\ said that it was clear from the cable that SWAPO was preoccupied with NATO participation in logistics. However, in the same cable it had also reiterated its position setting out a. list of acceptable countries which, for battalions, included only Panama and Finland. This impossible situation had now gone on for several months whatever one party accepts the other rejects. He had finally tried to cut this gordian knot by making honest efforts to achieve some sort of settlement. From SWAPO's list only Sweden had offered logistic support. He said that the concurrence of the parties was necessary in - 3 - going forward. The UN could not impose its will because that would end up in a shooting match with UN forces between the parties. He believed that SWAPO's negative answer set out in the cable would not involve a general rejection of his report and his proposals. The Secretary-General reiterated the last sentences of SWAPO's cable. However, it would raise the monitoring aspect once again. He said that there were three problems - composition, monitoring of SWAPO forces outside the country and the way the ceasefire would come into force. He would sum up by saying that he felt that he should continue with his contacts and various efforts to clarify the open questions, while having no illusions as to the difficulties. However, he said, his time-table could not be implemented for the objective was to have . , a ceasefire enter into force on 15 March 1979 and the ceasefire letter/to be sent out in the next few days. He said his time-table would now depend on how quickly he received answers from the parties on the matters for clarification. The UK Ambassador said that both sides were jockeying for position and both were trying to get things they were not able to get in the last few years. Neither expected to have a peace-keeping force along the lines it now proposed. The Secretary-General's report was an extremely balanced document. He thought the Council should give the Secretary-General an indication that his manner of proceeding so far had been acceptable. He thought that the test should be, not what the parties would like but what they would both finally acquiesce in. The Secretary-General could not go and seek agreement between the parties for this would not happen. He said also that it would be impossible to get the parties to face up to matters until they were obliged to take decisions. The UK felt that the Secretary-General's letter should go out. That would be when an answer would be forthcoming, not at the present stage. The USSR Ambassador said that the question raised by SWAPO related not only to composition but also to the report.