Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws
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Countering Corporate Inner Circles
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-2\ORE202.txt unknown Seq: 1 18-FEB-05 9:16 JAMES FANTO* Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner Circles here have been startling cases of corporate fraud, self-deal- Ting, and mismanagement, particularly among Chief Execu- tive Officers (“CEOs”), Chief Financial Officers (“CFOs”), and other top executives of publicly traded firms. The scandals in- clude executives at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Qwest, Adelphia, Dynergy, Tyco, Xerox, Vivendi, Sprint, and Health- South.1 In these cases rarely, if ever, did a member of a com- pany’s board of directors, even an independent director (the director with no ties to the company, who has long been touted as the panacea for corporate governance reform),2 identify the * Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank my colleagues Dana Brakman-Reiser, Ted Janger, Roberta Karmel, Arthur Pinto, Norman Poser, Tony Sebok, Larry Solan and Spencer Waller for offering comments on this Article, and Clara Mack (class of 2003) for her valuable research assistance. I would also like to thank participants in faculty forums at Brooklyn Law School and Pace Law School, and at the 2004 AALS meeting of the Section on Business Associations, where a paper based on the Article was presented, for giving me additional sugges- tions. The Article was prepared with the assistance of two summer research stipends from Brooklyn Law School, for which I thank Dean Joan Wexler. 1 See, e.g., Task Force on Corp. Resp., Am. B. Ass’n, Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 58 BUS. -
The Federal Reserve's Catch-22: 1 a Legal Analysis of the Federal Reserve's Emergency Powers
~ UNC Jill SCHOOL OF LAW *'/(! 4 --/! ,.%'! " ! ! " *''*1.$%-) %.%*)'1*,&-. $6+-$*',-$%+'1/)! /)% ,.*".$! )&%)#) %))!1*((*)- !*((!) ! %..%*) 5*(-*,.!, 7;:9;8;<= 0%''!. $6+-$*',-$%+'1/)! /)%0*' %-- 5%-*.!%-,*/#$..*2*/"*,",!!) *+!)!--2,*'%)1$*',-$%+!+*-%.*,2.$-!!)!+.! "*,%)'/-%*)%)*,.$,*'%) )&%)#)-.%./.!2)/.$*,%3! ! %.*,*",*'%)1$*',-$%+!+*-%.*,2*,(*,!%)"*,(.%*)+'!-!*).. '1,!+*-%.*,2/)! / The Federal Reserve's Catch-22: 1 A Legal Analysis of the Federal Reserve's Emergency Powers I. INTRODUCTION The federal government's role in the buyout of The Bear Stearns Companies (Bear) by JPMorgan Chase (JPMorgan) will be of lasting significance because it shaped a pivotal moment in the most threatening financial crisis since The Great Depression.2 On March 13, 2008, Bear informed "the Federal Reserve and other government agencies that its liquidity position had significantly deteriorated, and it would have to file for bankruptcy the next day unless alternative sources of funds became available."3 The potential impact of Bear's insolvency to the global financial system4 persuaded officials at the Federal Reserve (the Fed) and the United States Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to take unprecedented regulatory action.5 The response immediately 1. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (Laurel 1989). 2. See Turmoil in the Financial Markets: Testimony Before the H. Oversight and Government Reform Comm., llO'h Cong. -- (2008) [hereinafter Greenspan Testimony] (statement of Dr. Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, Federal Reserve Board of Governors) ("We are in the midst of a once-in-a century credit tsunami."); Niall Ferguson, Wall Street Lays Another Egg, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2008, at 190, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/12/banks200812 ("[B]eginning in the summer of 2007, [the global economy] began to self-destruct in what the International Monetary Fund soon acknowledged to be 'the largest financial shock since the Great Depression."'); Jeff Zeleny and Edmund L. -
Market Structure and Liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: The Industrial Organization and Regulation of the Securities Industry Volume Author/Editor: Andrew W. Lo, editor Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-48847-0 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/lo__96-1 Conference Date: January 19-22, 1994 Publication Date: January 1996 Chapter Title: Market Structure and Liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Chapter Author: Bruce N. Lehmann, David M. Modest Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8108 Chapter pages in book: (p. 275 - 316) 9 Market Structure and Liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Bruce N. Lehmann and David M. Modest Common sense and conventional economic reasoning suggest that liquid sec- ondary markets facilitate lower-cost capital formation than would otherwise occur. Broad common sense does not, however, provide a reliable guide to the specific market mechanisms-the nitty-gritty details of market microstruc- ture-that would produce the most desirable economic outcomes. The demand for and supply of liquidity devolves from the willingness, in- deed the demand, of public investors to trade. However, their demands are seldom coordinated except by particular trading mechanisms, causing transient fluctuations in the demand for liquidity services and resulting in the fragmenta- tion of order flow over time. In most organized secondary markets, designated market makers like dealers and specialists serve as intermediaries between buyers and sellers who provide liquidity over short time intervals as part of their provision of intermediation services. Liquidity may ultimately be pro- vided by the willingness of investors to trade with one another, but designated market makers typically bridge temporal gaps in investor demands in most markets.' Bruce N. -
The SEC and the Failure of Federal, Takeover Regulation
Florida State University Law Review Volume 34 Issue 2 Article 2 2007 The SEC and the Failure of Federal, Takeover Regulation Steven M. Davidoff [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal, Takeover Regulation, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2007) . https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol34/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW THE SEC AND THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION Steven M. Davidoff VOLUME 34 WINTER 2007 NUMBER 2 Recommended citation: Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover Regulation, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 211 (2007). THE SEC AND THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF* I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................. 211 II. THE GOLDEN AGE OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION.................................. 215 A. The Williams Act (the 1960s) ..................................................................... 215 B. Going-Privates (the 1970s)......................................................................... 219 C. Hostile Takeovers (the 1980s)..................................................................... 224 1. SEC Legislative -
Series 6 Kaplan Financial Education
The Exam Series 6 • 100 questions (plus 10 experimental) Kaplan Financial • 2¼ hours Education • 70% to pass ©2015 Kaplan University School of Professional and Continuing Education 1 ©2015 Kaplan University School of Professional and Continuing Education 2 Session One Securities Markets, Investment Securities and Corporate Securities, and Economic Capitalization Factors ©2015 Kaplan University School of Professional and Continuing Education 3 ©2015 Kaplan University School of Professional and Continuing Education 4 Securities and Corporate Securities and Corporate Capitalization Capitalization A. Issue stock B. Issue debt 1. Ownership (equity) 1. Bonds, notes 2. Limited liability 2. Holder of note or bond is creditor of corporation 3. Conservative for issuer a. Senior to equity securities in the event of liquidation Public 3. Conservative for investor Public ©2015 Kaplan University School of Professional and Continuing Education 5 ©2015 Kaplan University School of Professional and Continuing Education 6 1 Common Stock A. Characteristics 1. All corporations issue common stock Common Stock 2. Most junior security a. Has a residual claim to assets if company goes out of business or liquidates 3. Purchased for a. Growth b. Income c. Growth and income ©2015 Kaplan University School of Professional and Continuing Education 7 ©2015 Kaplan University School of Professional and Continuing Education 8 Common Stock (Dates) Common Stock (continued) B. Dates 3. Regulation T—FRB 1. Trade date a. Credit extended from broker/dealer to customer 2. Settlement date b. Two business days after settlement date a. Cash—trade date and settlement date on same c. Time extension day 1.) FINRA or Exchange b. Regular way—three business days d. -
The Great Telecom Meltdown for a Listing of Recent Titles in the Artech House Telecommunications Library, Turn to the Back of This Book
The Great Telecom Meltdown For a listing of recent titles in the Artech House Telecommunications Library, turn to the back of this book. The Great Telecom Meltdown Fred R. Goldstein a r techhouse. com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the U.S. Library of Congress. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Goldstein, Fred R. The great telecom meltdown.—(Artech House telecommunications Library) 1. Telecommunication—History 2. Telecommunciation—Technological innovations— History 3. Telecommunication—Finance—History I. Title 384’.09 ISBN 1-58053-939-4 Cover design by Leslie Genser © 2005 ARTECH HOUSE, INC. 685 Canton Street Norwood, MA 02062 All rights reserved. Printed and bound in the United States of America. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. All terms mentioned in this book that are known to be trademarks or service marks have been appropriately capitalized. Artech House cannot attest to the accuracy of this information. Use of a term in this book should not be regarded as affecting the validity of any trademark or service mark. International Standard Book Number: 1-58053-939-4 10987654321 Contents ix Hybrid Fiber-Coax (HFC) Gave Cable Providers an Advantage on “Triple Play” 122 RBOCs Took the Threat Seriously 123 Hybrid Fiber-Coax Is Developed 123 Cable Modems -
Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws
Florida International University College of Law eCollections Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 2003 Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws Jerry W. Markham Florida International University College of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons Recommended Citation Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 725, 812 (2003). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCollections. For more information, please contact [email protected]. +(,121/,1( Citation: Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 725 (2003) Provided by: FIU College of Law Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline Tue May 1 11:26:02 2018 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your HeinOnline license, please use: Copyright Information Use QR Code reader to send PDF to your smartphone or tablet device Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal -
Securities Market Structure and Regulation
INTRODUCTION In beginning this symposium on the structure and regulation of the securities markets, I’m sure we will all keep in mind George Santayana’s caution that: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”1 Although enormous changes have taken place over the past few decades, we keep hearing echoes of the past. When the London Stock Exchange (LSE) switched from floor-based to electronic trading exactly twenty years ago, it decided that the transformation might be too traumatic for its members, so it adopted a hybrid market—an electronic market combined with traditional floor trading. The hybrid market lasted just over four months, at which time the LSE closed its floor for trading in equities. Will the New York Stock Exchange’s experience with its new hybrid market be the same or different? The Consolidated Limited Order Book (CLOB), which I expect will be discussed today, was first proposed to the SEC thirty years ago by Professor Peake, one of today’s speakers, in 1976, a year after Congress told the SEC to create a national market system. The CLOB, which would execute investors’ orders electronically under a rule of time and price priority, seemed to him the best way to assure best execution of investors’ orders throughout the national market system. In 1978, the SEC told the exchanges to create a CLOB. A year later the Commission had second thoughts: it feared that a CLOB would lead to the elimination of exchange trading floors by inexorably forcing all trading into a fully automated trading system. -
Enron and Co
Enron and Co. - the fiasco of the new USA-style economy Eric Toussaint (*) Twenty years of deregulation and market liberalization on a planetary scale have eliminated all the safety barriers that might have prevented the cascade effect of crises of the Enron type. All capitalist companies of the Triad and emerging markets have evolved, some with their own variations, on the same lines as in the USA. The planet's private banking and financial institutions (as well as insurance companies) are in a bad way, having adopted ever riskier practices. The big industrial groups have all undergone a high degree of financialization and they, too, are very vulnerable. The succession of scandals shows just how vacuous are the declarations of the US leaders and their admirers in the four corners of the globe (see Ahold, Parmalat,…). A mechanism equivalent to several time -bombs is under way on the scale of all the economies on the planet. To name just a few of those bombs: over indebtedness of companies and households, the derivatives market (which in the words of the billionaire Warren Buffet, are « financial weapons of mass destruction »), the bubble of property speculation (most explosive in the USA and the UK), the crisis of insurance companies and that of pension funds. It is time to defuse these bombs and think of another way of doing things, in the USA and elsewhere. Of course, it is not enough to defuse the bombs and dream of another possible world. We have to grapple with the roots of the problems by redistributing wealth on the basis of social justice. -
Alemany, Ricard
1 As I finished my first year of the MBA, one of my mentor’s advice was to read. Used to reading case studies, the question really was “what books should I read?”. After two years at IESE, and experiencing first hand the breadth and depth of knowledge shared from IESE Faculty, I thought the most valuable advice on what to read was right in front of me. How could I continue to learn from professors beyond the classroom, once the MBA path comes to an end. I thought a reading list from IESE Faculty could serve not just me, but my whole class and perhaps future IESE graduates, as a guide to continue learning. Therefore, I asked professors for book recommendations that would inspire and guide us in our future endeavors. The document that follows is the result of it. I hope you find this document insightful and useful. I would like to thank all the participating professors for their recommendations and participation in the project and for sharing their knowledge not only in class, but also beyond it. Additionally, I am grateful for the help and patience of Eduardo Pérez (IESE MBA 2019), the creative genius, who has given shape of the document that I here present to you. Antonio Recio Sanromán. " Our brain is like our body: it needs exercise. If you don’t read at least one good book every month, you will lose most of the good intellectual and analytical shape you got during the MBA reading every day case after case… So, don’t stop reading. -
After the Meltdown
Tulsa Law Review Volume 45 Issue 3 Regulation and Recession: Causes, Effects, and Solutions for Financial Crises Spring 2010 After the Meltdown Daniel J. Morrissey Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Daniel J. Morrissey, After the Meltdown, 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 393 (2013). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol45/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Morrissey: After the Meltdown AFTER THE MELTDOWN Daniel J. Morrissey* We will not go back to the days of reckless behavior and unchecked excess that was at the heart of this crisis, where too many were motivated only by the appetite for quick kills and bloated bonuses. -President Barack Obamal The window of opportunityfor reform will not be open for long .... -Princeton Economist Hyun Song Shin 2 I. INTRODUCTION: THE MELTDOWN A. How it Happened One year after the financial markets collapsed, President Obama served notice on Wall Street that society would no longer tolerate the corrupt business practices that had almost destroyed the world's economy. 3 In "an era of rapacious capitalists and heedless self-indulgence," 4 an "ingenious elite" 5 set up a credit regime based on improvident * A.B., J.D., Georgetown University; Professor and Former Dean, Gonzaga University School of Law. This article is dedicated to Professor Tom Holland, a committed legal educator and a great friend to the author. -
The Book House
PETER BLUM GALLERY Where is Our Reckoning? September 29, 2020 Text by Catherine Wagley Mock Bon Appétit cover by Joe Rosenthal (@joe_rosenthal). For weeks, I have been preoccupied with the brilliantly crafted tweets of freelance food and wine writer Tammie Teclemariam, who has been fueling, supporting, and live-tweeting reckonings in food media since early June. Her early grand slam, tweeted alongside a 2004 photo of now-former Bon Appétit editor-in-chief Adam Rapoport in brown face (two anonymous sources sent her the photo, which the editor allegedly kept on his desk),1 read: “I don’t know why Adam Rapoport doesn’t just write about Puerto Rican food for @bonappetit himself!!!”2 Hours later, Rapaport—who, according multiple accounts, nurtured a toxic, discriminatory culture at the publication—had resigned. But perhaps my favorite tweet came after Teclemariam’s tweets contributed to the resignation of Los Angeles Times food section editor Peter Meehan: “I’m so glad the real journalism can start now that everyone is running their mouth.”3 In its glib concision, her tweet underscored the ideal aim of many recent so-called media call-outs: to expose, and hopefully excise, a toxicity that narrows, stifles, and handicaps writing about culture—the importance of which has been underscored by the ongoing uprisings against violent systemic racism. Blumarts Inc. 176 Grand Street Tel + 1 212 244 6055 www.peterblumgallery.com New York, NY 10013 Fax + 1 212 244 6054 [email protected] PETER BLUM GALLERY Not everyone appreciates that tweets like