FFrraannccoo--TTuurrkkiisshh PPaa ppeerr NNoo..1133 ______________________________________________________________________ Turkey: the Sèvres syndrome, or the endless war ______________________________________________________________________ Dorothée SCHMID April 2015 . Contemporary Turkey Programme The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is France’s main independent centre for research, information and debate on major international issues. Founded in 1979 by Thierry de Montbrial, Ifri is a non-governmental and non-profit organization (associations Act of 1901). Ifri falls under no administrative supervision, publically sets its agenda and regularly publishes research papers. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to host its debates and research activities. Along with its Brussels offices (Ifri Bruxelles), Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to position itself at the very heart of debate within Europe. The opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not reflect the official views of their institutions ISBN : 978-2-36567-381-5 © Tous droits réservés, Ifri, 2015 Ifri Ifri-Bruxelles 27, rue de la Procession Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE 1000 – Bruxelles – BELGIQUE Tél. : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 Tél. : +32 (0)2 238 51 10 Fax : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Fax : +32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email : [email protected] Email : [email protected] Website : Ifri.org Franco-Turkish Papers Ifri's Turkey programme aims to encourage dialogue between France and Turkey on areas of common interest. As part of the programme, Ifri publishes a series of "Notes on Franco-Turkish relations", which are written by experts from France, Turkey or elsewhere. The aim of these notes is to shed light on the key factors of the relationship between the two countries, but also on the major changes in modern-day Turkey and on regional issues. The notes conform to Ifri's usual quality standards (peer review and full editing). Editor: Dorothée Schmid 1 © Ifri Author Dorothée Schmid is a graduate of Sciences Po (Paris Institute of Political Studies) and holds a PhD in political science from Paris II (Pantheon-Assas University). She joined Ifri in 2002 as a specialist on EU policies in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. Since 2008, Ms Schmid has run Ifri's Turkey programme, which focuses on internal politics in Turkey, the re-emergence of Turkish diplomacy, political transition and power relationships in the Middle East. She has worked as a consultant for several public bodies, NGOs and private companies. Ms Schmid appears regularly in the French and international media. 2 © Ifri Abstract For Turks, the Treaty of Sèvres symbolises the dissolution of the empire and the carving up of Turkey by foreign powers. The historic effect of the treaty survives as a syndrome, which explains the vision of a nation under siege struggling for survival. Apart from the current neo-Ottomanism, a reconsidered dialogue with Europe could perhaps provide the country with a new relationship with its history and help it move beyond a syndrome used by all sections of its political class. 3 © Ifri Contents INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 5 THE FIRST WORLD WAR AS SEEN BY TURKEY ...................................... 6 Choosing its side ..................................................................................... 6 Sèvres, final stage of the loss ................................................................ 7 The national revival: Turkey, the paradoxical victor ............................ 8 EXTENSION OF THE SCOPE OF SÈVRES: TURKEY AS HOSTAGE ............ 10 Appearance and versions of Sèvres syndrome ................................. 10 Handing over the syndrome ................................................................. 12 The isolated country .............................................................................. 14 BYPASSING, EXTENDING, OR MOVING BEYOND SÈVRES: THE TURKISH DILEMMA .......................................................................................... 16 The syndrome and disease ................................................................... 16 The Neo-Ottoman path: bypassing Sèvres or moving beyond it ..... 17 4 © Ifri D. Schmid / Turkey: the Sevres syndrome Introduction This paper is the translation of Dorothee Schmid’s article published in French in Ifri’s journal Politique étrangère n°2014-1, special edition for the First World War Centenary. The First World War divided Europe from Turkey. This much is clear, while the commemoration of its centenary brings the Western European nations together in memory of a historical disaster which led to other eventually unifying events, for its part, Turkey conforms to a similar account: that of the birth of the modern Turkish nation from a defeated Ottoman empire. The nationalist impulse remains strong and in 2015 Turkey will celebrate the battle of the Dardanelles more than it will mark the memory of the Armenian genocide. Nevertheless, history is being cast off in the country nowadays against a background of endless questioning about identity. The factory of history has produced a positive, integrative narrative throughout the xxth century, overcoming the nightmare of the end of the Empire, sorting and putting events in order since the foundation of the Republic. However, faults are appearing here and there, and debates are unfolding about a past waiting to be discovered by many. Thus, questioning is emerging on an ongoing and founding historical theme of the modern Turkish collective consciousness: the Treaty of Sèvres, whose one-sided clauses were imposed on the Empire in 1920 by the victorious countries. A phantom treaty, replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne, but which remains the starting point of a reflex of fear among Turks: the dread of betrayal and fear, commonly referred to by the expression "Sèvres syndrome." The infinite variations of Turkish political rhetoric around the subject of Sèvres now seem considerably anachronistic, and increasingly out of touch with the actual power balance, both regionally and in Turkey itself. The initial trauma, which was never overcome, and the memory of which was cultivated by successive political generations, perpetuates an obsession with security in Turkey. The survival of the syndrome and its tactical exploitation by some players in the government system are ultimately indicative of obstacles to Turkish democracy, which for a long time was confined in a paranoid self-segregation. 5 © Ifri D. Schmid / Turkey: the Sevres syndrome The First World War as seen by Turkey The First Word War left a particular imprint on Turkey, which is recorded for the Turks in a continuum of confrontations of several decades with the European powers and which continued until 1922. The Republic of Turkey, born from a reforming "war of independence", is the paradoxical winner of a war which ended the Empire. Choosing its side When it entered the First World War on the side of the Triple Alliance, the Ottoman Empire, which had been at war continuously against the national offensives of its provinces, was already very weak. Referred to as the "sick man of Europe" in 1853 by Tsar Nicolas Ist; it disintegrated under the anxious and interested eyes of the major European powers. The Young Turks of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which took power in 1908, hastened the disaster by trying to restore an authoritarian centralism, and the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 had the effect of breaking off what remained of the Balkans from the Empire. Hence, before the war, the Turks had lost almost all of European Turkey and they only kept eastern Thrace to the west of the straits. This accelerated contraction of Ottoman territory was alarming and it had serious consequences: large-scale massacres hastened the return of hundreds of thousands of Muslims from the Balkans to Anatolia and influenced the balance of power. The spectre of final dismantlement emerged and the melting-pot of Turkish nationalism was at boiling point. Therefore, it was under conditions of extreme weakness and high volatility that the Empire entered into the great conflict of European imperialism in November 1914. Which side should it be on? The history of its European friendships was full of reversals1, and the CUP was divided, but the 1. For the detailed and complex relationships between the European and Ottoman powers, see J.-F. Solnon, Le Turban et la Stambouline. L’Empire ottoman et 6 © Ifri D. Schmid / Turkey: the Sevres syndrome main enemy at this time was Russia, which precipitated the fall of the Balkans and coveted the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. The ambitions of France and Great Britain in the Middle East posed another threat and their financial control brought the Empire economically to its knees. Germany, which was responsible for modernising the Ottoman army, appeared as the only natural friend. It was a CUP driven by an expansionist nationalist dream, now turned towards central Asia and anxious to consolidate its power, which initiated hostilities against Russia. The war would only be a series of disasters for the Turks, with the exception of the Battle of the Dardanelles. Their heroic resistance at Gallipoli, as demonstrated by Lieutenant-Colonel Kemal Atatürk then promoted to "pasha" (general) probably delayed the end of the conflict