TM Mar. 25 2019 Issue
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THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION MARCH 25, 2019 VOLUME XVII, ISSUE 6 p.1 p.3 p.6 p.7 Brian Perkins Sunguta West Animesh Roul Jacob Zenn BRIEFS Asset or Victims: A The Maldives Faces Dual The Return of Portrait of Women Challenge of Terrorist al-Qaeda’s Faction in Within al-Shabaab Returnees and Extremist Nigeria: What’s Going Hate Campaigns on in Zamfara? NEW ZEALAND: WILL NEW ZEALAND other terrorist groups including al-Shabaab, Ansar al- LOOK TO AUSTRALIA TO EXPAND Islam, Ansar al-Din, and pro-IS groups have issued simi- ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION lar statements threatening attacks against Westerners in New Zealand, Australia, and more broadly against the Brian M. Perkins rest of the West (Jihadology, March 16). On March 15, a mass shooting at the al-Noor Mosque Inconsistencies with the application of anti-terrorism and Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zea- laws will likely mean Tarrant will never actually face ter- land left 50 people dead and at least 50 others injured. rorism charges, despite politicians referring to the shoot- The suspect, Brenton Tarrant, is a 28-year-old Australian ing as a terrorist attack. However, the violent incident that authorities have described as a violent, right-wing coupled with calls for retaliation will likely lead to a polit- extremist. Tarrant livestreamed the attack, and the video ical response that will serve to broaden counter-terror- ultimately began circulating on the internet. The attack ism strategies as a whole rather than just addressing the primarily underscored the threat of right-wing extremism particular brand of ideology underlying the shooting. in New Zealand, but it also pointed to how vulnerable the state could be to similar style attacks in the future New Zealand has already rushed through proposed leg- and raised the specter of attacks motivated by islation to ban assault rifles and will likely look to review vengeance. or amend other related legislation as a catch all. New Zealand does not have as broad or expansive anti-ter- Following the shooting in Christchurch, al-Qaeda in the rorism legislation as nearby Australia. In fact, anti-terror- Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal ism legislation in Australia seems to broaden each year, most recently with proposed laws allowing Australian Muslimeen (JNIM) released a joint statement condemn- dual citizens to be stripped of their citizenship, granting ing the attack and calling on Muslims to retaliate. The access to encrypted messaging platforms, and establish- groups vowed that the mass shooting would “not pass ing that “there will be a presumption that neither bail without a response” (Jihadology, March 18). Countless nor parole will be granted to those persons who have 1 demonstrated support for, or have links to, terrorist ac- AFGHANISTAN: TALIBAN-U.S. PEACE TALKS RAISE tivity” (See Terrorism Monitor, January 11). [1] Mean- NEW SECURITY THREATS while, New Zealand’s laws have remained relatively stat- ic, with only a few amendments to the Terrorism Sup- Brian M. Perkins pression Act of 2007. Taliban and U.S. representatives concluded their most While Tarrant was not on authorities’ radar, among the substantial round of peace talks in Doha, Qatar on top provisions of the Terrorism Suppression Act of 2007 March 12. The talks ended with some progress, but no that will likely come under review is a provision that lim- final agreement on the withdrawal of foreign troops and its warrantless surveillance to a 24-hour period as well as Taliban assurances that the country will not be used as a the state’s ability to monitor social media (Stuff.co.nz, staging ground for attacks on other countries (Tolo March 31, 2016). In view of preventing such attacks from News, February 23). The Afghan government has so far recurring, politicians could seek to broaden the state’s been left out of the process and is expected to remain ability to proactively surveil suspects for longer periods out of the loop until the timeline for withdrawal is estab- of time while expanding the scope of activities that lished and a new round of talks begin. might facilitate such surveillance. While the results of the latest round of negotiations have New Zealand and Australia maintain a close counter-ter- largely been viewed as welcome progress, with each rorism partnership and Australian legislation provides a side expressing cautious optimism, the prospect of a ready-made template for New Zealand to draw from. peace deal with the Taliban also presents numerous new However, doing so would be an outsized response given security challenges. Aside from the most obvious chal- that the threat profile to New Zealand is still significantly lenge of attempting to bring longtime Taliban members lower than that of Australia and this specific attack and into the government fold and integrating them within the subsequent calls for retaliation do not necessarily the administrative fabric, there is also a significant chal- indicate an upward trend. lenge posed by recalcitrant Taliban members unwilling to surrender, and the likelihood of disenfranchised Notes members to join up with the local Islamic State (IS) branch, Islamic State-Khurasan (IS-K). [1] See Justice Legislation (Links to Terrorist Activity) Amendment Bill 2018 https://www.parliament.qld.gov- The Taliban and its associated groups, including the .au/Documents/TableOffice/TabledPapers/ Haqqani Network, are relatively decentralized and often 2018/5618T1852.PDF members’ allegiance is to their field commander and local comrades first. Although the Taliban has included prominent members from different cross sections of the group in its negotiating team, it is likely that many of the factions will be reluctant to lay down their arms, opting instead to continue their ongoing mission or, in a slightly better scenario, end the insurgency but continue reap- ing the benefits of other illicit activities—such as taxing poppy cultivation, illegal mining, or smuggling (UN- ODC, May 21, 2018). If there are factions that do not agree to lay down their arms, there will be a persistent threat that those who do are not genuinely doing so and will infiltrate various government, security, or administra- tive entities, or that some will eventually join back up with the factions that held out. Another key scenario that should be closely monitored is the likelihood of Taliban members joining up with IS- K, which has surged in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region 2 over the past year as core IS has lost territory in Syria and Iraq. IS-K and the Taliban have historically clashed Asset or Victims: A Portrait of over IS-K’s hardline approach, but that has not prevent- Women Within al-Shabaab ed disenfranchised Taliban members from joining the group (See Terrorism Monitor, August 10, 2018). IS-K has Sunguta West also recently softened its approach and rhetoric in order to draw in more recruits. IS-K, in many ways, poses more Al-Shabaaab, the Somalia-based terror group, has been of a threat outside of Afghanistan than the Taliban does largely portrayed as a male organization in its more- and, unlike the Taliban, has intentions to strike Pakistan than-decade-long operational history, but it’s now as well. With IS-K’s significant number of foreign fighters emerging that women are also at the center of one of and the core IS’ increased focus on turning toward other Africa’s deadliest insurgencies. exploitable locations outside Syria and Iraq, Afghanistan could see a surge in foreign fighters and the recruitment The group, al-Qaeda’s terror network affiliate in East of disenfranchised Taliban members. Africa, is waging its war from bases in southern Somalia, with the aim of overthrowing the UN-backed govern- In conducting peace talks with the Taliban, local and ment and replacing it with one governed through Sharia international security teams will need to come up with (Islamic) law. Its violent actions have also been felt in creative and well-laid plans to prevent the fracturing of neighboring Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda. the Taliban or a sudden surge in the ranks of IS-K. One significant issue in doing so is that an agreement on the Since 2006, the militant group has been the subject of withdrawal of foreign troops is foundational in securing African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops’ mili- a peace deal, and it is unclear how quickly the second tary operations, but the force has remained resilient de- order effects of a peace deal will present themselves. spite the onslaught by the better armed African mili- taries. Brian M. Perkins is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor In al-Shabaab’s campaign of terror, there are women who play key roles. They are not mere victims, but active players who the group heavily relies on for non-combat- ive roles. These are indirect roles and are viewed as more important for the survival of the group than the female actors moving to the frontlines as combatants (The East African, January 31, 2018). The profile of women within al-Shabaab and their role has appeared to rise over the years. Many of them are victims of multiple rapes and brutal treatment by the militants. Some of the women have escaped from the battleground to tell their own story and the stories of those still remaining in al-Shabaab camps. Female jihadists within al-Shabaab were not considered a key factor in al-Shabaab until the emergence of British national Samantha Lewthwaite, also known as the “White Widow,” or Sherafiyah Lewthwaite. After the Nairobi Westgate Mall shopping terror attack in Sep- tember 2013, Lewthwaite became one of most wanted terror suspects for her role in masterminding the assault which killed more than 60 people (Nairobi News, March 25, 2016).