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Í3M04 AIR UNIVERSITY mí reiview Irõm the êdltõFs aerie Potential authors frequently ask, “ What are you looking for?" Our first response is to refer them to the inside back cover, where the editorial policy of the journal is stated. To narrow that general guidance further, we are always looking for articles that examine the interrelationships between national objectives and developing aerospace capabilities, particularly in the light of technical advances by ourselves, our allies, and our adversaries. We do not limit our contents to matters of national policy; rather, we try to cover a broad spectrum of subjects of professional interest. New applications of improved hardware, management problems solved in innovative ways, technical breakthroughs described in lay language, human relations, and reviews of defense-related literature have always been pertinent. We are especially receptive to thoughtful and informed challenges to existing doctrine and practice. Contributors also express curiosity about the acceptance rate and if the Review pays for its articles. Acceptance rates vary, but an overall average would run close to 15 percent of the material submitted. Cash awards to eligible contributors currently vary between $80 and $150 for articles and major reviews (DOD employees are not considered eligible if they prepared the articles during normal duty time). Potential contributors should not be discouraged by the acceptance rate for major articles. Although we have a comfortable backlog of articles awaiting publication, we have an immediate and constant need for vignette and space-filler material. Flashes of humor or anecdotes that provide insight into leadership are particularly welcome. Our cover photo is of a Delta launch vehicle carrying the Intelsat III spacecraft. As emphasized in our lead article by Brigadier General Charles E. Williams, USAF (Ret), Communications sateliites and transportable terminais will be indispensable in the management of future crisis situations. March-April 1978/Vol. XXIX No.3 artides 2 Communications and Crisis Actions Brig. Gen. Charles E. Williams, Jr„ USAF (Ret) 9 Defense Suppression as a Basic Operational Mission Li. Col. David Brog, USAF The Meteorological Satellite: An Invaluable Tool for the Maj. Ernie R. Dash, USAF 13 Military Decision-Maker Maj. Walter D. Meyer. USAF Laser Isotope Enrichment: A New Dimension to the Nth Di. Robeit L. Bledsoe 34 Country Problem? 51 Dissem: The Neglected Factor ín Decision-Making Col. Edsel R. Field, USAF 58 l ’SAF Information Engineering: 1990 Plus Maj. Jerry C. Hix. USAF 66 T.S. Military Technology: The Soviet Perspec tive Paul M. ko/.ar 74 A Perspective for Human Relations CMSgt. Willard P. Anderson, USAF (Ret) SMSgi. Thomas E. Wolfe, USAF departments MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 25 The United States on Diego Garcia: A Queslion oí Limits Ryan J. Barilleaux IN Y1Y O P I N I O N A Research Note: DOD's First Lt. Andrew J. Sherbo. 81 Budget Requests and Approprialions Jr„ USAF BOOKS and IDEAS 84 l he Art of Leadership Squadron Leader J. D. Breu, RAF 88 Potpourri 94 THE CONTRIBUTORS COMMUNICATIONS AND CRISIS ACTIONS B rigadier G en er a l . C harl.es E. Williams. J r .. U S A F ( R et ) RISIS SITUATIONS generally do not Gambodian governments during the spring of attract the deep analysis that histori- 1975 involved Pacific Command (PACOM) in ans give to general wars. Nonetheless, a series of joim crisis/contingency operations. C Eagle Pull, Frequent Wind, and Mayaguez are crises can lead to serious conflict if not controlled or resolved promptly. They really familiar names, at least to those of us in the deserve more attention. With the growth in PACOM. The response from United States number, power, and diversity of atomic forces was superb. The evacuation of Phnom weapons as vvell as the number of countries Penh (Eagle Pull) proved to be a dress rehearsal possessing them since World War II, the for the rapid planning and fast response penalties for failing to control crisis situations demanded in the evacuation of Vietnam could be unnacceptably severe. As study of the (Frequent Wind) and the Mayaguez rescue. conventional wars and numerous crisis/con- Analysis of these operations reconfirms many tingency operations in the intervening 30 years of our earlier conclusions about the illustrates the fragile border between crisis and importance of flexible Communications in general conflict. support of crisis actions and provides some The growing impact of world opinion, the new insights. change from a bipolar world to one of For example, one of the most importam multipolitical orientation, and the ever more lessons is to recognize the value of satellite severe consequences of general war make it Communications as a flexible, high-quality increasingly importam that we be aw'are of communication médium. This is not a new potential trouble spots and handle crises with lesson, for we here in PACOM have stated our speed, precision, and good judgment. communication requirements in these terms Commanders must have fast and secure over the years. But these crises provided real upward reporting, accurate situation reports, world situations wherein satellites and tight reins on the use of force, and, when transportable terminais proved indispensable. needed, the capability to apply the right Figure 1 shows the general Communications amount of force at the right time. For vast areas like the Pacific, this calls for forward-based forces and in-being, highly active command and reporting channels. Figure 1. Southeast Asian Communications in early March 1975 As a general rule, fast-moving, event-driven crises place gTeat stress on command, control, and Communications systems. By and large, we have to go with resources on hand or available in theater within a matter of hours. The situation usually involves use of highly mobile forces that must be supported by easily transported Communications equipment. Timely Communications both for reporting and control are extremely importam. Voice coordination and direction of tactical operations become paramount over record Communications, although both are needed. The Southeast Asian crises of 1975 illustrate the point well. The collapse of the South Vietnamese and 3 4 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW backbone for Southeast Asia in early 1975. The through the military satellite terminal at bulk of our precrisis Communications to Ramasun, another very importam link to Southeast Asia depended on the military Nakhon Phanom, and a few leased channels** undersea cable (Wet Wash) from San Miguel on the commercial Intelsat terminal at Si Bay, Philippines, to Nha Trang, Vietnam.* Racha. Onward connection to Vietnam was The only other entry points were in Thailand, via the military undersea cable (439L) from •This does not include limited leleiype communication via lhe **A i hannel refers lo a signa I narrow-band voice paih (nominal Diplomam Telecommunicaiions System direclly to theembassy in 3 io -1 kiloheru of bandwidth). Ii may be used to carry several Saigon. teletype or data signals instead of one voice signal. One of lhe important lessons from the fighting m Southeast Asia was recognition of thevalue of satellite Communications as a flexible, high- quality communication médium. The satellite earlli terminal AX TSC-54 (below) occupied much of lhe MAC A' cornpound courtyard in A p n l 1975. The satellite Communications (SATCOM) complex at Clark AB, Philippines (opposite) provides long-range Communica tions. The complex includes two MSC-46 satellite ground terminais in the large geodesic domes and a TSC-54 terminal in lhe smaller one. COMMUNICATIONS AND CHISIS ACTIONS 5 Sauahip and multichannel radio (troposcatter The undersea cables to Thailand and or tropo)*** from Warin. Communication Vietnam were clearly vulnerable to enemy with Cambodia depended on a military interdiction, as can be seen from Figure 1. troposcatter link from Long Binh, South Enemy capture or sabotage of the Nha Trang Vietnam. (See Table I.) cable head would cut Communications betwen •••Troposcatter is a transmission technique that involves the Philippines and Southeast Asia. A similar bounctng signals off the troposphere. Through use oí large (60- 120) foot "billboard" antennas. it is good for distances up to 600 loss at Vung Tau would sever the cable link miles. It was especially useful in V ietnam. where it was not feasible to ha ve microwave relay towers evcry 20 miles. with Thailand. This vulnerability was a 6 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW mauer of serious concern to Commander in until the Cambodian exit was completed. Chiei, Pacific (CINCPAC), hence the Through the dedicated efforts of U.S. Army provision of satellite Communications that Communications personnel on the Long Binh bypassed the Republic of Vietnam. Even wiih end and at the Military Equipment Delivery our considerable invesiment in satellite Team, Cambodia (MEDTC), in Phnom Penh. Communications, loss of Nha Trang would this importam channel remained operational seriously t ut Communications to the Southeast until all U.S. personnel left the embassy in Asian mainland. Further, loss ol Vung Tau Cambodia on 11 April. With the loss of and cross border troposcatter sites at Monkey terrestrial links to Saigon imminent, we put a Mountain (Da Nang) and Pleiku would transportable satellite terminal (TSC-54) imo virtually isolate South Vietnam by removing Tan Son Nhut, and it provided effective access to the Thailand satellite terminais. It Communications support after these terrestrial was not difficult to predict the effect on links were lost. Communications of a successful southward sweep by North Vietnamese forces. Figure 2 portrays the actual advance and the F ROM the tactical commander’s point date each major link was lost. Our primary of view, the most vital Communications in all concern around the tenth of March was to three operations were his tactical radio retain high-quality Communications with the networks—tiltra high frequency (UHF), very * embassy in Saigon, thedefenseattacheofficeat high frequency (VHF), and high frequency Tan Son Nhut, and the embassy in Cambodia, single sideband (HFSSB).