Í3M04

AIR UNIVERSITY mí reiview Irõm the êdltõFs aerie

Potential authors frequently ask, “ What are you looking for?" Our first response is to refer them to the inside back cover, where the editorial policy of the journal is stated. To narrow that general guidance further, we are always looking for articles that examine the interrelationships between national objectives and developing aerospace capabilities, particularly in the light of technical advances by ourselves, our allies, and our adversaries. We do not limit our contents to matters of national policy; rather, we try to cover a broad spectrum of subjects of professional interest. New applications of improved hardware, management problems solved in innovative ways, technical breakthroughs described in lay language, human relations, and reviews of defense-related literature have always been pertinent. We are especially receptive to thoughtful and informed challenges to existing doctrine and practice.

Contributors also express curiosity about the acceptance rate and if the Review pays for its articles. Acceptance rates vary, but an overall average would run close to 15 percent of the material submitted. Cash awards to eligible contributors currently vary between $80 and $150 for articles and major reviews (DOD employees are not considered eligible if they prepared the articles during normal duty time).

Potential contributors should not be discouraged by the acceptance rate for major articles. Although we have a comfortable backlog of articles awaiting publication, we have an immediate and constant need for vignette and space-filler material. Flashes of humor or anecdotes that provide insight into leadership are particularly welcome.

Our cover photo is of a Delta launch vehicle carrying the Intelsat III spacecraft. As emphasized in our lead article by Brigadier General Charles E. Williams, USAF (Ret), Communications sateliites and transportable terminais will be indispensable in the management of future crisis situations.

March-April 1978/Vol. XXIX No.3

artides

2 Communications and Crisis Actions Brig. Gen. Charles E. Williams, Jr„ USAF (Ret) 9 Defense Suppression as a Basic Operational Mission Li. Col. David Brog, USAF

The Meteorological Satellite: An Invaluable Tool for the Maj. Ernie R. Dash, USAF 13 Military Decision-Maker Maj. Walter D. Meyer. USAF Laser Isotope Enrichment: A New Dimension to the Nth Di. Robeit L. Bledsoe 34 Country Problem?

51 Dissem: The Neglected Factor ín Decision-Making Col. Edsel R. Field, USAF

58 l ’SAF Information Engineering: 1990 Plus Maj. Jerry C. Hix. USAF

66 T.S. Military Technology: The Soviet Perspec tive Paul M. ko/.ar

74 A Perspective for Human Relations CMSgt. Willard P. Anderson, USAF (Ret) SMSgi. Thomas E. Wolfe, USAF departments

MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 25 The United States on Diego Garcia: A Queslion oí Limits Ryan J. Barilleaux

IN Y1Y O P I N I O N A Research Note: DOD's First Lt. Andrew J. Sherbo. 81 Budget Requests and Approprialions Jr„ USAF BOOKS and IDEAS 84 l he Art of Leadership Squadron Leader J. D. Breu, RAF

88 Potpourri

94 THE CONTRIBUTORS COMMUNICATIONS AND CRISIS ACTIONS

B rigadier G en er a l . C harl.es E. Williams. J r .. U S A F ( R et ) RISIS SITUATIONS generally do not Gambodian governments during the spring of attract the deep analysis that histori- 1975 involved Pacific Command (PACOM) in ans give to general wars. Nonetheless, a series of joim crisis/contingency operations. C Eagle Pull, Frequent Wind, and Mayaguez are crises can lead to serious conflict if not controlled or resolved promptly. They really familiar names, at least to those of us in the deserve more attention. With the growth in PACOM. The response from United States number, power, and diversity of atomic forces was superb. The evacuation of Phnom weapons as vvell as the number of countries Penh (Eagle Pull) proved to be a dress rehearsal possessing them since World War II, the for the rapid planning and fast response penalties for failing to control crisis situations demanded in the evacuation of Vietnam could be unnacceptably severe. As study of the (Frequent Wind) and the Mayaguez rescue. conventional wars and numerous crisis/con- Analysis of these operations reconfirms many tingency operations in the intervening 30 years of our earlier conclusions about the illustrates the fragile border between crisis and importance of flexible Communications in general conflict. support of crisis actions and provides some The growing impact of world opinion, the new insights. change from a bipolar world to one of For example, one of the most importam multipolitical orientation, and the ever more lessons is to recognize the value of satellite severe consequences of general war make it Communications as a flexible, high-quality increasingly importam that we be aw'are of communication médium. This is not a new potential trouble spots and handle crises with lesson, for we here in PACOM have stated our speed, precision, and good judgment. communication requirements in these terms Commanders must have fast and secure over the years. But these crises provided real upward reporting, accurate situation reports, world situations wherein satellites and tight reins on the use of force, and, when transportable terminais proved indispensable. needed, the capability to apply the right Figure 1 shows the general Communications amount of force at the right time. For vast areas like the Pacific, this calls for forward-based forces and in-being, highly active command and reporting channels. Figure 1. Southeast Asian Communications in early March 1975 As a general rule, fast-moving, event-driven crises place gTeat stress on command, control, and Communications systems. By and large, we have to go with resources on hand or available in theater within a matter of hours. The situation usually involves use of highly mobile forces that must be supported by easily transported Communications equipment. Timely Communications both for reporting and control are extremely importam. Voice coordination and direction of tactical operations become paramount over record Communications, although both are needed. The Southeast Asian crises of 1975 illustrate the point well. The collapse of the South Vietnamese and

3 4 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

backbone for Southeast Asia in early 1975. The through the military satellite terminal at bulk of our precrisis Communications to Ramasun, another very importam link to Southeast Asia depended on the military Nakhon Phanom, and a few leased channels** undersea cable (Wet Wash) from San Miguel on the commercial Intelsat terminal at Si Bay, Philippines, to Nha Trang, Vietnam.* Racha. Onward connection to Vietnam was The only other entry points were in Thailand, via the military undersea cable (439L) from •This does not include limited leleiype communication via lhe **A i hannel refers lo a signa I narrow-band voice paih (nominal Diplomam Telecommunicaiions System direclly to theembassy in 3 io -1 kiloheru of bandwidth). Ii may be used to carry several Saigon. teletype or data signals instead of one voice signal.

One of lhe important lessons from the fighting m Southeast Asia was recognition of thevalue of satellite Communications as a flexible, high- quality communication médium. The satellite earlli terminal AX TSC-54 (below) occupied much of lhe MAC A' cornpound courtyard in A p n l 1975. . . The satellite Communications (SATCOM) complex at Clark AB, Philippines (opposite) provides long-range Communica tions. The complex includes two MSC-46 satellite ground terminais in the large geodesic domes and a TSC-54 terminal in lhe smaller one. COMMUNICATIONS AND CHISIS ACTIONS 5

Sauahip and multichannel radio (troposcatter The undersea cables to Thailand and or tropo)*** from Warin. Communication Vietnam were clearly vulnerable to enemy with Cambodia depended on a military interdiction, as can be seen from Figure 1. troposcatter link from Long Binh, South Enemy capture or sabotage of the Nha Trang Vietnam. (See Table I.) cable head would cut Communications betwen •••Troposcatter is a transmission technique that involves the Philippines and Southeast Asia. A similar bounctng signals off the troposphere. Through use oí large (60- 120) foot "billboard" antennas. it is good for distances up to 600 loss at Vung Tau would sever the cable link miles. It was especially useful in V ietnam. where it was not feasible to ha ve microwave relay towers evcry 20 miles. with Thailand. This vulnerability was a 6 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

mauer of serious concern to Commander in until the Cambodian exit was completed. Chiei, Pacific (CINCPAC), hence the Through the dedicated efforts of U.S. Army provision of satellite Communications that Communications personnel on the Long Binh bypassed the Republic of Vietnam. Even wiih end and at the Military Equipment Delivery our considerable invesiment in satellite Team, Cambodia (MEDTC), in Phnom Penh. Communications, loss of Nha Trang would this importam channel remained operational seriously t ut Communications to the Southeast until all U.S. personnel left the embassy in Asian mainland. Further, loss ol Vung Tau Cambodia on 11 April. With the loss of and cross border troposcatter sites at Monkey terrestrial links to Saigon imminent, we put a Mountain (Da Nang) and Pleiku would transportable satellite terminal (TSC-54) imo virtually isolate South Vietnam by removing Tan Son Nhut, and it provided effective access to the Thailand satellite terminais. It Communications support after these terrestrial was not difficult to predict the effect on links were lost. Communications of a successful southward sweep by North Vietnamese forces. Figure 2 portrays the actual advance and the F ROM the tactical commander’s point date each major link was lost. Our primary of view, the most vital Communications in all concern around the tenth of March was to three operations were his tactical radio retain high-quality Communications with the networks—tiltra high frequency (UHF), very * embassy in Saigon, thedefenseattacheofficeat high frequency (VHF), and high frequency Tan Son Nhut, and the embassy in Cambodia, single sideband (HFSSB). Radio was our only where evacuation was already imminent. It means of linking the widespread air, naval, was essential to preserve the troposcatter link and ground forces involved in these three between l.ong Binh (Saigon)and Phnom Penh operations. In the main, tactical radio

Table I. Sequence of crisis events in Southeast Asia, 1975 Figure 2. Southeast Asian Communications 13 March events, 18 March-29 April 1975 Ban Me Thuot fell. 16 March Lost Pleiku. Tropo link to Warin out. Kontum lost. 25 March Fali of Hue. 26 Marth Loss of Chu Lai and Tam Ky. 28 March Monkey Mountain (Da Nang) fell. Lost remaining tropo link to Warin. 4 April Added 12 Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS) and 6 Intelsat channels to Thailand. 12 April Eagle Pull (evacuation of Phnom Penh). 28-30 April Frequent Wind (evacuation of Saigon). 12 May Hijacking of Mayaguez. 13 May Mayaguez anchored at Koh Tang. 15 May Koh Tang landing. Mayaguez recovered. COMMUNICATIONS AND CRISIS ACTIONS 7

networks functioned as expected. There are, measure; however, there is no question that it however, importam lessons for the future. complicates tactical coordination among Because of its range and flexibility, high diverse force elements, hampers operational frequencv single sideband vvas the mainstay for monitoring, and forces ground units and tactical contact among distant forces and back aircraft to cover mulliple frequency bands. to their immediate headquarters. In terms of VHF and UHF gave effective Service. reliability and capacity, il did not measure up. Limited to line-of-sight distances, they lack the Inherent high frequency propagation range of HFSSB; but they com pensa te through anomalies (fading, skip. frequency better voice quality, greater bandwidth, and ínterference, etc.) lower reliability below an reliability. In Frequent VVind and Mayaguez, acceptable levei for fast-moving crisis an improvised manual airborne radio relay situations. The HF frequency spectrum is effectively doubled UHF range, extending it to highly overcrowded. producing mutual-user approximately 400 miles. This added range Ínterference. Loss of signal even for short was extremely importam because of the periods of time can impede timely geographical spread of forces. Unfortunaiely, coordination of forces. Further, these the relayed links were not secure and were propagation characteristics and the narrow severely limited in capacity, i.e., to the number bandwidth of the signals yield only marginal of calls the pilot could relay by voice while quality and capacity. This makes FfFSSB ílying the aircraft. unsuitable for high-level coordination and the An old lesson learned again—it is essential to iransmission of high-speed data. Heavy have direct Communications between ground reliance on HFSSB for teletype/data forces and supporting TACAIR. A new twist on Communications results in message backlogs another old lesson—the task force commander during crises, especially in field tactical needs secure voice and data Communications, Communications centers and on ships of the not only with supporting/senior headquarters íleet. HFSSB is also strongly susceptible to but probably extending up the unified hostile intercept and direction finding. The command chain to the National Military really frustrating fact here is that although the Command Center-/National Command shortcomings of high frequency have been Authority and, of course, downward to h is own identified over many years of use in exercises forces, however dispersed. and actual conflict, we are still having to rely Mobility and flexibility are increasingly on it for key command and control importam characteristics for PACOM forces. Communications. With today's demands for For the future, our Communications backbone high-speed. high-capacity Communications, must be as flexible as we can make it; we must HF is at best a backup médium. avoid the rigidity that characterized Further complications arise from the fact Communications imo Vietnam. We must that some nets are UHF, some VHF, and others increase Communications capacity tf) remote HFSSB. Of course such nets cannot areas. In my view, this calls for more reliance interoperate without special interíacing on satellite Communications and lheprovision equipment. Few of the tactical aircraft of highly mobile/transportable terminais, involved were equipped with each type of switches, nodal technical control elements, radio. The Marine landing team on Koh Tang and local distribution equipment. during the Mayaguez recovery needed both Effective Solutions to these problems call for l HF and VHF rádios to contact supporting better investmeni decisions, perhaps some aircraft directly. The quantitative impact of compromises, and resource reallocations. such a lack of interoperability is difficult to Satellite Communications offer an importam 8 AIR VNIVERSITY REVIEXV means of providing the lactical user a high- higher priority programs. The Airborne quality alternative lo HFSSB. Both Warning and Control System (AVVACS) would commercial and military satellite Com- have been extremely useful in these three crisis munications can supply flexible, high- situations, especially if it had contained an on- capacity alternatives to fixed undersea cables. board SHF satellite terminal with secure Some corrective programs are under way, but voice/data modems to link it to component, they deserve stronger emphasis and ac- theater, and National Command Authorities celeration. VVe cannot continue our present through the Defense Satellite Communica- policy oí launching only a few satellites at tions System. widely spaced intervals. Failure of the double Defense Satellite Communications System II launch in May 1975 delayed our achieving CKRTAINLY there can be no question of the adequate satellite capacity in orbit. need for assured Communications to control Fortunately, our one double launch in 1977 our strategic nuclear forces. Emphasis on these was successful, but these two satellites only Communications is appropriate, but there replaced the two orbited in 1973 and now are must be stronger emphasis on crisis essentially worn out. Communications. If we can effectively detect, Both TH F and super high frequency (SHF) report. and control the smaller crises, there is a satellite Communications are scheduled for the dim i n ished 1 i kel i h o o d for co n f 1 ict to expand to fleet and SHF for the mobile ground forces. a nuclear levei. T o that end, we need a SHF satellite terminais for secure voice and thoroughly integrated, satellite-based, high- data are needed now in tactical command and capacity Communications system with control aircraft as well as in some strategic mobile/flexible terminais, secure voice/data airborne platforms. Our FLTSAT/AFSAT conferencing, and flexibility to program* will help, but it vvill not provide interoperate/interchange with commercial direct flexible connectivity for joint force systems. (Flexibility to interoperate with operai ions. Automatic, wideband, high- commercial satellites would greatly increase altitude airborne radio relay in tactical redundancy and survivabifity.) The operations has been a recognized need for technology already exists. No new manv years but continues to fali out in favor of developments are required. Let’s face the problem squarely and solve it, not study it for •FLT SA T AFSATcombined íormerly separaie Navy and Air Force satellite programs into one program. The space vehicle provides two technically another ten years. separate sections which require distinctly diííerent earth terminal accessing equipment. San Antonio, Texas DEFENSE SUPPRESSION AS A BASIC OPERATIONAL MISSION LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID BROG HE AIR FORCE currently faces an typical Soviet air defense system near the unprecedented com binaiion of forward edge of the battle area (FEBA):3 The problems and opporlunities, the vveapons listed are organic to and controlled by T respí»nses to which may shape its roles aand Soviet army group. They cover a front siructure through the end of the ceniury. Air approxim ately 50 kilometers long and 100 defense capabilities of potential enemies, as kilometers deep. demonsirated in North Vietnam and tire Whenever and wherever the heavy use of air Middle East. pose a serious threat to air povver is needed to win the air-land battle, the operations. At the saine time, tactical air povver enemy air defenses must be suppressed, or has become increasingly necessary to counter losses of aircraft will be too high and the enemy ground strength, particularly armor.1 effectiveness of air support too lovv. Suppres- The proliferation and sophistication of sion operations may include temporary hostile air defense systems have caused the neutralization of selected facilities and short- defense suppression problem to become term degradation of other installations, as well increasingly complex. Past efíorts to grasp the as the planned destruction of criticai defensive problem analytically have been for the most elements.The overall aim is to reduce friendly part fragmented and issue-oriented.2 defensive elemenls. The overall aim is to reduce The Soviet Union and the Warsavv Pact friendly attrition to an acceptable levei.4 nations have tried to offset or reduce the Defense suppression encompasses both the 1'SAF's com ba t power effectiveness through destruc tion of defensive systems as represented the use of extensive and sophisticated mobile by lethal vveapons and the degradation of air defenses—defenses involving mixes of guns defensive systems as accomplished by and missiíes that provide overlapping nonlethal means represented by electronic coverage. Warsavv Pact air defenses now vvarfare (EW) capabilities. EW means include provide a mobile umbrella that accompanies the passive capabilities used for receiving eatlr echelon of the pact armies, including signals and the countermeasures, suc h aschaff forward deployed battalions. The variety and and active jammers, used for degrading the numbers of air defense vveapons accompany- radars. ing a typical Warsavv Pact army of four or five Defense suppression has already been divisions are impressive. identified in A FM 2-1 as an essential Table I shows the variety and density of a supportive task contributing to the

Table l. These heairy weapons do not include air defense weapons common to all troops (rapid fire AAA guns, machine guns), shoulder- fired SA-7 Grail missiíes, and BRDM-2 vehicles mountmg quadruple SA-9 Gaskw launchers. Electronic Warfare, M archfA pnl 1976.

Maxlmum Units Weapon Vertical Range Weapon Type (batteries) Launchers (In meters) ZSU 23-4 AAA 32 128 2000 S-60 AAA 23 138 over 4000 SA-6 SAM 5 15 10,000 SA-4 SAM 9 27 15,000 SA-2 SAM 3 18 25,000 10 DEFENSE Sl FFKESSION II

effectiveness oí oiher operationai missions.5 It Precision Location Strike System (PLSS) has has also been used as a tactic against enemy been developed to use time of arrival, distante ground-to-air defenses. The sole purposeof ihe measuring equipment (TOA/DME) to allow tactic is to detect, locate. idenlify, and then guided weapons to be targeted against degrade, neutralize, attack, and destroy hostile radiating defensive systems.9 air defense systems6 by the use of either In addition 10 the specific manned weapon destruction or E\V means. systems described, another totally different l !niil now the defense suppression role has family of systems has been underdevelopment. been identified vaguely as a submission oí lhe These are the unmanned remotely piloted counterair combat operationai missions.7 vehicles (RPVs). recoverable and expendable, Surface-to-air defensive systems are further and expendable support countermeasures identified as one example of oflensive such as chaff and battery-operated jammers. counterair targets.8 However. the hostile air The RPYs can lw used to degrade the aii defense systems have proliferated, improved, defense net by acting as decoys. thus drawing and become more cotnplex. Therefore, the missile Iire that would otherwise be used nature, method of operation, tactics, and against the strike forte. Al the sante time lhey equipment necessary to perform defense can be used to seed areas with t hall and carry a suppression have become more and more variety of small jammers. RPVs could also be jx-culiat to that specific mission. A new used to carry explosives and homing devices generation of weapon systems has evolved to that would enable lhem to tlesiroy hostile perform defense suppression. These weapon radars.10 systems are not at all related to counterair. The A final importam development petuliai to tactical electronic reconnaissance (TEREC) defense suppression has been the addition oí a system has been developed to idenlify and self-protection electronic warfare capability locate the hostile air defenses. The EF-111A for each combat aircralt. This is the one support jamming system has been developed to development that can be used by all airt raft on degrade or neutralize hostile early warningand all types of missions. The self-protection acquisition radars. The EF-111A is further capability consists of radat warning rei eivei s required to perform this mission either by (RWR) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) standoff or escort jamming in support of the pods to provide warning ol and jamming strike force. The F-4G Advanced Wild Weasel against enemy terminal threat systems. The has been developed from the Southeast Asia newest RWR and ECM pod systems. the Al.R- vintage F-105F G Wild Weasel to idenlify, 46 and ALR-56 RWRs and the ALQ-131 ECM locate, and destroy both early warning ac- pods, have brought along with them a unique quisition radars and the terminal threat logistit support system that is needetl to surface-to-air missile systems that constitute as monitor and change settings and techniques great a threat to Air Force strike aircraft as through a softwarecenter located at the Wai ner enemy aircraft. To enable the Wild Weasel to Robins Air Logistics Genter, Robins AFB, perform its mission. a new generation of air-lo- Geórgia. 11 ground radar homing missiles has been Primary among the basit operationai developed to destroy the hostile radars. These combat missions for tactical air forces are include the AGM-45 (Shrike) family, the AGM- counterair, both offensiveand defensive. dose 78 (Standard ARM) family. and the AGM-88 air support, interdiction, and tactical air (HARM). These missiles are specifically reconnaissance. AFM I-l States that counterair designed to be integrated with the unique F-4G is the mission to destroy or neutralize an Wild Weasel Avionics system, the APR-38. The enemy’s offensive and defensive air capability. 12 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW

Offensive counierair is conducted to seek out sufficiently to ensure adequate emphasis, and destroy targets that constitute or support proper funding, and appropriate planning for lhe enemy order of battle.* Defensive future force structure and development. counierair counters enemy aircraft penetrating Because of the great proliferation of the friendly airspace. Close air support is Soviet threat and the increased activity in conducted in support of and in dose developing countermeasures, defense sup- integration with friendly surface forces. pression has become a mission requirement. Imerdiciion is conducted against enemy Therefore, to ensure that it is fully recognized surface forces before they can be brought to as such at all leveis of the military and the bear against friendly forces. Tactical air government, defense suppression must be reconnaissance primarily provides field given the status of a íull-fledged basic commanders with timely intelligence on the operational mission rather than remain a enemy order of battle.12 vague submission that it has outgrown. None of these coinbai operational missions AFM 1-1 should be amended to include the stands alone. Each one requires some following defense suppression mission along complementary action by another. However. with the other operational missions in defense suppression is a mission that must be paragraph 3-5: accom plished prior to perform ing The purpose of defense suppression is to allow interdiction, close air support, counierair, or friendly air forces to conduct, with minimum reconnaissance effectively. Even in an air-to-air exposure to enemy surface-lo-air defenses, those other missions required to destroy enemy aircraft. encounter the battle is best fought after the support friendly ground forces, and interdict ground-to-air threat has been neutralized. In enemy lines of communication. Defense close air support and interdiction missions suppression operations are conducted using both flown at lovv altitudes, the need for defense lethal and nonlethal means to destroy, degrade, suppression far outweighs the need to or neutralize enemy surface-to-air defenses. Lethal means consist of those specific air-to- neutralize the enemy aircraft threat. The ground guided and unguided weapons, either importance of defense suppression and its bom bs or missiles, required to locate, identify, associated need for specialized equipment, and destroy enemy SAM sites and AAA defenses. training, and logistics—all strongly suggest that Nonlethal means consist of those electronic warfare systems needed to locate, identify, it has grown to the status of a unique basic degrade, neutralize, or avoid enemy radar, electro- mission essential to the accomplishment of optical, and infrared surface-io-air threats. VVhen overall objectives of the Air Force. The Soviet in conjunclion with close air support missions, military is continuing to develop and deploy these operations will require close cooperation newer air defense systems, such as the SA-8. with friendly ground forces. The integration of Additionally, there is increased interest at all ground and air defense suppression efforts will help to optimize the use of all available defense U.S. governmental leveis. Therefore, it is vital suppression forces against the enemy surface-to- that defense suppression be identified air threat. Hq VSAF •Author s note Ih is is the vague referent e to defense suppression.

Notes I Dotuild K. Lew iselai.. An Anatysi.s of Alternalives for ImprOifihg l'SA ir- h>-(.tound Capabilily m NATO f/WO); Fxei utive Summary (Lf). l he R.uul 6. Major W. Kross. (AF XOXFT). Defense Suppression Conceptual Corporation. R-I732-PR, November 1975 (Serrei), P I Framework—A Position Paper (Uh 17 November 1976. 2. l rnited St.ues Air Fone Defense Suppression Analysis and Evaluation 7. United States Air Fon e Basic Doctrine (Aerospare /Jtx7rinel.AFM 1-1.15 Steering C.roup, "Charter.’' Minutes of 21 Ortober 1976 Meeting of saine January 1975. para 3-5 group 8. USAF Operational Doctnne, AFM 2 -1 ,2 May 1969. |>ara 5-2. 3 Hrad<|uari( is, Depatitneni of tlu* Army, "O peraiions.'’ FM 100-5. I July 9. Ftlgar 1’lsamrr. ” Nceded: A New Family of EW Sysuins.'' Air Force 1976. p. 8-3. Magazine,¥fbruary 1976. pp. 27-30. I Ibid.. p. 8* I. 10. "USAF Augmeni.s Drone F.VV Capabilitiev." Aviation Weeh ir Space 5. Cniteil States Alt Fone, Tai tu al Air Operations—Counter Air, C. tose Air Terhnoloay, lanuarv 27. 1975. pp. 119-22 Support. and An Interdn hon (Aerospaee Operational Doclrine), AFM 2-1.2 11. Ulsamer. pp. 27-30. Mas 1969. pata 5-2. 12. USA F Basic Docirine. para 3-5. THE METEOROLOGICAL SATELUTE an invaluable tool for the military decision-maker

Major E rnie R. D ash Major Walter D. M eyer

As far as Iam concerned, this weather picture is probably thegreatest innovation of the war. 1 depend on it in conjunction with the traditional forecast as a basic means of makmg my decisions as to whether to launch or not launch the stnke. And it gives me a little bit better feel for what the actual weather conditions are. The satellite is something no commander has ever had before in a war.

O STATED General William Momyer while Seventh Air Force Commander during a nationally televised inierview on CBS in May 1967.1 General Momyer was referring to the value of the Defense MeteorologicalS Satellite Program (DMSP) in providing pictorial weather coverage over the data-void regions of North Vietnam, Laos, and the South China Sea. The use of meteorological satellite photography was conceived during the technology explosion of the 1940s and 1950s. During the 1940s, cloud photography wasstudied from high-altitude platforms such as rocketsor manned and unmanned free- floaung balloons.2 Also, from 1945 to 1950, the military Services were involved in several independem missile and preliminary space projects. In 1946, the Army Air Forces started specific satellite studies through Project Rand, a consultam group of scientists and technicians.3

13 14 AIR VNIVERS1TY REVIEW

By the end of the 1940s, however, very little Not long after this the Department of money had been committed to any of the space Defense realized that the civilian system would programs. The United States was not really not be sufficiently responsive to constantly interested in satellites or missiles. We were the changing military requirements. Thus, the most powerful nation in the world, and we DMSP was subsequently established and has were demobilizing. In addition, although the been providing military commanders with Rand study contended that a 500-pound meteorological satellite imagery. satellite could be put into a 300-mile orbit by Since the early 1960s, meteorological 1951, it would be impossible to lift a heavy satellite technology has continued to evolve atomic bomb to orbit altitude. Therefore, no and advance. The early satellites used active military purpose could be projected for television cameras and took photographs of satellites: only passive missions such as the Earth’s cloud cover only during the Communications or weather seemed feasible.4 daylight hours. The photographs were However, the initial 1946 Rand study did transmitted to ground receiving stations where make the following interesting observation: the individual frames were assembled into A satellite vehicle with appropriate Instruments mosaics to provide a total picture covering the can be expected to be one of the most potent area of interest. Today, meteorological scientific tools of the Twentieth Century. The satellites use a multitude of sophisticated achievement of a satellite craft by the United sensing instruments covering a wide portion of States would influence the imagination of mankind, and would probably produce the electromagnetic spectrum. They provide a repercussions in the world comparable to the variety of data, including images of the Earth, explosion of the atomic bomb. To visualize the and operate day and night in both polar and impact on the world, one can imagine the geostationary orbits. consternation and admiration that would be felt here if the United States were to discover suddenly that some other nation had already put the principies up a successful satellite.5 In 1949, the Soviets detonated their first Of the several types of orbits that can be used by nuclear weapon, and we immediately re- meteorological satellites, experience has established our missile programs. Then on 4 shown that two specific kinds are preferred for October 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik I, the meteorological satellite role: the earth- and it caused all the psychological and synchronous, geostationary orbit and the sun- political impacts that had been predicted by the synchronous, near polar orbit. 1946 Rand. study. TheSoviet threatof the 1950s The geostationary orbit is defined by a resulted in top priority and funding for our spacecraft flying in the equatorial plane at space efforts, including meteorological sufficient altitude to require 24 hours to satellites.6 By the end of the 1950s, complete one orbit. This means that the experimental meteorological packages were spacecraft is travelingat therotational speedof actually in orbit, and the stage was set for the the Earth, and, therefore, the satellite remains launch on 1 April 1960 of the first essentially stationary over a fixed point on the meteorological satellite, Tiros I (Television EartlTs equator. The altitude required for and Infrared Observation Satellite). Tiros I geostationary satellites is 35,786km was a forerunner to thecivilian polar-orbiting (19,323nm). The fixed position combinedwith meteorological satellites that provide the APT the high altitude allows the geostationary (Automatic Picture Transmission) data to satellite to view a large portion of the Earth on several hundred civilian (both U.S. and a nearly continuous basis. Thecurrent civilian foreign) and military installations throughout system was developed by NASA and is operated lhe world. by the National Environmental Satellite The first meteorological satellite. Tiros / (TeUvision and hifrared Observalion Satellite) ivas launched on I April 1960 from a Thor-Ablc 16 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

Service (NESS) of the National Oceanic and sun time, an importam characteristic for Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); it is meteorological satellites. called the Geostationary Operational It is possible to select the proper altitude and Environmental Satellite (GOES). The GOES inclination to match desired sensor coverage spacecraft views an area illustrated by Figure 1 requirements so as to obtain full global data routinely every 30 minutes or, when desired, coverage. NOAA polar-otbiting meteorological subsets of that area as frequently as every satellites, for example, fly at a 1300km (890nm) minute, depending on the size of the area nominal altitude circular orbit inclined at 102° vievved. It should be noted, however. that to the equator with an orbital period of 115 geostationary satellitescannot view areas north minutes. The DMSP spacecraft are at an or south of approximately 60° latitude. 833km (450nm) nominal altitude circular orbit The sun-synchronous polar orbit is one in inclined at 98.7° to the equator (8.7° from true which the orbital plane is inclined nearly 90° polar). This results in an orbital period of to the Earth’s equatorial plane. The altitude about 101 minutes. The Earth rotates just over and inclination (the angle specifying the 25° during each DMSP orbit. departure from the equatorial plane) of the While aerial coverage obtained from orbit are adjusted so that the orbit plane geostationary orbit is relatively fixed (the precesses or shifts exactly 360 365th of a degree satellite can be relocatedaidifferent longitudes per day. This precision shifts the orbit plane so by proper thrusting), aerial coverage from that it makes one complete revolution as the polar orbit is much more complex. The Earth makes one revolution around the Sun coverage obtainable from real-time readout of and thereby maintains a constant orientation of a polar-oibiting satellite at a single ground the orbit plane to the Sun. This sun- s t a t i o n d e p e n d s on l i n e - o f - s i g h t synchronous orbit means that the satellite communication. Because of the much lower passes over a given latitude at the same local altitude, coverage is much smaller than from geostationary altitudes. (See Figure 2.) To receive data on a global basis, polar- orbiting satellites must carry on-board recording equipment. Recordei s on the DMSP Figure 1. Typical geostationary satellite coverage satellite collect and store as much as four orbits of data. These data are subsequently iransmitted to command readout stations located at Loring AFB, Maine, and Fairchild AFB, Washington, for relay via a Communications satellite to the Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC) located at Offutt AFB, Nebraska. Through this system, global imagery data are received at the AFGWC with minimum delay. The Soviets have flown decidedly different, orbits for their meteorological satellites. The geostationary orbit is of little use to them because of their extensive area in high northern latitudes. The Soviets thus have typically flown a combination of non-sun-

Communications range synchronous polar orbits and the Molniya THE METEOROLOCUCAL SATEUJTF. 17

The Block 5C DMSP imager senses in lhe visible (0.4-1.1 jLim) as well as in lhe window region (8-l3(im) of lhe inliared portion oí the elec tromagnetic spec trum and oblains images at two different surface resolutions, O.bkm (one- third nm) and 3.7 km (2nm). Some improvement in resolution is being ac hieved with lhe Block 5D saiellite now in operation. The resolution ol the imagery defines the smallest detectable element that can lx- displayed in the data direclly Ixdow the Figure 2. Typical polar-orbitmg satellile coverage (direct satellile. Beca use of lhe geometry of the Block readout al Howard AFB. Canal Zone) illustrates lhe rough 5C scanning radiometei Systems, the size of lhe DMSP readout circle, as lhe aenal coverage is called. Il is onty within this circle that Howard could resolution of the imagciy degrades by a faclor recene real-time data jrom a DMSP satellite. of about six from the center toward the edges. The resolution ol the DMSP VHR. and WHR data, lor example, degrades lrom one-third NM at picture tentei to about two NM at the orbil, which is highly elliptical. The latter lias edges.7 The resolution ol lhe data from the lhe advaniage lhai when apogee is in the Block 5D satellile is more consiant, resulting Northern Hemisphere the spacecraft can view in a degradation of less than two to one. most of the Soviet 1’nion continuously for up to 12 hours. additional sensing capabilities

In addition to the imaging systems, most the imaging system meteorological satellites carry a complement The fundamental imaging system used on of instruments that measure a number of lx>th geostationary and polar otbiting atmospheric, exoatmospheric, and solar satellites is the scanning radiometer. Figure 3 parameters. One of the most importam of these illustrates the scanning concept for thecurrent instruments is lhe infrared profiling DMSP polar-orbiting system. The radiometer radiometer, which measures upwelling energy consists of a telescope-detector combination that sweeps across the F.arth’s surface. In polar orbiters the scanner sweeps perpendic ular to lhe orbit plane. For geostationary orbiters the entire spacecraft rotates in one direclion, and the radiometer is mechanically stepped in the other direction. Figure 3. DMSP scanning radiometer concept The DMSP primary imager covers a swath width of about 2%0km (IbOUnm), which equates to about 26° at theequator. (See Figure 3.) rherefore. lhe DMSP satelliie will image every point on the Farth ai least twiceeach 24- hour day, once ascending (traversing from south to north) and once descending (traversing from north to south). 18 AIR UNIl/ERSITY REVIEW from narrow spectral intervals in a region of horizon communication and navigation strong aimospheric absorption. The energy Systems. data are then inverted lo temperature or absorber concentration. By careful selection oí decision assistance the proper spectral intervals, a mean vertical profile of temperature and water vapor concen- Meteorological satellites provide weathermen tration (humidity) can be obiained. This and military decision-makers with large area information is input into global numerical observations or depictions of the existing weather analysis models. Both NOAA and weather. This imagery is especially valuable DMSP polar orbiters have carried a vertical over the vast data-sparse regions of the globe temperature profile radiometer since 1972, and and is indispensable over unfriendly, data- the retrieved temperature information is used denied areas during times of conflict. operationally to prepare forecasts at the Geostationary satellites provide wide area AFGWC. coverage that is almost continuously available Instrum ents that measure upper on demand. This can be a significam aimospheric, exoatmospheric, or solar advantage, for example, for battlefield parameters are still in their infancy. They cover support. However, the resolution and the electromagnetic spectrum, ranging from usefulness of the data degrades north-south measurements of cosmic and x rays to the from the equator as well as east-west from the monitoring of high frequency radio waves to longitude of the satellite subpoint; useful determine the criticai frequency for over-the- coverage does not extend much beyond 55°

The Defense Meteorological Satel- lite Program (DMSP) provided invaluable weather support in Southeast Asia. The Son Tay raid was scheduled to coincide with a break in the weather between two tropical storms that moved across the South China Sea and into the mainland. The remains of the first storm can be seen (right) in northeasl Thailand while the second storm, Patsy, is off the coast of South Vietnam near Da Nang. . . . The more recent DMSP photos (opposite) augmented available weather data for the recovery of the crew of the Mayaguez. The poor weather conditions in the initial location are clearly evident (left) as are the original and relocated refueling areas. The DMSP photo used to support the recovering operation (right) shows that weather along the Cambodian coast imprcwed, en- abling some damaged helicopters lo recaver on the Thai mainland. THE METEOROLOGICAL SATELL1TE 19

north or south. Because of lheir much higher times per day over all areas of the globe. One altitude, geostalionary satellites provide data satellite is in an early morning/evening orbit, that are much more difficult to locate and the other is in a near noon/midnight orbit. geographically with certainty. Geostalionary The DMSP system has designed the ground- satellites also cost roughly an order of processing and display equipment to be magnitude more than corresponding polar responsive to military needs. The display orbiters. equipment produces a high-quality positive Since the military needs worldwide high- film transparency that is available within five resolution satellite weather imagery that can minutes after receipt of the last line of data be precisely gridded, the DMSP system has from the satellite. The display system also has relied on sun-synchronous polar-orbiting many enhancement and processing options. satellites. Two satellites are routinely kept in For example, the brightness of the visible operational orbits to provide coverage four imagery can be enhanced to accentuate the 20 A IR l 'NI I ERSIT Y RE \'IE\ V clouds, or ihc giomul, or water; inírared development of algorithms for computing imagery is presenteei as kelvin lemperature, probabilities of cloud-free line-of-sight and selected lemperalure leveis can be (CFLOS) for electro-optical guidance systems. displayed separa lely. l he foreshorteningof the imagery at lhe edges caused by lhe Earth’s the future cuivature is reduted in lhe display syslem by using a sinusoidal sweep raleon each scan line. The role of the meteorological satellite and the While ihis produces an equal-area rectified DMSP program will continue to grow. In image, il does not compensale for lhe loss of 1976, the first of the newest generation of resolulion ai lhe edges.H DMSP satellites, referred to as Block 5D, was The DMSP direc i readoui equipment has launched. These satellites are designed for been installed in trailers lhai are iransportable longer on-orbit operational lifetime, improved by C-5aircraft. Wilh thisequipmeni, known as gridding and data locaiion accuracies through I ransportable Terminal Systems (TTS), direc i i m pro ved sa tel 1 i te posi t ion i n g tech n iq ues, and readout of DMSP imagery can be made increased data resolution by making the available to inilitary commanders anywhere resolulion of the imagery nearly constant on the globe wilhin a matler of hours after across the photograph. The constant arrival on site. resolulion is accomplished by varying the As meniioned previously, the AFGWC detec tor si/.e and orientation (smallest at data receives the stored global imagery and other edge, largest at data center) whilescanningat a data from the DMSP satellites. These data are sinusoidal rate (slowest at data edge, fastest at reproduced on positive transparency film for data center). In addition, a feasibility model of immediate use. Simulianeously, the data are a smaller direct readout syslem has been tested. input into electronic data processing The smaller Transportable Terminal Systems equipment and usecl in developing the many will be iransportable by C-130or C-141 aircraft AFGWC computer-assisted analyses and and suited for tactical bare base deployments. forecasts. Examples of the support that is Military and civilian scientists are also enhanced by these computer-processed testing and evaluating new satellite-borne meteorological satellite data include detailed sensors that promise to overcome some of the cloud information lor computei i/ed flighl iimitations of today’s systems. Microwave plans, cloud cover forec asts for aerial refueling sensing instruments, dependingon frequency, operations. point analysis information for the are not sensitive to higher, drier cloud environmental impac t determination for new formations; they can (in a sense) see through weapon syslem testing, and a comprehensive many cloud types and depict the areas of cloud c limatologic al data base for the t one entration of rainfall or clouds with largei

C.omposite photograph of the four types of imagery data. The two top photographs are 1.7km resolution visual (HR) and 0-6km resolution visual (l’HR). The two bottom photographs are 3.7km resolution infrared (IR)and O.ókm resolution infrared (WhlR). The visual HR imagery was taken at night (near nudnight) wilh the aid of reflected moonlight about three days bejore a full moon. This visual channel is higlily sensitive and can provide useful cloud cover information with as httle as one-half moon conditions. The image also shows City lighls in the eastern half of the United States. 21 •*5 experimental satellites, experimental and a willsounder be Organization of Air of Force Command Systems Organization flown on future DMSP and NOAA satellites. NOAA and DMSP flownfuture on and sounders Microwave water droplets. 22 imagers have been flown on NASA NASA on been flown have imagers The Space and M issile Systems issile Systems M and Space The AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW AIR UNIVERSITY (GOES) provides wtde-area coverage, asbuthere, evident wtde-area coverage, provides (GOES) useful coverage is limited to islimited coverage useful The Geostationary Operational Environmenlal Operational Satellite Geostationary The adaptation of of geostationary satelliteadaptation Systems to studiesThese willreview suchtopics as the to strategic forces.laclicaland satellite supporl thalstudies include analyses of meteorological is sponsoring a analysis mission and isfollow-on sponsoring meet needs military as well as thedevelopment 55° 55° north andnorth south.

THE METEOROLOGICAL SA TELLITE 23

of Computer forecasting models based entirely the basic atmospheric circulation patterns and on data inputs from satellite-borne sensors. associaied weather phenomena. The First In addition, the World Meteorological GARP Global Experiment (FGGE) will be Organization is conducting Global conducted during 1978. Nations around the Atmospheric Research Projects (GARP) in an world will join in taking detailed attempt to improve man's understanding of simultaneous observations of the Earth's

The Transportable Terminal Systems (TTS) are trailers that accommodate the DMSP direct readout equipment. These trailers can be transported by C-5 aircraft. 24 A IR l NIVERSITY RE I IEIV atmosphere in the mid-laiiiudes and ihe continually working to improve the weather tropics. Geostationary meteorological suppori provided to the military decision- satellites are scheduled lo be placed around the maker. Satellite meteorology, as supported by globe to ensure total coverage of the Earih’s the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, surface hetween 60°N and 60°S. FGGEshould is an invaluable aid. In unveiling some of the provide some new insights to obsei ving and DMSP photos beíore a Pentagon press íorecasting tethniques using geostationary (onference in March 1973, *Dr. John L. platforms. Mc Lutas (then Secretary of the Air Force) said that DMSP “furnishes the best data possible to MUCH HAS been accomplished since the decision-makers anywhere in the world whose launch ol Tiros 1 in 1960, yet military operations are affected by weather.” meteorologists and space engineers are Air Weather Service

Notes State Cniversiiy Press. 1964). pp. 46-47. 1. John F. Fullcr. Weather and War, Scou AFB. Illinois: Military Airliít 4. Ibid.. p. 75. Cominand. Detrmbcr 1974. p. 16. 5. Ibid.. p. 74. 2. Charles W. Dickens and MSgt Charles A. Raverstcin. edited by John F. 6. Ibid.. pp. 108-9. Fullcr, Air Weather Service and Meteorological Satellites 1950-1960, Air 7. James R. Blackenship and Richard C. Savage. "Eleciro-Opiical Weather Service Historiral Study No. 5. Scou AFB. Illinois: Military Airliít Processing of DAPP Meteorological Satellite Data.” American Meteorological Cominand. December 1973. p. I. Society Bulletin, January 1974, p. 9. 3. Eu gene M. Emmc. The History of Rockel Technology (Deiroú: Wayne 8. Ibid.. p. 5.

. . . the United States still maintains its technological edge. But the important thing to look at is not a static picture, but trends relative to the rest of lhe world.... Certainly, the world is gaining much of our technology. Many nations are investing more heavily than we are in terms of their gross national product. We are realizing, 1 think, that we are in a very urgent and real technological race with the rest of the world, in terms of general economic trade considerations, our economic security, and certainly in terms of military research and development vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Dr M alcolm R. CuRRir Director of Defense Research and Engineering Countermeasures, December 1976 Ctiãyos AjxhipGl&yv ODIBGO GARCIA

o Mãuritítís

military affairs abroad

THE UNITED STATES ON DIEGO GARCIA

R yanJ. Barilleaux a question of limits N Through lhe Looking Glass, Lewis tion facility into a naval support base, ICarroll describes the country of the Red therefore, focuses the question of limits on Queen, where one has to run as fast as possible what the status of the installation on Diego to stay in the same place. This situation is Garcia should be. similar to the one faced by modern American The purpose of this article is to show how a foreign policy. Because it is a superpower, the policy of nonexpansion beyond present harder the United States vvorks at protecting its construction projects on Diego Garcia would interests the more it seems that there can be no best promote peace. This objective will be advancemeni of those interests. Many nations, accomplished by examining major aspects of esperially those in the third world, automati- the problem: development of the American cally respond to American actions with presence on Diego Garcia and in the Indian charges of imperialism. Furthermore, military Ocean in recent years, the nature of the moves by the United States can touch off controversy surrounding the facility there, the reciprocai moves by the Soviet Union. At failure of alternate proposals to achieve a home, too, government policy is the subject of solution, and the way in which a nonexpan- pressure to minimize defense expenditures. sion policy will work to promote peace. Liberais regard increases in the military as something of an overkill. While the accuracy of such a charge is debatable, the idea of Development of the overkill raises an importam issue in American United States Presence foreign policy: the problemofsettinglimitson The problem of Diego Garcia has been the size and scope of military operations that developing for more than a decade, and a will provide maximum benefits without multitude of events has contributed to today’s generating new security threats. complex situation. To appreciate the signifi- This concept of limits is especially applic- cance of Diego Garcia thus requires an able to the American presence in the Indian understanding of those past events, beginning Ocean, specifically concerning United States with the change in the British government in policy tovvard the island of Diego Garcia. That the early 1960s. island, the home of an American communica- Soon after taking power in 1964, Britain’s tion facility, lies in the approximate center of new Labour government found itself heir to the Indian Ocean, no closer than about 2500 defenses that were overextended and under- miles to any major land mass. This centrality, equipped. Seeking to minimize foreign defense as well as the fact that it is isolated from the commitments, the British leaders decided to sensitive littoral States,1 accords it great value withdraw forces from areas east of Suez within to strategists. Effective use of this position thus seven years. However, in 1966 the LInitedStates depends on the nature of the facilities installed and Great Britain decided that their mutual there. The transformation of the communica- security interests would be best served if they maintained an installation in the Indian Distance of Diego Garcia Ocean. from other countries In order to obtain such a facility, Britain Approximate formed the British Indian Ocean Territory Country distance (miles) (BIOT) from the Chagos Archipelago.2 As an Australia------3000 incentive to British participation, the United India------1000 States agreed to lower the cost of a group of Mauritius------1200 Somalia------1800 Polaris submarines that it was selling to Yemen------2400 Britain by $14 million.* The agreemeni. 26 MILITAR Y AFFAIRS ABROAD 27

however, was kept as quiet as possible, so as to had convinced Congress would be necessary in secure purchase of lhe islands from Mauntius, the near future. That naval escalation was not which at this lime was gaining its independ- begun until 1971, when decreasing activities in ence and feared a foreign military establish- Vietnam offered the opportunity to send ment in the area, even though it vvould be some modern ships into the Indian Ocean. 1200 miles away. Despite assurances to the The need for such escalation was soon contrary, the purpose of the BIOT was to serve evident. The India-Pakistan and Yom Kippur as the home of such an installation; and soon wars had brought a larger Soviet force into the after its purchase, the island of Diego Garcia area, as well as the greater American presence. was quietly leased to the United States.4 United States national security analysts At that time. the British withdrawal “ Eastof perceived the Soviet build-up as a threat to Suez” was viewed in the West as a disastrous American interests. This threat was especially move, for it was felt that the cutback would significam in terms of the military and create a power vacuum. This view was diploinatic pressure that the Soviet Union predicated on the assumption that littoral would be able to employ in its dealings with States w'ould be unable to defend themselves. littoral States.7 Moreover, the 1973 oil crisis The Western notion of a power vacuum was demonstrated the vulnerability of thesea-lanes not echoed elsewhere. Indian Ocean area and how easily oil shipments might be blocked nations claimed that this concept would in some future war. The United States thus undermine thexr independence and develop- drastically increased its naval forces in the ment by inviting Big Power intervention and Indian Ocean.8 The American policy was negating third world nonalignment. Joining justified in terms of the Nixon Doctrine, which the littoral States in denouncing the West was called for a reduced United States presence the Soviet Union, charging that the power- around the world. State Department ofíicials vacuum concept was imperialistic.5 contended that such escalation would aid Despite the rhetoric, the Soviet Union was American allies in the area by providing a the first major power to increase naval stabilizing influence, apparently to pre-empt activities in the area. In 1968. a small naval the need for a major United States action if the force, including missile-bearing warships, situation were to become more precarious in entered the Indian Ocean. In 1969, the Pacific the future.9 American presence was also and Black Sea fleets of the Soviet Navy held expected to ensure that the lanes of oil traffic, joint maneuvers in those waters. Later in the running from the Persian Gulf through the same year, the Soviets began maintaining a Indian Ocean and on to Europe, Japan, and permanent surface vessel presence in the area. America, would not be blocked.10 Nevertheless, As for the United States, its actions at this the United States failed to keep pace with the time were largely confined to the Navy’s bid for advance of Soviet activity, which always a base on Diego Garcia, designed to counter the managed to have more ships in the region. growing Soviet presence. Failing in its Because of the superiority of some American attempt, the Navy was left with only the ships, it is impossible to determine objectively Mideast force at Bahrain, a symbolic patrol if either side held a clear advantage.11 The unit of outdated ships that had been there since Soviets, however, did not merely escalate their 1948.6 The Navy tried again with a different naval presence. Anchorages and installations plan in 1970 and received approval for an were actively sought and gained. The inost austere communication facility on Diego significam of these were on the island of Garcia. I his base was to provide support for Socotra, at the entrance to the Red Sea; in the increased activity that naval authorities Yemen; in Mauritius;12and most importam, in 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Berbera, Soma lia, which was later discovered These two attitudes were rather pronounced to be a substantial missile-handling facility.13 in the Subcommittee Hearings, which in In addition to increasing its presence in the themselves were quite significam. Recom- Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union also looked mendation or disapproval of the proposed forward to the reopening of the Suez Canal, Diego Garcia expansion by the Foreign Affairs which would shorten by about 8000 miles the Committee would have a major impact on distance that Soviet ships would have to travei. American foreign policy. The hearings would The United States at this time was not effectively determine the nature of American inactive in the Indian Ocean area. In addition activities in the Indian Ocean, and Diego to stepping up naval activities, it, too, sought Garcia was to be the test-case. The veracity of bases in the region. The long-standing base at this statement is better appreciated after Bahrain was under pressure from the local examining the island's strategic significance, government to close. Yet because of improved the expansion plans, and the nature of the relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, possibil- present controversy. ities of building establishments there were As previously noted, Diego Garcia’s isolated increased. The United States Navy wanted a central position in the Indian Ocean makes it dependable, permanent base in the Indian very valuable to strategists in that the nature of Ocean. The logical Navy choice was Diego the facilities there would determine how Garcia. Without such a base, the nearest fuel effectively such a position would be used. facilities would have to be in distant Australia Until the summer of 1976, Diego Garcia held or the Philippines. These seemed remote or only a communication facility. In July inefficient possibilities. Thus, in 1974, a construction began which will transform the request was sent to Congress for the money to island into a logistics support base, intended to expand the communication facility into a service a carrier task force and relieve the strain logistics support base. With this request, the of having to depend entirely on facilities in present controversy about Diego Garcia began. Australia or the Philippines. This installation would have a twenty-eight-day fuel storage capacity, a harbor capable of admitting fleet Nature and Roots of warships, and a 12,000-foot runway. This is Present Controversy not the original base that the Navy had wanted, By the time of the 1974 Hearings before the however, although it is close to it.14The Navy House Subcommittee on the Far East and had desited a base in the Indian Ocean since South Asia, the question of desirable limits on 1959, when it saw that those waters would militarv deployment had produced two major probably be an area of future American schools of thought: the expansionists and the deployment.15 Eventually, the plans were minimalists. Expansionists fearedthegrowing developed to a point that required a permanent Soviet presence and the instabilities of the naval and air support facility capable of troop- Indian Ocean region. They sought to remedy staging and extensive aircraft trafficking. this problem by establishing a real and llnable toachieve thisgoal immediately, the permanent facility that would strengthen the Navy then decided to approach it in stages: the American presence in the Indian Ocean, to be first stage was the communication facility; the accomplished by a major naval commitment projects now under way constitute the second; there. Minimalists feared that such actions and the third stage would be further expansion would cause a superpower arms race in the to achieve a permanent, multipurpose base.16 region and sought to halt or minimize It was this final step that most disturbed American activity in the area. minimalists, who feared that it would MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 29

stimulate an arms race in lhe Indian Ocean. of American naval deployment in the area. The Ahhough the Navy denies that what itactually American deployment, then, was the key to wants is the maximum facility, the evidente advancing United States security interests in indicates that this argument is only rhetoric the Indian Ocean.18 used to quiet minimalist forces. That “stabilizing influence” that the Navy The minimalists met head-on with expan- was to provide was a maintenance of sionists in the 1974 Hearings and again in conditions favorable to trade.19 The Soviet Congress in 1975. The views expressed by both presence was seen as counter to this goal. sides also reflect the worldwide controversy Noyes pointed out that the Soviet Union then about the question as well as the American had 29 ships in the Indian Ocean, of which debate. approximately one-half were combatants. He Illustrations of this debate can be found further stated that this presence was a potential repeatedly in those hearings. The expansion- threat to United States interests.20 ists argued that upgrading the facilities on Herein lies a crucial issue in the understand- Diego Garcia was crucial to the entire ing of the expansionists' beliefs, i.e., the spectrum of United States' interests in the perception of a Soviet threat. It is importam to region. Essentially, the argument was that the note that, in the hearings, the expansionists status of the base directly influenced naval attempted to minimize their obvious concern effectiveness and that the security of American over Soviet activity in the area. They interests was dependent on that effectiveness. apparently wanted to justify Diego Garcia in The Defense Department stated that the United terms of interests that can be perceived as other States had three major concerns in the area: (1) than military compeiition between the super- maintaining dialogue with Arab States; (2) powers and thus negate the fears of the critics protecting the sea-lanes, especially oil routes; of expansion that a war might be the result of and (3) countering the Soviet presence. All such competition. A State Department witness, three were considered justifications for strong Seymour VVeiss, Director of the Bureau of United States forces in the ocean, especially the Politico-Military Affairs, echoed Noyes in the latter two. statement that “ there is a potential threat when Because of the “delicately balanced system” 17 there is a Soviet force which is substantially in of oil production and distribution, American excess of our own.”21 Further questioning of military presence was necessary to provide a VVeiss revealed that instability in the region deterrent against disruption of oil supplies was regarded as counter to American interests, vital to national defense. The Defense a point important to understanding why Department witness, James H. Noyes, Deputy expansionists want a larger United States Assistant Secretary for International Security presence: they fear Soviet control. Affairs, explained that the 1973 oil crisis had This altitude is reflected on a world scale by demonstrated that threats or coercion on the nations such as Iran and China, who see part of a major or even minor power could United States activity as an aid in protecting check the flow of oil to the United States and its their interests.22 Britain, Singapore, and allies. The essential value of Diego Garcia thus Pakistan also favor American response to the lay in the idea that it allowed a stabilizing Soviet Union.25 Japan and Western Europe are American presence to be maintained "effi- concerned about oil shipments. Even Australia ciently and economically.” The central loca- and France have sent ships in hopes of aiding tion of the island would provide better defense the United States in striking a balance. The of the sea-lanes than any of the more remote main idea, however, is that American presence support bases, by enhancing the effectiveness will prevení Soviet domination of the region. 30 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

It is this reasoning that minimalists attack. many members fear another war like Vietnam. They view it as merely power-balance politics. Even stronger is the fear of instigating a major Furthermore, they are afraid that the result of arms race in the Indian Ocean. In 1975, the this competition will be either superpower majority leader, Senator Mike Mansfield (D- domination of the area or an Indian Ocean Montana) led a move to block the expansion of war. This opinion was reflected in the Diego Garcia on the grounds that it would testimony of Dr. Earl Ravenal, Professorial start such competition. This move revived the Lecturer at the School for Advanced Interna- arguments that had been used in the hearings, tional Studies, Johns Hopkins University, a but with an addition. leading advocate of the minimalist position. While the minimalists once again spoke of Dr. Ravenal insisted that the United States leading the way to peace, the usual expan- could no longer be the “policeman of the sionist response was supplemented by the world” and that the decision concerning Diego proof that the Soviet base at Somalia was Garcia would also concern the question of indeed a missile-handling facility.28 This new whether the United States was going to "threat” effectively killed opposition to continue to engage in power politics abroad.24 expansion at the time. Nevertheless, a short The statements of Dr. Ravenal were reinforced time later the minimalists sought a delay so as by those of Rear Admirai Gene LaRocque to allow arms-limitation talks with the Soviet (Retired), Director of the Center for Defense Union. This time they succeeded, and Information, who declared that the United construction was postponed until July 1976.29 States Navy was trying to start an arms race in That time has passed, and expansion is now the Indian Ocean by exaggerating Soviet under way. This decision would seem to settle strengths and American weaknesses.25 the affair, but it does not. Instead, the question In this declaration, the minimalist view of limits becomes more exacting, demanding a becomes apparent, i.e., that the military is better grasp of reality, not merely rhetoric. misleading Congress (and everyone else) as to the actual importance of Soviet presence. In The Failure of Alternate Proposals doing so, the minimalists fali victim to their own perceptions. In attemptingtodetract from In the light of a decision by Congress the formidability of the Soviet naval forces in concerning Diego Garcia that does not settle the Indian Ocean, the minimalists tend to the issue, one would do well to consider what ignore it almost completely. Instead, they courses of action are available. Apart from place extreme emphasis on United States nonexpansion on Diego Garcia, which will be activities and how these are dangerous to discussed later, there are two major peace. possibilities: the "zone of peace” concept and índia, one of the main opponents of bilateral arms-limitation talks. American presence in the region, is representa- The arms-limitation talks idea has been the tive of this attitude. It has been stated by the subject of much debate in recent years, as both Indian Ministry of Defense that it has regarded the United States and the Soviet Union claim superpowers in the region as a security threat to desire such meetings but seem to actively since 1972. Furthermore, American presence avoid them. Despite governmental inaction, has been viewed as an "adverse factor.” 26 The the debate over the merits of this proposal goes base at Diego Garcia is expected to increase the on. Its supporters argue that such an threat, rising out of the fear of intervention.27 agreement would eliminate the need for a base That fear, however, is not limited to littoral on Diego Garcia. Critics claim that the talks States. It is also apparent in Congress, where will not be honored. Whether either argument MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 31

is right is unknown, as both the Soviet Union Those policies make the question of limits and the United States have taken steps to avoid paramount, since the United States must then such discussions. achieve the goal of security on its own. On the Soviet side, those steps are part of Brezhnev’s "Peace Program.” which isrespon- The Wisdom of Nonexpansion sible for establishing a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean. An importam aspect of the In order to establish a desirable limit to program, renewed last year by the Party United States policy regarding Diego Garcia, it Congress, is to advance the superpower status is necessary to eliminate the vast amount of of the Soviet Union through an undermining rhetoric and determine the true State of affairs. of United States policies abroad.30 Thus, the Effectively, this imperative requires a judg- Soviets are uninterested in arms-limitation in ment of whether Soviet presence is a threat to the Indian Ocean. the United States. If there is such a threat, then On the American side, actions taken todelay the issue becomes one of how much presence is talks range from charging a lack of Soviet enough. Is Diego Garcia crucial to this interest to claims that the United States needs a presence? position of strength before it can begin There is little doubt in the West that the bargaining, i.e., an Indian Ocean base. Even in Soviets are in the Indian Ocean to stay. Their the delay period established by Congress for objectives in the area are threefold: (1) to promoting talks, no action was taken.31 establish a shipping outlet to the south, a goal While neither country makes a move to start which has been of Russian concern for any discussion, both blame each other for the centuries;33 (2) to solidify the image of the delay. Even without the rhetoric, however, Soviet Union as a superpower by undermining each party’s working policy has shown that Western power and influence, especially by neither wants arms talks nor considers them in jeopardizing oil shipments vital to the West;34 its interests. and (3) to inhibit Chinese actions and Also, both sides refuse to come to terms with influence in the area.35 the concept of a “zone of peace" in the Indian Despite minimalist arguments, these objec- Ocean. While this idea is favored by the littoral tives are perceived as a threat to American States as the best road to peace and interests. The threat is real rather than development, the superpowers view it as an imagined because of the Soviet naval presence infringement on the concept of an "open" sea. in the Indian Ocean. That presence might be The United States and the Soviet Union do not used to block oil traffic. Furthermore, the wish to have their extensive naval activities in forced withdrawal of the Mideast force from the region limited.32 Bahrain leaves the United States without a It becomes apparent that both the United permanent establishment in the area. Thus, States and the Soviet Union are unwilling to Diego Garcia assumes a physical value in engage in situations that would depend on terms of American response to the Soviet bilateral or multilateral agreements and thus presence. The threat is enhanced, however, by regulate their respective defense policies in the the perception of such a threat by American area. The renewal of Brezhnev’s Peace leaders. The problem for the United States is Program and reports from inside the Depart- the establishing of a necessary limit to its ment of State attest to this idea. Thus, the response to the Soviet build-up. (As noted alternatives die before they have a chance to above, Diego Garcia is also accorded a work, as a result of the Big Power foreign symbolic significance.) Therefore, policy policies. concerning the status of the base there is 32 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW crucial to both physical and perceived aspects ports in eighteen littoral States.39 Diego Garcia of United States security. is necessary because of the Bahrain withdrawal That policy should be oneof nonexpansion. and especially as a “potential.” It must not be VVhile the Soviet presence is real,36 overreac- used as a troop-staging facility, for this could tion by the United States wouldonly expandit. be interpreted as a belligerent act, as could any The Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean, further expansion in the base. Moreover, a already numerically superior to American larger base on Diego Garcia is not needed to forces, have managed to stay ahead of any compete with the Soviet base at Berbera. In increases by the United States. Much of this 1977, Som alia ordered all Soviet personnel and expansion has been from motives that are facilities out of the country.40 Diego Garcia, purely Soviet initiatives. Some, hovvever, were combined with American, French, and Japa- triggered by American expansion. One exam- nese naval forces in the area, thus provides an ple of such increases carne in 1971, when Soviet adequate response to the Soviet presence in the and American naval forces in the Indian Ocean Indian Ocean region. were enlarged because of the índia-Pakistan For those who argue that the facility should war. The additional Soviet ships did not be removed because it is unnecessary, there are withdraw until the Enterprise had done so. four considerations. The first is that the base Another example was in 1973, when the does exist. Removal might be taken as alackof United States increased its Indian Ocean resolve on the part of the United States, which presence following the Yom Kippur War. The could spur further Soviet increases. Second, in American increases were soon followed by light of the Bahrain withdrawal, there is no expanded Soviet deployment.37 Such increases longer a permanent American force in the area. place additional significance on Diego Garcia. Without an establishment such as Diego The status of the base there will affect the Garcia to be a constant reminder of American character of the American response to the intent, security of the oil routes could be Soviet presence and thus influence Soviet jeopardized. Third, the island lends itself to reaction to United States policy in the area. efficiency and economy in military deploy- When present projects (runway extension, ment. Finally, the base is necessary for its fuel storage, and harbor dredging) have been potential uses. Due to the instability of the completed, the base at Diego Garcia will Indian Ocean region, it is highly desirable to provide a valuable but limited support facility have a dependable facility ready. The word for United States operations in the Indian potential must bestressed, however. To use the Ocean. There will be no troop-staging base as little as possible would offer diplomatic activities on Diego Garcia, nor will there be advantages, as both internai and externai any permanent naval detachment. Yet, these forces regard Diego Garcia as a symbol of limits do not necessarily compromise security, United States interventionism. as the base will be able to Service B-52s and These considerations lead to the question of attack-submarines.38 These limits will not the future status of the base. While it is useful exist, however, if the expansionists are in countering the Soviet presence and triumphant. It therefore becomes important protecting American interests, to expand it for the United States to develop a specific would invite increases on the part of the Soviet policy concerning that base, in terms of its Union in addition to the regular Soviet functions and status, if the expansionists are schedule of escalation. Moreover, increases on not to win merely by their persistence. Diego Garcia would provide excellent “justifi- The function of the base must be a minimal cation” for such additions. one. Presently, the United States has access to Furthermore, the policy of nonexpansion MIUTARY AFFA1RS ABROAD 33

should specifically deal with ihis ideaof staius. not compromise security interests. As noted As lhe evidence has borne out, the Navy has above, the major Soviet base in the area has been able 10 accomplish its goals. if only by been ordered removed, thus impairing Soviet sheer persistence. This is Iargely due to the lack power in the Indian Ocean region. Coupled of a comprehensive policy that staies lhe with the rather extensive naval forces that the objectives and iimits of a Diego Garcia base. United States is able to deploy in the ocean, Such policy is not without its critics. this base will provide an adequate response to Expansionists will view it as a compromising the presence of the Soviet Union. To increase of security interests. Minimalists will still have the facilities there is not really necessary unless to face the United States presence and the a permaneni, large-scale presence is desired in possibility of intervention. the region, and that type of activity would serve This fear is unfounded. American leaders only to spark Soviet increases. have expressed the attitude that the United Essentially, then, nonexpansion would States should not dominate the Indian Ocean establish a limit to American presence in the region, but as yet these leaders have not taken Indian Ocean that would advance security concrete action to implement such a policy. interests without spurring future threats to Nonexpansion offers the opportunity of those interests. Such a policy should make a transforming this idea into action. contribution to peace without jeopardizing At the same time, however, this policy will United States security. Lafayetle, Louistana

Notes 17. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Indian 1. U.S. CongTrss. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Proposed Ocean, 9Sd Cong.. 2d sess., 1974, p. 87. Expanuon of the U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, Heanngs before 18 Ibid. a Subcommittee of the House Commillee on Foreign Affairs. 93d Cong.. 2d 19. W. A. C. Adie. Oil. Poliltcs, and Seapower: The Indian Ocean Vortex (New York: Crane. Russak. and Co.. 1975). p. 12. Alihough Adie concludes sess.. 1974. p. 90. 2. While Clhagos is its most importam part. the British Indian Ocean that military manipulations are the wrong answer to the oil supply problem. Territor> also contam* the islands of Aldabra. Farquhar. and Desroches. he emphasizes that a major American goal is regional stability. 3. New York Times, 17 October 1975. p. 3. 20. Hearings before lhe House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Indian 4. K. P Misra, International Poliucs in the Indian Ocean.” Orbis, Winier Ocean. 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974. p. 61. 1975. pp. 1099-1100 21 Ibid. 5. Ibid 22. Ibid., p. 28. 6. Mídrast (orce consists of a ílagship. La Salle. and two deslroyers. 23. G. S. Bhargava, "índia s Security in lhe 1980s," Adelpht Paper No. 124 7. Heanngs before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Indian (Summer 1976), p. 23. Ocean. 93d Cong.. 2d seis.. 1974. p. 56. 24. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on lhe Indian 8. Brucr Chou. "The United States and Soviet Union in lhe Indian Ocean.” Ocean. 9Sd Cong.. 2d sess.. 1974, p. 37. Auan Outlook. July 1974. p. 22. 25. Ibid 9. Heanngs before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Indian 26. Bhargava. p. 19. Ocean. 93d C on g. 2d sess.. 1974. p. 141. 27 Ibid. 10. Japan. which depends on the Persian Gulf for 79.6 percent of its oil. is 28. New York Times, 6 July 1975, sec. 4. p. 3. reached through the Stratts of Malacca. Europe and America, which dcpend. 29. U.S. Congress. Senate. 93d Cong.. 2d sess., 6 November 1975. respectively. on the Gulf for 64 percent and 30 percent of their oil. are reached Congressional Record, p. SI9465. through the Red Sea or around the Cape of Good Hope. 30. Stralegic Survey 1975 (London International Insiiiute for Strategic 11. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Means of Studies, 1976), p. 25. Measunng Naval Power wtlh Spectal Reference to U.S. and Soviet Actwities in 31. New York Times, 8 July 1975. p. 2. the Indian Ocean, by lhe Foreign Affairs Diviston of the Congressional 32 Misra. pp. 1098-99 Research Service. Committee Pnnt (Washington. D.C.; Government Printing 33. Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell. "Soviet-U.S. Naval Compeiuion in Office. 1974), pp. 15-16. the Indian Ocean." Orbis, Winier 1976. p. 1109. 12. Maunuus has apparently changed its policy on foreign acttvity after 34 Ibid learning of the true nacure of the BIOT. 35. Denms Chaplin, "Somalia and the Development of Soviet Activity in the 13. New York Times. 6 July 1975. p. 3. Indian Ocean." Mihtary Review, July 1975. p. 9. 14. U.S. CongTeis. Senate. Senator John Culver (O-Iowa) spcaking on the 36. Ibid. amendment to the 1976 Military Construction Act. No. 1054. 93d Cong.. 2d 37. Norman Polmar. Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the I970s (New sess.. 6 N ovem brr 1975. Congressional Record. pp. S 19451-52. York: Crane, Russak, and Co.. 1974), pp 313-14. 15 Heanngs before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Indian 38. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Commillee on the Indian Ocean. 93d Cong.. 2d se ».. 1974. p. 90. Ocean, 93d Cong.. 2d sess., pp. 125-26. 16. U.S Congress, Senate. Senator Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina) 39. U.S. Congress. Senate. 93d Cong., 2d sess., 11 July 1975. Congressional speaktng on the Amendment to the 1976 Miiitary Construction Act. No. 1054. Record, p. SI2440. 93d Cong.. 2d ses».. 6 Novembrr 1975. Congressional Record, p. S 19462. 40. "Airlift to Ethiopia." Newsweek, January 23. 1978, p 34 LASER ISOTOPE ENRICHMENT a new dimension to the nth country

D r . robert L. Bledsoe

N T H E post-YVorld War II atomic era, the issue of the spread of nuclear weapons beyond those countries then possessing I them (the United States and the Soviet Union) was typically referred to as the “ third country” problem (before Great Britain acquired thecapability), then the “fourth country” problem (until Prance cletonated a nuclear device in 1960), and, finally, symbolic of the emerging trend, simply the “nth country” problem. This issue of nuclear proliferation was generated a sizable body of literature both within and outside the scientific communities of many countries during the past fifteen years or more.1 Whether optimistic or pessimistic in outlook, the basic assumptions of 34 LASER ISO TO PE ENRICHMENT 35

much of this literature can be summarized as of uranium and for fusion power portend a follows: (1) the technological inputs for profound technological breakthrough in both nuclear weapon development are beyond the cost and development factors which add a new capability of all but the most advanced States; dimension to the problem of nuclear weapons (2) the capital outlay requirements for such proliferaton? weapon systems are prohibitive even for those States possessing the requisite technological capability and resources; (3) the acquisition of nuclear weapon poses as many problems to a S lN C E TH E first laser nation’s security as such weapons are designed demonstrations by Theodore H. Maiman in to resolve; and (4) a primitive nuclear arsenal is 1960, research has been under way in laser not cost-effective. application to computers, surgery, and a variety of other uses, including nuclear fusion The nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is and isotope separation. In these latter areas, a aided, therefore, strategic and political consid- major focus has been to develop an alternate erations aside, by the extremely costly and source of civilian energy that will replace complex technological demands placed on conventional nuclear reactors. Conventional countries considering the nuclear option. In production of nuclear energy uses enriched fact, the question of proliferation of nuclear uranium as the fuel for fission reactions that weapons cannot be separated from that of the release usable energy. Capital costs, proliferation of nuclear technology. Indeed, it technological complexity, enriched uranium is nuclear technology that “ has risen above fuel supply, and waste disposal are all factors nuclear weapons and is proliferating into that have inhibited the application of nuclear every corner of the world.’’2 As long as such energy to electrical power production. Those technology remains complex and capital working with lasers are hopeful that laser- intensive, the nth country problem remains induced fusion reactions might provide an manageable. However, more than one study of attractive alternative, ininimizing the the problem has ended on a note of caution drawbacks of conventional nuclear energy comparable to that in the National Planning methods by providing an energy source that is Association’s study of 1960: “ It is not clean, safe, efficient, low-cost, and uses readily inconceivable that simpler methods will in available, relatively inexhaustible fuel time be developed."5 materiais.5 The lime has now arrived to reopen the issue Research efforts in these areas were begun raised in this statement in light of widespread during the 1960s in the laboratories of a discussion within the scientific community, number of countries: for the United States, the recently made public by declassified research of Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos Scientif- the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)# ic Laboratories of the University of Califórnia, involving purportedly significam advances in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Sandia laser isotope separation and in laser fusion,4 Laboratories at Albuquerque (under AT8cT’s This analysis will make some exploratory Western Electric Company), Exxon Nuclear, observations on the question: Do research and KMS Industries of Ann Arbor; in Rússia, advances m the use of lasers for the ennchment the Lebedev Physics Institute; the Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics in West Germany;

•In 1974. Public Law 93*438 rrorgammi ihc ÁECby funrtiom into ihc* the Limeil Laboratory in France; and govern- Nurlrar Rrgulafory (^mrtmsion and lhe F.nrxgy Rc**t*ar< h and Drvrlopmcm ment-sponsored research in Israel, among Admirmtratinn (fcRDAf. *T br oldcr litlc will bt rriainrd in this analysis as it is the morr familiar o( thr iwo. others. 36 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW

Initial research successes were apparently Uranium Enrichment handicapped by the technological limitations Methods of laser design and of high-power require- Essential to any nuclear program, whether ments, but with advancing laser technology, for civilian power production or for nuclear breakthroughs in laser applications were weapon production, is the availability of reported in lhe mid-1960s by N. G. Basovof the “enriched” uranium.13 Natural uranium is Lebedev Instituir in the Soviet Union.6 This, in composed primarily of two isotopes: fission- turn. led to substantially increased research able 11-238 and fissile U-235. “ Enrichment” programs in several of the aforementioned involves the process of concentrating the fissile countries. uranium isotope U-235, which comprises only In the United States, for example, advances 0.7 percent of uranium in its natural State. For at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, the use in civilian power reactors, this concentra- Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, and Oak tion must be increased to about 3 percent; Ridge7 (among others) have generated a more nuclear weapons demand an enrichment to than tenfold increase in AEC-provided funds over 90 percent. for laser fusion research since 1970, toa levei of Various methods, both present and future, some $30 million annually.8 AEG support for can produce the required materiais. laser isotope separation research and develop- ment (R&D) alone—a segment of the much power reactors larger laser fusion program—was projected to increase from less than $1 million in fiscal year A common method of acquiring nuclear 1974 to over $10 million in fiscal year 1975.9 It weapon material is as a by-product of the is reported that industrial funding on laser generation of electrical power from nuclear separation research by Exxon-Avco Nuclear is reactors, since reactors that utilize uranium as comparable to this latter figure.10 At the Los their fuel source produce plutonium (Pu). Alamos Scientific Laboratory alone, which did However, as with U-235 and 11-238, Pu-240 is not begin a laser separation R&D program formed from Pu-239 and is not desired for (Project Jum per) until 1971, the budget had military use. Thus, the fuel can be left in the risen to $5.7 million for fiscal 1975. The AEG reactor for only a short time. As a method of invested an additional $3.1 million for similar acquiring weapon-grade material, therefore, it R&D at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory is an extremely slow and very inefficient means during the same period.11 of utilizing the uranium feeder ore. Only grani Such an increase in financial support in this lots of weapon-grade Pu-239 can be extracted short period of time would seem to validate the from a ton of feeder ore. The Israeli reactor at observation that “. . . laser-induced fusion has Dimona, for example, is rated at 24 megawatts recently joined magnetic-confinement fusion and could produce 4-6 kilograms of Pu-239 per as a prime prospect for generating controlled year if operated at full capacity.14 Thisamount thermonuclear power.”12 Of more pressing would be sufficient for a single, small-yield interest to those concerned with the problems nuclear weapon. A nation desiring todevelopa and prospects of nuclear proliferation, how- modest-sized nuclear force in a reasonable ever, is the impact of these research advances period of time would, therefore, be inclined to on the nth country question. seek alternate methods of acquiring the needed A brief comparison of existingand potential fissile material for warheads. uranium-produclion methods will help pro- An alternate method used specifically for the vide insight into the revolutionary potential of production of enriched uranium is gaseous laser technology. dif fusion. LASER ISOTOPE ENRICHMENT 37 gaseous diffusion Uranium hexaflouride gas is pumped into the drum, and the rotation movement disperses the The standard method for enriching uranium, molecules outward from the center. As gaseous diffusion involves the diffusing of hot pressure builds, the molecules of the lighter U- uranium hexaflouride gases up and down 235 isotope concentrate toward the center, and porous stacks of synthetic membranes that this enriched flow is then passed into the next pass and collect the lighter U-235 in their centrifuge drum in the cascade for similar upper layers. Since each pass increases the U- treatment. This process is repeated until the 235 concentration only slightly, the process desired enrichment levei is achieved. The must be repeated thousands of times before process is similar to that of gaseous diffusion, high leveis of enrichment are achieved for except that the separation factor is reportedly weapon-grade material. The process is slow ten times higher than that achieved by the and costly and requires massive production diffusion method. Therefore, an advantage to facilities. At the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion the centrifuge process is the shortened time Plant, for example, buildings to house the required for uranium enrichment in compar- "cascades” of diffusion stacks (cells) cover ison to the more repetitious separation process some sixty acres and are often half a mile long. in gaseous diffusion. Investment costs and energy demands are It is projected that the centrifuge process will equally impressive. The three gaseous diffu- supplant the gaseous diffusion process some- sion plants presently operaiing in the United time in the 1980s. Although initial capital States require some 6000 megawatts of outlay is expected to be comparable to that for electrical povver at peak production (approxi- gaseous diffusion facilities, the power mately 1 percent of the total power generated requirements are estimated to be only 10 nationwide).15 The investment figures for lhe percent of that needed for gaseous diffusion construction of such a facility are widely operations, as well as operating costs quoted at between $1 to $3 billion; the French decreasing by 20-30 percent.18 Even at this, plant at Pieirelotte is reported to have cosí however, the technological requirements and close to SI billion some ten years ago.16 investment costs remain beyond thecapac ity of Thus, the technological demands, invest- all but a handful of nations. ment and operating costs, energy require- For these reasons, a nation desiring nuclear ments, and impossibility of disguising such a energy sources or weapon-grade fissile mate- facility have acted as deterrents to nuclear riais cannot avoid being interested in the proliferation. Even in those countries that research advances and potential offered by have invested in gaseous diffusion plants,17 a lasers for uranium isotope separation and search has been under way to discover less fusion power. At present, such nations are cumbersome and less expensive methods of bound largely to the slow and inefficient enriching uranium such as the gas centrifuge. production of plutonium from nuclear power reactors or to the purchase of enriched gaseous centrifugation uranium from the few highly advanced Research in the gas centrifuge process has been nations possessing gaseous diffusion facilities. under way in several countries since the early 1960s, particularly in the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and France. Essentially, laser isotope enrichment the centrifuge process relies on extremely As noted earlier, the use of lasers for uranium powerful gravitational forces produced isotope separation has made rapid progress in through the rotation of long, rotating drums. the past decade. Essentially, the process 38 AIR 1'Nll'ERSITY REl'lE\V consists of adjusting tunable dye lasers to the Joint Congressional Committeeon Atomic extremely fine frequencies (corresponding to Energy in October 1973, Exxon Nuclear’s absorption frequencies characteristic of the presidem, Raymond L. Dickeman, reported isotope in question), which can then exciteone laboratory successes in cooperation with Avco isotope of an element without exciting other Everett Research Laboratories. He predicted isotopes. This is possible due to the difference that within two years Exxon Nuclear would in atomic weight between two isotopes of the begin the construction of a pilot plant for same element. The excited isotope can then be uranium enrichment utilizing a laser process ionized and separated by any of several and that by the mid-1980s processing on a rnethods: Chemical, electrical, or magnetic.19 commercial scale would be feasible at an Although laser isotope enrichment is hypo- overall cost of 10 to 20 percent below projected thetically applicable to any element, its costs by gas centrifuge rnethods.23 potential employment for uranium separa- Although the ability to jump rapidly from tion/enrichment is of particular interest. laboratory to commercial scale production has Projections released by the Lawrence Liver- not been optimistically accepted by all more Laboratory indicate that the physical observers, it would seem likely that the laser plant facilities for such a processare minuscule isotope enrichment process is largely a in comparison to those for gaseous diffusion or function of time. If this process realizes its centrifugation; thus, investmem costs would preliminary promises of low cost and high be less than lor either of the aforementioned efficiency, it will make “alternative enrich- processses. In addition, energy demands ment processes economically obsolete,” ac- should be far less than even the centrifuge cording to the AEC’s former general manager, process requires, and the laser process would John A. Erlewine.24 be the most efficient user of the natural uranium The implications of such developments are fuel, removing virtually all the U-235 (in of the first magnitude. The successful comparison to the approximately 60 percent commercial development of laser enrichment use-level achieved by either diffusion or technology might not only greatly reduce the centrifugation).20 This results from the ex- cost and complexity of acquiring enriched tremely high separation factor in laser isotope uranium for civ ilian power reactors but also do separation, which produces more enrichment lhe same for nuclear ivarhead materiais. in fewer stages and requires no cascades as in laser fusion gaseous diffusion plants. Laboratory successes with this method have Research in laser isotope separation enrich- been reported from various sources within the ment is only a segment of a much larger AEG past several years. In an address before the research and development program in laser Eighth International Quantum Electronics fusion. Unlike laser separation, laser fusion Conference in June 1976, Benjamin B. Snavely research is geared directly to producing a of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory an- fusion reaclion of elements, such as deuterium nounced results of experiments conducted at (found in water) and lithium or tritium. It is Livermore that succeeded in separaling speculated that first generation plants would microscopic quantities of the uranium isotope be similar to fission plants, consisting of a in which the proportion of U-235 exceeded 60 reactor, heat exchange, and generator.25 percent.21 According to a report in the March Success at this stage is not readily known, as 22, 1974, issue of Science, Israeli scientists have much remains classified for security reasons, also succeeded in enriching uranium through both military and industrial; however, in 1974 the employment of lasers.22 In tesiimony before K.MS Industries announced success with laser LASER ISOTOPE ENRICHMENT 39 fusion experimems. Although such claims met for the physical plant itself and, since its with skepticism among someobservers,26 it has operation requires approximately 2000 mega- been reported that KMS signed a contract to watts of electrical power, forces investment in work closely with both the Los Alamos large-scale power plants (unless a nation is Scientific and the Lawrence Livermore Labor- fortunate to have a ready supply of cheap atories.27 Although the AEC has hopes of hydroelectric power). developing a system that produces more power A centrifuge facility is projected to be than it consumes soinetime in the 1980$. there somewhat more capital intensive (initially) are scientists who predict that the laser than a diffusion plant, with cost-declines enrichment process will prove successful much likely for successive plants that place it on a sooner than laser fusion efforts.28 levei comparable to gaseous diffusion plants.29 Even if laser fusion advances were to remain The savings accrue in the centrifuge process in the more distant future in comparison to from the much lower power requirements laser isotope enrichment advances, ultimate needed for its operation—about one-tenth the success in such efforts would produce an energy requirements for a diffusion plant. The inexhaustible source of inexpensive nêutrons cost comparisons in the two techniques are for energy production from ordinary water. It represented in Table I. might also produce, however, a low-cost and Theoretically, a laser separation enrichment readily available source of weapon-grade facility should be less capital intensive than material for nuclear weapons. Either way, they either a diffusion or centrifuge facility, since both represem significam new elements to the size requirements are minimized (only a single nth country problem, which require serious pass being required for enrichment rather than investigation and clarification in the years the thousands of repeated stages found in the ahead. cascade-stack method of gaseous diffusion Cost Comparisons plants). Additionally, energy power require- ments are less than for either of the above A typical gaseous diffusion plant requires an methods. initial investment of between SI to $3 billion Overall, the laser separation method would

Table I. Cost comparison of gaseous diffusion and centrifuge methods

Gaseous Centrifuge Centrifuge diffusion (first plant) (later plants)

capital investment per plant $1.4 billion $1.71 billion $1.13 billion operating costs per plant $16 million $115 million $70 million power costs per plant $210 million $21 million $21 million total cost/plant $1.63 billion $1.85 billion $1.22 billion

Source: Adapted from William J Wilcox, Jr.. D M Lang, and S A Levin. Process Seleclion tor New Urenlum Enrichment Plants (Oak Ridge. Tennessee Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant. 1975). pp 7-8 Gaseous diffuslon Laser enrlchment

plant investment $20 billion $2 billion separation costs $65 billion $8 billion feeder ore costs $70 billion $30 billion total costs $155 billion $40 billion

Sourc«: See James W Dubrin. Laser isotope Separation (University ol Califórnia Press: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, November 1974), p. 16

Table II. Total cost comparisott of gaseous diffuston and laser isotope separation enrichment methods, 1980-2000

appear to offer three distinct advantages over million BTU for fóssil fuels.31 On the basis of either the gaseous diffusion or centrifuge these figures, laser fusion methods remain methods: attractive at even several times the capital outlay of conventional nuclear power plants. (1) less costly and complex plant facilities— Cost comparison figures for gaseous diffu- since a single pass can theoretically produce sion and gas centrifuge processes versus laser enrichment leveis above 90 percent; isotope separation and laser fusion processes (2) lessenergy demands—approximately 10- are observably an intriguing source of 100 kilovolts per separated atom by centri- speculation. Although uranium enrichment fuge and 3 megavolts per separated atom by will probably be processed by conventional gaseous diffusion; methods for at least the next decade, it is (3) more efficient use of the feeder ore— certainly not too soon to begin evaluating the which might ultimately amount to a saving potential impact of these newer methods under of between $40-$100 billion by theend of this laboratory development, for in somewhat century.30 Draconian overtones, the program director of Although figures for cost comparison the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory has purposes remain a matter of conjecture, the announced that “ the main thrust of the figures irr Table II provide a general indication research for the next several years is to of the cost involved. demonstrate the feasibility of laser-induced Projected costs of a laser fusion facility are thermonuclear reactions regardless of their not widely available as yet, but it is speculated final application. . . .” 32 that the capital costs of the support facilities, at The major assertion of this analysis is that least, should be no greater than those of technological advances in laser isotope and conventional plants. The savings derive from laser fusion may in time so reduce the cost and operating costs, which are projected to be complexity of uranium enrichment as to extremely low in comparison to existing induce present nonnuclear nations to re- methods. According to one source, the costs for evaluate their positions on the acquisition of deuterium and lithium would amount to nuclear weapons. Whether this will lead to a about 3c per million British thermal units situation where, as stated by one researcher at (B IT!) compared to present figures ol KK per Los Alamos, “the whole world had better be a

40 LASER ISOTOFE ENRICHMENT 41 little bit uneasy, because it will be a whole lot and, more recently, índia are forcing a re- easier to make bombs,”” provides the focus for evaluation of securily conditions in Japan, the remainder of this article. Australia, and possibly Indonésia. Elsewhere, regional conflicts, both real and potential, The Nuclear Option expand the nth country problem noticeably: in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and The acquisition or availability of fissile Peru); in África (South África versus black material for nuclear weapons does not, in África); in South Asia (índia versus Pakistan); itself, constitute a nuclear capability. Any in the Far East (North Korea versus South nation contemplating the nuclear option must Korea); and in Central Europe (East Germany have available to it the requisite scientific and versus West Germany). technological expertise in nuclear, materiais, It is largely, though not exclusively, for these and electronics fields, among others, to enable nations that advances in uranium enrichment it to resolve the complex problems in uranium techniques might hold the greatest interest. enrichment production; warhead design, as- Yet all nations must grapple with a complex sembly, and testing; and development of variety of interrelated problems and demands delivery systems. As noted by former Secretary when evaluating their need and ability to take of Defense James R. Schlesinger, in an article up the nuclear option. published some years ago, “ these problems will not be swept away through the growing Major Considerations availability of plutonium.”54 In addition, a nation must evaluate the It has become conventional wisdom as nuclear option in light of its economic portrayed by Leonard Beaton and John capabilities, geographic location, alliance Maddox in their pioneering work on nuclear commitments, domestic pressures, overall weapon proliferation that “only the most military capability, and the presence or sophisticated among industrial nations” can absence of regional threats. The variety of these opt for a nuclear weapon capability.*5 The considerations makes an impact study of laser reasons for this are varied, but they include enrichment effects on the nth country problem research and development costs, manpower extremely difficult insofar as providing skills, production facilities, weapon design, concrete or definitive conclusions. In general, and delivery systems. Many of these factors however, one can begin such an assessment exist both for the production of weapon-grade with the proposition that the above variables, materiais and for delivery systems as well. either singly or in combination, would seem to rule out for the foreseeable future all but a research and development costs dozen or so of the present near-nuclear States Acquiring the nuclear option requires a regardless of advances in laser research. It is for sizable investment of capital in research and this handful of States that laser enrichment and development programs prior toandduring the laser fusion advances might well activate (or development of military weapon systems. reactivate) debates over the acquisition of According to the Stockholm International nuclear weapons. Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the annual For Western Europe, such a list might levei of world military R&rD expenditures include Italy, West Germany, and Sweden if during the past decade was from $15 to $16.5 they view American defense commitments as billion. Of this amount, 85 percent was spent weak and Soviet intentions toward Europe as by the United States and the Soviet Union; an increasingly hostile. For Asia, a nuclear China additional $2 billion was spent by the United 42 AIR VNIVERS1TY REVIEW

Kingdom, France, China, and West Germany. A cursory glance reveals that only West The remaining 3 to 4 percent of the total Germany comes anywhere near the base figure constitutes the R&D expenditures of the rest of suggested in the SIPR1 study. To increase the globe, with Japan, Sweden, Canada, present military R&D to the base levei of $500 Australia, and índia the dominant investors.36 million would require both a sizable increase For a nation to develop the broad range of in present defense budgets and the division of weapon systems symbolic of a great power total R&D funds from the governmenial and requires military R&D outlays in the range of industrial sectors. R&D outlays for nuclear $5 to $10 billion annually. A more limited weapons can constitute from 15 to 25 percent of nuclear capability can be achieved with annual a country’s total annual defense expenditures, R&D expenditures of $500 million to $1 but this amount appears to be beyond the billion.37 In examining defense budgets of the present resources of all but a small percentage world's nations, one finds that even a of the present nth countries. Laser processes limited outlay of $500 million annually for are likely to increase the R&D demands for R&D constitutes the total defense budget of nuclear and nonnuclear States alike. some 16 of the w orld’s more advanced nations, and if one considers the larger expenditure production factors figure of $1 billion, the number of countries Suffice it to say that a nation embarking on a increases to 30 or more. In fact, only some 20 nuclear capability must expect to devote nations have defense budgets in excess of $1 financial resources of a magnitude beyond the billion.38 Table III provides a general com- resources of the majority of nations. For most parison of research and development outlays nations it would amount, in essence, to the for a variety of near-nuclear countries. creation of an entire new industrial sector to a

Table III. Expenditures for research and development among select near-nuclear countries

Country military % total total R&D government defense defense GNP R&D defense (Smillion) funded R&D budget budget (Sbilllon) (Smillion) budget (Smillion) (Smillion) % GNP3 • 1971’ 1971’ 1970’ 1970’ 19743 19733

Belgium 2.8 .41 176 132 1,079 2.2 49.9 Canada 80.8 4.24 1,103 600 2,429 2.1 118.1 India 24.4 1.59 236.89 203.3 2,443 3.2 78.6 Italy 14.4 .55 952 470 3,673 2.7 138.2 Japan 25.3 1.84 4,488 1,226 3,835 0.87 439.4 Netherlands 13.9 1.26 835 308 2,303 3.6 63.7 Spain 1.2 .36 87 43 1,131 1.9 61.02 Sweden 86.8 6.85 381 159 1,641 3.0 55.2 Switzerland 7.7 1.92 383 77 884 1.9 45.9 West Germany 321.9 4.58 4,317 2,017 10,764 2.8 385.4

Sourcei: Adapted from 'SIPRI. Resources Devoted Io Military Research and Development (Stockholm Almqvist and Wlksell. 1972). pp 76-83, tUntled Nations Stalislical Yearbook. 1973 (New York United Nations. 1974). pp 788-89; ’Military Balance. 1974-1975 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), passim LASER ISOTOPE ENRICHMENT 43

nations economv, a fact which could lead to leveis for a cross section of countries considered imbalance and distorted economic growth, ai capable of achieving nuclear status within 5- least for developing nations. To illuminate lhe 10+ years are represented in Table IV. For point, Beaton and Maddox compare a comparative purposes, a 1961 survey of 400,000 developing nation’s decision to build nuclear scientists and engineers doing R&D work in production facilities as equivalem to the United States showed that 250,000 (5 of 8) constructing the nation’s electric generating were involved in space and deíense projects.43 system or building several of the world’s As revealed by Table IV, only Japan achieves largest Steel complexes.39 an R&.-D manpower levei of a magnitude approaching that of the United States. For the manpower skills remainder, the gap is quite significam and Even with those nations possessing the varies greatly among the selected countries requisite financial resources, there are other themselves. Even among countries with restraining factors such as manpower skills. comparable R&D manpower leveis, the indus- The inhibiting factor becomes evident when it trial base of a Sweden or Belgium alters the is realized that most of the countries now significance of these figures in comparison generating power from nuclear reactors rely on with a Chile, Argentina, Egypt, or Pakistan, the major nuclear powers for technical advice whose less-developed industrial bases would and support. The industrial, scientific, and be significantly afíected by the diversion of engineering skill demands placed on a nation scarce manpower resources into military R&.-D. when building enrichment facilities (whether The gap in manpower leveis between near- conventional or laser) are considerable. A nuclear countries such as those listed in Table country must have skilled labor for plant IV and the remainder of the developing construction, but even more difficult to find countries of the world is as significam as the are the trained metallurgists, scientists, and gap between near-nuclear countries and Japan engineers for plant and weapon systems design or the United States. and the technicians and maintenance person- Clearlv, for most of the nonnuclear coun- nel for ongoing operations and repairs. If the tries of the world, manpower may well be a experiences of Sweden and Britain are any more inhibiting factor than finances. Laser indication, more than 10,000 technically advances are neither likely to alter this skilled workers and hundreds of research observation nor lessen the requirement. scientists are needed to build and maintain a Ahhough physical plant requirements for production facilny alone.40 In addition to this laser isotope separation are much smaller manpower requirement, a United Nations (hypothetically) than conventional processing study conserva ti vely estimates that at least 500 plants, laser-based technology is no less scientists and 1300 engineers are needed to demanding of high skills. develop and maintain warhead production facilities, and an additional 19,000 personnel warhead design and construction (more than 5000 of them scientists and engineers) are required to produce delivery In addition to the production of fissile material vehicles of the íntermediate ballistic missile for weapons, one must consider the financial, variety.41 A country survey of scientists and industrial, and manpower demands of nuclear engineers ín the United Nations Statistical warhead design and construction. Ahhough Yearbook reveals more than 50 nations with little is available in the general literatureof the fewer than 8500 personnel in thesecategories.42 field, William Davidon and his associates have The scientific and technical manpower R8cD provided an indication of the extern and 44 AIK VNIVERSITY REVIEW complexity of the problem. The range of delivery systerns activities includes exacting measurements of A nation embarking on a nuclear strike force is the properties of the bomb materiais; theoreti- limited to four options for its delivery system: cal and experimental design of the weapons; subsonic fighter-bombers, supersonic fighter- purification, heat treatment, and alloying of bombers, fixed land-based missiles, and the fissionable materiais; preparation of mobile land-based or sea-based missiles. To shaped charges of explosives; manufacture of ensure success, a natioi* will have to design a electronic and other components for fusing system that is vvithin its technological means and detonating; and instrumentation for and financial resources. For most States, this design, manufacture, and testing.44 would mean a manned delivery system, as the Success in this effori would require an experience of both the United States and the annual investment of approximately $2 Soviet Union testifies to the enormous million per warhead for a modest program investment required for intermediate and p r o d u c i n g t e n 2 0 k t - s i z e d b o m b s y e a r l y , 45 a n d a long-range ballistic missile systerns, whether design effort of 10 to 20 top-ranked scientists land- or sea-based. Even such a technologically working continually for two to three years.46 In advanced nation as France relies more on its addition, the testing of a nuclear device Mirage IV supersonic bombers for its nuclear requires an expenditure of some $12 million.47 strike force than on its ballistic missile system.

Table IV. Scientific and teclirucal manpower employed m research and experiment development

Country sclentlsts/engineers technicians engaged in R&D engaged in R&O

Argentina 6,500 9,800 Belgium 10,070 12,854 Canada 20.425 20,130 Chile 4,904 1,329 Czechoslovakia 38,572 57,906 Egypt 6,522 Hungary 16,282 23,811 Israel 2,900 Italy 29,304 22,488 Japan 310,870 85,089 Netherlands 22,670 34,130 Pakistan 1,054 847 Poland 59,000 55,100 Spain 5,842 1,526 Sweden 7,537 11,791 Switzerland 12,001 3,406 West Germany 82,000 188,000 Yugoslavia 15,118 9,601

Source: United Netions Stetisticel Yeerbook. 1973 (New York United Nations. 1974), pp 788-89 ballistic antitank, armored alrcraft combat Country missiles shlp, alrcraft vehicles ships missiles

Argentina X Australia X X Belgium X X X Brazil X X Canada X Czechoslovakia X Egypt X X X Hungary X X India X X Israel X X X X X Italy X X Japan X X X X X Netherlands X X Poland X South África X X X Spain Sweden X X X XX Switzerland X X X West Germany X X X X Yugoslavia X X X X

Source: Adapted from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Resources Devoted to Military Research and Development (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell. 1972), pp. 46-47.

Table V. Weapons development projects of near-nuclear counlries, 1960-68

The cost requirements for even a relatively have invested R&D resources in all the major simple subsonic bomber force can be quite weapon categories (Japan, Israel, and Swe- formidable. The British subsonic Vulcan den), and two others invested in fourof the five bomber fleet developed in the 1950s represents major categories. For most of the countries an investmem of $1.5 to $3 billion.48 To listed, research and development experience is develop a supersonic bomber would require focused on conventional armament categories, average annual R&D expenditures of $80 to although seven have some degree of familiarity $100 million per plane excluding bombs. For with special purpose missiles but not with comparison, the average annual R&D figures ballistic missile systems. for a single solid-fuel, intermediate-range If an nth country should decide, nonetheless, ballistic missile is from $300 to $500 million.49 to embark on a missile delivery system, the An examination of major military R&D French experience proves instructive. Table VI programs of various near-nuclear countries provides investment figures for the French reveals that nearly all have an existing or nuclear program from 1960 to 1964 and is potential capability in the area of manned indicative of program costs. The total cost of delivery systems, but few have operational the French program for the last decade has programs in the ballistic missile category. (See been variously estimated at between $8 to $15 Table V.) Of those nations listed, only three billion.50 In general, then, a nation deciding 45 Program Expenditures ($ milllon)

nuclear weapon development 805 manned bomber System 201 ballistic missile system 203

Source: Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread ol Nuclear INeapons (New York: Frederick A Praeger. 1962), p 92.

Table VI. French nuclear program costs, 1960-64

on a modest nuclear capability should expect indeed aequire a warhead stockpile of to invest approximately $1.5 billion respectable proportions. This does not affect, annually.51 however, the procurement costs and annual Should a nation make the monumental operating costs of various delivery modes. The decision of embarking on a full-scale program development of nuclear warheads appears to to develop delivery systems comparable to constitute only 5 to 10 percent of the total those of the United States and the Soviet investment costs of a nuclear weapon program, Union, it could mean a development time depending on the method of processing and frame of up to twenty years and an investment the size and type of delivery systems. (It should of $4 to $5 billion annually.52 A total be cautioned, nevertheless, that the above investment of $50 to $80 billion is frightening assessment does not take into account the to even the most advanced of the nth countries. possibility of using commercial aircraft On the basis of the above considerations, the already available to nonnuclear nations.) best that even the most ambitious nth country could hope to attain would be a modest-sized Overall Assessment nuclear force, comparable to that of Britain or France. To what extern would breakthroughs In addressing the probletn of nth country in the commercial application of laser isotope nucltar proliferation, one would be more separation processes alter this situation? A precise to speak in terms of N minus 5 to 10 glance at Table VII reveals that the acquisition years. When the decision is made to aequire the of fissile material for nuclear weapons is only a nuclear option, two to three years of effort are small pari of the total cost picture. needed for the planning, design. and construc- Since figures are as yet not available on tion of conventional enrichment facilities; and investment costs of a single laser isotope an additional two to three years for material separation facility (other than the broad produetion and weapon assembly.53 assumption that it should be significantly less In Hearings before the Senate Foreign than for contemporary methods), it isdifficuli Relations Committee. the AECestimated that, to provide comparative data. If one assumes, within five to ten years after deciding on the for illustrative purposes, that the employment nuclear option, the following countries could of laser methodology could produce a fissile join the ranks of the nuclear powers: Australia. program of the French magnitude for the cost Canada, West Germany, Italy, índia (has since of a small plutonium-based program listed in exploded a device). Japan, and Sweden. Other Table VII, then a near-nuclear country could nations requiring more time to achieve the

46 LASER ISO TOPE ENHICHMENT 47 siatus included: Argentina, Netherlands, BtT several of the nations cited are represented in giuni. Brazil, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Table VIII. Israel. Pakistan. Poland. South África, Spain, The decision to develop a nuclear capability Switzerland, the United Arab Republic, and involves even more than the technical obstacles Yugoslavia.54 The general capabilities of and considerations presented here. To some

Table T1I. Trocurement cost summary for vartous nuclear force leveis (in J millions)

small plutonium- moderate French based program program gaseous (10x20-kt, (10x20-kt, dlffuslon devlces over devlces over program ten years) ten years) (to 1964)

fissile material 70.0 151.0 1040 design and manufacture 18.0 18.0 500 testing 12.0 15.0 340 storage, maintenance 4.0 4.0 Total 104.0 188.0 1880

system category system descrlption procurement annual costs operatlng costs

aircraft, elementary 30-50 bombers (Canberra. 180 25 B-57) missile. elementary 50 missiles (soft, 1000-km 440-540 5 range) 50 missiles (soft, 3000-km 800-900 10 range) 140 missiles (U.S. Atlas- 4900 280 type) aircraft, mid-level 50-60 French Mirage IV 940 100 bombers 300 British V bombers 1800 120 missile, mid-level 50 Minuteman I (hard, 1250 5 10,000-km range) 25 French SSBS (hard, 700 ? 4000-km range) 140 missiles (U.S. Titan- 4900 ? type) aircraft, advanced 210 U.S. FB-111 2200 340 missile, advanced 3 French nuclear submarines 1000 20 w/16 missiles each of 3000-km range 41 U.S. Polaris submarines 13,000 ? w/16 missiles each

Source: Data adapted Irom Report ol lhe Secretary-General. Etlects ol the Possible Use ot Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implicatíons tor States o/the Acquisition and Further Development ot These Weapons (New York United Nations. 1968). pp 24-26 c M ao CO o O fia «1— M C E k.O ^5 2 o CO .2 —C3 JÍO ™ l 3 > íü a> —o. O a0o o a CO c 1w aJZ — a» 5ã-5 s E 0 w.

Argentina 5 1 200 M Canberra bombers Australia 2 06L Phantom aircraft; Canberra bombers Belgium 10 4 N F-104 aircraft; short-range missiles Brazil 3 0 N L(T) N Egypt 1 0NNTu-16 bombers India 31 220L(T) Canberra bombers Israel 2 010NPhantom aircraft; short-range missiles; artillery Italy 3 1 227 S F-104 aircraft; missiles Japan 5 1 494 S Phantom aircraft; short-range missiles Netherlands 1 0 19 N short-range missiles; artillery Pakistan 1 0 90 S N South África 1 1 5 VL Canberra and Buccaneer bombers Spain 2 1 225 MPhantom aircraft Switzerland 3 0 382 N N West Germany 9 1 387 N several types of aircraft, missiles, and artillery.

Abbrevlations: N = none/neghgible; S = small; M = médium; L= large; VL = very large; (T) = thorium

Source: SIPRI. The Near-Nuclear Countries and the NPT (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1972), pp 14-15. Tuble VIII. Nuclear capabilities of fifteen near-nuclear countries

nations there are political and moral consider- strategic capability comparable to that of ations that work against a pro-nuclear decision Britain or France—a capability that has (Japan, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, Den- produced as many problems (or more) for mark, Norway, and Switzerland, for security as it has resolved. Whether such a example).55 For these and others, there is the capability can provide even regional security is broader concern of the global impact of a question that has been the focus of much of nuclear spread. All but eight of the above the Indian debate over the nuclear option.57 nations (índia. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Israel, Pakistan, South África, and Spain) have either signed or ratified the Nuclear Non-Prolifera- ALTHOUGH THE tangible impact of laser tion Treaty (NPT).56 isotope separation/enrichm ent and laser fu- Strategic considerations further serve as an sion processes remains for the future, it is ameliorating influence. The most that any of suggested that such advances will neither the nth countries could hope to achieve is a dispel nor resolve the problems, demands. and

48 LASER ISOTOPE ENR1CHMENT 49 considerations discussed. It is not at all proliferation. The latter dependson prevailing conclusive lhat "rapid proliferation is much international trends, alliance configurations, more likely in the next decade than ever in the and regional animosities and developments. past simply because it will be technically more One could also adopt the position that, by easy. . . .”58 Simply because technology shortening the time frame for nonnuclear advances, it is not that much easier. States to N minus 2 to 5 years, laser advances The most likely impact of these new might be a significant step in the direction of technological advances—if they prove success- dampening rather than exacerbating the nth ful and achieve their designers’ claims—is to country problem.59 This hypothesis is based on reduce the five- to ten-year time frame now the observation that by shortening the lead imposed on nth countries. Although it is true time, near-nuclear nations would still retain that the cost figures for weapon-grade the nuclear option without forcing them to materiais will probably be reduced consider- make the crucial decision immediately simply ably, the much more importam consideration because of the excessive development span bearing on the nth country problem would demanded under present methods of nuclear appear to be the potentially greater ease of material produetion. generating such materiais through laser In short, one can still subscribe to former application. Thiscouldconceivably reduce the Defense Secretary Schlesinger’s observation nuclear option time frame from N minus 5 to that the acquisition of fissile material does not 10 years to perhaps N minus 2 to 5 years. elevate a nation to the status of a nuclear Whether this time compression would auto- power. Whatever advances are actually made matically lead to unprecedented nuclear in the emerging field of laser fusion and laser proliferation or instead produce a situation of isotope enrichment would seem to have only a potential proliferation is an important distinc- negligible to slight effect on the major tion to examine. considerations in nth country proliferation— One can only conclude that laser advances weapon research and development costs and will be a major factor in contributing to manpower/skill demands. potential proliferation, but it is quite possible Florida Technological University that such advances will not cause actual Orlando, Florida

Noto I A sa m p l i n g of such works might indudc George Questcr. The Polittcsof Literature: A Permuted Btbliography (Norih Hollywood. Califórnia: Western \uclear Proliferation (Balttmore. Maryland Thr John* Hopkins University Perioditals Co., 1967)—shed liulc light on lhe revolulionary advances ihen Press, 1973/; Lronard Braton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear undei way. Weapons (New York Frrdenrk A Praegcr. 1962); William B Badcr. The Y l.ikely candidates widely riled for energy sources intlude deutermm (a ( mled States and the Spread of Nuclear Weafiom (New York Pegas us. 1968); virtually incxhaustiblcelcment found in iheoceans); the Icsstommon tritium; Bmnrit Boskes and Mason Willnch, rditorv Nuclear Proliferation, Prospecls and. potentially. the common isotope of boron. B-l I Sec John L. Emmett. for Contrai i New York Hir D u n elIm C o. Inc . 1970). Richard N Rosrrrance. John Nutkolls, and Lowell W !>avid Willcy (Loiidon; Europa P u blicalton v 1971 • 6. For an overview of the dcvelopmenis of the 1960s. see Lubtn and Fraas. Z Johan Jorgen Holst, Secunty. Order. and the Bomb (Oslo Hc.stholms 7 "A method for converting the fusion energy from laser-ignited deuterium- Boktrykken. 1972), p 129 tritium pellets into clccirical power was evolved at the Oak Rtdge National 3 WjIlumC. Davidon. Marvm 1 kalkstrtn, and Chrtstoph Hohenemscr. l^boratory early in l% 9in conjunction with fusion-power feasibility studies The Nth Counfry problem* and Arms Contrai (Washington. D.C.: National that had boen under way there sinre 1967." Ibid., p. 29 Planning Assoe lation Pamphlei No 108, Januarv 1960/. pp 6-7 8 John Nuckolls. John Emmett. and Lowell Wood. "Lascr-indured I Much of lhe dctlassifird liierature tan br found in such journals and Thermonuclear Fusion." Phyucs Today (August 1973). p. 16. The autbors publications as Scienhfu American, Phyucs Today, Science, and .Srirnrr suggest that thr Soviel Union‘s investment in laser research is of comparablc News. !t is inirrrsting lonote ihai prior lo the AECsdccision, twomajor laser si/e. bibliographies—Kujo Tormyasu. The Laser Literature: An Annotated (,uide 9. Robert Gillette. "Uranium Enrichment: Rumors of Israeli Progress with (New York Plenum Press. 1968); and Edward V Ashburn. rdnor, l.aser Lasrrv" Science (March 22. 1974). p. 1173 50 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

10. William D Mea. "Uranium Enrichment: Laser Methods Nearing Full- Italy. Netherlands. Spain. Sweden. Egypt. lran, Israel, and Japan. scale Test," Science (August 16. 1974), p. 602. 39. Beaton and Maddox. p. 22. 11. Physics Today (September 1974), p. 20; and Melz. p. 603. 40. Ibid., p. 25. 12. Nuckolls et al.. p. 46. 41. Report of lhe Secrctary-General of the United Nations, Effects of the 13. Descnptions of these processes have been denved from Gillette, pp. 1172- Possible Use o/ Nuclear Weapons and the Secunty and Economic 73. Beaton and Maddox. Chapter One; Davidon et al.. Chapter One; Boskey Implicattons for States of the Acquisitwn and Further De\>elopment of These and Wilirich. Chapter Four; and S1PR1. The Near-Nuclear Countnes and lhe Weapons (New York: United Nations, 1968). p. 28. Hereafter referred to as N PT (Stockholm; Almqvist and Wiksell. 1972), Appendices I and 2. Report of the Secretary-General. 14. Beaton and Maddox. pp. 171-73. 42. United Nations Statislical Yearbook, 1973 (New York: United Nations. 15. Gillette, pp. 1172-73 1974). pp. 788-89. 16. Rosecrance, p. 135. 43. John S. Tompkins. The Weapons of World War III (New York: 17. At present. gaseous diífusion plantsaxe in operation in lhe United States, Doubleday. 1966). p. 201. the Soviet Union. France. Britam, and China. 44. Davidon et al.. pp. 20-21. 18. Gillette, p. 1173. 45. Quester. p. 61. 19. See Meu, pp. 602-3; and Science News (June 22. 1974). pp. 396-97, for 46. Davidon et al.. p. 24. descnptions of this process. 47 Report of lhe Secretary-General, p. 24. 20. See James W. Dubrin. Laser Isolope Separation (University of 48. Beaton and Maddox. p. 75. Califórnia: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. November 1974), p. 16. 49 C J. E Harlow, Defence. Tethnology. and the Western Alliance 21. Science News. p. 396. (London l he International Institute íor Strategic Studies. I. 1967). p. 22. 22. Gillette, p 1172. 50. Fischer, p. 33. 23. Ibid.. pp. 1172-73; and Mea. p. 602. 51. Schlesinger. p. 82. 24. Gillette, p 1173. 52. Ibid.. p. 73. 25. Schematics of such a system are found in Lubin and Fraas. pp. 28-30. 53. Davidon et al.. p. 21. 26. "Laser Fusion Claims: An Evaluation." Science News (May 25. 1974), p. 54. Nonproliferation Treaty. Heanngs Before lhe Committee on Foreign 333. Relations, U.S. Senate, 10. II. 12 and 17 July 1968. p. 11. 27. Physics Today (March 1975), p. 20. 55. For an examination of these considerations, see thecTOSs-national survey 28. Meu, p. 603 in SIPRI. The Near-Nuclear Counfnes and the NPT (Stockholm: Almqvist 29. William J. Wilcox. Jr.. D M. Lang.and S. A. Levin, ProcessSeleclion for and Wiksell, 1972). Neu> ['ranium Ennchment Plants (Oak Ridge. Tennessce: Oak Ridge 56. For the text of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and list of Gaseous Diífusion Plant. 1975), pp. 7-8. signatories. see Boskey and Wilirich. pp. 151-68. .Argentina, Brazil. and Chile 30. Benjamin B. Snavely. Laser Ennchment of Uranium. Why, How. and are signatories to the Laun American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. When (University of Califórnia: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. September 57. See A Strategy for Índia for a Credible Posture against a Nuclear 3. 1974), pp. 2-5. Adversary (New Delhi: The Institute for Defense Studies and Analvses), n.d. 31. Lubin and Fraas. p. 33. 58. James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman. Jr.. editors, Arms Control for the 32. Benjamm M. Elson. "Laser Studied as Nuclear Power Trigger, " Late Sixties (New York: D. Vran Nostrand Co.. Inc.. 1967). p. 162. Avialion Week br Space Technology (March 25. 1974), p. 46. Italics added 59.1 am indebted to Mr. Ryukichi Imai whoadvanced this interesting thesis 33. Gillette, p. 1174. in a different respect in his article "The Changing Role of Nuclear 34. James R. Schlesinger. "Nuclear Spread,” The Yale Review (October Technology in the Post-NPT World: A Japanese View." found in Holst. pp. 1967). p. 79. 120-30. 35. Beaton and Maddox. p. 21. 36. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Resources Devoted to Acknowledgment Military Research and Developmenl (Stockholm. Almqvist and Wiksell. 1972). Chapter One. I am indebted to Joseph M. Mack of lhe Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. 37 Ibid.. pp 10-14 and 44-52. who introdticed me to lhe advances being made in laser isotope separation and 38. The Mihlary Balance: 197.1-1974 (London: The International Institute laser fusion. Both he and ProfessOí Roger B Handberg. Jr.. of Florida for Strategic Studies, 1973), pp. 74-75. This includes such nth countnes as Technological University. haveoffered valuable suggestions and critiques of Czechoslovakia. East Germany. Poland. Canada. Denmark. West Germany, this article.

The purpose of all but litile people is not to dominate but to inspire, not strike fear into men or women but to enlist their goodwill, not to gain a point by fighting but to win support by making people want to get behind the plan.

The Royal Bank of Canada Monthly Letter October 1954 OU MANY times have vou nodded assent during a meeting or as you coordinated on a paper, even when you did noi totally agree? At the same time you may have recognized that implementation of the decision in its H present form would nut be feasible. and il put intoaction would lead to adverse and far-reaching consequentes. Today's leaders face rapid and continuai change in a highly competitive environment. Change has become commonplace. To compete successfully—even to survive—leaders must adapt to these conditions by managing change. Thus, leaders must make timely and correct decisions to rettify deficiencies caused by changed circumstances.

DISSENT the neglected factor in decision-making

51 52 AIR UN IV ER SITY REVIEW

Much has been written concerning the quences of our recent Vietnam and Watergate importance of systematic approaches to experiences. Decisions concerning “guns and executive decision-making. We have been butter,” incursions into Cambodia, and taught, using various steps and terms, that we “ break-ins” will continue to affect and should identify the problem, consider alterna- constrain our decisions, actions, and capabili- tives, choose the best alternative, and imple- ties far into the future. Decisions by a limited ment the decision. Analytical and behavioral few (concerning what seemed to be the central decision techniques continue to be advanced in problem at hand) are causing us presently to various publications and courses. Are we, as a spend considerable time repairing the unfavor- result, becoming incréasingly successful lead- able consequences of earlier incomplete judg- ers and managers? Is our greater knowledge of ments. Inflation, the War Powers Act, and loss the decision process producing better results? I of confidence in the basic integrity of doubt it. George Odiorne supports this in his government officials combine to reduce our examination of the “activity trap,” when he effectiveness. asks why things are going awry. New ideas Look about you. Have our people and should be improving the system, but their organizations profited from the lessons learned unintended side effects are in reality killing from Vietnam and Watergate? Open dissent us.1 concerning those important decisions was not If you agree with these generalizations at visible; it was more important at the time to be least in part, then you agree that a fresh effort a good team player. To some this indictment must be made to improve our decisions. We may seem too harsh—to be judging after the need to better understand why decisions are fact. They may be true, but the significam made as they are. point is that we do not seem to have made a Typically, we Americans are anxious to find conscious effort to apply the lessons learned. the trouble and fix it as quickly as we can. We We tend to think of those problems as being learn early that successful leaders should attack behind us, but the basic cause still exists. problems quickly and decisively, that decisive- Where are the Billy Mitchells of today? Is it ness and confidence are desirable traits—key coincidental that questioning our own mili- indicators of the effecdve leader. This is tary doctrine and strategies has been at low ebb especially true in the military, where “ battle- since we began increasing emphasis on field” decisions are considered the ultimate institutionalizing our decision processes? test. Increased standardization of rules and regula- However, we seem to do a poorer job of tions and greater centralization in making anticipating change than of reacting to it. We those rules have removed many of the spend relatively little time considering the prerogatives of decision-making from leaders consequences of our Solutions—consequences at lower leveis. If new and conflicting ideas do that often are worse than the original problem. not enter our decision deliberations, we should This is where our decision piocess seems to be consider the cause rather than continue to the weakest—in failing to evaluate the mourn the consequences. That cause is at least consequences of important decisions prior to partially due to the climate we create within implementation. In short, it is not enough to our organization. be change-oriented, we must be consequence- What are the alternatives? It appears much oriented as well. easier and the time better spent in questioning, A simple example might be of value here. debating, and dissenting before making a However, such examples seem unnecessary decision rather than trying to salvage the when we consider the far-reaching conse- results of a bad decision at a later date. To DISShXT 53

adopt such a methodology means that one are continually putting out fires, staying busy must consider change on a wider scale than (but comfortable) in their “activiiy trap.” Our just problem solving. If executives are to be decision methodology actually encourages effective in the long run, they must evaluate such activity. altematives not only in terms of the solution of In the military, we are taught the staff study an immediate problem but also in terms of the method, a very systematic and formal decision long-run implications of that solution. Peter process. Its limitation, however, is that it Drucker points out that considers problems, not objectives. Each action officer attempts to restrict his problem . . . effective executives do not make a great many decisions. They concentrate on the important as much as possible so as to sell his solution ones. They try to think through what is strategic with the least possible opposition. “ Com- and generic, rather than "solve problems." They pleted staff work” implies that the various try to make the few importam decisions on the altematives have already been questioned and highest levei of conceptual understanding. They argued. Actually, constructive debate about are not overly impressed by speed in decision making; instead, they know what the decision is altematives seldom takes place. Instead, the all about—what the underlying realities are positive aspects of the preferred solution are which the decision has to satisfy. They want emphasized. Staff members normally have impact rather than technique; they want to be vested interests in the outcome—increased sound rather than clever.2 power, prestige, and rew'ard for being a A competitive and changing environment problem solver are powerful incentives. The fosters a certain degee of risk and uncertainty pressure to be a positive team member is very for all leaders; decision-makers are essentially strong, and the role of the deviFs advocate is risk takers. It is seldom possible to gather all considered to be a hindrance to action. the information concerning a problem. Not Such an environment produces decisions only is it prohibitive from a time or cost that appear optimal on the surface, decisions standpoint but sometimes misleading. Facts that indicate consensus among the key people. are concerned with what has already hap- But a similar consensus on the adverse effects pened; decisions are concerned wriih the future. of the decision frequently does not exist. Ford’s Edsel is a case in point. Considerable Questioning and dissent on how the decision data vvere collected concerning the kind of will affect the overall organization are automobile the American consumer preferred, typically not encouraged. As a result, the but it was misleading because it did not department that has the action is usually the identify changing attitudes. If yesterday’s only one interested in the implementation of information were appropriate for tomorrow, the decision. there would be no need for decisions. Instead, The Japanese method of decision-making we must draw on theopinionsof othersand try takes a very different tack. Policy changes are to learn which facts will still be relevant, and debated throughout the organization until that means taking risks concerning what the agreement is reached. The emphasis is on future will be like. This requires a careful defining the question and transmitting infor- weighing of risks—do the benefits outweigh mation. When the decision is finally made, the costs? there is more ready acceptance, and The easiest way to avoid risk and uncertainty implementation proceeds smoothly.3 is to deal with the presem rather than the The American method jum ps to the decision future, to concentrate on immediate problems much more quickly. We tend to want to rather than far-reaching strategies. No wonder overcome obstacles and motivate people to get so many organizations consist of people who the job done successfully. 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The difference between lhe two approaches sition programs during the 1960s, the Presi- is lhat lhe Japanese spend iheir time involving dem^ Blue Ribbon Defense Panei in 1970 people in the decision process while we recommended a "fly-before-buy” approach, Americans spend our time trying to implement one in which greater technical realism and the decision. The most significam contrast is testing would augment the paper studies of the the point in timeduring which leadersattempt McNainara era.4 This was in reaction to to challenge the behavior of people so that new serious cost overruns and problems encoun- procedures will be followed in more tered with Systems like the C-5A and FB-111. purposeful and productive ways. Considerable discussion and questioning took The Japanese way is understandably cum- place ai the operating levei during the bersome and inefficient if it is applied to minor planning for these aircraft concerning roles, decisions or to decisions lhat must be made missions, and requirements and capabilities. quickly. We need to understand that different The failure to actively challenge requirements situations call for different leadership styles, prior to the ultimate decision partialiy contrib- ranging from autocratic to participative. uted to subsequent problems in both of these Therefore, dissent and questioning are not very vital national defense programs. always appropriate. However, the greatest The "fly-before-buy” approach attempts to value of dissent and questioning is found in see just how new ideas will work before higher-level policy decisions where adverse committing them to costly development and consequences would be disastrous and espe- production stages. The production decision cially when effective implementation requires occurs only after careful testing and a acceptance by subordinates. thorough evaluation of life-cycle costs. Innovation has become a way of life in an These same principies can be applied to environmem where doing "more with less" is other decisions. The complete consequences of not only in vogue but necessary for survival. a decision must be forced intotheopen. Future To encourage innovation, organizations fre- benefits and total costs must be realistically quently create ad hoc groups to study and weighed and debated. If the decision can profit recommend new and fresh ways of doing from a trial test (such as with flights of the things—of keeping up with change. The Concorde aircraft into certain airports), it military is noexception. Ad hoc groups are less makes sense to do so. If a test is not feasible, constrained by established procedures and wide-ranging viewpoints must be solicited. freer to cut across bureaucratic lines. But even The more criticai the decision, time permit- those decisions made in this innovative ting, the greater the number of views which atmosphere must be implemented within the should Ix' sought. Dissenting or diverse view- established hierarchy. Since the implementejs points uhimately strengthen the final decision. of the decision were not consulted during the How can we provide the methods needed for deliberation, theoutcomeof the change largely better decisions? It appears that our decision depends on imposing or successfully selling process needs revision in two basicareas. First, the decision. Consensus and understanding alternatives need to be considered in light of among those who must execute the decision overall objectives, not just compartmentalized probably play the most importam part in the problems. Second, greater constructive debate ultimate success of any change. and dissent prior to the making of decisions are In recem weapon acquisition programs one needed and should be encouraged. If dissent can find examples of attempts to analyze the does not occur, the decision-maker must consequences of decisions prior to their become the protagonist. He must ask such implementation. After several problem acqui- questions as how will this decision bettei ÜISSENT 55 promote organizaiion objectives? And what decision authority automatically ascends to could go wrong with all of ihis? higher headquarters; instead, it should be The decision-maker must set the climate for delegated to lower leveis when the need and active and well-thought-out dissem. That analysis so dictate. climate is easier to establish once the decision- We must, therefore, continue to ask maker realizes that the real threat to authority ourselves, “ What is it that we are really trying occurs when dissent takes place during the to accomplish?’’ The overall answer should be implementation of the decision and not during to provide maximum effectiveness of our war- the deliberation stage. fighting capability within an ever changing As an example, changes such as eliminating environment. That calls for some hard intermediate headquarters or adding Consult- questions and tough answers from our best ing teams mean that we plan tochange the way people at all leveis. people will interact (behave) within the The task, then, is to intelligently and organization—to elicit that behavior which consciously hedge against that uncertain will get the job accomplished more effectively future—to use all of the tools and information for the dollars expended. However, before available. This is probably why some execu- implementing any change, we should have a tives exercise intuitive judgment so well. They very clear idea of what that decision will do to have the ability to estimate on a wider range the behavior of our organization. How will the future possible effects of their actions. They communication be affected—will it be faster, avoid actions which they “feel” have high more direct, and complete? What happens to probability of producing serious loss; how- decision-making? Is it improved? Will the ever, a systematic and conscious examination right people make the decisions? Wrh a t a b o u t and inquiry are good substitutes for such conflict— are we creating conflict by not intuition. clearly delineating responsibilities? Do we At your next meeting, if there is no have to sell or impose the idea throughout the disagreement concerning an important deci- organization? Are we creating a situation that sion, reflect a while on these words of Alfred P. yields more effective use of our human Sloan, Jr., who said at a meeting of one of the resources, one in which our best people will General Motors top committees (during the want to stay? What about cost—are we 1920s): expending our resources where the marginal “Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete return is the greatest? agreement on the decision here.” Everyone This kind of questioning requires a more around the table nodded assent. “Then,” thorough analysis of the entire situation. We continued Mr. Sloan, “I propose we postpone further discussion of this matter until our next must consciously weigh the decision's advan- meeting to give ourselves time to develop tages and disadvantages and make only those disagreement and perhaps gain some understand- changes that clearly benefit the organization. ing of what the decision is all about.”5 For example, the consolidation and centraliza- It is interesting to note that the matter in tion of our organizations may show dollar question was not adopted during the next savings in the short run but hinder ongoing meeting. efforts for increasing the effectiveness of our These remarks are not meant to advocate people. committee action or a retreat from decisive- We should continue to look for better ways ness. Responsive and responsible leadership is to communicate within the hierarchy. How- probably more important now than ever ever, the elimination of intermediate head- before. These remarks are, however, a call to quarters does not mean that corresponding actively involve those who best understand the 56 AIR VNIVERSITY REV1EW situation and who are closest to the problem. minds and the best effort to be placed on Those people are often other than the corporate concerns, with the leadership able to immediate staff and advisers to the executive. tap their advice and experience before making Participants may include a larger group or a decision.’’6 This process also recognizes that only a few, either individually or collectively. the broader the base of support for a decision. This is perhaps the successful leader’s greatest the better is the possibility for successful ability—to identify those subordinates who are implementation. best qualified to aid in a specific decision. The There is need to transfer this concept to our extern of participation and the techniques used overall decision process. Our leaders must be to foster it are necessarily dictated by the given the flexibility they need todo the job—to urgency and importance of the situation in involve, when practicable, the decision capa- question. bility at the levei that knows most about the Most of our great presidents have under- decision. stood the value of conflicting opinions. Our military organizations need to get back Washington knew and valued the frequently to employing all of our leaders, the people we divergent views of Jefferson and Hamilton. have hired and the people we hold responsible Those presidents who sought conformity are for guiding and directing our organizations, remembered more for their lack of accomplish- especially our middle leaders and managers. ment. For it is only through dissenting views When we first began to experience substantial that new alternatives and creativeness can externai change during the 1960s, our leaders surface. It is not possible to have new Solutions found that the bottom (operating) levei of our without new and differing ideas and opinions. organizations increasingly did not accept and Some decisions, such as those that involve implement directions from the top. Since a safety and dynamic operations, must be made climate for dissent did not exist within the quickly. However, executive decisions are hierarchv, there arose a need for the top to find normally not that pressing. Leaders must take out what problems existed at lower leveis. The time to ensure that the right questions get result was that the top increasingly bypassed asked. If these questions are not asked, then middle management and went directly to the complex policy decisions will be made by a operating levei through mediums of inspec- single individual within a small circle of tion, various councils, and the like. confidants (in at least a partial vacuum), and The results have not been encouraging. In subordinates will continue to react to and resist fact, they have often been disastrous. In some implementing decisions they do not and instances, lower leveis demanded that the top cannot understand. hear their problems directly; dissent became During the past few years, there has been violent in other instances. Middle leaders growing appreciation of the role which responsible for putting decisions into action involvement plays in the decision process. The were and are even now largely excluded from decision process at the national levei has seen a participating in making decisions that directly proliferation of advisory groups, the best affected their daily activities. The point is that known and most influential being the we need a forum for dissent, but differing views National Security Council. The Air Force most fruitfully occur within the structure Board Structure is also a highly formalized which we have carefully created and staffed. body of advisory gfoups that highly influence Ultimately, a decision process that continu- our decision-making elements. General Wil- ally bypasses our middle leaders will fail. liam V. McBride recently remarked that “ the Lower leveis that report directly tocommand- Air Force Board Structure permits the best ers and reliance on externai change agents are DISSENT 57 basically "quick fix” arrangements. They are well-lhought-out dissent from our knowledge- indicaiors of an unhealthy organizaiion—one able p>eople and make it a part of our decision that needs to get back to the basics of managing process. Once the decision is made, we need to within its established capabilides. Lasting press on positively and strongly with its change can only occur within the group of implementation. people who have daily responsibilities for the Decision-making in an ivory tower immedi- unit. ately surrounded by harmony and conformity We should realize by now that arbitrary is relatively easy. Conversely, it takes strong, decisions are seldom implemented as originally self-confident, and farsighted leaders to conceived, because considerable power to resist encourage questioning and dissent during exists at lower leveis. On the other hand, their deliberations—and intelligent and think- decisions which capitalize on the knowledge ing subordinates to make such dissent and experience of those on the firing line have effective. Are you, as a commander, capable, or little trouble being placed into action. even ready, to meet the challenge? Or is that Involvemeni breeds commitment, and commit- warm glow that comes from putting out fires ment produces team action. too comfortable? Think about it as you nod If the foregoing is correct, the time has come assent or coordinate on that next important for us to shift our yes men from the decision decision. mode to the implemeniing mode, and to bring It may well be that our ability to question our dissenters out of the implemeniing mode and the freedom to think and aci may be our and into the decision mode. We must single most important advantage in any future encourage—even demand—questioning and conflict with our potential adversaries.

An War College

Nota

1. George S. Odiorne. Management and the Âcltvtty Trap (New York: 4. Reporl Io ihr Rreudrnt and thr Serretary o/ Dr/rnje on Oir Drparlmrnl o/ H arpa le Row 1974). p. 5. Defense Hanrl (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govemmrni Prinnng Offire, July 2. Peto F. Drucker. The Efleeítve Executtve (New York: Harper ie Row. 1970). p. 74. 1967). pp. 113. 114. 5. Drut kor. Manogrmeni. p. 472. 3. Pctcr F. Drurkrr. Management ( New York lU rprr fc Row. 1974). pp. 466. 6. Gcnt-ral William V M> Bridr. 'T h e Air Siaft—A Vicw from ihr Top," Air Forcr M agaim r. April 1976, p. 28. USAF INFORMATION ENGINEERING: 1990 PLUS

Major J krr y C. H ix

Ciood evening! Time: 2200. Date: 3 June 1990. Few clerical people are assigned to your Weleome to Futucornm AFB. I am UN1BAC, lhe ofíice in the base aerospace maintenance central base Computer. Please inseri your precoded, complex. Instead, your terminal, consistingof sensitized ID card into the terminal and repeal your a keyboard and video system tied to the base natne, rank, and serial number for voice print Computer system, does the work that formerly authenticalion. . . . As you can see from the display required many base support people such as screen, your records have already been filed with me, and l unll update your pcrsonnel file and inform the secretaries, stock clerks, posting clerks, CBPO, finance, and your duty unit lhat you have runners, switchboard operators. For instance, arrwed. I have also verified that all your family by pressing the “dictation” button on the medicai and dental records are here. Please call 834- terminal, you can edit the text as it isdisplayed 1716 if you have any questions. Thank you andgood on your screen and receive a finished copy for nighl. signature. The letter is also forwarded through the system to other offices forcoordination and filing as necessary. In addition, through your video terminal you can participate in conferences and briefings, check the maintenance status of projects, rcfer to the latest technical order data HIS SCENARIO sounds strange even updated by video messages from Air Force to those of us who have lived with lhe Logistics Command, and give and receive relatively sophislicated communication training—all withoul leaving your desk. If you T Systems of the ’70s. But project yourself areinto moving around the base, messages reach 1990 and a closer look at your surroundings you over a pocket unit, or your terminal Stores shows that they are even less familiar. all routine messages until you return. All this

58 USAF INFORMATION ENOINEERING 59

freedom from confining, routine than from elemeniary and high schools. “ By adminisirative deiails gives you more time for the time the average chiid enters your primary job, managing. kindergarten,” he continues, “he has already Sound fanciful? Just look at all the spent more hours learning about his world technological developments of the past ten from television than lhe hours he would spend years. The truth is we now stand on the verge of in college earning a bachelor’s degree.”2 communication changes that will vastly alter Unfortunately, all this exposure is not and improve the way we do business. necessarily good, and television has been According to author and in forma tion blamed for everything from increased violente futurist Ben Bagdikian: and drug use to the triviali/alion of the nation’s brainpower.3 In the near future, the Computer linked to electronic Communications will probably alter American public television, including personal and social life in ways comparable to lhe educational TV, has put up a good iight to combined changes produced by the telephone, provide alternatives, but its history is marked automobile, and television in the last 90 years, by persistem developmental problems that but do it in the life-tiine of most of us.1 have retarded its growth. These include an These far-reaching com m unication unsteady relationship with government, developments will impact virtually every confusion over its mission and intended aspect of our lives and certainly have a audience, and, above all, chronic profound effect on how USAF managers underfinancing. Despite these problems the function. Hopefully, by giving some insight Public Broadcasting System has managed to into what is coming, this article can help avoid offer some excellent programming.'1 the “future shock" these developments portend. Given public television’s chronicdifficulties for the average USAF manager. and commercial television’s 25-year big In future Communications, two key business profit-motivated history, you miglu technological areas—coaxial or cable well ask how television will ever reach its full television (CATV) and word processing com- potential as a communication médium. The puters—seem to hold most potential for USAF answer probably is not in either of these application. Systems, but the abundance of outlets and innovative opportunities of cable television Cable Television offer great potential. Cable or Community Antenna Television To understand cable television, you must (CATV) is not new. The first system was first understand the nature of television. constructed in 1948, only a few years after Television has been called the greatest commercial television broadcasts began in the instrument of human communication ever U.S. As its name implies, CATV consists of a developed. Certainly, it is the most pervasive large central antenna, amplifiers to boost the force in American life today. As Nicholas signal, and cables connected to subscriber Johnson, former FCC commissioner, States: homes. Until recently, CATV’s sole purpose There are 60 million homes in lhe USandover95 was to give poor reception areas an increased percent of them have TV. (More than 25 percent number of channel options, but recent have two or more.) In the average home, TV is turned on some 5 hours and 45 minutes a day. technological developments have broadened The average male viewer, between hissecondand cable’s capabilities with the promise of more to 65th year. will watch TV for over 3000 entire come. days—roughly nine full years of his life. Early systems coultl relay no more than five Further, according to Johnson, Americans to seven channels. Modem systems can carry up receive much more of their education from TV to 30 channels and, in the future, may haveany 60 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVI KW

number ot multiples of 20 up to 24,000.s Two- with present or follow-on systems.9 This way communication via cable, though not inherent equipment limitation was further perfected, has been demonstrated ex- aggravated by rapid technological changeand perimentally, and Computer digitization oí a lack of comprehensive communication video signals is feasible and tould vastly plans. There has also been some confusion as increase system versatility. The rabie industry to how the USAF should use television. is also currently investigating the possibility of lh e 1970 AFR 100-1, "Closed Circuit linking cable systems nationally via satellites.6 Television,” listed six managerial uses for TV: Thus, the prospect of cable television, • Immediately interchange audio- computers, and satellites linked in a common visual information to meet an operational carrier system tould produce yet another requirement. communication revolution this century. Think of the great variety of innovations • Immediately transmit audiovisual possible in this ‘‘wired world” environment. information to expedite decision-making at l he cable is as accepted as the telephone and as high echelons of command. necessary as the mail. • Achieve face-to-face communication Of course, cable television is not a panacea. It capability. has problems—primarily a lack of money and • View events of major signifieanre as regulatory limitations imposed by the Federal they occur. Communications Commission (FCC) under • Attain real-time reporting. pressure from network lobbies. These • Achieve data remoting. opposing forces havecombined thus far to keep CATV from fulfilling the predictions of the The 1975 version deleted all referente to prestigious 1972 Sloan Commission. In its managerial applications and now recognizes projections for CATV, the commission stated only four routine uses for CCTV: R8cD that, “ Its (CATV) impact on society’s most instrumentalion, audiovisual production, immediate needs rnight be enormous."7 The surveillance, and weather briefing. (Note: optimism of the report was based on the belief There really is little difference between CCTV that 40 to 60 perceni of all American homes and CATV. Boih use a cable, and both are would be "w ired” by 1980. T o date CATV has capable of providing a wide variety of Services. reached only 15 percent of American homes, CCTV is usually used to refer to a smaller but with favorable legislation in the next few closed system within a building or facility.) years to ease some restrictions, it could be in 90 Present USAF policy for CATV in AFR 70-3. percent of the urban homes by 1990.8 "Cable Television (CATV) Systems on USAF Installations,” and AFR 190-18. "USAF USAF and the Cable Internai Information Program,” is equallv How has the Air Force reacted to this lacking. AFR 70-3 is devoted to CATV potential communication revolution? Until franchise agreements and, in many respects, is recently, not very well. Certainly, USAF has a valuable document. One area that should be been using closed circuit television (CCTV) in re-examined, however. is the provision of one education, security, and weather programs for reserved on-base channel as a franchise fee. One some time. However, these and other systems channel will not be enough to handle future were procured to satisfy "specific” base needs, and since this current policy is communication requirements. This approach based on today’s small-volume systems, it fails has resulted in a proliferation of specialized to consider the vast capabilities of the future. systems with little or no interface cápability Perhaps exacting a percentage of total USAF INFORMATION ENGINEERING 61

channels available would be wiser than asking ‘‘The fact is that print, for quite prosaic for a specific number. reasons, may be reaching the upper iimits of its The information regulaiion, AFR 190-18, usefulness to man: the accumulation of presents a similar problem in that it published paper since the invention of perpetuates a tradicional view of CATV as printing five hundred years ago has become so largely a commercial TV reception massive that it is too difficult to manage.” 12 improvement device. While it does propose Newspapers, along with all forms of printed some base CATV uses, such as broadcasting m aterial, have experienced massive commander’s call, base orientation. and other multiplication of printed pages. In the last 20 programs, its narrow view does not recognize years, the number of pages entering the home the true potential of the cable in future base has increased two and one-half times, and a information Systems. 400-page Sunday paper is not uncommon. One of the central problems concerning Such a paper is the equivalent of more than USAFs entry into the cable age is the lack of a sixteen 300-page books.15 It is not surprising, single Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) then, that our newspapers spend more than 80 for system development. An October 1976 percent of their budgets on production.14 Secretary of the Air Force Office of There is some parallel between newspaper Information (SAFOI) study showed that of the production and USAF administration 48 bases with CATV installed, only 56 percent functions, and anyone who has fought the obtained the required franchise fee dedicated never-ending ‘‘battle of the in basket” knows channel. Further, none of the 27 bases that had how much USAF paperwork volume has the channel had any comprehensive use plans. increased. Since the written word is key to boih Only six bases had designated OPRs, and these operations, perhaps we can learn from the six chose the office of information.10 Given the newspaper industry’s application of tremendous potential of the cable as a base computers to word processing functions. communication assei, it would seem more Every newspaper has a system for converting prudent to charge the base communication news into type. New typesetting machines are unit with responsibility for developing plans much more efficient than older models, but that could benefit all potential base users there is still a great deal of time lost in the through base Communications Electronic editing process. Usually, the writer has the Meteorological Board activities. basics in his story, but some editing is required. So. thereisgreatpromise in CATV, but there The key is to preserve as many of the original are severe regulatory and economic problems keystrokes as possible without retyping after that must be overcome before the promise can each editing process.15 bc fulfilled. There is also a philosophical Computers, video display terminais (VDT), question that must be answered in the USAF. optical character recognition (OCR) What role will CATV play in future USAF machines, and other forms of new technology Communications? Beyond these problems, are beginning to decrease editing time. Typed however, is the fundamental question of “ how copy with minor editing marks is now fed much information people can absorb.” The through an OCR machine and converted into cable, with its abundante of choice, could type at vastly improved speeds up to 1500 overload the human reception capability.11 words a minute. This process is good for volume input but tends to be ineffective when Word Processing Computers copy must be heavily edited.16 One area where we are already overloaded is Video display terminais, on the other hand, in printed pages. As Bagdikian points out, seem to hold lhe most promise for speed in 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEAV editing. By pressinga button, an editor can call Looking toward the Future up any story from computei storage to his USAF actually began examining local video screen. VVorking with a keyboard (or communication improvement options in the light pencil on more sophisticated versions), early ’70s. In 1972 MI I RE Corporation he can add or delete words and rearrangc completed a year-long study on using the paragraphs as required. This process can be CATV “wired city” concept for an improved repeated by any number of editors, and when base network. They proposed a Universal the story is ready, it is fed into computerized Intra-Base Communications (UNIBAC) typesetting machinery and then printed.17 system that would integrate data processing Thus, scanners are great for volume input, but with áudio and video signals to form an video terminais are better for selective input interactive information handling system and editing. In addition, they provide ilirect e apable of providing a wide range of Services. Computer links and ready access toa vaiiety of The system would allow offices to tailor reference inform ation ai com putei-to- terminal configuration to particular needs computer speeds of 2400 words a m inute.18 through various modular keyboard and video But newspapers are not alone in their display configurations. Although telephone recognition of the economies word Services were not included in the system, Processing computers can produce. Other current telephone equipment is compatible industries are beginning to establisli word with the UNIBAC concept.19 Processing centers that concentrate all Ralhei than proceed with the MITRE administrative support paperwork functions ptoposal, USAF chose to establish a Base in one area. This allows for cost-effective use Communicalions Analysis (BCM) group to of modem electronic office systems to extend study alternatives further.This represented an worker productivity. The USAF is very nuich initial in-house effort to identify, investigate, interested in this concept. and phototype and propose conceptual Solutions to base centers have been set up at 1 Iq USAF and several information transfer problems on a total major commands. However, here, as in the system basis projec ted into the 1985 time frame. CATV area. there is little central guidance, Base Communications, administrative Services, and the comm ands seem to be devcloping and data automation—the user groups their program s independently. primai ily concerned with intrabase So most of the Computer technology information transfer—were included in the meniioned in the opening scenarioisavailable study along with 20 other functional support today and in the embryonit stages of areas.20 Interestitigly, the information employ ment. Wh>. then. is the l JSAF scenario function, which is a key element in dated 1990? VVell, USAF has been studying information flow and is being entrusted with local i ommunic ation updates for some time, USAF’s growing CATV assets, was not but thus fai there has been little real progress. included in the analysis. With the current and the predicted funds To anyone involved with base shortages, most of the USAF's communication Communications, the BCM groups initial development efforts are going toward new assessment of current base systems was coinmand and control Communications (C3) prediciable. I hey found a proliferation of systems such as the WorldWVide Military subsystems, designed to meet specific user Command and Control Systems (YVWMCCS). needs, with major interfac ing problems. While Nevertheless, there is a very real need to long haul systems liad improved dramatically, moderni/.e intraoffice intrabase com- they saw base systems that had remained munication networks. relatively stagnant over the past 30 years.21 USAF INFORMATION ENOINEERING 63

For example, most base telephone exchanges • Goncept 2 provided a new electronk are step-by-siep electromagnetic sysiems analog circuit switch to handle integralion of operaiing on the same basic design as a 1928 most special circuits. Video circuits were exchange. They are expensive to maimain and handled by a separate dedicated system. operate, but they do meei most basic user needs. • Goncept 3A simply represented a Where they have not met increased digital data further refinement of Goncept 2 and wasadead needs, "engineering by addition” has produced end in achieving total system integralion. the current incompatibility problems.22 • Goncept 3B preserved the present VVe c a n t r a n s m i t a m e s s a g e h a l l w a y a r o u n d telephone switch and provided a GATV-type the world in a few minutes, but the processand broadband transmission médium—a dual time required to get it to and from the base coaxial cable in tree configuration—capableof communication center is about the same as in handling all digital and pictorial Services in 1947. About the most significam changes in the one distribution piam. The digital add-on base distribuiion system over the past three capability of the system seenied to make it a decades have been the introduction of the logical evolutionary step in total system electric typewriter and the trade-in of bicycles integralion. for mobile distribution vans.23 The BCM study group looked ai six • Goncept 4A provided an all-new set alternative concepts: of distribution hub swiuhes with a common control center. Obviously, this is a very • Goncept 1 was to continue operating expensive and complex option. and maintaining the various parallel sub- systems that now comprise the base information • Goncept 4B was an extension of transfer system and respond only to individual Goncept 3B using narrow-band frequency slots program requirements for new capabilities. In to provide the necessary analog channels to other words, more diverse proliferation. incorporate the telephone system.24

million $

investment sa lanes Figure I. Concepl ei>aluation by maintenance cost calegones (average annual life-cyclc costs over a Ib-year period by cost calegones) 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REIIEW

The Air Force musi pursueoneof these latter information systems. The Air Force needs a opiions to obtain an integrated system. Given new intraofíice/intrabase communication the preference for incrementai funding, it system, but there are many problems assoe iated would probably be more viable to obtain with developing such a system. Designers face Concept 3B capability and lhen add the complex choices in a wide variety of design Concept 4B option later. Also, life-cycle cost opiions, and customer requirements are data over a 16-year period (Figure 1) show that difficull to determine. New systems involve all alternatives have a lower opera ti ng cost high-risk technology and are difficult to phase than presem labor intense Concept 1 in to existing installations. The ideal system operations. To date, however, USAF seems to should provide efficient, modular elements be continuing down the same old paih, using that can be economically connected to any add-on engineering to accommodate new appropriate information resources. The requirements. challenge is to develop a planned evolutionary Meanvvhile, USAF’s administrative people process to integrate new technology with apparently have tired of waiting for a new existing systems.2S communication system to develop and have USAF has been trying unsuccessfully for the pressed for the development of the new word past five years to develop such a concept. Processing centers mentioned earlier. One of Insulficient funds and lack of central direction the more promising efforts in this area is Air have contributed to lhe inability to define an Force System Command’s Project IMPACT Air Force system adequately. The recently (Improved Administrative Capability Test). established Assistant Chief of Staff, The project is designed to demonstrate an Communications and Computer Resources, optimal automated office system that will should provide the necessary cohesive provide the greatest benefits in reduced direction, provided USAF adopts the manpower and increased administrative philosophy that modernization isessential and efficiencies. Results of the test, which will be is willing and able to devote sufficient funds conducted over lhe next three years at toward such a system. In developing its plan, Electronic Systems Division, should help USAF should ride piggyback on civilian develop and refine criteria for automated office CATV wherever possible, to save money and systems throughout the USAF. These centers provide interface with regional and national promise to speed typing and editing, but systems as they develop. without an improved electronic distribution Projected future military manpower short- system, they can do relatively little about ages make it imperative that USAF get the most moving the paperwork faster. It is hopcd that from each person, and improved local the systems employed in these centers will be in form a tion transfer system s could compatible with future information transfer tremendously increase administrative systems. Otherwise, development problems produetivity. If lhe USAF fails to anticipate will be compounded through the proliferation the full potential of the information of diverse word-processing equipment. technology revolution, it may find itself unable to manage 1990 "space shuttle” type opera- tions with a biplane communication system. THERE IS a very real need and a very great challenge in updating local USAF Aerospace Deftnse Cnmmand USAF INFORMATION ENGINEERINC. 65

Media (New York: Harprr and Row. 1972), p. 190. 1. Robrrt J. ClrMing and Willixm P. Whilr. Mass Media. The Invuible 13. Ibid . p. 193 Envtronmenl (Paio Alio. Califórnia. Science Rararch Auonalr*. Inc.. 1973). 14. C lniing and Whilr. Mass Media: The Invuible World Revilited, p. 53. p. 306. 15. Ibid 2. Ibid.. p. 3. 16. Ibid.. p. 55. 3. Robm J. Glm ing and William P. Whilr. Alau Media The Invuible 17 Ibid.. p. 54. World Rn-utled (Paio Alio. Califórnia: Srimcr Rnrairh Aituculr». Inr.. 18. Bagdikian. p. 180 1976). p. 26- 19. USAF. Air Forcr Syumu Cominand. l'NIBAC: Conrepli and Apple 4. Ibid.. p. 23. calions. vol. I. Brdford. Mauachinriu. MI I R t CáirpofaiÚMi. 1972, p. 8. 5. G lru in g and Whilr. Mass Media: The Invuible F.m ironmenl, p. 306. 20. USAF. Air Forcr SyuenuCommand. Afusion Analysison Air Fone Base 6. ClcMing and Whilr. Mass Media. The Invisible World Revuiled. p. 23. Communicalions: I98Í, vol. IA. Hanitom Firld. MaruchuH-tu: Electronic 7. Ibid. Sysirms Divtsion. 1973, p. I. 8. Ibid.. p. 24. 21. USAF. Air Forcr Sytlrnu Command. Afunon Attifyiu Air Force Base . u _ Col. D. L. Eppingrr. USAF. "C ablt TA’ (CATV): Com mrrcul Crowih Communicoliom—I98í. vol IB. HanKnni Firld Mauachiurtls: Elnironu and Air Forcr Application. ' Unpublirhrd Air War Collcgr Siudy. Alt Systrmr Diviúon. 1973. p. 6. U n ivm úy. Maxwell AFB. A laba ma. 1973. 22. Ibid . p. 4. 10. USAF. Setretary oí Air Forte, Office oí Information. "Air Forcr Cable 23. Ibid . p. 5. Teievision Survey.'* Warhtngton: SAFOI. Dccrmbrr 1975. 24. Ibid.. pp. 58-71. 11. Gleuing and Whilr. Mast Media: The Invuible Envnonmenl. p. 308. 25. USAF. Air Forcr Syiirnu Command. UNIBAC: Concepls and Appli- 12. Brn H. Bagdikian. Inlormaliun Machines: Their Impaclion Men and lhe cations. p. I.

Communications satellites will be complementary to, not competilive with, cable systems. Two recent technical developments are oí major importance for the future of satellite Communications: random access (making it possible for any earth station in a satellite system to communicate with any other earth station), and broadeasting capability. Thus satellites are likely to be the vehicle for large-scale interconnection of cable systems in the future, and are also likely to be the vehicle that provides broadeast Services for homes that are beyond lhe reach of either cable or terrestrial broadeast systems. Much farther in the future, satellites could become the preferred vehicle for switched interconnection among cable systems.

A br a m C hayes. “ The Impact of Satellites on Cable Communications'' On lhe Cable: The Teievision of Abundance. Report of the Sloan Commission on Cable Communications HE TERM “ technology” suggests a variety of meanings. It may define a body of applied scientific knowledge or even the actual product of this competence. Moreover,T advanced technology may not be visible in the product itself but rather in the process that created the prototype. Integrated circuits and Computer software are obvious examples.1 However, such definitional distinctions become academic when considered within the context of national security. Technology emerges as a criticai national resource and an equally important dimension of international political power. Most industrially advanced nations covet and nurture this asset. Consequently, a perception of future technological trends may well emerge from trends in acquisition and development. The Sovict Union shares this perspective with one notable exception. The Soviet leadership’s perception of American technology is filtered through the lens of contemporary Marxism-Leninism and a unique view of Russia’s historie relationship with the West. Hisioricallv, Rússia, with few exceptions, has lagged behind the West in technological development. From the earliest days of the Soviet State, its leaders recognized this fact and tried to rectify it. In 1921, for example, an exasperated Lenin complained,“ . . . it is necessary to establish who

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY the Soviet perspective

Paul M. Kozar 66 will be responsible for acquainting us with and scientiíic achievement and exhorts greater European and American technology clearly, effort from the scientiíic community.7 timely, practically and noi formally.”2 Three This interpreiation by Dr. Thomas P. years later, Joseph Stalin concluded that Kridler of the U.S. Air Force’s Foreign "American efficiency . . . combined with the Technology Division offers a framework Russian revolutionary sweep” are essential to within which to gauge lhe actual Soviet the successful construction of socialism in commitment to Science and technology. Soviet Rússia.3 Neither statement is surprising During the decade of the 1960s, the U .S.S.R.’s when considered in relation to the observation research and development establishment ex- of Dr. Herbert S. Levine, an economist ai the panded rapidly. For example, the number of University of Pennsylvania, that . . modern research institutes increased from 1729 in 1960 Russian history—from the middle of the 15th to 2388 in 1969.® By theearly 1970s theSoviets Century to the present day—had been domi- claimed that one out of every 250 people in the nated by the need perceived by Russian leaders nation was employed in science; the growth in to catch up with the more advanced nations of the science labor force exceeded by several the West.”4 This motivation has not abated in limes the growth in the nation’s total labor recent years. On the contrary, it has assumed force; and, furthermore, 15 percent of each even a greater sense of urgency. In a 1969 annual college-level graduating class entered a address to the International Conference of scientiíic career.9 Between the years 1970 and Communist and Worker’s Parties, General 1976, Soviet scientiíic and engineering man- Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev declared: power engaged in research and development . . . we must compete in the scientific-technical increased from 600,000 to 800,000 individuais.10 arena. The struggle here will be long and hard. It is estimated that during the same period, at But we are resolved to carry it out seriously to least a quarter million engineers were prove lhe supremacy of socialism.5 graduated annually. This is five times greater Such competition is not only a reflection of than that of any other country in the world.11 the "historically inevitable struggle between A major effort in the Soviet drive to catch up socialism and capitalism” but the essence of a and surpass the West is devoted to the new stage of socioeconomic development. The application of science and technology to 1961 Soviet Com m unist Party Program military needs. “ Scientiíic research should be concluded that “ . . . humanity is entering a subordinated primarily to the interests of period of scientific-technical revolution asso- further strengthening of the army and navy.” 12 ciated with the mastering of nuclear energy, The judgment is that of Victor G. Kulikov, the conquest of space, lhe development of Marshal of the Soviet Union and Commander chemistry, the automation of production and in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces. Moreover, other enormous achievements of Science and this assertion is corroborated by the growth in technology.” 6 Over time this concept has Soviet research, development, test, andevalua- proved to be more substantive than polemicai. tion expenditures since 1964. In thirteen years, this financial investment has increased from It [the scientiíic and technical revolution] defines the accepted ideological stance toward Science approximately $9 billion per annum to a and its social role. The concept’s development is a currem expenditure of about $20 billion.13 way of seeking popular support for leadership One of the principal formulationscreated by goals. It also assigns a national priority to Science Soviet military theoreticians to explain and

67 68 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW jusiify ihis commitmem to military-oriemed capitalist States.17 Yet, a fundamental question research an d developm en t is the . . sh arp , remains: What are the technological aspects of leap-like transition írom conventional to this “condition,” and how are they perceived nuclcar-missile weapons as the main means of by the politico-military hierarchy of the Soviet waging war and the correspondí ng new means Union? of achieving the basic aims of the war, [which] comprise the essence of the contemporary revolution in military Science.” 14 The “revolu- I n HIS evaluation of lhe Defense De- tion in military affairs” demarcates a historical partment^ research and development pro- period concurrent with the revolution in gram for fiscal year 1978, Dr. Malcolm R. Science and technology. Currie related technology to military power in The first stage began in the Soviet Union the following manner. with the “ creation of aiomic weapons” in 1953, Technology, per se, does not equate to military and it was followed in 1960 by the "emergence power. Rather the real significance of technology' of a carrier for the atomic charge (rockets) and to the balance oí military power lies in the ability of each nation to transform its scientific the creation of nuclear-missile weapons” discoveries and engineering breakthroughs into under the control of the newly established military capability—in the form of equipment Strategic Missile Forces. Both the U.S. and the which enhances or multiplies force effectiveness U.S.S.R. are now in the midst of the third and and which can be deployed in militarily final stage. It is characterized by the “compre- significam numbers . . .18 hensive automation of military equipment Strategic weapon programs such as the B-1, the and the combat actions of troops, the intensive Trident, and air- and sea-launched cruise introduction of scientific knowledge into the missiles, together with various tactical Sys- military field, notably for control of troops.” 15 tems, demonstrate this relationship. The In their survey of military applications of development of each of these systems prompted automated control and management Systems a spate of commentaries that partially reveal a in the United States, V. A. Baranyuk and V. I. Soviet perception of U.S. military technology Vorob'yev noted that while the employment of and what it may augur for the future. an excessively large number of different types The following examples reflect some of the of computers is an important deficiency of assumptions relative to American Science and such systems, the immediate prospects in this technology’ that consistently appear in Soviet field include the standardization of hardware, publications. For instance, in oneof his many the development of time-sharing multiproces- commentaries on lhe role of Science in military sor computers, and the development of mobile strategy, Colonel V. M. Bondarenko argues Computer systems for troops control in the that “science has become an independem field. The authors urge their Soviet counter- element in lhe system of the defensive might" parts to analyze foreign experience critically of the Soviet Union; "militarization as usual is “ in adopting means of automation in the a characteristic feature of the development of practical activities of headquarters staffs and scientific knowledge . . .” in the United military establishments” in order to reach the States.19 The growth in U.S. defense expendi- "mosí objective conclusions.” 16 tures is often cited to justify this assertion. The impact of Science and technology as Citing lhe increase from FY 1970 of $74.5 manifest in the “revolution in military affairs” billion to $112.3 billion for the fiscal year that is considered by many Soviet military analysts ended 30 December 1976. S. Novoselov to be the most important condition and the concludes in his July 1976 article published in basis for raising the military might of the Military Knowledge, the monthly Journal U.S. MIL1TARY TECHNOLOGY 69 jointly sponsored by Soviei Civil Defense and sincere step toward íurther arms control, while DOSAAF.* thal others dismissed the proposal as merely a Soviei propaganda ploy designed to orches- A significam porcion of lhe US mililary budget trate international pressure oppc»sed to the goes for lhe coniinued buildup of straiegic offensive weapons: purchases and mainiaining development and deployment of the B-l and lhe combai readiness of ICBMs in underground Trident. The latter inierpreiaiion is far closer silos and on nuclear-powered submarines, plus to Brezhnev’s true motives. As the General scientific research and experimental design work Secretary declared in the CPSU Central on lhe developmem of new iyp>es of weapons.20 Commitiee Report to the 25th Party Congress The American miliiary-indusirial complex eight months later, is accused of attempting 10 “expand the range We specifically proposed reaching agreemeni on of military applied scientific research and banning the creation of new and even more development in order 10 establish conditions desiruelive arms systems, particularly new for lhe constam qualitaiive improvemeni of submarines of lhe Trideni lype equipped wilh military potential . . . in order to make use of ballistic missiles and new straiegic bombers of lhe new scientific discoveries for military pur- B-l lype in the United States and analogous systems in lhe USSR.24 poses.”21 Finally, the “fruits” of U.S. Science and technology are converted into a “lever The nature of such analogous systems in the with which it will be able to create new ways in Soviet Union wasneverclarified. Nevertheless, which other States are dependem on American explanatory articles generated in support of imperialism" or to entice “ scientists from the Brezhnev proposal are quite revealing; in other capitalist countries . . . to perpetuate the particular, an essay contained in the monthly, so-called ‘technological gap’ between the USA: Economies, Politics, Ideology, pub- economies of the socialist countries and that of lished by the Soviei Union’s Institute of the the United States.” 22 U.S.A. and Canada (IUSAC). The article was As one might expect, the development of the written by two sênior staff members of this B-l, Trident, and the cruise missile provided institute, General-Lieutenant (Retired) M. A. ready grist for the Soviet agitation and MiTshteyn and L. S. Semeyko. propaganda machinery. The standard fare The authors pose the following question: included allegations of “mass protest move- “ What does the United States see as the main ments” and “ broad domestic opposition” in directions in the creation of a new, ‘super- the United States to the coniinued develop- powerful weapon’?” Based on an analysis of ment of these Systems.25 Of greater significance “ U.S. sources,” they foresee three alternatives: are those political and technical commentaries first, “the production of new weapons on the subsumed beneath such obvious Soviet rhetoric. basis of already known types (classes) of mass In a 13 June 1975 speech at the Kremlin’s destruction weapons—nuclear, Chemical, or Palace of Congresses on the occasion of his bacteriological (biological)”; second, "the de- victory in the single-party elections to the velopment of fundamentally new types of mass Russian Republic’s Supreme Soviet, General destruction weapons diífering fundamentally Secretary Brezhnev proposed an international from existing ones in terms of their physical ban on the development and production of nature” ; and, finally, "the creation of original new types of weapons of mass destruction and systems mainly connected with new delivery their associated delivery systems. In some weapons.”25 quarters, this declaration was welcomed as a In support of lhe first proposition, MiTshteyn and Semeyko State that “scientific research •DOSAAF. ihr Voluntary Srxirty for Coopcranon with the Arm>. Air Forte, work is being performed in the United States and N aw 70 AIR UN1VERS1TY REV1EW on the utilization of uncharged-particle and development of a broad front of long-range charged-particle accelerators to create weapons scientific studies that will provide a good of powerful destructive action . . .”26 The freedom of selection.” 31 A TASS political news second trend is illustrated by research in the observer, Vladimir Goncharov, subsequently field of genetic weapons. It is alleged that the described one outcome of these earlier U.S. Advanced Research Projects Agency— “ an studies, viz., the B-l, as follows: “ It does not elite of civilian scientists engaged in highly attend meetings, deliver speeches or give risky scientific research work of a revolution- interviews, nevertheless it plays an important ary nature’ in the military field” is involved in pari in the election campaign battles, now such an eífort.27 Research into military unfolding in the United States . . . Its sharp applications of lasers together with the B-1 and beak, glassy eyes, and widespread wings rub Trident systems exemplify the third trend. shoulders on newspaper pages with the Interestingly, the authors appear to give emblems of the biggest American political credence to an unattributed report that parties.”32 indicated the “ possibility of arming the B-l While the Soviet press gave wide play and strategic bomber with a laser gun . . .”28 implicit approval to the U.S. congressional U.S. military technology, therefore, is debate surrounding procurement funding for perceived broadly in terms of specific products the B-l during the spring of 1976, Presidem that are, in and of ihemselves, examples of Carter’s decision to discontinue deployment of advanced technological achievement. The the B-l in favor of the cruise missile elicited a Soviets do not indicate that they foresee any uniformly negative response within the curtailment of this trend. U.S.S.R. In its initial coverage of the Such a conclusion does not imply the President’s 30 June 1977 announcement, existence of a reactive relationship between TASS, the official Soviet press agency, Soviet military research and development and attached far greater importance to his decision similar activities in the United States. There is to authorize deployment of strategic cruise little evidence to question the veracity of the missiles in contrast to the cancellation of B-l late Marshai A. Grechko’s contention, expres- production although the dispatch did note sed during the 24th Party Congress, that ‘‘the that “ the United States will continue tests and constant strengthening of the armed forces is research for perfection of the ‘B-l’ bomber.”33 an objective necessity for the successful In the judgment of Oleg Skalkin, a Pravda building of socialism and communism . . .”29 columnist, “There was simply no other Nevertheless, the potential for a reciprocai outcome.” “The White House,” heconcluded, Soviet response does exist. The current Soviet “was too strongly committed by election Minister of Defense. Marshai Dimitri F. campaign promises to prevent the production Ustinov, commented that “our country’s of these aircraft.”34 However, the American economy, Science and technology are now at decision to begin deployment of air-launched such a high levei that we are capable, within cruise missiles was viewed by Izuestiyas V. the shortest period, of matching any type of Kobysh as a significam reinforcement of “ US weapon that the enemies of peace create.” 30 military-strategic potential.”55 About four years ago, a leading Soviet observer of American military affairs, V. M. Kulish, argued that the main direction of the “military-technical race being conducted in T H E SOURCES of information avail- the United States reflects two principal trends: able to Soviet military and political analysts modernization of existing arms . . . lhe are, in many respects, as interesting as the U.S. M1LITARY TECHNOLOGY 71

insights gleaned from their writings. The activities of the USSR concerned with long- party and governmental organs of the U.S.S.R. range forecasts of the future.” 39 literally pursue a vacuum cleaner approach to While the international technology transfer the acquisition of Western seientific and issue falis beyond the purview of this paper, technical knowledge. The techniques range the channels utili/ed provide the Soviet from the translation of professional articles to leadership with a valuable source of informa- espionage. While the methods vary, the goal tion. Professor Joseph Berliner of Brandeis does not. Each technique is designed to extract University labeled these: publications, prod- the maximum advantage for the Soviet Union ucts, and people in ascending order of in its military and technical competition with importance and effectiveness.40 The first the United States. channel is comprised of VINITI et al. The Today, the seientific and technological data significance of the last two conduits graphi- mechanism that Lenin lacked exists in the cally emerged during the course of the May Soviet Union. It is the reponsibility of the All- 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow. Union Institute of Seientific and Technical Point 8 of the agreement on "Basic Principies Information (VINITI), a branch of the State of Relations between the U.S. and the Committee for Science and Technology U.S.S.R.” endorsed at this conference States: (GKNT) of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. The two sides consider it timely and useful to VINITI provides information storage and develop mutual contacts and cooperation in the retrieval and abstracts domestic and foreign fields of Science and technology. Where suitable, literature. In 1971, it was reported that \ ’INITI the US and USSR will conclude appropriate processed publications from 117 different agreements dealing with concrete cooperation in these fields.41 countries which encompassed approximately one million articles, books, and descriptions of As a consequence, eleven intergovernmental inventions.36 A. I. Mikhaylov, the present cooperative agreements were developed in Director of VINITI, stated in 1973 that the such fields as environmental protection, space number of items compiled for publication in cooperation, transportation, and atomic en- its journal of abstracts increased since 1961 at ergy. The cooperative agreement that dealt an average rate of 5 percent per year; the with the general field of Science and journal's preparation time from original technology has provided the basis for a rapid sources was reduced from 7.5 to 4 months; and. increase in American trade with the Soviet the number of subscriptions had increased Union. Of the total number of contracts for from 264 to 317.000.37 VINITI also publishes industrial equipment placed with American ‘Express Information” reports. which contain firms, half are for the Rama River heavy truck sources with limited access, and the reference produetion complex.42 vvork Results of Science and Technology.38 The recent growth in U.S.-U.S.S.R. com- Among the principal consumers of VINITI mercial and cooperative ventures spawned a publications are IUSAC and the Institute of commensurate increase in official travei the World Economy and International Rela- between the two countries. During the first tions (IMEMO), two of the Kremlin’s key eleven months of 1975, approximately 359 foreign policy think tanks. As a Stanford Soviet commercial groups carne to the United Research Institute study concluded, “ Informa- States, morethan four times the figure for 1972. tion generated by this system serves a dual The number of official Soviet representatives function: it is used directly to supplement almost doubled, reaching 1197 during the Soviet knowledge in specialized fields and as a same period. The number of Soviet exchange primary input into the strategic intelligence visitors also doubled in less than four years, 72 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW and the figures on groups jumped from 330 in of its rivalry with the United States can be 1972 to 530 for the first five months of 1975. By “scientifically” demonstrated by the Soviet way of comparison, about 5500 American leadership; it is referred to variously as the commercial and technical travelers journeyed “ balance or correlation of forces.” This to the Soviet Union in 1975 as opposed to 2300 concept integrates military, political, econom- in 1972. ic, and social considerations and the correla- Scientific and technological symposia offer tion is determined by “ . . . capabilities a prime source of information on U.S. developed with respect to, and effectiveness in technology to the Soviets. Among those utilizing, not just one or another, but the academic functions included in the proposed combination of these elements.”45 itineraries of Communist bloc exchange Although the Soviet Union recognizes the visitors during 1975 were the Seventh Confer- United States as the most powerful economic, ence on Laser Atmospheric Studies sponsored scientific, and technical country in the by the Stanford Research Institute and the capitalist world, its national leadership is Sixth International Conference on High- confident that the world correlation of forces Energy Physics and Nuclear Structure at Santa has shifted decisively in favor of socialism and Fe, New México. communism.46 From the perspective of Georgi The breadth of technological data flowing A. Arbatov, Director of IUSAC, “ thechanging to the Soviet Union through each of these balance of forces ... is contributing to the various overt mediums defies accurate meas- shifting [of] the main bridgeheads of the urement. Moreover, thereisacovertdimension struggle into non-military spheres,” one of the to this process. The Scientific and Technical most important of which is Science and Directorate of the RGB engages in clandestine technology.47 operations abroad and coordinates the scien- Paradoxically, the very confidence with tific and technical espionage of all other RGB which the U.S.S.R. approaches the struggle divisions. This organization is also responsi- between capitalism and socialism is tempered ble for liaison with the State Science and by a continuing awareness of U.S. technolog- Technical Committee (GRNT), and ii deter- ical power. The future credibility of America’s mines the membership of Soviet scientific nuclear deterrent may well hinge on the exchanges with other nations. Western techni- operational deployment of such weapon cal data with respect to nuclear, space, and systems as Trident and the strategic cruise missile research, cybernetics, and industrial missile. This is one eventuality that the Soviet techniques remain an area of intense interest to Union undoubtedly wants to impede. Soviet intelligence collectors.45 To isolate, let alone study, Soviet percep- To those in the United States who remain tions is an exercise fraught with obstacles. skeptical about the aggregate benefit of However, encouragement is to be found in an increased cooperation with the Soviet Union, appraisal made more than a century ago in Leonid Ilich Brezhnev respondscurtly: “Those Rússia by a French traveler. the Marquis de who believe that we need contacts and Custine. exchanges in economic, scientific and techno- In a free society everythingcan be published—and logical spheres more than others need them are it is forgotten because it is all seen at a glance. Under absolutism every thing is hidden, but may mistaken."44 be divined; that is what makes it interesting.48 His wisdom remains an appropriate commen- tary on the Soviet Union today. N4a RXISM-LENINISM provides an ideological device by which the relative status Fort Belvoir, Virgínia U.S. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 73

iVotes Harvey, GourF, and Prokofieff, p XIII 1. U.S . Confins. House. Commiite* on Science and Astronáutica. Thr 23 Moscow Domesiic Service. 6 February 1971. trans in FBIS Soviet Union, Technology Ba lume Heanngs before lhe Subcommmee on International 7 February 1977. p. B 14 A. Tolkunov. "Clouds over the Ghcito," Pravda Cooperauon in Science and Space. 93d Cong.. Ist and 2d scssions. 4-6 December iMoscow), 7 January 1977. trans. in FBIS Soviet Union, 11 January 1977. pp 1973. no. 27. p. 2*. Hereaíter referred to as The Technology Balance J . Fred B-3 to B-6. "A Dangcious Course." TASS. 3 Decembei 1976, uans, in FBIS Bucy. International Technology Transfer—Chatrmans Ptenarv Stssion Soviet ('nion, 7 December 1976. p. B-l. Summary. National Securiiy AJJairs Conference. Washington. D.C.: National 24. M. A. Mil shieyn and L. S. Semcyko. "The United Statrs and lhe Defensc Univenity, 1976. p. 209. Queslion o( New Types of Mass Desiruciíon Weapons." USA: Economics, 2. V. L Lrmn. Polnoye Sobrantye Sochtnenit. 5lh edition. Moscow. 1965, vol. Politics, Ideotogy, no. 5, May 1976. p. 32. 53. pp. 163-64. tn Mose L, Harvey, Leon Goure, and Vladimir Prokofieff, 25 Ibid.. p. 27 Science an j Technology as an Instrumenl of Soviet Policy. Miami Center for 26. Ibid Advanced International Studics; 1972. p. 214. 27 Ibid . pp 29. 30. 3. Harvey. Goure. and Prokofieff. p. 105. 28 Ibid.. p. 33. 4. The Technology Balance, p. 25. 29. Harvey. Gouré. and Prokofieff. pp. 24-25 5. Thomas P k n d lc r. Soviet Science Policy o f the Seventies. DIA DST1830S- 30 "Soviei Defensc Minister Says Russians Can Match Any New U.S 160-76, U.S. Air Force Systems Command. 10 May 1976, p. 2 Weaponry." Aleu' York Times. 18 February 1977. p. 7. 6. Ibid.. p. 6. 31. V. M. Kulish. Military Force and International Relattons, Moscow. 1972. 7. Ibid.. p. 8. trans in JP R S 58947. 8 May 1973. p. 59 8. Ibid.. p. 3. 52 V. Goncharov. "Dangcious Idea." TASS. 20 May 1976. trans. in FBIS 9. Ibid.. p. 8. Soviet Union, 21 May 1976. p. B-3. 10. U.S Departfnent of Defensc. Program o/ Research, Developmenl, Tesl. 83 TASS Dispalch, 30 June 1977. trans. in FBIS Soviet Union, I July 1977. and Evaluation (RDTfcE) FY 1978. 18 January 1977. p. 11-25. p. B-l II General George S. Brown, US Mihtary Poslure for FY 1977. 20 January 34. O. Skalkin. "lniein.iiioii.il Wcck." Pravda. 3 July 1977. trans. in FBIS 1976. p 88. Soviet Union. 5 July 1977, p. B-l. 12. Marshal "Victor G. Kulikov. "Soviet MiUiary Science Today." 35. V. Kobysh. Dangcious Gam e." Uvesliya. 6 Ju ly 1977. trans. in FBIS Kommuntsl. Mav 1976. p. 43. Soviet Union, 8 July 1977. p. AA-3. 13. U.S. Department of Defensc. Annual Repor1 FY 1978 (Executive 36. W. M. G a r p c n t r r , p . 174,. Summaryi. 17 January 1977. p. 12. 37. "The Status and Prospects of Developmenl of Scicntific Information 14. Marxism-Lenintsm on War and Army. Moscow. 1972. trans. by lhe U.S. Sysicms." Herald of lhe USSR Academy of Sciences, March 1973. trans. in Air Force. Washington. D.C : Government Printing Office, p. 253. JP R S 59000. 14 May 1973. p. I. 15 Ibid.. p. 255. 38. Ibid.. pp. 2. 3 16. V A Baranyukand V. 1. Vorob'yev. Aulomated Control System for Sta/fs 39 W. M. Carpenter el al., Soviet Perceplion o/ thr United States, p. 174 and Mihtary Installations. Moscow Voyenirdat. sígncd to press 24 April 1974. 40. The Technology Balance, p. 27. p. 211. 41. Lawrence H. Thcriot. "U.S. Govemmenia! and Privatc Industry 17. General-Coloncl N. A. Lomov, editor. Scien/i/ic- Techntcal Progress and Cooperauon wilh the Soviet Union in lhe Fields of Scienceand Technology." lhe Revolution tn Military Af/airs. Moscow. 1973 in W. M. Carpcmcr et al., in Soviet Economy tn a New Perspective. U.S. Cong. Joint Economic Soviet Perceptions o/ the Upited States, Arlington: Stanford Research Commmee. Washington, D.C.: Governmem Printing Office, 1976. p. 740. Institute. 1975. p. 181. 42. The Technology Balance, p. 4. 18. U.S. Departmeni of Delense. RDT&E. FY 1978. p 11-2. 43. John Barron. KC,B (New York: Baniam Books. Inc.. 1974). p. 107 19. Coloncl V. M, Bondarenko. "Soviet Science and Strengthening lhe 44 A. Stroganov. “ To Whom Is Cooperauon More Advantageous?" Defenye of the Counlry." Communtsl o/ the Armed Forces, Septcmber 1974; Sociahst Industry. 5 Januarv 1977. trans. in FBIS Soviet Union. 12 January pp 23. 24. 1977. p. B-l 1. 20. S. Novoselov. "In the Nuclear Vaults of the Penlagon.” Mihtary 45. The Technology Balance, pp. 114-15. Knowledge. July 1976. p. 44. 46. G. A. Arbatov, "U .S. Foreign Policy and lhe Scicntific and Tcchnical 21. G. S. Khozin, Book Review." USA: Economtcs, Politics. Idcology, no. Revolution." USA: Economtcs. Pohtics. Ideotogy, no. 10. October 1973, uans 12. December 1975. p. 79. in JP R S 60504, 9 November 1973. p. 4 22 Yu P Davydov. V. V Zhurkin. and V. S, Rudnev. Nixon Doctnne, 47. Ibid.. p. II. Moscow Irdatel stvo Nauka. sígncd to press 18 Septcmber 1972. p. 120. 48. Michel Tatu. Power in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Press. 1969). p. 5. A PERSPECTIVE FOR HUMAN RELATIONS

CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT WlLLARD P. ANDERSON. USAF (Rei) S ênior Master Ser gea nt T homas E. Wolfe

Attaining true unity and harmony among all personnel throughout the Air Force, as each member must know, is a difficult task. Houiever, we must not curb our efforts in an attempt to realize this goal.

74 HE AIR FORCE needs strong, dedicated This article presents a perspective for leaders with the “super vision’' neces- positive human relations in the context of sary to see beyond day-to-day details of social changes and their implications for Air T the work process. People do not inherit suchForce supervisors. Many changes have been ability; they must develop it through experi- legislated, and others have come as the result of ence and conscious efíort. A primary element trends in the social order. For example, of “super vision” is the leader’s understand- legislation has outlawed discrimination and ing of human needs on the job and the suppression based on ethnic or cultural ability to relate this understanding to sub- differences, but Air Force supervisors must ordinates. The basic skills needed by an recognize social reality in that people can use effective leader are those that teach self- sublle forms of behavior to discriminate discipline, promote human dignity, and against other human beings. The authors of emphasize positive human relations. Perhaps this article offer some concepts based on their most important, the leader needs to recognize experiences in certain important areas that and concern himself with people as individu- supervisors can easily overlook or misunder- ais without making prejudgments based on stand in their relationships with people; obvious differences. This is not to imply that namely, pluralism, need frustration, and the differences are not important. Whai we are “preventive maintenance” in human rela- saying is that the leader needs to understand tions. They do not contend that their approach differences and similarities among people. is “ the way” to achieve positive relationships, One significam result of cultural, ethnic, but it is definitely “a way” that has proved and personal diversity is the tendency of people effective for them. to express personal prejudices and stereotypes One of the most significam social realities in their relationships with other people. today is the refusal or failure of people to Individuais develop prejudices on the basis of recognize interests, values, and beliefs com- past experience, lack of knowdedge or under- mon to all human beings. They focus instead standing, intimidation or fear, resentment, on differences that tend to divide rather than and incomplete or incorrect information. on common interests that tend to unite people. Many people recognize prejudice in the racial For instance, there are those who would argue or ethnic connotation, but prejudicealsoplays that there are three distinct races of people a significam role in other areas of human based on inherited physical characteristics: relationships. Supervisors and other leaders, Mongoloid, Negroid, and Caucasoid. Yet, for example, must realize that their personal there may frequently be more inherited prejudices can be significam influences in the physical differences within any of the three attitudes of their subordinates and that given “ races” than among the alleged three subordinates may use prejudice to stereotype races of people. There are others who think of other people. Supervisors reveal their personal race in nationalistic terms, such as the German prejudices when they express attitudes and race, the Jewish race, the Italian race, and so feelings about their superiors, stereotype forth. Today many scientists such as geneti- certain military ranks or career fields as cists, anthropologists, behaviorists, and sociol- inferior, degrade the educational accomplish- ogists can not agree on a common defini tion of ments of others, or stereotype people on the race; however, most do agree that biological basis of their cultural heritage or sex. Such differences between races do not in any way expressions reinforce the prejudices of subord- indicate superiority or inferiority within any inates and cause resentinent and conflict from race, regardless of the definition used. the offended or injured people. Nevertheless, many people still act and thihk 75 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW as if physical characteristics were indicators of arrived at his new base, he was assigned the superiority or inferiority. Supervisors must task of cleaning weapons in a back room rather recognize th is reality because people attach than instructing. When he asked why he was major significance to ethnic identity in their not teaching, his supervisors told him that he relationships. For example, one of the authors had a Spanish-sounding surname, and they has often been the victim of personal abuse and assumed that he could not speak English well ridicule because of bis heritage, but, in other enough to teach others. instances, he has received outstanding support In still another incident, some Air Force and encouragement from the most unlikely members taunted and tormented a young sources. woman in the Air Force because of her Apache Most people like to think that lavvs have heritage. Her peers ridiculed her off-duty dress eliminated all trace of discrimination and and her “ learned cultural behavior.” She had inequitable treatment, but, in reality, discrim- begun her Air Force career as a hard worker ination has merely taken a variety of new with a positive attitude, but, as a result of the forms. Often, people try to exercise specific conílict caused by her peers, her performance rights prescribed by law, but they are denied steadily declined until a concerned social these rights simply because they come from a actions officer became aware of her situation. different ethnic group. For example, in a large A leader must understand social reality as a Southern cily, an Air Force mernber sought to vital pari of the human relations concept if he join a locally advertised ballroom dance club. expects his subordinates to understand people He discovered, however, that club bylaws did from different cultural backgrounds. Both the not permit certain ethnic groups toattendclub leader and subordinates must recognize that all dances or to become members. In some people have the right to be proud of their communities, Air Force members are reluctant cultural background. Unfair or biased com- to invite members of different ethnic back- parisons of people from diverse cultures often grounds into their homes because of éommun- lead to discord because such comparisons ity or peer pressures. cause people eit her to become overlv concerned On many Indian reservations in the United with their own personal qualities and States, tribes observe religious customs that are achievements or to resort to expressions of traditional and sacred in their daily lives. bitterness, resentment, and animosity. Th is Recently, at a large Air Force base in the inevitablv opens the door to conílict with Southwest, security police arrested a young people from different cultural backgrounds Navajo airman who had been bom and reared and even with people of similar backgrounds. on a Navajo reservation. The airman was The right of the individual to express pride carrying a small bag of sacred corn that he used in his cultural heritage is very meaningful to in his daily prayers. Although he tried to most people, but th is right is no more explain the importance of the sacred corn bag, meaningful than the individuais duty to the police took it. They finally returned the respect the rights of others to express pride in bag to the airman. but only after the base social their cultural heritage. Recognition of this actions officer contacted the security police dual concept is frequently a difficult task in officer and pointed out its significance in supervisory relationships because leaders must Indian culture. earn the respect of their subordinates. An In another incidem, a technical sergeant had effective leader understands that respect for the completed the Air Force instuctor course in rights of others depends largely on the respect small arms and was assigned as a small ar ms that the individual receives from supervisors instructor at a major Air Force base. When he and peers. Obviously, in relationships with HUM AN RELATIONS 77

people of diverse cultural backgrounds, a patterns distinguish the Balinese culture from leader must be a model of open and unbiased other cultures. behavior worthy of emulation by his subord- By comrast, lhe Sioux Indians nurse their inates. One can never assume that problems babies for three or more years and rarely permit will resolve themselves because the priorities of them to cry from hunger or other needs. Sioux human needs differ greatly from time to time. parents feel that crying makes fearful children and poor adult hunters. As the infants grow older, the parents encourage frustration and anger because they believe that habitual PEOPLE frequently focus their outbursts of anger make their children strong attention on cultural differences. This tendency and brave. Traditionally, Sioux adults have may indicate either deliberate or inadvertent been perceived as aggressive, hostile to efforts to stereotype people as undesirable or outsiders, and quarrelsomeamong themselves. inferior. Of course, people of various cultures Social sciemists State that rnany of the may differ considerably in their typical differences in human personality, behavior, motivations and reactions to their environ- and achievement are learned eniirely from ment, but cultural differences are not indicators cultural influences; such differences are rooted of inferiority, low morais, or social degrada- in cultural tradition, opportunity, and reward tion. Admittedly, majority members of any and not in heredity. Numerous Air Force social group may not always approve the members of all cultures have experienced the behavior of other members. But people differ trauma that results from a lack of opportunity primarily from one another because of what and appropriate rewards. These experiences they learn in their formative years. That is. are criticai elements of their learning patterns their cultural environment determines the in the military culture, and they compound the interests, attitudes. values, and beliefs that they tasks of Air Force leaders at all leveis of develop in relation to other people. command. Of course, opportunities are For example, significam characteristics of available in the Air Force, but leaders should the Balinese people of Indonésia are their help open doors to opportunity. Although gentle, relaxed, and unaggressive social everyone recognizes that the door of opportun- relationships. These people passively conform ity is marked push, some people do not know to the demands of tradition and show little how to open the door, or their leaders may even inclination to compele with other people for block the way to the door. Nor are these pre-eminence or mastery. These are cultural experiences common only to minorities within traits developed by tradition. Balinese parents the Air Force. and other family members deliberatelv tease Leaders confront still another social reality infants and small children to outbursts of love when they become mediators in instances of and anger and then ignore them when they perceived discrimination. Recently enacted become emotionally aroused. Early in their social changes and learned behavior based on lives, children learn not to expect responses to past cultural practices often cause people to embraces or temper tantrums, and they become misinterpret the attitudes, actions, and re- adults with no strong emotional responses to sponses of others. Consequently, a person may other people. If a Balinese child wanders away perceive discrimination when another person from his village area, emotionally distraught is not aware that he or she is discriminating. parents do not chase after him. Any person Perceived discrimination may not always be who finds the child leads him calmy back to his based on cultural factors; it may be perceived family. These and numerous other learning between rated vs. nonrated officers, noncom- 78 AIR UN1VERS1TY REV1EW missioned officers vs. commissioned officers, therefore, every citizen is free to give complete male vs. female, or married personnel vs. single allegiance to the Swiss nation. personnel. Nevertheless, a person íeels the Major differences between American society same vvhether the discrimination is real or and Swiss society are the attitudes, beliefs, and imagined. Leaders must recognize that all feelings of diverse cultural groups. In a large victims of discrimination respond in similar pluralistic society, such as that of the United behavior patterns. These patterns of behavior States, various cultural groups often engage in do not indicate that people are immature or struggles for influence, but these struggles do that they are rocking the boat or fighting the not reflect disloyalty to a common national system. They merely offer a leader another government. National patriotism and loyalty opportunily to improve relations with his to a common government do not require subordinates. cultural uniformity. As has been proved in Switzerland and elsewhere, a country can tolerate differences in ethnic origins, national- I OR YEARS, the dominant culture in ity, language, religion, and customs and still American society sought to make “culturally live under a common government. different" minorities more “American” in Numerous groups in the United States their values, beliefs, and attitudes. This accept the idea of cultural pluralism, but represents the traditional melting pot concept Amèrican Indians and Mexican Americans applied by the dominant culture to perpetuate (descendants of the earliest Mexican settlers in its own values and beliefs. To become “ true” the Southwest) have expressed the strongest Americans under this concept, minority desire to retain their cultural independence. groups were expected to abandon their Their espousal of the idea may stem from the cultural values and adopt the values and beliefs fact that their cultures predate the Anglo- of the dominant cultural group. In recent Saxon culture in America, and they have years, however, minority cultures have de- maintained a degree of cultural autonomy manded recognition of their rights to preserve despite considerable pressure. Many Ameri- and perpetuate their traditional values, in- cans derive a great deal of meaning from such terests, and beliefs. These demands have led to holidays as Thanksgiving, Columbus Day, a new concept of social accommodation YVashington’s Birthday, and St. Patrick’s Day, known as cultural pluralism. Under this but people of minority cultures may not concept, various minority groups maintain observe these holidays with the same feelings their cultural differences and traditions and as other Americans. Members of various still cooperate as relative equals in the American Indian tribes, for example, frequent- economic, political, and social life of the ly derive more significam meaning from their dominant social group. holy days and spiritual ceremonies (the Bear Switzerland provides a good example of Dance of the Utes, the Green Corn Festival of cultural pluralism in practice. The Swiss the Senecas, the Snake Dance of the Hopis). people maintain a high degree of national Although some of the cultural values, beliefs, unity although they have no national and interests of black Americans, Hispanic language and are divided in their religious Americans, American Indians, and other beliefs. Protestants and Catholics speak minority groups differ in many respects from German, French, and Italian and live in peace those of the dominant cultural group, people under the same government. Swiss cilizens do with diverse cultural backgrounds maintain not feel threatened by other citizens becauseof their national pride as citizens of the United differences in ethnic or religious backgrounds; States. The military traditions of these and HUM AN RELATIONS 79

other groups have always reflected genuine their relationships with subordinates, super- American patriotism in spite of cultural visors should realize that people behave in differences. much the same manner as teakettles. They Understanding the concept of cultural either need safety valves (alternate channels) to pluralism and accepting cultural differences vent their frustrations when pressure begins to are important elements of the “super vision’ increase or less heat when the water boils. needed by modern Air Force leaders. Cultural People who feel good about themselves, pluralism is a significam characteristic of the their jobs, and their relationships with others Air Force environment. Frequently, however, experience few, if any, frustrations. Unfortu- individuais or groups are denied the right to nately, all human beings, at one time or express their cultural identity, or their peers another, face personal difficulties or experience and supervisors make them feel inferior frustrations in their relationships with others. because of different behavior and learning At such times, individuais may deviate from patterns based on cultural differences. These their normal behavior patterns, and group be- people tend to become frustrated and resentful havior may deteriorate unless safety valves are over their perceived or real inability to gain available. When supervisors understand their acceptance, understanding, or recognition people and show a genuine interest in them, from other Air Force members. In most they recognize the boiling signs and apply the instances, individuais can cope with frustra- "super vision” that will prevent undesirable tions and injured feelings if they can release or disruptive behavior. Understanding human their emotions through alternate channels. behavior does not imply approval of unaccept- These channels may be a supervisor who can able behavior, but it does provide insights into listen and understand, a concerned and the causes and cures for such behavior. Key compassionate friend, or some activity that elements of this understanding are respect for dissipates excess energy. human dignity and the individual’s right to Considered in this context, a human being express pride in his cultural heritage. and his behavior can be compared to a teakettle All Air Force members recognize the full of water. If no heat is applied, the teakettle importance of preventive maintenance on rests calmly and causes no concern. When heat aircraft, in their homes, in shops, and warms the water, the kettle will remain elsewhere, but all too often supervisors and relatively calm unless the water becomes too other leaders overlookor forget the importance hot. But, if the water reaches the boiling point, of preventive maintenance in their relations the kettle will let off excess steam (frustration) with people. Just as the pilot or the mechanic through a safety valve (alternate channel). The knows and respects his aircraft, a supervisor valve even whistles to attract attention. should know and respect his people, their However, if the safety valve fails to open and problems, their frustrations, and their needs prevents the escape of excess steam, the kettle and should convey concern for them in person- will continue to boil and finally overreact. If to-person Communications. Positive interest someone recognizes the problem and turns off in people and genuine recognition of their the heat, the kettle will cool and beready again efforts are primary obligations of effective to perform its function. On the other hand, leaders. Recognizing, understanding, and continued heat will cause internai pressure to accepting human differences not only make buildup until the kettle explodes. If the kettle the supervisor’s task easier but also ensure has been overused, dropped, or otherwise more efficient accomplishment of the Air abused, it probably will have a weak spot, and Force’s mission. this will be the point at which it explodes. In Positive supervisory action produces posi- 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW tive human relations, and positive action • Practice self-discipline and assist begins with positive thought along the others in achieving self-discipline. following lines. • Examine personal motives in efforts • Every person is an individual with to develop better self-understanding. his own unique personality and character traits. • All human beings have commoti No INDIVIDUAL or group of individuais can feelings, aspirations, and altitudes. claim a monopoly on personal dignity and • All human beings have a right to be feelings. The red man’s injuries are just as proud of their cultural heritage. deep, the yellow man’s fears are just as real, the • Cultural differences are real, but they black man’s frustrations are just as great, and are not the sole determinam of behavior. the white man’s sadness just as strong as those • All members of the U.S. Air Force of any other human being. Contentment and serenity are not rationed by color, dispersed by want a responsible military society. race, divided by sex, or determined by position. • Every person. to some degree, is a part All people share the spectrum of human needs. of the problem. People are similar, and they are also quite • Openness and honesty are healthy different. But are they so different that they attributes. cannot see their similarities? Recognition of common bonds and emphasis on similarities The next step is to apply specific behavior that can only lead to greater unity and harmony. will facilitate positive relationships: This challenge obviously requires “super • Listen without interrupting. vision" from outstanding leaders throughout • Work through difficult confronta- the Air Force. tions. Air Force Leadership and • Take a risk—demonstrate an interest Management Development Center in the perceptions of others. Air University A RESEARCH NOTE DODJs budget requests

and appropriations Fir st Lieu t en a n t Andrew J. Sherbo. J r .

he MOST VISIBLE aspect of the become almost synonymous. Why, one may entire federal budgetary process is the question, is it DOD's budget that is under such submission of the President’s budget to intense annual political scrutiny on Capitol T Congress each year in January. For fiscal yearHill? 1979, the Presidem submitted a total federal Undoubtedly, general altitudes and opin- budget request of approximately $500 billion; ions of the American taxpayer concerning the approximately $115 billion or 23 percent of military have an influence on the annual thís total is designated as the budget of the congressional debates about the federal budget. Department of Defense (DOD). Reducing the However, public opinion on reducing the total budget is always a strong objective of both the federal budget and DOD s portion in particu- VVhite House and Congress. During the past lar may be obscured by an important decade, the objectives of reducing federal intervening variable that I believe to be of spending by reducing DOD’s budget have utmost significance.

81 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

I suggesi that lhe federal budget can be uncontrollable item within that budgetary effectively reduced only in certain areas process is pension funding for retired military because many of our federal expenditures are personnel. These payments are of a recurring of such an uncontrollable or sunk-cost nature and uncontrollable nature. In the last six years thai congressional reduciion of the budget the administrations’ requests for pension becomes an extremely arduous task.1 To funding for retired military personnel has elaborate further, one must understand what is differed from the final congressional appropri- meam by "controllability” and "uncontrolla- ation only once, and even then it was by bility” of federal expenditures. one-half of one percent. Thus, DOD’s budget Not all spending, whether at the federal, for the Annual Defense Appropriation Act is State, or local leveis, is under the absolute and predominantly controllable, and such appro- unchallenged control of the executive and priations as military personnel (i.e., pay raises, legislative branches of govemment. Many benefits, etc.), operations and maintenance, public seeior programs are “ built-in” or sunk procurement, and research and development costs when a particular budget is prepared in are subject to debate, criticism, and, some- the executive branch and subsequently debated times, reduction by Congress. and voted on by the legislative branch. These An itemization of defense spending and programs generate “uncontrollable” expendi- social (non-DOD) spending requests indicates tures, which are appropriated with relatively significam differences in the percentages of little debate or discussion. They can best be uncontrollable requests in the total federal considered as recurring expenditures once the budget. (See Table I.) Some astonishing itiitial commitment to the program is percentage differences exist between defense established. Good examples of uncontrollable and social spending requests. Pension pay- programs are the transfer payments for Social ments for retired military personnel comprise Security and Medicare and the many public DOD's entire uncontrollable request. On the assistance programs throughout the federal other hand, in the social spending area Social structure. The Department of theTreasury has Security payments, Medicare, public assistance a very large annual appropriation considered programs, interest funding for the national uncontrollable because it pays interest on the debt. etc., constitute a huge uncontrollable national debt. portion totaling over 80 percent of such social In examining the budget of the Department spending requests in FY 1974. of Defense, one observes that the only Such data clearly indicate why DODs

fiscal % social spending % defense s Table I. Teu entages of federal budget year requests uncontrollable requests unc< requests that are considered uncon 1965 58.7 2.8 trollable. EY I96i through FY 19742 1966 58.9 3.1 1967 62.6 3.4 1968 63.5 3.7 1969 71.0 4.0 1970 74.1 4.3 1971 69.7 4.7 1972 71.1 5.1 1973 75.9 5.5 1974 804 6.1 IN MY OPINION 83

budgei always comes under intense scruiiny reduction in that they are protected by the and debate each year. In an era of budget growing percentage of uncontrollable budget conservatism the extremely high comrollabil- requests. Theendresult isan uncertain climate ity of the administration’s DOD request is for DOD’s annual budgei. conducive to reduction by Congress. From the late 1950s through the mid-1960s, Congress either appropriated to DOD more than the T here SEEM to be no easy Solutions as to what administration request or very close to that DOD might do to alleviate this inherent figure. However, beginning in FY 1968 and problem. The very nature of defense expendi- continuing through FY 1976, Congress has tures subjects them to a high degree of appropriated much less to DOD than the controllability by Congress. The controversy Presidem originally requested. For FY 1976, over the B-l bomber was an excelleni example Congress cut these requests for DOD by l'/i as well as the Navy’s Trident missile percent. Yet congressional social spending submarine program and the Army’s Patriot, appropriations were 13 percent greater than Stinger, and Roland missile requests for FY the Presidem had requested. 1978. An acute awareness on the part of the Moreover, the public attitude toward na- members of Congress and the armed forces, tional security is another variable that greatly and especially the public, of this importam affects the size of DOD’s budget. VVhen public variable would aid in understanding the opinion is unfavorable, DOD s budget is quite annual relationship of the defense budget to vulnerable to reduction because of its control- the total federal governmem request. lable nature. Social spending requests, though, are much less subject to criiicism and Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany

No» this subject was prepared by John R Ciist in "Mandatory Ex|x’ndituresand the 1 tconorniM Murray Wirdrnbaum has disctmcd (his arca rxirnsivcly in Dcímsr Scctor: Thcory of Rudgcian Inrrcmentalism." Sa%r Profrxuonal On ihr tlln Iivmrssof (aingir-ssiun.il (ainirolof ihr Publu Pune." National Papns m American Politics, vai. 2. Series (M-020(Beverly Mills .md London: Tax Journal. Drcrmbrr 1965. pp. 370-74 and "Inslilutional Ohslades Io Sagc Publications, 1974). pp. 5-11. RrallocanngGovrrnmmi Expcndiiurcs." in Robrrl H. Havrrman and Julius 2. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Re|x>rts; Facis cr Fi^urr.% on Margolis. rdilors. Publir Expm dilurrs and Pcdiry Analynn (Chitagu: Government Finance. I8th Biennial Edilion (New York: lax Foundation. Markham Publishing Companv. 1970). pp 232—15. Alv». an c x t r llr m siudy ol Inc., 1975). p. 88; ser also Gist. pp. 5-11. There is a difference between leadership and management. The leader and the men who /TH > books follow him represent one of the oldest, most natural and most effective of all human relationships. The manager and those he manages are a later product with neither so romantic nor so inspiring a history. . . . MÍSL Managers are necessary, leaders are essential.

F iel d M arshalS ir W il l ia m S lim Australian Army Journal, November 1957

A myth has been conceived and is growing that management and command are synonymous. They are not.

G ener a l L uciusD. C lay, USAF Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command, July 1975

institutions emphasize management to the exclusion of leadership. The proliferation of management techniques in the business world and the increasing demands made on the military profession for management expertise are responsible for the confusion in the minds THE ART OF LEADERSHIP of many young officers about to embark on their chosen careers. The art of leadership cannot be taught, but S qi adrox Lea der J. D. B rett, RAF the realities oi leadership become increasinglv < lear after studying some of the Great Captains of retem limes, lhe quantity of recently published military biography suggests that leadership still has a fascination both for the general public as well as for the military HE MOST remarkable feature of these profession. two quotations is their similarity, not the Field Marshal Sir Michael Carver, recently T obvious difference in time and experienceof theChief of Defence Staff in Britain (the authors. The concern that leadership and equivalem of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs management should be seen in their correct of Staff in the U.S.), has edited an impressive places has been a recurring but muted theme collection of biographical sketches of military for the past twenty years, as it has appeared that commanders of the twentieth century in his more and more of our professional military book The War Lords.t Twentieth century

tField Marshal Sir Michael Carver, editor, The War Lords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976, $17.95), 624 pages.

84 BOOKSAND IDEAS 85

commanders have been coniinually placed on being able to identify easily with his combat the horns of a dilemma—the generally crews, and he was a pragmatist in his belief in conservative nature of the military profession, air power. Consequently, he achieved much especially in time of peace, faced with the more. He did not prevail in the transportation necessity to adapt to the most rapid technolog- vs. oil debate prior to Overlord, yet he still ical developments in warfare of any century. retained the confidence and respect of Although mistakes were clearly made, it may Eisenhower, Tedder, and Portal. This portrait be easy to underestimate their actual achieve- shows the debt owed to Spaatz and places him ments. In his introduction, Sir Michael is at alongside the other great American command- pains to suggest that the commanders of the ers in this volume—MacArthur, Eisenhower, Second World War achieved much more than and Nimitz. their predecessors, particularly in economy of The Royal Air Force’s most private and effort. sensitive commander never became Chief of The author's selection criteria were that the Air Staff, but as Commander-in-Chief of man should have commanded a considerable Fighter Command he won the Battleof Britain force (land, sea, or air) in an important in 1940. Hugh Dowding’s real achievement, as campaign and that as many different cam- Gavin Lyall shows clearly, was more in the paigns of the two world wars were covered. building of the system of command and Excluded, therefore, are such U.S. command- control from the radar stations to the ers as Marshall, King, and Arnold as well as operational airfields than in dynamic leader- Alanbrooke and Portal of Britain. The criteria ship once the battle had begun. Yet that was a have also excluded any coverage of unconven- supreme achievement against the lack of time, tional or guerrilla warfare, either in the two resources, and a sense of urgency from above world wars or, more important, since. The that characterized British military policy in the contributions to both military leadership and 1930s. At the time of Munich, there were only warfare of the twentieth century of Lawrence, five radar stations and three squadrons of Tito, Mao Tse-tung, and Giap must surely Hurricanes. Once the Battle of Britain was seen have been worthy of inclusion in such a to have been decisive, the controversy began, collection, and their exclusion could be and has continued, over the shabby treatment considered a weakness. of Dowding by Churchill; relieved of com- There will be some disappointment that mand, Dowding was never given another only five airmen are included: four British— operational duty, nor was he accorded the Trenchard, Dowding, Harris, and Tedder; and highest rank of the RAF. Dowding himself one American—Spaatz. “Tooey” Spaatz was a remained outside the arguments. Like Spaatz, most private person who shunned personal he never wrote an autobiography and left it to publicity to such an extent that he is still others to make a fuss. largely unknown not only to the American Robert Wright, personal assistant to public but also to the heirs of the tradition he Dowding for a short time during the Battle of did so much to shape. Present-day cadets at the Britain, made the most fuss in his book, The USAF Academy can talk endlessly of Mitchell, Man Who Won the Battle of Britain.f It was Doolittle, and Chennault but know relatively published just a year after the film Battle of little of Spaatz. Unlike Harris at RAF Bomber Britain had fanned the flames of argument Command, Spaatz had the common touch of with Laurence Oüvier’s impressive portrayal

f Robert Wright, The Man Who Won the Battle of Britain (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1969, $6.95), 291 pages. 86 AIR VN1VERS1TY REVIEW of Dowding’s strength of character. Based on basic to his profession was “ the smell of private papers, this book is a personal siory soldiers’ feet.” and defense by VVright of his former Slim restored the morale of the battered commander; it is the best portrayal of the man British forces in Burma by proving that the himself. Much has been writtenelsewhere, and jungle was neutral and that the Japanese again here, of the controversy that arose soldier could be defeated. He was quick to between Dowding’s two sênior commanders, grasp that air supply could nullify the Park and Leigh-Mallory, over the correct Japanese tactics of infiltration and penetration employment of fighter squadrons during the behind lines of communication, but above all battle. Park, often heavily outnumbered in the he realized that no jungle battle could be won most vulnerable southeast of England, put his without physical and mental robustness and squadrons into the air to disrupt the Luftwaffe improvisation on the part of the commander, as best they could and so prevent targets from and confidence and high morale from the being bombed. Leigh-Mallory, with more soldier. Evans, with firsthand experience of lime, in the group to the north of Park, what this meant, shows this side of Slim most preferred to build up a strong force which clearly. Slim showed a rare moment of pure could deliver a decisive blow—as Bader’s anger at the treatment given his forces by the "Duxford VVing” did—but often after the staff in índia after their 1000-mile retreat. He Luftwaffe had bombed. YVhile the merits of the could accept shortages of food and medicai respective cases will continue to be debated, supplies but not the lack of consideration. what is surely not in doubt is that Dowding Such moments re-emphasized to him that failed to appreciate what was happening until simple maxim that the staff are the servants, late in the battle and even then failed to act not the masters, of fighting troops. It was Slim decisively. Dowding thought Park was right, who remained implacable towards the Japan- that loyalty to a sênior commander was to be ese when the treatment of prisoners of war taken for granted, but his sensitivity in this became known and he who ignored Mac- case nearly had grave consequences. Arthur's ruling that the surrender of swords Few wartime reputations have been en- was an archaic practice by ordering all hanced by subsequent investigation of the Japanese officers in his area of command to records; manv have been tarnished. Of those surrender their swords to British officers. He whose reputations remain intact, and, if was determined that no legend of an anything, have grown, is Field Marshal Sir unconquered army should flourish in Japan as YVilliam Slim. Both the portrait in The War it had in Germany after the First World War. Lords by General Geoffrey Evans (a divisional Like Bradley, Slim’s integrity and sense of commander under Slim) and Ronald Lewin’s justice made him the man everyone—soldiers official long biography, Slim: The Standard to commander in chief—trusted. “ Uncle Bill* Rearer,f show why. Put simply, in Lewin’s was every inch the “ soldiers’ general.” words, it is because “his military distinction A collection of biographical sketches may was founded on his humanity.” No British sometimes be the lazy man’s approach to an general had the knack of being so adored by his understanding of military history. Given troops—not in the Montgomery imageofcap quality of authorship and care in selection, badges and pep talks, but for thesimplefeeling such collections may be useful in showing a of trust he inspired because he understood how broad sweep in the development of the art of

fRonald Lewin, Slim: The Standard Bearer (Hamden, Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, 1976, $16.00), 350 pages. BOOKSAND IDEAS 87

leadership over a period of time. Oliver of the Japanese fleets at Midway and Leyte \Varner‘s Command al Seat fits thal descrip- Gulf. tion. From the great Lord Hawke, who established English sea power in the eight- eenth century. through Nelson’s Colling* Two GENERAL conclusions seem clear from wood. to Farragut "damning lhe torpedoes,” looking at these military leaders of the and on to Nimitz, Warner traverses the age of twentieth century. First, the diversity of the sail and steam. What emerges is that men is so obvious, not just in nationality or distinguishing mark of all naval commanders, whether they commanded land, sea, or air not shared by their equals in land or air forces, but across lhe entire spectrum of operations, that they stand the same chance of background, intellect, training, and experi- death or capture as the most junior and ence, which can be documented, as well as inexperienced seaman under their command. integrity, loyalty, honesty, and vision, which The “quality of command,” as the author cannot. Clearly there is no set pattern for describes it, is unique in both sail and steam. successful leadership in twentieth century The dominant commander is very clearly warfare, no model which will guarantee Nimitz—“the greatest commander of them success. No greater contrast can be seen than all” —whose Pacific Fleet was the most between the two most successful Allied powerful naval force ever assembled for generais of the Second World War in the arena combat. Nimitz could be bold and imaginative of coalition warfare: Eisenhower, thediffident in the seafaring tradition of Nelson when he Midwest farm boy who went to West Point to directly assaulted the central island of the get a free education, and Alexander, heir of an Marshalls while all his staff were urging aristocratic feudal tradition, whose impeccable caution. He was also modest and compassion- manners complemented his diplomatic skill. ate in blaming no one when he took command Second, all these men commanded large forces of the Pacific Fleet just 24 days after Pearl demanding control of complex logistics, Harbor. He could be tough and determined in planning staffs, and personnel management getting the best out of his two contrasting on a scale unknown to a civilian organization. subordinates, Halsey and Spruance, in a style Management to them was absolutely necessary similar to that used by Eisenhower to bring the as a prerequisite for combat leadership, but it best out of Patton and Bradley. In retirement, was only a prerequisite. They had an instinct he was determined that there should be no for command that has no rules. They practiced repeat of the acrimony between leaders that an art that is essential and which our had marked the aftermath of previous wars, profession can ignore only at its peril. and this seemingly modest achievemeni may eventually be seen as comparable to his defeats United States Air Force Academy

fOliver Warner, Command at Sea (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976, S8.95), 196 pages. POTPOURRI

The Second World War: An Illustrated History by British surface forces in Westen Europe in 1944-45 A. J. P. Taylor. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, and theCombined Bomber Offensive, istodoagreat 1975, 234 pages. $17.50. injustice. The Sov iet Union may deserve the lion's Year afier year we Americans are barraged with share of the credit for defeating the Nazis, but to say new books on World War II. Some ireai specific that “Great Britain and the United States had battles or operations. such as the Allied parachute acquired an ally who would win the war against assault at Arnhem, whileothersconsume thousands Germany for lhem" is to distort the truth. of pages rehashing the military action that took The Second World War does not slight the plate around the world from 1939 through 1945. A. strategic bombing campaign against Germany, for J. P. Taylors The Second World War does not fit Taylor provides an interesting, although brief, either mold. Instead, it is the first short survey of analysis of its effectiveness. He classifies lhe Royal note since Gordon Wrights The Ordeal of Total Air Force’s area bombing slrategv as worse than useless throughout the war and explains that once liar, 1939-1945, to cover the six-year conflict in both its military and political aspects. the U.S. forces received fighter escorts and began bombarding German synthetic oil plants in 1944 Taylor. one of today’s best known and most “ lhe effect wasdevastating.” Corning at a time when respected diplomatic-military historians, is a man the Nazis were producing large quantities of jet of penetrating insight. Employing a smooth, fighters and snorkel submarines, the American flowing writing style, he examines nearly every precision bombing efforts were “decisive," accord- aspect of the war—from causes, strategy, and ing to Taylor, for lhey destroyed the lifeblood of the economic policy to leadership, operations, and enemy’s war machine. political considerations—offering judgments on Many American readers may find The Second events as he goes. Two major conclusions stand out World War excessively complimentary to lhe Soviet throughout the book: Hitler, Stalin, Ghurchill. and Union in both its appraisal of the Soviets’ Roosevelt shaped and directed the course of the war, contribution to victory and their lack of responsibil- and Rússia deserves credit for defeating Germany. ity for the emergence of the Cold War; yet this new One can hardly contest TayIor's first contention, volume, replete with numerous excellent pictures, is but he goes too far with his second. Certainly, the undoubtedly the best brief survey and analysis of Soviet Union faced the overwhelming majority of World War II. If one wants to know about such German divisions and did far more to destroy the diverse subjects as the Russian method of warfare, enemy's army than her two Western Al lies. Taylor is Germanv’s wartime economic and occupation also essentially correct when he writes that, due to policies, or why British and Americans invaded circumstances, Britain and the United States were North África in late 1942, hewill find theanswersin fighting Italy throughout much of the European The Second World War. Do not look for much on war while Rússia, alone, was fighting Germany. the Pacific Theater in this British writer's work and But he errs by continually underplaying the expect an occasional error in judgment as Iaylor Western Allies’ contribution to Nazi defeat. By analyzes the war. But, also. expect some keen Taylor’s own count, Anglo-American operations or insights into the conflict and excellent coverage of threats of invasion were tying down 112 German nearly all of its diverse aspects. for they are both pari divisions by early 1944, at a time when the German of this exceptional volume. army needed as many men as possibleon the Eastern Front. To dismiss this fact, as well as the Major John F. Shiner. USAF contributions to ultimate victory made by U.S.- Department of History. L’SAF Academy

88 BOOKS AND IDEAS 89

Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat by Albert operating today. YVith judicious reading, one can Parry- New York: Vanguard, 1976. 624 pages. gain a better understanding of the many forms of $15.00. terrorism that threaten our safety and security. Captain Earl H. Tilford, Jr., USAF On 4July 1976, an elite Israeli army unit applieda Office of Air Force History military solution to a lerrorist situation when they freed 103 hostages ai the Entebbe airport outside kampala, Uganda. Today s military oííicer must understand terrorism as a type oí military Energy and Conflict: The Life and Times of Edward contingency he may well have to face. Teller by Stanley Blumberg and Gwinn Owens. Dr. Albert Parry's book traces the employment of New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1976, 460 pages, terror from French revolutionaries to Palestinian $9.95. guerrillas. Parry’s detailed knowledge of both Red and White terror (he is a White partisan) in the Edward Teller has sought relentlessly to protect Russian Civil War (1918-1921) will benefit scholars, with atomic weaponry the America that gave him while his in-depth investigation of modem refuge. As a Jew, he had fled from persecution by the terrorism—that used by the YVeather Force Under- Fascists and Communists who had, in turn, ground (YVeathermen) in the United States and engulfed his native Hungary with hate and Palestinian terrorists abroad—provides a timely genocide. The decades-long gulf between J. Robert reference for military people involved in intelli- Oppenheimer (who headed the famous Los Alamos gence and security. atom bomb laboratories) and Teller, mainly over The comprehensive nature of this lengthy book is the reluctance of Oppenheimer to vigorously a significam fault. In his attempt to cover too much, pursue the "super” or thermonuclear weapon, is Parry failed to distinguish adequately between another of the conflicts pervading the book. terror and violence. YVithout a workable definition Although sometimes dealing with seemingly of "terror” or “ terrorism," Parry rambled from contradictory material, the authors manage to Hitler's policy of exterminating Jews to Red retain balance and objectivity. Their descriptions Chinese purges, then on to the Tupamaros of of the nighttime-knock-on-the-door terrors that the Uruguay and the Black Panthers of the United Teller family endured in Budapest at the hands of States. The author should have described the the Nazis, and later the Communists, make the defining characteristics of “ terror” that set it apart reader’s blood boil. But these are matched by not from the larger and more inclusive category of dissimilar outrages visited on the Tellers in “ violence." With terrorism indistinguishable from Califórnia in the 1970s by an organization called the violence, the machinations of the Joint Strategic Red Family, among whose founders was Thomas Target Planning Staff become no less reprehensible Hayden, husband of political activist Jane Fonda. than the plottings of Dr. George Habash and his This group and others contrived a war crimes Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. tribunal, held a mass meetingon the University of Addiiionally, in his fast-paced accounting of Califórnia Berkeley campus, and roused the inhumane and grotesque acts, Parry often lapses emotions of a student-faculty group on trumped up into needlessly detailed descriptions of torture charges of Teller's alleged war crimes. The meeting techniques. Parry ’s personal aversion to terrorism as degenerated into a mob, shouting "Get Teller. Burn practiced today obscures the objectivity that his house. KilI him." They headed for the Teller enhances his historical accounts of terror in the home, occupied by the scientist, his wife, and two French Revolution, the nineteenth-century Russian children. A concerned friend warned Teller, who revolutionary movement, and even Stalin's bloody called the police. Held at bay by a riot squad, the reign. mob spent its energies burning Teller in effigy. The Air Force officers engaged in current intelligence, Tellers have remained in their tree-shaded home, counterintelligence, or security should read this but it is now guarded by a high chain link fence, an book, despite its flaws. It provides a useful reference alarm system, and a huge dog. to many obscure terrorist and guerrilla groups These chronicles of his problems only serve to 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW complete the authors' picture of the towering Teller badness and blaming the largest oil corporations for personality. Teller had the satisfaction of pushing much of today’s energy crisis. Presidem Carter's the nuclear arming of the U.S. before potential energy speech before Congress in April 1977drew its adversaries could develop the capability. But he largest applause from a familiar charge: the later suffered the chagrin of seeing the earlier- Petroleum industry needs more competition. To than predicted detonation of a Soviet atomic weapon that end, lhe so-called Bayh bill (S. 2387) aimed to in 1949. Even more disturbing, according to the break up the nation’s largest oil companies with the authors, was the only recently revealed 1953 assumption that lower petroleum prices would explosion by the Soviets of a deliverable hydrogen follow. This line of reasoning may be good politics, bomb using lithium ahead of the U.S. They tell that but it is poor economics. it was only later, on 1 March 1954 at Bikini atoll, The National Sirategy Information Center has that the U.S. caught up with the Russians in produced this very useful book of seven essays that thermonuclear weaponry “ by exploding a deliver- address two problems: the need for breaking up able fusion bomb using lithium deuteride." large oil companies and the ramifications of On his retirement from the Lawrence Livermore divestiture, particularly as it relates to national Laboratory on 16 June 1975, Edward Teller madea security. The authors contend that vertical divesti- farewell speech. Over the years, he had been accused ture would neither affect the current market of crying “wolf" in his many warnings to thepeople structure of international oil nor weaken the Saudi of the U.S. In his valedictory, Teller stated: Arabian-based cartel. Moreover, such action would hinder development of new oil supplies and fail to I did not cry “wolf” too often. I did not say the lower petroleum prices for U.S. consumers. Russians are ahead of us. I said the Russians are Contrary to popular belief, they argue, corporate going to be ahead of us. And now they are. They profits in petroleum are comparable to those of are very cautious. They are very conservative, and other large industries, and current figures show that they know that five years from now they will be the oil industry has become more competitive in much farther ahead of us. This is the situation in recent years, not less. which the country finds itself__ The Russians are The authors argue convincingly that OPEC ahead of us and they are going to stay ahead of us (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) for years to come. This means danger. This means interests and those of the large oil companies arenot hardship. always identical. The 1973 embargo, for example, The book is a sometimes-tangled chronicle of forced the oil companies to redirect exploration and fission and fusion weapons and of one who development funds away from the Middle East, contributed so much to their development. It certainly an undesirable move for the Arab provides perspective and dimension regarding the producers. The embargo’s severity was reduced by personal sacrifices necessary to persevere for one’s the large oil companies when they deliberately beliefs. Edward Teller suffered personally at the shifted petroleum supplies to ensure that shortages hands of the totalitarians, as have others such as fell moreequally on all nations. Smallercompanies, Solzhenitsyn, and their warnings on military regardless of number, could not offer this capability. preparedness deserve special attention. In short, critics who consider the interests of OPEC and large companies identical oversimplify the Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Hansen, USAF (Ret) situation. PraUvüle, Alabama The authors provide fewer concrete answers concerning the impact of divestiture. Domestically, battles would follow over the reassignment of assets Oil, Divestiture, and National Security edited by pledged against corporate indebtedness, and re- Frank N. Trager. New York: Crane, Russak, 1977, alignment could take twenty years to complete. x + 130 pages, $4.95. Meanwhile, confusion and instability would adversely affect oil production and distribution, Many Americans and U.S. congressmen betray making the United States increasingly dependem their populist heritage by equating bigness with on Middle East oil. But other influences on national BOOKS AND IDEAS 91

security are less clear. Although the United States Of particular merit is lhe discussion of the soon will be imporiing half its oil needs. the Arabs Marxist conception of the "permanenl revolution" must practice care in applying this as an economic contrasted to the “ legitimacy crisis." The author, weapon against the West since American power acts however, is incorrect in criticizing the failure of as a counterweight to Soviet influence in the Middle others to analyze development from both political East. Any future embargo or attempt to use oil as a and economic perspectives.1 weapon carries political and economic costs. And, Those who seek either party tidbits or empirical except for Saudi .Arabia. most Arab nations are precision will enjoy the wealth of data: deposed overly dependent on oil production to fuel their Egyptian King Farouk received a 21-gun salute own economies. The overall impact of their future sailing into exile; quantitative tables on coups decisions on U.S. national security is difficult to reflecting the influence of per capita gross national measure. product or types of political Systems; and the The answer to oil shortages, the authors warn, is detailed information on the military impact on not divestiture of the large oil companies whose development in 13 countries. resources and capabilities offer the best hope of The faults are those of new exploration. More solving the immediate problem through further economic scrutiny is needed on the contribution of exploration. Quite possibly these corporations defense budgets to the development process. The could lead in the development of alternative energy framework of elites and legitimacy, while valid, begs sources for the long term. Finally.the problem of too the impact of other variables such as economic little competition is not real. Divestiture would resources, societal cohesion, and the impact of the solve nothing and would disrupt the industry to the developed world on these fragile systems. Further, is point of making the United States more vulnerable it not possible that the arms trade, as a substitute for to another Arab embargo. U.S.-U.S.S.R. defense pacts, may both have lowered The National Strategy Information Center has the threshold of superpower conflict and lessened produced another fine publication on a vital topic. the actual number of military interventions (a most The work offers no solid solution to lhe problems of imprecise word)? Although lhe book is clearly American dependence on foreign oil, but it does written, an index of tables would greatly enhance its point out serious flaws in divestiture plans. Those usefulness. in high government positions who support such For those seeking stimulating summaries on the measures would do well to put their populist role of the military in less developed countries, this rhetoric aside and examine the problem from a is an ideal book. The subject is the frontier of civil- more realistic viewpoint. military relations.

Capiain Harry R. Borowski, USAF Roy A. Werner Department oj History, USAF Academy Washington, D.C.

Note The Military in theThird World by Gavin Kennedy. I. Seeespccially The Political Economy ofC.hange by \V. F. Ilrhmanand N New York: Scribner’s, 1975, 368 pages. $17.50. T. Uphofí. Berkeley: The l ’niversity oí Califórnia Press. 1969; and. afeer Kennedy. Brazil since 1964—Modernizalion under a Military Regime by Georgc-Andrc Ficchtcr. New York; Joh n VViley and Sons. 1975. Unlike the usual surface generalities about the arms trade and coups, this book is rich in empirical detail, reaches balanced assessments, and offers America in a Divided World, 1945-1972 edited by corrections to the common, but all too vague, Robert H. Ferrell. Columbia: University of South theories regarding military men and costs in the Carolina Press, 1975, xxxviii + 353 pages, index, development process. Arms do not creaie tensions, maps, $7.50. they reflect tensions. An indigenous arms industry may provide economic benefits and may be a better America in a Divided World is the last book in a building block than social Services. Violence is three-volume documentary history of American endemic in the Third World, but a regime's foreign relations since 1775. While any such legitimacy is the key to how much violence. collection must of necessity be selective, Robert H. 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

Ferrell, one of this courury’s foremost diplomatic York: Amber Publishing Corp., 1976, xxxii + 194 historians, has drawn on his extensive knowledgeof pages, $10.00. lhe íield to assemble a useful compilation of primary sources dealing wilh a vital period of This work, subtiiled "YVar Crimes and the American history. Military Professional," is very interesting but very The documents are grouped chronologically odd. It consists of 387 collected commentaries on the vvithin topic areas that cover the world geographic war crimes trial of Grand Admirai Karl Doenitz, the regions as well as such specializecl subjects as the German ll-boat commander who succeeded Hitler United Nations, atomic diplomacy, and lhe as German chief of state. constitutional crisis revolving around the issue of Following World War II. the United States, vvho Controls foreign relations. Going beyond France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed formal "documents” in a narrow sense, Ferrell has to establish an International Military Tribunal to included ireaties, executive agreements, communi- bring German war leaders to justice. Admirai qués between heads of State, laws passed or proposed Doenitz was indicted at Nuremberg for “crimes by Congress, memoranda, speeches, press confer- against peace," in that he built and trained the ences, and off-the-record remarks. The material German U-boat arm for specific "war crimes,” and varies from single paragraph excerpts to complete for participating in the "common plan or texts. The supporting maps are clearly drawn; the conspiracy." Convicted on the latter two counts, he detailed index covers the entire three volumes. served ten years in Spandau prison. More than that The primary purpose of this book is to providea of any other defendam, Doenitz’s conviclion was handy collection of the record of the most active criticized because he had merely executed military years of American diplomacy. However, the editor duties and ordered submarines to operate in does more than merely lump documents together. fn accordance with the dictates of modern war. the thirty-eight page introduction as well as in the After the Admiral’s release from Spandau in 1956, commentary he uses to place each item in the the two editors apparently shotgunned letters to the context of specific events, Ferrell interprets both lhe armed Services' retired lists and to foreign policies and lhe actions of lhe United States. His dignitaries. seeking statements criticai of the trials objeetives in doing so are clearly awareness and and favorable to Doenitz. Those statements, the understanding rather than simply condemnation or result of twenty years of effort, form the body of the condonation. Moreover, Ferrell’s introduction is an work. excellent brief essay on American foreign relations Of these commentalors, more than one hundred since 1945. Lucid, well-organized, and thematic, it were U.S. Navy admirais. Another 135 were presents ideas and suggestions on the conduct and American generais, lawyers, diplomais, educators, direction of American foreign policy which every artists, and political leaders. The remainder are individual involved in either the planning or the European, British Commonwealth, South Asian, execution of. that policy should consider. Middle Eastern, and African leaders, both military Although this work is not for everyone’s personal andcivilian. Unfortunately, thecredentialsof many library, it is certainly worth knowing about and of the commentators are obscure. being familiar with. Students in PME schools at all The opinions presented in the book are one-sided; leveis will find it particularly useful. Nowhere else the editors admit publishing no opinions unfavor- can one find such a convenient compilation of the able to the admirai. Perhaps the only generality that important statementson American policy from this can be made from such a biased sample is that crucial period. among military professionals there is a considerable body of opinion opposed to "war crimes trials” by Captain Robert C. Ehrhart, USAF Department of History, USAF Academy victorious powers. Any further generalization is hazardous at best, largely due to the book’s shabby editorial standards. Its value as a historical document is extremely Doenitz at Nuremberg: A Reappraisal edited by limited. There is no concise brief of the actual H. K. Thompson, Jr., and Henry Strutz. New proceedings against the admirai. The points of law BOOKS AND IDEAS 93 involved in lhe debate over the trials are meniioned 1973 (against which former President Ford in- only in cursory fashion. The ediiors have not shared veighed, incidentally, in April 1977). with the readers their editorial standards, and one is The heart of Taylor’s book deals with compo- led to wonder whether the excerpts fully represem nents of a national security program. Embracing the opinion oí the writers. To make their point, did strategic deterrence and conventional requirements, the editors quote only the most forceful paragraphs? the detailed military chapters are splendidly Did they omit qualiíications or reservations? And informed by personal experience. Undoubtedly, the íinally, the editors failed to provide the dates of lhe shoe will pinch certain readers, e.g., the low opinions. Had the commentaiors considered the estimated probability accorded the Navy-Marine Nuremberg trials in the light oí Mylai? mission of traditional amphibious warfare. But the In sum, Admirai Doenitz’s case deserves better most innovative prescriptions are found in Chapter treatment than this book provides. VIII, dealing with the civil segment of national security. Having pinpointed weaknesses in national Captain Donald M. Bishop, USAF power and the nonmilitary sector in particular, Department of History, USAF Academy Taylor proffers counsel to any chief executive regarding choices of policy goals and programs and ways to counter “media adversaries.” Taylor's sagest suggestion is to create an Precarious Security by General Maxwell D. Taylor, Executive mechanism incorporating "nonmilitary USA (Ret). New York: W. VV. Norton, 1976, xi + power into national programs—something analo- 143 pages, $7.95. gous to the National Security Council in the foreign-military sector.” He clearly comprehends The foreword and íirst pages of this aptly titled that security and well-being are intertwined. Hence, study commence rather gloomily. General Taylor a broadened National Policy Council would replace sysiemaiically identiíies the environment of nega- the NSC and bring in the Treasury and HEW tive externai and domestic factors that impinge on secretaries and a new economic representative of the American security. Pessimisiically, Taylor admits President. Undoubtedly, Stansfield Turner would "to a lack of faith in the governmental apparatus as find Taylor's suggested restructuring of the a primary means in itself for guaranteeing our national intelligence system interesting, including future security.” The interested layman, however, to renaming the CIA Director as Director of Foreign whom the book is addressed specifically, should not Intelligence—“purely . .. an intelligence specialist, recoil from reading on. As might be anticipated never . . . a foreign policy adviser to the President." from such of his earlier writings as The Uncertain Another substantive recommendation envisages Trumpet (1960) and Responsibility and Response creation of a “Center for Policy Research.” (1967), Taylor now devises a bold prospectus that Whereas Taylor abounds in intelligent ideas and could comribute immensely to the construction of thoughtful approaches, his empiricism is comple- an improved national carapace. mented by literary felicity and rugged espousal of The author's treatment of the relationships traditional virtues. Happiness, he reminds us, can- among national security, policy goals, and not be bestowed by government; national security, supporting power is magisterial. Although he still too, is "dependem on the character and quality of speaks of dominoes in Southeast Asia, he calls the the people who would enjoy it.” Precarious Security events of spring 1975 a defeat and a debacle. Taylor could well serve today as a vade mecum for Presi- also has astringent comments about congressional dent Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski. intervention in the conduct of foreign affairs: the Dr. Alvin D. Coox Cyprus tragedy, the “ tilt” toward Israel, and the Department of History enactment of the oft-forgotten War Powers Act of San Diego State University the contributors

co Hq t ’SAF. Directorate oi Military Assist- ance and Sales. His earl> career was spem in special operalions in Europe, and much of his Service has been in elecironic warfare In 1968 he flew a combai tour in che F-105F Wild Weasel o u io í Korat AB. Thailand. In 1969 he was assigned co Hq USAF. Direccorace of Operacions, Electronic VVarfare Division. where he was pnm anly responsible for cat tical íighcer electronic warfare capabilities. A coloncl seleccee, Colonel Brog isa graduate of the Industrial CoIlege of che Armed Forces and Air War College.

Major Wraltcr D. Meyer (Ph.D.. University of Washington i is Special Assistant for Air Force Army to the Defense Meteorological Satellite Systems Program Office. Headquar- ters. Spaceand Missile Systems Organization. Brigadier General Charles E. Williams, Jr.. Los Angeles. He has served as operacions (Rei), (M.S., George Washington University) officer of the meteorological satellite data worked in command and roncrol communi- Processing section ai the Air Force Global cations and Computer activities much of his Weather Central. Ofíutt AFB. Nebraska, and militarv career Fie was Director, Communi- recently was assigned as DMSP Staff Officer cations and Data Processing (J-6). on che scaff in the DCS Aerospace Sciences of Headquar - of the Commander in Chiei. Pacific, when he ters Air Weather Service. Major Meyer is a retired on 1 March 1977. He hascom manded graduate of Air Command and Staff College operacions in FEAF and Vietnam. filled and of lhe Industrial College of the Armed command and scaff posicions in TA C related Forces. to operacions, command and control. Com- munications and elcctronics; and served as Vice Director. Joint Tactical Communica- tions Office, Fort Monmouth. New Jersey. General Williams is a graduate of che Air Command and Scaff College. U.S. Armv Command and General Scaff School. Air War COIIege. and the National War College.

Major Ernie R. Dash (M.S., Universicv of Souchern Califórnia) is (Ommander of Detachment 75.3d Weacher Squadron (MAC). Hurlhurt Field, Florida. He has served as a Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (ac tical site commander and recently was assigned as the DMSP Scaff Officer in the DCS Operacions of Headquartcrs Air Weath- er Service. Major Dash is a graduate of Air COmmand and Staff COIIege and Industrial College of che Armed Forces.

Rvan J. Barilleaux is an honor student in politital Science and holds an aiadcmic scholarship from the University of South- western Louisiana. He serves on the Cumc- ulum Committee of the departmrnt of political Science and heads a researrh committee of the university honors program. He has been selected as the Louisiana State alternate in the Flarrv S. Truman Scholarship competition.

94 Major Jerry C. Hix (M A.. University of Dcnver) is Chiei of Internai Information and Chiei Master Sergeant Willard P. Anderson. Plans, North American Air Defense Com- USAF (Ret). (B $.. University of Tampa) was mand Aerospace Defense Ciominand. He is a a Management Consultam, Leadership Man- career information officer and has served as Robert L. Blrdsoe iPh.O.. University of agement Development Center. Hq Air Uni- Director of Informauon for lhe Alaskan Florida) is an Associate Professor of Political versity, at the time of his recent retirernent. He communicaiions region and Air Force Insii- Science at Florida Technological University, presented seminars and workshops worldwidr tuie of Technology He has written extensive- Orlando. Dr Bledsoe was an Intelligence on cffcctive leadership and management at all ly for base and local newspapers and Officer in lhe Lann American Branch. leveis of command. He has lectured in all the published several magazine ariides. Major Military Capabilities Division. of lhe Dcfense Air University PME schools and helped Hix is a graduate of Air Command and Staff Inlelligence Agencv His special inceresis are develop phases of the Human Relations Co 1 lege. defense policy and (echniquesof mlemation- Education prograrn. Mr. Anderson is Assist- al violence, particular l\ dcierrence theory and am Personnel Manager at I TI -Rayonier low-Ievel cechniques of subversion. coups. (iorporation. Jessup. Geórgia. and unconvennonal war iheory.

Sênior Master Sergeant Thomas E. Wolfe (M.S., Troy State University) is on lhe faculty of the Air Force Leadership and Management Instruciors’ Course. Maxwell AFB. Alabama. Colonel Edsel R. Field (M B A.. Kem State Prior to his assignment to the Sênior NCO University) is Deputv Commandcr. Opera- Academy. he was a faculty mcmber of lhe hons. 438th Miliiary Airlifi Wing. McCuire MAC NCO Academy and was one of the AFB. New JeTsey. His experience has bcen Paul M. Kozar (M.I.A.. Columbia University) initial members of the Leadership and primarily in airliíi operations, including is a Military-Political Affairs Analyst with the Management Development Center. He has Air Force Inlelligence Service. Additionally. tours in Miliiary Airlifi Command and lectured in all the Air University PME Southeast Asia flying C- 123s. He has served as he is studying for his Ph D. in Russian Area schools. .Sergeant Wolfe is author of numer- a plans and programs officer at Hq USAF and Studies at Georgetown University. His ous articles used in Air Force PME and has on lhe faculty of Air War Co)lege. of which he professional training has also included aided in developing lhe Human Relations is a Distinguished Graduate. attendance at the Defense Inlelligence School. Education prograrn. 95 Squadron Leader John D. Breu, Royal Air Force, (M.A., Cambridge Universily) ison lhe First Lieutenam Andrew J. Sherbo. Jr.. stafl of lhe Director oí Ground Training. (M.P.A.. University oí Geórgia) is Depuiv Ministrv of Deíence, London. Uniil June Accounung and Finance Officer. 435th 1977. he was lhe RAF Exchange Officer and Taclical Atrlifi Wing (MAC). Rhein-Main an Assistam Professor in lhe Depariment of Air Base. Germany. Previous work experiente History. USAF Academy. His RAF Service has includes three years as a budgei analysi in ihe been in lhe Educaiion Brandi wilh insirucior State Comptroller’s Office, lowa. Heobiained and siaff appoinunents in officer and airmen his commission through A FR O T C in 1973 ai training schools. He hasalso been seconded 10 Drake University. Previous publicai ions lhe Royal Malaysian Air Force for ihree years indude articles in lhe National Tax Journal as an insirucior ai lhe Royal Military College and lhe Air Force Complroller maga/ine. al Kuala Lumpur.

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "The Extraterrestrial Imperative” by Dr. Krafft A. Ehricke, Head of Space Global, La Jolla, Califórnia, as the outstanding article in the January-February 1978 issue of Air University Review. editorial staff advisers

COLONEL GLENN E. WASSON. L’ SAF Colonei ArthirS. Ragen Editor Hq Aerospace Defense Command ajor eneral ohn uston Chief Lieit ena nt Colonel David R. Met s. USAF M G J \V. H . Office of Air Force History Assoe iate Editor Colonei Rlssell A. T i rner II J ack H. Mooney Hq Air Force Logistics Command Managing Editor Dr Harold M. H elfman J ohn A. W est co t t Hq Air Force Systems Command Art Director and Production Manager Colonel Ril ha r » A. Ingram E nrique C aston Hq Air Training Command Associate Editor, ColonelRoberi VV. Kline Sparush Language Edition Hq Air University Lia Mido si May Patterson Lieit en a n t Colonel T iioma s VV. S hrgess Hq Military Airhft Command Associate Editor, Franlis VV. J ennings Porluguese Language Edition SAF Office of Information WlLUAM J. DEPAOLA Coi ONEI D \ VII) O. SCHILLERS I ROM Art Editor and lllustrator Hq Strategic Air Command Rudolph VV. Morgan Lieit en a n t Colonei. Stephen B. H inder i iier Financial and Administrative Manager Hq Tactical Air Command Colonel J ohn H. Prk.e Hq United States Air Force Academy Professor 1 B H olli y. J r Duke University Major General, Air Forte Resewe

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