~ UNITED NATIONS GENERkL ASSEMBLY ENGLISH I I SPECIAL COMMIT'lj'E;E ON THE SITUATION WI'I'H REGARD TO TH_lj; IMPLEMENTAT I ON OF THE DECLARATI ON GN THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES
DRAFT REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMI'ITEE ON THE SITUATION W 'IH REGARD TO 'I'HE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF I NDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES*
(covering its work during 1965)
Rapporteur : Mr. K. NATWAR SI NGH (India)
ADEN
CONTENTS Paragr phs Page
I. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY 1 - 8 2 A. General . . . 1 - 2 B. Political and Constitutional developments 3 - 0 3 C. EconJmic conditions 41 - 14 D. Soci 1 conditions 69 - 21 E. Educational conditions 85 - 23 II. CONSIDERJ}TI ON BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE 99 - 75 28 .. Introduction . . . . 99 00 28 ✓ ,. A. Written petitions and hearings 101 - 20 28 B. Statements by members . . . . 121 - 75 34 • III. ACTION T"4KEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE 276 - 02 78 ANNEX: REPORT OF TEE SUB - COMMITTEE ON ADEN
* This docu1ent contains the draft chapter on Aden. Part I was previously issued as Annex III of the report of the Sub - Committee on Ade (A/AC.109/L.194 and Corr.1). Other chapters of the draft report of the Speci 1 Cammi ttee will ,. be reproduced as separate documents . / ... . '
A/AC .109 /L .236 English Page 2 (!·
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I. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY
A. GENERAL
1. The Territory of Aden consists of the Colony of Aden, no ...· known as Aden State and twenty Protectorates known as the Protectorate of South Arabia. Sixteen of the Protectorate States are joined with Aden State in the Federation of South Arabia, three having joined at the beginning of 1965. Of the four States outside the Federation, one, Upper Yafai, is in what is known as the Western Protectorate, while the other three, Q1aiti, Kathiri and Mahra, make up what is known as the Eastern Protectorate. Also included in the Territory are Perim Island, the Kuria Muria Islands and Kamaran Island. Perim Island is part of the Col ony of Aden but is administered separately by the High Commissioner. The Kuria Muria Islands are also part of the Colony of Aden but are administered by the British Political Office in the Persian Gulf. Kamaran Island is not part of the Colony of Aden but is administered separately by the High Commissioner. 2. Information concerning Aden, as well as an account of action taken in respect of the Territory, is already contained in the previous reportsY of the Special Committee to the General Assembly. Supplementary information on recent political and constitutional developments and on economic, social and educational conditions is set out below.Y , ..,,,,, "~ £ r; ,j• ; l ~ ~ "' "'-!- .,.,,} 4,,_,'!;
Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes addendum to item 23 (A/5446/Rev.1), chapter V; and A/ 5800/Add.4, section B ~ i1t and appendix, section III. 'Ihe informaticn presEnted in this paper has been derived from published reports, and frcm the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter, en 28 October 1964.
I ... A AC.1O9/L.236 ; E glish P ge 3 . I
B. POLITICAL AND CONSTITlJTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Results of eleqtions held in October 1964
Elections ere held for the sixteen elected seats in the Aden . egislative Council on 16 I ctober 1964, when 6,079 of the 8,345 registered vo ers went to the polls to elect sixteen members from forty-eight candidates. Mr. Z ·n Abdu Baharoon, the former Chie~ Minister was re-elected along with nine other for r members. The largest vote inr any district went to Mr. Khalifa Abdulla ifa. Mr. Khalifa had been arrestbd after the grenade incident at the Aden Airport in December 1963, and at the tim~ of the election was still detained under the ncy powers. Following the e}ection, fourteen of the newly elected Council s informed the High Commissiont r that they would not accept ministerial office unl ss Mr. Khalifa was released ana ten of them asked that he be made Chief Minister. On 26 October, + Mr. Khalifa 1 s release was secured and Mr. Ba~aroon was asked by the High Commissioner to form a Gover ment. 4. On 30 Octobert 19 6 4, following the nomination of the five membe s to complete the Legislative 1Council, Mr. Zain Abdu Baharoon was re-appointed Chef Minister, and I on 31 October the following members of the Legislative Council wer appointed as Ministers: Chief Mini:;;ter: Mr. Zain Abdu Baharoon "'· ,j Minister of State: Mr. Hussein 1Ali Bayoomi "· IS' ' ' Minister of Public Works and J1, Water: f Mr. Has son I smail Khudab Khan ' {\' l' :i: Minister of Finance: Mr. Abdo Hussein Sulaima Adhal ~ ct .. . ,. Minister of State for .. Constitutional Affairs: Mr. Saeed Hasson Sohbi • Mr. Saeed Hasson Maddi Minister for Endowment (Wagf): 4', 'Ii, • j " Minister o:f Labour and Welfare: Mr. Abdul Rahim Kassim M ammed 'i, ~... Minister fdr Local Government: Mr. Mustafa Abdilla Abdo \ ,l .... • ~ ~" ' Minister fdr Lands and Antiq_ui t:i!e s: Mr. Ahmed Salem Matari ,. 5. The new Aden Legislative Council met on 23 November 1964. meeting, the '.I;· 1 .. Chief Minister, Mr. Baharoon, was reported to have stated / determined "to push the wheel forward and, in particular, to move ./'· i, I ••• {ti ¢, ,. ~ (.< t: ~ t ~ • ,. 4i • , a, '' ~ \ ~ .., ~ ~ ~ . <' • • • 'r, t I•, ., ~. n- 1• A/AC.l09/L.236 English • Page 4
towards independence, freedom and social justice. 11 He also said that the present Government felt that many of the country1 s problems could be solved only by root changes in the Constitution and that the next London conference on the Federation of South Arabia would discuss the ending of colonial rule in Aden. 6. On 25 November 1964, Opposition members of the Aden State Legislative Council ~ decided to put proposals for a single parliament for the whole of South Arabia to the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Anthony Greenwood. ... Speaking for the Opposition, Mr. Abdul Qawi Mackawee said that this would mean a single parliament for Aden Colony and the South Arabia Protectorates, including the Protectorate States which were not members of the Federation. The parliament would be elected by universal suffrage under United Nations supervision, within two years. Meanwhile, the Aden State Legislative Council would be dissolved and li, a government formed from all parties after the lifting of the state of emergency, the return of political exiles and the restoration of public freedoms. The interim government's main task would be the preparation for elections. Mr. Mackawee added that the Opposition hoped Mr. Eaharoon's Government would accept their proposals and make a joint approach to Mr. Greenwood.
Visit of the United Kingdom Colonial Secretary to Aden
,!;~ 7. On l2 November l964, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, .if>< Mr. Anthony Gxeenwood, made the following statement in the House of Commons: " :: 11 Now that the elections in Aden have been held and a Government has been ~. formed there, we shall proceed as soon as possible with the further ' constitutional conference envisaged in paragraph 32 of the report of the South Arabian Conference held in June and July (Cmnd.2414). I hope ·t to visit South Arabia later this month in order to become better • acquainted with the problems of the area. I shall have talks with the political leaders and one of the matters I propose to discuss is the date \~ > of the constitutional conference. Meanwhile, I am having general ~ • discussions with the High Commissioner, who is at present in this country. 11
8. Mr. Greenwood arrived in Aden on 26 November 1964 for a ten-dav visit to study the political situation preparatory to holding a new constitutional conference. During his visit, Mr. Greenwood held meetings with Ministers of the Aden Government and of the Federation Government and with representatives of organizations in Aden such as the Peoples Socialist Party and the South Arabians
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I League. The ~olonial Secretary had talks with the ruler of Fadhl State, Sultan Nasser bin Abaullah, and members of the Fadhli Legislative Counci. He also visited militllry installations in Aden and the frontier area. 9. At a pres conference held before leaving Aden on 7 December 1964, • Mr. Greenwoodl read a joint statement issued by the ministers en and of the Federatio of South Arabia. According to the statement, the overnments of
, ll the Federation and of the other States in the Federation had aggr don the following: (i) The creation of a unitary, sovereign State comprising a 1 the States of South Arabia and "enjoying full powers and responsibili ies that are enjoyed by other unitar y, sovereign Stat es". / '(ii) The establishment of such a State on "a sound democrati basis and the
rec©gnition of human rights and independent equitabl e j stice11 • (iii) Disr ussion of a sound basis for the State at the next L ndon conference. The sponsors of this statement said that they intended to consult the Governments still outside the Federation immediately. 10. In answering questions, the Colonial Secretary stated that state concept! "was a big step forward" for South Arabia, ihich he ttributed t o a change of altitude of the Governments and parties concerned. also said that independence had been promised not later than 1968 and that if th date could be brought forwa~d, "that would be better". He did not think that f rming a unitary State instead! of a federation would delay independence. Mr. Gree wood added that he hoped the ccnference would take place about the first week in arch 1965. He said that it r as still to be decided whether all groups in Aden ad the Federation • would be invited to be present, but the basis of the decision at he conference "must be as r r presentative as possible". 11. The Colonial Secretary was reported to have had "no enthusi put to him byl the Peoples Socialist Party in Aden for a United tions presence in the area to supervise a prelimicary election before independe and for a referendum on joining Yemen, which the party proposed. He said t t supervision of an election $s the responsibility not only of the United ~ingdo, but also of the people of Sou_/th Arabia, and that no one need doubt that an elect· n would be conducted wit out interference. A/Ac.109/L.236 English Page 6
12. Mr. Greenwood was also questioned concerning the British military base at Aden. He stated that the question had been raised, during his visit, of the United Kingdom paying rent for the military base, now that its intention of retaining the base had been stated at Westminster. In this connexion, it may be noted that in answer to a question in Parliament on 30 November 1964, • Mr. Denis Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, speaking for the Government, said: "The Government's policy is to retain the base in agreement with the Government of the Federation of South Arabia for so long as it is required to serve the interests which we have in common." 13. On his return, the Secretary of State for Colonies made a statement in the House of Commons on 11 December concerning his visit to Aden. Part of this statement reads as follows:
nI made clear that the questions of independence and constitutional advance were essentially matters for free discussion and that Her Majesty's Government would not be deterred from such free discussion by the use of violence originating either within or outside the Federation. I also made clear that it remained the policy of Her Majesty's Government that there should be, not later than 1968, an independent Arab state in South Arabia and that the steps towards this end should be worked out in a way which would command the widest measure of support obtainable. I emphasized that Her Majesty's Government would do everything in their power to help in this. I was encouraged by the fact that on the last day of my visit a joint statement on constitutional objectives was issued by the Federal Supreme Council and the Aden Council of Ministers. This statement which had my full approval called for the creation of a unitary state on a sound democratic basis and for the recognition of human rights. A joint committee of Ministers of the Federal and Aden State Governments will continue to study the means of giving practical effect to these tu objectives in preparation for the next conference which we agreed should 11 begin in early March. • 14. Acts of violence were reported in Aden during the visit of the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies. Within forty-eight hours of his arrival, two British servicemen were killed and several injured in bomb explosions. Among the total of thirty injured were a European civilian and several Arabs. A window u~ the Legislative Council was destroyed by a shell fired from a bazooka. Mr. Greenwood described the bomb attacks as "brutal and useless". 15. The Nation~l Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South has claimed responsibility for a number of these acts. On 24 November 1964, the party issued a statement on Mr. Greenwood 1 s visit condemning both the British Labour and the • • • • 'lt ~ '*,, :. • ,, , "' A AC.lO9/L.236 ~ ,., .. E glish ' ' P ge 7
'\, ~ Conservative ,Government's policy on Aden, and describing both th political parties and the tradltional authorities in Aden as "renegades from the p The statement co9tinued: i, \} "The Froht proclaims its non-recognition of any negotiation which take 1 .., place between the political parties or the Sul tans and the ~/ Governme t. The Front also proclaims its determination to ontinue the
revoluti1 n until Britain yields unconditionally t o the just demands of the peop'.Le." ~ I .~ 16. Speaking in Cairo before Mr. Greenwood's visit, Mr. A. Al-A on behalf of the PeoplJs Socialist Party, made the following statement: "We do nbt refuse to meet anybody in connexion with our caus It is ,, clear th~t the British Administration in Aden hid many facts from London. • It is nap in the interest either of the country or the peopl to boycott Secretary Greenwood. What is more important than boycotting is to submit the peopile's demands regarding independence and stability." ( · '
~ ,· Congress Party, who became Minister of Civil Aviation, and Mr. Ha son Ismail '1i Khudabux Khan lwho took over as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. The former , ,. Minister of P~sts and Telegraphs, Sultan Faisal bin Serour al Hau habi, became Minister of State. Sheikh Husaim bin Mansour, ruler of Dathina S appointed Minister of State and Sultan Nasser bin Abdullah al Fa ~ .. reappointed Minister of Justice. I l8. On 25 January 1965, Sir Richard Turnbull, formerly Governor- in ~ • >1 < ~t
~, Tanganyika and who succeeded Sir Kennedy Trevaskis as High arrived ' ,,, in Aden to take up his appointment. ff < ,j; ,I. .. if ., 'lo V w t,'
J~ 'ff, A/Ac.109/L.236 English Page 8
Events leading to the postponement of the London constitutional conference
19. Mr. A. Al Asnag, President of the Peoples Socialist Party, was reported to have said on 15 February that his party's participation in the London conference would be "conditional". Mr. Al Asnag explained that his part y wanted to deal with basic issues in detail before attending the confe.rence. Therefore, he demanded a specific agenda and guarantees to enable national organizations in Aden "to conyince public opinion that the London conference was not another colonialist political game". 20. A spokesman for the South Arabians League was reported. to have said that a representative of the league would not attend the conference if it was between "master and servant". It supported the idea of' a unitary State, however. 21. On 16 Febr)lary, •an article in El Tahrir, the National Liberation Front I s bulletin, stated that the "National Front for the Liberation o:f O'ccupied South Yemen" would kill anyone attending the March London conference. It was reported that copies of El Tahrir had been sent to some government and public leaders in Aden. 22. On 20 February, the High Commissioner invited the Peoples Socialist Party, 0 the United National Party, the Peoples Congress Party and the South Arabians ( League to nominate representatives and observers to the Conference. 23. On the same day, the Aden Legislative Council concluded a discussion of the question, in the course of which two members of the Council resigned. Opposition members were reported to have demanded a postponement of the conference to enable the Government and all political parties to agree on a common policy towards the United Kingdom. According to reports, the reason for the resignation of one of the members, Mr. Hasham Omer Ismail, was the Aden Government's insistence on attending -~ the London conference. On 8 March, Mr. Ismail was reported as having joined the National Liberation Front in Taiz, Yemen. • 24. On 21 February, sixteen States of the Federation announced that their presence at the conference would be conditional on "a full participation" of Q1 aiti, Kathiri and Mahra States. The federal Foreign Minister declared that without the participation of the Eastern Aden Protectorate States the conference would be "useless". This announcement followed a meeting held in the federal capital, at which Aden State was not represented, during which the federal representatives ...
/Ac.109/L.236 glish age 9
unanimously adhered to the idea of realizing a unitary State for on the basis of the joint statement issued in December 1964, but emphasi unwillingness [ o attend the London Conference unless all-the Feder States, \,';7P , including Aden and the Eastern Aden States as well as all politic .parties, were appropriately epresented • • 25. On the sa e day, the leaders of Kathiri and Q'aiti States we repo~ted to have said that thei~ representatives would attend the conference as 26. On 23 February, talks took place between the Aden Government nd the High Commissioner cbncerning the publication of the Aden Government's statement issuf d by sixteen States of the Federation on 21 Februa During these talks four minfsters resigned in protest against the High Commiss· ner's "refusal to allow publication of Aden's reply". On the same day, the Chie submitted his Government's resignation to the High Commissioner. n his letter of resignation, the Chief Minister, Mr. Baharoon, stated that the dir[ ct cause of his resignation wab the High Commissioner's "objection and refusal11 to allow the publication ofj the Aden Government's statement. Another basic iss e was the present ~ ' constitutional' position "which was un::::a.tisf'actory". lVIr. .bc1.llc1.roon said tha't, .r Luw the beginning, his Government had found that the Constitutions of Federation and, Aden State did not conform with the hopes and aspi people of Aden. Although they had always supported the idea of A n's merger, they did not approve of the c~nditions and the way the merger was Mr. Baharoon said that his Government had resisted the development pr posals which did not meet its declared for a conference which all the Governments, political concerned would attend as full participants, to realize unity, freedom for South Arabia. He added: "We now fear that recent 1 prevented the holding of such a conference will continue to fette Aden with a I Constitution wkich no one supports. Therefore I and my Governmen see no use in ccontinuing in power ••• ". 27. On 25 February, the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Anthony Greenwoo · , announced that the conference had been postponed. Mr. Greenwood said that he ho I questions which were supposed to be debated at the conference wo d meanwhile be discussed locally and that such discussions 11 will result in agree Conference shall be held at an early date". I. - . J A/Ac.109/L.236 English Page 10
Developments since the postponement of the constitutional conference
28. On 3 March 1965, the High Commissioner called upon Mr . Abdul Qawee Mackawee to be Chief Minister. The High Commissioner's action followed a letter from eleven members of the Legislative Council conveying their support of Mr. Mackawee. The new Cabinet, which was sworn in on 7 March, included five elected and two nominated members of the Legislative Council as follows: • Mr. Abdul Qawee Macka-wee Chief Minister Mr. Saeed Hasson Sohbi Minister of State for Constitutional .. "~"' Affajrs, labour and Immigration Mr. Saeed Hasson Maddi Minister for Waqf and Tourism Mr. Saeed Mohammed Hasson Minister for Local Government Mr. Ahmed Salem Matari Minister for Lands and Housing Mr. Hasson Ismail Khudabux Khan Minister for Works, Water and Electricity Mr. Khalifa Abdulla Hasson Khalifa Minister for Finance
Mr. Khalifa spent ten months in detention on suspicion of having thrown a bomb at \ Aden airport in December 1963. 29. Following the swearing-in of the new Cabinet, the Chief Minister made a statement. In this statement Mr. Mackawee said that his Government ' s first step would be to work for complete change of the present (Aden) Constitution for one acceptabl e to all . He wanted his country freed from colonialism and to obtain for it genuine independence and unity based on democratic foundations, restoration of general liberties and termination of the era of arrests and deportation of
nationalists. 11 Col onialists do us or our country no honour 11 , he said, and added that the present legislature was not fully representative, the country was in a
I chaotic and unstable state, and the people were resentful because of the big gap separating British policy from the violent currents existing among the people .
Mr. Mackawee also said: 11 We are not antagonistic towards anybody, but we want to do our best t o clear the atmosphere and make a united effort to stand in one line to realize the people's wishes in every part of the Territory and rr..ove in line uith the policy of the Arabs and Arab nationalism in which I and every Arab strongl y believe," • 30. On 16 March, Mr. Abdullah Al-Asnag of the Peoples Socialist Party was reported to have said that while "the National Li beration Front for the Occupied South
maintains that armed struggle is t he only means to be used11 , hi s party "maintains
11 that the national struggle is politico.land armed • When asked if he opposed t he c;:renade -throwing in Aden, Mr. Al-Asnag replied: "We cannot stop- the violence . As I explained to the High Commissioner, we cannot denounce violence until a political situation exists t hat is worth defending. No such situation exists now". He also added: "Britain must not ,12.it too long; the i nitiative is _.,:::::~,..::;;:..=_::;;_,.-::::~.;=;;;;;;;;:.,:...::.;:...:::.:;.::.::;:;+::::;::===;.;;:.=.-=:::;::~::::;;::;::::::;::;::::;:;.;;:::;::;::::::;:;,;::::;:;;:::;;::::;;:;;;:;;;:;:::::::::;::;;:::::;::;:::;,.,;;;;:;..:::....,,;:,,;:;;....,. =~~-~;;.;;,-~.;::--.:;.;~--- "'!
/Ac.109/L.236 English Page 11
with her. Evbrybody is just watching each other - the agenda fo the London Conference which did not take place was so vague that the confer ce promised only to be a picnic. We had the unitary idea when Mr. Greenwood, Sec etary of State for the Colonies, was in Aden, but some of those who declared fo the idea had second thoug s soon after. There must be a starting point now, and it is for Britain to this and specify her needs." 31. On 17 M ch, Mr. Abdullah Al-Asnag, representative of the P Party, Mr. F+ sal Abdal-Latif, head of the National Front's poli ical bureau, representatives of the South Arabians League and five Sultans an sheikhs, among them the ~ep1sed sultans of Fadhli, Lahej and Aulaqi, issued as atement in Cairo dealing with the political situation in Aden and the Protectorat It is reported that the statement included a demand that the United Kingdom rec advance their stand op topics such as the evacuation of the British base self determinatio1 and the agreements existing with some of the prate torate rulers. The statemenl is also reported to have condemned air attacks aga·nst "villages and plantations" , called for a unified effort against "Imperialism i the Occupied 1 South" and reaffirmed that a political and armed struggle should e maintained. According to another report, the participants opposed responding any conference which might ble convened by the Ur1i ted Kingdom, except on the bas· s of prior undertaking Jy the United Kingdom to abide by the United Nations resolutions and the humanita1ian principles they set out; to evacuate the base; nd to allow the •, people to de~ermine their future in freedom. 32. Sir Ric~ard Turnbull, High Commissioner in Aden, flew to Lo 20 March 196~ for discussions with the Colonial Secretary. On 1 pril, the Colonial Sec~etary gave the following reply to a question in Par concerning the measures r eing taken by the Government to negotiate a politi solution to
I the conflict in South Arabia: "I appr~[ciate that is is a problem which calls for a poli ti al solution and in the ourse of an intensive and most useful review of the situation, I have discuss d with the High Commissioner proposals designed to urther political and con titutional progress in the area and to promote co-o eration between the Gov~rnments of the territory and the political parties. I hope to be in a posit]on to make a further statement before long." I A/Ac.109/L.236 English Page 12
33. On 30 March, the Aden Government announced its decision to repeal the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1960, which had been described by the trade unions as banning the right to strike. The Aden Trades Union Congress had never
I I recognized this ordinance or the industrial court set up under it. 34. On 19 April, Mr. Abdul Qnwee Mackawee, the Chief Minister of Aden, was reported to have made a statement in the Legislative Council calling on Britain to implement the United Nations resolutions for a political settlement of the problems of South Arabia. Mr. Mackawee said the Aden Constitution, which was drawn up in London and forced on the people of Aden, limited in a most undesirable manner the powers of the Chief Minister. He said Aden had been forced into the Federation in a manner which the people had time and again rejected, and that the British Government had also imposed on them a treaty allowing itself to give advice which could not be refused. He said:
"I must now put it on record with every confidence in my power and in the clearest possible manner ... that my Ministers and I refuse, and shall always refuse, any kind or form of false or falsified independence."
"We are fully determined to make a firm stand in the face of any attempt to ignore the true aims of the people or any endeavour. to dictate terms for an independence of the kind to which I have referred. In this stand ... we are in full agreement with major political organizations of the country." While warning Britain against delay in fulfilling ihe people's aspirations Mr. Mackawee said that the only solution open to the British Government was to implement the United Nations resolutions under which the people could choose with complete freedom their central government and central parliament. Mr. Mackawee also said that he would be introducing the motions before the Council, one calling for implementation of the United Nations resolutions, and the other demanding the lifting of the state of emergency, restoration of public freedoms, release of political detainees and return of all political exiles. '
Incidents in Aden
35. Many incidents involving the use of firearms and explosives have been reported in Aden during the last months. The National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied S~~th has claimed responsibi~ity for many of these acts; others have been described by the Front as provocative acts committed by the British authorities
t /Ac.109/L.236 nglish age 13 ·
themselves. Hand grenades have been thrown at British patrol cars and in places where British rervicemen gather, killing some persons and injuring several others. Twice explosiors occurred in buildings where British servicemen's live. An Adeni membe~ of the Special Branch of the Aden Police and the A ab Commissioner of Aden Prison/ were shot at. Several Adenis have been killed or i explosions. Bazooka shells have been fired at British military d ots, the Aden Legislative Co6icil buildings, the Office of the Assistant High C issioner, a secondary school and at the Federal Government Secretariat buildi at Al Ittihad. Other explosions have damaged the transmission station of the Ade transformer of an RAF base and pipelines carrying bunker oil from the refinery to the harbour. 36. It ha13 b1en reported that arbitrary arrests, summary searche and other actions restricting public freedoms are still being carried out under the state of emergency. od 23 February it was reported that about sixty perso s were at that time under arrest on suspicion of being members of the National 37. Fbllowing a shooting incident which occurred on 30 March, a curfew was imposed in the Crater area of Aden. A statement was issued s that the purpose of the curfew was to protect the public from terrorist at acks . Commenting on the curfew, Aden's Chief Minister, Mr. Abdul Qawee Mackawee, d clared "The Aden Ministers wish to make it clear that the decision to impose a cur ew in the Crater was made by the High Commissioner entirely on his own responsibil ty. The Aden Ministers have nothing whatever to do with the imposition of the urfew or with the decision taken by the High Commissioner". On 2 April the cur ew was lifted. A security of±icial was reported to have said that no incidents o curred during the two nights the curfew was in force. , Military operations in the Territory
38. In December 1964, it was reported in the British Press that here were 2,000 British troops in Radfan and according to British officials, the jority of tribesmen in the area had made their peace and were being allowed back to attend to their land. However, incidents continue to be reported, parti ularly around Dhala and Muk~iras, and on 31 December 1964, a land mine explode in the Radfan area, killing one British soldier and wounding two others. Accor to A/AC . 109/ L.236 English Page l L~
communiques issued by the National Front for the Libe:ra.tion of the Occupied South) attacks continued to be l aunched ao;ainst Briti sh ri1ilitary posts i n Rad fan during the mo nths of February and Ma rcl1 1965 . On 7 Ma rch it was reported that fighting took place at Wadi Yerarnis in Fadhli State beti1een federal guards and persons wearing uniforms :::if the National F1·ont. 39. I t 1ias announced on 1 March t hat Mr . Andre Rochat) the Dele0a te General of
the Internati onal Comn1i ttee of the Red Cross in the Yemen J had r.1ade a t\-10'" week visit to the Federation of South Arabia. It ,ias stated that because of the ,{ inaccessibl e nature of the terrain the federal a uthorities ha.d arranged for •• Mr. Rocl1at to fly :::iver the Radfo,n area by helicopter. He was a lso abl e t0 see the organi zation of ri1ed ica l care i n federal territory including Aden. Mr. Rochat ' s report on his vis i t vias to be made to the I nternational Committee of the Red Cross.
40. Mi lita ry operations and incidents have continued a l ong the border with Ye r11e n. ~ In connexion with these incidents) ten communications '.1ave ,Jecn acia1·es sed to the Secretary ·General bet11een 9 Deceri1ber 1964 and 12 A:;iril 1965'2/ by the Permanent Representatives of the Uni ted Kingdom and of Ye men .
C. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
General
41. The port of Aden is the ma in centre of economic activity in the Terri tory. It is said to be the busiest oil-bunkering port in the 11orl d. I t has a l a r ge entrepot trade ) a nd its status as a free port ives rise to a substantia l trade in duty-free consumer g:::i:::ids. There i s a l arge oil refi nery with a n annual capacity of some 6 million tons) which produces petroleum products from i mpor ted crude oil. Ac7en is a l so the s i te of the United Kingdom military base. I n addition) the tra de of the hinterl and; includino; that of the States of the Wes tern Protectorate and much of that of the States of the Eastern Protectorate) passes through the port of Aden. 42. Apart from economic activities connected with the port) the State of Aden produces sal t for export and has a number of small manufacturin3 industries and a s ma ll fis hi ng i ndustry 11hich serve l ocal needs.
_3;' s /6094) s /6105) s / 6124 and Corr. l J s/6252 and Corr. l ) s/6258) s /6259, s/6265, s /6272) s/6276 and s /6283 . A Ac .109/1.236 glish P ge 15
43. In the Protectorate, about 90 per cent of the popul tion aid to live by • farming. Pro u,ction is mostly for subsistence, although cash and export crops are being devel op d. Livestock, mainl y sheep and goats, are kept for local needs and there i s fishing industry based on Mukall a and Shi hr in Q'a·ti Stat e .
Trade
44. The value of goods imported through the port of Aden in 1962 rose from £82,886,404 to £86,113,692 while the value of exports and re-expo ts rose from £64,920,298 tp £68,770,418. It is estimated that petroleum produ ts accounted for about 60 per cent of the total value of 'trade. The value of ntrepot trades in hides, skit s, gums, grain, coffee, textiles and cotton amounte in 1962 to £16,530, 000. 45. During 1963, the port of Aden was used by 6,206 ships and 1, 00 dhows with ,, a total tonnage of over 30 million tons and 133,500 tons r especti ely. In i' 1962-1963 over 3,600,000 tons of fuel oil were supplied to 4,797 hips bunkering at Aden. 46. The Commissi on appointed by the Aden Government in 1963 toe amine the present and future position of the port of Aden presented i ts rep rt in March 1964 . It recommende~ that the port should be run as a commercial enterp ise, free of government co+trol over both its day-to-day activities and its lo g-term development and finance. The Commission also rec8mmended that th Aden Port Trust be converted into a port authority with members drawn from he Goverpment and users of the port, and that further modernization should be dertaken. 47 . The main ports in the Protectorate a r e Mukalla and Shihr, i n Q'aiti State. The latest figures ava.ilable are for 1961 and, in that year, Muka la handled 89 ships and 462 dhows. In the same year, the value of imports i to Q'aiti State , amounted to just over £2 million, while exports amounted to £276, 00.
I,
I ... '4\. ~': 1;
A/AC. 109/ L.236 ff.~.... tf;iT English l'· Ps ese 16
Public finance
48. Since 1951 ) the l egal cur rency in both Aden and the Protectorates has been the East African shilling .~/ A new South Arabi an currency is expected to be introduced during 1965. This will be t he S::mt h Arabian dinar, which will be issued a t parity with the £ 1 sterling and will be divi ded into 1 ,000 fils. L~9. Each of the States in the Territory has its own bude;et, I n addi tion, the Federal Government has its own budget. • 50. The Federal Government ' s revenue is raised from direct taxation a nd duties ) contributions by member States, and gr a nts by the United Ieingdom Government.
Federal revenue from 1 April 1963 to 29 February 1964 amounted to £6 J 993, 1 58, ·which included a gr ant from the United Kingdom of £3,949,000 ) £ 49,000 from direct taxes and £ 1 ,918,000 from indirect taxes. Expenditure for t he same period amounted to £5)501 ,271, including £ 1 )311,000 for t he Federal Rec;ular Ar my; £990)000 for the Federal Guards and £736)000 for rural and urban educati on and £651 ,000 for heal th.
Budget estimates for 196L~-65 provi de for a n expenditure of £ 12,300 J 000 including contributions by t he United Kingd0t;1 for development and other purposes amounting to £8)400)000. 51. The revenue of Aden State for the period 1 April 1963 to the end of February 1964 amounted to £.2 , 830)000) of which £ 1 ,476,000 ,ms deri ved from direct taxes . Expenditure for the same period was £-3,061 ,000J the principal items being for pol ice) pensions, public works and payments t o the township authorities . Budget estimates for 196 L~. 65 provide for an expendi ture of £3,983) 000 including contributions b,y the United Kingdori1 for developme nt and other pur9oses amounting to 2 982,000. 52. The revenue and expenditure of other States in the Federation for the year 1963-64) including the amount of grants from the United Kingdom) are set out b elow:
Twenty East African shillings equal £1 sterling.
., A c.io9/L.236 E glish P ge 17
United Kingdom grant- State2/ Revenue in-aid and subsidies Expenditure (pounds sterling) Amirate of~Beihan 54,283 44,500 54,476 Upper Aula i Sheikhdom 51,676 44,400 45,638
~ Audhali Su.Il..tanate 90,314 45,400 86,928 Amirate ofl Dhala 68,338 44,400 70,058 Lower Yafai Sultanate 125,317 40,000 115,515 Fadhli Sultanate 256,519 40,000 263 ,827 Abdali Sultanate 283,345 40,000 252 ,020 Aq_rabi Sheikhdom~ 11,153 2,000 10,085 Lower Aulaq_i Sultanate 50,775 32,200 49,595 Dathina State 53,955 28,800 52,780 Wahidi Sulianate 55,335 31,164 54,716 Shaibi Sheikhdom 22,879 14,000 21,835 Haushabi Sultanate 60,486 21,900 44,356 53. The budget figures for States outside the Federation are only vailable for Q'aiti and Kathiri. Estimated revenue for Q'aiti for the year 1963 64 was £794,000, of which more than half was to be raised from customs dut·es. Estimated expenditure amounted to £787,000, the principal items being educati n, £141,000; military, £121,000; armed constabulary, £99,000; public works, £8 ,000; and health, £54,ooo. 54. The estimated revenue in Kathiri for the same year was £72,000 of which £31,000 was to come from customs duties and £16,000 from uhited Kin dom grants and loans. Estimated expenditure wa s £70,000, the principal i t ems bein armed • constabular~ £1J, 700; educatio1> £9,400; and health, £8,506 .
,
5./ The States listed do not include the Sheikhdoms of Alawi and of uflahi and the Sultanate of Upper Aulaq_i, which joined the Federation in 19 5. / ...
. \ ii ?, '#, .:~ ~ "· " A/Ac.109/L.236 i ~ English ' Page 18 £• ,. ,t t'' j ,"" ~ ,t " .., \ "t;' " "
< \ Development plans
55 . Economic development is a federal responsibility which is exercised by the federal Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Devel opment . The Federal Government is reported to be preparing a development plan which will cover education, \.'t agriculture, fisheries, communications, heal th, marketing and information services. The Federation is an administering authority for Coloni al Development and Welfare ,... ~ schemes and. was all ocated £1,125,000 from Colonial Development and Welfare funds for 1963-64 . No details of how this money was to be spent a re available. 56 . It has also been reported that the United Kingdom will make grants to :the Federation totalling f:,2,300,000 for development in the period t o March 1966. No de:tails are available. 57 . British-assisted devel opment activity outside the Federation. is co-ordinated through the Eastern Aden Protectorate Development Plan, 1963 -1968 . This plan is financed mainly from Colonial Development and Welfare funds although the States have made contributions of from £5 ,000 to £10,000. Under the plan, a total of £1,090,000 has been made availabl e. Of this, £369,712 is committed to schemes already in existence or to projects awaiting approval, £475,027 is for the continuation of existing schemes, £225,700 is for new projects, and there is an unallocated balance of some £20,000. Of the expenditure under this pian in 1963-1964, 34 per cent was for education, 18.8 per cent for health, 18. 5 per cent for agriculture, 11.4 per cent for roads, and 8 per cent for co - operation' and _marketing . 58. In addition, Q1 aiti State has its own development programme which is financed from its own resources. This programme,which was put into operation in 1961, with .. funds totalling £350,000, covers education, health, roads, water supply, electricity supply and fisheries . At the end of March 1964, the balance in the Q1aiti Development Fund was £167,100. 59. The administering Power has stated that the principal variation in relative expenditure in the Eastern Protectorate, as. compared with previous years, is a marked increase in expenditure on education. It has also noted that substantial contributions to development are being made by WHO, UNICEF and UNESCO in the fields of social services, and by the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in the economic field. A/ C.109/L.236 En lish Pae 19
Agriculture
~ I' 60. The ad.minis ering Power has stated that, except in a few favour d mountainous areas in the wes, crops can only be grown with the aid of irrigatio. Measures to improve and m dernize agriculture have been directed towards exte ding and improving irrigal~ion, diversifying production, encouraging the growi g of cash as well as subsistence crops, improving the marketing system and imp oving the q_uality of both props and livestock. 61. One of the principal means of promoting agricultural developmen has been through the orgatization of farmers' co-operatives which undertake i rigation works, own and operate agricultural machinery, and organize the mark ting of members' produce. Cotton was introduced as an export crop at Abyan ·n 1949 and I in lahej in 1954, through organizations of this kind. Five other co ton producers' associations havt= been established in the Federation, which, in 1962 had 8,000 members and handled a crop valued at £400,000. In 1963, the total c tton production of the Territory amounted to 37,700 bales, an increase of about 4 30 per cent over the previous year. 62. The growing of fru~t and vegetable for sale in Aden has also be n organized on a co-operativt basis. Production in 1962 amounted to 15,000 tons valued at £500,000. Among other activities designed to improve agriculture an livestock, research is b~inf carried out on soil conditions, pest control and t e improvement of animal husbandl.ry. A pilot poultry centre was establishea alla in 1963. ~~, Fisheries ~.,1 63. Fishing takes place all along the southern coast but is based p incipally on t, the ports of Ade1, Mukalla and S:hihr. The fishing industry is incre sing in
,f, importance and, in recent years, funds have been made available top omote its ~ devel opment . Under the Aden Development Plan, 1960-1964, as$istance as given , . ,, through a co-·operative society, as a result of whi.ch engines have be n fitted to ,~ 1 .)\. ~ 170 vessels, and improved gear has been introduced. In 1963, the ca ch landed at Aden totalled 54,465 tons. The types of fish caught include tunn, sardine, anchovy, kingfish and Indian mackerel. Supplies of other marine pro ucts such as • crayfish and green turtle are also being developed. / Commercial acti ities. ar(; / ... t A/AC.l09/L.236 English Page 20
reported to have increased rapidly in 1963 and international fishing companies were expected to begin operations in the area in 1964. 64 • . The Aden Fisheries Department has been assisted by experts provided by FAO. One expert advised on types of fishing boat.s and anothe~ carried out extensive work on the introduction of tunny long-line fishing. Training for fisheries staff and fishermen has also. been provided locally and, under the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, at Malta. 65. Responsibility for the development of fisheries within the Federation is now exercised by the Federal Fisheries Department which also provides advice and assistance to the Eastern Protectorate States. The Department's budget in 1963 am.ounted to £35,682. 66. The United Nations Special Fund was reported to have planned to begin a fisheries development project in the Federation in 1964. This project would entail the analysis of oceanographical information obtained by International Indian Ocean Expedition, the chartering of Japanese long-line tunny fishing vessels for trials in the Gulf, and the establishment of a Fisheries Training School for local crews. 67. There are no local fisheries departments in the maritime States of the Eastern Protectorate, but assistance and advice is provided by a United Kingdom Fisheries Officer and by the Co-operative. and Marketing Department at Mukalla. A recent survey of crayfish resources, conducted with United Nations assistance, has indicated that. an annual production of 500,000 pounds could be reached within the next few years.
Mining
68. The Pan-American Hadhramaut Oil Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey) has held a twenty-year oil prospecting concession in Q'aiti and Kathiri since 1961 and in Mahra since 1962 . These concessions cover 70,000 square miles. Prospecting results are reported to have, been encouraging and drilling has started near Thamud, in Q'aiti.
/ ... 'z "'", 'i S' '"" +' ••
~¥ "( /Ac.109/L.236 nglish age 21
D. SOCIAL CONDITIONS
Labour
69. Employme t opportunities exist only in Aden State where the total labour force was estimated at 78,053 in December 1963. The distributio was as foll ows:
PoA workers 7,487 Building and construction 12,352 In~l strial undertakings 13,004 Retail and wholesale trades 10,335 Govrrnment police forces and other services 16, 655 Dolestic servants 17,000 Mis ellaneous 1,220 78,053
70. The Ministry of Labour conducts an employment exchange whic in 1963 recorded 4,944 placeme[I ts, a substantial increase over the previous year. In December 1963, the number of persons registered as unempl oyed was 3,621. I t is stimated that 60 per cent o the labour force is mi grant in character, mainly · om the
neighbouring rl reas and Yemen . 71. In 1963, there were twenty registered empl oyees ' trade in Aden, with a total membership of 22 , 235 . There were also five employersr o anizations. In addition, there is the Aden Confederation of Employers and the n Trades Un.ion Congresr . 72. Labour legislation covers such matters as wages, hours, cond·tions and labour relations. I f has recently been announced that the Industrial Re ations Ordinance , of 1960 , which had been i gnored by the trade union movement and a tacked politically, is to be repealed (see paragraph 33 above) .
Public health
73. The Permanent Secretary of the federal Ministry of Health is the professional and executive head of health services in the Federation. He also advises federated and non-federated state Governments on public health matters. I n general, medical services are a federal responsibility and public health and preve tive services are a state responsibility. A/Ac.109/L.236 English Page 22
74. In Aden State, public health and preventive services are provided by the Municipality of Aden and the t wo township authorities. Public health services in other States of the Federation are reported to vary from nnon-existence to fairly satisfactory, the more progressive states making some efforts to improve
matters 11.
75. In 1963, the medical and health staff of the Federation (almost exclusively ,. located in Aden State) was as follows: Government Missions Private Companies Registered physicians 44 4 16 12 Licensed physician 1 Nurses of senior training 70 8 24 Certified nurses 21 2 Partially trained nurses 15 Midwives of senior training 45 8 17 Certified midwives 3 Partially trained midwives 2 2 Health inspectors 6 5 Sanitary inspectors ll 3 Laboratory and X-ray technicians 20 + 23 in training Pharmacists 1 9 6 Medical auxiliaries 401 + 17 14 7 117 in training
76. In Aden State, the Health Ministry maintains one general hospital (495 beds), one maternity clinic (80 beds), five dispensaries, (one of which has 10 beds) and three small special hospitals (38 beds). There is also a mission hospital (40 beds) and a private hospital (124 beds). In other States of the Federation there are .. three rural hospitals, one in Makhzan (80 beds), one in Lodar (35 beds) and one in l ' Lahej (40 beds). Approximately forty rural health units operate from these hospitals bringing medical assistance to the remote areas of the Federation. t 77. Actual expenditure by the federal Ministry of Health for the eleven-month period to the end of February 1964 was £651,000. Recurrent expenditure in Aden State in the previous year was ;£,824,240, while capital expenditure was £383,000. This expenditure represented 13.26 per cent of the total government expenditure. I .. . A/AC.l09/L.236 English Page 23 i " ,,,
i Expenditure lon public health by_the Aden Municipality for tl;le s e year amounted to £254,459 or 40.4 per ce:o.t of the total expenditure. 78. Vital tatistics are available only for Aden State. Based on an estimated population n 1963 of 225,000, the infant mortality rate per 1, 00 live births was 86.54, whil the death-rate per 1,000 was 8.40. 79. In the unfederated States, the United Kingdom Government p ovides advisory staff to astst the States in running their health services, an pays for. a Senior
Public Health Inspector, who advises on all aspects of public h alth work. As Q !\
stated above the Health Ministry provides advisory med cal services • .,. ., ~ ( See paragr~;h 7;. ) " "' • 80. In Q1 aiti, there is a Senior Medical Officer ~ho, with fou doctors runs a ~ hospital and training centre (70 beds) at Mukalla.. There are a so three small " I di.strict hoJpitals, each run by a doctor, at Shihr, Du'an and S fl'• 81. In Kathiri, the Senior Medical Officer is stationed at Sai , where a new hospital (49 beds) has recently been completed. There is also small hospital at Tarim. 82. In these two States there are twenty rural health units st ffed by locally
trained healh assistants. A three-year training course for he th assistants is provided at ukalla. _ 83. The in fnt mortality-rate was estimated at 50 per cent in 84. The est~mated expenditure on medical and public health ces for 1963-1964 was: £53,938 for Q1 aiti and £8,564 for Kathiri. l' t I E. EDUCATIONAL CONDITIONS ·~ ~ ! ;{\ I •- . ♦ 85. Responsibility for primary, intermediate and secondary tion throughout ,,. the whole Fe~eration now rests with the federal Ministry of The • • ~ administering Power states that, as a result of this change, the been no • ~ ~ loss to yhe f ntegrity of the educational system in Aden ich had reached a \ • ♦ .. much higher ~tandard than that of the surrounding area, and taken to imptove the standards in the other States. ... ;y ~ .. ♦ * ,, ,. / ... ·" t, \ t· ,.. ~ .. 86. Within the Federation, in 1963, there were 161 government primary schools ;1 (26, 7113 pupils) and sixteen private primary schools (3,599 pupils). Intermediate ~- standard education was provided by thirty-four government schools (7,337 pupils) and fifteen private schoqls (2,801 pupils). Jt 87. In the same year, there were fifteen government secondary schools (2,289 pupils anci eight private secondary schools (1,002 pupils). ·, 88. Estimates of expenditure by the Federation for 1963-64 were: recurrent £1,118,700 and capital £97,000. ,, , 89. The federal Ministry has prepared two educational development plans, one for • ,," , Aden State, the other for the rural States. The plan for the rural States sets the following aims for the period 1963-1966: (i) To increase facilities for boys' ~rimary education by providing 80 additional schools covering the majority of the settled areas. (ii) To provide intermediate education for about 40 per cent of the primary output. This is the same percentage as before. (iii) To provide secondary, places for about 25 per cent of the output of the intermediate schools. This is also the same percentage as before. (iv) To provide "A" level places and subsequent scholarships at overseas universities, for pupils of proven ability and capacity, in accordance with the needs of the Federation. ( v) To provide add.i tional primary and intermediate .schools for girls in areas where it is known they will be successful. (vi) To provide facilities for technical and trade training. 90. The plan for the State of Aden is for the years 1964-69 and sets the ♦· following aims: (i) To provide adequate facilities for boys' and girls' primary education for every 7-year-old child or less. (ii) To provide sufficient accommodation at boys' and girls 1 intermediate schools to accept every child leaving the primary school. (iil) To increase facilities for boys' §.nd girls' secondary education by building three secondary schools for boys and three for girls. I .• • ,A '' A/Ac.109/L.236 English Page 25 (iv) T[ provide for a co-educational university college ca ering for a tfal of 240 students (including 120 boarders) and of ering three-year c rses leading to the degrees of Bachelor of Arts an Bachelor of S ience. (v ) T extend the present Men's Teacher Training Centre ad Women's Tdacher Centre to provide for a three-year course. (vi) Td build two separate schools for handicapped childre to provide separately for a seven-year primary-cum-intermediate ourse for 280 boys and 280 girls. 91. In 196~ there were sixty-two scholarships awarded for stud overseas. Of these, forty-seven were for study in the United Kingdom. 92 . In the unfederated States education is the responsibility f the States. The United f ngdom maintains an Education Adviser in the Protec orate through whom it provides assistance in staffing and capital development 93 . The States .seek to provide primary education for all chil en between the ages of 8 and 12. This aim is said to have been attained for bys in the urban and sJttled rural areas, but difficulties have been encou tered in extending education t~ Beduin (nomad) children, and girls in general. Th re are three Beduin primary boarding schools at Mukalla, where both tuition nd board are free. Four. new Beduin day schools were to be opened in tribal centres during 1963 and 1964. 94 . Q1aiti State provides intermediate education for 40 per ce t of pupils leaving primary schools. wnile expansion and the attainment of higher tandards is hoped for, it is stated that the present finances of the States, eve with the assistance given by the United Kingdom, are unable to bear the osts of expansion. , 95 . Tb~ first secondary school in the Eastern Protectorate was opened at Mukalla in 1962. I i has 105 students, all of whom are boys. Scholarsh"ps are provided for secondary education in the Sudan, and in Aden. 96 . The number of schools, pupils and teachers in Q'aiti and K thiri is set out below: I .. . , ~ ~ .,, •t 'I\ .. .. f• "" • " (; . 1c " • .. t. ., ~ lit ~ at- •f< .,,. • "' ~ ti .. ,} l' < .., ;, \ A/AC.l09/L.236 ~ ,t• • ' ~ ~ ., English ' ·~ ',; ,. of:•• < • Page 26 ' ~ .} el ,, "' ,. ~ '.l' • ... • 'i, • ,. ... Ii "' Primary .. t ;, > • .. t • ' . ~ ., ¥ " Schools Pupils Teachers ~ t f; ,, Male Female Total --- "" 1 ~ ,> .., Government: .., QTaiti 6 .. p .. ~ (' 1,119 70 1,18) 45 " ~ "I Kathiri 2 10 '" 285 285 .. Government-a-ided: • , "" " Kathiri 1 27 l 27 12 Private : .., ill,- 5 218 218 9 " ;, ,, ~ • v ii. Total: 14 l,649 70 1,719 76 11, " ~ '~ ~ •\ .. ~ " .. .. ~ 'I Ir ,!I, • "' '• 4 "' ... .. "'I> ' f, Y, t j . ., " " " ~ ' ~ ·~ ·~ ~ ;. ~ , .,., ~ 1l, ,. ,. * ., ~ ,, "' "' ' ~ i = t ♦ ., " 7... '!;, .. . t • t , ♦ ~ .. ·'l' ♦ 11 ~ ;I; * ' " . .. "' • "' iic A/AC.109/L.236 English Page 27 97. Most primary school buildings and equipment are regarded s inadequate. In I contrast, the intermediate schools and the new secondary schoo are described as ' modern buildings, with most of the essential requirements. 98. Estimates of recurrent expenditure on education for 1963- 964 in Q'aiti amounted t? £140,995 or 34 per cent of the total. In addition capital expenditure was estimat ed at £1,650. In Kat:1iri, recurrent expenditure wa estimated at £9,428. , I ... A/Ac.1or;;/L.236 English Page 28 II. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMiiTEE Introduction 99 . The Special Committee considered the question of Aden at its 329th to 338th meetings between 27 April and 17 May 1965 and at its 370th meeting on .I 16 June 1965 . The Special Committee had before it the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden which is appended to this chapter (see annex ). The report was introduced I by the representative of Cambodia speaking as Chairman of the Sub-Committee at the 329th meeting of the Special Committee on 27 April 1965 . 100. By letter dated 3 May 1965 (A/Ac.109/115) the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic asked to participate in the discussions of the Committee on the ~uestion of Aden. At its 331st meeting on 4 May 1965, the Committee decided, without objection, t o grant this request. A • Written -petitions and hearinr-:s 101. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Aden : Petitioner Document No . Peoples Demands Pursuance Committee, Hadhramaut A/ AC.109/PET,333 Mr . Abdalla Baatwa, Secretary, Hadhramy League of East Africa A/AC.109/PET.334 Arab Unitarian Party A/ AC.109/PET.335 Mr . Sal meen Almaargi A/ AC.109/PET.336 Mr. Omar Salem Ba-Abbad, President, Peoples Congress in Hadhramaut A/ AC.109/ PET.379 Dhala Peoples Association A/ AC.109/PET.380 Mr. Qahtan Shaabi, Naticnal Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen A/ Ac.109/PET.381 and Add.l • Mr. Zain Baharoon and others A/ AC.109/PET.386 rtsons of the Occupied Zone in South Arabia who i mmi grated to the USArr A/AC . 109/PET.387 102. At its 370th meeting, held at Addis Ababa on 16 June 1965, the Special Committee heard Mr. Qahtan Shaabi and Mr . Saif Dhalee, representatives, National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen concerning Aden.~/ ~/ These petitioners were heard after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution on the question of Aden at its 338th meeting on 17 May 1965. ' A/AC 109/L.236 Engl· sh Page 29 103. Mr. Shaa~i said that, at that very moment, thousands of his ountrymen were being boJbed out of their homes by British forces. Politica detainees were being tof ured and denied the right of trial and recent legi lation legalized summary arresi:/, and confiscation of property. The National Front ad itself been declared a te;lrorist organization. 104. He outli ed the history of the Territory, where British impe ialism had 'i,- sought to ensl ave the people and to drain the riches of the county, leaving it poor and igno~ant, with few schools, no real hospitals and no pro er roads. 105. British dolonialism was determined to hold out in occupied S uth Yemen for the protectio1 of its manifold interests - the exploitation of th oil, cotton and other agricultural resources; the protection of the huge and rofitable oil refineries; t~e development of an extensive consumer market forte distribution of British prJducts in the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa; and the maintenance of a strategif post at the mouth of the Red Sea for the protectio of imperialist economic interests in Africa and parts of Asia. Aden was also on of Britain's main bases fot the storage of atomic and hydrogen bombs. 106. Prior to1the revolution, national resistance to colonialism ad taken two forms: stand rd peaceful political activities in Aden and unrela ed tribal movements in t he emirates. 'Ihe United Kingdom had resorted to va ious illegal means in the t ffort to secure its colonial position in what was a strategic area, such as bribery, the brutal suppression of democratic freedoms an the establishment of a puppet State, the so-called Federation of Sout ern Arabia, with which it could conclude treaties and thus give a semblance o legitimacy to its nefarious activities. ~ 107. The nature of the 1959 Treaty with the counterfeit Federatio offered cleRr proof of the hangerous scope of British imperialist policy in the area. It , provided for the Federation to remain under British protection an conferred full powers oh the United Kingdom for the conduct of foreign affa ·rs_: acceptance of its advice/ on any political issue was obligatory. Furthermore the annex to the Treaty mare provision for the granting of full facilities for the operation of British troops in the Territory. t /. . . ' . ,, , . {"" ~ ,", A/AC.109/L.236 English Page 30 108. It was thus that the United Kingdom) in collusion with the pro-imperialist sultans) sought to mask its true aims under the guise of advances toward nominal independence that were designed to palliate popular discontent and save its face at the international level. The only tope for the peoples had been to unite against British colonialism and that was how the National Front had come into being) composed originally of seven clandestine organizations and subsequently joined by three others. The Front's adoption of the policy of armed struggle to achieve its objectives r.ad been a turning point) restoring to the despairing I, peoples their self-confidence and giving the necessary impetus to channel all nationalist forces into the fight. 109. At a meeting with the Sub-Committee on Aden in Cairo in June 1964, a representative of the National Front had had the opportunity to recount the story he had told above) and had defined the people's aims and demands. After exhausting peaceful means - which had merely led to the use of force by the United Kingdom) the imposition of unjust lawsJ deportations and imprisonment for long periods without trial - the people had been forced into a popular uprising) the armed revolution that broke out on 14 October 1963) under the leadership of the National Front. Since that time the National Front had been able to extend its scope, so that the revolution had now spread to eleven regions of the South, as well as to the military base serving the strategic and economic interests of the colonialists. The Liberation Army had been able to make great progress against ~ the British forces and to inflict great losses on all battle fronts. In addition) political victories had been achieved both at home and abroad. On the home front) the people had been effectiveiy mobilized) through the radio and the Press) to break up the plot to hold a constitutional conference in London on 2 March 1965) with the participation of the United Kingdom 11 stooges 11 in the counterfeit Federation and in the puppet Aden Government) together with the unrepresentative Aden political parties that were taking no part in the revolution. At the • international level the National Front had been able to gain solid support for the people's causeJ through its recognition as sole representative of the people of South Yemen by the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. 110. British colonialism in its direct form had begun to falter before the persistent and heroic struggle of his countrymen. Hence) the latest neo-colonialist plots. But to the National Front) colonialism and neo-colonialism were but one and A/AC. 09/L.236 Engl ·sh Page 1 the same evil, to be fought until victory was achieved. 'I'he Special ommitt ee doubtless was informed about the creation of the Aden Legislative Co cil and the I Council of the sd called Federation both of which had made a volte f e and :were now pressing for he application of the pertinent United Nations res utions . That political ma oeuvre was being complemented by the latest (ingdom i nnouncement that a Commission was to visit the Territory and a report on the situation, with a view to the drawing up of a more advanced cons The • National Front had exposed that plot to make improper use of the Uni resolutions which~ as drafted, were inadequate to the present phase the struggle, since they covered but a minute part of the just demands ierlying the popular revolution. Those demands were: complete political and liberation from colonialism for the whole of South Yemen and the islands; unconditional liquidation of the British military base in A the sub-bases elsewhere in the Territory and the islands; removal of eactionary regime uT Llle lrn_f}eL·.LaJ.ic; t, ..Lackey Sultans; and restoration of the and of the. plundered weafth of the people. '1.11. To further i s aims., the National Front would ask the Special C to bring stronger an more effective pressure to bear on the United Kin om, to submit to the wil of the people by meeting their demands, immediately all ·1itary oper ations against the people and in partic ar the massacres in the illages. The United Nations should take the initi i ve in offering all poss·ble aid to t he unfortunate victims, and to the fam:i.lies of the rtyrs and detaipees. 112 . In response Lo questions, Mr . Shaabi said t hat the United Kingd . had made no progress whatsf ever toward carrying out the resol ution i b questio Far from taking action to f ntroduce independence and t o liquidate the1 militar the United Kingdom was sending in more troops to- Aden and the emirates., om Cyprus, West Germany and the United Kingdom itself. 113. The main military base at Aden was at present being extended, at an estimated cost according to United Kingdom sources of £11 million. s 1 -bases e i sted in the emirates and were being secretly established on off-shore islands. He had no exact f.igures but would estimate the strength of the main base at 45, 00 off icers and men. In addition, some 10,000 troops stationed ip the so-called ederation r, A/Ac.109/L.236 English Page 32 of Southern Arabia were being used against his people. Big aerodromes were being built in Aden and the emirates, to accommodate a modern air force. Furthermore, according to the British Press, Aden was regarded as a strong base of operations in nuclear weapons. 114. Accordingly, Aden, as a military base, was intended to serve as a spring-board \ of aggression directed against, not only his people, but the Arab, African and Russian world. The continued maintenance of that base was of no interest to his people, which had no desire to join in British aggression; hence the demand for its immediate liquidation. The base was at present being used for preparing British air attacks on the towns of the 1emen Republic, as the General Assembly had no doubt heard. Its. continued existence therefore represented a dangerous threat to pea~e in the area. 115. The military campaigns in the Territory were by no means a novelty, but United Kingdom aggression had recently been expanded to cover the whole country. He gave particulars of the effect of the continuous bombardments carried out by the British Air Force. The fact was that there was a state of war in the Territory and the United Kingdom claims that only small operations were involved. to repel outside aggression were merely designed to deceive world public opinion. There was no outside intervention; the armed struggle now going on was the result of the spontaneous uprising of the people. The revolution would be mainta i ned so ~ong as the United Kingdom refused to recognize their legitimate demands. 116. · Referring to United Nations resolutions concerning Aden, he said that it was not enough for these resolutions to speak of the desirability of removing the military base in Aden; what the National Front and the people wanted was i t s immediate unconditional liquidation. Secpndly, no reference had been made t o the sub- bases that were being established. Both those points should be covered in ~ny subsequent resolution. . ' 117. The National Front regarded the latest United Kingdom proposal to send a constitutional commission to the Territory as a further move to advance its plot to impose a constitution on the Territory against the people's will, following upon the failure o.f the earlier plan to convene a constitutional conference in London in March 1965. The commission which was to be composed of three members from the United Kingdom and two from the Commonwealth, ~ould undoubtedly fail in its assigned I .f \ /Ac.109/L.236 nglish age 33 • task, for the National Front and the whole people were determined that any constitµtion 1or Aden would reflect their will and not the desire of the United Kingdom. Only;) a few sultans :whose interests were bound up with t e British impfria~ists ould co-operate. 118. Mr . Dhal e, National Liberation Front of Occupied South of Y men, said , I that, in the F.rotectorates, the United Kingdom was restoring to a rial bombardment to drive the ~eople out of their villages; daily, men, women and hildren were being killed. In Aden itself, the British Army was applying all cdern methods of torture, including, the use Sf electricity, in order to extract information from detained natiJnalists. After descri bing some of the methcds used, he went on to say that nationalists were being held in prison without trial, some f or as l ong as 9-10 months, and all efforts to get a fair trial had been in v in. The detainees were not allo, ed to have food brought in from their homes, and pr ssure for permission merely resulted in beatings and the withholding of all nourishment. 'I'hose who went on a hunger strike were given no medical attention whatsoever. In answer to ai further question from the Syrian representative, h said that a number of is1lands which had always been regarded as part of the Territory had been expressl excluded from the 1958 Aden Constitution, with the obvious purpose to keep them f pr use as military bases. Some smaller islands, of no importance at the moment bj ut of pptential value if they were not liberated a part of Aden, had. al so been rxcluded. 119. Referrin§ to the United Kingdom Government's creation of a single State encompassing both Aden said that the nited Kingdom Government had approached the so-cal ministers, the ... sultans and some local political parties, for most political had been controlled by ~he United King~om since the armed revolution, ignored the people on the rretext that they were revolutionary elemenr s • • was trying to give the i mpression of working for Adent s independe But the people had not been consulted; and they were not until they were convincedi of the United Kingdom t s sincere int,ention full liberty and to withdra1W all military bases unconditionally. 'I·he iP eople continue • < ' ' their armed revolt until their legitimate demands had been met. A/Ac.109/L.236 English 1[ ' Page 34 4 120. If the Committee could send a gr oup to Aden to see the backwardness and i,r, ·l ~ misery that existed after over 120 years under British colonial rule, they would 'If.... realize the emptiness of Unit~d Ki ngdom promises to bring the people culture and lead them to independence. There might be a pr etence at independence, but the United Kingdom did not want true economic or military independence for Aden, i/i{J • otherwise ;i.t would not be flooding the country with armed forces and torturing the people. The United Kingdom had hidden the facts for l ong enough: the time had come for the Committee> the United Nations and the whole world to know the truth. B. StatErrn::ts bv rr.E-rr.hF:rs ~ l21. The representative of Cambodia, speaking as Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden, introducing the Sub-Committee' s draft r eport (see annex ), stressed ~ its concern at the extremely serious situation i n Aden and the Protectorates . Although some changes had taken place, Gene:ral Assembl y resolutions 1514 (XV ) and 1949 (XVIII) had still not been implemented. 122. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had been glad of the opportunity to meet the Sub- Committee on Aden . I t would comment l ater on' the report of the Sub-Committee, which it had only just received, but at first gla;n~e there seemed to be points on which it would have _some reservations t o make . ' 123. The vi sit to Aden by the new Coloni al Secretary, Mr . Anthony Greenwood, to which the United Kingdom delegation had referred when the Special Committee had last consider.ed th~ situation in South Arabia, had taken place in November and December 1964. Mr . Greenwood had held talks with a wide section of public opinion and had travelled extensively i n the area including visits. to areas whe;re 11 aggression and subversion from across the border gave cause for serious concern. He had reaffirmed the United Kingdom Government 's determination to carry out its treaty obligations to the full in South Arabia. He had also condemned the brutal, senseless and cowardly terrorism which had been taking pl ace in Ad eh, but whi ch f, would not deter the United Kingdom Government from encou:raging free discussion on t the questi ons of independence and constitutional advance. He had again stated the fundamental policy of the United Kingdom Government that not l ater than 1968 there woul d be an i ndependent Arab State in South Arabia and that the steps t owards that objective should b~ worked out in a way which woul~ command the widest measure of support cl tainable. A/ c.109/1.236 En lish Pa ·e 35 124. On the last day of Mr. Greenwood's visit a joint statement on onstitutional objectives, calling for the creation of a unitary State on a sound emocratic basis and for tqe recognition of human rights, had ;Jeen is.sued by t e Federal Supreme f:;ouncilland the Aden Council of Ministers, with JvJr. Greenwo d's full approval. Ith d been aGreed that the next constitutional conferen e should begin , in early March 4nd the Colonial Secretary had felt that it was impo tant to invite not only official bodies but also political parties, in order to ob ain the bro~dest possicle agreement. 125. Upon his arrival on 21 January, the New High Commissioner, Sir Richard Turnbull, had iwmediately entered into discussions with the Ministers of the ederal and State Governments and leaders of the political parties on the compl x questions regarding the agenda and representation at the conference. On 21 F bruary the Federal Ministers had published a statement to the effect that they would not be able to attend the conference unless there could be further loca consultations to work out a ur;iited front and unless representatives of all States includine; the States o.f the Eastern Aden Protectorate, attended the conferenc as full participants. On 23 February the Aden State Government had resigne, stating as the reason its disagreement with the High Commissioner ove~ a stron ly worded counter-statement which some Aden Ministers had wished to issue but which. the Hig)1 Commissioner had thought would be inappropriate in the circums ances. 126. The Colonial Secretary had then reluctantly agreed that the co ference would have to be post:Qoned, sinc,e sorae particants essential for full repr sentation were not willinc; tc:i attend. One ::>f t he ms.in tasks of the Cc:ilonial Se ere ary and t he Higl} Cor::r.nssi·::>ner . . since. th.e pos t poncmen t "'ua d b een _,_uO naintain. . . tJ.~ e m'.Jmen t m o f d.iscussion . '.JD thG next steps of consti tuti::mal advance. They had discussed pr posals · designed to further political and constituti'.Jnal proGress in the ar1a and to prvmote co-cpcrati·:::m between the Governments '.Jf the Terri t'.Jry and t he poli t c&l parties. • Consulto.tions on those proposals were still activelv proceeding bet een the High Commissi'.Jner and Government, S·cate and political leaders, and the C lonial Secretar~r hoped to make a further statement after their completion. 127. The United Kingdom rcprcsGntative felt bound to draw the Commi tee's attention t·.J the c.Jntinued acts of terrorisn and criminal violence wllich had ccurred in Aden o.nd other parts of the are2. and uhich were aimed at o"~structin t he proe;ress . of the Federatisn of South Arabia to f ull independence. Ht ref erre . in particular to the repeated attacks by nrned bands from the Yemen and ~he recen serious si tuati.Jn in thf Federal State of Beihan resulting from attacks by rtillerv and "' A/Ac.109/L.236 English Page 36 aircraft. Those attacks, which had been reported in detail in Sir Roger Jackling ' s letters of 22 March, 5 April and 7 April (s/6252, s/6272 and s/6276), and other acts of aggression were completely contrary to the Security Council's resolution s/5690 and to the Declaration on the granting of independence to ., colonial countries and peoples, inasmuch as they were designed t o obstruct progress to independence. 128. Despite differences of view which were only natural in a country of such diversity and at a time of rapid tr&nsition, the people of South Arabia were I determined to ga;in full independence and had already made considerable progress towards that end. It was therefore difficult for them to understand why their Arab neighbours were opstructing their progress by promoting violence, murder, t hreats and subversion. 1/hile such acts would not deter the inhabitants of the area from gaining independence, they meant that some of the resources of the Federation had to be diverted f r om economic and social development t o· defence and secµrity, and that might well help to delay constitutional i:rogress. 129. The general aim of the Special Committee, as he understood it, namely to bring about the earliest possible independence of South Arabia in accordance with the wishes of its people and the principle _of self-determination, coincided with 'it the. policy of the United Kingdom Government . 130. Wbile the delegations in the Special Committee could all state, and perhaps agree upon, the long-term aims and objectives in Soµth Arabia, there remained the task of translating them into practical reality. The United Kingdom Government was not committed to any particular constitutional system for South Arabia, and it was surely for the people of South Arabia to decide their future system of , ' J, government rather than to have a constitutional framework ~mposed from outsi de . It was to that end that the dialogue between the United Kingdom Government and the leaders of the Arab peoples in Aden and South Arabia was being carried on. There would naturally be disagreements and setbacks, but t he United Kingdom was determined to fol;Low paths which were acceptable t o the largest possible majority of the people. The United Kingdom delegation looked to the United Nati ons for encouragement and understanding in the fulfilment of th~ United Kingdom's declared int~ntion to grant independence to South Arabia by 1968 . 131. The representative of Syria expressed his delegation' s gr atitude to the Cl1airman and members of the Sub- Committee on Aden, as also to the pecretariat, for the enlightening report submitted by the Sub- Committee (see annex) . • 41:t ~¥(!: I. ,,:,, ',, "' ~ ~ ~'1 l32. His delegation found it disturbing that, in his statement at previous meeting, Kingdom representative had slandered Aden 's Arb neighbours and had failed to ake constructive proposals for withdrawing United K forces from Ad n, liquidating the military base there and granting and unconditio al independence. Instead of suggesting measures fo implementing the resolutionf of the Special Committee and the General Assembly, in particular General Assembly resolution 1514 (xv), the United Kingdom represen ative had given the Committee hn account of the visit made by the Colonial Secreta y and had spoken of "aggression and subversive activities from across the border". He had quoted the Colonia;l. Secre~ary as having referred to nbrutal, senseless and co ardly terrorism" in Aden. The whole world knew, however, that military operations ·n the Territory 1.;rere continuin~ unabated, that repressive measures were being enac ed against . pol;i.tical leadfrs and that innocent civilians were being subjected to bombings. 133. The Commi~tee had been told that it was the United Kingdom's olicy that there should be an iidependent Arab State in South Arabia by 1968. The uestion, however, had already been under discussion in the United Nations for severa . years and a further delay ~f three years was unacceptable to the people of Ade . The Colonial Secretary had attributed the postponement of the cpnstitutional co ference to the fact that certain persons were unwilling to attend. He had failed to mention that I many of the inqlividuals in question wer.e eitber in detention or in exile, as was ind;i.cated in tltJ.e Sub-Committee's report. 134. The Uniteo. Kingdom representative had spoken of the exercise f self- • determination lY the people of Aden, but he had not told the Commi tee how that could be achieted. In point of fact, Aden was still being denied elf-determination and freedom of speech. As the United Kingdom representative him?e f ha~ informed the Committee, the Aden State Government had resigned on 23 Februa y be<.::ause of the Rigµ Commissio! er's refusal to permit them to issue a certain stat ment. 135. In a statJment at the 314th meeting, he had asked a series of questions concerning the lUnited Kingdom 's real aim in Aden, but so far there had been no rep;l.y from the United Kingdom reprcsEntative. 136. His delegj tion had boped that the new Labour Government of th United Kingdom would co-operate with the United Nations in granting independence o Aden, but it did not appear to pe doing so. He recalled that on 17 June 1964, becoming Prime Minister) Mr . Harold Wilson had said that the need Aden A/AC.l09/L.236 English '' Page 38 11 as an essential centre for peace-keeping operationsn. The Labour Government was apparently adhering to t hat position, which was at variance with all :the resplutions adopted by the Special Committee and the General Assembly. l37• Since, in his statements in the Sub- Committee on Aden and in the Cow.mittee itself, the United Kingdom representative had failed to indicate what practical steps his Government would take to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee, the Syrian delegation wished to put the following questions to hi m: ' (1) wny bad the ycnr 1968, rather than l965 or l966, been chosen f er the gr anting of independenc e to the Territory? (2) What kind of constitution would emerge after a further delay of three years? (3 ) What kind of independence was the United Kingdom planning to grant to the people of Ad en? (4) What was to be the basis of the unitary State to which the United Kingdom representative had referred? (5) Could the United Kingdom representative gi ve the Committee more details about the constitutional discussions, such as where they were being conducted, with whom, and in what context? He was certain that the Committee could tolerate no further del ay, since five years had passed since the adoption of General Assembly .resolution l514 (:CV ) and the situation in Aden was growing more critical every day. (6 ) Why had the pub- Committee 's request to visit the Territory been denied? (7) How could Mr . Wilson's statement of 17 J une l964, to which he had just referred, be reconciled with the United Kingdom Government ' s determination to grant i ndependence to Aden? 1ij1at had the United Nations peace-keeping operations to do with the question of Aden? Could the Prime Minister i mpose Aden on the United Nations as 11 an essential centre for peace-keeping operations 11 ? (8) When would the political detainees be freed and those in exile be returned t o their homeland to participate in shaping its future destiny? (9) When would the state of emergency be ended and the curfew lifted? (10) whe n would the United Kingdom stop its aggression, air bombardments and mil}tary operations in Aden? 138 . Those questions called for i mmed i ate replies and quick action. V I 139, He went ~n to quote certain passages :from an article by tinguished Arab scholar, Dr. r aiz Saigh, according to whom the situation in Aden as a re;Uection of the larger co frontation between Arab nationalism and B~itish im Having ., been ousted om Suez and other military bases, Dr. Saigh wrote, he United Kingtl.om was now clin ·ng desperately to Aden as a last refuge o maintain its influence in he Arab world. Dr. Saigh concluded his article by nationalists were irreconcilably opposed to the existence of Uni ed Kingdom military , bases on theilr soil because those bases were an infringement of sovereignty abd were used for aggression against Arab countries, reactionary J,ocal Arab regimes and to place the Arab world in th "sphere of influence" and thus involve it in that countryts inte ational conflicts and alignmentj~. Dr. Saigh rs article reflected the views of the i_an delegation. 140. His delegation would vote in favour of the adoption of the b-Ccm:ni tt ee' s report since it found the report constructive, factual unreservedly r upported its findings and conclusions, 141. He drew attention to the latest developments in Aden, as re recent ' Press dispatches. According to the 27 April issue of The Times f London, members of the Aden 1Jegislative Council had expressed suspicion that the British were ,. behind terrotist activities in Aden, and the Council had ad.opted a motion requesting the High Conm+issioner to end the state of emergency, release all detainees, permit the return o~ exiles and restore full public freedom. Mr. Abdul ~awee Mackawee, the Chief MiJister, had stated that there could be no peace ors ability without a settlement in accordance with the United Nations resolutions and wit hout an end to provocations against the Yemen Republic and to the aid being giv n to the Yemeni royalists. {According to a Reuters dispatch of 28 April, Mr. Ma kawee had called ,,, for independence from the United Kingdom and negotiations on the the United Kingdom military base at Aden. He had said that Aden no anger had f aith in the Unite1 Kingdom and he had called for the establishment of a provisional k I government to negotiate a date for the granting of independence d to arrange for the transfer of power from the colonial Administration. He had so sai d t hat a constitutiot conference would be of no use at the present time I ... f , A/Ac.109/1.236 English Page 40 fi 1LQ. His delegation felt that, in view of the critical nature of the situation in Aden, the Committee should adopt a resolution calling for the following: (1) Immediate and full implementation by the United Kingdom Government of all the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee. • \ (2) Immediate ending of the state of emergency. (3) Immediate lifting of the curfew. J ( 4) Cessation of all military and naval oper~tions against the people of Aden and the Protectorates. (5) Immediate repeal of all laws restricting public freedom. (6) Advancement of the date of independence. (7) An early invitation from the United Kingdom Government to the Sub-Committee on Aden to visit the Territory. (8) Immediate dismantlement of all military and naval bases and withdrawal of all United Kingdom armed forces. (9) Drawing the Security Council's attention to the critical and explosive situation in the Territory. f (10) Assistance by Member States, the United Nations the specialized agencies ,,\II and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent to the civilian '"'111. sk population, which had suffered as a result of the military operations. ,: .. ~ (11) Constant review of the question by the Sub-Committee on Aden, which would report, as necessary, on any new developments in the Territory. ' I /AC.109/L.236 nglish age 41 143. The representative of the United Arab Republic thanked the Committee for having g anted his request, on behalf of his Government, to ddress it on the f question of den. The concern of the United Arab Republic at th unfortunate _, situation in Aden and Aden Protectorate had been constantly expr ssed, both in and outside he United Nations, and its sole purpose in particip ting in the Committee 1 s eliberations was to contribute to a solution in ace rdance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the grantin of independence to colonial countries and peoples, The United Arab Republic had always followed with great iihterest the Committee I s efforts to fulfil its noble andate of bringing colonial peoples to independence and had helped in the eneral Assembly to formulate decisions based on the conclusions and recornmendati ns of the Committee. 144. He woulf like first to submit a few observations on the dis barge by the administering Power of its responsibilities under Article 73 (e) of the Charter. , .. The United Kingdom Government continued to submit information to the Secretary •, General on Aden but had never submitted information on Aden Prat ctorate, and the Special Committee was only in a position to discuss the situ tion in the Protectorate because of the existence of a federation comprising Aden itself. 145. General Assembly resolutions 742 (VIII) and 1541 (XV) gave lear definitions of a Non-Sel~-Governing Territory, and under its mandate the Spe ial Committee was required to study the situation in all Non-Self-Governing an Trust Territories. He therefore considered that it was time the Special Committee d ew up a ' I comprehensive list of all Territories to which the Declaration o the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples applied, so that he people of those Territories could know what was their status and what kind of relations they could enter into with independent countries. 146. With regard to the Special Cammi ttee I s degree of participat · on and responsibiliuy in the process whereby Non-Self-Governing Territo ies developed towards self~government, he wondered whether the populations of hose Territories I ... A/AC.109/L.236 English Page 42 were participating actively in that process. Whereas certain ad.ministering Powers accepted observation, and sometimes supervision, of the plebiscites held in the Territories under their administration, others did not even accept a visit by a sub-coIJD.llittee of the Special Committee. It was hard to understand why in certain situations the administering Power was unable to convene a constitutional : conference, while in a different situation the same Power imposed agreements, conventions and sometimes constitutions without a proper consultation. Surely all ' the administering Powers should be guided by the same principles in administering Non-Self-Governing Territories. It was that inconsistency and the systematic flouting by the administering Power of the recommendations of the Special Committee and the General Assembly that accounted for its continuing failure to solve the problem. 147. The failure of the United Kingdom Government to settle the question of Aden was clearly demonstrated in its resort to the use of force in the Radfan Mountains area. After brutal attacks against the defenceless population, United Kingdom I troops had searched the villages and camps for the tribesmen, but had found them completely deserted, their former inhabitants fearing to be murdered by the Power that pretended to protect them. Nothing had been found to substantiate the slanderous claim that those tribesmen were receiving arms and ammunition from abroad. / 14B . According to a Minister of the so-called Federation of South Arabia, the reasons for the unrest in Radfan were purely economic and a reflection of the widespread dissatisfaction with prevailing cond·itions. Furthermore, a touchy political issue involving the plans of the former High Commissioner in Aden lay .. behind the unrest. 149. As the former Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, had conceded in the House of Commons, there had been a long history of resentment and rebellion in that area. Following its seizure of the Port of Aden in 18.39, the United Kingdom had occupied the country by force and it continued to remain there by the use of force. The United Kingdom policy in Men was fragmentation of the territory and its isolation from the Arab world. Realizing that it could neither stay forever by the use of force nor withstand the overwhelming force of Arab nationalism, the United ~ ~ Kingdom had created a fictitious Federation and in March 196.3 had forced Aden to •✓ accede to that Federation without any consultation of the people of Aden or of the Aden Protectorate. A/AC 109/1.236 Engl sh Page 43 150. The question of Aden and the Aden Protectorate had been und r constant consideratio · by the United Nations since 1962, when a number of petitioners had addressed th mselves to the Special Committee. In resolutions a opted in May and July 1963, t,e Special Committee had expressed its deep concern t the critical I situation in the Territory as a result of the denial of politica rights and the detention of nationalist leaaers - a situation that continued to deteriorate and was likely td threaten international peace and security. 151. Following its adoption of resolution 1949 (XVIII), the dene al Assembly had on 16 December 1963 adopted resolution 1972 (XVIII) expressing is concern at the situation re,ulting from the declared state of emergency and at he arrests, detentions ajd deportations, which constituted a denial of funda ental rights and endangered p,ace and security in the regio,n. In resolutions ado ted on 9 April and 11 May 1964 (A/5800/Add.4, paras. 166 and 202), the Special Com ittee had again expressed its deep concern at the continued deterioratiqn of the situation and had reaffirmed that the ma intenance of the military base in Aden was prejudicial to peace and seourity and that its removal was therefore desirable. 152. Despite all those recommendations and resolutions, the Secu ity Council resolution 01 9 April 1964 (188 (1964)), the United Kingdom Gove nment continued to deploy its forces in Aden and the Aden Protectorate, and even outside the borders, and was purs1ing dangerous policies at a time when great efforts were being exerted to lessen international tension. The present United Kingdom Gov rnment, like its predecessor, continued to defy United Nations resolutions, as we 1 as the appeals of the League of Arab States and the Second Conference of the He or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. 153. World i9dignation at the policies of suppression in Aden an the Aden Protectorate ~ad been shared by public opinion in the United In a letter published in the Daily Telegraph of 9 May 1964, Mr . Ber/rand Rusell had stated that the attempt to drum up war hysteria in South Arabia was no ontribution to peace or to the British national interest and that the sensible bing would be to assist those ~ho would eventually form a government of the popul and to contribute to economic welfare in the area, in the interests of and international co-operation. He had added that attempts on the p Western Powers to dom[nate or undermine the economic and political devel of the Afro- Asian world wpuld only result in authoritarianism, suffering and instability. A/AC.109/L.236 English Page 44 154, Surely, the United Kingdom Government did not believe that a fake federation would survive and that it could guarantee the functioning of a military base surrowided by hostile peoples . 155, The demands of the overwhelming majority of the population, which had been made abundantly clear on several occasions , were: an immediate end to colonial rule; dissolution of the Federation, through which the United Kingdom controlled internal and external affairs, and separated the South from the Northern Yemen ; supervised elections or plebiscite with a United Nations presence during a transitional period; evacuation of the military base and other military installations; and unification of the area. I 156 . The failure of United Kingdom policy in Aden and Aden Protectorate had been clearly demonstrated by various resignations of ministers, the boycott of elections by popular organizations and political parties, and the withdrawal from the Constitutional Conference convened for June 1964 of the very people whom the United Kingdom had thought would be co-operative but who had found its plans untenable and were now among the strongest of its critics. 157. The situation seemed to have entered a new phase since Mr. Mackawee had become Chief Minister. It was significant that twelve opposition members of the South Arabian Federation Council had given outspoken support to the Chief Minister in his warning to the United Kingdom not to delay the fulfilment of his people's aspirations to independence and his demand for implementation of the United Nations resolut ions on Aden. Furthermore, a spokesman for the National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South had stated that the Chief Minister's demands coincided with those of the Front. For the first time, therefore, there appeared to be a really "legitimate" opposition to the United Kingdom plans. 158, The non- committal statement of t he Col onial Office t hat the United Kingdom Government wanted to start talks on the future status of South Arabia as quickly as possible did not constitute any advance. The crux of the matter was whether the United Kingdom was willing to allow the area self-determination. The refusal to admit United Nations bodies into the area raised suspicions about the United Kingdom attitude and made it doubtful whether opposition views would be given sufficient expression or consideration at the talks proposed by the United Kingdom. 159 . There was no indication that any change had taken place in the British conception of independence, which embodied only nominal independence while maintaining the area under British influence. Self-determination was the only answer. /AC.109/L.236 nglish age 45 160. The United Arab Republic delegation recolllillended that the Sp cial Committ ee should again[request the United Kingdom Government to implement neral Assembly resolution 1, 49 (XVIII). It would be necessary for the Sp~ci al ommittee, through its Sub - Commi ttee, to enter into illlillediate talks with the Uni ted Kingdom Government and perhaps ix a target date f or their conclusion, when the que tion could again Q be considere by the Special Committee. The Committee might als deem it necessary to draw the attention of the Security Council to the conditions n the territory, in order t ~ avoid any further deterioration of the situation. e United Kingdom must evacuat e its military base in Aden, which was maintained o y for aggressive purposes . T~e situation in that area was ample proof of the dan ers created by the presence of foreign military bases. There was no need to co vince the members of the Special Committee that the arguments of the United Kingdo Government for maintaining military bases in Aden and elsewhere were unfounded. 161. The representative:; of _?:r aq said that t he si t uation in Aden, instead of improving as had been hoped, seemed to be deteriorating. The pe ple were living in intolerabi e conditions as a result of the continuance of t he tate of emergency, the suppressJon of individual freedom, and mass detentiQns. Yet the people of Aden were mo te determined than ever to achieve their national go ls. A declaration ,y the principal nationalist organizations and leade shad recently been publish din Cairo, in which they had called for tne immedi te implementation of the Unite Nations resolutions on Aden. The-Chief Minister of Aden had made the same deJ nd in his statement before the Legislative Council, quoted in r,aragraph 22 c:f the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden (see a ex), where refere ce was made also to a cable sent to the Uni ted King om Colonial Secretary by the Ministers of-Aden likewise requesting ihe imple entation of United Nat ions resolutions. 162 . His delegation had hoped t hat the statement of the United K ngdom representative (see par as . 122-130 above ) would be such as to al ay the Corrrrnitte0 1 s fears . That statement had, however, been negati•-e in nature. T e border incidents on which the United Kingdom representative had dwelt were irrele ant to t he Committeets work and outside its terms of reference . With regar to t he implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independenc to colonial I ... A/AC ._109 /L .236 English Page 46 countries and peoples, the United Kingdom representative's statement that it was his Government rs intention to grant independence to the territory by 1968 seemed to lack a sense of urgency. 163. Past United Nations resolutions had called on the administering Power to arrange for the early removal of the military base in Aden, to guarantee basic freedoms, to effect constitutional changes with a view to the establishment of a representative legislative body and of a provisional government, and to co-operate in arranging for a United Nations presence during the elections held for that purpose. Those just demands had now been reiterated by the Chief Minister of Aden . In a cable published by The Times of London, the Chief Minister had called for the removal of the base and had asked for an impartial body to be sent by the United Nations, composed of people from countries without interests in the area, to be present before and during elections based on universal adult suffrage. On the arrival of that body, the United Kingdom should dissolve the Aden and South Arabian federal legislative bodies and abolish the Aden and federal Conotituticns, the 1959 Treaty of Friendship and Protection and all similar treaties. The United Kingdom High Commissioner should surrender his supreme powers and withdraw all political officers and advisers. A provisional government should then be set up, composed of persons acceptable to all groups. That government, to be guided by an interim constitution, should be in office for only one year, during which it should prepare for and conduct elections for a central parliament. The parliamentrs first task would be to set up a committee, including Arab legal experts, to prepare a constitution. 164. It was also a matter of concern that the administering Power had not allowed the Sub-Committee on Aden to enter the Territory, obliging it to go to neighbouring countries to hear petitioners. The only possible conclusion was that the administering Power was determined that the world should not know the true facts. 165. The deterioration of the situation in Aden was evidenced by petitions and telegrams received by the Committee and reports which had appeared in the United Kingdomrs own Press. The state of emergency, the curfew, military operations and the detention of patriotic elements of\ the population had become permanent aspects ' ' T A C.109/1.236 E lish e 47 of Aden life. ~he only solution lay in the speedy implementation o General Assembly resolu ions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII). His delegation a pealed to the administering P wer to respect the wishes of the people of Aden and Southern Arabia) whose w lfare and independence was a matter of concern tote Arab peoples and to all free om-loving peoples of the world, who would continue o support the struggle for fr edom in Southern Arabia. 166. The repres 1 ntative of Ethiopia congratulated the Sub-Ccrrmi ttee on Aden ~ on its report on the situation in the Territory (see annex). The r port showed that) although some progress had been made, the situation was still far f om satisfactory. 167. 'I'he progreks made included the administering Power's acceptanc of the concept of a unitary sot ereign State comprising all the States of South Ara ia, the Aden Government's re:peal on 30 March 1965 of the Industrial Relations Or inance, which bad seriously i t terfered with workers' rights, and the visit to the Territory by a representativ of the International Red Cross. 168. Unfortunately, despite those few signs of goodwill on the part of the administering Pd:lwer, the fact rema:imed that United Nations resoluti ns on Aden were still not being implemented. He deplored, inter alia 1 the pos ponement of the constitutional t onfere'nce that was to have been held in Lofdon in M r~h 1965, the continuation of the state of emergency, which was helping to create a chaotic situation in Aden State) and the continuation of military operation against the people of the Ttritory. 169. The Sub-Co ittee 1 s report gave a very clear picture of the si uation and it was now the tasf of the Committee to make recommendations which wou d facilitate ·• the implementation of the General Assembly's decisions. 170. Recalling iis delegation's position on the question, be observ d that the problem was to iransfer power to the people in accordance with the elevant resolutions, i.e. General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 ( VIII). Hence, even at the present late stage, the United Kingdom should be urged nee again to comply with tho}e resolutions and to repeal the laws which restrict d public freedoms, to rel ease political prisoners , to allow the return of po itical exiles and to cease forthwith all repressive action against the people. I should also be urged to convene without delay a constitutional conference at which all segments \" -tf ./''Ii of public in the Territory were represented. ~ ~ ti:·~ \ opinir 1 'f {I ~ r ' '' .,. ' l1 ~ . I f i, 1c ./~ h " I-• ,, • A/Ac.109/1.236 English Page 48 171. His delegation was prepared to take part in working out recommendations along those lines. 172, The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the reason the Special Committee was obliged to resume its consideration of the question of the United Kingdom possessions in Aden and South Arabia was that the administering Power, by continuing the state of emergency, banning political parties and trade unions, depriving the people of their elementary rights and employing terror and arbitrary methods, showed that it was unwilling to give up its rule over the Arab population, a rule which served only the administering Power's own interests. The United Kingdom's refusal to carry out the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee had aroused the indignation of the Arab people and had forced them to take up arms. The situation had deteriorated so greatly that it had become explosive. Yet the statements made by the leaders of the British Labour Party before and immediately after the Party's accession to power had aroused high hopes. For example, Mr. Gordon-Walker, the former Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, had stated that his Government was prepared to establish better relations with the Arab countries and Arab nationalists. Unfortunately, subsequent events had shown that those statements had been made only for propaganda purposes and to win votes for the Labour Party. The new - United Kingdom Government was continuing its predecessor's policy and was doing nothing to implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII), in particular: the political prisoners had not been released, the exiles had not been allowed to return to their country, repressive action had not ceased, the laws restricting freedom had not been repealed and the state of emergency had not been terminated. The United Kingdom Government had refused the Sub-Committee on Aden permission to visit the Territory and it not only refused to dismantle its military base but was, in fact, strengthening it. The situation was very tense and constituted a threat to international peace and security. 173. In his statement at the 329th meeting of the Committee, the United Kingdom representative had set forth his Government's policy in Aden. That statement, which had been as disappointing as those made by his predecessors, had been a veritable defence of colonialist policy. The United Kingdom representative had held the Arabs responsible for the criminal acts committed by the United Kingdom I / ... A AC.l09jL.236 E glish P ge 49 authorities, lad not stated what his Government intended to do in order to implement Gen ral Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) and had not ma ea single specific new roposal. He had merely sought to convince the Comm ttee that his Government, i~ its efforts to find a solution to the constitution 1 problem and ' to enable the Territory to attain independence in 1968 within the framework of a unitary Statel was meeting with opposition from the Arabs. The c itical situation in he Territory, he had contended, was caused by the p licy of the neighbouring rab States and the Arab nationalists, who were carr ing out acts of sabotage a~d terror. The United Kingdom representative had ma e vague promises about independence for the peoples of Aden and about the r right of self-determination, but he had not said a word about the powers t be exercised by the future unitary State. 174. The purpose of all that was clear: the United Kingdom was se king a new type of colonial ~le which would permit it to maintain its hegemony i the area. The London Government was said to be making plans to lease the milita y base at Aden. He recalled i* that connexion the United Kingdom Prime Minister's statement on 16 December 1964 that the United Kingdom could not give up its yo ld role "east of Suez" and therefore needed all its bases. That policy was not ne ; it had been inherited from the Conservative Government and wa 9 supported byte bankers of the City of LQndon. It was prompted by economtc and military con iderations: the aim was to protect the :i.nterests of the oil companies, Royal Dute Shell and British Petroieum, in that region. Moreover, since the evacuatio of Suez, Aden had become an important link in the chain of United Kingdom milit ry bases and was being usea, inter alia, as a relay station for United Kingdom troops on their way to Malaysia. Everyone knew the purpose of those military bass: it was from the United Ki,gdom island of Ascension that Belgian paratroopers ad left in • United States aircraft to fight the Congolese rebels at Stanleyvi le. 175. The United Kingdom representative's efforts to demonstrate t e usefulness of establishing a unitary State were deceiving no one and the United Kingdom's policy continued to be based on the old principle of "divide and e". Despite the manoeuvres being made for the purpose of placating them,the A ab inhabitants were demanding the right of self-determination. The Chief Minist r of Aden had rejected the lSeudo-independence that the United Kingdom was tryi g to impose on his countrz; he had just stated that the constitutional confer nee to be held ' I 'ti .~~t,~ le. A/Ac.109/L.236 English Page 50 in London would be of no use at the pr esent time , and, l i ke t he Aden Legislative Council, he was demanding the implementation of the United Nations resolutions and the immediate granting of independence. While there was therefore no question that ~ Aden and South Arabia would attain independence, the price they would have to pay for it depended essentially on the United Kingdom. 176. The Special Committee, for its part, should assist the Arab inhabitants in their fight for independence, demand that the United Kingdom should withdraw its forces from the Territory and liquidate its military base, condemn the United Kingdom ' s present policy and urge that the resolutions of the Committee and the General Assembly should be put in effect. The only possible solution to the question of Aden lay in the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples . ,e., 177. His delegation felt that the Cammi ttee should request the Security Council to ~ " consider the question of the threat to peace and security resulting from the policy of violence and arbitrary action which the administering Power was pursuing in ~~ Aden and the Protectorates. It would support any proposal designed to liquidate colonial rule in Aden and South Arabia. 178 . The representative of Yugoslavia recalled that his delegation had stated on a number of occasions that the immediate and unconditional elimination of the last remnants of colonialism was one of the major problems of the day and that its solution was an essential prerequisite to the stabilization of international relations and the maintenance of peace. The solution of the problem must, however, be in accord with the spirit of the Charter and the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples; it must, in other words, fully respect the rights and interests of the people of the territories in question. 179. 'I'he people of Aden and the Protectorates had -been fighting for freedom and independence for a long time and had the support of world public opinion. His • own country hoped that they would soon join the Arab community and other sovereign peoples in freedom and independence. If the administering Power, the United Kingdom, had taken the aspirations and interests of the indigenous population into account and had implemented the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Committee would not have had to consider the question of Aden. 180. The United Kingdom representative had indeed stated, at the 329th meeting, that "the general aim of the Special Committee, namely to bring about the earliest possible independence of South Arabia in accordance with the wishes of its people A/ C.109/1. 236 En lish Pae 51 and the pr incipl e of self- determination, coincided with t~e policy of the United Kingdom Govern 1 ent", which ·rrwas determined to follow .paths which ere acceptable to the l argest possible majority of the peopl e". The true facts w re, however, quite differen , and the situation in Aden must still be regarded s very serious. I n the conclus ons to its report (see annex), the Sub-Committee ha deplored the fact that 1he resolutions of the Special Committee and the Gen ral Assembly, in particul ar resolution 1949 (XVIII), were still not being implem nted by the administering tower and that the state of emergency had not been 1 fted and many of the laws restricting publ ic freedom were still in effect (para. 25 ). 'I'he Sub - Committee fuad also noted with concern that the policies being ursued by t he admini stering Power in the Territory continued to give rise to ten ion in the area, that the United Kingdom was still carrying out military operations against the peopl e of the Territory and that its decision to maintain its mili ary base in Aden added to j he aggravat ion of the state of tension. That was w y the Sub- Committee [ onsidered that the situation in the area was still ritical and even expl osive and shoul d be closely followed so that if necessary it could be drawn to the attention of the Security Council (ibid., para. 26). 181. The Aden J inisters and Legislative Council were of the same o inion as the Sub- Committee. [ On 19 April 1965 , the Chief Minister of Aden had a ked the United Kingdom to implement the resolutions of the United Nations and the eby achieve a political settiement of the problems of South Arabia. He had aske for the lifting of the state ol emergency, the release of all prisoners, the retur of exiles and the full restoJation of publ ic freedoms. The United Kingdom alone he had said, held the key to peace and must realize that there could be no peac or stability until the question had been settled in accordance with the resolut ons of the General Assembly and until the provocations against the Yemen Repu lie caused by suppl ying aid to the Yemeni Royalists had been ended. For its par, the Congress " of the Nationa1 Organizations of the Arabian South, which had been held r ecently at Cairo, had ~xpressed its disapproval of United Kingdom policy i the Territory and had asked for the immediate implementation of the General Asse bly resolutions . Furthermore, the many petitions received from the Territo~y expres ed, without exception, the same desire and criticized the United Kingdom's pol cy. 182 . 'I'he statement made by the representative of the administering Power with regard to its policy and the way in which that policy was implemented in he Territory did not, however, doincide. It seemed clear that the present United K ngdom Government was continuing to operate according to the colonialist principles hich had A/AC.109/L. 236 English Page 52 characterized the policy of its predecessors. It was difficult to see what practical effects could be expected from that policy so long as the indigenous ~ population was not free to express itself on the question of its future or so long as the curfew and the state of emergency were not lifted, repressive military actions were being taken and the United Kingdom insisted on retaining its military bases. 'I'hat policy was, in fact, diametrically opposed to the wishes of the people , and contrary to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII), which, according to the United Kingdom representative, formed the basis of his Government's J policy in the area. 183. Any attempt to blame the Yemen Republic and other Arab States for the present situation in Aden and the Protectorates was unjustified, since the situation had been provoked by the United Kingdom's coloni al policy and by the resistance of the people of the Territory, who wanted freedom and independence wi thout further delay.. The administering Power, which continued to defer the granting of independence to Aden and the Protectorates and the implementation of the General t Assembly resolutions, was alone responsible. Its inability to solve a problem which was becoming every more acute was a direct threat to the security of the Yemen Republic and other neighbouring States, while its insistence on retaining the base in Aden gave rise to doubts as to its intentions. 'I·he United Kingdom representative had stated that his country had hoped that it could count on the encouragement and understanding of the United Nations. It could do so, provided that it showed a genuine readiness to join the United Nations in achieving a rapid solution to the question of Aden and the Protectorates in the interests of the people of the Territory. For his delegation, as for the Sub-Committee, there was only one solution: the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and of the resolutions of the General Assembly. 'I'he measures set forth in those resolutions were in accord with the wishes of the people and political parties of the Territory ~ and took their interests into account; they were also likely to promote the future relations between the United Kingdcm and the Arab world. His delegation would support any proposal based on this principles. 184. 'I'he representative of the United Republic of Tanzania congratulated the Sub-Committee on its interesting report (see annex) but noted with regret that the statements of the United Kingdom representative had contributed nothing -: (:,; substantially new. 'I'he administering Power was trying to divert attention from C.109/L.236 lish ge 53 the real issue by making accusations about subversive activities incursions into the ory of Aden. Such accusations were not new; they been made in Southern Rhode ia, Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Gu·nea with the aim of transformin those Territories into military-states and their eople into slaves. It wa a fact that the people of Aden were struggling to 0 egain their independence ara that, despite all the excuses of the administeri g Power, history was on their s~ae. ~ 185. In any event, the situation in Aden had deteriorated. The U ·tea Kingdom representative was trying t o absolve his country from resiPonsibili y for the disorders in the Territory resulting from the colonialist methods sea there. In paragraph 19 otf its report (see annex), the Sub-Committee ad noted "that the United Kinpdom continues to carry out military operations agai st the people of the Territory". However, no military force would prevent ople of Aden from triumphing in their struggle for independence; examples t ki nd abounded all over the wbrld. 186 . The Unite~ Krngdom representative had told the Committee that his Government intended "to grant independence to South Arabia by 1968 11, ostensib y through negotiations. It mi ght therefore be asked why so many nationalist struggling for freedom had be~n imprisoned or e:;ciled and why a state of emergency had been imposed . I The United Kinfdom representative had added that his Government wa te9- to bring about the earliest possible independence of South Arabia "in accor anc.e with the wishes of its people and the principle of self-determination". question then was why the goirernment in power in Aden had warned the United King om against delay in fulfilling the people's aspirations and had emphasized th t the only solution open to the United Kingdom Government was to i mplement United Nations resolutions. The United Kingdom representative had said that his overnment did not intend to impose a particular constitutional syst em on South A abia. The question in th~t case was why it was imposing colonial domination, , restricting the freedom of the individual, to release all the political pri soners • and amnesty all exiles, to cease all military and para-military activities in the region, to allow the Sub-Committee to visit the Territory and, above all, to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, particularly General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 19Lr9 (XVIII). 188 . His delegation fully endorsed the conclusions of the Sub-Committee on Aden and hoped that through the understanding of the United Kingdcm Government the heroic people of South Arabia would at last be able to enjoy the fruits of their labour and to devote all their efforts to national reconstruction and progress, in f freedom and sovereignty and with the co-operation of all other countries. 189. The representative of Mali congratul ated the members of the Sub- Committee on ,.: Aden and the Secretariat on the excellent report (see annex) they had submitted on the situation in Aden, which constituted a permanent threat to neighbouring States. 190. As it had already said in the Special Committ ee and the General Assembly, Mali considered that Aden and the Protectorates were Non- Sel f - Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter and that the responsibilities of the United Kingdom towards the inhabitants ·Of those Territories were those defined in that Chapter. The situation in Aden and the Protectorates not only had all the appearances of the classical type of colonialism but was also a source of tension throughout the region, particularly along the border with Yemen. Mali therefore appreciated the concern of the Arab countries in that region over the e;dstence of a sizable United Kingdom military base in Aden, and it shared their feelings about its removal. Unfortunately the Labour Government had announced that it intended to keep the base as long as possible, thus showing that it paid no heed to the opinion of the countries of the region or to the resolutions of the Special Committee . 191. His delegation deplored the refusal of the United Kingdom to implement the ~ Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and ,. to allow the Sub-Committee on Aden to go to the Territory. The United Kingdom sought to justify its presence by the need to protect the people of South Arabia, but the military operations mentioned in the Sub-Committee 1 s report were incompatible with defence of the interests of the indigenous population, who .Q desired independence. Although the Uni tea Kingdom Goverri.ment seemed to have accepted the idea of a unitary State being set up in South Arabia, it had not yet taken any steps in that direction and was, on the cont rary, trying to preserve its regime in Aden with the support of ignorant and corrupt tribal chiefs who cared A; C.109/1.236 En lish Pae 55 little about the country 1 s economic and social developmJnt. The constitutional conferences heduled for 1965 had not been held, and it was not nown when and in what conditi ns it would be able to take place. The political 1 aders and exiled patriots wer therefore forced to resort to violence. The need or the United Kingdom Gove nment to take steps to combat what it called subver ion in the country proved, as w1s also apparent from the evidence gathered by the Sb-Committee, that its presence was becoming increasingly unpopular. The leaders o the country themselves, ~ncluding the Chief Minister of Aden, were demanding that the administerin4 Power should implement the resolutions of the Spec al Committee and the General As sembly. 192. The Uni~ed Kingdcm was intimating that it would grant indep ndence to Aden and the Protecto~ates in 1968 . Mali, for its part, asked the United Kingdom to do so without dela~ and with no conditions or reservations , in accorda ce with the wishes of the peopl~, and, to that end, to convene a conference for the purpose of drafting a ndw constitution, to remove its base from Aden, to re tore all individual f eedoms and to make all the sheikhdoms into a genuin unitary State with a repre entative Parliament and Government. 193. His del gation endorsed the report of the Sub-Committee on den and appealed to the United Kingdom to implement General Assembly resolutions 51L~ ( XV ) and 1949 (XVIII), in co-operation with the United Nations. The Unit d Kingdom could · bring the pe4ple of South Arabia something other than oppression Sincere co-operationl based not on the exploitation of one country by anther but on justice and friendsh"p and on equality and fraternity among States, coul and should exist in the regio. 19L~. The rep esentative of Tunisia congratulated the Sub-Cornmitt eon Aden on its excellent report and recommended that it should be adopted by th Committee. He nevertheless regretted that, five years after the adoption of th Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, he situation in Aden was sti11 giving rise to concern and was endangering these urity of the region. 195. AlthcugJ the changes in the United Kingdom administration h d given the people of Aden new tlope for speedy liberation, the profound aspirations of the people uf South Arabia for freedom and independence were still being ignor d. - The population was still being denied fundamental rights and freedoms; the army ruled supreme; the repression artd persecution of political leaders and nationalist ovements were continuing; ~nd thousands of persons were in prison awaiting tri 1. / ... · A/AC.109 /L.236 English Page 56 196. Not only had the state of emergency not been lifted since 1962, but fresh measures, including the curfew, had recently been taken to enable the anny and the police to go about their business unobserved. In addition, twenty-five vi~lages in the Dhala district had been destroyed by United Kingdom aircraft, and further reinforcements of troops and materiel were being landed. Such actions a.nd military preparations, combined with the repression and destruction of the population, were ~llii extremely alanning because they indicated that the United Kingdom Government intended to perpetuate its presence by force. That was particularly surprising as the new United Kingdom administration might have been expected to pursue a more realist ic policy in hannony with the resolutions of the United Nations and the legitimate aspirations of the inhabitants of Aden for sovereignty and independence. 197. His delegation))rotested against the campaign of terror being waged against the people of South Arabia and strongly denounced the manoeuvres of the administering Power to delay the achievement of independence by Aden and the Protectorates. Any further delay was unjustifiable not only because it was contrary to the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) and the wishes of the population but also because there had never before been better conditions for transferring to a people the responsibility for its future. 198. On 7 December 1964 the Governments of the Federation and of the States belonging to it had agreed to establish a sovereign unitary State of South Arabia on a sound democratic basis. On 19 April 1965 the Chief Minister of Aden had called on the United Kingdom to implement the United Nations resolutions in order to achieve a political settlement of the problems of South Arabia, and he had added that his Government was determined to make a firm stand in the face of any attempt to ignore the true aims of the people, and that it was in full agreement with major political organizations of the country. 199. While all conditions had been fulfilled for hastening the Territory's liberation, the administering Power's reluctance to satisfy the people's aspirations to sovereignty was only too evident. Its pretexts for delay only proved its wish to put obstacles in the way of decolonization. The Committee should be distrustful of manoeuvres intended to sidetrack the debate, and it should turn a deaf ear to the arguments of the administering Power, which cited the alleged designs of an t expansionist neighbour of South Arabia only in order to conceal the true problem. It must not be forgotten that the administering Power's essential task was to hasten the enslaved people's liberation and to lead them without delay to their independence. Any argumAnts that were irrelevant to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (xv) and 1949 (XVIII) should be put out of mind. J J,' 't: A/A .109/1.236 Eng ish Fag 57 200. In view If the gravity of the situation, his delegation appe led to the administering Power to give up its dilatory manoeuvres, to carry ut the General Assembly reso utions on Aden without delay and to ta.~e prompt and practical steps to restore to the people of South Arabia their most legitimate ri hts of ,, sovereignty~ d freedom. His delegation would support aQy action taken with those ends in view. 201. The repr sentative of Chile_~xpressed his delegaticn's conce n at the ' fact that although the question of Aden had been on the Special C mmittee's agenda for the last i hree years, no genuine progress had been made in th Territory. 202. Chile co sidered that the Sub-Committee's recommendations wee pertinent and in keeping wit h the facts of the situation. The United iingdom s ould apply to the Territory the provisions of resolution 1949 (XVIII), and to that nd should restore ,,,, all political and public liberties, stop persecuting the leaders . f the Territory, < release political detainees and put an end to military o~erations When those conditions we r e fulfilled, it should convene a constitutional con erence and hold ele.ctions on t he basis of universal adult suffrage. 203. The Unitl d Kingdom had announced its intention of granting i dependence to Aden in 1968; but the Chilean delegation hoped that sufficient pr gress would be made and that the Territory would be able to achieve complete ind pendence before !Ji. that date • _[ 204. Chile ap]ealed to the United Kingdom Government to carry out the terms of General Assemoly resolution 1949 (XVIII), in co-operation with th Special Committee, and in that way to contribute to the birth of another ree and sovereign nation. His f elegation would support any proposal aimed at givin the inhabitants of South Arabia the free exercise of all their rights. 205. The reprfsentative of Italy congratu~ated the members of the Sub - Committee on Aden for having presented, in their brief report, a complete p· cture of a complex and constantly changing situation. 206. In his of inion, four recent developments indicated ~n improv ment in the situation. 207. Firstly, the agreement concluded by the Ministers of Aden an of the Federation ofl: South Arabia and approved by the United Kingdom Gov rnment provided I I ... j A/AC.1J9/L.236 English Page 58 :for the establishment, on a sound democratic b2.sis, of a sovereign unitary State comprising all the States of South Arabia. That c7ecision was consistent with the spirit and letter of General Asse1i1bly resolution 19L!-9 (XVIII) , and was encouraging in that it indicated that the Co1mnittee' s resolutions were not a dead letter, as might sometimes be felt. ' 208 . The second si gn of change was the United Kingdom Government's renewed assurance that independence would be granted to a unified State of South Arabia not later than 196J , and that, accordi ng to the United Kingdom Coloni al Secretary 's statement of 11 Decemb er 1961!-, steps would be worked out so as to command the widest measure of support . 209 . Thirdly, Mr. Abdul Qawee Hackaw ee, Chief Minister of Aden, had recently pledged to make a firm stand in the face of an;y attempt to i gnore the true aims of the people . His stand would reassure those who might have feared that the local authorities in Aden and the Federation did not trul y represent public opinion in the Territory. 210 . Finally, the decision to repeal the Industrial Relations Ordinance was also a move in the right direction, since its aim was to restore the atmosphere of detente necessary for the Territory's peaceful progress towards self-determination and independence . 211. It was in the light of those positive elements that the negative elements of the situation, i.e. the difficulties which had delayed the convening of a constitutional conference, should be assessed. 'i!hile sharing the Sub-Committee's view that the administering Pouer had shown an apparent willingness to widen the representation at the conference, his delegation had not been able to determine precisely the viewpoints of the various political parties in the Territory on that subject. He would only point out that the murder threats published in a newspaper against persons attending the London conference indicated a disturbi ng divisi on of public opinion a s to the best way of moving towards independence and as to the nature and structure of the future independent State. Such a division of opinion was a matter for serious concern, not only because it manifested itself in violent forms , but also because it mi ght delay the granting of independence to · the Territory. 212-. In the light of those considerations, his delegation considered that the l Connnittee ehould urge the political partiee to eettle their differences and agr ee on the eesentials of a connnon policy for i nde"l")endence . That would make a A/Ac.109/1.236 English Page 59 constitutiona~ conference possible . At the same time, the Commit ee should appeal to the United Kingdom Government to do its utmost to convene sue a conference at an early date and to facilitate the acceptance by the va~ious sec ors of t he population of a policy which would command the wi dest possi b l es port. His delegati on ld support any resoluti on along those lines, since he Territory' s early and pea eful attainment of independence would depend on the response received to those ls. 213. The sentative of the United Ki ngdom, i n a further moderati on and restrai nt of the language used in the report Sub-Commi ttee on Aden (see annr x) . His delegation di d not believe that provocati serve the comr on cause - name l y, the search for a sol ution to the probl ems of South Arab i a - and hi s a i m i n maki ng hi s to see those probl ems set in the right perspecti ve i n the l ight of Wi th that aim i n vi ew, khere was a great deal in the report wh i ch .hi s coul d not accept: aspebts of the situation had been mi srepresented, facts importance ha~ been omi tted al together, and effects had been des r i bed and lamented wi thout any r1eference to thei r causes. 214. With regard to paragraph 16 of the Sub - Committee ' s report, question of a un i tary state for South Arabia, he had made i t cl e r i n an earlier statement (se~ para. 130 above) that the United Ki ngdom Governme was not commi tted to any particr l ar constitutional system for South Arabi a . continue to be gui ded by the wishes of the peopl e of South Arabi and by the principl e th~~ whatever solution was adopted should have the wi d measure of s r port. 215. His Government's cl early stated policy on the question oft e military base i n Aden, referrt to in paragraph 17, was to retai n the base, in ag t he Government oJ the Federati on of South Arabia, for so long as it to serve the co mon interests of the two Governments. The Prime Mi i ster of the United Kingdcm had ade it clear that the security of a base depended o the willi ngness with which it was accepted by the local population. intended that the eventual arrangements for the base should be n the Uni ted Ki ngdom Government and the Government of the new Stat at the time when South Arabia ~ecame i ndependent; that was not a matter 216. The essdnce of the problem in South Arabia was to establ ish relationship b etween the wi shes and vi ews of the people of the a of A/AC .109/L.236 English Page 60 representative government able to speak for the majority of the people governed. The constitutional conference planned for March 1965 had been postponed, as reported in paragraph 18, because there was not yet a sufficient consensus in South Arabia about the form of government desired by the people of the Territory. There was a wide measure of agreement about the objectives and long-term constitutional ~ims, but not on the practical probl ems involved: qualification for ci tizenship and for the vote, distribution of powers between the centre and the subordinate units, and so on. His Government shared the Sub-Committee's di sappointment and regret at the necessity of postponing the conference, but the delay would not be long and steps were already being taken to speed up constitutional advance. 217. His delegation regretted that the Sub-Committee had once more seen fit to refer, in paragraph 19, to United Kingdom military operations without once referring to the events and activities which had made those operations necessary. Some of those were described in the Secretariat working paper (paras. 1-98 above). Again, in paragraph 20 of its report (see annex), the Sub - Committee expressed deep concern that the state of emergency and the laws restricting public freedoms were still in force, but made no reference whatsoever to the factors which made such restrictions necessary. Those factors fell into three categories: the situation on the borders of the Federation; incitement to violence from outside the Federation; and acts of terrorism within the Federation. 218. With regard to the situation on the borders of the Federation, he had little to add to his previous statement (see para. 127 above); his Government and the Government of the Federation of South Arabia had done everything possible to respect and implement the Security Council resolution of 9 April 1964 (188 (1964)) but the parties concerned outside the Federation had made no positive response to that resolution or to the constructive proposals put forward by his Government in pursuance of it. 219. As to incitement from outside, inflammatory and provocative broadcasts had been made from Cairo, Sanaa and Baghdad, urging the people of the Federation to engage in acts of violence, to take up arms, and to murder not only British soldiers and officials but their fellow Arabs as well. He quoted one such broadcast which suggested that independence gained by sane and civilized discussion and conciliation was worthless, and that the only genuine independence was won by bloodshed, violence and suffering. His delegation could not believe that such a ~·• philosophy was acceptable to the Committee or compatible with United Nations ., ,,. -,;. "I ~ ii!\' ,,. ,, " • ., ,:, '\ A II A .109/1.236 Eng . sh Page 61 pripciples or I urposes. In marked contrast to those appea-ls for "olence, the United Kingdom Colonial Secretary, in a statement on 2 May 1965, d declared that no British itory had to fight for its independence. ije had c demned terrorism ., as foolish pointless, and had called for calm and rational di cussion and negotiation. n that connexion, the representative of the United rab Republic had stated that no hing had been found to substantiate the claim that ribesmen in the Radfan Mountains area were receiving arms and ammunition from abr ad (see para. 147 abol e). The facts, unfortunately, were very different. Since early 1963, the United Arab Republic authorities in Yemen had sup lied money and i. war materiel Jo dissident tribesmen of the Federation of South Ar bia and had ,' encouraged thdm to carry out raids on the Federation from Yemen. ~ Egyptian Inte~ligence Service Officers had been installed in bord r towns and had undertaken th~ recruitment, training and supply of terrorists. Te United Arab Republic had ~rganized and supplied the Radfan revolt in 1964 and unsuccessfull~ to start similar revolts elsewhere. Hundreds oft ibesmen had been enticed into i emen, where they had been provided with weapons and trained in their use. Arms and ammunition manufactured in the United Arab Republi had been captured by F1deral and British forces. The widespread terrorist activities in the Federation were designed, not to force the United Kingdom to gran early independence, lbut to obstruct South Arabia 1 s peaceful development and progress towards indepJndence . The suggestion that the people of South Ar bia were waging a national stfuggle for freedom, on their own initiative and by t eir own decision, was false. T~ere had of course been political dispute and dissen ion, but very J few local lea?ers of any standing had been prepared to associate hemselves with the campaign ?f violence. He cited a number of incidents involvi g aid by the United Arab Rr public to armed rebellion in South Arabia and empha ized that there was plenty of evidence, supported by photographs, to substantiate everything his 1 delegation had said about subversion and aggression from outside he Federation. l 220. In the light of the facts, it was hardly surprising that eme gency restrictions were found tofbe necessary or that defensive military action byte Federal ArmyJ and by UnitedlKingdom f orces in support, had been needed to prese ve the integrity of the countr~ and the safety of its inhabitants. To describes h operations, as I ... j <- .. '< ~ • • • ,; ,.~ . ~ ·~- k w; '11-;,f .~ A/Ac.109/1.236 English :,, •,. Page 62 ~ •. l ,. I' ~ ., the Sub-Committee had done, as repressive action against the people was therefore • false and misleading. The Sub-Committee had called for the ending of the state of emergency and of military operations, and the lifting of all associated restrictions; the prerequisite for those highly desirable measures was the ending - of violence and lawlessness. The Special Committee could' help by making it clear that it did not condone or approve of violence from any quarter but favoured a peaceful solution by discussion and negotiation in accordance with United Nations If p.rinciples and General Assembly resolutions. 221. To judge from paragraphs 20 and 22 of its report; the Sub-Committee seemed unaware that questions of security affecting the whole of South Arabia were not the e:::clusive concern of Aden Ministers. Such questions were subject to the authority of the federal Government, under the over-all responsibility of the United Kingdom Government. The Chief Mi nister of Aden was concerned with matters within the competence of Aden State; his authority did not extend beyond it. ' 'ij Allegations had been made concerning restrictions on freedom of political expression and activity in Aden; the very fact that the Chief Minister had been able to make policy statements of the kind mentioned in paragraph 22, which did not ·~ represent the policy of the United Kingdom Government or of the Federal Government . of South Arabia demonstrated the falsity of those allegations. The United Kingdom ~- delegation did not consider that the state of emergency unduly hampered political freedom in Aden. The minimal restrictions imposed, under the emergency regulations, for the protection of ordinary people in their every-day lives were kept under constant review and would not be unnecessarily maintained. 222. He welcomed the references in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the report to the decision to repeal the Industrial Re lations Ordinance and to the visit by a representative of the International Red Cross. The repeal decision had been taken by Aden Ministers, not by the Aden Government. The United Kingdom Government and the High Commissioner agreed in principle with the repeal of that law, provided that there was proper prior consultation with both sides of industry and that ~ legislation was passed to retain the necessary elements of the existing law, such as those relating to the safeguarding of essential services. According to \£ l .,_'tr '· information published by the Red Cross on 25 March 1965 , its representative had ,., ', "', !i • . ,, ' -~ / ... i< ~i, i. q/1' \, ~ • ,,,, .,.. i:r ~. , f ·:1 i .. ,, ,. .109/ 1.236 ish 63 observed that large proportion of the patients of the federal m ical service in the Radfan rea were Yemenis, who received free medical care a surgical treatment in t e same way as the local population. The I bternati al Cormni ttee , for the Red Cr ss had made it clear that its representative had b n given I abundant assis ance during his visit to South Arabia. 223 . A number f charges had been made in Aden; and reported in T Times, about ~ the activities of British troops and other authorities. Those ch ges, which had been quoted in the Committee) were inaccurate and tendentious. T re was - no martial law in Aden. Necessary arrests were made by the civil po ce, not by British soldie s. The suggestions that British troops or agents grenades and went about dis uised as Arabs should be rejected with contempt. 224. According to the representative of the United Arab Republic ( ee para. 144 abov~), the Unfted Kingdom Government had never transmitted infor m tion, under Article 73 (e) of the Charter, in respect of the Aden Protectorate; but in fact that informati n had always been transmitted and that for 1963 was entitled A Handbook of he Federation and Protectorates of South Arabia area in accordance wit Article 73 (e) of the United Nations Charter) whic covered the ,rhole area of r. outh Arabia in respect of which his Government had esponsibility for the transm·ssion of information under Chapter XI of the Charte Indeed, his Government vol ntarily went beyond the requirements of the Charter by supplying information on political and constitutional matters in the territo-ies under United Kingdom administration. 225 . The Colon· al Secretary had just announced the appoinitment of Commission to consultation with the Governments and peoples of S the structure appropriate for a sovereign independent S \ State and the ecessary interim constitutional arrangern'.ents lead in ' t ; li i-\ '.~ introduction, nd to make recommendations . His Government such .~): a Commission r presented the best means of maintaining ana progress ceful solution of the various problems which remai to be settled before South A abia achieved full independence not l ater than 1968. The Colonial way incompatible with the basic c objectives of Nations resol~tionsJ and they would be generally w Special Committee as clear evidente Governmer.t.'s determination full independence for South Arabia A/AC .109 /1.236 English Page 64 226. The representative of renmark complimented the Sub-Committee on having produced an instructive report; however, his. delegation disagreed with some of the points made, especially in the conclusions. 227. As decolonization progressed, the proportion of hard-core cases among the Territories discussed in the Special Committee increased; he was therefore happy to learn from the Sub-Committee's report that progress had been made on some vital points in Aden and South Arabia as a whole. First, a new and broadly based Government had been formed in Aden. The statements of the Chief Minister, Mr. Mackawee, showed that he and his Government were in a position to take an independent view of the problem now facing Aden and the surrounding territories. Next, there was now full agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Ministers of Aden ;:i.nd the Federation of South Arabia that the formation of a unitary State was the goal. According to Mr. Mackawee, his Government's first step in that direct:i.on was to set about transforming the present Constitution into one acceptable to all. The United Kingdom Government's statements that independence would be granted in 1968, or if possible earlier, were encouraging; it was to be hoped that a constitutional conference would be convened in the near future and that its composition would be truly representative, so that no major po+itical group or legitimate interest would be excluded and no one invited would obstruct the conference by not participating. In his delegation's view, the cessation of all acts of violence in the area and the lifting of the state of emergency would facilitate the convening of such a conference and make for a positive outcome. The repeal of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and the visit by a representative of the International Red Cross were steps in the right direction. 228. All members of the Committee would doubtless agree with him that the military activity in the area should be broµght to an end and that all concerned should do their utmost to make that possible. Any resolution adopted on the subject by the Committee should take into acccunt operative parag~aphs 3 and 4 of the Security Council resolution of 9 April 1964 (188 (1964)), in order to ensure that the resolution reflected the duties of all parties. 229. The Sub-Committee had been very pessimistic in its conclusions, and particularly in paragraphs 25, 26, 27 and 29 (see annex). In his delegation 1 s v'iew considerable political progress had been made, the situation as a whole had not deteriorated, and l there was no reason why the political improvement should not influence conditions in the area, given the goodwill of all concerned. He welcomed the United Kingdom representative 1 s announcement that a new Commission was to be formed to investigate .1c9/ 1.236 ish 65 conditions e spot, and he wished the Commission every success. Any resolution on Aden should account the positive features of the situ ion and should encourage the p ties to qontinue, extend and further harmonize th r efforts with the constitutio al conference as the first objective and independe as the ultimate aim. 230. The repre cntative of Poland said that Aden had been under co onial • administration for more than a hundred years; the United Nations h d now reached its twentieth fiversary and five years had passed since the adop ion of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries d peoples. Yet the administering Power intended to postpone granting independ ce to Aden and the Protectorates until some time in th~ distant future, in pl in disregard of operative Pf'agraph 3 of the Declaration. 231. The Sub-Cqnmittee's report left the administering Power no pr text for any delay in grant~ng independence. The view that Aden was ready for ·ndependence was supported by J~ C. Campbel~ in his book Defence of the Middle Eat. The real reason for the ldelay, as Bertrand Russell had pointed out, was am "cynical control of peo~le and countries for purposes alien to their requir ents11 • The tragic situatiol in Aden and the Protectorates was the result oft e administering Power's policy of strangling the independence movement. The peopl of Aden demanded independence ~d were fighting for it; that fact was confirmed by he Sub-Committee's report and by ~e United Kingdom representative's statements at th 312th and 329th meetings.I However, neither of those statements had explaine how the administering Power intended to fulfil the legitimate aspirations f the people and why the grant of independence was being delayed. Ins~ead, the United Kingdom representative had asked the United Nations for encouragement and derstanding in the fulfillnient of its professed intention to grant independenc to South Arabia. There was abundant encouragement in the petitions, circul ted by the United Nations, from people representing various social groups and political parties; in thJ statement by the Chief Minister of Men that Brita·n should ' ' implement Gene~al Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII); and in the Dec aration adopted by the Confererice of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned C untries held at Cairo in OctobJr 1964 (A/5763), condemning the continued refusal of the United Kingdom Government to Jmplement the United Nations resolutions on Aden and the Protectorates. I A/AC . 109/L.236 English Page 66 There would be no lack of support and assistance from the Committee for the immediate implementation of General Assembly resolutions 151~- (XV) and 19~-9 (XVIII). 232. The main obstacle to self-determination in Aden was the United Kingdom 1 s determination to perpetuate its dcmination of the Territory as long as possible in order to preserve and safeguard its economic and strategic interests. That aim had been clearly indicated by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on 1 April 1965. The Prime Minister had admitted that a military base could be held only with the agreement of the Government of the country concerned, but the United Kingdom Government was not putting that policy into practice. 233 . The only way to solve the problem of Aden was to secure the speedy implementation of resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII). His delegation 1 considered the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub- Cow1r1ittee to be constructive, and it fully endorsed and supported them as it would any resolution drawn up on similar lines. It hoped that, if such a resolution was adopted, the administering Power would comply with it so that the peopl e of Aden and the Protectorates might attain independence as soon as possible. 234. He shared the hope expressed by Bertrand Russell that the United Kingdom would not intrigue to foster internal dissension and ccmmunal rioting, and that no more people would be slaughtered to preserve oppression and appalling neglect in South Arabia. 235. The representative of Syria, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, noted with interest that the United Kingdom Government intended to establish a Cow1r1ission to visit Aden. , However, the ineffectiveness of similar commissions in Palestine and elsewhere had shown that such an approach was of little value nowadays. If the United Kingdom was sincere in its intention, the new Ccw1nission would do well to heed the advice given by Professor Arnold Toynbee in the October 196L~ issue of International Affairs: namely, that quick action was needed in the area, and 'l that the members of the League of Arab States should be consulted. 236. The United Kingdom had failed to justify to the Committee the existence of the military base in Aden. Many delegations had spoken, in the Committee and elsewhere, against the maintenance of military bases in foreign territory. According to Professor Toynbee, it was certain that South Arabia was soon to be evacuated; Arab disunity could not be counted on, and no purpose was served by waiting to be turned out of Aden and Bahrein; it was therefore better to go quietly and to go quicl\:ly. r A/ C.1t9/L.236 En lish Pae 67 237. The repr~sentative of the United Arab Republic, spe king in xercise of the right of repl, said that, with regard to the allegations made by the United Kingdom representative that his country was inciting trib.esmen t o violence and supplying the with materiel for rebellion, the Committee should ear in mind the true situatio in the area. The fact was that a war of liberatio was in progress, and the Arab p/eople were entitled to every assistance in their st uggle for freedom . • 238. The United Kingdom representative had stated at an earlier meting that the general aim o~ the Special Committee coincided with the policy of he United Kingdom Goverqnent. Unfortunately the facts belied that contenti T'he creation of the Federation of South Arabia in 1959 had conformed t o the co onialist pattern of imposing tr1eaties on territories and shaping their future with t regard to the wishes of the opulation. In June 1964 the Sub-Ccrnmittee on Aden ad i ssued a very clear statement (s/58CO / Add.4, annex, appendix III A) regardi g the Constitutional Conference convened by the United Kingdom, drawing he attention of the administerr1·ng Power to the unrepresentative nature of the Con erence and urging it to widen re resentation or postpone the Conference. Despite t t appeal, the Conference had taken place without the participation of litical parties and other orgar izations in the T~rritory, and had reached conclusi ns contrary to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the population. 239 . The prese~t United Kingdcm Government had planned another co titutional conference for March 1965, but the conference had been postponed r reasons which were well known. The Government of Aden had resigned as a result f the High ·y Cormnissioner'sl refusal to allcw publication of a Minister's reply o a previous statement; yet the United Kingdom representative still maintained hat there was full freedom of speech in the Territory. 240. The United Kingdom representative had told the Committee that his Government's policy was to retain the military base in Ad:n, in agreement with he Government of the Federation of South Arabia, f or so long as it was required to erve the common interests oft e two Governments. It was noteworthy that the base was r etained in agreement with the Government of the Federation, and not in whose territory the base was situated. The retention e was linked with the exist nee of the Federation, and in no way accorded with aspirations I· of the people. A/AC-.109/L.236 English Page 68 241. Every time the question of the supply of information to the Committee was raised, the United Kingdom representative said that consultations were still actively proceeding and nothing more coµld be said at that stage. It was difficult to understand that lack of co-operation. The truth was that the political developments imposed on the area were contrary to the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, to General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) and to the Committee's recommendations. The promotion of • political advancement in Non-Self-Governing Territories, which was the obligation of the administering Power, had to be accompanied by economic development, the furtherance of democracy, orderly change and social advancement. None of those features was in evidence in Aden. A petitioner in 1963 had vividly outlined the tragic lack of educational, sociaJ., legal and other facilities in the Territory aft.er more than a century of colonial rule • 242. The United Kingdom Press, at least, was frank about the military base in Aden. Three recent articles in The Economist had questioned the value of retaining the base, particularly if the United Kingdom-United States plan for a common base in the Indian Ocean was put into effect. The U.s. News and World Report had stated on 10 May that the United States was proceeding with the plan to establish a base on Diego Garcia in the Mauritius Group. It was therefore clear that independence in the Territor y depended on changes in strategic military plans, and that the United Kingdom Government considered its base in Aden more important than its obligations to .the population. 243. It was now going to the length of enlisting United States support for actions which had been deplored by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, putting all the blame for the situation on the nationalist leaders, and requesting encouragement and understanding from the United Nations. He was at a loss to understand what more encouragement and understanding could be ex:p·ected than those nationalist leaders and the United Nations had already giver., for their approach was based on the Charter and the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The nationalist leaders were not alone in their struggle, and in giving them effective support the Arab world was merely fulfilling its obligation to its Arab brothers in their fight for freedom. 244. The United Kingdom representative had said that, by supplying political information his Government went beyond its obligations under Article 73 e of the . ' Charter. The only item concerning political advancement that had ever been A/ 09/L.236 En Fag forthcoming wa l the announcement of the creation of the Federation in 1959. There were two poss i f le explanations: either there had been no politica advancement or, if there had bf en any, no information regarding it had been suppli d. 245. The repre entative_ of India said that his delegation1 which h d participated in the discuss ,· ons on Aden both in the Special Committee and in th Fourt h Committee and had co-spopsored all resolutions relating to the Territory, retted to have to state once again that the situation had not improved and that Gene al Assembly resol uti ons l l4 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) had not yet been implemente by the administering Power. He thanked the Chairman and members of the b - Committee on Aden for their report (see annex), with which his delegation was general agreement. 246. The Indian delegation had hoped to hear from the United Kingd m representative of the politicr l and constitutional advancement of the Te~ritory t independence, f ut had been disappointed in that expectation. The ituation in Aden was disqui eting, and violence and political restlessness were asing. The Times of London of 2v April had reported a speech by Mr. Mackawee, the C ief Minister, in the Aden Legist ative Council, in which he had said that the United Kingdom had failed to presr rve law and order in spite of restrictions and curb·ng of freedom, that anarchy hrd increased and that the critical situation a political solution accepf able to all, not a state of emergency which ived people of whatever meagrt democratic life they had had. The Indian de l egati n felt that tension could ot be reduced unless the administering Power made a determined effort to implement GI neral Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVI ). Mutual trust and the restorrtion of normal conditions in the Territory were ess ntial and they could be achiel ed if the administering Power heeded the words oft e Chilean representative, who had said that it should restore all political nd public liberties, stof persecuting the leaders of the Territory, release olitical \ detainees and put an end to military operations (see para. 202 ab e). Colonialism was a discredit ed creed and the use of force to sustain it was of o assistance. 247. His delegation, which was aware of the complex and difficult situation which the United Kingdom faced in many of its colonial Territories, had een interested in the visit of t ~e Colonial Secretary to Aden in November 1964 and t e visits of two United Kingdom! Mini~ters which had followed. The optimism to whic the visits had given rise, hor ever, had evaporated with the postponement of the ndon conference which had been! scheduled for March 1965. No new date for the co A/A C.109/ L. 236 Er:glieh Fage 70 had yet been announced, although Mr. Mackawee had made it abundantly clear that he wanted resolution 1949 (XVIII) to be implemented. 248 . Unlike the United Kingdom Ministers, the Sub-Committee on Aden had been unable to visit the Territory. In his statement of 27 April (eee para. 130 above) the United Kingdom representative had referred to the dialogue going on between the United Kingdom Government and the leaders of the Arab peoples in Aden and South Arabia. It would help all concerned if the Sub-Committee on Aden participated in those discussions and was invited to visit Aden. Many members of the Special Committee felt that the Sub-Committee on Aden could give the United Kingdom Government useful assistance in its difficult task of preparing the Territory for independence in conditions of political stability and peace. 249. The Indian delegation welcomed the announcement by the United Kingdom that independence would be granted not later than 1968 but, while it realized that that did not rule out the possibility of an earlier attainment of independence, it felt that the setting of such a distant date was likely to increase the difficulties of the United Kingdom Government and of the people of Aden. The Chief Minister ✓ of Aden had recently stated clearly that his Government refused any kind of false independence and would take a firm stand against any attempt to ignore the true aims of the people. 250, He had been interested in the announcement by the United Kingdom representative (see par a . 225 above ) t hat a Co:rm;1 i ssion wae t o be appointed t o visit , South Arabia and that it might include some members from countries other than the United Kingdom. He had no intention of prejudging the functions of the Commission but would like to stress that it should start its work without delay. The membership of the Commission should therefore be announced as soon as possible and he hoped that the Sub-Committee on Aden would be invited to assist the Commission in its work. If the Commission proved really effective it would be welcomed, but if it functioned in a dilatory manner it would discredit itself in the eyes of the people of South Arabia and of all those who wished to see the end of colonialism. 251. In conclusion, he thanked the representative of the United Arab Republic for , .. the useful information given in his statement of 5 May (paras. 143-160 above). The A C.109/L.236 E lish e 71 Indian delega~ion, too, appealed to the United Kingdcm G vernment to take urgent steps to impl4ment r esolutions 1514 (XV) and 191!-9 (XVIII). 252 . The repr esentat ive of Iran said that the discussions in the pecial Committee on the subj ecJ of Aden had given the impression that there was a reat .gap between the administej ing Power 1 s pulicy and objectives and those of the den people, but a close study o the Sub-Committee's r eport on Aden (see annex) rev aled a good deal of common gro ,nd between the two sides . A comparison of the stat ments by the United Kingdoi Secretary of State for the Colonies (see Jaragraph 13 above) and by Mr . Abdul Mac~awee, formerly l eader of the Opposition in the Aden State Legislative Council and now Chief Minister of Aden (ibid., paragraph 6) showe that the two sides were inl agreement on three essential el ements: the grantin of independence, only two year separating the date demanded by the Adenis and tha proposed by the United l( ingdo , Government; the form of government, namely, a unit ry State system; and the basis for such a system of government, namely, a sound de ocratic basis and the recog~ition of human rights. 253 . As there was agreement on those three fundamental elements, t might have been expected that there would be a lull in the strife in Aden while t e antagonists worked out thl relevant details. The tragic fact was, however, t at the bl ood of innocent peopie continued to be shed over the simple questions of procedure and timing. The ~esulting political tension and discord were likely o threaten peace and security in the area. Moreover, it was difficult to make pro ress in such an atmosphere of distrust and deep-seated suspicion. 251~. The Aden people 1 s distrust of United Kingdom intentions ste ed frcm a long period of col1nial rule rendered all the more intolerable in rece t years by the state of emergency, the acts of violence, and the military operat ons carried out. The United Ki1gdom Government' s refusal to allow the Sub-Committe on Aden to visit the Territory had further increased the Sub- Committee 1 s doubts an suspicions about • conditions th1re . It was therefore essential that, as M:r. Mackaw e had suggested, the atmosphere in Aden should be cl eared before, rather than afte, the election of an Aden Parliament. The recognition of human rights, the aboliti n of the state of emergency, t _hJ release of politic al detainees, the readmission of politic al exiles and the repea{ of all laws restricting public freedoms were among the steps whicq must be taken in order t o create the necessary conditions for pea eful change and the peaceful establishment of an independent State in South Arabi. I A/AC.1O9/L.236 English Page 72 255. At the same time, preparations should be made for the convening of a conference, to be attended by representatives of all sect ors of publ ic opinion in the Territory, with a view to establishing a provisional all -part y Government with a mandate to hold elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage for a representative organ for the whole of the Territory. In addition7 the United Kingdcm should try to dispel some of the suspicion attaching to i t s policies in .,. Aden by co-operating with the Sub- Committee on Aden and admitti ng that body to - the Territory. The United Kingdom Government had recentl y stated t hat i t was to establish a Royal Commission7 which would not be restricted to United Kingdom nationals 7 to consult the various segments of the populati on of the Territory. The United Kingdom Government 1 s co- operat ion with t he Unit ed Nations, through that Royal Commission or any other agency7 in taki ng immediate st eps towards the implementation of General Assen:bly resolution 1911-9 (XVIII) would constitute a concrete contribution towards t he easing of tension in the Aden area and the removal of the threat to peace and security. 256 . The Iranian delegation would vot e in favour of any draft resolution which embodied the above-mentioned points. 25 7. The representative of Iraq, in a f urther statement 7 recalled that in his statement on Aden the United Kingdom representative had mentioned, inter alia, Aden' s i mportance t o the United Kingdom a s a military base and the United Kingdom Government' s appointment of a Royal Commi ssion to consider constitutional arrangements f or South Arabia. 258 . As far as the military base was concerned, operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) stated that the maintenance of the military base in Ad en was prejudicial to the s ecurity of the r egion and that its early removal was therefore desirable, while the Sub-Committee on Aden had f ound that the representatives of the people of the region were unanimously opposed to the maintenance of the base. The United Kingdom representative, however 7 had made no mention of any contemplated removal of the base7 but on the contrary had made an impassioned defence of its presence. 259. As far as the Royal Commission was concer ned 7 t he reaction to it in South Arabia had been for the nat ionalist parties to merge together into a new organization known as the Organization for the Li beration of the Occupied South, which had categorically rejected the Royal Cow.mission . Moreover 7 the Chief Minister of Aden had declared that he and all his Ministers rejected the Royal Commission and would boycott it. / ... A/A .109/ L.236 Er:.c iE:h Fag 73 26 0. In the 1Jght of the foregoing, the ~elegation of Iraq was fo ced to conclude that the Royai Commission was doomed to failure. The United Nati ns, however, could play a 1eading part in helping Aden and the Protectorates t achieve ' ' independence Jpeedily and smoothly. He therefore appealed to the United Kingdom to facilitate lthe work of the Sub-Committee on Aden, in which the people of South i Arabia had great confidence, to ascertain the wishes of the peopl in an objective manner and to recognize that only a truly international body like the Sub Committee co, d give the people of the area a fair hearing. ;,, 261. The repr~sentative of Bulgaria noted that the report of the ub-Committee on Aden (see annex) contained the conclusion that the situation in Aden and the Protectorates continued to be extremely serious and that the reso utions of the SpeciaJ. Cornmi tee and the General Assembly were still not being i plemented in Aden and the lf>rotectorates by the administering Power. The draft report also stated that t i e decision by the United Kingdom Government to main ain its mili tary base in Aden added to the aggravation of the state of tension in he area. 262 . The fact that there had been no change in the United Kingdom Government's attitude to the Aden question was all the more disappointing and egrettable in that world hof s had been raised by statements by Labour Party ca didates during the recent eli ctoral campaign in the United Kingdom. Before t he eneral Election, the Labour Patty had strongly criticized the Conservative Governm nt' s attitude to Aden and ht d let it be understood that if the Labour Party was elected it would right the wro~gs in Aden along lines similar to those advocated b the Special Committee. U~fortunately, it had now become clear that the Labo Par ty' s statements haJ been nothing but electioneering propaganda and the situation in Aden, far fro! improving, was now worse than ever and had become in the words of the Sub-Commit tee, "critical and explosive". 263. Although the United Kingdom Government had made it clear tha its general policies on A,en remained the same, it had been forced, in the fa e of the heroic struggle of t be people of Aden for freedom and human rights, t o m e several concessions, which included the abandonment of the plan to make A en and the p Protectorates}a federation instead of a unitary State, the appoin ment of ~ Abdul Mackawee1 as Chief Minister of Aden, and the repeal of t he I dustrial Relations .; . " :;f!! :~·~ l: ( ·iil ,, "' ,,, ~ ,, ii ~, ;/ ) fj).I ~ ~ ·• ' A/Ac.109/L.236 ,, English ., h 1f , ., ,;' fj '.l. Page 74 . ' Ordinance. Before the appointment of Mr. Mackawee as Chief Minister and head of a Cabinet which included several persons equally prominent in the struggle for the independence of Aden, the United Kingdcm Gover~.ment had often used the statements • ~1 of various members of the former puppet Cabinet as proof of Adeni support for its policies . That was no longer possible, for Mr. Mackawee and his ministers had lost no time in categorically rejecting those policies . 264. One of the principal targets of criticism by Mr . Mackawee and his Cabinet was the military base in Aden. That base was a menace to all the Arab nations, and all who loved peace and j ustice should support the people of Aden in their attempts to secure its removal. The United Kingdom Government had referred to the Aden base a s a vital centre for peace-keeping activities, but past United Kingdom activities in South Arabia had made it abundantly clear what that implied and no one would be deceived by such a transparent disguise for imperialist domination. 265. Re cent developments in South Arabia, and particularly in Aden, left no doubt of the rapid deterioration of the situation. The Special Committee must therefore deal with the question urgently and take whatever action was necessary. The United Kingdom' s proposal to send a Royal Commission to South Arabia seemed to the Bul garian delegation to be simply an effort to keep control of the Territory in the hands of the United Kingdom 's puppets or, i f that proved impossible, a means of postponing the satisfaction of the Adeni people 1 s lawful demands for independence and keeping Aden under the United Kingdom yoke until 1968 . 266. In the light of the foregoing, the Bulgarian delegation was willing to support any draft resolution which was in harmony with the aspirations of the people of Aden, whose freedom and independence were vital to the maintenance of the peace and security of the whole Arab world. 267 . The representative of the United Arab Republic, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he would like to place the problem in its proper perspective and try to answer EO~e of the accusations which had been directed against his Government. The United Arab Republic was a firm supporter of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, one of which was to ensure the peaceful attainment of independence by colonial peoples. It was the attitude of tbe colonial Powers that drove those peoples to take up arms to secure their ", right of self-det ermination, as many States represented in the Committee / ... A AC.109/1.236 E glish P ge 75 which had had to make heavy sacrifices to gain independence coul The process of ration was irresistible and irreversible, and it s a mistake to think that eration movements, which sprang from the people th selves , were instigated b other Governments. 268 . The long struggle of the Arab peoples in the Aden Protector e had always had the support nf t only of the Arab world but of all nations aspiri to peace and freedom. As as clear from the resolution of the League of Arab tates of 19 May 1964 ( /Ac.109/83), the Arab Nations had done their best o persuade the United Kingdo Government to reverse its policies and to recogniz the right of the people of the Occupied South to self-determination and indepe dence. They were surely n t to be blamed when the situation deteriorated and he population resorted to a, ed resistance. The United Arab Republic had alwa made its intentions clf ar to the United Kingdom Government and had in fact host to many of the nr tionalist organizations and leaders of the Occupied 269 . A disturf ing element in the question of the United Kingdom ·1itary base in Aden was the ~nternational peace-keeping role which the United Ki gdom Government had arrogatedl to itself, disregarding the United Nations Charter. He was disappointed l t the dangerous new trend of thinking of the Government. f t the Second Conference of Heads of State or Gover ent of Non Aligned Countr ies a large number of Governments had condemned the maintenance or future establLsbment of foreign military bases, particularly in i dependent territories, t hich could be used for the maintenance of coloniali m. At a time when a number of countries were trying to have foreign bases remo ed from their territory, thf policy of the United Kingdom Government in maintai its existing bases and seeking to establish new ones was in no way contributin to i nternational • understandingl and co-operation and would be opposed by a great n of countries • 270. With regl rd to the Royal Commission which was to visit Sout and consult the v[ rious interests there, he would point out that thos interests, and particularly l he political parties and organizations, had alread positions clear and were demanding the implementation of United resolutions l f l4 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII). By recognizing and acced·ng to the valid demands of the people, the United Kingdom Government would prove ts goodwill / ... A/Ac.109/L. 236 English Page 76 towards a population which was seeking to live in peace and freedom. The United Kingdom could not conceal its real aims behind the familiar fa~ade of constitutional conferences. The granting of so-called independence, dependent on the maintenance of United Kingdom bases, was a well-known manoeuvre which had .. given rise to many difficulties and crises in the past. 271. The representative of Sierra Leone congratulated the Sub-Committee en Aden on its report. His Government was deeply concerned about the events in the Territory and was anxious to do everything possible to help the people to achieve self determination and independence. It was clear from the report that the people of Aden had been subject to extreme provocation in their gallant and unrelenting struggle. The position was further complicated by the United Kingdom military base in Aden. The situation had already been fully considered in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII), but the administering Power consistently refused to implement those resolutions. 272. His delegation fully endorsed the Sub-e:Committee's conclusions and deplored the continuance of military operations in the Territory. It associated itself with those who had called for the abolition of the present state of emergency, the repeal of all laws restricting public freedoms, the release of all political detainees and the withdrawal of all restrictions preventing exiled nationals from returning to their country. A fully representative constitutional conference should be convened to work out arrangements for general elections on the basis of II one man, one vote.11 273. The United Kingdom had often refused requests by United Nations groups to visit Territories under its administration. In view of the appointment of a Royal Commission to visit South Arabia, he hoped that the United Kingdom Government would now agree to allow the Special Committee to visit the Territory and to ascertain • the real conditions there. He also hoped that the United Kingdom Government would agree to an effective United Nations presence in the Territory both before and during the proposed elections. 274.The Sierra Leone delegation welcomed the United Kingdom representative's reassuring statement of his Government's intentions in the Territory, and his reference to the acknowledgement by the Colonial Secretary of the need for a I ... ' \ /I!>. C .109 / L. 236 nglieh age 77 constitutiona!l conference and consultations with all sections of the population. His delegation particularly welcomed the Colonial Secretary's tement that the proposed Co ission was to be set up in the light of the wish he Government and people of So• h Arabia to achieve independence as soon as possib the general desi re in So~~h Arabia for unity. He hoped that immediate steps ould be t aken t o put the Colon~al Secretary' s intentions into effect and that f consideration would be giver t o the recommendations of the Special Committee the resolution I. which it hope~ to pass on the matter. 275 . 'l'he Sierra Leone delegation had never failed to acknowledge he dignity with which the Uni~ed Kingdom Government had relinquished certain parts of the world. He therefore hoped that it would now allow good judge ent and fairness to prevail in the case of Aden and would enable the people of Ad e and South Arabi a to exercise democracy in their ovm land . • I • • • j t J I A/AC.109/ L. 236 English Page 78 ',' III. ACTION TAKEN BY 'IEE SPECIAL CO.f:vX[TTEE 276. At the 337th meeting, the representative of Syria introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.198), sponsored by Cambodia, Ethiopia. India.. Iran, Iraa, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia. " 277. In introducing the draft resolution, he stressed the gravity of the situation and appealed to the United Kingdom to take immediate steps in accordance with the draft resolution. 278. The representative of Australia s~id that, while the draft resolution (A/ Ac.109/1.198) before the Special Committee laid great stress on the troubled s ituation in Aden and the Aden Protectorates, it completely i gnored the causes of that situation. 'Ihe truth was that the troubles in adjoining areas, where there was no United Kingdom presence and Arabs were at odds with Arabs, overflowed into Aden, which was the target of attempts at upower extension" by States other than the United Kingdom. It was true that the United Kingdom had substantial interests in Aden, but other States also had interests in the area and had much to gain by securing the departure of the United Kingdom. 279, The United Kingdom was continuing its policy of giving Aden as much freedom as the troubled situation there allowed, and the Special Committee had heard the United Kingdom representative's assurance~ to the effect that Aden would be granted independence not later than 1968. 'I'he Australian delegation was convinced that the United Kingdom Government attached great importance t o participation by non-Br itish persons in the work of the Royal Commission which was to be set up to consider Aden's constitutional problems, and felt that the United Kingdom pr oposals for Aden were meaningful and far-reaching. 280. As f or the possible retention by the United Kingdom of the military base in Aden, the Australian delegation wished to point out that it was not a crime to • maintain a base on foreign territory. Such matters were for the people of the territory concerned t o decide, and it would be quite wrong for any body like the Special Committee to meddle in such decisions, 'Ihe Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had stated, before his party' s return t o power, that his policy would be to maintain United Kingdom bases abroad provided that the country on whose territory they were located was agreeable to their existence, and that was exactly what, in the present case, the United Kingdom was doing. ,., j •. •' ,;¥,\• #; ,, , ~\.; ,."t' ~ "i" ,1.' Zif 'ti,( l•,r, .' "t A AC.109/1.236 I ' .. E glish .. p ge 79 "' 281. In conclusion, it was a matter of great regret to the Austra ian delegation I that the draf ' resolution before the Special Committee did not me tion the progress made in relat ons between the United Kingdom Government and the p ople of Aden, or the many prog essive measures recently taken in the Territory. Sch omissions did the draft res ,lution a grave disservice, and could only harm its tances of securing unan mous approval in the Special Committee. 282 . The repr sentative of Denmark expressed regret at the failur to mention, in the draft res lution, any of the progressive aspects of the si tua i on i n Aden . The draft resolution was in many respects similar to Genrral Asse bly resolution 1949 (XVIII). ! 'Ihe Danish delegation had abstained from voting on that. resolution, and would lik wise abstain from voting on the present draft resol tion. 283. The repr sentative of Uruguay said that, while the situation in Aden presented mor~ positive aspects at the present time than it had d ne in the past, the draft res1lution before the Special Committee did put into wo ds the concern which his cou,try felt regarding Aden, and his delegation would t erefore vote for the draft res ,lution as a whole. The Uruguayan delegation could ot, however, vote for operative paragraph 8 of the draft, as it felt that the ecision whether or not to all~w the United Kingdom to maintain a base in Aden lay with the people of Aden rathe l than with a body such as the Special Committee; no, for the reasons set out in the Uruguayan statErrEnt at the Special Ccrr.mittee's 328 h meeti ng, could it vote for t J e fourth preambular paragraph or for operative ~ara raph ll., The Uruguayan delJgation therefore requested separate votes on thos e aragraphs. 284. The reprJsentative of Venezuela said that his delegation lik wise requested a separate vo~e on the fourth preambular paragraph, and also on o erative paragraph 8. It would abstain from a vote on those two paragraph, although it would vote fo11 the draft resolution as a whole. 285. 'Ihe repr sentative of Madagascar observed that the situation in Aden did seem • to have i mpro ed recently in some respects; the draft resolution hould perhaps i have acknowleqged that fact. Like several other delegations, the delegation of : Madagascar fel t that the question of the existence of a United Ki gdom military base in Aden ~as one for the people of Aden rather than f or any o tside body to decide; but o the whole the draft resolution merited support, an the delegation of Madagascar would vote for it. , i I .. . A/AC.10 9/L. 236 English Page So t 286. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the United Kingdom Government intended to continue with its plans for a Constitutional Commission on Aden's constitutional problems, and hoped that all those in any way concerned with the future of Aden would give their assistance. The United Kingdom Government wished to give South Arabia independence in peace and with order - an objective which was surely compatible with the aims of the Special Committee. While it was for the Constitutional Commission to decide whom it wanted to hear, the United Kingdom Government would certainly place no obstacles in the way of any person or group wishing to appear before the Commission. 287. It would surely not surprise the Special Committee to hear that the United Kingdom delegation would not be voting for the draft resolution. 'Ihe draft did not mention the Constitutional Commission, but operative paragraphs 3 and 6 seemed to prejudge the latter's work. As a number of representatives had pointed out, operative paragraph 8 went beyond the Special Committee's terms of reference and interfered in a question which it was for the people of Aden alone to decide; and there was no valid reason for bringing the situation in Aden to the attention of the Security Council, as provided for in operative paragraph 11. The United Kingdom delegation would therefore be obliged to vote against the draft resolution. 288. The representative of Syria, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the Australian representative's references to 11 Arabs at odds with Arabs 11 ; and 11 power extension11 by States were completely irrelevant. The Syrian delegation agreed with the United Kingdom representative that it would be desirable to solve the Aden question with dignity; but that, unfortunately, was impossible. The Syrian delegation had little faith in bodies like the Royal Commission which the United Kingdom Government was to set up; nevertheless, it was prepared to listen attentively to any new ideas which the United Kingdom Government might put forward through that Commission. Finally, the sponsors of the draft resolution ... agreed to the request by Uruguay and Venezuela for separate votes on certain paragraphs of the draft, an.a thanked those countries for their support of the draft resolution as a whole. 289. 'Ihe Special Committee then voted on the draft resolution (A/Ac.109/1.198) • at its 328th meeting. The fourth preambular paragraph was adopted by 16 votes to 4, with 3 ccstentions. • I ... , -I, s ... ,i; A/Ac.109/1.236 English Page 81 Operative paragraph 8 was adopted by 16 votes to 5, with 3 ab tentions. Operative paragraph 11 was adopted by 16 votes to 5, stentions. The draft resolution (A AC.109/1.198) as a whole was adopted y 19 votes to 3, with 2 abstent·ons. ii 290. The repre entative of the United States of America, speaking ·n explanation ~,' of his vote, s id that his Government fully sympathized with the d sire of the resolution's c[~-sponsors to facilitate and speed the r;rogress of he peoples of South Arabia t pwards independence. His Government's opposition to the resolution had to do, not with opposition to its objectives, but with the s of implementing them. Part of the task of implementing the Declaration on the ting of independence t ~ colonial countries and peoples involved making reful study of the situation, as the Sub-Committee had done, making judicious rec mmendations and encouraging tht administering Power to take well-considered steps. 291. His deleg tion had observed with interest the development of he situation in South Arabir, and took satisfaction in the progress which had b en made towards the independence and advancement of the people of that area on as und democratic basis. Althou1h there appeared to be a growing measure of agreeme t among all the parties concerfl ed regarding form and objectives, the situation was so complex that certain diffic lties remained with respect to the procedures for r aching the objectives agr ed upon. 292. In his statement of 11 May, the United Kingdom representative had indicated that his Goverf ment was prepared to take what seemed to be a decid dly forward step in the effort o establish a single independent State by 1968. Th United States delegation con idered that the appointment of a Commission, to inc ude members from countries other than the United Kingdom, would constitute an effec ive method for dealing with spme of the problems of constitutional development; ad it hoped thRt such a Commission would in due course be able to agree with the Go ernments and peoples of Souf h Arabia on further practical steps towards early i dependence. His delegation was convinced that the Commission' s best hope for signi icant progress · lay in the establishment of an atmosphere of order and goodwill. 893. While he t ppreciated the desire of the Committee to si:reed and to facilitate the independence of South Arabia, it was unfortunate that the resoluti n failed to take account of the general evolution of the situation and the proposal for a Commissi_on. 'I A/AC .109 /L. 236 English Page 82 • 294. The representative of Ital y, speaking in E::'.',r;;ilanation of his vote, sa id that the resolution just adopted by the Special Commissi on was very i:iI'lilar t o General ,. As sembly resolution 1949 (XVIII)) which nad no,:; ref.Let!ceJ the .situation existing in Aden or in the Aden Protector:::tcs at the end of j_965 . In the se,-enteen mor:ths which had elapsed sj n.ce tte~;> tt,":re 1,ad tet:1 &. :.:.ur:b•,r "'f s:Lgni f.:..e:ar 1t rcli·,~ical a nd constitutional developrnE:nts in the Terr:itcn·y . Hts d.:::lega,tion had a1jsta.:i.r,ed 1.r1 the vote because it conside;~ed thai· ·_,he, d·raft resolutior-. should haye r:ientioned t hose developments and the proposal to appoint a Constitutional Commi ssion. It " felt that the Special Committee, whose task it was to recommend ways and means for t. the speedy attainment of independence 1y No n-Self-Governing Territories,. should not have ignored a poli ticaJ. i:leciE>::c.1 v,hi•:i1 w,_,uJ.ci have c,C'i:e et/ect on the proi:_;re0c5 ,. t owards independence of the Territory under consideration. 295 . Furthermore) the Italian delegati on thought that the placing of entire responsibility for the future of the Territor~r o~. th<:': :::-.dministerir.g Powel'; ano. the • ignoring of the articulate purlic opinion whi ch exi steo in the area, constituted a f,. ·"' of the administering Power. His delegati,Jn believed that publ ie OpinL.ir: an& the own future; a ud it felt that the draft resolution should have add2·e:::seJ an 8._ppeal, .. . .. to all those concerned, to settle the:i r dif:::·,,1· .. r:.ces OL ,.11e e co.c;•c:r;:; ia:_ ele,ments of: a common policy fur· independene:e. 296. I n conclusior.) he said that hib d.elega-::;ior,' s v:l ews n-:.1-,arding 1~he ,!,ainter..anc:e of the milite.ry base in Adeu were cor.tained in the surnrr.ary records of the 156th and 197th meetings o:f T,Le 3pec:ial Cornmi ttee. 297 . The representative of the Ivory Coast said that his delegation had abst ained ) in t he vote on operative paragraph 8, because it considered that it would be f or the people of Aden, ·,ten they had br:,en g1anted thei r ir:.depe,1.dence, t,, Jecie,. , whether or not they wanted to maintain the military base . 298 . The representative of' the United Arab Republic sE-Ll that i t was difficult t o understand the argument of some representa~ives t:bat they had abstairced i n the vote because of the constitutional advances made in the Territ01·y) since t he r eport of the Sub-Committee on Ader and the _petitions n:::c.:ei ved i'r-rn11 the Territory showed that no such advances ·bad tal;:en place. '.rhere bad been no changes in the I ... A/Ac.109/1.236 English Page 83 f ederal legi lative Council since the previous year. re been any free e a. on univertal adult suffrage. Moreover, fundame al human rights and freedoms respected. 299. I t had lso been said that the draft resolution made no re rence to the polit ical ev lution which had taken place in the Territory. Ho ver, petitioners fr.·OL'l the 11er ·i t ory had pointed out that t he political situation past yea~·, actual y deteriorated. 3co In cone usion, he stressed the contradiction between the f t that some r epresentati es had welcomed the United Kingdom proposal to app Co ns-situtlo±l Commiss ion and had not even mentioned the right the people of the Te rritor r t o gi ve t heir views on the proposal, and the fact r epresentati es had considered that only the people of the ory were competent t o deci de t bje question of the maintenance of the military base ·n Aden. 301. The r esiolution (A/Ac . 109/ 116) on the question of Aden, a opted by the Special CcMin~ittee at its _338th meeting on 17 May 1965,_ reads as follows: 11 ']he S-r:;ecial Ccn:mittee, 11 f 2.ving examined the q_uestion of Aden and Aden Protec orate ( report of t h~ 3u" -Committee on Ad en (A/ Ac.109/ 1.194 ar.d Corr.l)), n aving heard the statements of the administering Pow r, ir ecal l ing General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 4 December 1960 and 19 9 XVI II) of 11 December 1963, as well as its own r solutions of :) Ap· i .]_. l l Hay and 17 November 1964, i:I:1e eply concerned at the critical and explosive situa ion which is thr eat ning peace and security in the area, arising from t e policies purEue by the administering Power in the Territory, 11 onvinced that the solution to the question of Aden an best be found t~roug the immediate and full implementation of the resol tions of the Genera Assembly, particularly resolutions 1514 (:XV) and 1 49 (XVIII), 11 1. Reaffirms the right of the people of the Territo y to self deter m' nation and independence in accordance with the Deel ration on the granti g of independence to colonial countries and peoples ,, Adopts the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden ad endorses its A/AC.109/L.236 English Page 84 I }' 'f 11 3. Deplores the refusal of the United Kingdom Go vernment t o i mplement General1Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) on Aden and the recommendations of the Special Committee; ' 14. Notes with deep concern that military operations against the people of the Territory are still being carried out by the administering Power; • 115. Urges the United Kingdom to: r'' . ~ ·, ~ •v.'f,q ,..,;1,,1 •~'l, ,,, ¾~ (a) absolish the state of emergency; .. (b) repeal all laws restricting public freedoms; • (c) cease forthwith all repressive actions against the people of the Territory, in particular military operations; (d) release all political detainees and allow the return of those people who have been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory because .I,'-, of political activities; ol' 11 6. Calls upon the United Kingdom Government to convene immediately a I conference of representatives of all sectors of public opinion of the whole Territory, with a view to deciding on the necessary constitutional measures for the holding of immediate general elections on the basis of universal ~ """"' adult suffrage and with full respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, to be followed by the establishment of representative organs and government for the whole of the Territory and for the granting of immediate independence: "7. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to arrange for an effective United Nations presence before and during the elections referred to in paragraph 6 above; 11 8. Reaffirms that the maintenance of the military base in Aden is prejudicial to peace and security in the region and its early removal is, therefore, desirable; 11 9. Urges the United Kingdom Government to enable the Sub-Committee to visit Aden; n10. Requests the Secretary-General, the specialized agencies and the international relief organizations, in consultation with tr.e ccr.:inister:ing Power, to assist the civilian population which has suffered from the military operations in Radfan and other regions of the Territory; 1111. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the gr ave situation prevailing in the Territory; 71 ,. I ... A/Ac.109/1.236 English Page 85 11 12~ Decides to maintain the question of Aden n the ag nda of the Committe and to request the Sub-Committee on Aden to keep tis question under co stant review and to report to the Committee as nece sary.rr 302 . The text of the resolution, together with the records of the Special Committee's d ates on the question, was transmitted to the Pr esi ent of the t Security Coun il on 18 May 1965 (s/6368). , / ... A Ac.109/L.236 E glish A nex P ge 1 ANNEX REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON ADEN-~/ Chairman: lv!.r. Huot SAMBATH ( CarnlJcdia) I CONTENTS 1 J INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • • e • • • .• ...... 2 ACTION TAKEN B THE SUB-COMMITTEE 3 CONCLUSIONS OF THE SUB-COMMI'ITEE •• ...... 10 APPENDICES I. Lette dated 2 December 1964 from the Chairman of the . "· Sub-C mmittee to the Permanent Representative of the Unite Kingdom • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . 12 II. Lette dated 15 January 1965 from the Permanent Represent tive of th United Kingdom to the Chairman of the Sub-Committe ••• 13 .' f ~/ Previously issued under the symbol A/Ac.109/L.194 and Corr.l. l ' A/AC.1O9/L.236 English Annex Page 2 INTRODUCTION 1. By its resolution on Aden adopted on 17 November 1964, the Special Committee, having considered the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden (A/580O/Add.4, annex), reaffirmed General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and the i }}: resolutions adopted by the Special Committee on 9 April and 11 May 1964 and called on the administering Power to implement them without delay. It regretted the refusal of the administering Power to co -operate with the Sub - Committee, endorsed the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations and decided to maintain the Sub-Committee with the same terms of reference as set out in the Special Committee's resolution on Aden of 9 April 1964. By this r esolution the Sub-Committee was requested to: (a) Study and keep under constant review the situation in the Territory and to report thereon to the Special Committee ; (b) Establish contacts with the administering Power at such time and place as may be agreed upon, with a view to implementing resolutions 1514 (xv) and 1949 (XVIII ) ; (c) Arrange in consultation with the administering Power, for visits to the Territory; (d) Make such other visits as may be deemed necessary. 2. The present report is presented in accordance with the Special Committee's request and may be considered as supplementary to the report it has already presented (A/5800/Add.4, annex). 3. At its meeting on 2 April 1965, the Sub-Committee unanimously elected Mr. Huot Samb~th (Cambodia) as Chairman to fill the vacancy brought about by the departure of Mr. Vouensai Sonn (Cambodia). Representation on the Committee is therefore as follows: Mr. Huot Sambath (Chairman) (Cambodia) Mr. Adnan Pachachi (Iraq) Mr. Julien Kacou (Ivory Coast) Mr. Leonardo Diaz Gonzalez (Venezuela) Mr. Milos Melovski (Yugoslavia) I ... / AC.1O9/1.236 glish nex ge 3 ACTION TAKEN BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE (a) Contact with the administering Power 4. Followi g the adoption by the Special Committee of its ution on 17 November 964, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee addressed a etter on· 2 December 1 64 to the Permanent Representative of the United gdom. In his letter (appe dix I) the Chairman drew attention to the Sub-Commi tee's continuing functions an, to the provision of the Special Committee's resolu ion of 9 April 1964 requesting the Sub - Committee "to establish contacts with the Power, at such time and place as may be agreed upon, with a view to ementing resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII)". The Chairman stated the hope of the Sub- Committee, that, in view of the declared desire of th United Kingdom Government tp move the Territory towards independence and of the intention to re - assess thk situation there, early contacts would be establish d within the context of t f ese resolutions. 5. In his feply (appendix II) dated 15 January 1965, the Perma ent Representative of the Unite~ Kingdom drew attention to the recent visit to the erritory by the Secretary oft State for the Colonies and stated that it would be nderstood that hi s Governme t would require time before reaching final conclusi ns about future policy on Ad n and the Federation of South Arabia on the basis o the Colonial Secretary's assessment of the situation. Subject to this, he st ted, his Government wt uld be glad to enter into contacts with the Sub-Co ittee on Aden at the appropriate time in whatever manner might be mutually conven ent, in accordance with the provision of the Committee's resolution of 9 April 1964 to which the Chairman had referred. ~' 6. At a me ting between the Chairman and the representative of the United \. • Kingdom arra gements were made for the representative of the Uni ed Kingdom to make a state ent to the Sub-Committee on 15 April. The Chairman stated that the Sub-Commi ttet was anxious to hear the administering Power ' s asse sment of recent developments in the Territory and of what steps it intended tot ke to implement the resoluti6ns of the General Assembly. The Chairman also reit rated the Sub Committ ee ' s .equest for permi ssion to vi sit the Territory. I ... A/Ac.109/1.236 English Annex Page 4 7. The representative of the United Kingdom made a statement to the Sub-Committee at its meeting on 15 April 1965. In his statement, the representative of the United Kingdom reviewed developments since the visit to the Territory by the Colonial Secretary in December 1964. He drew attention to the statement made by the Federal Supreme Council and the Aden Council of Ministers, which had been made with the Colonial Secretary's full approval, and which called for the creation of a unitary state on a sound democratic basis and for the recognition of human rights in South Arabia. He describ,d ihe circumstances surruunding the resignation of the Aden State Ministers and the postponement of the constitutional conference that had been scheduled to begin in London in March 1965. Since then, the Colonial Secretary had been examining, with the High Commissioner, ways and means whereby progress could be maintained. On 1 April, the Colonial Secretary had informed the House of Commons that he had discussed with the High Commissioner proposals designed to further political and constitutional progress in the area and to promote co-operation between the Governments of the Territory and the political parties: he hoped to make a further statement before long. 8. The representative of the United Kingdom referred to the "continued acts of terrorism and criminal violence in the area and, in particular, to 'acts of aggression' against the Territory of the Federation" which, he stated, were contrary to the Security Council's resolution (s/ 5650) of 9 April 1964, and, inasmuch as they were designed to obstruct progress to independence, they were also contrary to the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. He pointed out that these acts would not deter the inhabitants of the area from gaining their independence, although they might well help to delay constitutional progress in the Federation. His Government looked to the United Nations for encouragement and understanding in fulfilling the declared intention of granting independence to South Arabia by 1968. 9. With regard to the Sub-Committee's request to visit the Territory, the representative of the United Kingdom informed the Sub-Committee that his Government could not accede to this proposal. He said that quite apart from the issues of competence, on which his Government's position was well known, the proposals foreshadowed in the Colonial Secretary's statement of 1 April might not fit in with a visit by the Sub-Committee. , 1 ,. ex e 5 10. In concl~sion, he reiterated that it was the intention of hi Government to grant the Fedrration of South Arabia full independence by 1968, o before if possible. Hif Government hoped that a large measure of agreement on the constitutional matters now under discussion would soon be achieve so that the next step to indep~ndence could be taken. 11. In putting questions to the representative dom, a clarification was requested concerning the statement that it was United Kingdom's intfntion to grant independence to the Federation of So th Arabia by 1968, and thel statement by the Colonial Secretary concerning the eplacement of the Federatio[ by a unitary state. The representative of the Uni ed Kingdom was asked how the United Kingdom intended to establish the te in the place of the Federaluion and whether the unitary state would be establis ed before or after indepen~ence. In reply, the Sub-Committee was the United Kingdom Goverrment was not committed to any one form the area as a whole, and would continue to be guided by the wishes of the eople. The question of the timing of the establishment of the unitary state ·n relation to I the date of i r dependence and indeed the question of the unitary sate itself had still be to wrrked out. 12. When askfd whether he could give more details about the cons itutional discussions tpat were continuing, such as where they were being c nducted, with whom, and in !hat context, the representative of the United King m said that for mo:i:e details re would have to await the further statement which t e Colonial Secretary hopfd to make before long. 13. Asked wh ther he could give an approximate date for ning of the constitutiona conference which had been postponed, the represent tive of the United Kingdof said that he could not name a date but that, as he had indicated in his statembnt, his Government hoped that constitutional progre s would be maintained. (b) Review of the situation in the Territory 14. Througho t the period following the adoption by the Special of its resolution on Aden on 17 November 1964, the members of the ittee have I " A/Ac.109/1.236 English . '\ Ar.nex Page 6 closely followed developments in and concerning the Territory. An outline of developments considered by the Sub - Committee is contained in the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-98 of the present report). These developments took place subsequent to those already reviewed by the Sub - Committee in section I II of its report to the Special Commi t t ee i n 1964 (A/ 5800/ Add . 4, annex) . 15. In reviewing these developments the Sub-Committee wishes to draw attention to the following, to which it attaches particular significance . f Acceptance of the concept of a unitary state for the area 16. The announcement on 7 December 1964 by the Mi ni sters of Aden and t he Federation of South Arabia that they had agreed on t he creation of a unitary sovereign state comprising all the States of Southern Arabia, and the approval given to this by the United Kingdom Government is welcomed by the Sub-Committee. I n this connexion the Sub-Committee recalls that its predecessor, the Sub-Committ ee on Aden of 1963, had noted in its reportSU that one of the principal demands of the people was for the unification of the Territory and for the dissol ution of the Federation which they regarded as 11 f alse 11 , 11 a sham11 and undemocratic, being designed 11 to divert the people from realizing their goal of true unity and independence 11 (para. 81). Further, basing itself on the expressed wishes of the people of Aden and the Protectorates, the Sub -Committee stated in its concl usions: 11 The entire population is also eager for national unity, but the present Federation - which it should be noted, does not include all the States in the l 4 area - represents merely an artificial unity imposed on them and governed by ' provisions which ensure United Kingdom control11 • Finally, i t r ecommended t hat the administering Power be asked to take the necessary steps to hol d general elections with a view to establishing a government for the whole of the Terri tory (para. 176 (3)). This recommendation, along with others made by the Sub - Committee, was subsequently adopted by the Special Committee and by the General Assembly in resolution 19lf9 (XVIII). Again, in its report presented in 1964 (A/5800/Add.4, annex ), t his present Sub - Committee recorded wishes expressed to it by t he people for a central government for the whole Territory and their opposition to the present Federation . It also reiterated the General Assembly's cal l for the establishment of a single government for the Territory. Official Records of the General Assembly., Eighteenth Session, Annexes., o.ddendu.r:i. to o.gcnda item 23 (A/5446/Rev. 1) chapter v, appendix, paras. 150- 154. I .•• ,, I' ~. , ~ .· . l' I .. ,, ' 'i ~ A AC.109/L.236 E glish A nex ge 7 Retention b the United Kingdom of the military base i Aden 17. It is a matter of deep regret to the Sub-Committee lthat the new United King~om Gove ,nment has announced that its policy is to retain it military base in Aden. The Ul ited Kingdom has stated that the base will be retai ed in agreement with the Gov1rnment of the Federation and 11 for so long as it is equired to serve the interests which we have in common". Apart from any other co siderations, the question of !he maintenance of a base of this kind in the Territ ry should be decided upon in accordance with the wishes of the people express d through their own elected epresentative government. Both this present Sub-Co ·ttee, and its predecessor, have recorded the clearly expressed wish of the peo this base should be evacuated. It has also been clearly shown that the pe ple do not regard the Governmel t of the Federation as representative, and this wou d seem to have been confirmed by the recent decision to discard the Federation in fa our of a unitary state. More~ver, the Special Committee and the General Assembly in resolution 1949 (XVIII), have stated that the maintenance of the base in Aden is prejudicial lo the security of the region and that 1its early re is therefore desirable. Post~onement of the constitutional conference to be held in March 19 5 18. The pos ponement of the constitutional conference in London in Ma~ch 1965 is a matter of concern, as also are the cir umstances that led to it. fe Committee has been informed by the representativ of the United Kingdom that lone of the Colonial Secretary's major tasks since ten has been rrto examine. wli th the High Commissioner ways and means whereby pr gress can be rraintainedn. The Sub-Committee is disappointed that it was not further details of what the United Kingdom Government was doing statement thaJt the Colonial Secretary had discussed proposals Commissioner nd hoped to be able to make a further statement Sub-Ccn:nitteel feels that the present state of affairs calls positive acti n lest the situation drift and the initiative / ... A/Ac.1c9/1.236 English Annex Page 8 Continuation of military operations in the Territory 19. The Sub--C'.Jmmittee notes with serious concern that the United Kingdom continues to can·y out military operati ons against the peopl e of the Territory. Reports indicate that rn ilitary a ctions have taken pl ace particul arl y in the R2dfan area) in Fa dhli State and a l ong the border with Yemen . The Sub.. C::immittee recalls t hat t his is contrary to the resolutions of the Speci a l Committee and the General Assembl y ,1hich have repeatedl y call ed on the administering P::i"\-1er to "cease forth,iith a ll :;_•epressive action agai nst the peopl e of the TerritoTy, in particular, military expeditions and the bombi ng of villages 11 • Continuation of the state of emergency 20. I t i s a ma tteT of deep concern to the Sub--Cornmittee that the state of emergency in the Federation ,1hich was decl a red on 10 December 1963 is still in force . This is a matter of deep regret to the Sub·•Committee, a nd is contrary to ~ t he Sl_)e cia l Comli1ittee ' s resolution of 9 April 1964. The Sub-·COli1mittee a l so views 1vi th c oncern the Federal cleci'ee of 23 FebruaTy 1965 empm1eTing the States to i mp ose curfe,rn. A curfew was i mposed for a short t i me in Aden State between 30 March and 2 April and again on 22 April. The Sub-Committee notes the statement of the c ;1 ief Minister that the decision to i mpose the curfew was the Hi~h Co mmi ssi oner ' s and ~ that the AC::.en Ministers had nothing t::i d::i ,1ith it. DeclaTation by the nationalist parties and l eaders at C2iro i n Ma rch 1965 21. The Comc1i ttee a l so ,1 ishes to draw attention to the declaration by the principa l nationalist o:;_·ganizati ons and l eaders in Cai ro in which they reaffirmed their full s uppoTt of the United Nati ons resolutions on Aden and demanded that they be f ully ., r i mp lemented . They a l so stated that these resolutions should be the basis of any future di s cussions and negoti ati ons. t A/ c.109/1.236 En lish An Pa Declaration by the Ch ief Minister of Aden ~· .1 il, 22 . The Sub - ommittee also wishes to draw attention t.o the i mp o made gislative Council on 19 April 1965 by Mr. Abdul Qa ee Mackawee, Chief Ministe of Aden State, calling on the United Kingdom to i l ement the resolutiops in order to achieve a politi~al settle ent of the problems of S uth Arabia. In the course of this statement, the ief Minister said "We are f ully determined to make a firm stand in the face of any ttempt to ignore the true aims of the people or any endeavour to dictat~ terms fo an -independence of the kind t b which I have referred, In this stand ••• we are full agreement with major po~itical organizations of the country. " He also war d Britain against delay in fulff lling t~e people 1 s aspirations and said that the o solut ion, open to the Britis Government was to implement the United Nations res lutions under which the peo le could choose with complete freedom their central Government and central Farli~ment . Mr. Mackawee also said that he would be intr ducing two motions beforp the Council, one calling for implementatipn of Nations resolutions, knd the other demanding the lifting of the state restoration of p~blic freedoms, release of political det~inees an return of all political exif es. 'I'he Sub-Comm ittee also draws attention to the eport that on 22 April the den Ministers sent a cable to the Colonial Secretar protesting against t he i posit ion of a curfew which they stated "complicates our problems". The cable empbasized the necessity of "a political solution accep people" ar;id r ~quested the implementation of the Uni ted Nations re olutions "which will put an e~d to all disturbances". The Sub - Committee recalls hat the present Chief Ministe~ appeared as a petitioner before the Sub -Committee ·n 1964, at which time he had sr ated that the aims of the independent group he repr sented were identical to t hose held by all free nationalist parties in Aden. Decision to repeal the Industrial Relations Ordin 23 . The Sub- ommittee notes with satisfaction the announcement Aden Government, oh 30 March 1965, that it has decided to repeal the Relations Ordinance. This ordinance, which has seriously interfe rights, is on~ of the laws restricting public freedoms which the Committee and the Gener~l Assembly have called on the United Kingdom to rep A/Ac.1c9/L. 236 English Annex Page 10 Visit by a representative of the International Red Cross 24. The Sub-Committee also not~s that a representative of the International Red · Cross has visited the Territory. It will be recalled that the present Sub-Committee had recommended that international relief organizations, such as the International Red Cross, should be invited to send representatives to the Territory ' to assist the civilian population which has suffered from military operations. The Sub-Committee awaits with interest the report of the representative of the International Red Cross. CONCLUSIONS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE 25. The situation in Aden and the Protectorates continues to be extremely serious. The Sub-Committee deplores the fact that the resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly are still not being implemented in Aden and the Protectorates by the administering Power. Among other things, the Sub-Committee is concerned to note that the state of emergency has not been lifted and many of the laws restricting public freedoms are still in effect. 26. The policies being pursued by the administering Power in the Territory continue to give rise to tension in the area, in particular along the border with Yemen. The Sub-Committee notes with concern that the United Kingdom is still carrying out military operations against the people of the Territory. Moreover, the decision by the United Kingdom Government to maintain its military base in Aden adds to the aggravation of the state of tension in the area. For all these reasons, the Sub-Committee considers that the situation in the area~s still critical and explosive and should be closely followed so that if necessary it can be drawn to the attention of the Security Council. 27. The Sub-Committee deeply regrets that the United Kingdom GoverI)]11ent is still not willing to permit the Sub-Committee to visit the Territory. It is not necessary here for the Sub-Committee to reiterate the compelling reasons for such a visit. The Sub-Committee remains firmly convinced of the value of such a vipit to the Territory. 28. The Sub-Committee notes that there have been signs of a slight change in the attitude of the administeting Power, such as its support for the concept of a unitary state for the area, and its apparent willingness to widen the representation at the constitutional conference. • J A/A .109/1.236 Eng ish Ar:n X Pag 11 29. The Sub·· ommi ttee remains fully c::mvinced that the Sol uti::m f the question of Aden can b st be found througl1 the i mmed iate and full impl emen a tion of the De claration cj"tainea in resol ution 1514 (XV) , and the resolution :::>f the Ge nera l Assembly concjrning Aden 7 in particular resolution 1949 (XVIII) . The measures set out in thise resol utions express the ,1ishes of the people and a re fully supported by ~he political parties and the present Aden Mini sters as is shown by the decl arJti ons issued recently in Ca i ro and in Aden respecti e l y. I' 30. 1!ith re,Jrd to the political and constitutiona l negotiati ons that are at present being carried on7 tl1e Sub-C omG1 ittee believes that if the ni ted Kingdom lJases its pro1:) osa.ls on the provisions :::if General Assembly res:::ilut :::in 1514 (XV) containing th~ Declaration and of resolut i on 1949 (XVIII) ; the qu sti on will be speedily settied. Further, any constitutional conference that is hel d shoul d be representativ of a ll sectors :::if public opinion of the Territory. At this stage, the Sub-Commi tee feels that a clear--cut statement by the Uni ted in,::;d:::im accepting the provisionJ of General AsseG1b l,y resolutions 151 L~ (XV ) and 1949 (XVIII) wo uld be· the absolute rfi nimum and woul d go 2. l ong way towards reducing ten ions in the area} thus paving t4e ,18.y for the speedy accession :::if the Territory to ndependence in accordance ,1ilh the freely expressed wishes of the peopl e. 31. I n view f all t,1ese c:::insiderations the Sub-C:::>rnmittee feels J hat the situation in Aden and t e Protectorates continues to be extremel y seri :::>us a d deri1ands tl1e urgent attentJLon :::if the Special C:::>rim1ittee. .~. I • I• ,I'· A/Ac.109/L.236 English Annex ,. }'"I., \.. ¥' " Page 12 " .. t-'.\i,\ };_ J: Appendix I . . LETTER DATED 2 DECEMBER 1964 FROM TEE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUB-COMMITI'EE TO THE PEB.MA:NENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TEE UNIT.EJD KINGDOM ) I have the honour to refer to the resolution on Aden adopted on 17 November 1964 by t he Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. Under the terms of this resolution, the Sub-Committee on Aden has been maintained with the same terms of reference as before, as contained in operative paragraph 7 of the resolution of 9 April 1964. The composition of the Sub-Committee is the same as when it was originally established. This was confirmed at the 318th meeting of the Special Committee held on 30 November 1964. On behalf of the Sub-Committee, I would like to reiterate the wish of its members to carry out the mandate entrusted to it in a spirit of co-operation and understanding. I therefore draw the attention of Your Excellency to the provision of the resolution of 9 April requesting the Sub-Committee "to establish contacts with the administering Power at such time and place as may be agreed upon, with a view to implementing resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII)". It is our hope that, in view of the declared desire of your Government to move the Territory towards independence and of the intention to r eassess t he ~ituation there, early contacts will be established within the context of the above-mentioned resolutions. (Signed) Voeunsai SONN Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden ~e:r:.cUx II LETTER I!ATED 15 JANUARY 1965 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTA UNITED KINGDOM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUB-COMMI I have t e honour to refer to your letter number TR 300 ADEN of 2 December 1964, about the resolution on Aden adopted by the Spec·a1 Committee on 1 7 November . I am instructed by my Government to draw Your Excellency's to the visit paid to Aden in November and December by the Secretary of ate for the Colonies, Mr. Anthony Greenwood. The United Kingdom Representati e in the 1 Special Committee informed the Committee of the Colonial Secreta 's intention of making this visit in his statement on 17 November at the 314th meeting. I am sure it f1-ll be understood that Her Majesty's Government wil require time before reachihg final conclusions about future policy on Aden an the Federation of South Arabia on the basis of the Colonial Secretary's t of the situation dur~ng his visit to the territory. Subject to Majesty's Government wif l be glad to enter into contacts with the Sub-Commi tee on Aden at the appropriate time in whatever manner may be mutually convenie , in accordance with the provl sion of the Committee's resolution of 9 April 1964, to which Your Excellency referred in your letter. (Signed) CA DON J ' •