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This translation of the Prologue of the Ordinatio of the Venerable Inceptor, William of Ockham, is partial and in progress. The prologue and the first distinction of book one of the Ordinatio fill volume one of the critical edition of the Latin text of Ockham’s theological works edited by the Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, NY. These translations are works in progress and may contain infelicities or errors or (through oversight) omissions. Apologies in advance, therefore, and requests that readers who notice such faults would communicate them to the translator for his information and correction.

The paragraph numbers are my own additions for ease of reference. The numbers in bold italics inside {} brackets that are embedded within the text indicate, for reference purposes, what the relevant volume and page number of the Latin critical edition is at that point, so {1.4} means volume 1 page 4 of that edition. These numbers are not in italics when they are referred back to or forward to elsewhere in the text. The headings and subheadings are in the text of the critical edition.

Peter L.P. Simpson September, 2021 Page 2

THE ORDINATIO OF THE VENERABLE INCEPTOR, WILLIAM OF OCKHAM

Prologue

Question 1: Whether it is Possible for the intellect of the Wayfarer to (page 5) have Evident Knowledge of the Truths of Theology [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Exposition of the Terms of the Question Num. 6 Objections against the Last Affirmation Num. 12 Response to the Objections Num. 16 About the Meaning of the Question Num. 29 Division of the Question Num. 30 Article One: Preparatory Distinctions about Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge of the Same Thing Num. 31 Preparatory Conclusions: First Conclusion Num. 35 Objections against the First Conclusion Num. 36 Response to the Objections Num. 39 Second Conclusion Num. 43 Third Conclusion Num. 44 Proof of the First Conclusion First Reason Num. 45 Objection to the First Reason Num. 48 Response to the Objection Num. 50 Second Reason for the First Conclusion Num. 55 Exposition of the First Article Num. 58 Conclusions Inferred from the First Article against the Opinion of Scotus Num. 64 Opinion of the Author about the Difference between Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge Num. 76 Corollary I: Intuitive Knowledge of a non-existent Thing is Possible Num. 77 Corollary II: There is Intuitive Knowledge of Things Purely Intelligible Num. 80 The Second Corollary is Confirmed by the Authority of Scotus Num. 89 Articles Two to Four: About Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge with Respect to the Deity Num. 95 Article Five: Response to the Form of the Question Num. 98 Article Six: Ten Doubts about the Question Num. 104 Page 3

Solution to the Doubts Num. 119 Response to the Principal (Opening) Arguments Num. 158

Question 2: Whether Evident Knowledge of the Truths of Theology is (page 39) Science Properly Speaking [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Article One: What Proposition is Knowable by Science Properly Speaking Num. 9 Objections to the Second and Third Condition Num. 15 Response to the Objections Num. 20 Article Two: What is Science? Num. 37 Objections against the Last Condition Num. 41 Solution of the Objections Num. 43 Article Three: Diverse Opinions First Opinion Num. 63 Opinion of Scotus Num. 69 Against the Opinion of Scotus Num. 78 Ockham’s own Solution Num. 96 Conclusions Inferred from the Above Num. 100 Doubts about the Aforesaid Num. 124 Response to the Arguments of the Subtle Doctor Num. 127 Solution to the Doubts Num. 148 Response to the Arguments of the First Opinion Num. 151 Response to the Opening Arguments Num. 154

Question 3: Whether a Property Knowable of Something by Science (page 65) Properly Speaking Differ from it Really [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Opinion of John of Reading Num. 5 Against the Opinion of John of Reading Num. 8 Solution of the Author Num. 14 Response to the Arguments of John of Reading Num. 22 Response to the Principal Argument Num. 36

Question 4: Whether Every Property is Demonstrable a Priori of its (page 72) First Subject [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Distinction of Properties Num. 6 Which Properties are Demonstrable First Conclusion Num. 7 Second Conclusion Num. 15 Third Conclusion Num. 21 Fourth Conclusion Num. 22 Page 4

Objections Num. 25 Response to the Objections Num. 30 Response to the Principal Argument Num. 43

Question 5: Whether in Every Demonstration a Definition is the Middle (page 79) Term for the Demonstrating [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Opinion of Richard of Conington Num. 7 Attack on the Opinion of Richard of Conington Num. 15 The Author’s own Response Num. 23 Refutation of the Arguments of Richard of Conington Num. 28 Opinion of the Author about Formal Definition Num. 34 Response to the Principal Argument Num. 44

Question 6: Whether only a Proposition per se in the Second Mode of (page 88) Speaking is per se Knowable by Science Properly Speaking [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 What Proposition is Per Se in the Second Mode Num. 6 What sort of Proposition is Demonstrable Num. 15 Response to the Principal Argument Num. 18

Question 7: Whether the Theology that of Common Law is Possessed (page 91) by Theologians is a Science Properly Speaking [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Opinions that Hold the Affirmative Side Num. 7 Rejection of these Opinions in General Num. 18 Against the Same Opinions in Particular Num. 23 Opinions that Hold the Negative Side Num. 34 Ockham’s Opinion Num. 36 Opinion of Peter Aureol about the Theological Habit Num. 38 Rejection of Peter Aureol’s Opinion Num. 43 Ockham’s Opinion about the Theological Habit Num. 46 Response to the Arguments for the Other Opinions Num. 55 Response to the Opening Arguments Num. 76

Question 8: Whether the Habit of Theology is Really One in Number (page 103) [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Opinion of St. Thomas [Aquinas] Num. 8 Attack on the Opinion of St. Thomas Num. 9 Opinion of Henry of Ghent Num. 18 Against the Opinion of Henry of Ghent Num. 23 The Author’s own Response Num. 38 Doubts about the Aforesaid Num. 46 Page 5

Solution of the Doubts Num. 50 Response to the Reasons of Henry of Ghent Num. 63 Response to the Opening Arguments Num. 68

Question 9: Whether God under the Proper Idea of Deity is the Subject (Page 114) of Theology [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 The Opinion of Scotus about the Idea of the First Subject Num. 10 Attack on Scotus’ Opinion about the Idea of the First Subject Num. 14 The Author’s Own Opinion Num. 54 Conceptual Knowledge of One Thing does not Cause Conceptual Knowledge of another Thing Num. 55 The Subject does not always Contain the Property Virtually Num. 63 What is Required for Knowledge of a Proposition? Num. 64 What belongs to the Idea of the First Subject? Num. 66 Objections against the Aforesaid Num. 78 Solution of the Doubts Num. 88 Response to the Reasons of Scotus Num. 107 The Author’s Opinion about the Subject of Theology Num. 118 Preliminary Distinctions Num. 119 Response to the Form of the Question Num. 126 Concordance of the Various Opinions Num. 133 Response to the Principal Arguments Num. 142

Question 10: Whether only the Operation of the Sensitive Power is (Page 140) Action [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Opinion of Robert Cowton Num. 7 Attack on the Opinion of Robert Cowton Num. 13 Opinion of Scotus Num. 15 Attack on the Opinion of Scotus Num. 19 Ockham’s own Opinion about Action Num. 34 Solution of the Question Num. 41 Distinction between Practical and Deliberative Intellect Num. 42 Which Operation is Action in the More Strict Sense? Num, 44 Which Operation is Action in the Most Strict Sense Num. 50 Response to the Arguments of Robert Cowton Num. 53 Response to the Reasonings of Scotus Num. 64

Question 11: Whether Practical and Speculative Knowledge are (Page 153) Distinguished by Ends or by Objects [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Opinion Page 6 Page 7

Prologue

{1.3} Question 1: Whether it is Possible for the intellect of the Wayfarer to have Evident Knowledge of the Truths of Theology

1. Concerning the prologue I ask first whether it is possible for the intellect of the wayfarer to have evident knowledge of the truths of theology. 2. That it is not: Because evident knowledge of the truths of theology cannot be had without a distinct knowledge of the deity under the proper idea of deity; but a distinct knowledge of the deity is impossible for the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore impossible for it too is evident knowledge of the truths of theology. Proof of the major: because indistinct knowledge of the deity does not suffice, because if it did, since it would be possible for us from our pure natural powers, the consequence would be that we could from our pure natural powers have evident knowledge of the truths of theology, which is manifestly false; therefore for evident knowledge of the truths of theology {1.4} there is required a distinct knowledge of the deity. The minor is plain: because knowledge of the deity under the proper idea of deity, since it is of the infinite and beatific object under the idea of beatific, is itself beatific; but beatific knowledge is impossible for the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore etc. 3. Second as follows: if the intellect of the wayfarer had evident knowledge of the truths of theology, those truths would either be known per se or would be known by other things that are more known to it. Not in the first way because the truths would be known when the terms are known; but such propositions, which are per se known, are known by everyone who apprehends the terms, and so they would be naturally known to anyone who apprehends the terms, which is manifestly false. Nor in the second way, because those things more known to it would either be simply more known and prior or would be so only to itself. Not in the first way because nothing is prior to this proposition ‘God is three and one’, since there is no middle term between God and the three persons in which the predicate could be first present. Nor in the second way, because nothing that is posterior can lead to evident knowledge of this proposition ‘God is three and one’; therefore etc. 4. Third as follows: evident knowledge of a truth is the most perfect knowledge that can be had about any truth; but such knowledge about those truths is not possible for the wayfarer, because then the blessed would not have a more perfect knowledge about them than the wayfarer, which is manifestly false. 5. To the opposite: He who is able to apprehend distinctly the terms of any first necessary truth can know that truth evidently, because, if {1.5} it is first, it is known when the terms are known. But a wayfarer can know that truth distinctly, at least in the abstract, Page 8 and can for the same reason know theological truths distinctly that are not first. Therefore etc.

Exposition of the Terms of the Question

6. Concerning this question certain terms put in the question need principally to be explained; and first what is meant by the intellect of a wayfarer; second what is meant by the name evident knowledge; third what is meant by the truths of theology. In the second principal place must reply be made to the question. 7. About the first [n.6] I say that the intellect of a wayfarer is one that does not have that intuitive knowledge of the deity which is possible for it by God’s ordained power. By the first part of this is the intellect of the blessed excluded, which does have intuitive knowledge of the deity; by the second part is excluded the intellect of the damned, for which that knowledge is not possible by God’s ordained power, though it is possible for it by God’s absolute power [cf. Ockham, Quodlibet 6 q.1]. 8. About the second [n.6], namely what evident knowledge is, I say that evident knowledge is knowledge of any propositional truth that is of a nature to be sufficiently caused, mediately or immediately, by simple knowledge of the terms; namely, such that, when simple knowledge of {1.6} any terms (whether they be terms of that proposition or of another proposition or of diverse propositions) causes, or is of a nature to cause, sufficiently in any intellect having such knowledge, whether mediately or immediately, knowledge of the proposition put together from them, then that proposition is evidently known. From this it follows that evident knowledge is in more things than science or understanding or wisdom, because a contingent proposition can be known evidently; and it follows that that knowledge is neither science nor understanding nor any of the habits that the Philosopher sets down in Ethics 6.3.1139b16-17. 9. If it be said that evident knowledge of contingent truth is never sufficiently caused by non-propositional knowledge of the terms, because then it would be known when the terms are known; but any such principle is known per se, according to the Philosopher in Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b18-26; but no contingent truth is known per se; therefore etc. 10. One must say that a proposition known per se [cf. infra I d.3 q.4] is that which is evidently known from some knowledge, whether abstractive or intuitive knowledge, of the terms of the very proposition. But this is not possible about a contingent proposition, because some knowledge of the terms does suffice for causing evident knowledge of a contingent truth, namely intuitive knowledge (as will be plain later, 1.39), and some knowledge does not suffice, namely abstractive knowledge. Hence, if someone were to see intuitively Socrates and the whiteness existing in Socrates, he can know evidently that Socrates is white. But if he only knew Socrates and whiteness {1.7} in Socrates abstractively, in the way someone can imagine these things in their absence, he would not know evidently that Socrates was white; and so the proposition is not known per se. 11. About the third [n.6] I say that all truths necessary for man as wayfarer so as to attain eternal beatitude are theological truths. This is plain from Blessed Augustine, On the Trinity 14.1 n.3, where he speaks as follows, “Not to this science, indeed, do I Page 9 attribute whatever can be known by man in human affairs (where there is much of superfluous vanity and harmful curiosity), but only what a most wholesome faith, which leads to true beatitude, is generated, nourished, defended, and strengthened by.” From this it follows that some truths naturally known or knowable are theological truths, as that God exists, that God is wise, good, etc., since these are necessary for salvation; and some are supernaturally knowable, as that God is three, incarnate, and the like.

Objections against the Last Affirmation

12. But argument can be made against this: because every naturally knowable truth belongs to some naturally discovered science; but the same truth does not belong to distinct sciences; therefore no naturally knowable truth is theological. 13. Further the truth that can be proved through a subject, as through something intermediate to which it must first be resolved, belongs {1.8} to the science of the subject that is intermediate, and not to the science of the subject to which the truth to be proved belongs. But such propositions as ‘God is wise’, ‘God is good’, and the like can be proved through being as through something intermediate, by arguing as follows: every being is good; God is a being; therefore God is good. Therefore these truths belong to the science of being and not to the science of God. 14. There is a confirmation: because these are properties of being, therefore the truths in which they are proved belong to the science of being, and to no other science. The consequence is plain, because it belongs to the same science to consider a subject and its properties; therefore, to no science does the consideration of the properties belong save to the science to which it belongs to consider the subject. 15. Besides, Posterior Analytics 1.7.75a38-39: “He who demonstrates cannot proceed from one genus to another.” But if the same truth were to belong to distinct sciences, it would be possible to prove through the principles of one science the conclusion of another science, and this would be to pass from genus to genus; therefore etc.

Response to the Objections

16. To the first of these [n.12] I say that a science, for present purposes, is taken in two ways. In one way [second way, n.19] for the bringing together of many things that pertain to the knowledge of a single thing, or of many things that have a determinate order. And a science said in this way contains both {1.9} the simple knowledge of the terms and the knowledge of the propositions that combine them, both the principles and the conclusions; it also contains the refutations of errors and the solution of fallacious arguments; it also contains the necessary divisions and definitions, for the most part. And about a science said in this way it is commonly said [e.g. Bonaventure, Breviloquium Prol. n.5] that in it there is a triple mode of proceeding: namely by division, by definition, and by collection (although this is only true when something having many species under it is treated of in the science). And in this way is science taken for the compilations and Page 10 tractates of authors and philosophers. Thus science is taken in Physics 1.2.184b25-85a5 when it is said that to no science does it belong to argue against someone who denies its principles; and in Posterior Analytics 1.10.76a31-32, when it is said that it belongs to no science to prove its principles, and in Metaphysics 3.1.995a29-30 that subsequent investigation is the solution of things doubted at the beginning. In this way is science also taken when the book of Metaphysics or the book of Physics is said to be one science. 17. And this science is not one in number but contains many habits that are distinct, not only in species but also frequently in genus, yet having some order among themselves, because of which special order {1.10} (of the sort that some other knowables do not have) they can be said, and are said, according to the usage of speakers, to be a single science. Taking science in this way it is not unacceptable for the same truth to belong to distinct sciences, even naturally discovered ones, because the same conclusion can be evidently proved in distinct sciences through distinct middle terms (whether it can be demonstrated in them by the most powerful demonstration or not I care not, because this science does not contain only demonstrations in the most proper sense, but also several other evident proofs). The same truth can also be a principle in one science and a conclusion in another, and this especially when something that is determined in one science is contained as an inferior under something which is determined in another science, as is the case with being, which the metaphysician determines, and with God, which the theologian determines. 18. But that the same truth could belong to distinct sciences is plain from the Commentator (Averroes) On Physics 1.5 t.83, in the final comment, who maintains that the physicist proves that separate substances exist and that the metaphysician takes as supposed that they do exist. Likewise, according to some [Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.1, Robert Cowton Sent. I Prol. q.3, Scotus Ord. I Prol. n.194], that there is a God is proved not only in natural science but also in {1.11} metaphysics. Likewise, if one posits that this would not be possible about sciences naturally acquired, yet the same truth can belong to a science speaking properly and to a science taken broadly for firm adhesion, of which sort is theology for a great part of itself, as will be plain later [q.7, the author’s opinion]. 19. In another way [first way, n.16] science is taken for a habit existing per se in the genus of quality that is distinct from other intellectual habits, namely from understanding, wisdom etc. [Aristotle, Ethics 6.3.1139b16-17]. And in this way does the same truth not belong to distinct sciences, because there is of one conclusion only one science stated in this way, for any such science is numerically one thing, not containing knowledge of several conclusions. 20. And if it be said that, according to the aforesaid, the same conclusion can be demonstrated through diverse premises, at least by a demonstration of the fact; but distinct demonstrations cause distinct sciences; therefore, the same conclusion belongs to distinct sciences said in this way. 21. I say that distinct premises do not always cause distinct sciences, because just as the same color in species can be produced by diverse causes distinct in species, namely by fire and the sun, so can the same science in species be caused by distinct principles or premises, as will be plainer later (see 1.90). Page 11

22. {1.12} To the second objection [n.13, 1.7] I say that such truth can belong to each science stated in the first way. 23. If it be said that then those two sciences will be one science, just as the science of the soul and the science of the intellective soul are one science, I say that it is not necessary that those sciences should make a single science in this sense, unless the sciences were precisely of the subject of that truth and only considered the duly ordered properties [of it]. But if the sciences consider many things, whether subjects or properties, that do not have the determinate order required for the unity of a science, it is not necessary that such sciences make a single science, just as is the case with metaphysics and theology, because theology considers many things, both subjects and properties, that do not belong to metaphysics. 24. As to the confirmation [n.14, 1.8], I concede that they are properties of being and so belong to metaphysics; but consistent with this is that they belong to different sciences. Similarly, given that such truths, which prove about God the properties of being, belong precisely to metaphysics, yet all the truths, which express properties that are proper to God and which are contained virtually in God alone under the idea of deity, do belong, according to the mode of speaking of those who argue in this way, to the science of God under the proper idea of deity. But these sort of truths: God is three, God is infinite, God is the first cause of all things, God is pure act, and so on as to many other such truths – these express properties that belong to God alone and that are contained in God under the idea of deity {1.13}, according to them; therefore they belong to the science of God under the proper idea of deity. 25. If it be said that these properties are demonstrated of God within metaphysics and so they belong to metaphysics, this is not valid. For these properties are demonstrated in metaphysics only by a demonstration-that, but they are demonstrated of God, according to them, by a demonstration-why through the idea of deity, whether mediately or immediately, and they are resolved ultimately to the idea of deity. If therefore these properties belong to metaphysics on the ground that they are proved in metaphysics by a demonstration-that, much more will they belong to the science of God, according to them, under the proper idea of deity on the ground that they are demonstrated of God under the proper idea of deity by a demonstration-why. 26. If it be said that then the numerically same habit would be metaphysical and theological, I say (according to what has been said) that when taking metaphysical and theological habit as they are commonly taken, and as we are speaking of them now, neither of them is numerically one but contains many habits distinct in number, species, and genus. And therefore the habit whereby this truth is known, ‘God is one’, which belongs to metaphysics and to theology, is neither a metaphysical habit nor a theological habit, just as neither is it metaphysics or theology. Hence, just as one should not allow that a man is a people or an army, or that a house is a city or a town, so this habit is neither metaphysics nor theology. But if by a habit’s being metaphysical or theological {1.14} is understood that this habit belongs to metaphysics or theology, thus it can be allowed that the same habit is metaphysical and theological. However, I do allow that the Page 12 numerically same habit is part of the metaphysical habit and also of the theological habit, just as the same man is part of the people and of the army. 27. To the third [n.15, 1.8] I say that the Philosopher is speaking of distinct sciences that have all subjects distinct and all properties distinct, and about such sciences it is true that by the principles of one science it is not possible to prove the conclusion of another science. But when some subject of one science is contained under the subject of another science, then it is indeed possible, as is plain through Aristotle himself in the same place [ibid. 75b14-17], because he there excepts sciences so disposed from his conclusion. So is it in the issue at hand, that God, who is the subject of theology, is contained under being, which is part of the subject of metaphysics. 28. And if it be said that the Philosopher only excepts subalternating and subalternated science, as is plain in the same place, one must say that by his excepting subalternating and subalternated science he intends to except (though he not express it) certain other sciences subordinated in other ways. Hence one must note that it is not unacceptable for theology to be, as to some part of itself, subalternated {1.15} to metaphysics, or conversely – in the way that medicine is subalternated, as to some part of itself, to geometry, as the Philosopher teaches in Posterior Analytics 1.13.79a13-16.

About the Meaning of the Question

29. I say therefore that I do not understand the question [n.6] to be precisely about evident scientific knowledge but about evident knowledge in general, because some theological truths only supernaturally knowable are necessary, and some theological truths are contingent, which can be scientifically known neither naturally nor supernaturally. Similarly, I understand the question precisely of truths supernaturally knowable, whether they are necessary or contingent.

Division of the Question

30. Having shown these points about this question, I will proceed as follows: First I will show that our intellect, even for this state of life, can have, in respect of the same object under the same idea, two simple distinct kinds of knowledge, one of which can be called intuitive and the other abstractive. Second, that such double knowledge with respect to God under the proper idea of deity is possible. Third, that each of them is separable from the other. Fourth, from this I will conclude that abstractive knowledge of the deity is possible for the wayfarer. Fifth, I will reply to the form of the question. Sixth, I will raise some doubts and solve them.

{1.16} Article I: Preparatory Distinctions about Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge of the Same Thing Page 13

31. To make the first conclusion clear I first preface some distinctions and conclusions by way of preparation; second, I will prove the conclusion chiefly intended. 32. A first distinction, then, is this, that among acts of intellect there are two acts, one of which is what apprehends things, and it is in respect of anything that can be the term of an act of the intellective power, whether the term be a propositional complex or a single term; for we apprehend not only single terms but also propositions and demonstrations and impossible things and necessary things, and in general all things that the intellective power has regard to. The other act can be called judicative, whereby the intellect not only apprehends the object but also assents to it or dissents from it. And this act is only in respect of a propositional complex, because we assent to nothing through the intellect save to what we reckon to be true, nor do we dissent from anything save from what we consider to be false. And thus is it plain that with respect to a propositional complex there can be a double act, namely an act that apprehends and an act that judges. 33. The proof of this: because anyone can apprehend some proposition and yet neither assent to it nor dissent from it, as is plain of neutral propositions that our intellect neither assents to nor dissents from, because otherwise they would not be neutral. Similarly, a layman who does not know Latin can hear many propositions in Latin that he neither {1.17} assents to nor dissents from. And it is certain that the intellect can assent to some proposition and dissent from another one; therefore etc. 34. A second distinction [n.32] is that just as there is a double act with respect to a propositional complex, so there is a corresponding double habit with respect to a propositional complex, namely one that inclines to an act of apprehension and another that inclines to an act of judging. This distinction is plain because, after many apprehendings of some proposition that is neutral, someone feels himself more inclined to apprehending and thinking about that proposition than he was before; therefore he has a habit inclining him to acts of apprehension. And that there is a habit inclining one to acts of judging is plain from the Philosopher Ethics 6.3.1139b16-17, where he posits [habits of] intellect and science etc.

Prefatory Conclusions First Conclusion

35. The first prefatory conclusion is this, that an act of judging as to some propositional complex presupposes an act of apprehending as to the same complex. The proof of this is that no habit inclines to the act of another habit save by means of its own act, to which it first inclines. This is plain from an example, because the habit of the principle never inclines to an act of knowing some conclusion save by means of its own act as to the principle to which it first inclines. But the habit of apprehending inclines to an act of judging; therefore, it first inclines to an act of apprehending and consequently those acts are simultaneous. And the act of apprehending can be without the act of judging {1.18} and not conversely; therefore, it is naturally prior, and so the other presupposes it. The minor of the main reason is plain from experience, for let it be Page 14 posited that someone first frequently thinks of some proposition that is neutral for him (such that he is inclined promptly to think about that proposition which is neutral for him), afterwards he begins to assent to that proposition. This person will feel himself ready to give assent to the proposition after his first assent, and ready to think about it. But he does not have this readiness precisely from some habit bequeathed by that single act of assent, because, if he had never thought about it before, he would not be thus readily inclined to it. Therefore, he has that readiness, at least partially, from a habit already acquired from acts of apprehension; therefore it is then inclining to its own act.

Objections against the First Conclusion

36. Objection can be made against this conclusion. First, that then in the same intellect there would be two acts of understanding simultaneously. 37. Second, that the minor of the main reason is false because, when some habit inclines to the act of another habit, the act of the first habit is a sufficient cause of the second act. This is plain from an example: because the habit of the principle inclines to the act of the conclusion, therefore the act of the principle is a sufficient cause for knowing the conclusion. So if the habit of apprehension were to incline one to the act of judgment, the act of apprehension would be a sufficient cause of the act of judgment, and thus whoever apprehended any proposition would at once assent to or dissent from the same proposition, which is manifestly false. 38. {1.19} Third, the proof of the minor is not valid, because the sort of person who has frequently thought about any proposition neutral to him and has afterwards assented to it, will not assent to the proposition by virtue of the habit first acquired from acts of apprehension, but by virtue of the proposition by virtue of which he assented to the same proposition. For he now has some principle that that proposition follows from, which before he did not have, as an authority or reason because of which he now first assents. And so the first acquired habit does not incline him to an act of assent, because if such a person were to recall the premises or the authority because of which he now first assents, he would not be inclined to assent [to the conclusion] but only to think about it.

Response to the Objections

39. To the first of these objections [n.36] I concede that there are several acts of understanding in the same intellect. And this is true not only of ordered acts (the way the act of apprehension and of judgment are related to each other) but also of disparate ones (as will be said later). My proof of this general conclusion: because every act naturally posterior to an act of love is really distinguished from an act naturally prior to the same act of love. But Plato can love Socrates and know that he loves Socrates; this act of knowing, which terminates at this proposition ‘Plato loves Socrates’, is naturally posterior to the act of loving, because the act of loving can exist without it, and not conversely, so it is naturally prior, and the act of knowing exists together with this act of Page 15 loving. But this act of loving presupposes conceptual or some other knowledge of Socrates, and is together with it; therefore these three acts {1.20} are together: two in the intellect and the middle one in the will. Therefore I concede that there can be two acts of understanding together in the intellect. 40. As to the second [n.37] I deny the major, because it is enough that the cause be a partial cause. The point is plain because the habit of one premise inclines, by means of its proper act, to the act of knowing the conclusion, and yet that act is not a sufficient cause of the other premise. Also, it is enough for it be an at least partial intermediate cause; the point is plain about the habit in respect of the term and about the act in respect of the conclusion. 41. To the third [n.38] I say that the sort of person who has a habit acquired from such acts preceding assent does indeed assent afterwards by virtue of the principle or authority by virtue of which he first assents – not however totally but only partially, because if such a person were equally disposed to the principle or authority and have never before thought about the proposition, it is manifest that he would not as easily or as often assent to the proposition as after having acquired an intense habit from the preceding acts.. Therefore the habit does do something. 42. Hence one needs to know that the intellect can assent to some complex proposition by virtue of something in two ways. Either because that other thing is cause of assent, and thus by virtue of such apprehending act the intellect also immediately assents to such complex proposition, just as by virtue of the intellect or of God he is said to assent to such complex proposition, because God is the effective cause of that assent. And, second, according to some (e.g. John de Bassolis), the intellect too is an effective cause of it. {1.21} In another way can the intellect be said to assent to some complex proposition by virtue of another as by virtue of that to which it assents more, and thus it does not assent by virtue of the apprehending act. Along with this, however, stands the fact that the apprehending act is active cause of the assent.

Second Conclusion

43. From these points follows a second conclusion, that every judicative act presupposes in the same power a simple knowledge of the terms, because it presupposes the apprehensive act. And the apprehensive act presupposes, with respect to any complex act, a simple knowledge of the terms, according to the Commentator (Averroes) on Aristotle’s De Anima 3 com.21, where he distinguishes between two acts of the intellect, namely formation and faith, and says as follows, “Now the things in which the false and true etc. are found, that is, objects understood that truth and falsity are found in – in these things there is a composition made from the material intellect and the intellect that first understands singulars.” And later he adds (ibid.): “For the intellect first understands the singulars and then combines them.” From these authorities it is plain that the intellect can form no proposition, nor consequently apprehend it, unless it first understand singulars, that is, uncombined terms. The same Averroes in ibid. com.22 says as follows, “What makes these single understandings to be one by composition after they were many is the Page 16 material intellect. For this distinguishes the single understandings and {1.22} combines those that are alike and separates those that are diverse. For the power that comprehends simple terms and complex propositions must be the same.”

Third Conclusion

44. The third conclusion is that no act of the sensitive part is the proximate immediate cause, either partial or total, of any judicative act of the intellect. This conclusion can be proved: because the reason that the things in the intellect are sufficient for any judicative act as proximate and immediate causes of it is a reason for them to be sufficient for every judicative act. But with respect to any judicative act the things in the intellect are sufficient, namely with respect to the conclusion, because if there is in the intellect an act for knowing the premises, the conclusion is at once known (everything else excluded). So for every judicative act the things in the intellect are sufficient as proximate causes. Besides, from the fact that what is in the intellective part is sufficient, other causes are posited in vain.

Proof of the First Conclusion First Reason

45. On the basis of these premises I prove the first conclusion as follows: any conceptual knowledge of any terms that can be cause of evident knowledge with respect to a proposition composed of those terms is distinct in species from the conceptual knowledge of things that, however intense the knowledge is, cannot be the cause of evident knowledge with respect to the same proposition. This is plain, because things that are of the same idea and are equally perfect can have, in the same {1.23} equally disposed passive subject, an effect of the same idea (Aristotle, Topics 7.1.152a2-4). But it is certain that the intellect can have conceptual knowledge of both Socrates and white by virtue of which it cannot evidently know whether he is white or not, as is plain from experience. And besides this, it can have conceptual knowledge by virtue of which it can evidently know that Socrates is white, if he is white. Therefore, it can have two conceptual cognitions one of which can be cause of evident knowledge of that contingent proposition [sc. ‘Socrates is white’] and the other of which, however intense it is, cannot be. Therefore, they are distinct in species. 46. There is a confirmation from the Philosopher in Prior Analytics 2.21.67a39-b1, where he says that we know no sensible reality when it is away from the senses. Likewise Ethics 6.3.1139b21-22 says, “When contingent things are beyond perception, whether they are or are not is hidden.” From these authorities it is plain that about sensible things in our present state, about which the Philosopher is speaking, some conceptual knowledge is possible by virtue of which it can be evidently known whether a thing is so or not. And yet it is certain that about a sensible and contingent thing able to be otherwise when it is outside sense and knowledge, there can be for the intellect some conceptual Page 17 knowledge by virtue of which it can be evidently known whether it is or is not; therefore etc. 47. Nor is it valid to say that a conceptual knowledge of these terms does not suffice for evident knowledge of a contingent truth but that some other knowledge is required, because it is manifest that the proposition ‘this is whiteness’ does not depend on nor presuppose any other proposition {1.24} more known to me by virtue of which I can know this proposition. Because that other proposition would be either necessary or contingent: not necessary because the contingent does not follow from the necessary; nor contingent, because it would for the same reason depend on knowledge of the terms alone, or there would be a process to infinity. And so one must grant that, with respect to any contingent truth, conceptual knowledge alone of one or more terms suffices. And yet it is manifest that it is possible to have conceptual knowledge of the same terms and yet for that truth to be unknown. Therefore with respect to those terms there is a double conceptual knowledge distinct in species.

Objection to the First Reason

48. Against this reason can be objected that it is not valid, because it only proves that about the terms of a contingent proposition, or about something imported by the terms, such a double knowledge can be had by us; but that each of them is intellective, or is subjectively in the intellect, is not proved, because it is enough for one to belong to sense, by virtue of which such contingent truth can be known, and for the other to be intellective, by virtue of which it cannot be evidently known. This is plain because when the extremes, or what is imported or signified by the extremes, are known by sense, such contingent truth can then be evidently known; but when they are not known by sense but only be imagination or the intellect, it cannot be evidently known. And it is about such double knowledge, one of which is through exterior sense and the other through the intellect or imagination, that the adduced authorities are speaking. {1.25} This is confirmed by the Philosopher in Metaphysics 7.15.1039b20-b4 and by the Commentator [Averroes] On the Metaphysics t.53, where they mean that these particulars are not manifest when they are away from the senses. Hence the same Commentator says, “When the sensed thing has departed from sense, information about it will remain in the soul, but not such that it is certain that it is so when the thing is absent from the senses. And therefore sensible things do not have a definition or a demonstration, because after they depart from the senses, they only have guesswork [sc. as to whether they are or not]. Likewise the Commentator Eustratius On the Ethics 6.3 (in Grossteste’s version), “We discern that contingent things exist when they come into act and are sensibly seen as present.” 49. From this it is plain that these sensibles become manifest as to the contingent truths about them only through sense knowledge.

Response to the Objection Page 18

50. This objection is not valid, because direct sense knowledge is not enough for knowledge of any contingent truth, but one must posit beside it some conceptual intellective knowledge. And so if, when the intellect has conceptual knowledge of the terms of that truth, or of what is signified by the terms of it, it assents to it when the terms, or what is signified by the terms, are sensed, and {1.26} when they are not sensed it does not assent, it must have some intuitive knowledge of them when they are sensed other than what it has when they are not sensed. This is plain from the prefatory conclusions, because it was said before [Second Conclusion, para 43] that the formation of a proposition presupposes in the intellect a conceptual knowledge of the terms, according to the Commentator; therefore for the same reason, evident knowledge of such truth presupposes knowledge intuitive in itself, and intuitive sense knowledge alone does not suffice – just as neither does intuitive sense knowledge alone of the terms (or of what is signified by the terms) suffice for formation of a proposition. 51. Likewise it is plain before [para 44] that no act of the sensitive part is the proximate and immediate cause with respect to any judicative act. Therefore if the intellect can judge a thing to be or not to be when a sensible thing is sensed by the senses and could not judge it before, it must have something in itself, previous to the judgment, which before it did not have and now has; therefore etc. 52. This is confirmed by the Commentator in his On the Soul 3 t.2 at the beginning, where he says as follows: “If the singulars were understood to be of things that are innate either in past time or in future time, then the intellect understands along with those things the time when they are, and afterwards it will combine it with them, and will judge {1.27} that those things were or will be, just as it judges that the diagonal is incommensurable [asymmetric] with the side.” And later he adds: “And truth and falsity do not belong to composition only in propositions in which the predicate is a noun, but in those in which the predicate is a verb.” From these authorities it seems that intellective knowledge alone suffices for judgment as proximate cause of it, and that the intellect thus has to know time and the like just as the senses do. But this cannot be without intuitive knowledge, as will be made clear elsewhere [Sent. II qq.14-15]; therefore etc. 53. Hereby is it plain, as to all the authorities [n.48; 1.25], that such contingent truths cannot be know about these sensibles save when they are being sensed, because intuitive intellective knowledge of these sensibles for this state of life cannot be had without intuitive sensitive knowledge of them. And therefore sensitive knowledge is not superfluous, although intuitive intellective knowledge alone would suffice if it were possible for it to exist naturally for this state of life without intuitive sensitive knowledge – as it exists in angels and the separated soul, where, for evident knowledge of such truths, there is not required any intuitive sensitive knowledge, as will be said later [Sent. II qq.14-15] 54. If it be said that intuitive intellective knowledge is not destroyed on the cessation of any exterior sensation, and so consequently some contingent truth could be evidently known about some sensible without sensation of that sensible, I say that just as it is not unacceptable that on any bodily transformation (as sickness {1.28} or sleep) all act of the Page 19 intellect ceases, so it is not unacceptable that on the cessation of any sensation of exterior sense intuitive intellective knowledge of the same ceases.

Second Reason for the First Conclusion

55. Second I argue principally as follows: everything intelligible that can be apprehended by the intellect alone (and in no way by the senses), of which some non- propositional knowledge suffices for evident knowledge of some contingent truth about it, and of which some non-propositional knowledge of the same thing does not suffice, can be known by the intellect in two specifically distinct cognitions. But intellections, affections, delights, sadnesses and suchlike are intelligible and in no way sensible, and some non-propositional knowledge of them suffices for evident knowledge of whether they are or are not, and of whether they are in such and such subject or not; and some knowledge of the same things does not suffice; therefore etc. The minor as to its first part is plain, because anyone experiences in himself that he understands, loves, is delighted, and is sad; and this knowledge, since it is with respect to something contingent, cannot be received from necessary propositions. Therefore, it must be received (1) from non- propositional knowledge of the terms or the things, or (2) from something contingent that is taken from non-propositional knowledge of the terms or the things they import, or (3) there will be a process to infinity in such contingent things. The third (3) is impossible, because it is [necessary] to posit a stand in such things. If the second (2) be granted, then either (i) this contingent thing has some term that can be taken from some sensible thing or (ii) it has no term. The first (i) cannot be granted because there is no proposition about anything sensible from which would necessarily follow that there is {1.29} love in the will (as will be plain elsewhere [1.40-41]), and consequently there is no such contingent proposition by virtue of which it can evidently be known that this man loves. If the second (ii) be granted the proposition is gained, because non-propositional knowledge of terms merely intelligible suffices for evident knowledge of such contingent truth. If the first (1) be granted, the proposition is gained. The second part of the minor is plain because it is not unacceptable that someone should be ignorant as to whether some intelligible exists or not and yet that he should have non-propositional knowledge about it no more than about anything sensible. Hence if the intellect were first to see the love of another and were as certain about the love of another as of its own love, it would not be unacceptable but that afterwards it would understand the same love and yet not know it existed (although it would exist), just as holds about any sensible thing first seen and afterwards understood. 56. This second reason proves that for the intellect such a double cognition is possible, and this with respect to something merely intelligible. But the first reason proves that in fact for this present state the intellect has such a double cognition even with respect to sensibles. 57. This second reason could be confirmed from Blessed Augustine, On the Trinity 13 c.1 n.3, where he says as follows: “The faith itself, which each sees to be in his heart if he believes, or not to be if he does not believe, we know in another way: not like bodies that Page 20 we see with bodily eyes, and that we see also when absent through the images of them we hold in our memory; nor like the things we do not see.” From this authority it is plain that the faith itself, which pertains {1.30} to no sense of the body (as he makes clear in the second chapter [ibid. ch.2 n.5]), can be known by a knowledge which is sufficient for judging whether it is or not, and by another which is not sufficient for this. Therefore two non-propositional distinct species of knowledge of it are possible.

Exposition of the First Article

58. I say therefore as to this article [n.31, 1.16] that with respect to something non- propositional there can be a double knowledge, one of which can be called abstractive and the other intuitive. Now whether others want to call such non-propositional knowledge intuitive I care not, because I intend principally to prove this alone, that the intellect can have about the same thing a twofold non-propositional knowledge distinct in species. 59. However one needs to know that abstractive knowledge can be taken in two ways: in one way that it is in respect of something abstracted from many singulars, and in this way abstractive knowledge is not other than knowledge of some universal that can be abstracted from many things (which will be spoken of later [1.65]). And if the universal be a true quality existing in the soul as in a subject, as can be held with probability, it would be conceded that the universal {1.31} can be seen intuitively, and that the same knowledge is intuitive and abstractive in this way of taking abstractive knowledge; and in this way it is not distinct as an opposite to it. 60. In another way abstractive knowledge is taken according as it abstracts from existence and non-existence and from the other conditions that contingently belong to the thing or are predicated of it. Not that something is known by intuitive knowledge that is not known by abstractive knowledge, but that the same thing totally and under every idea is known by each knowledge. But they are distinguished in this way: that intuitive knowledge of a thing is the sort of knowledge by virtue of which it can be known whether the thing is or not, such that, if the thing is, the intellect at once judges that it is and knows evidently that it is, unless perhaps it be impeded because of the imperfection of that knowledge. And in the same way if such perfect knowledge were, by divine power, conserved about a non-existent thing, it would by virtue of that non-propositional knowledge know evidently that the thing was not. 61. Likewise, intuitive knowledge is such that when certain things are known, of which one inheres in the other or one is distant in place from the other, or is disposed in some other way to the other, at once it is known, by virtue of the non-propositional knowledge of those things, whether the thing inheres or does not inhere, whether it is distant or not distant, and so on about other contingent truths (unless the knowledge is too weak, or there is some other impediment). Just as, if Socrates is in point of fact white, the knowledge of Socrates and of white, by virtue of which it can be evidently known that Socrates is white, is called intuitive knowledge. And universally every non-propositional Page 21 knowledge {1.32} of a term or terms, or of a thing or things, by virtue of which can evidently be known some contingent truth, especially about the present, is intuitive knowledge. 62. Now abstractive knowledge is that by virtue of which it cannot be evidently known about a contingent thing whether it is or not. And in this way abstractive knowledge abstracts from existence and non-existence, because (in opposition to intuitive knowledge) it cannot thereby be evidently known about an existent thing that it exists, or about a non-existent thing that it does not exist. 63. Likewise, by abstractive knowledge no contingent truth, especially about the present, can be evidently known. As is in fact plain, because when Socrates and his whiteness are known in his absence, by virtue of that non-propositional knowledge it cannot be known that Socrates is or is not, or that he is white or not white, and that he is distant from such place or not, and so on about other contingent facts. And yet it is certain that these truths can be evidently known. And all propositional knowledge of terms or things signified is ultimately reduced to non-propositional knowledge of the terms. Therefore these terms, or things, can be known by some other knowledge than that by virtue of which such contingent truths cannot be known, and that will be intuitive knowledge. And this is the knowledge from which experiential knowledge begins, because universally he who can receive experiential knowledge of some contingent truth and, by its means, of a necessary truth, has some non-propositional knowledge about {1.33} some term or thing that he who cannot thus experience it does not have. And therefore, just as according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 1.1.980b25-82a2, Posterior Analytics 2.19.100a3-9, the knowledge of sensible things that is received from experience (about which he is himself speaking) begins from the senses, that is, from intuitive sense knowledge of these sensible things – so universally scientific knowledge of purely intelligible things that is received through experience begins from intuitive intellective knowledge of these intelligibles. However, one must note that sometimes, because of the imperfection of intuitive knowledge (namely because it is very imperfect and obscure, either because of impediments on the part of the object or because of other impediments), it can happen that either no or few contingent truths about a thing thus intuitively known can be known.

Conclusions Inferred from the First Article against the Opinion of Scotus

64. From these points certain conclusions follow: 65. First, that intuitive and abstractive knowledge do not differ, because abstractive knowledge can be indifferently of the existent or non-existent, of the present or non- present, but intuitive only of the really existent and present. Which difference some posit [Scotus, Ord. II d.3 q.9 n.6, Wadding 6-1.453.] whenever they speak of this matter. 66. Nor {1.34}, second, do they differ because abstractive knowledge does not attain the object in itself under its perfect idea but only in a certain diminished likeness, while intuitive knowledge attains the object in itself under its perfect idea, as a certain doctor says, [Scotus] Quodl. q.6 n.8 [Wadding 12.145.] Page 22

67. Nor, third, do they differ “by formal motive reasons, namely because in intuitive cognition the thing in its proper existence is what per se objectively moves [sc. to knowledge]; in abstractive cognition there is something that moves in which the thing has knowable being, whether it be a cause virtually containing the thing as knowable, or whether it be an effect, namely the species or likeness representatively containing the thing itself of which it is the likeness,” as the same doctor says, Quodl. q.13 n.10 [Wadding 12.310.]. 68. Nor, fourth, do they differ because intuitive knowledge necessarily has annexed to it a real and actual relation to the object itself; abstractive knowledge does not necessarily have an actual real relation to the object, although it does have a potential relation, namely of measure and dependence, but not a relation of union and dependence, as the same Scotus says, Quodl. q.13 nn.11, 13 [Wadding 12.311, 320]. 69. Nor, fifth, [do they differ] because in intuitive knowledge the object is present in its proper existence, and in abstractive knowledge the object is present in something perfectly representing it under the proper and per se {1.35} idea of knowable, as the same doctor says, Quodl. q.14 n.10 [Wadding, 12.369], Sent. IV d.10 q.8 n.5 [Wadding, 8.565]. 70. The first conclusion [n.65] is plain from their own principles, which I believe to be true in this part. For in [Scotus] Sent. III d.14 q.2 n.2 they prove that no form necessarily precedes in the intellect, prior to vision itself, as follows: If some form necessarily precedes, it would be disposed to vision either in idea of efficient cause or in idea of material cause. If in the first way, then it could be without it, because whatever God can do through an efficient cause as a means, he can do immediately. If in the second way, then that form, if it could exist per se, could per se receive the vision – Thus do I argue in the matter at hand: either the thing that is existent and present is disposed in idea of efficient cause for intuitive knowledge, or in idea of material or formal or final cause. If the first, then [intuitive knowledge] can happen without it, because whatever God can do through a mediate efficient cause he can do immediately. Not in the second way, because then, with the thing existing and the intellect destroyed, [the thing] could receive that intuitive knowledge as subject of it; similarly is it manifest that that knowledge is not in the intuited thing as in a subject. Nor in the third way, as is manifest. Nor in the fourth way, because everything can exist when any end, except the first, has been destroyed, because nothing requires the existence of a second end more than the existence of a second efficient cause. 71. If it be said that the object is required in idea of terminating object, on the contrary: either the object insofar as it terminates has the idea of some essential cause or it does not. So if it does I argue as before. {1.36} If it does not I argue as these arguments elsewhere argue [Scotus, Ord.I d.3 p.3 q.2 n.414, Quodl. q.7 nn.19-20]: every effect depends adequately on its essential causes, such that, once they are posited and everything else is removed, the effect can be adequately posited. Therefore if the object, insofar as it a terminating object, does not have the idea of an essential cause with respect to intuitive knowledge, then if the object is simply destroyed as to all its real existence, the intuitive knowledge itself can be posited; therefore when the thing itself is destroyed, the intuitive knowledge itself can be posited. And so, the intuitive knowledge, in itself Page 23 and necessarily, is no more of something existent than of something non-existent, nor does it more regard existence than non-existence, but it regards both the existence and non-existence of the thing in the way made clear above [n.60, 1.31]. But abstractive knowledge regards neither existence nor non-existence, because by it cannot be had a judgment that the thing exists nor that it does not exist. 72. The second [n.66] is plain, because the same thing totally and under the same idea on the part of the object is object of intuitive and abstractive [knowledge]. Therefore everything the same and under the same idea that is object of intuitive knowledge can be {1.37} the object of abstractive knowledge. And it is manifest that whatever real thing can be known abstractively can also be known intuitively; therefore etc. Likewise, according to them elsewhere [Scotus, Rep. I Prol. q.2 n.15; Wadding 11-1.18], deity under the idea of deity can be known abstractively. But this is the most perfect idea of God, according to them [ibid. q.1 nn.40-42]. Similarly according to them [Scotus, Quodl. q.13 n.10, Wadding 12.310], existence too can be known abstractively. 73. The third [n.67] is plain from the arguments against the first difference [1.34, 35-36], because God can through the same thing totally cause each knowledge, nor is it required that the thing move in its proper existence and objectively, as was proved [1.35-36] 74. The fourth [n.68] is plain through the same point, because a real relation, according to them [Scotus, Rep. I d.31 q.3 n.27, Wadding 11-1.177; Quodl. q.13 nn. 14-15, Wadding 12.320], cannot have a term at non-being, but the object of intuitive knowledge can be a non-being, as has been proved and will be proved later [1.31, 36, 38-39]. 75. The {1.38} fifth [n.68] is plain through the same point, because for intuitive knowledge is not required that the thing be present in its proper existence, as has been proved [1.34, 35-36].

Opinion of the Author about the Difference between Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge

76. Therefore I say that intuitive and abstractive knowledge differ in themselves and not by their objects or any of their causes, although naturally intuitive knowledge could not be without the existence of the thing, which is truly the efficient cause, mediate or immediate, of intuitive knowledge, as will be said elsewhere [Sent. II qq.14-15]. Now abstractive knowledge can naturally exist when the known thing itself is simply destroyed. And if he [Scotus, supra 1.33] so understood when positing the aforesaid differences, he seems to hold the truth as to this matter, although in some things, which have regard to other difficulties, these do not contain truth; which things will be spoken about in their own place [Sent. II qq.14-15].

Corollary I: Intuitive Knowledge of a non-existent Thing is Possible Page 24

77. From these it follows that intuitive knowledge, both sensitive and intellective, can exist about a non-existent thing. And I prove this conclusion, differently from before, as follows: every absolute thing, distinct in place and subject from another absolute thing, can, by divine absolute power, exist without it, because it does not seem likely that, if God wants to destroy one absolute thing existing in the heaven, {1.39} he be necessitated to destroy another thing existing on the earth. But intuitive vision, both sensitive and intellective, is an absolute thing, distinct in place and subject from the object. Just as, if I see intuitively a star existing in the sky, that intuitive vision, whether it is sensitive or intellective, is distinguished in place and subject from the object seen; therefore, the vision can remain when the star has been destroyed; therefore etc. 78. It is also plain from the aforesaid how God has intuitive knowledge of all things, whether they are or are not, because He as evidently knows that creatures are not when they are not as he knows that they are when they are. 79. It is plain too that a non-existent thing can be known intuitively, however much the first object of that act does not exist (against the opinion of some [Scotus supra]), because sense vision of a color can be conserved by God when the color itself does not exist, and yet this vision has its term at the color as at its first object; and intellective vision for the same reason.

Corollary II: There is Intuitive Knowledge of Things Purely Intelligible

80. It is plain too that our intellect for this present state not only knows these sensible things, but it knows in particular and intuitively certain intelligibles that in no way fall under the senses, any more than {1.40} a separate substance falls under the senses, of which sort are intellections, acts of will, consequent delight and sadness, and the like, which a man can experience to be in himself, which however are not sensible nor fall under any sense. For it is plain that such things are known by us in particular and intuitively, because this fact is evidently known to me, ‘I understand’. Therefore either this is first and immediately taken from conceptual knowledge of the terms or the things, or it is known through some prior more known thing. If in the first way, then since it is contingent, there must be some term or thing imported by the term that is intuitively seen. Because if it precisely were understood abstractively then, since such knowledge, according to everyone, abstracts from the here and now, through such knowledge a contingent truth that concerns a determinate difference of time could not be known; therefore, in order for this to be evidently known, some intuitive knowledge is required. But it is manifest that an intuitive knowledge of myself is not enough; therefore an intuitive knowledge of intellection is required. The second way [supra: ‘or it is known through some prior more known thing’] cannot be granted, because there is no contingent thing from which necessarily follows the proposition ‘I understand’. Or at any rate, because of the freedom of the will, there is no contingent proposition from which this would necessarily follow, ‘I love Socrates’; because if it were to follow from some such proposition, it would most of all follow from this one, ‘I understand Socrates under the idea of a good’, or ‘I know Socrates is to be loved by me’. But because the will can freely Page 25 will the opposite of what is dictated by the intellect {1.41}, therefore from no such proposition does ‘I love Socrates’ necessarily follow; and so this is simply first among contingent propositions, and so it cannot be evidently known by any prior one. 81. Besides, as was touched on [1.33], knowledge taken from experience cannot be without intuitive knowledge. But knowledge about these is taken from experience, because we experience these in ourselves, as we experience any sensibles, nor does anyone more doubt whether he loves or not than that he is hot or sees; therefore etc. 82. This is confirmed from Blessed Augustine On the Trinity 13.1 n.3, where he says, “Of absent things there is faith present, of things that are outside there is faith within, and of things that are not seen there is faith within.” From this authority it is plain that although some things are not seen but only known abstractively, yet the faith itself by which they are believed is seen and not only known abstractively. 83. If it be said that Augustine is speaking of supernatural things that are not known by us save in a general concept, this is not valid, because according to him those things and faith are known in different ways; therefore, if they are known in general, in order for it to be seen to be faith, it is necessary that it be known in particular. Likewise, just as faith can be had about supernatural things, so too about particular things sensed previously and absent afterwards, and then faith will be seen to be of absent particular things sensed before; therefore the former things will then only be known abstractively and faith intuitively. 84. Again, On the Trinity, ibid. 2 n.5, Augustine proves that faith does not belong to any sense of the body; and afterwards there follows: “This thing belongs to the heart, not to the body; {1.42} nor is it outside us but within us; nor does any man see it in another but each in himself.” And there follows: “Each one therefore sees his own faith in himself, but he believes and does not see that it is in another.” From which it is plain that each has one conceptual knowledge about his own faith, by which he evidently knows that it exists, and a different knowledge of another’s faith, by which he cannot know whether it is or is not. 85. If it be said that he has another knowledge, because about his own faith he has knowledge in particular, about another’s faith only in general, this is true, because the faith of another we cannot for now see, nor can we understand it save in a general concept. However, positing that we did understand the faith of another in particular, as now I understand some color in particular which I saw before, it would not be unacceptable that I should doubt whether he believed or not, just as now I do not know whether the color that I saw before exists now or not. And consequently I would also have a knowledge other in species about another’s faith and about my own, because, if it were of the same species, so by virtue of that knowledge I could judge that faith to exist, if it does, just as I can judge my own faith to exist, when it is based on the common proposition: ‘causes of the same idea have effects of the same idea’. 86. Augustine says the same about the will [Trinity 13.3 n.6]: “It is one thing to see one’s own will, another to conjecture another’s, however certain the conjecture. For {1.43} the fact that Rome was built I hold to be as certain among human affairs as that Constantinople was, although I have seen Rome with my own eyes, but about Page 26

Constantinople I know nothing save what I have believed from others’ testimony.” Therefore, just as about bodily things a knowledge can be had by which some contingent truth can be known and another knowledge by which it cannot be known, so too about spiritual things; and thus both of these knowledges will be intellective. 87. Besides, those truths, which, among all contingent truths, are known more certainly and evidently by the intellect, have terms or things they import that are most known in particular and intuitively, just as the knowledge of a contingent truth necessarily presupposes intuitive and particular knowledge. But contingent truths about things merely intelligible are, among all contingent truths, known more certainly and more evidently by us, as is plain from experience and from Blessed Augustine Trinity 15.12 n.21, where he declares at length that, although one could have doubt about these sensibles here, yet not about those of this sort: I know I am alive, I know I want to be blessed, I know that I do not want to err. And afterwards he speaks as follows: “Since there are two kinds of things that are known, one of things that the mind perceives through the senses of the body, the other of those that it perceives through itself, those philosophers (namely the Academics) have prattled many things against the senses of the body; but their minds have never been able to call into doubt certain in themselves very firm perceptions of true things, of which sort is this that I say, ‘I know I am alive’.” 88. From this authority it is plain that the intellect understands some things that were first sensed and others that were not. It is likewise plain that these contingent truths about these intelligible things are most evidently known, so that {1.44} about them someone cannot doubt who has knowledge of the sort that someone has about his own faith. Therefore, among all contingent truths those about pure intelligibles are more evident, and consequently they do not presuppose any others from which they may be known. From which it further follows that for evident knowledge of them there is required intuitive knowledge of something merely intelligible.

The Second Corollary is Confirmed by the Authority of Scotus

89. Now lest this opinion as to intuitive knowledge of sensibles and of certain things merely intelligible be despised as new, I bring it forward in the words of the Subtle Doctor, Sent. IV d.45 q.3 nn.17-18, who expressly posits two of the aforesaid conclusions, namely that our intellect knows sensibles intuitively and knows some mere intelligibles intuitively. Hence, when he concedes that the intellective part has an act of remembering properly speaking, and consequently that it intuitively knows the act which it afterwards remembers as its proximate object, he speaks word for word as follows: 90. “I say therefore as to this article that in the intellective part there is memory and an act of remembering properly speaking. For on the supposition that the intellect does not only know universals – which indeed is true of abstractive intellection that the Philosopher {1.45} speaks of [Physics 198a5-7, On the Soul 417b22-23, Scotus, Ord. IV d.45 q.3 n.1], because it alone is scientific – but it also knows intuitively the things that sense knows, because a more perfect and superior cognitive power in the same thing knows what an inferior cognitive power knows; and also because it knows sensations. Page 27

And each point is proved by the fact that it knows propositions contingently true and syllogizes from them; but to form propositions and to syllogize is proper to the intellect. Now the truth of these propositions is about objects as intuitively known, namely under the idea of their own existence under which they are known by sense. It follows that in the intellect can be found all the conditions stated before that pertain to remembering. For it can perceive time and have an act after a time, and so on about the rest.” 91. “And it is able, briefly, to remember each object that sense memory can remember, because it has power for the act that is knowing intuitively an object nearby when it exists, and thus to remember it after it has existed. It can also remember many proximate objects which the sense power cannot remember, as a past intellection or volition. For that a man does remember such things is proved by the fact that otherwise he could not repent of evil volitions, nor even compare a past intellection, as past, to a future one; nor consequently, from the fact that it has thus engaged in speculation, order itself to speculate about other things that follow from these. And briefly, we are {1.46} in many ways ruined if we do not remember past intellections and volitions. Now those things can no sense remember, because they do not fall under the object of any sense; therefore this remembering is proper to the intellect, and this by reason of proximate object. There is also another proper remembering, not only by reason of proximate but of remote object, as is the remembering that tends to the necessary as necessary, as to a remote object, of which sort is the remembering that has for remote object ‘a triangle has three angles…’ For the proximate object of the remembering, namely the act that tends to such an object, can only be an act of the intellective part.” 92. “Thus, therefore, is it plain that some remembering is proper to the intellect by reason of each object, namely both the proximate and the remote object. Some remembering too is, by reason of proximate object, so proper [sc. to the intellective part] that it could not belong to sense, and another remembering by reason of its proximate object belongs to the intellect but it can belong to the sense, as for example if the intellect intuitively understood that I am seeing white and afterwards the intellect understands and remembers that I have seen white. This proximate and remote object, indeed, could be the object of intellective remembering, and there are occasions when a collating from such remembering takes place through discursive reasoning to concluding something else syllogistically. However, of some sense power, as the supreme one, a past sensation cannot be the proximate object, save only of intellective remembering, as was touched on in the preceding article. However, no remembering belongs to the intellect insofar precisely as it abstractively understands.” 93. From {1.47} the aforesaid it is clear that this Doctor, not only in opinion but in words, posits that the intellect intuitively knows sensibles, and some mere intelligibles. And if it be said that he is speaking of the separated soul, it is plainly evident that he is speaking not only of the separated soul but also of it for the present state, for he is speaking (as is plain to one who looks) of the soul that can repent and that can order itself to speculating things other than what has been speculated before. Likewise, he speaks of the soul remembering sensations and the like, and these belong, either most or precisely, to the soul for this present state. Page 28

94. And if it be said that elsewhere he posits the opposite, that does not much move me, because I do not allege him as an authority, nor do I state the aforesaid opinion because he stated it, but because I reckon it true. And therefore if he elsewhere said the opposite, I care not. Here however he held it, and therefore his followers should not despise it as new.

{1.48} Articles II-IV [paragraph 30 supra]: About Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge with Respect to the Deity

95. About the second article I say that God, of his absolute power, can be known by such double knowledge, so that one is intuitive and the other abstractive. However, it is difficult to prove this. It can however be made persuasive: because if God could not be known abstractively, either this would be because of his identity with his existence, or because he cannot be apprehended in himself unless he be known actually to exist, or because it is repugnant to him that so perfect a knowledge should terminate at him. The first is not an impediment, because even his very existence can be known abstractively. Nor is the second an impediment, because perhaps such a person could doubt that the thing is, so that it would not be known to be save discursively. Similarly, on the supposition that an angel cannot doubt that he himself exists, yet he could know himself abstractively, just as also another angel can know another angel abstractively. Therefore he could thus know God abstractively, albeit he could not doubt that God exists. Nor is the third an impediment because imperfect knowledge in imperfect potency posits no imperfection in the object. Besides all non-complex intelligibles can be known by a like sort of knowledge; therefore, just as a creature can be known intuitively and abstractively, so also can God. 96. About the third [article] I say that each of these kinds of knowledge with respect to the deity is separable from the other, because these knowledges do not have a more essential order or connection with respect to one object than with respect to another. But with respect to the creature each [knowledge] is separable from the other, therefore also with respect to God. Besides, if abstractive knowledge could not be without intuitive knowledge of God, then the intuitive would be an essential cause {1.49} with respect to abstractive knowledge, though only an extrinsic cause; and whatever God can do by means of an extrinsic cause he can do immediately by himself. Therefore, he can make abstractive knowledge to be without intuitive, and conversely. 97. Fourth [article], from the aforesaid I conclude that a distinct knowledge of the Deity is communicable to the wayfarer while he remains a wayfarer, because only intuitive knowledge is repugnant to a wayfarer. Therefore if abstractive knowledge can come to be without intuitive, it follows that distinct abstractive knowledge of the Deity can exist in the wayfarer while he remains a wayfarer.

Article V [paragraph 30 supra]: Response to the Form of the Question Page 29

98. About the fifth article, I say to the form of the question that God, of his absolute power, can cause in the intellect of the wayfarer evident knowledge of some truths of theology and perhaps not of others. 99. To understand this, one needs to know, first, that, of things predicable of God, one sort is a true thing outside the soul, according to one opinion, because whatever the intellect can understand with simple knowledge, it can combine with something else or with itself, by saying ‘this is this’. Now a predicable is a concept possessing only objective being, according to one opinion, which concept indeed can truly be predicated of God, not for God himself, but for the thing; and this concept is either simply absolute or connotative or, according to others [John of Reading, cf. 1.131-2], relational. An example of the first: if by such an intellect ‘Father’ were predicated of God (provided however a thing could be predicated [cf. Ockham, Quodl. III q.6]) {1.50}, by saying ‘God is Father or Paternity or God’. An example of the second: ‘God is being’, ‘God is intellect’ and so on about others. An example of the third: ‘God is Creator or Creative’. 100. Second, one needs to know that among truths of theology some are merely contingent, as: ‘God creates’, ‘God is incarnate’, ‘God beatifies’, etc. Others are necessary, and of these some have connotative predicates, as: ‘God is creative’, ‘God is able to be incarnated’, and so on about others. Others have non-connotative predicates, and this whether things or univocal or negative concepts. 101. To the matter at hand, then, I say1 that since, according to what has been said, no contingent proposition could be evidently known save by intuitive knowledge of some extreme [term], or of what is signified by an extreme [term]; then, if some such contingent proposition could not be evidently known from intuitive knowledge of a creature, necessarily, for this to be evidently known, one must presuppose intuitive knowledge of the deity, and consequently a wayfarer cannot evidently know such a contingent truth. And therefore if this proposition ‘God is incarnate’ could not be evidently known from intuitive knowledge of human nature, there is need to have intuitive knowledge of the deity; and therefore, however much the intellect might distinctly know the deity abstractively, yet in no way could it, by virtue of that, evidently know that God is incarnate. Likewise, such truths as ‘there will be a resurrection of the dead’ {1.51}, ‘the blessed soul will be beatified perpetually’, and suchlike contingent truths about the future, since it is manifest that they cannot be evidently known from intuitive knowledge of any creature, in no way can they be evidently known by the wayfarer.2 But whether someone intuitively seeing the divine essence could evidently know them, there is a doubt.3

1 Apparently Ockham got into some trouble at the Papal court in Avignon because of this response. 2 Presumably the sense is ‘cannot be evidently known by the wayfarer by natural knowledge’, for Ockham could hardly deny that they could be (evidently) known by the wayfarer by divine revelation.

3 The doubt is presumably that these truths, being contingent, cannot be known from the divine essence, since they come from choice by the divine will. Their possibility could perhaps be known from the divine essence, but not their actuality. Page 30

102. Second, I say that if there are any necessary truths that have connotative predicates, the evident knowledge of which depends on evident knowledge of some contingent truth that cannot be evidently known by the wayfarer, such [truths] cannot be evidently known by virtue of distinct abstractive knowledge of the Deity. And perhaps ‘God can be incarnated’ is such a truth, and perhaps some others. But as to how evident knowledge of some necessary truth depends on evident knowledge of a contingent truth, this will be discussed in the next question [1.90]. 103. Third, I say that necessary truths, in which a thing is predicated (if a thing could be predicated) or a simply absolute concept is, are evidently knowable by virtue of such knowledge; because if a thing is predicated, it can only be the thing that is really God, and consequently an intellect that distinctly understands the Deity knows evidently that this thing is that. Similarly, if such a concept is predicated, it must be univocal to God and other things (as will be said elsewhere, Sent. I d.2 q.9), and consequently it is as possible to know such a proposition as someone distinctly understanding white knows that white is a color or a quality.

Article VI {1.52}: Ten Doubts about the Question

104. Sixth, some doubts need to be raised and solved. 105. A first doubt is about the acts of apprehension and of judgment [1.16], because they do not seem to be two acts compossible with each other, for it is impossible for an intellect to apprehend a proposition unless it assents to the same or dissents from it or doubts it. Therefore, besides the act of assenting and dissenting and doubting, there is no other act with respect to a proposition; but every act of assenting and dissenting and doubting is a judgmental act; therefore etc. 106. A second doubt is how the simple knowledge of terms and the apprehension of a proposition and the subsequent judgment are disposed to each other [1.16]: whether they are all really distinct and whether any of them could come to be without another indifferently. 107. A third doubt is about the first article [1.30], because, first, it seems that there is no such double knowledge. And some argue [Aquinas, ST I q.77 a.3] first as follows: of the same power with respect to the same object under the same idea there cannot be acts distinct in species: first, because since acts do not essentially depend save on the power and the object, it must be that they get their distinction from the power or the object; second, because of Metaphysics 8.4.1044a15-32 [or rather Averroes’ commentary ad loc.]: if the agent is one and {1.53} and the matter is one, the effect will be one; third, because On Generation 2.1.336a27-28, “The same thing, insofar as it is the same, always does the same thing;” fourth, because On the Soul 2.4.415a14-25, acts are distinguished by their objects; therefore with respect to the same object under the same idea there cannot be knowledges distinct in species. – It seems, second, that the intellect does not have intuitive knowledge: first, because intuitive knowledge is only of a singular thing, but the intellect understands only the universal [1.44]; second, because the intellect abstracts from the here and now, but intuitive knowledge does not. Page 31

108. A fourth doubt concerns what things intuitive knowledge is in respect of for this present state, because it does not seem that it is in respect of things other than sensible things. First, because acts of understanding of this sort are only understood by reflection, but intuitive knowledge is direct, not reflex understanding. Second, because then there would be in the intellect at the same time an infinite number of understandings; because if the first understanding is intuitively seen, this is only because it is sufficiently present to the intellect; but that intuitive knowledge of the first understanding is equally present, so it will be seen by a third understanding; and for the same reason the third, since it is sufficiently present, will be seen by a fourth understanding, and so on ad infinitum. 109. If it be said that it is possible to proceed thus to infinity, but the intellections are not in fact simultaneous, on the contrary: when {1.54} there is a natural total agent cause and a passive object is sufficiently close to it, if it does not act in time, the effect is at once posited. But the total cause with respect to the third intellection is the second intellection along with the power, and the passive object is sufficiently disposed; therefore, the third intellect would be immediately posited, and for the same reason the fourth, and so on ad infinitum. 110. This also seems to be against the Philosopher, because in On the Soul 3.8.432a7-9 the Philosopher says that “he who does not sense learns nothing; but when he speculates, a phantasm must at once be speculated.” Here the Commentator says [Averroes ad loc. t.39], “Because the intention understood is the same as the thing that the sense comprehends in the thing sensed, it must be that he who senses nothing learns nothing as to knowledge and distinctness.” Therefore, nothing in particular is understood save the sensible thing. Besides On Memory and Reminiscence 1.450a12-13, “understanding is not without a phantasm.” Besides On Sense and Thing Sensed 6.445b16-17, “Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses.” 111. Besides, what is known intuitively is known perfectly; therefore, it can be known to be distinct from everything else, especially from everything intuitively known. Therefore, it can be evidently known that the direct and the reflex act are distinct, if they are distinct, or whether love and delight are distinct, which however are doubtful. 112. A fifth doubt concerns what intelligibles there is intuitive knowledge in respect of, whether namely with respect to habits just as with respect to acts {1.55}. Because there does not seem to be more reason for acts than for habits, since habits are as equally present as acts. 113. A sixth doubt is about intuitive knowledge and the judgment by which a thing is judged to be or not to be; because they are distinguished either really or not. It cannot be said that they are so [distinguished], because it is impossible for the same thing to be really the same as two opposites. But when the same intuitive knowledge remains in place and the thing has changed, the intellect first judges the thing to be when it is and afterwards judges it not to be when it is not; therefore, to neither of these judgments is it the same really, because there is no greater reason for one side than for the other. Likewise, if the intellect were first to see intuitively white and its subject and, while that seeing remains in place, white should first inform the subject and afterwards would, by divine power, be separated from it, he who is so seeing would first judge this to be white Page 32 and afterwards not to be white, and so it would have opposite judgments compossible with the same intuitive knowledge. Therefore, with neither is it really the same. 114. It cannot be said that they are really distinct; first, because then, since the knowledge is prior to the judgment, it would follow that it could, by divine power, come to be without it, and so someone could intuitively see an existing thing even perfectly and yet not know whether the thing existed or not, and so someone could love and yet not know that he loved. This seems to be against Blessed Augustine On the Trinity 15.12 n.21 (as cited before, 1.43). Second, it would follow that someone could intuitively see an existing thing perfectly and yet judge {1.56} the thing not to be, because when with something absolute something else absolute is compossible, if it is separable from it, its opposite absolute is compossible with the same for, according to the Philosopher (Categories 11.14a15-18), contraries have the same subject. And likewise, conditions of a subject that are separable from each contrary are compossible with each contrary; therefore, if along with intuitive knowledge of an existing thing there stands the judgment that it exists, and the opposite judgment by which the thing is judged not to be is separable therefrom, it will stand with that same judgment. 115. The seventh doubt is that it does not seem that by intuitive knowledge of a non- existing thing it could evidently be known that the thing does not exist. Because I ask: by what is the judgment caused whereby the intellect judges that the thing is not when it is not? Either by the intellective power alone, or by intuitive knowledge of the thing, or by the thing intuitively known. Not the first because that remains invariant whether the thing is or is not. Therefore, since it is a natural cause, it will not have opposite effects on the same passive subject even at diverse times. But when the thing is then it judges that the thing is; therefore, whether the thing is or is not, it will not be the total cause of the opposite act. From the same point it is plain that it cannot be said that intuitive knowledge is total cause of the judgment. Nor can the third option be asserted, because that thing is simply a non-being; therefore of no effect can it be the efficient cause. 116. The eighth doubt is that it does not seem that intuitive knowledge can be of something non-existent; first because then God could beatify {1.57} the intellect through intuitive knowledge of the Deity, [even] supposing that God did not exist. Similarly, it would follow that there could be as much delight in the absence of a delightful object as in the presence of it, because delight can be adequately posited when intuitive knowledge of the thing is posited. 117. The ninth doubt is about the statement that God can be abstractively known distinctly [1.49], because God is present either in himself or in another. If in himself then the knowledge will be intuitive, because it will be of a thing really present. It cannot be said that it is present in another, because that other would be the thing known, or only the reason for knowing. Not the first because nothing other than God leads to distinct knowledge of the Deity; nor the second because nothing other than God (since it is infinitely more imperfect than God) represents God distinctly under the proper idea of Deity. 118. The tenth doubt is about the statement that such knowledge is communicable to the wayfarer [1.49], because all abstractive knowledge of something presupposes Page 33 intuitive knowledge of the same thing. But intuitive knowledge of God is not communicable to the wayfarer; therefore, neither is abstractive knowledge.

Solution to the Doubts

119. To the first of these [1.105] I say that the act of apprehension is distinguished really from the act of assenting and of dissenting and of doubting, and it is compossible with any of them, although perhaps it could not naturally {1.58} come to be without any of them. And so the fact stands that whoever apprehends some proposition assents to it or dissents from it or doubts it, and yet that the apprehending act is really distinct from each of them. 120. But that it is distinguished from each of them is plain from the argument made above [1.18]: that if someone frequently elicits acts of doubt about some proposition, so that he be much inclined to thinking about that proposition by means of some habit acquired from preceding acts, if afterwards he were to assent to the same proposition through some principle or authority to which he adheres (with respect to which he has an act perfectly inclining him), he will, after the first act of assenting, more easily and promptly apprehend that proposition and assent to the same than if he had never had acts of doubt. Therefore, something acquired when acts of doubt are elicited in some way inclines now to this act of assenting mediately or immediately. But it cannot be the habit of doubt, because that inclines precisely to acts of doubt, and he would consequently be less inclined to an act of assenting than if he had never thought about it, the opposite of which we experience. Therefore, when the habit of doubt was being acquired, some other act was also being acquired that remains still and inclines to an act of assenting. Therefore, just as the habit is distinguished really from the habit of doubting, so the act from which it is generated is distinguished really from the act of doubting. 121. To the second [n.106] it can probably be said that the simple knowledge of terms and the apprehension of a proposition and the subsequent judgment are {1.59} really distinguished, and that each of them is, by divine power, separable from any of them. The first is plain from what has been said [1.58]. The second can be argued for, because about no absolute really distinct from another absolute should it be denied that it could, by divine absolute power, come to be without the other, unless an evident contradiction appear. But there appears to be no evident contradiction that a judgment following an apprehension should be and yet the apprehension not be; nor that the apprehension of a proposition should be and yet the simple apprehension of terms not be; therefore etc. 122. If it be said that it is an evident contradiction that someone should assent to some proposition and yet not apprehend it, and that someone should apprehend some proposition and yet not apprehend the terms of that proposition. 123. It can be said that it is not a contradiction that some intellect assent to some proposition and yet not apprehend it in an apprehension really distinct from that assent. Yet that he should assent to it and in no way apprehend it would include a contradiction. And therefore it could be said that an assent is also a certain apprehension; but besides it there is another one, which was spoken of before [1.16-18]. In the same way could it be Page 34 said that someone can apprehend some proposition and yet not have simple knowledge of the terms, however much he may have a single known proposition by which the proposition and its terms are also known. 124. If it be said that then, at the same time and in fact in one go, the terms of the proposition would be known by two knowledges, this could be conceded {1.60}, because besides the propositional knowledge whereby the terms are known there is a simple knowledge of each term, and this simple knowledge does not seem to be repugnant to the propositional knowledge. And so, since there is no evident experience that it is corrupted by the arrival of the propositional knowledge, it should not be denied that it remains when the propositional knowledge arrives. And in the same way, proportionally, could this be said of the apprehension and of the following judgment. 125. And if the question is asked how these knowledges are distinguished, I say that they are distinct in species; nor is it unacceptable that in the same power with respect to the same object there are acts distinct in species, as will be stated below [here, 1.60]. But whatever be true of God’s absolute power, I say that the first is naturally separable from the following two, and that the second is naturally separable from the third; but the third is in no way separable from the two preceding, nor the second from the first. And one reason among others is that whenever an apprehending or judging act is elicited, an act with respect to the terms is also elicited, and consequently the habit is generated. And therefore no act is elicited by means of the apprehending and judging habit unless at the same time the habit with respect to knowledge of the terms inclines to it. 126. But he who wishes to say that not every absolute can be separated from another absolute (just as it is commonly held that volition cannot come to be without cognition) – he can say with the same facility that the apprehension of a proposition cannot come to be without simple knowledge of the terms, and neither can the following judgment come to be without the two other preceding ones. 127. To the third doubt [n.107] I say, as before [n.125], that with respect to the same thing under the same idea there can be two knowledges distinct in species. To the argument {1.61} to the contrary [1.52] I say that of the same power with respect to the same object there can be such distinct knowledges. 128. To the first proof [1.52] I say that they are distinct in themselves formally, but they are distinct causally from their essential causes, wherefrom they have their being. But not in such a way that they require distinct essential causes, because from the same cause simply, namely from God, many things can come to be, and therefore they depend essentially on something other than the power and the object. However, speaking naturally, these knowledges do have distinct effective causes, because the effective cause of intuitive knowledge is the thing known itself, but the effective cause of abstractive knowledge is that very intuitive knowledge or some habit inclining to abstractive knowledge, as will be said elsewhere [Sent. II qq.14-15]. Similarly, if one posit that things were such that the act did not depend essentially save on the power and the object, the acts would still be able to be distinguished specifically, because it is not unacceptable that the same agent, totally unlimited simply or in a certain respect, may produce in the same passive subject effects specifically distinct. Page 35

129. Hereby is plain the answer to the second proof [1.52], that the agent can be one and the matter one and yet there can be several effects specifically distinct. 130. To the Philosopher and the Commentator [1.52] I say that their meaning is about a natural and sufficient agent and about incompossible forms, in the way that the forms of a box and a bench are disposed, which {1.62} the Commentator uses as examples [1.52]. About their intention, however, more will be made plain elsewhere [sc. in a proposed commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics that Ockham never realized]. 131. To the third proof [1.53] I say that the Philosopher is speaking in On Generation about a natural agent which, when remaining the same, always does the same thing. Because, namely, whatever it does in one time it does in another time, unless there be some variation on the part of the passive subject or on the part of the agent, or there is some other impediment – so that, if at one time it does one thing, it will at every time do one thing, and if at one time it do a hundred things, it will at every time do a hundred things, and so always the same. However, it is not necessary that it always do precisely one thing, but it can do many things, just as if the sun by its same power sometimes produce in the medium heat and light (always if it be present in the same way and the medium is equally disposed and there is no impediment), it will always produce in the medium heat and light, and so always the same thing and yet several things. 132. To the fourth proof [1.53] I say that acts are distinguished by their objects, because always from a distinction of objects (one of which is apprehended by one of those acts and the other not) there follows a specific distinction of acts, but from identity of object does not follow identity of act. Just as, if A is the object of intellection and B the object of volition, it follows that intellection A and volition B are distinct. {1.63} But it does not follow that, if A and B are simply one, intellection A and volition B are one act, and so, however much the object is the same, yet abstractive and intuitive knowledge are distinct. 133. Hereby is plain the response to the authority of Aristotle On the Soul III. 8.431b24-25 that “sciences are divided as the things also are,” because on a diversity of knowables there follows a diversity of sciences. And yet about the same proposition there can be specifically distinct acts, because according to the Philosopher Posterior Analytics I.33.89a24-b6, there can be about the same thing science and opinion, likewise error and knowledge, and acts of erring and knowing about the same conclusion, which however are distinct in species. 134. One must know, however, that although of distinct knowables there are distinct sciences, yet, as will be said later [q.8, in Ockham’s response], of distinct knowables there can be one equivalent habit, or a habit equivalently containing several habits proper to those knowables – such that neither of the knowables will be the total object of the habit but only a partial one, just as holds of a complex knowledge that, while being one, has each term for its partial object. 135. To the second argument [1.53] proving that the intellect does not have intuitive knowledge, because it does not know the singular, I say that the intellect, for this present state, knows the singular and knows it first, as will be plain elsewhere [Sent. I d.3 q.6, Quodl. I q.13]; and it is the first thing known by primacy of generation. Nor {1.64} does Page 36

Aristotle [De Anima II 5.517b22-23] deny this, but he posits that the intellect understands the universal while the sense knows only the singular. And such propositions he as it were always writes for proving the difference or distinction between the intellect and the senses. But as it is, things are so that if the intellect understands not only the singular but also the universal and the sense senses only the singular, a distinction between the intellect and the senses follows. And thus, in order to have a distinction between the senses and the intellect, which Aristotle intends, there is nothing to prevent the intellect understanding the singular even first, but not precisely. 136. To the third [1.53], that the intellect does not abstract from the here and now in every intellection, although it does so abstract in some. Because just as the intellect has one knowledge by which it cannot judge of the here and now (that is, whether the thing is here or whether it is now or not) no more than imagination can, and that is abstractive knowledge – so it has another knowledge whereby it does concern the here and now, because through it (unless there be an impediment) it can thus judge that it is here and that it is now, just as can the senses, according to others [Averroes, supra 1.27]; and that is intuitive knowledge. 137. If it be said that the intellect abstracts from matter and material conditions [Aquinas ST I q.85 a.1, against whom Ockham argues Sent. I d.3 q.6 B], I say that this abstraction is not to be understood on the part of the object, and this in the case of every intellection. Because I say, as will be proved elsewhere [Sent. I d.3 q.6 G], that the same thing totally under the same idea {1.65} on the part of the object is the first object of the exterior sense and of the intellect by primacy of generation, and this for the present state; and so the object of the intellect in that first intellection is not more abstract than is the object of the senses. Afterwards, however, the intellect can abstract many things: both common concepts and by way of understanding one of the things conjoined in the thing while not understanding the other. And this cannot belong to the senses. But if abstraction is understood universally, it must be understood on the part of intellection, because it is simply immaterial; but sense cognition is not so. 138. To the fourth doubt [1.53] I say, as was proved before [1.39-47], that our intellect for this present state understands something merely intelligible in particular and intuitively. 139. To the first argument to the contrary [1.53] I say that, properly and strictly speaking, no intellection is reflexive, because reflection strictly taken necessarily includes at least two things, as is plain in reflex local motion. However, taking reflection in a broad sense, I concede that that intellection is reflexive, and yet along with this stands that it is intuitive; just as it is plain that an angel can thus understand himself intuitively as he can another angel, and yet when he understands himself intuitively he has reflex intellection broadly. 140. To the second [1.53] I say that the argument is against every opinion. Because if I know a thing in any way whatever, I can know that I understand that thing; and further, according to Blessed {1.66} Augustine [On the Trinity 15.12 n.21; supra 1.43-44], I can know that I know I understand this thing, and thus might I add a fourth and a fifth and innumerable others. Then I ask about the cause of the second intellection: why is it Page 37 understood? And whatever answer be given, a similar answer can be given about the third and fourth intellection, and so on about the rest. And there will be an argument about abstractive similar to the one made about the intuitive knowledge by which the first intellection is intuitively seen. 141. Therefore I say for all of them that a stand must be made at the first: because the first intellection will be intuitively seen, and that intuition for this present state impedes the second intuition, not simply, but because the mere presence of the first intuition does not suffice for the second intuition. Now no cause why it does not suffice can be given save the nature of the thing, which we know by experience. Just as no cause why, when one thing is understood, the understanding of another thing is impeded, can be given other than the nature of the thing, because these intellections are in nothing totally repugnant to each other, just as neither are the objects understood. But that so it is, we know by experience, nor can we know otherwise, as will be said elsewhere [possibly a reference to an intended exposition of Aristotle’s On the Soul]. 142. To the authorities from the Philosopher and the Commentator [1.54], I say that they are speaking of the first intellection by firstness of generation. Because for this present state, nothing is understood first save the sensible thing; and this {1.67} is what the Commentator says (as before [1.54]), because an intention understood is the same as the thing that the sense comprehends in the sensed object. Their understanding [Aristotle’s and Averroes’] is also about the intellection of things that are first abstracted from things that are first understood, and of such sort are sensibles only. Thus is the answer plain to the first authority of the Philosopher and the Commentator. 143. To the other authority from On Memory and Reminiscence [1.54] I say that to understand without a phantasm is nothing, because all intellective knowledge necessarily presupposes, for this present state, sense knowledge both of the exterior and of the interior senses. 144. If it be said: intuitive knowledge is first, therefore it presupposes no other knowledge, I say that intuitive knowledge presupposes no knowledge of the same thing in the same power, but it does presuppose another knowledge in another power, just as intuitive intellective knowledge of whiteness presupposes intuitive sense knowledge of the same thing. Similarly, intuitive knowledge of intellection or affection or delight presupposes knowledge of the object of the intellection or affection or delight, and so on about others. However, if it were possible for there to be love in the will without any previous knowledge, intuitive knowledge of that love would presuppose no other knowledge. But this is not possible for our present state. 145. To the other authority from On Sense and Sensed [1.54] I say that it is not of the Philosopher’s intention that nothing is understood by the intellect save what was first in the senses, but that no extrinsic sensible {1.68} is understood by the intellect save what was first in the senses. Hence Aristotle [On Sense and Sensed 6.445b15-17] says as follows: “Further, to what do we assign these things that need to be known (namely the parts of which the sensible is composed) save to the mind – but they are not intelligibles; nor does it sense the things outside without the senses.” Here he means that of things that are outside, that is of sensibles, the mind senses, that is intuitively knows, nothing Page 38 without the senses; that is: unless there is a previous intuitive sensitive knowledge of the same thing. Hereby he is as it were insinuating that the mind can sense – that is, intuitively know – some things that are outside; and likewise it can intuitively know some things that are inside (of which sort are acts of intellect and of will and delights and the like) without the senses, that is, without sense intuitive knowledge of them, although sense intuitive knowledge of some things be necessarily presupposed. 146. To the other [1.54]: because perhaps when something is known intuitively, it can clearly and perfectly be discriminated from something else, distinct in species, intuitively known perfectly and clearly; however, when something is intuitively known obscurely and imperfectly, perhaps it is not necessary. Now our intellect for this present state knows intuitively nothing clearly and perfectly, and therefore it cannot discriminate it from anything else. And for this reason it cannot discriminate between a direct and a reflex act and so on about others, though it could make discrimination from some others. This seems to be of the intention of Blessed Augustine where he seems to say that the mind can see itself and yet cannot discriminate it from other things {1.69}. Hence he says about the mind in On the Trinity 10.9 n.12, “It does not seek to see itself as something absent, but takes care to discern itself as present. Nor does it acknowledge itself as if it did not know, but by it does it diagnose what another knows.” He seems to say the same in 9 n. 19. 147. To the fifth doubt [1.54] I say that intuitive knowledge for this present state is not in respect of all intelligibles, even those equally present to the intellect, because it is in respect of acts and not in respect of habits. But that it thus knows we know by experience, because anyone experiences himself understanding, loving, and being delighted; but not thus does one know that one is inclined to an act through a habit, because a power could be inclined by God acting as much as by a habit inclining. And therefore the inclination which anyone experiences in himself cannot be evidently known from intuitive knowledge of the inclining habit, but it can only be known in the way in which it can be known through reason and discourse. From this it is plain that no one can intuitively see the faith and charity that are habits in us, although one could intuitively see the acts that are elicited from these habits, which are to believe and to love. 148. To the sixth doubt [1.55] I say that that intuitive knowledge and that judgment are really distinct, because the intuitive knowledge is in respect of a concept, but the judgment is in respect of a proposition. 149. And if a question be asked about the judgment that is consequent precisely to intuitive sense knowledge, whether it is distinguished from that, it can be said that it is not distinguished from it, just as neither is a judgment of the intellect that rests precisely on conceptual knowledge; and therefore there is no following judgment {1.70}, nor is it properly a judgment, because it is not in respect of any proposition, but is only a judgment equivalently, as will be said elsewhere [1.139-140]. 150. To the first argument for the contrary [1.55] I say that that intuitive knowledge can come to be without a consequent judgment, and so someone can love and yet not judge that he loves, just as it is not impossible that someone know the terms of some self- evident proposition and yet not know the proposition, even positing that he apprehends it. Page 39

151. If it be said that then it will not be a self-evident proposition, because a self- evident proposition is at once known when the terms are apprehended and known, I say that that is a self-evident proposition for the evident knowledge of which the terms along with the general influence of God suffice; however, God can impede this. Thus intuitive knowledge suffices for evident knowledge that a thing is unless there is an impediment, or unless the activity of the intuitive knowledge is impeded. 152. To the second [1.55-56]: perhaps it is not unacceptable that a thing be intuitively seen and yet the intellect believe that the thing is not, even though this could not naturally happen. And this suffices for intuitive knowledge, that, as far as concern itself, it be sufficient for making a right judgment about the existence of the thing or its non- existence. 153. To the seventh doubt [1.56] I say that through intuitive knowledge of the thing can the thing be evidently known not to be when it is not or if it is not. And when the question is asked by what the judgment will be caused, it can be said that it can be caused by intuitive knowledge of the thing. And when it is said {1.71} that the thing has to cause the opposite effect if the thing is, it can be said that it is not unacceptable that some cause along with another partial cause should cause some effect and yet that it alone without the other partial cause should cause the opposite effect. And therefore intuitive knowledge of a thing and the thing itself may cause a judgment that the thing is, but when the thing is not then the intuitive knowledge without that thing will cause the opposite judgment. And therefore I concede that there is not the same cause for those judgments, because of one the cause is knowledge without the thing, of the other the cause is knowledge along with the thing as along with a partial cause. 154. To the eighth [1.56]: because it is a contradiction that God does not exist and that yet intuitive knowledge of God exists, and therefore it is no wonder if something unacceptable follows. 155. To the other that is hinted at [1.52]: it does not seem unacceptable but that there could, through divine power, be as much delight in absence as in presence. This could be confirmed by the example of Blessed Augustine, On the Trinity 14.17 n.23: When the greatest delight is had by means of abstractive knowledge alone, how much greater could it be by means of intuitive knowledge? 156. To the ninth [1.57]: because God is present in himself in the presentness that is required for knowledge, nor from this does it follow that it be intuitive knowledge. However, if it were possible for God not to exist, it would not be required for God to be present, neither in himself nor in another representing him, as some presentness previous to knowledge, just as now God {1.72} can cause knowledge of something non-existent without anything previous to it. 157. To the last one [1.57] I concede that all abstractive knowledge naturally acquired of something presupposes intuitive knowledge of the same thing. The reason for which is that no intellect can naturally acquire knowledge of anything save by means of that thing as partial efficient cause. But all knowledge for which the existence of the thing is necessarily co-required is intuitive; therefore the first knowledge of a thing is intuitive. However, God can cause abstractive knowledge of the Deity and of other things without Page 40 previous intuitive knowledge, and so abstractive knowledge of the Deity is communicable to the wayfarer.

Response to the Opening Arguments

158. To the first main argument [1.3] I say that distinct knowledge of the Deity under the proper idea of Deity is possible for the intellect of the wayfarer. However it is not beatific knowledge, nor is all knowledge of the infinite and beatific object, under a beatific idea, beatific, but only intuitive knowledge is, which is not possible for the intellect of the wayfarer but only abstractive knowledge is. 159. To the second [1.4] I say that some truths that would be theological for such an intellect would be self-evident to it, and some would be known to it through others more known to it. For example, such an intellect would apprehend distinctly and in itself the very Deity and the personal properties from which it could make for itself a self-evident proposition, by saying {1.73} that God or the Deity is Three Persons. For such a proposition, because of the real identity of the persons with the divine essence for everyone who apprehends the terms in themselves, would be self-evident, nor could he more have doubt of it than of this proposition ‘Deity is Deity’. Besides this proposition, the intellect could form the same proposition that we in fact have, by saying ‘the Deity is three persons’, which would be evidently known to it and yet not self-evidently known but through the first proposition spoken of [1.72, here supra], which would be self- evident for it, and this because the second formally follows from the first. 160. But that these are distinct propositions is plain because of the distinction of the terms: because the terms of the first proposition are things in themselves (if things could be predicated, or other intentions of the soul that the wayfarer cannot have); but in the second proposition the terms are the concepts that we in fact have, because neither God in himself nor anything that is really God can we know in itself. 161. And when it is said [1.4] that if such propositions were self-evident to it they would be known when the terms were known, I concede that whoever knows the terms, not possessing other terms, evidently knows such propositions, but this is not possible for us according to our common state. 162. And when the proof is given [1.4] that this proposition ‘God is three and one’ cannot be made known through any prior and more known proposition, I say that it is so, because the predicate belongs first {1.74} to God in himself or to some intention impossible for the intellect of the wayfarer before it belongs to this concept that we in fact have and which is the subject in the proposition we possess by common law. 163. To the third principal argument [1.4] I say that, when it is posited that evident knowledge of the truth is the most perfect in species, this is because no knowledge distinct in species from that evident knowledge is as perfect, yet one evident knowledge of the same species can be more perfect than another of the same species. And thus would it be in the proposed case that the knowledge of the blessed about the same truth is more perfect than the knowledge of someone else non-blessed about the same truth; and this Page 41 because intuitive knowledge of the terms causes a more perfect knowledge than does abstractive knowledge of the same terms. 164. He who would wish to say that, because intuitive and abstractive knowledge with respect to the same thing are distinguished in species, therefore they will cause effects distinct in species, could say that the evident knowledge of such truth caused by intuitive knowledge of the Deity and of the Three Persons is more perfect than the evident knowledge caused by abstractive knowledge of the Deity and of the Three Persons, and is distinct from it in species. Then this proposition would be false, ‘all evident knowledge of a propositional truth is most perfect’. But some would be most perfect, namely that which is caused by intuitive knowledge, and some would not be most perfect, namely that which is caused by abstractive knowledge. 165. But against this is the proposition that ‘a plurality is not to be posited without necessity’ [Aristotle, Physics 1.4.188a17-18, 8.6.259a8-15, Scotus On the First Principle 2 concl.15, also Henry of Harclay]. And therefore, since causes distinct in species could {1.75} cause effects of the same species, then because of the specific distinction between intuitive and abstractive knowledge of single terms, a specific distinction between knowledges of the proposition that are caused by them is not to be posited. And therefore if the knowledges were distinct in species, it would be necessary to assign some other reason, which is difficult.

{1.75} Question 2: Whether Evident Knowledge of the Truths of Theology is Science Properly Speaking

1. On the supposition, from the preceding question, that by divine power many truths purely theological can be evidently known, I ask whether evident knowledge of the truths of theology is a science properly speaking. 2. That it is not: 3. First as follows: every science properly speaking is through a cause, because “to have science is to know through causes” (Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b20-23). But nothing predicable of God, since it is really God himself, has a cause. Therefore, nothing such can be known about God by science properly speaking. 4. Second as follows: all science is the effect of demonstration, but demonstration is through a definition as through the middle term. But God does not have a definition since he is simply simple. Therefore, nothing can be demonstrated of God nor, consequently, be known by science properly speaking. 5. Third as follows: every proposition, when a science properly speaking is known, is per se in the second mode of speaking per se, because a property is predicated of a subject {1.76}. But nothing is predicated of God in the second mode of speaking per se, because he has no property, since a property differs really from the subject, and nothing such is predicated of God. Therefore etc. Page 42

6. To the opposite: 7. If it is not [sc. if theology is not a science], this would only be because of the identity of the predicate with the subject. But this is not an obstacle, because there is science properly speaking of being, namely metaphysics, and yet nothing differs really from being, because then it would be non-being. Therefore etc. 8. About this question one must see first what proposition is knowable by science properly speaking; second, what science properly speaking is; third, to the question.

Article One: What Proposition is Knowable by Science Properly Speaking?

9. About the first I say that a proposition knowable by science properly speaking is a necessary proposition, subject to doubt, of a nature to be made evident by necessary evident propositions, through a syllogistic process applied to it [cf. 1.87]. 10. The first condition, which is ‘necessary proposition’ is plain, for by it is excluded a contingent proposition that, although it can be evidently known, yet because it is not necessary but can be false, is therefore not knowable by science properly speaking. 11. The second condition, which is ‘proposition subject to doubt’ is plain, because by it is excluded a self-evident proposition that, although it is necessary and can be evidently known, yet because it is not subject to doubt {1.77} is therefore not knowable by science properly speaking. This is also plain from Grosseteste [On Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics I t.1] where he speaks as follows: “The science of principles is not acquired through teaching, because we are taught and learn only what, when we first conceive it, is doubtful for us or appears false; and its truth is made manifest to us after doubt and contrary opinion.” And as is plain in the same place, he is speaking of a knowable conclusion according as it is distinguished from principles. Therefore, every knowable proposition is first doubtful or appears false, and afterwards its truth is made manifest through the principles. 12. The understanding must not be that a proposition properly knowable must first be doubtful or appear false to anyone who is learning it, but it is possible for it to be doubtful to a learner or that it could be doubted by someone or appear false, and that afterwards, through a syllogistic process, it could be made known. And thus is it distinguished from self-evident propositions and from first principles. 13. Again, Posterior Analytics II.1.89b23-24, “The questions are equal in number to the things we truly know.” Therefore everything knowable is questionable; but everything questionable is doubtful; therefore everything knowable by science properly speaking is doubtful. 14. The third condition, which is ‘of a nature to be made evident by necessary evident propositions applied to it, through a syllogistic process’, is plain, because by it is a distinction from certain first principles drawn that are not self-evident and are consequently doubtful, but because they cannot be made known by a syllogistic process, therefore {1.78} they are not knowable by science properly speaking. For example, this proposition ‘heat makes hot’ is necessary and doubtful, because if some intellect were to Page 43 apprehend heat intuitively through intellect alone and were never to see nor feel that heat makes hot, for example if nothing heatable were brought near to some heat intuitively known, the intellect could thus doubt whether heat could produce heat just as it doubts whether whiteness could produce whiteness, and consequently this proposition is doubtful. And yet this proposition cannot be made evident from being non-evident by any evident necessary propositions applicable to it through a syllogistic process, but it only becomes evident through experience taken from intuitive knowledge, and so it is not knowable by science properly speaking.

Objections to the Second and Third Condition

15. But objection can be made to this description. 16. First, it seems that the second condition is false: First because some self-evident proposition is knowable by science properly speaking, because it is demonstrable and not doubtful, therefore etc. The assumption, that some self-evident proposition is demonstrable, is plain first through that Alhazen in his Treasury of Optics 2.3/1.12, because this proposition is demonstrable ‘every whole is greater than its part’ and yet it is self-evident. Second, because every property is demonstrable of its subject, and yet some such property is self-evident and consequently not doubtful. Similarly, every proposition posterior {1.79} to the first principle can be demonstrated through it, because by syllogizing through it there will be a syllogism from things first and true, etc., and consequently there will be a demonstration, and consequently the conclusion will be knowable by science properly speaking; and yet some proposition posterior to the first principle is self-evident, and consequently not doubtful. 17. Second, it can be argued that the condition is false; because if every proposition knowable by science properly speaking is doubtful, then the intellect that could not err could not know any proposition by science properly speaking. The consequent is false, because then the divine intellect would know no proposition by science properly speaking. Which is false, because science properly speaking involves no imperfection, therefore it should not be denied of the divine intellect.4 18. Against the third condition:

4 The editors of the critical edition include the following from a note added in one of the ms, Cod. F: “Again, against the second condition that is put in the description of a knowable proposition: either the understanding is ‘it is a proposition doubtful to every intellect’ or ‘it is doubtful to some, and to some not’. If the first, then no proposition is knowable, since no proposition is doubtful for [every] intellect. And there is the same non-sequitur on the supposition that there no intellect save the divine intellect etc. – It is asserted that the proposition must be doubtful in itself; hence it is not asserted to be doubtful because this or that intellect doubts it, just as neither is a proposition said to be known through itself because it is known to this or that intellect, as is said by John [Scotus?]. – On the contrary: then stand together the propositions that it is doubtful and yet that one cannot doubt it, which seems unacceptable, because there follows: it is doubtful, therefore one can doubt it, and consequently someone can doubt it. Proof that the propositions stand together: because when things are really diverse, one can be posited when the other is not posited. But the intellect and a doubtful proposition are of this sort, therefore etc. And consequently, on the supposition that there can be no intellect, a proposition could still exist in writing, but it is not knowable because no one could know it by science properly speaking. – I reply: this is not valid.” Page 44

19. It seems that it is superfluous because every necessary proposition that is not self- evident is knowable by science properly speaking, and only such is. But every necessary proposition that is not self-evident can be doubted. Therefore, every proposition that can be doubted is knowable by science properly speaking; therefore, when something doubtful is posited, it is superfluous to posit anything else {1.80}. The major is plain from the Philosopher [Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b18-26] where, treating of the manner of accepting principles, he says that “we know principles insofar as we know the terms.” Therefore, all principles are known when the terms are known; therefore no principle is doubtful, but every necessary proposition is either a principle or a properly knowable conclusion. Likewise, Topics 1.1.100a27-29, the Philosopher maintains that “demonstration is from things first and true, or from those that have obtained belief through what is first and true.” Therefore, in every demonstration it is possible to stand at what is self-evident, and consequently every principle of demonstration, which is thus a principle because it is not a conclusion, is first and self-evident, and consequently not doubtful.5

{1.81} Reply to the Objections

20. To the first of these [n.16] I say that demonstration can be taken very broadly and very improperly, and thus can any syllogism from necessary premises be called a demonstration. And therefore if a necessary and self-evident proposition were syllogized from necessary non-self-evident propositions, that syllogism could be called a demonstration, because it would not be sophistical or dialectical or falsely written, strictly speaking. And so it can be reduced to demonstration, according as syllogism is adequately divided into litigious, dialectical, and demonstrative [Peter of Spain, Logical Summaries tr.7 n.1]. Demonstration can in another way be taken broadly and improperly, and in this way every syllogism from things necessary and prior can be called a demonstration, whether the conclusion is self-evident or not. In a third way demonstration can strictly and properly be taken for a syllogism giving one knowledge from things necessary, such that the premises are of a nature to cause knowledge of the conclusion. And in this way does the Philosopher speak of demonstration, and thus do the expositors and doctors speak [supra n.19, Grossteste, On Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 1.2. tt.7-12]. 21. Hereby to the argument I say that a self-evident proposition is demonstrable in the first and second way [n.20]. And such perhaps was that author’s understanding [Alhazen, supra 1.78]. But in the third way it is not demonstrable, because a self-evident proposition is known precisely from knowledge of the terms: for otherwise it would not

5 The editors note that from the same ms. Cod. F the following is added here: “On the contrary: that proposition is not demonstrable, nor consequently properly knowable, first knowledge of which is not received save through experience (for you) from elsewhere. – On the contrary: with science obtained through experience there stands ignorance with respect to the same, an object for demonstration. For there stand together the fact that I know through experience some conclusion, as you concede, and yet that I err in demonstrating it from certain premises. And yet such error does not stand along with knowledge caused by demonstration with respect to the same. Therefore etc.” Page 45 be self-evident. Therefore knowledge of a self-evident proposition is not of a nature to be caused by knowledge of premises, and {1.82} consequently it is not demonstrable nor knowable by science properly speaking. 22. If it be said that, although such a self-evident proposition could sufficiently be known from knowledge of the terms, yet, if knowledge of the terms did not suffice, still the premises from which it is inferred would cause knowledge of the proposition, and consequently knowledge of those premises is of a nature to cause knowledge of that self- evidently known thing, and consequently it is demonstrable: 23. This is not valid, because by this reasoning a first principle could be demonstrated, because if knowledge of the terms did not suffice, it could be syllogized from certain known things that would cause knowledge of the first principle. 24. If it be said that if a first principle were not known nothing else would be known, and therefore the case is not similar, this is not valid, because even in fact sometimes something is actually known and yet the first principle is not actually known, and thus does the reasoning stand. 25. Therefore I say that it is of the idea of a knowable proposition that knowledge of it could be caused by knowledge of the principles, and thus that it would have the idea of being dubitable. Hence, through the reasoning made above, it is plain that in the way it is knowable it is dubitable. Because if for this reason it is called knowable ‘that if knowledge of the terms did not suffice, then knowledge of it could be caused from premises’, thus will it be called dubitable ‘because if knowledge of the terms did not suffice, there could be doubt about it’, that is, ‘if the proposition were apprehended without the propositions from which it would have to be known’. 26. {1.83} To the other proof [1.78] I say that not every property is demonstrable of its subject, but some property cannot be known to be present in its subject save precisely through experience and in no way through demonstration. And this is not only true of a self-evident proposition in which a property is predicated of its subject, but even frequently of a proposition that is not self-evident, as of this one ‘heat makes hot’ and the like. 27. To the other proof [1.78] I say that not always can a posterior necessary proposition be demonstrated through a first principle, even if it could be syllogistically inferred from it; but along with this there is required that the knowledge of the principle could cause knowledge of what comes after it. And this is lacking in the case at hand. 28. To the second [1.79] I concede that the divine intellect does not have science thus strictly taken. Nor does this science state a perfection simply but includes imperfection, namely that it is of a nature to be produced by other propositional knowledge. 29. To the other, against the third condition [1.79], I say that it is not superfluous. To the argument I say that not every proposition that is not self-evident is knowable by science properly speaking, because there are many first principles indemonstrable and immediate, and yet they are not self-evident propositions. 30. Hence, one needs to know that some conclusion is demonstrable through self- evident principles, such that the final resolution of it comes to a stand at self-evident Page 46 principles, and some conclusion comes to a stand not at self-evident principles but at principles known only through experience. Just as there are many properties {1.84} that cannot be known about their subjects save by experience alone: as that heat makes hot, that heaviness inclines downwards. And yet these are not self-evident but doubtful; and therefore there are many first principles not resolvable to anything prior, that is, because they can be inferred and known from nothing prior, and yet they are not self-evident. 31. This is the intention of Blessed Augustine, Retractions 1.8 n.2, where he makes clear how the soul carries some arts along with itself and some not. Because it is said to bring with it those arts about which, when asked in order, it responds rightly without experience. And this happens when the ultimate resolution stands at self-evident principles. For then it is only necessary that conclusions immediately following from self-evident propositions be proposed in order, and others afterwards that immediately follow from those, and always thus proceeding to the ultimate ones. Now other arts do not bring them with themselves, namely those that are not resolved to self-evident principles but only to principles known through experience. For if the resolution were to stand at self-evident principles, a doctor possessing the science could propose to his disciple self-evident principles to which (it is certain) the disciple would rightly respond. Second, he could propose conclusions that immediately follow, to which the disciple would rightly respond, because he would see that they follow from propositions known to him. Third, he could propose propositions immediately following to which he would also rightly respond for the same reason. And in this way too proceeding to the ultimate ones. 32. But it is manifest that this does not happen in all sciences, because there are many that cannot be acquired without experience, although {1.85} opinion and belief about those knowables could be acquired precisely through teaching. Therefore, those sciences do not have self-evident principles, but others have them. Hence Augustine, after he has explained how the soul has brought arts along with it, adds [Retract. 1.8 n.2], “Nor, to be sure, does it bring with it or have with it in that way all arts; for of the arts that belong to the senses of the body, as many medical arts, as all parts of astrology, it can only say what it has learnt here. Those things, in fact, that science and intelligence grasp, because of what I have said, does it reply when it has well examined and remembered them, either from itself or from another.” He sets down the same opinion in On the Trinity 12.15 n.24. 33. This is also the intention of Aristotle in diverse places. Hence when teaching, in Metaphysics 1.1.980a27-81a16 and Posterior Analytics 2.19.100a4-9, how the knowledge of principles is acquired, he says that “from sense memory comes to be, and from memory experience comes to be, and from experience is the universal received, which is the principle of art ans science.” And yet it is manifest that the first proposition frequently received through experience is that in which a property is predicated of its subject and which is doubtful, as the Philosopher makes clear in Metaphysics 1.1.981a3-12. Hence he says, “Experience indeed made art, but inexperience chance. Now art comes to be when, from many experiential conceptions, one realization, as from like things, comes to be. For to have a realization {1.86} that this has benefited Callias and Socrates, who are laboring under this disease, and so is singular for many, is a matter of experience; and what has benefited all those of this sort, who are determinate as to one Page 47 kind and laboring under this illness, as the phlegmatic or choleric or hotly feverish, belongs to art.” From this authority is got that such experience is about dubitable things. And so the first principles in an art and science acquired through experience are dubitable, and consequently they are not self-evident. 34. This is also plain from the Philosopher in Ethics 1.7.1098b3-4 when he says, “among principles these indeed are grasped by induction, but these by sense, and these by a sort of custom, and others again in other ways.” And the Commentator on the same place [Eustratius, On Aristotle’s Ethics I]. 35. To the first proof of the major from Posterior Analytics 1 [1.80] reply can be made in two ways: in one way that he is speaking of self-evident principles, because these are known when the terms are known; but he is not speaking of other principles that can be known only be experience and in no way by teaching. In another way can the statement be understood universally about all principles: because they are known when the terms are known, to the exclusion of other necessary propositions, prior to them, from which they can be syllogistically inferred and through which they can be known. But not just any knowledge of terms suffices (as holds of knowledge of a self-evident proposition, because for that suffices any knowledge, abstract or intuitive, of the terms), but intuitive knowledge is required at least of some term or of something imported by a term {1.87}, and perhaps many intuitive knowledges are frequently required. So let it be posited that this is a first principle ‘every herb of this species is of benefit to someone in a fever’; this can be syllogized through no propositions more known, but knowledge of it is taken from intuitive knowledge perhaps of many people. For because he sees that, after the eating of this herb, health followed in someone with a fever, and he has removed all other causes of his health, he has evidently known that this herb was the cause of health; and then he has experience of a singular case. But it is known to him that all individuals of the same idea have effects of the same idea in some patient equally disposed [Aristotle, Topics 7.1.152a2-4, supra 1.22-23], and so he evidently receives as a principle that every such herb benefits someone in a fever. 36. To the authority from the Topics [1.80], I say that he says that “demonstration is from what is first and true or from what gets faith through what is first and true.” And this I concede. But he does not say that it is from what is self-evident or from what gets faith through what is self-evident. Nor are ‘first principles’ and ‘self-evident principles’ the same, as was said [1.83-84].

Article Two: What is Science?

37. About the second [1.76]: what is science? I say that science, according as it is distinguished from the other intellectual habits that the Philosopher speaks about in Ethics 6.3.1139b16-17, is evident knowledge of what is true {1.88}, necessary, of a nature to be caused by premises applied to it through syllogistic discourse [Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b20-22]. 38. By the first condition is excluded opinion and suspicion and faith and the like, because none of these is evident. By the second is excluded evident knowledge of Page 48 contingent things, which is not science properly speaking, because it is not of the necessary true. By the third condition is excluded evident knowledge of first principles, because it cannot be got through syllogistic discourse. And I say ‘of a nature to be caused’, because it is not necessary that in fact it be caused by such premises, because it can be caused by experience. For someone can, without a syllogism, evidently know that the moon is capable of being eclipsed by experience alone without any syllogism, on the supposition this is a demonstrable conclusion.6 39. Now that this is science properly speaking can be proved, because this science is a veridical habit. But according to the Philosopher {1.89}, Ethics 6.3.1139b16-17, there are only five veridical habits, namely intellect, wisdom, science, art, and prudence. And it is certain that it is not intellect nor wisdom nor art nor prudence. Therefore, what is left is that it is science.

Objections against the Last Condition

40. Against this last condition, however, objection can be made: 41. First, that there is not the same way for acquiring knowledge of principles as of conclusions, but knowledge of some principles, as was said [1.83-87], is received through experience, without demonstration. Therefore knowledge of conclusions, which is science properly speaking, cannot be received through experience without demonstration. 42. Second: either this knowledge is of the same species as knowledge acquired through demonstration of the same conclusion, or of a different species. Not in the first way, because science acquired through demonstration and science acquired through experience differ more than science-that and science-because-of-which, Posterior Analytics 1.13.78a22-30; therefore etc. — A confirmation can be given: because distinct causes cause distinct effects; but sciences of which one is acquired by experience and the other by demonstration are caused by causes distinct in species; therefore they are distinguished in species. The major is plain, because upon the multiplication of a prior follows multiplication of the posterior, although not conversely. — Nor can the second {1.90} be granted, because in the same intellect with respect to the same proposition there cannot be two abstractive knowledges distinct in species.

Solution of the Objections

43. To the first of these [1.89] one must say that the way of acquiring knowledge of some principles and knowledge of some conclusions can be similar. But besides this

6 Cod. F adds: “Again, against what is said there: because experimental intuitive knowledge suffices for having science, therefore it is not required that it necessarily be caused by discourse; and consequently God could have science properly speaking, the opposite of which was said in the preceding chapter [1.83]. – Again, against what is said at the end of the margin [1.80 fn.]: because it follows that about the same conclusion there could not be two sciences at once. To be sure, in this it is false. The consequence is plain, because then however much a conclusion were known first through one middle term and afterwards through another, the preceding science would be increased and not a new one generated. The falsity of the consequent is plain, because this conclusion ‘the earth is round’ is proved by natural science and by geometry, which are distinct sciences, as is clear. And the proof is that along with natural science about that conclusion there stands ignorance of geometry with respect to the same conclusion.” Page 49 common way there is one proper to the knowledge of conclusions, namely by demonstration, which in no way can belong to knowledge of any first principles at all. 44. To the second [1.89] it can be said that knowledge of a conclusion acquired through experience and knowledge of the same conclusion acquired through demonstration are of the same species, because it is not unacceptable for causes distinct in species to have effects the same in species. Just as the sun and fire produce heat the same in species, and each without the other is a sufficient cause as regard heat. So it is in the matter at hand, that intuitive knowledge of some terms, or of what is signified by the terms, by virtue of which is acquired evident knowledge of some contingent truth about some singular intuitively known, is a cause at least mediate and partial with respect to knowledge of some demonstrable conclusion. Just as, if by virtue of intuitive knowledge there is acquired evident knowledge of this contingent truth, ‘this herb cures this sort of illness’, it is a mediate partial cause of knowledge of this demonstrable conclusion, ‘every {1.91} such herb heals’. But this intuitive knowledge is a partial cause only, because this knowledge does not suffice unless it be evidently known that all individuals of the same idea are of a nature to have effects of the same idea on a passive subject of the same idea and one equally disposed [1.87]. 45. And, besides this cause, knowledge of the premises can be a sufficient cause for causing knowledge of the same species with respect to the same conclusion. And if the conclusion be first known by experience and afterwards the same conclusion is known by demonstration, a new science distinct in species will not be caused but one thing will come to be from the preceding and subsequent degree; just as if heat is first caused in wood by the sun and is afterwards intensified by fire. 46 If it be said that, according to Aristotle in Posterior Analytics 1.6.74b5-75a37, something necessary cannot be known through a contingent truth, though it could be inferred from it, therefore knowledge of a contingent truth does nothing for the acquisition of science properly speaking: 47. I say that the intention of Aristotle is that the necessary cannot be demonstrated by the contingent as by some premise in a demonstration. However, by evident knowledge of something contingent and knowledge of a necessary truth (not arranged in mode and figure [of syllogism]), evident knowledge can be received of a conclusion demonstrable in the way explained. Namely because a necessary conclusion will be evidently known through one contingent [proposition] evidently known, from which contingent [proposition] the demonstrable conclusion formally follows. Just as formally follows: ‘this herb heals, therefore every herb of the same species heals’. And this consequence holds not through any intrinsic middle by the adding of which there would be a syllogism, but it holds through an extrinsic {1.92} middle, namely through this: all agents of the same most specific species are effective of effects of the same idea. 48. And if it be said: given this, one experience would be sufficient for possessing a principle of art and science, because, if that proposition be universally true, it would be sufficient to know about one singular that it is productive of such effect: 49. Similarly, given this, never by experience could a principle of art and science be attained save about the most special species and not about the genus. Because the proposition ‘all things of the same genus are productive of effects of the same idea or the same genus’ is simply false, because some substances can produce substances and some produce accidents only: Page 50

50 Similarly, this consequence is not valid, ‘this herb causes health, therefore every herb of such species causes health’, because the opposite can hold: because some such herb may not be cause of health but rather of illness, because it could have the contrary of what does cause health and is in this herb. 51. To the first of these [n.48] I say that sometimes one experience is enough for getting a principle of art and science, and sometimes many experiences are required. For if the most specific species is the subject in a first principle of art and science, one experience is enough. Just as, for knowing this proposition, ‘all heat is cause of heat’, which is a first principle, it suffices to know evidently that this heat heats or has heated, and this for the reason already stated [n.47, last lines]. But if something common to many species {1.93} is the subject, then many experiences are required, because experience of a singular of each species is required. Just as, for knowing evidently that every act is generative of a habit, experience is required that the act of the principle is generative of a habit (because the act of a conclusion is generative of a habit), and so on about the species. 52. And this is true when such principle is attained precisely through experience, because if it were attained through reason it would not be needed. And then such a deduction will not hold through this proposition that ‘causes of the same genus are effective of effects of the same genus or of the same idea’, or through some similar middle, as through this sort of middle, ‘whatever belongs to one thing of some genus can belong to another of the same genus’ or the like; but it will hold through the middle, ‘when something belongs to anything contained under some genus, it belongs universally to that genus’. And thus such a principle about the genus or about something common to several things of this or the other idea will be attained through experience and in some way by induction, namely by inferring one universal about the genus from all the universals about all the species contained under the genus. Just as if I were to argue as follows: ‘every man is able to grow, every ass is able to grow, every lion is able to grow, and so on about each one, therefore every animal is able to grow’. And for this reason does the Philosopher say [Ethics 1.7.1098b3-4] that sometimes first principles are attained through induction. 53. {1.94} Then to the argument I say that it suffices to know about one singular so as to have such an evidently known proposition about the most specific species, but not about anything common to many things of diverse ideas. 54. The answer to the second is evident through the same point, because ‘a proposition about what is common to several things of diverse ideas’ will not be received through this proposition ‘all causes of the same genus have effects of the same genus or the same idea’, nor through anything similar but in the way already expounded [1.93]. 55. To the third I say that this is not the first proposition received through experience ‘every such herb is curative of such illness’ unless the substance itself were the idea of producing such health. For if some quality present in a herb is a principle of curing, then the proposition in which the curative thing is predicated of what is common to that quality will be the first principle, and this proposition ‘every such herb is curative’ will be a demonstrable conclusion. Just as this is a first principle ‘all heat makes hot’, this too is a conclusion ‘all fire makes hot’, and also that one, ‘everything hot makes hot’. 56. However this is a good consequence ‘this herb is curative, therefore every such herb is curative’, although the consequent here inferred would be a conclusion and not a Page 51 principle, because such a consequence holds through this necessary and evidently known middle premise: whatever absolute, or property consequent to an absolute, belongs to some individual, some similar thing can belong to any individual of the same idea {1.95}. And therefore from this very fact that this herb has such quality that is a principle for curing such illness, any such herb at all will be able to have it. And when it is said that some such herb is not curative but rather induces illness, I say that the facts that it induces such illness and yet is curative of such illness stand together. And this because it is not unacceptable that something be in potency to each of the contraries that are principles of contraries. 57. This point about this last consequence is true according to theology [cf. Sent. I d.2 q.1] and the truth, although the Philosopher and those in error would deny this. 58. Hereby is evident the response to the first confirmation [1.89], that not always do causes distinct in species have effects distinct in species; nor always does multiplication of the latter follow on multiplication of the former, because, according to everyone, many essential causes come together for producing the same effect. 59. To the other proof [1.89] I say that science-that and science-why can be taken in two ways. In one way for a demonstration-that and a demonstration-why, in another way for knowledge caused by the premises of these demonstrations. If in the first way, I say thus that they are distinct in species with respect to the same conclusion, just as the demonstrations with respect to the same conclusion are distinct in species, because the premises in one demonstration and the premises in another demonstration are other. And in this way does the Philosopher speak in Posterior Analytics [1.89]. In the second way, I say that they are not distinct in species, however much the knowledges of the premises {1.96}, which are the efficient cause of the knowledge of the conclusion, are distinct in species. 60. If it be said that, according to what was said in the prior question [1.60-61], those things that cannot have the same effect in species are distinct in species; but science-that, however much it be intensified, even to infinity, will never cause science-why; therefore science-why and science-that are distinct in species. And an argument can be made in the same way about science acquired through demonstration and through experience. 61. I reply that science-that never causes science-why, because another cause is required for this, namely knowledge of the premises of a demonstration-why; and therefore it follows that it is distinct in species from the knowledge of the premises of that demonstration. 62. The aforesaid opinion about the unity of science acquired through experience and through demonstration is most of all probable if science of the conclusion is distinct really and totally from knowledge of the principles. But if it were not distinct really and totally from knowledge of principles, it would not be probable.

Article Three: Diverse Opinions First Opinion

63. About the third article [see supra n.8] one needs to know that there are diverse opinions about this question. One is that, however much there could be certain and Page 52 evident knowledge about such theological necessary truths, yet it will not be science properly speaking. 64. The proof {1.97} of this: because all science properly speaking is acquired through the cause of what is concluded of the subject; but nothing predicable of God has a cause; therefore etc. The major premise is plain from the Philosopher, Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b9-12, who says that “we think we know each thing when we think we know the cause through which the thing is etc.” 65. If it be said that the Philosopher is taking cause there not for a simple [non- complex] cause but for a complex cause, on the contrary: the Philosopher says there expressly “when we think we know the cause through which the thing is,” not “through which the complex is.” Likewise in Posterior Analytics 2.11.94a20-24 he says, “We think we know when we know the cause,” and he immediately exemplifies it about the four causes, which are the causes of things, not of complexes. He seems to think the same in Physics 1.1.184a10-16, in the first proposition of the book. 66. There is also proof of this: first, because every subject of a science is something caused and composite, because it has a quidditative and denominative concept; second, because every subject of science has a property really different from the subject; third, because every subject has a property demonstrable of it through the definition of the subject as through a middle term. These do not belong to God. Yet this opinion says that something can be concluded of God a priori, but it will not be science properly speaking, because it is not through a real cause.

{1.98} Against the First Opinion

67. Against this opinion: it seems that the first and second are repugnant to each other [1.97, previous paragraph?]. Because when some conclusion is known a priori, there is in respect of that conclusion some veridical habit; and it is not intellect, because that is precisely in respect of principles that are either known through themselves or precisely knowable through experience; nor is it wisdom, because that is both of principles and of conclusions, Ethics 6.3-8.1139b14-1141b33; nor art nor prudence, because they are in respect of things doable and makeable only; therefore it is science. 68. If it be said that such knowledge is wisdom, just as metaphysics, which is about being, is wisdom, because it is not through a cause, on the contrary: such proposition, concluded through something prior, but not through a prior real cause, can be found about these lower things here. And consequently, according to this person [sc. the holder of the first opinion], such a habit of the conclusion will not be wisdom, because it is not about universal and first causes; nor is it intellect (it is certain), nor art, nor prudence; therefore it is science properly speaking, and yet it will not be through a real cause. The assumption is plain from them [sc. those who hold the first opinion], because just as the indivisibility of God can be shown through the infinity of God, so can the incorruptibility of the intellective soul, or its simplicity, or anything the like, be shown through the intellectuality of the intellective soul.

Opinion of Scotus Page 53

69. So there is another opinion of the Subtle Doctor that about such truths there can be science properly speaking, science that is of the why and a priori. {1.99} And this opinion first makes clear that essential perfections are demonstrable of an essence through the why and a priori; second it shows the same thing about notions; third about extrinsic relations. 70. They first make clear [Scotus, Reportatio Prol. q.1 n.43, Quodl. q.1 n.16]: that “there is an order among the ideas under which God is conceivable, such that the idea of the essence is altogether first and the other following ideas are prior or posterior according as they are nearer to this idea or more remote from it.” This is plain because “whatever real order certain things would have if they were really distinct, they have a like order in idea when they are distinct in idea. But now, if the essential elements were distinct among themselves, they would have an order in how they follow the essence; therefore if they be distinct in idea, they have such an order in idea.” 71. “The minor is plain because if essential perfections were really distinct, namely immaterial perfect nature, perfect intellect, and that through which the intellect has present to it an object proportioned to it, and the very act of understanding, and further also there would be another act about secondary objects virtually contained in the primary object — if so, there would be between them such a real order that the perfect immaterial essence would be really prior to the idea representing the object, and this representing idea would be prior to the act of understanding the object, and the act of understanding a primary object would be really prior to the act of understanding a secondary object. And this proposition would be why {1.100} ‘what has a perfect immaterial nature has a perfect intellectuality’; and this would be why ‘a perfect intellectual thing has an idea perfectly representing for it a proportionate object’; and again, this would be why ‘a perfect intellect having a proportioned object perfectly present to it understands, unless it is impeded’. And this ‘why’ is for concluding extreme term of extreme term.” The like can be argued about the will itself and the act of willing etc. 72. The second is made clear: because “if these were to differ really: perfect memory, namely that which includes intellect and an object present to it, and act of intellect or of intelligence, and an act of expressing knowledge declarative of the very object, which is ‘to speak’, and the knowledge itself produced by the act of speaking, which is called the Word, there would be there simply a real order, such that memory in perfect act would be there first, saying would be second, the Word third. The like can be argued about the will and spiration.” And thus is it plain that always through things prior, as through causes why, the things posterior could be known; therefore now there is the sort of order among them in idea that there would be if they were, as was said [1.99-100], really distinct among themselves. 73. Again, for each of the aforesaid conclusions there is argument secondly as follows: “in demonstrations-that and -why about the same thing there seems to be a contrary ordering. For in demonstration-that those things are first inferred that are closer to the effect from which the argument is drawn, and these seem to be more remote {1.101} from the per se cause. But it is the converse in demonstration-simply and -why, where those things are first inferred that are closer to the cause itself, and a conclusion is ultimately drawn about the remote effect. Therefore if in some cause some things come Page 54 together that can at once be inferred from effects and other things come together in it that cannot be so inferred, the latter do not seem to have an order equally immediate with such a cause.” But now some things can be inferred about God from effects and some cannot; therefore the latter and the former are present in God purely according to order. 74. There is a confirmation, that some things can be known of God when he is confusedly conceived, others of him only when he is distinctly conceived.7 75. The third {1.102} is proved elsewhere [sc. by Scotus, Quodl. q.7 n.5], because such a necessary proposition, namely ‘God is omnipotent’ (and for the same reason such propositions as ‘God is creative, beatific, etc.’), is a demonstrable proposition, because it is necessary through a middle [term]. Proof of this: because “of what sort the real order is between certain things if they are really distinct, of that sort is the order of knowability between the same things, whatever way they may be distinct in knowability. But now, if there were a real distinction between nature and intellect and will and exterior power, such an order would be real because, for the reason the nature has such intellect and will, for that reason does it have power with respect to such things extrinsically. Therefore here, of whatever sort the distinction may be, there will always be an order of knowability such that, because the divine nature has such intellect and such will, therefore does it have the sort power that is omnipotence.” 76. Likewise, something notional more immediately belongs to the essence than does that which states an external respect. But of that notion, by comparing it to a divine person, there can be a true mediating term. 77. Besides there is argument as follows [Scotus Reportatio I, Prol.1 nn.37, 49]: about a quiddity not contained in anything prior, composite, possessing per se a definition and cause and property really distinct from it, and having many denominative concepts per se in the second mode — about everything such there can be science properly speaking as about a subject. But this is not by reason of composition, nor of causation, nor of real distinction of property from subject (the fact is plain about ‘being’); therefore precisely because it has several ordered concepts. But of this sort is God; therefore etc.

{1.103} Against the Opinion of Scotus

7 Cod. F: “There is confirmation of the reason, that if there were altogether no distinction between animality and rationality or another difference from him elsewhere, there would be no reason why the concept of animal would be more the concept of the genus than the concept of the difference. And the same way about the difference; for there would be no reason etc. So similarly in the matter at issue. — Again, if there were no distinction between animality and rationality, it would be trivial to say ‘rational animal’. Therefore similarly in the matter at hand, when saying ‘wise God’ etc. — Again, against his reason, it is proved through the same reason that the intellect should not be distinguished from the will as to the fact they are principles of distinct emanations, because positing that there would be altogether no distinction between them, it would still be said that the intellect would be principle in respect of the Word and the will in respect of the Holy Spirit and not contrariwise. — Proof through this proposition, ‘whatever order’ etc. This same thing I say also of the intellect and will in creatures etc. — Again, it will be said that because he is virtually many, therefore he can make concepts of all of them etc. — On the contrary: God virtually contains ass and ox, therefore he would make a concept of ass and ox as of good and true — Again, to be virtually such is only to be able to cause it. Therefore there is a begging of the question when it is said that he can make many concepts, because he is virtually many etc.” Page 55

78. Against this opinion (as to some things said in it) I argue first that attributes cannot be demonstrated of God by an argument-why, and this of God distinctly known, in the way this Doctor speaks: 79. Because no common quidditative concept can be demonstrated by a demonstration-why of that which is immediately contained under it, because such a proposition is immediate, according to the Philosopher Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b25-27, and consequently it is not prior to the other. But every such concept is common to God and creatures, as I take by way of supposition now because it will be proved later [Sent. I d.2 q.9]. And it is a quidditative concept, because I take it by way of supposition for the present, and it will be proved later [Sent. I d.2 qq.2, 9], because between the divine essence and the divine intellect or will there is no distinction, either real or of reason. Therefore the concept of goodness or of anything else such is quidditative, and consequently nothing such can be demonstrated of God. 80. If it be said [Scotus, Reportatio I Prol. q.1 n.50] that about altogether the same thing without any distinction there can be many concepts, namely quidditative and denominative, on the contrary: whenever something altogether on the part of the thing is expressed through one concept and another, there is no greater reason that one [of them] be quidditative than that another be. But if there is no distinction at all, on the part of the thing, between the divine essence and the intellect and the act of understanding, nothing imaginable can be expressed through one concept {1.104} more than through another, therefore both will be quidditative or neither will be. 81. If it be said that it expresses the same thing not in the same way, on the contrary: no such diversity of modes can be assigned save in some way because of some non- identity on the part of the thing. 82. There is confirmation of this reason: because the concept which precisely expresses the quiddity and nothing else is quidditative. Because no reason can be assigned why some concept is quidditative; therefore every such concept is quidditative. 83. And that it is immediate is plain, because nothing is a middle. Because not God, it is certain, nor anything created, because that will be the other co-divider; just as when it is said ‘some wisdom is created, some uncreated’, ‘wisdom’ is there immediately predicated of uncreated wisdom, which is in no way distinct from the divine essence. Therefore, no such concept will be able to be demonstrated a priori of God as distinctly known, unless perhaps some property of being is demonstrated in common about God through ‘being’ as middle term, such that some concept common to God and creature is the middle term in the demonstration. 84. Secondly I argue that nothing notional can be demonstrated of the divine essence through something else notional, because there is no distinction there save precisely between essence and relation and between relations among themselves, such however that there is no distinction in the property of one person. Therefore it cannot be there that anything is a middle term for demonstrating one about the others. 85. Through the same point is it plain against the third [1.102] that a concept with an extrinsic reference cannot be demonstrated of the divine essence, because nothing is such middle term etc. I argue {1.105} therefore as follows: if being omnipotent or anything is demonstrable of God, then either about the Divine Essence or about a Person. Not about the Divine Essence in itself, because if so, I ask: through what middle term? Either by a middle term that is a true thing, or through a middle arm that is a being of reason or a Page 56 concept of a thing. Not in the first way, because in God there are only essence and persons and relations, according to them [Scotus, Reportatio I Prol. q.1 n.31], if a formal distinction of attributes be not posited. But neither through a Person nor through a relation can this be demonstrated of the Divine Essence, because it does not belong to a Person or a relation before it belongs to the essence, because whichever Person or relation is taken, it belongs to some other which is not that Person or relation. Therefore it belongs to the essence before it belongs to anything that is not formally the essence; therefore it cannot be demonstrated of the essence a priori through any true thing as through a middle term. Nor through a being of reason, because when something is proper to anything, it is said first of that thing before it is said of any being of reason or a concept. But being omnipotent is proper to one thing, therefore it is not said first of any concept. 86. Nor can it be said that it is demonstrated of a person by a demonstration a priori, because then someone could know that the essence in itself was omnipotent and yet could have doubt about the person, the opposite of which will be shown below in Sent. I [d.20 q. un]. 87. If it be said [Scotus, Reportatio I, Prol. q.1 nn.50-51] to all these that besides the essence there is a formal distinction of attributes, and that that distinction suffices for the fact that {1.106} one concept be quidditative and the other denominative, and for the fact that something may be demonstrated of something by a demonstration-why and a priori. 88. To the contrary: this does not save this Doctor [Scotus]. First, because he posits that all these things could be preserved without any formal distinction, because of a distinction only of reason and because of a distinction only through relations of reason mutually regarding each other. Hence he says as follows [ibid. n.50]: One thing “can virtually contain quasi denominative concepts that can be distinguished by the intellect from a quidditative concept, and this precisely if the concepts be only distinct through relations of reason mutually regarding each other. Perhaps, however, another greater distinction could be posited of those concepts than according to relations of reason.” 89. From these and other things said in the same place, it is plain that his intention is to posit such concepts, namely quidditative and denominative, without any extrinsic reference, even if there were no formal distinction. 90. Besides, on the position that there would be a formal distinction: still, it would not be necessary that one concept would be quidditative and the other denominative, because if a concept of the intellect is called denominative and a concept of the essence quidditative, I ask: either the concept of the intellect is called denominative with respect to the essence or with respect to one thing that includes essentially both the essence and the intellect and other such distinct things formally. The second cannot be granted, because from the fact that the thing essentially includes intellect and essence, the concept of one is no more quidditative with respect to it than the concept of the other is; {1.107} just as the concept of matter is no more quidditative with respect to the composite than is the concept of form, or conversely. Nor can the first be said, because just as when certain things are distinguished really, however much they may make something per se one, the concept of one is no more denominative with respect to the other than conversely, as is plain of matter and form. So, when certain things are distinguished only formally, the concept of one will no more be denominative with respect to the other than conversely; therefore a concept of the intellect is no more denominative with respect to the essence Page 57 than a concept of the essence is denominative with respect to the intellect, because just as intellect does not include the essence formally, so not conversely either. But the concept of the essence is not denominative with respect to the intellect, because then, by reason of them, the concept of the essence could be proved of the intellect through a quidditative concept of the intellect; therefore neither is a concept of the intellect denominative with respect to the essence. Therefore one must say that the concept of the essence is quidditative with respect to something that is not formally the essence, with respect to which concept the intellect is not quidditative but denominative. But this is impossible, because it is proved that everything such includes the intellect as equally as the essence, and conversely. 91. If it be said that there is not anything so one that it thus essentially includes the essence and the intellect, but the essence itself is a sort of quiddity and the attributes are a sort of properties and features of it: 92. On the contrary: those things that are really distinct do however, because of composition, make something per se one, as is plain of matter and form; therefore much more things that are formally distinct will however {1.108}, because of real identity, make something per se one; therefore the divine essence and intellect make something per se one. Therefore it equally essentially includes intellect as essence, and conversely. 93. There is a confirmation through their principles [1.99]: because the sort of order that certain things would have if they were distinct really, that order will they have when they are distinguished only formally. But if essence and intellect were distinct really, they would have this order, because the intellect would be posterior; and the intellect would no more essentially and formally include the essence than conversely, nor would the concept of the essence more be quidditative with respect to the intellect than conversely. Therefore now too the concept of the essence will no more be quidditative with respect to the intellect than conversely, nor is it more quidditative with respect to something else that is not formally essence or intellect. And a concept of the intellect is as quidditative with respect to the intellect as a concept of the essence is quidditative with respect to the essence; therefore in no way is a concept of the essence more quidditative than a concept of the intellect. 94. If it be said that the concept of the essence is quidditative with respect to the person, but the concept of the intellect is not nor any attributive concept: 95. On the contrary: whenever certain things have a per se order among themselves, such that there is a first, a second, and a third, if the first and third make something per se one that essentially includes them both, necessarily the first, second, and third will make such a one. But for them [Scotus, Quodl. q.1 nn.15-17], what is essential to anything notional is more immediate to the divine essence, and this both positively and negatively. Therefore if essence and relation constitute something per se one, namely a person, it is necessary that essence, essential, and relation constitute something per se one that essentially includes any one of them. But that can only be the person; therefore a person essentially includes anything essential; therefore the concept of such an essential will be as quidditative with respect to the person as the concept of essence or relation.

Ockham’s own Solution Page 58

96. Therefore I say otherwise to this question, about which one needs to know, first, that some demonstration is demonstration-that and some is demonstration-why. 97. Second, one needs to know that among what is predicated of God some are things, if a thing could be predicated, and some only {1.110} concepts. An example of the first: that an intellect able to understand the divine essence can also understand paternity, filiation, and spiration, and all these it can predicate of God, because there is no greater reason that it could predicate one known object of some known object than predicate another. And so the intellect can predicate everything known, whether it be a thing or a concept, of everything known; and it can predicate paternity and filiation and spiration of the divine essence, although such a proposition is not possible for us in this present state, because we for the time now cannot, by the common law, understand the divine essence itself in itself, or paternity in itself, but only in some concept. An example of the second: by predicating the concept of being or of wisdom in general of God by saying ‘God is a being’, ‘God is wise’, and so on about others. 98. Third, I say that with respect to things predicable of God the subject can be either the thing itself that God is or some concept predicable of that thing. But what this concept is and how it is distinguished from the thing will be stated elsewhere [Sent. I d.2 q.2], but I suppose for the present that it is not really or formally the thing itself that it is of. 99. The whole of what is said about predication of a thing in divine reality must be understood according to the opinion that posits that intellection is not the subject nor the predicate of a proposition but the object of intellection is, which opinion I reckon probable. According to another opinion, which too I reckon probable, namely that every subject of a proposition in the mind is an intellection or some quality inhering in the mind, it must be said that the proposition which the intellect forms {1.111} about the deity distinctly is not composed of a thing but of a distinct intellection of the deity that is not possible for us. And according to this it must proportionally be said about that proposition as is said about a proposition if it were composed of a a thing.

Conclusions Inferred from the Aforesaid

100. According to the above, the first conclusion to this question will be this: that nothing intrinsic to God can be demonstrated of the divine essence such that the divine essence in itself be the subject, and that something which is really the divine essence be predicated in itself. 101. This conclusion can be made convincing: it is impossible that certain things be the same really and be intuitively or abstractly yet distinctly understood, and that there be doubt about their identity. Because if any proposition is known through itself, it will be most of all that in which the same thing really is predicated of the same thing really. But the divine essence is the same really as anything that is really God; therefore no such proposition is doubtful, nor consequently is it demonstrable. 102. Secondly, everything that is demonstrated of something is first predicated of another thing through which it is demonstrated. But nothing really the same as God can be predicated of anything before it is predicated of the divine essence, because nothing is such (as I suppose for the present and below it will be made clear [1.116]) save person or some relation. Page 59

103. If it be said that a this seems to be a demonstration ‘The Father is paternity; the essence is Father; therefore the essence is paternity’, it can be said that if to an intellect apprehending essence in itself and paternity in itself {1.112} this were doubtful and could be made known through the aforesaid premises, then there would be a demonstration there. But it does not seem that any such intellect could have doubt about this. 104. If it be said that then it would be a self-evident proposition and consequently it would be known evidently to any intellect and thus to us, I reply that that proposition, which someone can have who thus distinctly understands God under the idea of deity and understands paternity in itself, is a self-evident proposition, and so it is known to anyone able to form that proposition. But we in our present state cannot have that proposition, just as neither do we have its terms, but we have another one. Because in our proposition (possible for us by common law), the terms are certain concepts common to the faithful and to infidels; but in that proposition, which such an intellect would have, one term is essence and the other is paternity, and the terms of our proposition supposit for them, not for themselves. And therefore, just as the terms are distinct, so the propositions are distinct;8 and therefore one of them can be self-evident and the other simply doubtful and perhaps demonstrable. 105. This can be made clear: because he who were distinctly to understand the divine essence, and were to predicate it of itself, could not have doubt of that proposition but it would be known to him from the terms. And yet this proposition that we have, ‘God is God’, is doubtful, because this is equivalent to this one ‘a supreme and infinite being is a supreme and infinite being’ {1.113}. For we say that this is the ‘what’ of the name of God, or something the like. And yet this proposition, in which the same thing is predicated of the same thing, is doubtful, just as the union of the things set down on the part of the subject term is doubtful; just as, if the union of them were false, the whole proposition would be false, because of a false implication. Just as, if no man were white, this would be false, ‘a white man is a white man’, just as also this one, ‘something is a white man’. Therefore if the sort of proposition that that sort of intellect would have is not doubtful, and ours is doubtful, they are distinct. 106. The second conclusion, following from this one, is: that nothing such can be demonstrated of the person because of the real identity of the person with anything such that is predicated of it, and consequently no such proposition can be doubtful to one who has it. 107. If it be said that although such a proposition, whether essence or person is the subject, could not be doubtful to one who knows the terms distinctly and intuitively, but it can be doubtful to one who knows the terms confusedly and abstractly: 108. I say that to no one who has those terms can it be doubtful, whether the terms are known abstractly or intuitively, because whether the divine essence be known in this way or in that way, the divine essence is necessary known distinctly. Hence the divine essence itself, because of its supreme simplicity, can in no way be known distinctly and confusedly save because one confused thing, which is not the divine essence itself but is predicable of it (not on its own account but on that of the divine essence), can be known, and then necessarily it is a different known thing and a different term. And this I say not

8 This proposition was apparently cited by the Pontifical Commission that investigated Ockham’s writings for possible heresy. Page 60 only {1.114} of the divine essence but universally of every simple created thing, as will appear below. 109. This has to be understood when the thing is simple and nothing else, because of an opinion that I reckon probable. But that is said here according to another opinion [below q.9; cf. Sent. I d.3 q.3, d.8 q.3]. 110. And therefore I say that the terms of such proposition, when no other terms are known, can in no way be known confusedly but only distinctly. And therefore the proposition in which those terms are the subject, and not others, can be doubtful to no intellect, and therefore it will be self-evident and a principle and in no way a conclusion. 111. The third conclusion is this: that common concepts predicable of the ‘what’ of God and creatures cannot be demonstrated a priori of the divine essence in itself, nor of a concept proper to it and simple, if such be possible. 112. This is plain, because any such conclusion is immediate, because everything common is immediately predicated of any content into which it is first divided. But any such concept is immediately divided into God and creature; just as the first division of wisdom is that some is created and some uncreated; likewise some intellect is created, some uncreated; one goodness is created, another uncreated; and so on about other things. Therefore nothing such is demonstrable a priori. 113. If it be objected that this is a demonstration: ‘every being is good; God is a being; therefore God is good’, I say that when taking ‘good’ according as it is predicated of God as to his ‘what’, this is not {1.115} a demonstration because, when thus taking ‘good’ and ‘being’ simply, they are synonyms. But when taking ‘good’ according as it connotes a determinate being (because it is the same as what is ‘will-able’ and so it connotes the will), thus is it in some way a demonstration a priori. But thus is not predicated of God as to his ‘what’. 114. The fourth conclusion is: that connotative and negative concepts common to God and creatures can be demonstrated of the divine essence; and this if some such concepts of the divine essence known in itself are dubitable. 115. This is plain, because everything common that is adequately predicable of something common can be demonstrated of anything contained under that something common through that something common as through a middle term. But such concepts are predicated first and adequately of what is common to God and creatures; therefore through that something common as through a middle they can be demonstrated of anything contained under it. And so perhaps this is a demonstration and in some way a priori: every being is good; God is a being; therefore God is good. 116. And that science properly speaking is acquired by such syllogism and that consequently it is a demonstration is plain, because it is a veridical habit, and not intellect or wisdom etc., therefore it is science [Aristotle, Ethics 6.3.1139b16-17]. 117. There is a confirmation: because it no less seems that there is a demonstration there than in a syllogism from things simply posterior; but such is conceded to be a demonstration, though not the most powerful; therefore the former much more strongly 118. The fifth {1.116} conclusion is: that connotative and negative concepts proper to God are not demonstrable a priori of the divine essence in itself. And thus, that he is creative, is omnipotent, is eternal, infinite, immortal, and so on of others, are not demonstrable of the divine essence in itself. Page 61

119. Proof of this: because every demonstration a priori is through a middle term to which a demonstrable predicate first belongs before it belongs to the subject of which it is demonstrated. But such predicates belong to nothing prior than to God that could be a middle term, because that middle term will either be a thing or a concept. Not a thing, because there is no thing to which being able to create belongs prior than to God, because it is predicated of no other thing. Nor a concept, because every predicate proper to some thing belongs to it prior than to any concept.9 120. If it be said that such concepts can be demonstrated of the divine essence through their definitions as through middle terms, just as an argument can be made thus: everything productive of something from nothing is creative; but God is productive of something from nothing; therefore God is creative. This seems to be a good demonstration, because the syllogism is good, proceeding from things necessary and more known and prior. 121. I reply that this is not a syllogism simply and a priori, about which the discussion now is; nor is any such syllogism that is {1.117} through definitions expressing only the ‘what’ of the name simply a demonstration. The reason for this is that to every demonstration simply and a priori is the ‘what’ of the name presupposed as to all the terms. But when the ‘what’ of the name as to all the terms is presupposed, the intellect cannot be in doubt of the conclusion and yet know the premise in which the definition is predicated of the subject of the conclusion. Just as, supposing that what is creative is the same as what is productive of something from nothing, it is not possible to know this proposition, ‘God is productive of something from nothing’, and to doubt this one, ‘God is creative’. And of such a definition is the statement true that ‘from definition to defined thing there is a fallacy of begging the question’ [Aristotle, Topics 8.13.162b34-3a1]. And therefore such syllogisms are not demonstrations simply, about which the discussion now is. 122. The sixth conclusion is that all things predicable of God in himself that are doubtful about a composite concept (of the sort we in fact have) proper to God are demonstrable of that concept through the divine essence in itself as through a middle term, or though a distinct knowledge of the deity, or through something common as middle term. Because all such predicates belong first either to the divine essence (as relations and notions) or to a person, and similarly negative and connotative concepts proper to God, or they belong first to something common to God and creatures (as are true, one, good, and so of others). Therefore with respect to all such it is possible to find a middle term through which such a proposition can be syllogized. 123. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient to form one syllogism alone, sometimes a syllogism with a polysyllogism or polysyllogisms. For example {1.118}, someone not blessed can doubt this proposition, ‘God exists’; afterwards God can cause intuitive or abstractive knowledge in that intellect. On this basis, he will be able to form a

9 The following was written continuously with the rest but afterwards canceled: “Likewise every concept, as has to be made clear elsewhere, is common to many. But no predicate belongs first to anything common to which it does not belong adequately. Therefore to no concept common to God and creatures does any such concept proper to God belong first. — If it be said that by the same reasoning it is said that every concept is common, therefore none is proper to God, I reply that every simple concept is common to many, but not a concept that is composite either formally or equivalently or in some way implying many things, of which sort are all connotative and negative concepts.” Page 62 demonstrative syllogism in which this will be the conclusion, ‘God exists’, which first he doubted, so that in the major the predicate of this proposition, that in fact we have, will be predicated of the divine essence itself in itself, or of distinct knowledge of the divine essence, and in the second premise the divine essence itself in itself will be predicated of the subject of the conclusion, as if the argument were as follows: the divine essence exists; God is the divine essence; therefore God exists. However, these two premises are not possible for us, but they can only be apprehended by someone intuitively or abstractly understanding the deity itself in itself. And therefore only to such a one are the conclusions demonstrable in themselves a priori that cannot be demonstrated of God through anything common as through a middle term.

Doubts about the Aforesaid

124. About the aforesaid, besides what has been adduced for the first opinion [1.96-97], there are still some doubts. 125. A first doubt is: because it does not seem that anything could be demonstrated of God, because nothing that belongs to God can belong first {1.119} to something other than God, because then there would be something prior to God. And consequently nothing can be a middle term for demonstrating anything of God. 126. A second doubt is whether there can be several concepts of God. Because it seems that there can, notwithstanding the simplicity of God. Being, one, true, and good state distinct concepts, and yet they do not state distinct beings. Similarly, the definition and the thing defined state distinct concepts, and yet they state the simply same thing.

Response to the Arguments of the Subtle Doctor

127. To the first [1.99-100] for the second opinion I say, as was proved before [1.110-111, 114-115], that such concepts as are called attibutal are not demonstrable of the divine essence in itself; and this when understanding by attributal concepts concepts simply absolute, according as they are distinguished from connotative and negative concepts, for the reason stated in the preceding third conclusion [1.110-111]. 128. To the first proof [1.99] I say that there is not the sort of order to those concepts as is required for demonstration simply and a priori. Because for such demonstration there is always required an order of things disposed as superior and inferior, or disposed according to the order of whole and part, or according to the order of subject and accident, or where a property is demonstrated of a subject through a definition {1.120} expressing the real parts of the thing defined; and this for demonstration simply universal and categorical. 129. An example of the first: as the property of a triangle in general can be demonstrated of anything contained under triangle through triangle as through a middle term that is superior to the thing contained. As this: every triangle has three angles; an isosceles is a triangle; therefore it has three angles. And I call a universal demonstration here not precisely when a property is demonstrated of its first subject but when the conclusion is simply about the whole of the subject, in the way the Philosopher speaks, PosteriorAnalytics 1.4.73a28-34, 73b25-74a4. — An example of the second, the way this Page 63 can be called a demonstration: everything possessing an intellective soul is susceptive of teaching; every man has an intellective soul; therefore etc. — An example of the third: everything hot is able to make hot; all fire is hot; therefore etc. — An example of the fourth: every figure contained by three lines has there angles etc.; every triangle is of this sort; therefore etc. The second and third mode of demonstrating stand ultimately for demonstration from oblique terms.10 130. But among these concepts there is no such order, because they are not disposed as superior and inferior (it is manifest); nor do they express whole and part (it is manifest); and so of the others, because of the divine simplicity. But whether there is any other order between those concepts is not now to the purpose; about this elsewhere [Sent. I d.2 q.7]. 131. To the proof of the assumption in the argument [1.99], when it is taken that ‘whatever real order certain things would have if they were really distinct, a similar order do they have according to reason when {1.121} they are distinct only according to reason’, I say first that, according to the common understanding of many, which is this that ‘such things would have a similar order according to reason when they are distinct according to reason and yet are one really’, this proposition is simply impossible because of a false implication; because it is implied that certain things can be one really and yet be distinguished in idea, as will be plain elsewhere [Sent. I d.2 q.3]. Similarly, this proposition is still false when understanding it thus, that ‘what sort of order certain things would have if they were distinct really, that sort of order do the ideas or concepts have corresponding to those things if they existed, which concepts however are not one thing’; because there is not always a similar order in things and in the corresponding concepts. 132. An example: man and white are ordered as subject and accident, but the corresponding concepts are not thus ordered. Likewise, man and animal, if they were distinguished really, would be one of them potency and the other act, and neither would be predicable of the other in the first mode per se but only in the second mode, nor would one be of the understanding of the other. And yet when now they are distinguished not really but in idea, they do not have such an order, because one is predicated of the other not in the second mode but in the first. It is the same way about being and God, that if they were distinguished really, one would truly be potency and the other act; and yet it is not thus now when they are distinguished in idea. Likewise, if God and deity were distinguished really, one would be more perfect and the other more imperfect, and one would not be predicated of the other by a predication {1.122} saying that this is this; and yet these concepts are not thus ordered. 133. And therefore, from the order of things either in fact or in possibility, not from the order of things when an impossible position is posited that includes a contradiction, ought the order of conceptions to be taken. But not even in that case is there always a like order between things and concepts or ideas. 134. Plain too is the falsity of the proposition: that if body, animal, man, and this man were distinguished really, there would not be between them an order according to higher and lower, because, as will be made clear elsewhere [Sent. I d.1 q.7], there is no order of higher and lower between things, and yet between the concepts there is an order according to higher and lower. In the same way about being and God, because now the

10 Sc. from properties of a thing and not from the essence. Page 64 concepts have an order according to higher and lower, and yet then they would not have such an order. Thus then is it plain as to the major. 135. To the minor [1.99-100] I say that, if that impossible case be posited, perfect intellectual nature and perfect intellect would be disposed as subject and accident. Because, however, that position includes a contradiction, therefore there is no need that there be a similar order now among concepts, nor need that now one could be a middle term for concluding something of something else. Just as if God and deity were really distinct or included distinct things really, one would be part of the other or subject of the other, and consequently one could be a middle term for demonstrating something of the remaining one. And yet now it is not so. 136. If {1.123} it be said that this seems to be a demonstration a priori: every intellect nature is possessed of will; the divine essence is an intellectual nature; therefore it is possessed of will: 137. I say that, when taking will and possessed of will according as it is an absolute concept simply, not a connotative one, there is in this way no demonstration, because in this way is this proposition not immediate, ‘every intellectual nature is possessed of will’, but this one is immediate, ‘the divine nature is possessed of will’, and one other in which that predicate is predicated of another co-divisor. But when taking ‘possessed of will’ according as it is connotative, in this way can it be demonstrated, as was said in the fourth conclusion [1.115]. Hence in this way ‘possessed of will’ is the same as ‘what is able to have an act of willing’. 138. I reply in the same way to the point about personal features [1.100]: that they do not have the sort of order that suffices for demonstration, although perhaps they would have such an order if they were really distinct. Likewise, positing that they were really distinct, unless they had some order among the things that11 were spoken about at the beginning of the solution of this argument [1.119-120], one could not be the middle term for demonstrating anything of the rest. Just as if whiteness and sweetness were to have an order between them such even that one would be cause of the other (provided they did not have any order of the things just spoken about), one could not be a middle term for demonstrating {1.124}, by a universal demonstration (which has been spoken about [1.119-120]), anything of the other. 139. And if it be said that according to the Philosopher, Posterior Analytics 2.11.94a20-24, any cause can be a middle term of demonstration, I reply that not with a universal demonstration and as to universality of supposits and as to universality of time, as will be stated in another question [1.154-156]. 140. To the other reason [1.100-101] that there is no such contrary order in demonstration-that and demonstration-why as these people imagine, because the same conclusion is drawn in demonstration-that and demonstration-why, although through diverse middle terms. 141. And as was replied to the second [1.123-124], in the same way can it replied to the third [1.102]: because however much the divine nature, intellect, and will were distinguished really (because then omnipotence could be demonstrated of the divine

11 Cod. F has here as a note: “Again, for him therefore God under the idea of deity is a subject, because as such it first contains the knowable properties of God; at the same time, since under that idea it would contain any truth of any subject in itself, it could be the subject in every science, and then other things would be superfluous.” Page 65 essence through the intellect and will as through a middle term), yet now there is no such order to these concepts that one could be the middle term for demonstrating omnipotence of the rest. Because then omnipotence would not belong first to the divine essence but to intellect or will; but now it belongs first to the divine essence, because a predicate that belongs precisely to one thing can belong first only to that thing. And therefore omnipotence in the first way belongs to the divine essence, and it is an immediate proposition by predicating omnipotence of the divine essence. 142. From this {1.125} is plain the falsity of the proposition [1.102] “of what sort the real order is etc.” Because if the divine nature alone were intellective and volitive, and the divine nature and intellect and will were distinct really, then they would have such an order that whatever were predicated of one would be predicated also of another; and yet these concepts are not so disposed. Or let the argument be about the divine essence, the intellect, the act of thinking, the habit [of thinking] etc. Because not every act of thinking is the divine essence. Similarly, there is not in fact a like order to the things as to the corresponding concepts; because the order of the things corresponding to the concept of animal and to the concept of man is not the order of superior and inferior but another order; and yet to the concepts there is such an order [sc. of superior and inferior], and not the other one. And so the [above] proposition, because of many objections, is false. 143. As to the last argument for the opinion [1.102], I concede that of something simple that does not have a definition there can be science properly speaking, because there can be a subject of an accident that can be the middle term for demonstrating something of that something simple. Similarly, perhaps if that something simple be constituted from things formally distinct, something can be demonstrated of it through the other constituent as through a middle term. And so perhaps this would be a demonstration: the divine essence is creative; the Father is the divine essence; therefore the Father is creative. Similarly, about what is simple can something be demonstrated through something common to it and other things as through a middle term; but through the definition as through a middle term nothing can be demonstrated of it. 144. When, therefore, it is said [1.102] that if “neither by reason of composition etc. is there science about something…therefore only because it has ordered concepts,” {1.126} I reply that not any order of concepts suffices for there to be a science properly speaking about something, but there is required an order of concepts disposed according to superior and inferior, or expressing part and whole or constituter and constituted, or of concepts expressing subject and accident, or of definition and defined, as was said before [1.119-120]. And therefore, on the position that the concepts of intellect and will predicable of God have an order between themselves, yet because they do not have any order of the ones above mentioned, therefore one cannot be a middle term for demonstrating anything of the rest. Just as if in creatures intellect and will were powers really distinct each of which would immediately perfect intellectual nature, as some posit [Aquinas, ST Ia 1.79 a.1], one would not be a reason for demonstrating anything of the rest as through a middle term. 145. If it be said that this is a demonstration: ‘everything intellective is volitive; the rational animal is intellective; therefore etc.’; I reply that whether this demonstration is a demonstration-why or not, this is not a demonstration simply and a priori, because the intellect is not prior to the will as its subject; and so the will does not belong to the Page 66 intellective as to its first subject but it belongs first as to subject to the nature itself, which is both intellectual and volitive. 146. If it be said that every demonstration that is through what is prior is a priori, I say that not just any priority suffices, but priority of subject is required. 147. If it be said {1.127} that rather there is sometimes a demonstration a priori through an extrinsic cause, I reply that that demonstration is not universal as to universality of time and supposits. About this in another question [1.154-156].

Solution to the Doubts

148. To the first doubt [1.118-119] I say that something can be demonstrated of God. And therefore I concede that something is prior to God by priority of predication, and such prior thing ought to be the middle term in demonstrating anything of God. 149. To the second I say that there can never be a distinction of concepts save because of some distinction on the part of the thing: and this either of things in the same thing, or of things totally disparate, or of things formally distinct. And therefore I say that there would not be distinct concepts of God unless there were some distinction. Hence the distinction of God from created wisdom, from created will, and from intellection and volition, suffices for a distinction of these concepts predicable of God. And therefore all such concepts are either univocally common to God and some creature, or consequent to them. About this elsewhere [Sent. I d.2 q.9]. 150 When therefore it is said that ‘one, true, good etc. state distinct concepts and yet not distinct beings’, I say that they connote distinct things: because true connotes an act of understanding, good {1.128} an act of willing; and unless they connoted some really distinct things they would not be distinct concepts. Similarly, superior and inferior concepts are distinguished, because one imports more things than the other does. It is the same way about definition and defined, that they are distinguished because of the distinction of the things imported by the definition.

Response to the Arguments of the First Opinion

151. To the first argument for the first opinion [1.97], when it is said ‘knowing is through causes’, I say that the Philosopher does not intend precisely to speak of a real and properly speaking non-complex cause, but of all that to which something demonstrable first belongs; and so it is a cause (extending the name of cause) why it belongs to other things. Because it always formally follows that if it does not belong to the cause, that it does not belong to the others, and not conversely. And so it cannot belong to anything unless it first belong to that; and so that is the cause (in the extensive sense) why it belongs to other things. 152. If it be said that the Philosopher is properly speaking there of cause, because he gives a definition properly speaking, I say that he is extending cause to every first subject of any demonstrable predicate. And yet with this stands that it is a true definition; and this suffices for the intention of the Philosopher. Page 67

153. To the other argument [1.97], that it is not necessary for the subject of a science to be caused, nor composite, nor to have a property really different, nor to have a definition. But about this later [q.3, 1.129-243].

{1.129} Response to the Opening Arguments

154. To the principal arguments [1.75-76] the matter is plain. To the first, that it is not necessary that something demonstrable always have a cause properly speaking, but it is enough that there be something prior to which it first belongs, at least in predication. 155. To the second, that not every demonstration is through a definition as through middle term. 156. To the third I concede that something is predicated of God in the second mode of speaking per se, and that he has properties, as will be plain, but it is not necessary that they differ really.

{1.129} Question 3: Whether a Property Knowable of Something by Science Properly Speaking Differs from it Really

1. To make evident some of the things said in the preceding question, I will ask some brief questions. 2. First I ask whether a property knowable of something by science properly speaking differs from it really. 3. That it does: Metaphysics 6.15.1039b27-31, “Of substance there is no demonstration [‘…of singular sensible substances there is neither definition nor demonstration, because they have matter, whose nature is such that it contingently is and is not’].” Therefore what is demonstrable of something is not the same really as it. Therefore it is distinguished from it really. 4. {1.130} To the opposite: then there would be no science properly speaking about God.

Opinion of John of Reading

5. About this question there is an opinion12 that any property is the same really as its subject. And they argue as follows: “that which is known to be necessarily in some subject, so that the opposite includes a contradiction, is really the same as that subject; but in simply necessary demonstration the predicate, which is a property, is known to be

12 John of Reading in the second question of the Prologue to his commentary on Sent. I. Page 68 necessarily in the subject; therefore such a property is not distinct really from the subject. Proof of the major: what is naturally prior to something else can be without it without contradiction, and this if it is really distinct from it;” and consequently it is not known to be necessarily in the subject. 6. Therefore is it said that something’s being properly knowable about some subject can be understood in three ways. First, because “it is distinguished formally on the part of the thing, such however that it does not belong to its quidditative understanding, and therefore is it called a property of it, just as holds of oneness with respect to being [sc. that every being qua being is one].” Second because “it is not distinguished either really or formally but only in understanding,” as ‘creative’ and suchlike things with respect to God that involve respects of reason “that are predicated of God in the second {1.131} mode of speaking per se, and consequently they are properly knowable.” Third, because “it is not distinguished either really or formally through the making-intellect, as the intellect makes relations of reason.” But “the divine essence can cause in an intellect proportionate to it its own quidditative concept” and similarly a denominative and relational concept, as ‘creative’ which “does not state either really or formally anything other than deity.” “Nor does it state a relation of reason, because from the fact it is a real relation, naturally expressed by the object, it is not anything made by the intellect comparing or busying itself about it.” 7. And so about the same formality can a real quidditative concept be had and another concept, a real denominative one, namely a concept of respect not a quidditative one, “and the same in the thing according to different concepts has the idea of subject and property.” This is plain, because “risibility as it states an aptitude for laughing is necessarily in man as in a subject,” and it does not state another absolute thing, nor an accidental respect, nor a respect of reason, “because a man expressing its concept in the intellect can express the concept of risibility before he busy himself about it.” Likewise, a relation of reason is not a real property.

Against the Opinion of John of Reading

8. Against this opinion: because a property demonstrable of a subject is not the same really as the subject and is formally distinct. Second because, as will be proved later [Sent. I d.2 q.1], there is no such distinction save between the divine essence and relations, where one is not the property of the other. Third {1.132} because if this were possible, still one would not be demonstrated of the other, because the proposition composed of them would be immediate; and similarly it would be self-evident to the intellect apprehending the terms in particular, because of real identity. Fourth because all things that are one and the same really make something per se one, and consequently each is of the per se understanding of the something per se one. And so one is not the property of the other, no more than coloredness is a property of whiteness, according to them, or a relation in divine reality a property of the divine essence, because then Person would be composed of subject and property. 9. If it be said, as they say, that coloredness is of the understanding of whitenesss, therefore it is not its property, on the contrary: if coloredness is of the per se understanding of whiteness and yet is distinguished from it formally, it is necessary that Page 69 in whiteness there be something that coloredness is not in the understanding of; and consequently coloredness will be a property of it or conversely. This is manifestly false and against them. 10. A confirmation: because there is no greater reason that certain things distinct formally and one really, neither of which belongs to the understanding of the other, should be disposed as subject and property or not make something per se one, than that other things should, although they are equally distinct. And so, speaking rationally, this is to be posited of all or none of the things so distinct. 11. Argument against the second [1.130-131] will be plain elsewhere, when it will be proved that ‘creative’, ‘omnipotent’, and the like do not import a relation of reason [Sent. II q.1, Quodl. 7 q.3]. 12. Against {1.133} the third [1.131]: first it seems to be repugnant to the second. Because every relational concept necessarily imports some respect, just as an absolute concept imports something absolute; therefore if ‘creative’ is a relational concept it imports some respect, and not a real one, according to them [1.130], therefore a respect of reason. The antecedent is plain: because if ‘creative’ states a relational concept, then this term ‘creative’ is relational, therefore it imports some relation; therefore the concept does too. 13. Besides, it was proved before [1.103-104] that of the same thing simple without all distinction there cannot be two concepts, namely quidditative and denominative, importing precisely the same thing. And so one thing can in no way, before any concept of a second thing, express two such concepts.

Solution of the Author

14. Therefore to this question I say that a property can be taken in many ways [cf. Summa Logicae I.37, Exposition of Porphyry 5]. In one way for something that is said to belong to something. In another way a property is taken for what is predicated of something in the second mode of speaking per se. 15. In the first way I say that a property is universally distinguished really from the subject, because in this way nothing is a property save some accident or some form inhering in something really as in a subject. But in this way is property not commonly taken in the sciences. In the second way I say {1.134} that universally a property is not the same really as the subject, because a property in this way is only a certain concept predicable of something for the thing not for itself; and universally a concept is never the same really as that of which it is [the concept]. 16. Now that a property predicable in the second way is a certain concept is plain, because it cannot be a thing outside the soul, since there is nothing outside the soul save only a singular thing, as will be plain later [Sent. I d.2 q.7]. But no singular thing is predicated in such a proposition. For example, in this proposition, ‘every man is capable of laughter’, a particular thing cannot be predicated, because there is no greater reason to predicate one thing than some other, and consequently any at all might there be predicated. But this is manifestly false, because nothing is predicated in a proposition save what is known by him who has the proposition. But any at all is not known by such a person; therefore a concept precisely is predicated and not a thing. Page 70

17. Besides, according to Boethius, in De Interpretatione ch. On Signs (PL 64, 402, 410-411), a proposition has a triple being, namely: in the mind, in speech, in writing. Therefore to distinct propositions in speech always correspond distinct propositions in the mind. Therefore just as these propositions ‘Socrates is capable of laughter’, ‘Plato is capable of laughter’, are distinct in speech, so proportionally are they in the mind. But in speech they have simply the same predicate; therefore in the mind as well. But no same indistinct thing is predicated of Socrates and Plato; therefore no such thing is predicated in those propositions in the mind; therefore the concept that is in one mind holds true for one thing, and in another for another thing. 18. One needs to know, however, that although the property is not really the same as the subject and, according to an opinion [1.30 n.3] that posits a concept {1.135} only has objective being, is not really distinct from the subject, yet things cannot be disposed as subject and real property save because of a real distinction in some way imported by them; namely because, although a property could supposit for a subject, yet it in a way imports something other than the subject. For example, although ‘able to laugh’ supposits for ‘man’ in this proposition ‘every man is able to laugh’, yet it in some way imports the act of laughing (whether primarily or secondarily I care not for the present), and, because of this, one is property of the other. In the same way must one speak of ‘creative’ in respect of God, and universally of all such things as, according to one opinion [John of Reading, 1.131, 133], are called relational properties, and of all concrete things to which correspond abstract terms importing other things, as holds of hot and the like, according to the intention of the Philosopher [Categories 8.9a28-9b9]. 19. If it be said that corruptible is a property of a composite substance, and yet it does not import another thing; likewise, infinite, immortal, and the like are properties of God, and yet they do not import other things: 20. To the first of these I say that corruptible does import another thing, because it at least imports a part of the thing that is other than the whole of which it is the property. However I do no wish to say that such a distinction of part and whole suffices for one to be a property and the other a subject. But then, when too the negation of one part is imported by another (whether in act or in potency), as is plain of ‘corruptible’ by which is imported the fact that one {1.136} part can be separated from the other and consequently be denied [of it], then it is possible for the concept importing the part to be a property of that which imports the whole. 21. To the other [1.135] [I say] that eternal connotes time, which imports some other thing distinct really from God. But how this is the case will be made clear in the second book [Sent. II q.13]. Similarly, infinite, immortal and the like (which are negatives), and all negative concepts universally, in some way import a distinction of things, as has to be made clear elsewhere [Sent. I d.2 q.2].

Response to the Arguments of John of Reading

22. To the first argument of the other opinion [1.135]: when it is said that if a property is not the same really as the subject it can be separated from it, I reply that a property that is another thing can be separated from a subject, and therefore it is not necessarily in a subject. But that property is not demonstrable of a subject and therefore nothing about it Page 71 is to the purpose. But speaking of a property said in the second way, it is not the same really nor, according to one opinion [1.134, 1.30 n3], is it really distinct, because it is not a thing; and so it is not demonstrated to be in the subject really but is only demonstrated to be predicated of the subject, not for itself but for the thing. And this is possible whether a property said in the first way (when it is imported by a property stated in the second way) inhere in its subject or not {1.137}. But this will not be through a proposition purely about the present, but through a proposition about possibility or equivalent to a proposition about possibility. And so is it about these propositions, ‘every man is capable of laughter’, ‘the moon can be eclipsed’, and the like, which are always true, whether the things are in act or not. And therefore I concede that whenever a property imports another thing that is of a nature to inhere in a subject, that no proposition purely about inherence and about the present is simply necessary. 23. Then to the form of the argument: when it is taken [1.130] that: ‘that which is known necessarily to be in some subject, so that the opposite includes a contradiction, is really the same as that subject’, I say that this proposition needs to be distinguished. Because ‘to be in’ is in one way the same as to inhere really, as an accident is in a subject and the form of the matter; in another way it is the same as to be predicated [of it]. In the first way the proposition is impossible because of a false implication, because it is implied that some such thing is thus necessarily in some subject, and yet that it is the same as it really, which things are formally repugnant: because from the fact that it is thus in the subject, it is really distinguished from it. In the second way I say that there can be such a predication, such that each term supposits for itself. And then the first proposition is true, but the minor is then false, because a property is never in that way necessarily in a subject. For if in this proposition, ‘every man is capable of laughter’, each term were to supposit for itself, it would be simply impossible, because then what would be denoted is that this concept would be that concept, and {1.138} that the property would be the subject, which is impossible. Alternatively each term can supposit not for itself but for the the thing; and then the minor is true and the major false, because then it is not necessary that that which is predicated necessarily of something be the same really or formally. 24. And when it is said [1.130] that ‘what is naturally prior to another can be without it without contradiction’, I say about this proposition that it is true of things outside the soul. But whether it is true or false of beings in the soul is not to the purpose. Because for the conclusion of a demonstration it suffices that, along with other conditions, the conclusion be necessary, such that in no way could it be false but that, if the proposition is, it be necessarily true.13 But whether the subject could be without the predicate or conversely or not, is nothing to the purpose.

13 Ockham, Summa Logicae p.2 ch.9: “However about a necessary proposition one needs to know that a proposition is not said to be necessary for this reason, that it is always true, but that it is true if it is and that it cannot be false. As this proposition in the mind, ‘God is’, is necessary not because it is always true (because if it is not, it is not true), but that if it is, it is true and cannot be false.” Page 72

25. To the other point that is insinuated,14 that risibility is not distinguished really nor formally from man, and states neither a respect of reason nor a real one, and yet is a property, I reply that risibility states {1.139} another thing really distinct from man, because risibility, to laugh, laughter and the like have some same signified thing which is imported primarily or secondarily by all of them; and for this reason can it be a property. 26. And if a question be asked about the risibility that is on the part of the thing, how it is distinguished from man, whether really or formally: I say that all such questions about connotative terms proceed from false imagination, because we imagine that such things have the ‘what’ of a thing when, however, they have the ‘what’ of a name only. For we imagine that risibility is some one thing simply on the part of the thing and so risibility is called real, just as man or whiteness is something one on the part of the thing; and thus do we imagine about other connotative terms. But this imagination is false. For neither risibility nor aptitude nor anything such states something one on the part of the thing, neither per se nor per accidens, save perhaps as a consequence. But it states many things simply, in a way equivalently to a complex composed of them, because it is equivalent to some complex [phrase]; as ‘risibility’ is equivalent to this in a way ‘something is able to laugh’, as this ‘white-able’ is in some way equivalent to this ‘something can be made white’, such that whatever is imported by this complex phrase is imported {1.140} also in some way by the non-complex one. And because in such things whatever is imported by the concrete phrase is imported also by the abstract term, therefore is such a complex (and whatever is imported by any part of the complex) in some way imported by the abstract term. And therefore the ‘what’ of the thing should no more be asked for about the abstract term than about the complex phrase, but only the ‘what’ of the name should be asked for. And therefore one should not ask what risibility is on the part of the thing, but only what risibility signifies. And the reply must be that it signifies something that can laugh. And therefore, properly speaking, by virtue of words nothing that precisely signifies something one and does not signify many things (in the way such terms signify many things) is predicable of any such abstract term but only similar abstract terms are. Just as is true of blindness, about which nothing precisely signifying one thing can be predicated; for whatever is pointed to, this statement is false: ‘this is blindness’. 27. If it be said that this is not something positive but a privation, I reply that privation, and negation universally, states precisely certain things or ideas. And so it is not to be imagined that privation or negation is something conceivable distinct from positive things or ideas, but it states them as ‘not-man’ states something that is not a man. In the same way ‘blindness’ states an eye not able to see; and so the matter is similar in these cases as in others.

14 Here Ockham responds to an argument of John of Reading that however he did not adduce above (1.133). John’s words are as follows: “This third mode can be established thus: risibility, as it states an aptitude for laughing, is in man necessarily as a property and is not distinguished really from man, as is plain before. Nor even is it anything in reality different from man, because either it is only an actual respect in the thing (which is not true since a term is not anything existing in act), therefore risibility is not anything distinct in act from man either really or formally. Therefore either it will be a respect of reason or it will be altogether the same in reality as man, but under a respect other than the quidditative concept of man. But it does not seem to be necessary to posit that risibility is a respect of reason…; therefore it seems that risibility, as it is a real property, is not distinguished really or in any way from man save as a denominative concept of it or denominated by a quidditative concept of it.” Page 73

28. An example can be given in other cases. Because ‘creativity’ is predicated properly of no one thing; for it cannot be said that God is creativity, nor that a creature is, because creativity does not state one thing, but it states this totality which is: something that can produce something from nothing {1.141}. It is the same way about the potentiality of matter: because the potentiality of matter does not state something one, because it states neither an absolute thing, nor a real relative one, nor a relation of reason; because truly matter is in potency (every act of understanding having been removed), and consequently without any relation of reason; but it states that matter can have a form that now it does not have. 29. And therefore in many arguments there is a fallacy of figure of speech, taking a connotative name under a simply absolute name. It is like arguing thus: whatever God can do by means of a second cause, he can do immediately by himself; but he can produce an act of merit by means of an act of will; therefore he can do so without it. And so on about many other instances, wherein there is always a fallacy of figure of speech, because a ‘what’ is changed into a ‘relative to something’, according to one mode of speaking, or into a connotative term, according to another way of speaking. 30. However, one needs to know that ‘risibility’, ‘aptitude’, and many like abstract terms are by philosophers taken equivocally. For sometimes they are taken and supposit for the same thing for which their concrete terms supposit. And thus would it have to be conceded that ‘risibility is man’. Sometimes the terms supposit for an aggregate of everything that is imported by it, whether primarily or secondarily. Sometimes they supposit precisely for the concrete things themselves. 31. From these points is it plain that such a denominative concept, predicable in the second mode, is not caused precisely by the thing of which it is predicated before any concept of something else, but it presupposes the concept of something or other, because it presupposes the concept of whatever is imported by it {1.142}. And therefore this concept ‘creative’ cannot be had unless something is known that is not God. It is plain too that it must not be said that the same thing under one concept is the subject and under another concept is the property, because the thing itself is not a property either under one concept or under the other, but the concept itself is the property. 32. However, against the aforesaid seems to be Aristotle Topics 1.5.101b38-39, 102a18-22, because for him property differs from definition in this that definition states the ‘what’ and property an ‘accident’. 33. Similarly, according to Grosseteste On Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 1.4 t.19 on the ‘per se’, in the first mode the quiddity of the subject exceeds the quiddity of the predicate, but conversely in the second mode; therefore in the first mode the subject is really distinct from the predicate. There is a confirmation: because, according to him in the same place, there is not any other mode of per se predication save that the subject is cause of the predicate or conversely. 34. To the first of these I say that the Philosopher understands by ‘accident’ everything extrinsic to the thing; and therefore ‘property’, because it imports something that is extrinsic to the thing, is therefore said to state an accident of the thing, but such that it is convertible with it; because it takes ‘accident’ there as it is distinct from its ‘what’. And therefore we can truly say that ‘creative’ is proper to God, because it is convertible with God and imports the creature that is really distinct from God, though it does not state any accident of God. Page 74

35. To the second I say that it is not necessary for the predicate to be distinct from the subject nor that it be a real effect of the subject, but it is sufficient {1.143} that it be cause of something that is imported by the predicate. And, as is the case more commonly or always, when a proposition is truly affirmative and the predication is proper and per se in the second mode, the subject or something imported by the subject is cause of something imported by the predicate — and this by extending ‘cause’ to the integral parts that are in some way said to be causes of the whole. Hereby is plain the answer to the confirmation.

Response to the Principal Argument

36. As to the principal argument [1.129]: I deny the consequence ‘what is demonstrable of anything is not the same as it really, therefore it is distinct from it really’. An instance against it is plain, because a being of reason is neither the same really as the thing nor really distinct from it. And this according to the opinion that posits beings of reason objectively in the soul.

{1.143} Question 4: Whether Every Property is Demonstrable a Priori of its First Subject

1. Secondly I ask whether every property is demonstrable a priori of its first subject. 2. That it is: 3. Because there is no greater reason that one be demonstrable than that another be; and some is demonstrable (it is certain); therefore all are. 4. {1.144} To the opposite: 5. It was said before [1.116-117, q.2] that being creative and the like cannot be demonstrated of God.

Distinction of Properties

6. For this question I make a distinction first among properties [Ockham, Summa Logicae p.1 chs.10, 37; Expositio in Librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilius, ch.5]; because there are certain of them that import other absolute things really distinct from their subjects and inhering in them formally, the way that what is susceptible of teaching, what is heatable, and the like are disposed. And some import motion or change, as able to laugh, movable, alterable, and so on of others. And some are connotative and some negative or privative.

Which Properties are Demonstrable First Conclusion Page 75

7. A first conclusion, then, is that no property importing some formally inhering absolute thing is demonstrable of its first subject. 8. And I call a first subject that to which a property can belong when everything else is removed and none of the subject is removed. For example: the intellective soul is the first subject with respect to ‘susceptible of teaching’, because when everything else is removed the soul can still receive teaching {1.145}, and nothing can receive teaching when the intellective soul is removed. But man is a subject of that property; not however first subject but rather secondary one, because when a man is destroyed the soul can still receive teaching. So it is of other accidents that belong to a whole through the mediation of a part. 9. Proof of this conclusion: because an immediate proposition cannot be demonstrated; but this one is immediate; therefore it cannot be demonstrated. 10. If it be said that a proposition immediate with the immediacy of a subject can be demonstrated, because it is not immediate with the immediacy of a cause; just as this proposition ‘every triangle has three angles [equal…]’ is immediate with the immediacy of the subject and yet is demonstrable. So can it be in the case at issue. 11. This is not valid: because no immediate proposition can be demonstrated, for, according to Aristotle [Posterior Analytics 1.2.72a8], “an immediate proposition is that to which no other is prior;” and consequently it cannot be demonstrated from a prior. And when it is said that it can be immediate with the immediacy of the subject, although not immediate with the immediacy of the cause, I say that ‘subject’ is taken in two ways. In one way for some single term which something is of a nature to be predicated of; in another way for everything which something is of a nature to be predicated of. In the first way it is possible for some proposition immediate with the immediacy of the subject to be demonstrable, as about this one, ‘every triangle etc.’ In a second way it is not possible, because everything demonstrable of something belongs necessarily first to a middle term, which will not only be cause but subject. And therefore I say that the definition of a triangle, if it be the middle term for demonstrating this proposition, ‘every triangle has three angles [equal…]’ {1.146}, is the first subject of the property in one way and triangle is in another way. 12. Alternatively it can be said to the objection that such a proposition immediate with the immediacy of the subject is never demonstrable save by a definition expressing the determinate parts, either in number or in essence, as by a middle term, in which the property is more known to inhere than in the subject; because in no way would it be in the subject when any of these parts is removed, and so [when] whatever is in any way cause why the property inheres in the subject [is removed]. For example: if it were demonstrated of a triangle that it has three angles [equal etc.], this will be by a definition expressing parts diverse and determinate in number, namely the three lines of which a triangle is composed. Similarly, being corruptible is demonstrable of a subject (namely of a composite substance) by a definition expressing parts determinate in essence, namely matter and form, so that, when any of these is removed, in no way would it be a corruptible substance. 13. But such a property that imports an absolute thing inhering in another is demonstrable by some definition, because the definition would express parts either of the Page 76 same idea or of different ideas. Not the first, because then it would be necessary for it to express parts determinate in number. But this is not possible, because such a property could be posited whichever of them were removed. For example, ‘being heatable’ cannot be demonstrated of anything by such a middle term, because whatever part of it is removed the rest would still be heatable. Nor the second, because every absolute accident has a subject equally simple, so there is as much simplicity in the first subject as in the accident. Therefore the subject imports such a distinction of parts no more than the accident does, and consequently {1.147} it does not have such a definition. And this could be a second reason for the first conclusion. 14. A third proof of this is: because that proposition, of which the first knowledge can only be received through experience by means of some contingent proposition, is not demonstrable; but any such proposition is of this sort; therefore etc. The major is manifest because, with respect to every demonstrable conclusion, knowledge of certain premises is sufficient; therefore no other cause is required save what is required for knowledge of the premises. The minor is proved by induction, because however much abstractive knowledge be had both of the subject and of such property, unless something contained under the subject be intuitively seen, as well as something imported by such property by virtue of which it is evidently known that this inheres in this, never will such a universal proposition be evidently known. Just as if someone were to know the intellective soul intuitively and abstractly, and were to know discipline or science similarly abstractly or even intuitively, never would he evidently know such a universal proposition unless he evidently knew some such singular proposition as ‘this soul has discipline or science’; or he would know it when the terms are known, and consequently it would be a principle and not a conclusion. It is the same way about other things, as the facts that fire can be hot, that earth can be cold, cannot be known save through experience; therefore no such proposition is demonstrable.

Second Conclusion

15. The second conclusion is that such a property can be demonstrated of a subject of it that is not first. 16. But {1.148} a subject that is not first can be understood in many ways. In one way because not adequate to it in predication; and this either because [the property] exceeds as superior to the first subject, or because it is exceeded as something contained under the first subject. In a first way are isosceles and triangle disposed, in a second way are figure and triangle disposed with respect to having three angles [equal etc.]. In the other way because it is a whole with respect to the first subject, as man with respect to intellective soul as to being susceptive of teaching. In a third way because it is the subject sustaining the first subject, as properties of form and of accident in some way belong to the subject, hence fire too [sc. as well as hot] is said to be able to heat. And perhaps it can happen in other ways. 17. In the first way always is such a property demonstrable of the non-first exceeding subject. And the demonstration will be particular, because always the inferior is the Page 77 middle term for concluding something of its superior particularly.15 But if the non-first subject is exceeded by the property, it can still16 be demonstrated through the first subject, as by arguing thus: every triangle has three angles [equal etc.]; an isosceles is a triangle; therefore etc. In the second way always is such a property demonstrable of {1.149} the non-first subject through the first subject as through middle term. I say the like of the third way. An example of the first: this is a demonstration: everything possessed of an intellective soul is susceptive of teaching; every man is of this sort; therefore etc. An example of the second: everything possessing heat is able to heat; (let it be supposed that what is able to heat is the first subject of causing heat); fire is of this sort; therefore etc. 18. However, one needs to know that in these two ways, if a demonstration is made from propositions simply first, the premises must be taken obliquely and not directly. For example by arguing thus: that in which there is an intellective soul is susceptive of teaching; in man there is an intellective soul; therefore etc. In the same way in other cases must argument be made through such oblique propositions, because by arguing through propositions simply direct, it would be necessary that either an abstract term importing that part or the accident, or a concrete term, be the middle term. If in the first way [‘abstract term importing…’] then the second premise would be false: for example by arguing thus: every intellective soul is susceptible of teaching; every man is an intellective soul; therefore etc. Behold that the minor is false. And so it is about other cases. But if a concrete term were middle term, then the other premise will not be simply first: for example by arguing thus: everything intellective is susceptive of teaching; every man is intellective; therefore etc. This major {1.150} is not simply first, because this is prior: every soul is susceptive of teaching. 19. If it be said that just as this proposition ‘everything intellective is susceptive of teaching’ is not simply first, so neither is this one, ‘in whatever there is an intellective soul [is susceptive etc.]’, because this is simply first, ‘every intellective soul is susceptive of teaching’. 20. I reply: although this proposition is not simply first, because there is another prior, yet this one per se includes, as a part, that which is simply first. And this suffices for such a demonstration. And therefore, in order for such a conclusion to be demonstrated from propositions simply first, it is necessary that the other premise be hypothetical and not categorical; and in the hypothetical premise some part must be that simply first proposition, or be able to be such ultimately: because every soul is susceptive of teaching, then if there is soul in something, that something is susceptive of teaching. And it is similar of other cases.

15 Ms. F: For example: every triangle has three angles [equal to two right angles]; some figure is a triangle; therefore some figure has three angles etc.

16 Ms. F: either therefore the first subject is the most specific species or something superior. If in the first way, a demonstration can always be made, and this through the proposition, as through an extrinsic middle, ‘whatever absolute can belong to some individual, something similar can belong to every individual of the same idea’. In the second way it is not always possible. Sometimes, perhaps always, before knowledge of such a universal proposition there is presupposed knowledge of any proposition having any contained species. As, let it be posited that ‘heatable’ belongs first to composite substance; this cannot be evidently known unless it is first known of some contained species; and the reason is because of this, that some property belongs to some individual of another idea. As by the fact that I evidently know that fire can be cause of heat, I cannot evidently know that earth can be hot. But whether this is always true of not, I care not for the present. In the second way etc. [as in the text]. Page 78

Third Conclusion

21. The third conclusion: that connotative properties that do not require a determinate distinction of parts are not demonstrable, but others are demonstrable, because the former can only be known by experience, but the latter can be known without experience. Example of the first: as the fact that heat is cause of heat, or that the sun can produce a worm, cannot be known save through experience. {1.151} Example of the second: as the fact that every triangle has three angles [equal etc.]; every substance of this sort is corruptible; and so of others.17

Fourth Conclusion

22. The fourth conclusion is this, that every negative property, whose opposite can be evidently known to be predicated of something as of its first subject, can be demonstrated. But as for others it is not easy to give a definite rule which are demonstrable and which are not. 23. This conclusion is plain, because then such a conclusion can be demonstrated through its first subject as through a middle term, and it will be a syllogism in the second figure. As that, if it be known that triangle is the first subject of this property, ‘having three angles [equal etc.]’, then argument can be made as follows: everything having three angles [equal etc.] is a triangle; no quadrangle is a triangle; therefore no quadrangle has three etc. But it is not possible to demonstrate such conclusions precisely through such subjects as through middle terms, but it is frequently possible through a definition {1.152} expressing definite parts to demonstrate such conclusions. And this happens especially in mathematics. 24. Thus therefore is the answer plain to the question that not every property is demonstrable a priori of its first subject.

Objections

25. But objection can be made against this conclusion. First, that it seems contrary to the intention of the Philosopher. Because according to the Philosopher, Posterior Analytics 1.4.73b32-33, “Now it is then universal when the demonstration is in anything first.” Therefore a universal is always demonstrated of its first subject, as the Philosopher exemplifies there. Again in the same place [73b39-74a2] the Philosopher adds, “That therefore anything first that is shown to have two right angles, or anything else, in this first is the universal, and demonstration is per se of this universally, but of other things in

17 Cod. F: [cancelled text] The fourth conclusion is that negative properties, opposite to affirmative indemonstrable properties, are indemonstrable; and negative properties, opposite to demonstrable properties, are demonstrable. The first part is plain, because just as it can only be known through experience that heat heats or is productive of heat, so it can only be known through experience that whiteness is not productive of heat, and so about others. The second part is plain, because just as it can be demonstrated that a triangle has three angles [equal etc.], so it can be demonstrated that a quadrangle does not have three angles etc. Hence from the fact that some property is demonstrated to belong to some subject adequately, it can be demonstrated that that predicate is removed from every other subject. Page 79 some way not per se.” From this and from the whole chapter it seems to be got that the universal is always demonstrable per se of its first subject, of other things rather secondarily. 26. Again Posterior Analytics 1.10.76b11-13, “Every demonstrative science is about three things. And these are the genus of which it examines the per se properties.” Therefore properties are considered in demonstrative science. He says the same in 1.7.75a39-40. 27. {1.153} Again, the Philosopher everywhere gives examples of such properties, as of an eclipse, of thunder [Posterior Analytics 2.1-3.89b23-90a36]. 28. Again Posterior Analytics 2.11.94a20-24, the Philosopher teaches how to demonstrate through every kind of cause. Therefore everything that has a cause why it is in some subject is demonstrable of it through that cause; but such things are of this sort (it is manifest); therefore etc. 29. Again Posterior Analytics 2.1.89b29, “Those who know that a thing is seek for why it is.” But the question why it is, as also other questions, seek for a middle term, according to the Philosopher Posterior Analytics 2.2.89b37-90a7.

Response to the Objections

30. To the first of these [1.152] I say that the Philosopher is speaking of the universal that belongs first to any subject, whether it is demonstrable or not. But when it is demonstrable then it is demonstrated first of its first subject, that is, the subject to which it adequately belongs in predication; namely because it belongs to nothing save to that of which it is predicted, and to everything of which it is predicated. But of others it demonstrated secondarily, just as it is predicated as it were secondarily. This same thing I say about the whole chapter. 31. To the next [1.152], [I say] that the Philosopher is taking demonstrative science for demonstration. And I say that demonstration takes properties, whether demonstrable or not, because they can be principles {1.154} in demonstration, or in some way middle terms. Likewise, it can be said that demonstration is of properties, but it does not follow that therefore it is of all properties. Hence in every science some properties are demonstrable and some are not. 32. To the next [1.153], [I say] that such properties are demonstrated by a particular demonstration, not a universal one. 33. To the next [1.153], [I say] that particular not universal demonstration happens through every genus of cause. To understand this, one needs to know that demonstration is called particular in one way because it is not of the first subject. And thus does the Philosopher take it in Posterior Analytics 1.4.73b25-74a4, where he compares universal with particular demonstration. In another way is demonstration called particular because the conclusion is not about every instance [cf. ibid. 1.24.85a13-85a30]; and this either as to universality of supposits or singulars, or as to universality of time. Hence demonstration is called particular either because the predicate is not proved of all things contained under the subject, just as if it were demonstrated that some figure has three angles [equal to etc.]; or because, as concerns the form of the conclusion, it is not proved that the predicate is in the subject always but for some determinate time. Page 80

34. And commonly such demonstrations, if they be from things simply necessary, are hypothetical, conditional, or temporal, not categorical. For example, by no demonstration is it proved that the moon is eclipsable, because this can only be known by experience; just as it cannot be known save through experience that the moon is illuminable {1.155} by the sun. But after these are known by experience, there is a demonstration that it will be eclipsed at such or such a time, by arguing thus: whenever the earth is interposed between the sun and the moon then the moon is eclipsed; but whenever the sun is in such a place and the moon in such a place, then the earth is interposed between the sun and moon; therefore then the moon is eclipsed. 35. And in this way is a demonstration done through an extrinsic cause. And as is plain to one who considers all the examples, the Philosopher everywhere only gives examples of particular demonstrations. Hence he give examples there of propositions about the present and the past and the future [Posterior Analytics 2.12.95a10-96a19]. And for this the reason is it that an extrinsic cause of a thing is only a cause of the thing when it is in effect, therefore it can only be a middle term of demonstration by proving some difference of time. Similarly, in another way everything could be demonstrated through God as through a middle term, because he is the extrinsic cause, both efficient and final, of everything. But this is unacceptable. 36. And therefore I say that by a universal demonstration that is stated in the second mode and a priori, no such property is demonstrable of its first subject. 37. However one needs to know that when there is a property that imports not only such an absolute thing inhering in another, but at the same time along with this it connotes some determinate cause, although however that absolute thing can be caused in its subject by diverse causes; then it is not unacceptable but that such a property be demonstrated of its first subject. For example, let it be posited that the moon were illuminable by the sun and by another planet, then it is impossible to demonstrate this conclusion ‘the moon is illuminable’, but it can only be {1.156} evidently known by experience. But if some name were imposed that would import illumination of the moon and would determinately connote the sun, so that if light were caused on the moon by another planet and not by the sun, because then the moon would not be denominated by such a name, such a predicable term could be demonstrated of the moon. Because if it were first known by experience that the sun is a luminous body whereby another body can be illumined, and afterwards it is known that the sun could be directly opposite the moon at some time at which the other planet illuminative of the moon is not directly opposite to it (although this were never seen), it could be demonstratively concluded that the moon was illuminable by the sun. 38. To the next [1.153]: those who know ‘that it is’ in particular do not look universally for the ‘why it is’, and so they look of a middle term in a particular demonstration. Hence the Philosopher says [Posterior Analytics 2.1.89b19-31; cf. 1.153], “But when we know the ‘that’ we look for the ‘why’; as when we know that [the moon] fails, and that the earth is moved, we look for why it fails and why the earth is moved.” See that these questions are about the existence of the thing. 39. And if it be said that scientific knowledge is not of an existing thing save contingently, because the thing happens to be in act: 40. Similarly, all these propositions are contingent, therefore they do not belong to demonstration: Page 81

41. {1.157} To the first: that it is not necessary that the subject of science be in act, yet in many or in all case it must be that it can be in act; and, according to the intention of the Philosopher, it is required that it sometimes be posited in act. And so the conclusion is not this, ‘the moon fails’, but ‘the moon fails when it is opposed thus to the sun’. And this is necessary according to the intention of the Philosopher (although not in truth when speaking of the absolute power of God). And this, according to him, is a conclusion of demonstration. And this is what Grosseteste says [On Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 1.8 t. 41], that those things that happen frequently are necessary according as they come within demonstration. That is, about contingent things are necessary hypothetical propositions formed, that is, conditional or temporal ones. 42. Hereby is plain the answer to the second: because through those contingent propositions the Philosopher understands necessary propositions formed from the same terms.

Response to the Principal Argument

43. To the principal argument [1.143], it is plain that there is greater reason for the one property to be demonstrable than for the other to be, because some property presupposes that its subject has parts really distinct without which it would in no way be able to belong to it, and by a distinct knowledge of those parts knowledge is reached of the property of the subject, and therefore it is {1.158} demonstrable through a definition expressing the parts as through a middle term. And some property, as far as it is of itself, presupposes no distinction of parts without being simply able to be posited when any of the parts is removed, and therefore nothing is expressive of anything intrinsic to its subject to which it first or more knowably belongs than to the subject, and therefore such is not demonstrable.

{1.158} Question 5: Whether in Every Demonstration a Definition is the Middle Term for Demonstrating

1. Third I ask whether in every demonstration a definition is the middle term of demonstration 2. That it is: 3. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2.2.90a4-7, “Every question is a question of the middle term;” “and the middle term and the cause are the same,” in the same place. Therefore every question is a question of the cause. But the cause states the why: “the why and the what it is are the same;” in the same place [90a14-15]. Therefore every question is about the definition as about the middle term. But every conclusion of a demonstration can be questioned; therefore it has to be terminated through the definition as through the middle term. 4. To the opposite {1.159}: Page 82

5. It was said before [1.115, 117, 118; q.2] that some property is demonstrated of God, and yet he does not have a definition; likewise, something is demonstrated of being, and yet it does not have a definition. 6. For this question there is a common opinion that in every demonstration the middle term is a definition, but about the middle term of the strongest demonstration there are diverse opinions.

Opinion of Richard of Conington

7. One opinion [Richard of Conington, Quodl. I q.1] is that the middle in such a demonstration is the definition of the property, not of the subject. And about this opinion is first made clear what demonstration is strongest; second that the middle in it is not the definition of the subject but of the property. 8. The first point is made clear because, according to Aristotle Posterior Analytics [1.13-14, 24-26.78a22-79a32, 85a13-87a30], there are five conditions to the strongest demonstration {1.160}, “namely that it be the why, in the first figure [of syllogism], universal, affirmative, and ostensive; but in Posterior Analytics 2.8.93a7-13, he sets down a sixth condition,” that the middle term in it be a formal definition. And it is the definition that is taken from the form of the thing or from the end; but other definitions are take from the matter or from the efficient cause. 9. The proof of the second point is first that it is not the definition of the subject. First as follows: “When demonstrations are given through some kinds of causes, they are always given through causes of inherence, as through the efficient cause of inherence, through the material or final cause of inherence; therefore similarly when they are given through the formal cause, they must be given through the formal cause of inherence. But the formal definition of the subject is not a formal cause of inherence of a property but rather an efficient or material cause of it. Therefore etc.” 10. “Again, the middle term of the strongest demonstration must be the proper and proximate cause of the inherence of the property. But the formal definition of the subject is not of this sort, because if it were it would be the cause of it alone. But now it is the proper exemplary and proximate cause of the subject; therefore etc.” 11. “Again, the middle term of the strongest demonstration is not the middle term by position alone, as it is in any syllogism, but it must be that it is the middle term by nature. Because if it were equally first in nature with the property or posterior to it, it would not be the cause of it; and if it were prior to the subject, it would not be the proximate cause. But the formal definition of a subject is prior to the subject; for it is given through things prior in nature {1.161}, and consequently it is not the middle by nature between the subject and the predicate.” 12. Now that a formal definition, taken from the form, is the middle term in the strongest demonstration is made clear by Aristotle in PosteriorAnalytics 2.8.93a1-14, “because a demonstration demonstrating only is stronger than a demonstration demonstrated. For a demonstration is a syllogism according to which we know when we have it, without our needing anything else; but only a demonstration through a formal cause is of this sort; therefore etc. Aristotle illustrates the minor with many examples [Posterior Analytics 2.8.93a1-93b20] that all get their strength, according to Grosseteste Page 83

[On Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 2.2. t.45], from the fact that the end causes the efficient cause and the form the matter.” 13. If it be said that the causes are reciprocally causes, Physics 2.3.195a9-10, and, according to the Commentator [Averroes, On Aristotle’s Physics 1.3 t.70], one must say, according to this opinion, “that although the causes are reciprocally causes, yet this is in a less noble way. For example, the end in intention causes the efficient cause, and then first does the efficient cause induce the end. Hence it is plain that the efficient cause only causes insofar as it is caused by the end, but the end causes and is not caused by it. The efficient also does not cause the form insofar as the form causes formally; for the form causes formally when the efficient cause ceases; hence the efficient is only cause of the form’s coming to be. Also the efficient cause does not give being to the matter but gives it coming to be only. Now the matter {1.162} does not cause the composite unless it is by nature first caused and constituted by the form; nor then does it cause save as occasion only. But the form thus causes the thing formally because it is essentially whatever the thing is properly in itself, so much so that when it is posited and every other cause is, per impossibile, removed, the thing would exist in species and in genus and in effect. Hence it is the strongest cause of the thing, and therefore the definition taken from it is the strongest middle for demonstrating.” 14. Second, that the definition of the property to be demonstrated is the middle term is made clear: because “it is the formal exemplar cause of it and the proper and proximate cause in that genus of cause. It is also posterior to the subject in nature and prior to the property as the measure is prior to the thing measured; and consequently it mediates by nature between the subject and the predicate.”

Attack on the Opinion of Richard of Conington

15. Against this opinion I first show that the definition of the property is not the middle term. Because if so, either it is a definition properly speaking given through the intrinsic principles of the thing, or given through an addition. Not in the first way because many are the properties that do not have such a definition, as all properties that import other simple absolute things, as will appear elsewhere [1.163]. Nor in the second way, because that definition includes the very subject or some other extrinsic cause. If in the first way, it cannot be a middle term, because the middle term ought never to contain the other term, namely not the major nor the minor. If in the second way, then there will not be a demonstration simply universal {1.163}, because it was made clear in the prior question [1.154] that a universal demonstration is not done through an extrinsic cause. 16. Besides, the strongest demonstration is from things indemonstrable a priori, but the definition of a property is demonstrable of its subject a priori, and consequently it is not a principle in the strongest demonstration. The assumption is plain, because a property has a cause of its inherence in the subject, because the subject is the cause of the property and form of it, according to them [1.160], and consequently, according to them, it will be cause in knowledge of the definition expressing the form. Now every cause, according to them, can be a middle term in a demonstration a priori, although it is not always the strongest. Page 84

17. Besides, the definition of a property does not differ really from the thing defined, and consequently it will not really be the cause of it, but for you the strongest demonstration is through a cause; therefore etc. 18. To this the reply is made [by Richard, loc. cit.], “that definition and thing defined do not differ only in verbal form but also in reality of idea, which pertains to what is signified by one and not to what is signified by the other. For the name signifies a certain confused totality, as ‘circle’, but the definition divides it into its individual parts. Hence the explication, which the name does not signify, belongs to what is signified by the definition. For the definition indicates and explains the thing defined; not so the name. And therefore the definition is the measure and exemplar of the thing defined, and not the mane.” 19. On the contrary: whether the definition differ from the thing defined or not, yet it always explains the real cause of what is imported by the definition {1.164}, especially according to those who posit that every demonstration a priori is through a cause. But of the absolute thing imported by the property there is no other real cause but an extrinsic one, because of its simplicity. Therefore the definition, which is the middle term, is taken from an extrinsic cause, and consequently it is not the formal definition that he [Richard] is talking about. 20. Against what is said and the way of saying it: first he seems to understand badly [1.161 n.1] the Philosopher’s distinction between formal and material definition. Because every definition of something having a material and formal cause explains both the matter and the form, because otherwise it would not be convertible with the thing defined. For what precisely states the form and in no way imports the matter is predicated of the form in the abstract, and consequently does not convert with the whole possessing matter and form. 21. Besides, as to his statement [1.161] that “the end causes the efficient cause and the form the matter”: these are words either metaphorical and improper or simply false, because it would follow that something would cause God, since he is an efficient cause. It would follow too that the sun, whenever it caused some effect because of an end, would then be caused. And the the intellective soul, when doing something because of a bad end, would be caused by that bad end. But how these metaphorical words are to be understood will be plain elsewhere [Sent. II q.3; Summulae in Libros Physicorum p.II ch. 4]. 22. Similarly, his statement [1.161] that “the form causes formally when the efficient cause ceases” is not true — although this may be true of the second efficient, not of the first. Therefore the first efficient cause will be the strongest middle term of demonstration. 23. {1.165} Similarly, his statement [1.162] that “matter does not cause the composite unless first by nature it is caused and constituted by the form” includes a contradiction, because matter is not caused by form save because it is informed by the form; but it is impossible that it be informed by the form unless it cause the composite. The whole too that follows in his declaration is false, because matter is of the essence of the composite thing. For otherwise the intellective soul or other substantial form would be per se in species and genus, which is manifestly false. Page 85

The Author’s own Response

24. Therefore I say to this question first that the strongest demonstration is that which gives the ‘why’, universal with each universality (which was spoken of before [1.154-155], and affirmative; and from this follows that it is in the first figure by the very fact it is of the ‘why’; and because it is of the ‘why’, it follows that it is through the cause; likewise, because it is affirmative, it precisely follows that it is ostensive. 25. Second, I say that sometimes the middle term of demonstration is a definition and sometimes not. An example of the first: as having three [angles equal…] is demonstrated of a triangle, and as being corruptible of composite substance {1.166}. An example of the second: being susceptive of teaching is demonstrated of man, not through the definition of man, but through the intellective soul — let it be posited that it belongs to the intellective soul alone. I prove this second one because the strongest demonstration is from propositions simply indemonstrable, above all a priori. But the proposition in which this property is predicated of the definition of man is not simply indemonstrable, immediate, and first, because that proposition is prior in which the property is predicated of its first subject, namely the intellective soul. Therefore etc. 26. Again, in the middle term of this sort of demonstration nothing should be put save what has the idea of cause; but in the definition of man is put something that does not have the idea of cause with respect to it, because it can be simply posited to be present when everything else besides the form is removed; and yet something else is posited in the definition. Hence in such a syllogism there seems to be a non-cause for cause, because that which expresses the other part of man does nothing for the fact that the property is present in him. 27. Third, I say that when the middle term is a definition, it is a definition of the subject, not of the property. This is plain, because such a definition should express the cause and something necessarily required for the fact that the property is predicated of the subject. But such is the definition of the subject, because it expresses the parts of the subject without which it would be impossible for the property to belong to that subject. This is plain from examples: because a definition expressing the parts of a triangle is the middle term and cause why the property belongs to it, as the parts of a composite substance are the causes why corruptibility belongs to it, because unless one part were separable from the other it could not be said to be corruptible. Now of this sort are the demonstrations given {1.167} in mathematics. And because they possess the first place in demonstrations or among demonstrations, therefore does the Philosopher frequently attribute to a demonstration many conditions that belong to mathematical demonstrations, either always or for the most part.

Refutation of the Reasons of Richard of Conington

28. To the arguments for the other opinion. To the first [1.160], that it proceeds from a false imagination, because it imagines that the inherence of a property in a subject, or the property itself, has a formal cause. Which is simply false, because a simple form can have no cause save an efficient or final one; not a material cause, because that would only be the matter or what is receptive of the form, but matter is not cause of the form but of the Page 86 whole; nor a formal cause, but it itself is form of some other thing. And therefore it can have no definition taken from its form, since it has none, and therefore such demonstrations are not done through the formal cause. And thus is the argument to the opposite: because it understands either that the middle term should be cause of inherence or cause of the property. If in the first way: then since the cause of inherence is both the subject and the property (because a relation is caused by and depends essentially on both the foundation and the term, and one is not more a formal cause of the relation than the other), it follows that if the middle term needs to receive a cause, that the definition both of the subject and of the property ought to be the middle term of demonstration. If in the second way, and nothing is here the cause of the property save the subject, it follows that the definition of the subject will be the middle term. 29. {1.168} To the second argument [1.160], that the middle term of demonstrating ought to be the proximate cause in some way, that is, expressing the proximate cause, and this especially in the genus of material cause, because it ought to be the subject of the property. And this either the first subject, as when it is demonstrated of its non-first subject; or expressing some essential parts of the subject because of which such property belongs to it. And the definition of the property is not of this sort, because it does not precisely express the cause of the property but the property itself. But it is not necessary that it be the proper cause, such that it not be the cause of any other thing, but it is consistent for it to be cause of another both in the same genus of cause and also in another genus of cause. In the same genus of cause: just as the intellective soul can be the middle term for demonstrating both that man is intellective and that he is volitive, and so on about other things; and the soul in the same genus of cause is cause of intellection and of volition, because it is the immediate subject of both, and so each property is immediately predicated of it. And consequently it can be the principle for demonstrating each of the other in another genus of cause, because the soul is subject of intellection and volition and formal cause of man. 30. To the third [1.160], I say that between the middle and the extremes there is required some order other than by position only, and in that order sometimes the middle is simply first. Just as if the intellective soul is the middle term for demonstrating ‘susceptible of learning’ about man, it is first in the order of nature that is between them, because always the part is prior in nature to its whole, because it can be without the whole but not conversely. And the whole subject is in some way prior in nature to an accident, although not as strictly speaking as a part is prior to the whole {1.169} in nature, and from this very fact that a part is prior in this order, it can be the middle term in demonstration. Perhaps, however, in the order of perfection or in some other it can be simply the middle term, because in the case at hand man is more perfect than the intellective soul, and the intellective soul is more perfect than the act of understanding and of willing. 31. If it be said that of one subject there cannot be several properties equally first, but always one is prior and reason for demonstrating one of the other, I reply that of one subject there can be several properties equally first, so that neither is the reason for demonstrating the other of the subject; although sometimes one may be the reason for demonstrating the other of the subject, not by a demonstration universal and simply, but by a demonstration in particular and in a certain respect. And sometimes they are so ordered that one is the reason for demonstrating the other of the subject by a universal Page 87 demonstration; but this is only true when one imports the subject of the other, or the first states something subjectively existing in the subject and to it the other second property first belongs. An example of the first: if quantity is a different thing from the substance and it is the subject of quality, then the quantity that is imported by a property of substance will be the middle term for demonstrating of substance the property importing the quality. An example of the second: as heat is the middle term for demonstrating the making hot of fire. 32. To the declaration [1.161] that the formal definition is the middle term for demonstrating, I say that it is true: when the definition is the middle term in a universal demonstration then the formal definition of the subject is the middle term. But this definition does not include precisely the form of the thing, but it is called formal because it includes the essential principles of the thing. 33. {1.170} Hence for the intention of the Philosopher [1.161] one needs to know that among definitions one is what indicates the ‘what’ of the thing, one the ‘what’ of the name. Secondly, one needs to know that a definition can be compared to the thing defined and to something else of which the thing defined is predicated. Similarly, a definition is sometimes given through the essential principles, or through what declares the essential principles, and it is formal. And sometimes it is given through the extrinsic principles of some thing, and it is material. The first definition can only belong to composite substance, and this when taking formal definition most strictly. Taking it in a large sense, however, it can belong to anything having distinct parts of the same idea; and by such a definition are many mathematical things defined, as triangle, quadrangle, and so of others. Hence the definition of a triangle is that it is a figure contained by three straight lines etc. These lines are not of a different idea among themselves. And thus does the Philosopher understand formal definition in a large sense. But other definitions, given through other causes, are material definitions; and this because, frequently, such definitions are given through the matter, extending ‘matter’ to everything that is receptive. And these definitions, for the most part, are definitions expressing the ‘what’ of the name, not expressing the ‘what’ of the thing. 34. This can be confirmed: because, according to the Philosopher [Posterior Analytics 2.2.90a16-17] “an eclipse is the privation of light on the moon by the obstruction of the earth.” This definition expresses the ‘what’ of the name, because if a defect of light on the moon were caused by another cause, it would not, according to the intention of the Philosopher, be called an eclipse. Similarly, let it be posited that thunder were caused by the extinction of fire in a cloud, and then it is called thunder; and yet if a sound of the same species were caused in a cloud from another cause, it would not {1.171} be called thunder. And so always when a definition is given through some extrinsic cause, that definition is expressive of the ‘what’ of the name only. 33. Proof of this: because definition and defined thing convert, so that it is always possible to infer, by formal consequence, the defined thing from the definition and conversely. But if such a definition were to express the ‘what’ of the thing, the definition would not be formally inferred from the defined thing nor conversely, because the thing could simply come to be without the extrinsic cause, at least by divine power; and consequently it would not be possible to argue from the thing to the definition, nor conversely. For example: if thunder were caused from extinction of fire in a cloud as from an extrinsic cause, all of the thing that is different from that extrinsic cause can be Page 88 made by God without the extinction; therefore this definition would not then follow from the defined thing. For let it be posited that the thing is signified by A, then the consequence does not hold: ‘There is A, therefore there is sound from extinction of fire in the cloud’, because, on this position, the antecedent would be true and the consequent false.

Opinion of the Author about Formal Definition

34. I say therefore that a formal definition is always give through what is intrinsic and essential, that is, through concepts expressing the intrinsic principles; but a material definition is given through what is extrinsic to the thing to which the definition first belongs. And that this is the intention of the Philosopher [PosteriorAnalytics 2.8.93a4-5] is plain, because he says that “a cause is either the same or different.” This cannot be meant that sometimes the cause is distinct really, sometimes {1.172} not, because it is impossible that cause and effect be the same really. Therefore by the same cause he means an intrinsic cause, which can be called the same because it is not simply diverse; as the Commentator [Averroes On Aristotle’s Physics 1 ch.3 t.17] says, that a part is not simply other than the whole; and by a different cause he means an extrinsic cause. 35. But now things are such that the matter of a composite thing is as intrinsic as the form itself, and consequently it is thus the same, although the form is the more principal part. But now it is the case that the Philosopher [Posterior Analytics 2.8.93a4-13] calls definitions done according to species those that are not given through some other cause; but those that are given through other causes he calls material. Therefore the formal ones are given through intrinsic causes, the other ones through extrinsic causes. The assumption is plain, because Aristotle says as follows [ibid. 2.9.93b21-23], “Now of some indeed there is some other cause, of some there is not,” namely some other cause that has to be put in the definition expressing the what of the thing. “Definitions indeed according to species have no middle term by which to be demonstrated, but definitions made according to matter can have a middle term” [Grosseteste On Posterior Analytics 2.2 t.45). And there follows [Aristotle ibid. 2.9.93b25-27]: “Of things having a middle of which there is some other cause of substance and of being etc.” From this is plain that he calls material definitions {1.173} those given through other causes of which one is demonstrable and another not. And definitions according to species he calls those that are not given through other causes. 36. How then are these definitions disposed for demonstration according to the intention of the Philosopher? I say that a definition expressing the ‘what’ of a thing can never be demonstrated of the thing defined, because that proposition is always immediate. Second, that if there were some definition expressing the ‘what’ of a simple thing, it would not be demonstrable of the thing defined but of the same thing of which the thing defined would be demonstrable. And therefore if heat were to have a definition given through intrinsic principles, it would be demonstrable of the same thing of which heat would be demonstrable, and through the same middle term. And so this definition would be demonstrable, or the conclusion of a demonstration; that is, it would be demonstrable of something. Page 89

37. But speaking of a definition expressing the ‘what’ of the name, I make a distinction about it, because it is taken in two ways. Either for some phrase that all who speak of the name understand by the name, or for a phrase whose truth follows from the truth of a prior idea. The first definition cannot be demonstrated of the thing defined, though it could be demonstrated of the subject; and thus is it a principle of demonstration. The second definition can be demonstrated. For example: everyone understands by a house something keeping us from cold etc., and that definition cannot be demonstrated of a house but is a principle. Yet the inference holds ‘it keeps us from such sort of weather etc., therefore it is composed of solid bodies, but only of wood and stones’ — let it be posited that there were not any other bodies able to do the preventing. And so this second definition, which does not express the ‘what’ of any thing, can be {1.174} demonstrated through something prior and will be the conclusion of a demonstration. And from these is composed one complete definition expressing all the necessary causes of it, because it expresses the end and the matter. But it does not express the efficient cause, because what efficient cause it is caused by makes no difference, as what matter it is made of does make a difference, to the fact that the principal ‘what’ of the name is verified of it. Thus does everyone understand by demonstration a syllogism that causes one to know [Aristotle PosteriorAnalytics 1.2.71b17-24]. But this can only be done through propositions that are necessary etc. And therefore is it demonstrated that a demonstration is a syllogism from things true etc. 38. However, one needs to note that this demonstration is not a demonstration simply and universal. And therefore does the Philosopher say [ibid. 2.8.93a3-16] that, though some other cause is demonstrable and some not and one demonstrates and the other does not demonstrate but is demonstrated, it is said “that this mode indeed is not a demonstration was said before, but it is a logical syllogism of what the thing is.” Likewise, it can be said that in some way the what of the thing is demonstrable through the what of the name. For supposing that by ‘man’ is understood some composite substance, able to understand and will, it can be concluded that he is composed of body and intellective soul. But these demonstrations are not simply so and universal, because they do not make one to know, but only infer a conclusion from premises; because according to Aristotle Posterior Analytics 2.7.92b4-5, 8.93a20, it is impossible to know what a thing is without knowing whether it is. 39. {1.175} If it be said that then he who knew that there was an eclipse would not know what an eclipse was, I say that the ‘what it is’ cannot be known without the ‘whether it is’. That is, it cannot be known what it is without knowledge by which it is known that it is or was or will be, because otherwise it is not naturally known that it is possible in reality, and that the ‘what of the name’ does not include a contradiction. And thus, speaking of the ‘whether it is’, what Aristotle says [ibid. 2.8.93a3-4] is true that “It is the same thing to know the ‘what it is’ and to know the cause of the ‘whether it is’. Because, setting aside intuitive knowledge and knowledge caused immediately by intuitive knowledge, it is impossible to know naturally of some property whether it is or will be without knowing that its cause is or will be, and so without the ‘what it is’, that is, without a definition expressing the ‘what’ in some way. For example, by means of intuitive knowledge it can be known of the moon that it is failing without knowing the cause of it, and so without knowing the definition given by that cause. However, it cannot Page 90 be known in the abstract save by knowing the cause, I mean, knowing that the moon fails or will fail, without knowing that the earth is interposed or will be interposed. 40. If it be said that abstract knowledge abstracts from existence, and similarly that there cannot be a cause of the knowledge of a contingent truth; likewise, this proposition ‘the moon is failing or will fail’ is contingent. 41. To the first of these: that abstract knowledge abstracts from existence, because it is not sufficient for knowing that existence is present at a determinate time. However, since some other knowledge can be sufficient, just as, according to the way of the Philosopher [ibid. 2.8.93a29-33], it can be known that the moon will be eclipsed at a determinate time, because it is known that the sun {1.176} will move thus and the moon similarly, and consequently that the earth will be interposed and consequently that the moon will be eclipsed. And so by such knowledge never can it be known save through a cause. 42. To the second: that a contingent truth can be known in the same way by such intermediate truths, and therefore abstract knowledge of the term or terms does not suffice. 43. To the third: that a necessary proposition can be formed from those terms, and so science properly speaking will be caused; although the contingent proposition will be able to be known by evident knowledge, though not by science properly speaking.

Response to the Principal Argument

44. To the principal argument [1.158] I say that cause and middle term are the same, extending the word ‘cause’ to everything to which it first belongs and without which it could not belong to another; and this in demonstration that is universal and of the ‘why’. And when it is said that the ‘why’ and and the ‘what it is’ are the same, I say that this is not to be understood such that the ‘why’, that is the cause, and the ‘what’, that is the whole definition, are simply the same, but that the ‘why’, that is the cause, is put in the definition. And so for the intention of the Philosopher it is enough that the cause be part of the definition. This is plain from the Philosopher in Posterior Analytics 2.2.90a15-18: “It is manifest that in all things the ‘what it is’ and the ‘why it is’ are the same. What is the failing [of the moon]? The taking away {1.177} of light from the moon by the obstruction of the earth. Why is there a failing, or why does the moon fail? Because of defect of light when the earth is opposed.” Now it is manifest that the cause here is the obstruction of the earth, and it is certain that it is only part of the definition: the failing of the moon is the taking away of light from the moon by the obstruction of the earth.

{1.177} Question 6: Whether only a Proposition per se in the Second Mode of Speaking is per se Knowable by Science Properly Speaking. Page 91

1. Fourth I ask whether only a proposition per se in the second mode of speaking is per se knowable by science properly speaking. 2. That it is not: 3. Because according to Aristotle Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a28-31: where certain predicates are ordered essentially, the first can be shown of the last through the middle, as body and substance of man through animal. But such a proposition is per se in the first mode. Therefore etc. 4. On the contrary: the conclusion of a demonstration is per se, and not in the first mode because, Metaphysics 7.17.1041a6-20, there is no demonstration of substance nor of the ‘what it is’. But everything predicable in the first mode states the substance of a thing. Therefore such is not a demonstration. 5. About this question one must first see what proposition is per se in the second mode. Second, whether every demonstrable proposition is per se in the second mode.

What Proposition is Per Se in the Second Mode

6. {1.178} About the first point I say that every necessary proposition is per se in the first mode or the second. This is plain, because all are simply necessary. I say this because of necessary propositions per accidens, of which sort are many propositions about the past. And they are necessary per accidens, because it was contingent that they would be necessary, nor were they always necessary. Every other necessary proposition can be known evidently, and consequently there is some veridical habit with respect to any simply necessary proposition. But there is no such habit with respect to a necessary proposition save with respect to a proposition per se, because both principle and conclusion are per se. Therefore etc. 7. Besides, in Posterior Analytics 1.4.73b3-5 about the ‘per se’, the Philosopher says that what is present in something in a neutral way, that is, neither in the first mode nor the second, is an accident, as music and white for an animal. I ask: how does he understand that they are accidents? Either because they are predicated contingently, and the proposition is gained that every proposition that is not per se either in the first mode or in the second is contingent, that is, not necessary simply and per se. And this is true when there is proper predication, such that what is made subject is what is of a nature to be subject, and that what is made predicate is what is of a nature to be predicate. If by ‘accident’ he understands true real accidents, this is not true, because such can be predicated per se in the second mode, at least in a proposition about the possible or the equivalent, as that the moon is illuminable by the sun and the like {1.179}. Besides at ibid. 6.74b11-12 the Philosopher says that “all,” namely all that is predicable of anything, “either is so,” namely predicable in the first mode or the second, “or according to accident; and accidents are not necessary.” Therefore everything predicable necessarily of something is predicated per se in the first mode or in the second mode. 8. If it be said that then this would be per se: matter is in potency to form. Either then per se in the first mode, and this is not true because a definition is not predicated of a thing defined, nor is a part of a definition. Or in the second mode: and then form would be a property of matter; the consequent is false, because a subject is more perfect than its property and not conversely: Page 92

9. It can be said that this is per se, because it per se belongs to a demonstration as principle or as conclusion; therefore it is per se. And in the same way can it be argued of any simply necessary proposition, that it is per se, because everything such belongs to demonstration. 10. If it be said that then this would be per se: every man can be white; all fire is hot; all heat is able to heat. The consequent is false, because contraries cannot be predicated per se of the same thing. But the reason for which this would be per se ‘every man can be white’ is the same as the reason for which this would be per se ‘every man can be black’. And so contraries are predicated of the same thing. 11. It can be said that everything such is per se. Nor is it unacceptable for contraries to be predicated per se of the same thing in propositions about the possible, or equivalent ones. And so it is in the case in question. 12 But {1.180} to what mode ought this to be reduced: matter is in potency to form? 13. It can be said that ‘per se in the first mode’ and ‘per se in the second mode’ are taken to be distinguished in two ways: in one way when the predicate does not state anything totally distinct from what is imported by the subject first. And then is ‘per se in the first mode’ said when nothing imported by the predicate, as predicable of the predicate universally and not only particularly, is totally extrinsic to the subject. And thus nothing is predicated per se in the first mode save things per se superior to and parts intrinsic to the thing, or things importing precisely parts of the thing. But that is said per se in the second mode which imports something really distinct from what is imported by the subject, as this: ‘every man is able to laugh’, ‘God is creative’, and so of others. And in this way would this be per se in the second mode: matter is in potency to form. Grosseteste [On Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 1.4.tt.19-22] seems to draw the distinction differently, saying that whenever the predicate is cause of the subject then it is per se in the first mode, whether it is an extrinsic or an intrinsic cause. But when it is the converse, it is in the second mode. And so it seems that this would be per se in the first mode ‘matter is in potency to form’; or in no mode is it per se. And if it be per se in the first mode, for the same reason will the converse be, ‘form can inform matter’. Because form is no more cause of matter than the converse. Similarly it would follow that this [sc. ‘matter is in potency to form’] would be per se in the first mode, because the predicate is cause of the subject; and also in the second mode, because {1.181} the subject is cause of the predicate by the fact that matter and form are necessarily causes mutually of each other. 14. And one must understand that, whether the first way of distinguishing these modes is held to or the second, that what is said must be understood of a purely affirmative proposition. Because a negative proposition is negative per se in the first mode, and neither does the predicate state the essence of the subject nor is it cause of the subject; just as this is per se: no man is an ass.

What sort of Proposition is Demonstrable

15. About the second [1.177] I say that a demonstrable proposition can be taken strictly or broadly. In the second way not every proposition is demonstrable per se in the second way, because in this way every doubtful proposition of a nature to be made Page 93 evident through certain necessary evident propositions, disposed in mode and figure, is demonstrable. And in this way is science distinguished from intellect, and is common to science ‘that’ and science ‘why’. But some proposition per se in the first way is doubtful and necessary, and can be made evident through necessary propositions etc. Just as this is doubtful for some intellect ‘every ass is an animal’ and per se in the first way; and it can be made evident through some middle term, namely through operations and suchlike by arguing thus: everything that moves itself is an animal; every ass is of this sort; therefore etc. 16. But against this seems to be the Philosopher Posterior Analytics 1.6.74b16-21, proving that not everything that is syllogized from true and indemonstrable and immediate propositions is demonstrated: 17. {1.182} I say that it is not demonstrated by the strongest demonstration, just as neither is demonstration ‘that’ the strongest. However such a proposition is known by science properly speaking, according as science is distinguished from intellect. In the first way perhaps never is a proposition evidently known in which a subalternating genus is predicated of a subalternate genus unless all the species contained under the lower genus are known. Just as perhaps a concept per se and simple cannot be had unless all the species are known; and then no such proposition could be demonstrated.

Response to the Principal Argument

18. To the principal argument [1.177]: that the Philosopher there is extending demonstration to every syllogism from things necessary and prior. But not every such syllogism is a demonstration, because if the conclusion is not dubitable, it is not a demonstration. For just as there is never a demonstration for me save when I know the conclusion through the premises (for otherwise I would be able to demonstrate many things that I believe to be false), so never is there a demonstration simply save when the conclusion can be known through the premises; and therefore does the Philosopher say [Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b22] that [demonstration] is from the causes of the conclusion. And therefore if the premises were true and first and immediate and more known and prior, and yet they were not causes of the conclusion (that is, knowledge of the premises was not cause of knowledge of the conclusion), it will not be a demonstration. 19. To the argument for the opposite [1.177]: because demonstration a priori is not of substance itself.

{1.183} Question 7: Whether the Theology that of Common Law is Possessed by Theologians is a Science Properly Speaking

1. Third principally I ask whether the theology that of common law is possessed by theologians is a science properly speaking. 2. That it is: Every intellectual habit veridical with respect to necessary truth is intellect or wisdom or science, Ethics 6.3.1139b16-17, 6.1140b31-1b8. But theology is Page 94 not intellect, because then theological truths would be self-evident; nor wisdom, because wisdom is intellect and science, Ethics 6.7.1141a18-19; therefore it is science properly speaking. 3. Second as follows: the theologian has a more perfect knowledge than the layman; but the layman has faith with respect to these necessary theological truths; therefore the theologian has a habit more perfect than faith. But with respect to necessary truth there is no habit more perfect than faith save intellect, wisdom, or science; therefore etc. 4. Third as follows: I Corinthians 12.8, “To others is given the word of wisdom, to others the word of science, etc.” But this science, since it is a supernatural gift, can only be in respect of necessary theological truths; therefore etc. 5. {1.184} To the opposite: The habit that precisely rests on authority is not science properly speaking; but theology is of this sort; therefore etc. 6. There are diverse opinions on this question. Some hold the affirmative side, some the negative.

Opinions that Hold the Affirmative Side

7. Among those who hold the affirmative side, some [Thomas Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] say that once faith in the first principles of theology is possessed (with respect to which principles there is in us neither science properly speaking nor evident knowledge), science is acquired of the conclusions that follow from those first principles, so that the conclusions are known by science properly speaking, even though the principles are not evidently known. So it is said that [Aquinas ST Ia q.1 a.1] “there is a twofold class of sciences: for some proceed from principles known by the natural light of the intellect, as geometry does; some proceed from principles known by the light of a superior science, as optics proceeds from principles made known in geometry. And in this way theology is a science that proceeds from principles known by the light of a superior science, which namely is the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as music believes the principles handed on to it by arithmetic, so sacred doctrine believes the principles revealed by God.” 8. Again, it is agued by others [Richard of Middleton, also Aquinas] that to assert the opposite is to derogate from the dignity of theology, and is contrary likewise to the truth. The proof of the first point {1.185} is that theology excels all other sciences both as to certitude and as to dignity of matter. That it excels in the first way is plain, because it rests on the light that cannot deceive nor be deceived; but the other sciences rest on the natural light, which can deceive and be deceived. That it excels in the second way is plain, because it is about things that exceed human reason. There is a confirmation, because the other sciences are said to be handmaids of it. Similarly, theology has to pass judgment on the other sciences. The proof of the second point is, first, that all who treat of theology call it a science. Hence Wisdom 10.10, “He gave them the science of the saints.” Likewise I Corinthians 12.8, “To others is given the word of wisdom etc.” Likewise Augustine On the Trinity 14.1 n.3, “I attribute to this science etc. [whatever in human affairs can be known by man].” The proof, second, is that the veridical intellective Page 95 habits are only five, Ethics 6.3.1139b16-17, as was argued for the principal [argument; supra 1.183]. 9. Another opinion holding the affirmative side [possibly Francis of Marchia] is that theology is a true science not only as to its conclusions but also as to its principles, such that, once faith of the first principles is possessed, science of the same things is acquired by virtue of the faith and of the light of the agent intellect. 10. This can be made clear thus, because theology is not intellect nor prudence nor art (it is certain), nor faith, because theology and faith are {1.186} distinct habits, according to Augustine On the Trinity 14.1 n.3, “Most are not strong in this science, although they are most strong in faith itself.” Likewise, those habits are distinct whose acts are distinct; but the acts of faith and theology are distinct, because faith’s act is to assent without evidence by command of will, theology’s act is to defend and confirm, according to Augustine On the Trinity 14.1 n.3. 11. The proof that theology is a science is [cf. Scotus Reportatio I prol., q.2 nn.6, 20]: because that thing can be known about which it is known that the impossible does not follow from it. But about any theological truth it can be known that the impossible does not follow from it, because there will be an error either in the form and it can be solved, or in the matter and it can be denied, because from the very fact it is false it is not self- evident. 12. Secondly as follows: an intellect able to know some subject under the idea under which it includes all knowable truths can evidently know those truths. But God under the idea of deity includes all theological truths, and he can be known abstractly by us under that idea; first because the intellect reaches God discursively, so either God is known at the end of the discursive process, and the conclusion is obtained, or something else is known and then it is not at the end of the discursive process. Second because the intellect distinguishes God from creatures, so it knows both under their proper idea. 13. Thirdly, because the first in any genus is maximally such [Metaphysics 2.1.993b24-25]; but among all sciences or intellectual habits theology is first; therefore etc. 14. {1.187} Fourthly, because otherwise a theologian would not have a more perfect habit than an old woman has, which seems unacceptable. 15. Another opinion holding the same side [Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 12 q.2] is that both the principles and the conclusions are known in theology, but this is not possible by the light of faith or by the natural light but by a superior light that is a mean between the light of faith and of the light of glory that is in the fatherland. 16. The proof of this is that otherwise one person would not have a clearer knowledge of the things of faith than another, though he have a firmer knowledge, contrary to Augustine On the Trinity 14.1 n.3, “They are not strong in this science, etc.”; but this ‘being strong’ consists in clarity of knowledge. 17. If it be said [Henry ibid.] that faith receives increase, on the contrary: for then faith and this science would always be at an equal level, so that the more someone is Page 96 strong in the faith the more would he be strong in this science; which is contrary to blessed Augustine.

Attack on these Opinions in General

18. Against the principal conclusion in which all these opinions agree I argue as follows: first, that however much there could, by God’s absolute power, be a science properly speaking of theological truths, and perhaps in some people it may be so as regard certain truths, yet that it is not a science according to the common course of things I argue first thus: everything that is evidently known is either self-evident, or made known through what is self-evident, or through experience by means of intuitive knowledge, and this either mediately or immediately. But in none of these ways {1.188} can these matters of belief be known. That they are not self-evident is manifest; for then they would be known to unbelievers. Nor are they made known by what is self-evident, because then any unbeliever, when questioned in order about them, would assent to them, according to blessed Augustine Retractions 1.8 n.2. Nor are they known through experience by means of intuitive knowledge, because all the intuitive knowledge that a believer has an unbeliever has too; and consequently, whatever a believer can know evidently by intuitive knowledge an unbeliever can know, and so an unbeliever could know these matters of belief evidently. 19. Besides, there is no greater reason that necessary matters of belief be known by science properly speaking than that contingent matters of belief be known evidently in their own way. But these latter are not known evidently; for then it would be possible for anyone to know that he was in a state of charity, that the body of Christ is on the altar, which seem simply false. Therefore necessary theological truths are not known by science properly speaking. 20. Second, I argue against what they say [1.184-185], that faith is a presupposition for this science. First thus: never are two habits that judge about the same object so ordered that one necessarily presupposes the other – as is plain from induction – , although a habit with respect to one object may presuppose a habit with respect to another object. But this faith and this science would be about the same object, according to the last two opinions. Therefore etc. 21. There is a confirmation, that by what reason one habit with respect to one object might presuppose another habit with respect to the same object {1.189}, by the same reason would it be so as to all others; but this is not true. 22. Again, I prove that infused faith would not necessarily be presupposed because, when some habit does nothing for, nor disposes to, another habit save by means of its own act, then every habit that inclines to the same act seems to suffice for acquiring the other habit. But infused faith does nothing for acquiring the scientific habit save by means of an act of faith, because, as was said in the first question [1.17], never does a habit incline to an act not proper to it, nor consequently to another habit, save by means of a proper act to which it first inclines. But acquired faith inclines to the same act of faith to which infused faith inclines, because – as will be plain elsewhere [Sentences 3 q. Page 97

8] – infused habits do not incline to acts other than those that acquired habits incline to. Therefore someone could, by means of acquired faith, acquire a scientific habit; therefore infused faith is not presupposed.

Against the Same Opinions in Particular

23. Second I argue against the opinions in particular. First against the first [the opinion of Aquinas, 1.184]. First as follows: the habit of principles is more known and more evident than the habit of conclusions, therefore it is impossible for the principles to be merely believed and for the conclusions to be known. The antecedent is plain, for anything because of which something else is known is itself more known [Posterior Analytics 1.2.72a29-30], that is, {1.190} known more evidently; therefore the premises are always more evidently known than the conclusions. 24. Further, as opinion about principles is disposed to opinion about conclusions, so is evident knowledge of principles disposed to evident knowledge of conclusions. But it is impossible for someone to have opinion about the conclusion on account of the premises unless he have opinion about the premises. Therefore it is impossible for someone to know the conclusions evidently on account of the principles unless he know, that is, know evidently, the principles. 25. Besides, whoever knows some conclusion evidently on account of the principles, knows evidently that the conclusion follows from things necessary; therefore he knows evidently that the principles are necessary; therefore he knows the principles evidently. 26. Against the second opinion [1.185-187]. First, because it is not proved that theology is a distinct habit the way a science properly speaking is, because from the distinction of acts it cannot be proved that theology is a science. I prove it: because every act that a believer has an unbeliever trained in theology can have. For thus could such an unbeliever defend and strengthen the faith, likewise persuade believers and unbelievers, respond to the reasonings of heretics and unbelievers, just like any believer. And yet it is manifest that such a one would not have science properly speaking. Therefore from such acts it cannot be proved that theology is a science properly speaking. 27. Further, it would follow that someone could, on the basis of pure natural powers, know these things [of belief] evidently, because (as was accepted before [1.17, 1.189]) no habit inclines to the act of another habit save by means of its proper act. Therefore whatever can be done by means of such habit can be done without it, {1.191} if the act proper to it could be elicited without it. Therefore since an act of faith could be had without infused faith on the basis of pure natural powers, the science could be acquired by means of acquired faith without the infused habit. 28. Against the third opinion [1.187]. Every infused habit has an act that is of a nature to be elicited by some acquired habit. But there is no acquired habit naturally inclining to an act of knowing matters of belief, because every naturally acquired habit that a believer can have an unbeliever can also have; therefore etc. The major is plain inductively of charity, faith, and hope, and the like; and there is no greater reason for one than for another. Page 98

29. Further, every act of the intellect is evidently known to it, so this act of knowing would be evidently known to the intellect, because it would be known intuitively. And consequently no theologian studying in theology could doubt that he had such an act; which however is manifestly false, because many and great theologians deny that they have such an act. 30. There is confirmation: there is no greater reason that someone believing some matter of belief be certain that he believes than that someone knowing such matter of belief be certain that he knows. But no one can believe some matter of belief unless he be certain that he believes; therefore neither can anyone know unless he be certain he knows. 31. If it be said, according to what was said in the first question [1.41], that something can be intuitively known and yet that contingent truths cannot be evidently known by virtue of that knowledge; therefore it is not unacceptable that this act of knowing be intuitively known by someone and yet that he doubt whether he believes or knows: 32. {1.192} This is not valid, because although someone could intuitively know his own act and yet not know how to discriminate it from another, nevertheless he can know he has the act if the act is intense. For example, if someone has an intense love and an intense delight, he can well doubt whether the love is really distinct from the delight, yet he is certain that he loves and has delight. Therefore if someone believe matters of belief and know them, although he could doubt whether this believing and knowing are really distinct, yet it must be that he is certain that he believes and that he knows; and thus any theologian could know – know evidently – that he knows things of belief. 33. Further, whoever knows evidently some proposition cannot dissent from that proposition by mere command of will, but he must be persuaded by a reason moving his intellect more strongly to dissent, or he must forget something evidently known. But a theologian, however much he has studied in theology, can dissent by mere command of will from things of belief, even without a reason more strongly moving him (because no reasoning from falsehoods can move more strongly than reasoning from truths evidently known); nor is it necessary that he forget anything in order to dissent. Therefore he does not have evident knowledge with respect to any such thing.

Opinions that Hold the Negative Side

34. Others hold the negative side, and this in two ways. Some, as philosophers [Averroes, On Aristotle’s Metaphysics II t.1, On Aristotle’sDe Anima III t.36], hold that every science possible for us {1.193} we can attain naturally, and so nothing is a matter merely of belief without being able to be evidently known. But this opinion cannot be refuted by natural reasons but only by authorities,18 as will be plain elsewhere [1.202].

18 An opinion held by Scotus, Ordinatio I Prol. 1 q.un n.12. Page 99

35. There is another opinion [William of Ware, Sent. I Prol. q.319], which posits that, although matters of belief can be evidently known yet, of common law, not by us in this present state. And therefore theology, according as we commonly learn it, is not a science properly speaking with respect to such matters of belief, though with respect to some it could be a science.

Ockham’s Solution

36. And this opinion I reckon to be true. So about this opinion I will first show that every habit, besides faith, which a believing theologian can acquire, an unbelieving theologian can acquire too; second there is need to see what sort of habit is acquired in theology besides faith. 37. {1.194} Proof of the first point: because no habit is to be posited in us save one that can be proved by some act manifest to us or by the authority of Scripture; but neither by any act manifest to us nor the authority of Scripture can such a habit be proved. The first part of the minor is plain, because every act that a believer can have, besides the act of believing, an unbeliever can have, provided he were raised among Christians or trained in theology. The thing is plain from induction. The second part of the minor is plain, because it is not found in Scripture that in respect of matters of belief there is anything but faith. Therefore I say that all actual knowledge, whether propositional or conceptual, that, besides faith, a believer can have, an unbeliever can also have.

Opinion of Peter Aureol about the Theological Habit

38. As to the second point [1.193], there is an opinion [Peter Aureol, Scriptum I Prooem. sect.1 a.3 nn.92-129] that theologians by study acquire some habit beyond faith, but “that habit does not make one adhere [to the faith], nor does it cause any assent in the intellect with respect to matters of belief,” but is only declarative; and “it truly has the idea of the intellectual virtue of wisdom of which Ethics 6.7.1141a9-b8 treats, and it is the light or intelligence that the Saints make mention of and which they try to reach by the disputations and treatises {1.195} that they compose.” For the proof that some habit beyond faith is acquired is, first, because the agent intellect as principal agent, and propositions as instrument, are cause of some intellectual habit; but not cause of faith, because [the theologian] already had faith about the truth; therefore some other habit; second, because such [a theologian] has some act about matters of belief other than believing them, for he knows how to give a reason for them and how to defend them

19 “Therefore I say otherwise, that taking science properly and perfectly, this science in itself is perfect, indeed most perfect, and this is from the evidence of the thing; but to man the wayfarer, and this by common law, it is not a science. Or in other words it is said more evidently that this science can be considered in two ways: either in itself or in comparison to the object, and thus is it maximally a science, because its principles are maximally evident and its object maximally knowable. In another way in comparison to the wayfarer, and since to him the principles of this science are not evident, in respect of the knowing wayfarer it should not be called a science.” Page 100 against the impious and how to confirm them in the minds of the pious and how to speak “wisdom among the perfect” [I Corinthians 2.6]. 39. Further, something is acquired from such study, otherwise it would be vain; therefore an act or a habit. And whether this one or that, a habit will be acquired. 40. But that the habit does not make one adhere [to the faith] is plain, because then it would be opinion, and consequently it would make the believer fearful about theological truths. 41. That it is, however, a declarative habit is plain, because “a habit that makes something to be imagined better by the intellect without any adhesion to it is a declarative habit.” For it gives “explanation of terms, untying of involved reasonings, examples and directions, the aid of probable reasons, and inductions.” 42. And that it has the nature of wisdom is plain, because metaphysics has the nature of wisdom, and yet as regard some of its acts it is declarative only.

Disproof of Peter Aureol’s Opinion

43. But this opinion, as it seems, is false, because, although some habit is acquired, yet the habit does not have the idea of wisdom; because {1.196}, as is plain from what has been said [1.194], every habit that a believer could acquire from such study an unbeliever could also acquire from a like study; but it is manifest that an unbeliever does not have true wisdom about theological things; therefore etc. 44. Further, wisdom does not exist without intellect and science, according to Aristotle Ethics 6.7.1141b2-3. Hence he says in the same place, “It is manifest that wisdom is both science and intellect of things most honorable in nature.” But this sort of declarative habit can exist without intellect and science, both because it can exist with faith alone, according to him [Aureoli, Sentences Prol, sect.1 a.3 nn.112-113], and because, as was said [1.194, 196], it can exist in an unbeliever. It is plain from his reasoning [1.195]; because all the acts, besides the act of believing, that a believer can experience, an unbeliever could experience; for an unbeliever might know how to give the same account of the faith as a believer does, and how to defend it against the impious and to confirm it in the minds of the pious and ‘to speak wisdom among the perfect’ [I Cor. 2.6] in the same way as a believer does. 45. There is a confirmation, because wisdom does not exist along with error about the same thing; but this habit exists along with error about matters of belief; therefore such a habit is not wisdom.

Ockham’s Opinion about the Theological Habit

46. Therefore I say to this article that, with respect to matters of belief, a theologian increases the habit of acquired faith when acquired faith precedes his study; but when it does not proceed then he acquires {1.197} acquired faith if he is a believer. And such habit does not exist in an unbeliever. But apart from this habit, and for the most part in Page 101 fact, a student in theology, whether a believer or a heretic or an unbeliever, acquires many scientific habits that could be acquired in other sciences. And besides these, he also acquires many scientific habits of consequences that pertain to no natural sciences. But with respect to all of these – whether propositions or concepts, and this whether they are statements or are consequences of any sort, whether they are matters of knowledge or only of belief – any student in theology can acquire a habit of apprehending them. And by means of these habits, namely scientific habits with respect to things naturally knowable and consequences proper to theology and by means of these apprehending habits, all the acts can be had that are possible for a theologian by common law, besides only the act of believing, because by means of these habits he can preach, teach, strengthen, and do all such things. 47. But that such a habit – besides faith and the scientific habits that can be naturally acquired – is not a science properly speaking is plain, because nothing is known evidently that faith is required for assenting to; because the habit that inclines to evident knowledge no more depends on faith than conversely. But according to all the Saints, and all with contrary opinions, no one can assent to the truths of belief without faith. Therefore there is no science properly speaking with respect to them. 48. If it be said that then besides faith there would be no supernatural knowledge, which does not appear to be true, I reply that supernatural knowledge is taken in two ways. In one way that it cannot be acquired naturally; and in this way no supernatural knowledge is, by common law, necessary for us besides infused faith. In another way {1.198} is knowledge called supernatural because it is of truths that can be known, not by purely natural powers, but supernaturally; and in this way supernatural knowledge is necessary for us besides faith. 49.To the first argument for the last opinion [of Peter Aureol, 1.194ff.] I say that, by means of the agent intellect and of some propositions, acquired faith is sometimes increased, and sometimes acquired faith is acquired, not infused faith; nor is it necessary that about such one always have faith beforehand. 50. The other two arguments prove that some habit other than faith is acquired, which I concede. 51. To the argument which proves that an adhering faith is not acquired, I say that such an acquired adhering faith will not be opinion, when distinguishing opinion from faith. And thus no adhering habit distinct from infused and acquired faith is acquired with respect to matters of belief. 52. To the other argument I concede that the habit can be called declarative. 53. To the final argument I say that this habit, other than faith, with respect to matters of belief does not have the idea of wisdom, because it can stand along with error and can naturally exist without intellect and science. 54. And when it is said that metaphysics has the idea of wisdom, I make a distinction about metaphysics in the way I made a distinction about science in the first question [1.8], that it can be taken either for knowledge of many things in order, or for knowledge that immediately inclines to some proposition. I say that in the first way no part of metaphysics is wisdom {1.199}, because responding to sophistical arguments is not Page 102 formally wisdom, although wisdom is presupposed so that one may evidently know how to respond to them. And so it is in the issue at hand: if a theologian were to know how to defend the faith evidently and to confirm it, he would necessarily have wisdom; but this is not possible naturally. In the second way metaphysics can be called wisdom. But how this is to be understood will be plain in the following question [1.223-224].

Response to the Arguments for the Other Opinions

55. To the first argument for the first opinion [1.184-185], when it is said first that there is a twofold class of sciences, one that proceeds from principles self-evidently known by the light of a superior science etc., I say that, although this is true in the case of a subalternate science, yet never does anyone evidently know the conclusions unless he knows them by experience or by some premises evidently known. Hence it is saying nothing to say that I know some conclusions because you know the principles that I believe in because you tell me. And in the same way it is puerile to say that I know the conclusions of theology because God knows the principles that I believe in because he reveals them. 56. To the other argument I say that the fact the conclusions are not known evidently does not derogate from the dignity of our theology, just as it does not derogate from the dignity of the knowledge of the principles of theology that they are not known evidently. And therefore, just as without derogation the principles are not known evidently, so without derogation the conclusions are not known evidently either. 57. And {1.200} when it is said that theology exceeds other sciences both in dignity of matter and in certitude, I say that this argument equally proves that the principles of theology are evidently known, for these exceed both in certitude – because they are not subject to human reason – and in dignity of matter, just as well as the conclusions do. So I say that certitude is taken either for adhesion or for evidence. In the first way the principles and conclusions exceed, but not in the second way; therefore etc. 58. To the confirmation I say that the other arts are called theology’s handmaids, and that theology has to judge of them, because of the greater truth in the things known and because of greater adhesion to them. 59. To the other argument I say that all the Saints call it science by extending the name of science to knowledge that is certain and to a habit that apprehends things of which – as concerns themselves – there is by nature science and wisdom. 60. To the other, when it is said that the veridical intellectual habits are only five, I say that in the case of naturally acquired veridical habits there are only five kinds, which the Philosopher enumerates in Ethics 6.3.1139b16-17. For, according to the Philosopher, faith in its whole extent is not a veridical habit, because it can exist in respect of falsehoods, according to him, as well as in respect of truths. However, there is, besides, these habits, a veridical habit of faith, because the false cannot fall under it. And of this sort is faith with respect to theological matters of belief, whether it is infused or acquired faith. – In another way it can be said that the Philosopher is only {1.201} speaking of Page 103 habits that are both evident and certain, and theology with respect to matters of belief is not of this sort, because it is not evident though it is certain. 61. Hereby is plain the answer to the first argument of the second opinion [1.185-187], that theology as to its whole judging habit is science or faith etc. And when it is said that of faith and theology there are distinct acts, I say that as to all those acts, besides the act of belief, the apprehending habits, along with knowledge of the consequences, are sufficient, as is plain from experience. 62. And if it be said [Peter Aureol, Scriptum I, Prol. sect.1 a.1 nn.54, 59] that such a habit is a logical habit, I say that it does not pertain to logic to know consequences in particular but only to know the nature of consequences in general. And therefore every science uses logic as instrument, by means of which it knows its consequences in particular. So a logician does not have to know that this inference is good, ‘the earth is interposed between the sun and the moon, therefore the moon is eclipsed’, but this belongs to the astronomer. 63. To the other argument I say that that is known evidently about which it is known evidently that nothing impossible follows from it. But this is not known in the issue at hand except by some proposition of belief; hence it is not known evidently that the matter of belief is not the antecedent in a consequence wherein something impossible is inferred. And when it is said that any argument fails in matter or form, I concede it, although this cannot be known evidently. 64. Hence the argument, ‘the divine essence is the Father, the divine essence is the Son, therefore the Son is the Father’, fails in form, and yet no one can, by common law, know evidently that the argument fails in form; just as no one can, by common law, know evidently that one absolute thing is several relative persons really distinct. Similarly this argument, ‘God is immortal, no man is God, therefore no man is immortal’, fails in matter, because it takes a false minor. And yet no theologian can, by common law, know evidently that the minor is false, but he only believes that it is false. 65. As to the second, I deny the major – the point will become plain in another question [q.9, 1.226ff.]. I also say that the minor is false, because God cannot be known by us wayfarers under the proper idea of deity such that it itself alone be known in simple cognition. 66. To the first proof I say that at the end of the discursive process there is a stand at the one propositional complex that becomes known through the process and was unknown before, although all the terms of it were known by conceptual knowledge. Hence, since the discursive process is precisely between propositional complexes and in no way between concepts by themselves, by a discursive process is in no way acquired conceptual knowledge of any term, because any such knowledge is presupposed before the end of the process. Nor is any knowledge that apprehends a complex proposition acquired, because it can be had beforehand; but by the discursive process is knowledge of a judgment precisely acquired. For example, {1.203} he who wants to proceed discursively from creatures to God – according to their way of speaking – presupposes conceptual knowledge of God and of creature, namely what is signified by each term. Also any complex proposition can be formed before the discursive process, and so all Page 104 knowledge of concepts and also every act of apprehending can precede and is not acquired. But what is acquired is the knowledge by which assent is given to this complex, ‘God is an infinite being’, or ‘something is a supreme being’, or something the like. 67. To the second proof I say that the intellect distinguishes between God and creatures because it has one composite proper concept and it denies of it all creatures. For example, the intellect discursively concludes that some being is infinite, first, and supreme; and then it has this concept proper to God, ‘infinite and supreme being’. And it knows that no creature is of this sort, and so it distinguishes this being from every other. 68. And if the question is asked why then, from the fact the intellect has only a composite concept of God which is not God really, it understands God more than before, I reply that God is then understood because one proper concept is understood, of a nature to supposit for God alone. Nor is God of a nature to be otherwise known by us wayfarers on the basis of our pure natural powers; and God does not immediately terminate our act of understanding in this present state, but only that concept immediately terminates it. And this is what blessed Gregory says On Ezekiel 2 hom.2 n.14, “However much our mind will have advanced in contemplation of God, it will not attain to that which he himself is but to something that is beneath him.” {1.204} 69. And this is what must be said if it be held that the concept is not intellection or cognition but something created by an act of understanding, having the sort of objective being that the thing has in subjective being [cf. 1.30; Ordinatio 1 d.2 q.8]. But according to the opinion which posits that a concept predicable of something in reality – standing not for itself but for the thing – is the intellection itself, and that all universals are certain intellections inhering in the mind, it seems one should say that, when the intellect thus makes a distinction so as to know God and not something else, it reaches one concept composed of many intellections, by any one of which taken separately something other than God is as understood as is God himself, yet only God is understood by the whole concept composed of all the intellections joined together; and so God alone is object of that whole and nothing else is. And as to such intellection composed of many intellections, each of which is common to God and other things, it is not unacceptable that God alone is understood by it. But such an intellection does not suffice for possessing theological truths. 70. But against this seems to be the authority of Gregory cited before [1.203], because in this way the mind would in contemplation be able to advance to the attaining of deity itself, and consequently not merely to the attaining of what is beneath God. 71. It can be said that, according to this opinion, the intention of blessed Gregory is that the mind can never, by common law, advance so far that it does not always reach something that is beneath God, because {1.205}, by common law, no cognition can be had by wayfarers without something other than God being as much understood by the cognition, or by a part of it, as God is. And so it never reaches to what God precisely is but also to what is beneath God. 72. To the third I say that theology, as to some part of itself, is neither first nor lowest nor in the middle among sciences properly speaking, because it is, as to that part, not a science properly speaking. Page 105

73. To the fourth [14], that a theologian knows many things that an old woman does not know, I say that nevertheless an old woman does sometimes have as perfect a knowledge in respect of some one thing as a theologian has; but she lacks many other things. 74. As to the argument for the third opinion [1.187], when it is said that one person would not have a clearer knowledge than another, I concede that it would not be clearer, understanding by ‘clearer’ knowledge ‘more evident’ knowledge, because no one has evident knowledge of matters of belief. Nor is this against blessed Augustine, because blessed Augustine is there extending the name of science. And so I concede that many are strong in the faith although they are not strong in this science, namely the science by which they may know how to expound Scripture, defend it, etc. And therefore a superiority in knowledge of the same matter of belief does not consist in clearness of knowledge. 75. And when it is said that then faith and science would be on an equal level, it is plain that it need not be so, because this science means many other habits over and above faith that are not habits of faith, as was said [1.197].

{1.206} Response to the Opening Arguments

76. To the first principal argument [1. 183]: that every veridical habit evident with respect to necessary truth is wisdom or science etc.; however an inevident veridical habit can be faith, and this is what theology is in great part. Likewise, there is some habit with respect to such truth that is not properly veridical, because it does not judge but only apprehends, and this is what theology is in some part. 77. To the second: it is plain that the whole habit of a theologian is more perfect than the habit of one layman; however it is not always more perfect with respect to some matters of belief. 78. To the third [n.4]: that the Apostle is extending the name of wisdom and of science to the habits by which is known how Scripture should be expounded, defended, confirmed etc. 79. And if it be asked what the probable reasons do that are adduced for matters of faith, whether they induce faith or opinion or science or nothing – it can be said that they increase acquired faith, though they do not increase infused faith; hence too such reasons sometimes generate it. And this is what is said [Ethics 7.5.1146b29-30], that “Some people sometimes opine as firmly as others who know.” This opinion is faith; and it is not opinion as it is distinguished from faith.

{1.207} Question 8: Whether the Habit of Theology is Really One in Number Page 106

1. Fourth I ask whether the habit of theology is really one in number 2. That it is: 2. That it is: 3. Metaphysics 10.1.1052b31-32: the first in any genus is maximally one and most simple. But the habit of theology is first in the genus of intellectual habits, because in accord with the order of the subjects of the habits is the order of the habits themselves. But the subject of theology, which is God himself, is the first subject among all subjects. Therefore the habit of theology is maximally one and most simple. But any other habit is one in number, therefore theology is too. 4. Second as follows [Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.28.87a38-39]: “Of one genus of subject there is one science;” but the subject here is one in number, namely God himself; therefore the habit too is one in number. 5. Third: because there is as much unity to theology as to any science naturally acquired; but some science naturally acquired is one in number; therefore theology is too 6. To the opposite: 7. Distinct acts cause distinct habits; but there are distinct acts with respect to distinct theological truths; therefore the habits are distinct too.

Opinion of St. Thomas

8. {1.208} To the question it is said [Aquinas, ST Ia q.1 a.3] that theology is one because unity of science is to be reckoned, like unity of power and habit, according to the object; not indeed materially, but according to the formal idea of the object. But theology considers certain things according as they are divinely revealed, and so everything divinely revealed agrees in one formal idea of the object of this science; and therefore it is one science.

Attack on the Opinion of St. Thomas

9. But this reasoning fails in many ways. First because neither can the unity of a power or habit be proved from the idea of the formal unity of the object, nor can the distinction of a power or habit be proved from the distinction of the formal idea of the object. 10. The first point is plain, first because the same thing under the same formal idea is the object of sense and of intellect, because nothing is sensible without a superior power having ability for it under the same idea. Similarly, unless the same thing under the same idea were the object of sense and intellect, there would not be greater reason why the act of one power would presuppose the act of the other than the reverse. Similarly, there are in fact no such distinct ideas, because then there would be distinct things, as will be plain elsewhere [Sent. I d.2 q.1-3]. Therefore since {1.209} the thing itself can be apprehended by sense and by intellect, it must be that it is so under the same idea. First because the same thing is object of intellect and will, because it is impossible that something under some unknown idea should be willed by the will. Second because the same thing is the Page 107 object, under the same idea, of intuitive and of abstract knowledge. Third because the same thing is object of science and error and opinion, because one person can err or opine about the same conclusion and another can know it, according to the Philosopher, Posterior Analytics, near the end [1.33.89a39-b6]. 11. The second point [1.208] is plain, because of vision itself there are distinct formal objects, namely whiteness and blackness, and yet the power is one. And that these are formal objects is plain, because nothing can be apprehended by any power unless the formal object of it be apprehended. But whiteness can be apprehended by sight when nothing else is apprehended by sight, and blackness in the same way. 12. If it be said that these are material objects but color is the formal object; and likewise that nothing can be apprehended by vision save under the idea of color: 13. On the contrary: I ask what you understand by material idea? Either the subject of the formal idea or something contained under the formal idea. If in the first way — as he himself [Aquinas] exemplifies about man and ass and wood with respect to color —, then whiteness and blackness are not material objects, because they are not subjects of color but are colors; therefore they are formal things, and consequently the same power has {1.210} distinct formal objects. If in the second way, in this way nothing is such with respect to a complex habit. Likewise, then it is nothing else than to say that if there are distinct adequate objects, then there are distinct powers. But such is not what the discussion is now about. 14. Besides, when it is said [1.209] that nothing is apprehended by sight save under the idea of color, either you mean that nothing can be seen unless it be colored, or that nothing can be seen unless the idea itself of color (according as it is distinguished from other lower ideas) is seen. If in the first way, thus does the argument hold, because whiteness can be seen when nothing else is apprehended; therefore nothing is here the formal object save whiteness alone. If in the second way, on the contrary: the idea itself of color, according as it is distinguished from other lower ideas, is only the universal in the intellect, and consequently in no way can it be apprehended by sense. 15. Besides, when this whiteness is seen under the idea of color, I ask: either it is some particular idea, or some universal idea. If in the first way and it is only this whiteness, because in this whiteness there are not any distinct particular ideas, because then they would be distinct things (according to him [Aquinas, SG I chs.31, 54] who denies all formal distinction), therefore this whiteness is seen in its proper idea. If in the second way, then some universal would be apprehended by sight. 16. Besides, some habit has regard to some complex, and yet any term under its proper idea is object. 17. Besides, his minor premise [1.208] is false, because ‘to be divinely revealable’ is not the formal idea of the object of theology, both because then any geometrical conclusion {1.211} would belong to theology, since anything such is divinely revealable, and because, according to him [Aquinas, ST Ia q.1 a.7], God under the idea of deity is the subject of theology.

Opinion of Henry of Ghent Page 108

18. There is another opinion maintaining the same conclusion [Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IX q.4, Summa a.6 q.3], that a science which considers however many attributes of one subject according to one formal idea of consideration is one in number with as much simplicity as any affective habit is; such that there is no less simplicity in the metaphysical habit, to whatever degree one may have it, than in the habit of temperance or than in whiteness. Hence through the first generative act of a habit the whole reality of the habit is obtained, though in a most imperfect degree. Nor is there a difference between cognitive and affective habits save that the affective ones are generated and increased by like acts of the same species, but the cognitive ones are generated and increased by unlike acts and of a different species, and to those acts precisely do they incline. And so when a habit is generated from acts of the principle it is called the habit of the principle; when from acts of the conclusion it is called the habit of the conclusion; and then first does it incline to acts of the conclusion. 19. For this opinion some reasons are hinted at. First, that when conclusions are known from principles, the principles themselves are known more perfectly. Similarly, one conclusion known after another is more perfectly {1.212} known, which would not be true unless there were the same habit with respect to all of them. 20. Further, Posterior Analytics 2.3.90b21, “Of one thing, insofar as it is one, there is one science.” 21. Further, otherwise metaphysics would not be one save by oneness of aggregation. Likewise, there would then not be a greater unity in metaphysics than between mathematics and metaphysics. 22. Further, in things essentially ordered a stand must be made at some first one [cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics VI ch.2]. Therefore among the sciences there is a first one, and consequently one in number.

Against the Opinion of Henry of Ghent

23. Against this opinion. First, that he says that it is one because of one formal idea of consideration [1.211]. On the contrary: these ways of consideration hold either on the part of the understanding or on the part of the object. Not in the first way because, of the same simple intellect and of the same conclusion, there can altogether be such diverse modes of considering in him who understands. And yet there will not be distinct sciences of it, according to him, because according to him, the same conclusion cannot be mathematical and metaphysical [Henry, Quodl. IX q.4]. Nor in the second way, because these ideas cannot be distinguished in the object because then they would be distinct things, which is manifestly false, because by the nature of the thing there is no such distinction, according to them [Henry, Summa a.27 q.1]. 24. Further {1.213}, that of principle and conclusion and of diverse conclusions there are distinct habits I argue first as follows: whatever things are of the same idea and are equally perfect have effects of the same idea in an equally disposed passive subject. But a perfect and intense habit generated from many acts with respect precisely to the principle, Page 109 and a habit generated from acts of the conclusion that is not more intense, do not have the same effects, according to them [Henry, Quodl. IX q.4]. Because a habit generated from acts about the conclusion inclines to an act similar to which never does a habit incline that is precisely generated from acts about the principle, according to them [Henry, ibid.]. And it is plain from experience. Therefore these habits are not of the same idea. 25. If it be said [Henry, ibid.] that this habit, if it be perfected, can incline to an act of the conclusion, but only when it is generated or increased by acts about the conclusion: 26. To the contrary: for in order that some cause have its effect, it does not matter by what cause it be produced, provided it be of the same idea and equally perfect. Just as for the fact that heat heat, it does not matter whether it be produced by fire or by the sun or by God alone, provided it be equally intense in itself; and above all it does not matter by what cause, on which it does not depend in its being, it be produced. But a habit does not depend in being either on these acts or on those; therefore whether it be produced by these or by those, if it be equally perfect, it will have power for the same effect in species. But a habit generated precisely from a thousand acts in respect of the principle does not have power for the same effect that a habit generated from two acts in respect of the conclusion has power for; therefore they are not of the same species. 27. There is a confirmation {1.214}, because when a total efficient cause is next to a passive object sufficiently disposed, action will be able to follow. But, with respect to this conclusion, when a habit elicited from acts about the principle is posited, the total efficient cause is posited; because an act is not required (since it is not), and the passive object is sufficiently disposed; therefore etc. 28. If it be said [Henry, Quodl. IX q.4] that in such and such a degree will it be inclining to the the principle and in another degree to the conclusion, on the contrary: the degrees are not more distinct when generated from acts about the principle and conclusion than are the degrees that are generated from diverse acts about the principle, because those that are of the same idea are not more distinct than others of the same idea, save because of greater excess in intensity. Just as two whites, namely A and B, are not more distinct than two others, C and D, unless A exceed B more in intensity than C exceeds D. But a habit generated from a thousand acts about the principle exceeds more in intensity a habit generated from one act about the principle than habits of the principle and of the conclusion generated from many acts; therefore these degrees differ less, and consequently the effects are not more distinct. Therefore if two degrees generated from such such [acts] about the principle do not have power for such acts distinct in species, neither do the habits generated from acts about the principle and about the conclusion, which is against experience. 29. There is a confirmation, because whatever is repugnant to some remiss form as to its contrary, is much more repugnant to an intense form of the same idea. Therefore if error about some conclusion is repugnant {1.215} to a weak habit generated from diverse acts of knowing the conclusion, much more will it be repugnant to a very intense habit generated from many acts in respect of the principle, if the habits be of the same idea. But the consequent is manifestly false; therefore the antecedent is too. Page 110

30. Further, the argument still stands that if the degrees be of the same idea, the effects will be of the same idea. 31. Second, I argue thus, as a certain doctor argues [Scotus, Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics VI q.1 n.4]: along with intellect of some principles and science of some conclusions in geometry there stands an ignorance of disposition with respect to another conclusion. But with respect to the same proposition there cannot be in the same person at the same time opposite habits. Therefore the habit of those principles and those conclusions is not the habit of the conclusion with respect to which there is error. 32. If it be said that contraries are compatible with each other in weak acts, or if one be at the lowest level and another at the highest. And so it is in the case at hand, because the habit inclining to understanding one principle only is weak and imperfect, and so it stands along with error about the conclusion. But a habit inclining to understanding of principle and conclusion together is perfect, and so it does not allow along with itself ignorance of the conclusion. 33. On the contrary: I posit that the habit inclining to knowledge of the principle alone is at its highest, namely that it be increased by many thousands of acts about that principle alone; and the habit inclining to knowledge of the conclusion be generated from few acts both about the principle and about the conclusion. On this supposition, it is doubtful to no one that the first habit would be more perfect than the second, and yet, {1.216} on this supposition, ignorance of disposition with respect to the conclusion stands along with the first habit and not with the second. Therefore this is not because of the imperfection of the first habit. 34. If it be replied otherwise to the argument, that it proves a distinction in those degrees but does not prove a specific distinction, on the contrary: whenever something in a perfect degree stands along with one of the contraries and something else in a perfect degree does not stand along with the same contrary, those two perfect things are distinct in species. For example, if sweetness in milk stands along with whiteness and blackness does not stand along with whiteness, necessarily are sweetness and blackness distinct in species. It is plain too by reason, because when certain things are of the same species and are perfect, with whatever one of them stands the other does too, or its like; and whatever is repugnant to one is repugnant also to the other or its like, just as whatever stands along with one whiteness stands also with another whiteness, and what is repugnant to one is repugnant to the other. The assumed proposition is therefore plain. But now it is the case that with error about some conclusion there stands perfect knowledge of some principle and also of some other conclusion; and along with that error does not stand perfect knowledge of the same conclusion. Therefore those two perfect knowledges are distinct in species. 35. There is a confirmation of this reason, because whatever things are contrary first to things distinct in species are themselves distinct from each other in species, just as because heat and humidity are contrary first to coldness and dryness, which are distinct in species, therefore are the former distinct in species. But two errors about two universal conclusions, each of which is false {1.217}, are distinct in species, because they are formally repugnant, just as those propositions are formally repugnant. Therefore the Page 111 sciences contrary to these errors are distinct in species, and consequently for the same reason other sciences of diverse conclusions are distinct in species. 36. The other arguments and confirmations hold by virtue of the first two arguments. 37. Further, what is said about theology, that it is one [1.211, 208], seems simply false. Because evident knowledge of something necessary and non-evident knowledge of something else necessary and knowledge of something contingent, whether it be evident or non-evident, are not the same habit in number. But in theology there is some evident knowledge of something necessary, as was made clear in the first question [1.51], just as it is evidently known that God is and that God is one, good, wise; and with respect to something else necessary there is non-evident knowledge, as that God is three and one. Similarly, contingent truths are known in theology, as that God is incarnate, God beatifies the soul, and so on about others. Therefore all these habits are not one in number.

The Author’s own Response

38. Therefore to the question I reply: first about the habit in general; second in particular about theology. 39. As to the first I say first that a habit acquired from an act about the principle alone is other than a habit of the conclusion. First, because a cause is always distinct from its effect, whether it be {1.218} a cause per se or a cause sine qua non; but in one of these ways is the habit of the principle cause with respect to the habit of the conclusion. Proof of this: because when it is posited that someone acquires a habit from acts about the principle alone and afterwards, together with another principle, which was the second premise, he apply it to the conclusion, he will know it evidently, and not without the habit of the principle. Therefore that habit is in some way cause, mediate or immediate, per se or per accidens, of the knowledge of the conclusion. 40. Besides, knowledge of principles is more perfect than knowledge of the conclusion, Posterior Analytics 1.2.72a25-b4; but nothing is more perfect than itself; therefore etc. 41. Second, I say that of distinct conclusions there are distinct habits: first because universal and particular demonstration differ in species, Posterior Analytics 1.24.85a13-86a30; therefore it is necessary either that knowledge of principles be distinct in species or that knowledge of conclusions be so. But whether this way or that, the proposed result is obtained, because it is necessary that either the habit of principles be distinct in species or that the habit of conclusions be so. And there is no greater reason why the habit of principles be distinct in species than the habit of conclusions. Therefore always are the knowledges of conclusions distinct in species. 42. Third, I say that of some principles and conclusions there can be the same habit. The proof of this: of things with respect to which there is of a nature to be one act, with respect to the same things there can be one habit. But with respect to the premises and conclusion there can be one act, because it is not more repugnant for a syllogism composed of many propositions {1.219} to be understood in one act than for a proposition Page 112 composed of many terms to be so; but a proposition is understood in one act; therefore etc. 43. Therefore I say uniformly about habits and acts that they are always proportionate as to identity and diversity, because there is always as much identity and diversity in habits as there is in the acts from which the habits are generated or increased. This can be made clear: because a habit does not have regard to the object either in idea of object or in idea of cause save by the mediation of an act. That not in idea of object is plain, because it does not otherwise incline to the object save because it inclines to the act; nor is it caused by the object save by the mediation of an act. Therefore, from identity or diversity of object should not be proved diversity or identity of habit save by means of diversity or identity of act; therefore habit and act are always proportionate in diversity and identity. 44. However, for the intention of the Philosopher I say that the Philosopher [1.8] takes one science either for a collection of many things having a determinate order, or for many known conclusions having a determinate order. Now conclusions can have a multiple order: either with respect to predicates only or with respect to subjects only or with respect to both. An example of the first: if of the same subject be predicated many properties ordered according to higher and lower, as can be shown of a figure properties of magnitude, and likewise its own proper properties, and likewise the properties of its inferiors; but then the conclusion is particular. An example of the second: if common properties be demonstrated of their first subjects and of their inferiors, just as if the properties of animal be shown not only of animal but also of inferiors {1.220}. An example of the third: if properties of animal be predicted of animal and properties of contained species be predicated of those species. And so because of such an order, or even a similar one, some single science can be spoken of in a way that another cannot be that lacks a similar order. And in this way does the Philosopher take one science, as do other philosophers and doctors. 45. About the second main point [1.217] I say that theology in one way includes an infused end. And theology as to this part is one with numerical unity, because infused faith is one in number. But this point will be made clear in Sent. III q.8. In another way theology includes acquired faith and some habits evident as to both propositions and consequences, and habits apprehending them all, whether propositions or terms; and in this way it is not one in number. For the fact that acquired faith is not one in number is plain from the aforesaid, because acts of believing are distinct in species, therefore so are habits generated from those acts. Similarly, a heretic has acquired faith about one article and error about another, about which however he can have acquired faith. Similarly, apprehending habits are distinct, because one habit can be separated from the other; for someone can be much inclined to thinking about one article and not about another.

Doubts about the Aforesaid Page 113

46. About the aforesaid there are some doubts. First how the habits of principle and of conclusion are disposed according to perfection and imperfection; namely which of them is more perfect. 47. Second {1.221}, whether the habit of principles is cause of the habit of the conclusion. 48. Third, what is the necessity for positing a habit with respect to principles, especially since the intellect is determined for principles, especially self-evident ones, and a determinate power does not need a determining habit. 49. Fourth, of what sort the habit is that is posited to be one with respect to premises and conclusion.

Solution of the Doubts

50. To the first of these it can be said that the habit of principles is more perfect than the habit of conclusions, because the nobility of a habit consists either in that it is more evident or that it is about a nobler object. But now it is such that the conclusion is not about a nobler object, since whatever is a partial object of a conclusion is also a partial object of some principle. Nor is the knowledge of the conclusion more evident than the knowledge of the premises, but conversely. Therefore knowledge of the premises is nobler than knowledge of the conclusion. 51. To the second I say that knowledge of the principles is the effective cause of knowledge of the conclusion; and this is true in the intellect that acquires knowledge of the conclusion through knowledge of the principles. 52. Argument, however, is made against this opinion, because there cannot be any cause of the necessary and the perpetual; but a conclusion is necessary; therefore etc. 53. Besides, every effective second cause can be posited in fact though its effect not be posited, because God can suspend the causality of any second cause. But it is impossible that the premises be necessary unless the conclusion be necessary: 54. To these {1.222} I say that knowledge of the premises is cause of the knowledge of the conclusion, although the premises are not causes of the conclusion. The first point is plain, because that truly is cause of something on whose existence the other follows [Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.2.1013a24-35], such that that other cannot be posited without it. But when knowledge of the premises is posited in such intellect, knowledge of the conclusion follows, and when it is not posited knowledge of the conclusion would not be produced. The second is made clear because whether the premises are posited or not, the intellect that possesses the terms can form the conclusion. Hereby is plain the answer to the first, that the premises are not causes of the conclusion. But how is the conclusion necessary? One must not understand that it be necessary in this way, that always actually in the way in which it is of a nature to be in act it is always true, save perhaps in the divine intellect; but it is necessary because it is true, and can never be false. 55. To the other I concede that knowledge of the premises can be posited without knowledge of the conclusion; and therefore knowledge of the conclusion is contingent because it is caused, although it be of a necessary object, in the way expounded. Page 114

56. As to the third doubt, the answer will be plain in the third book [Sent. III q.4, where the question is asked “Whether a habit is an absolute quality, effective of an act.”] 57. To the fourth it can be said that this habit which is one with respect to premises and with respect to conclusion is wisdom. It is, however, equivalently intellect and science, because it is in respect of that in respect of which there is both intellect and science. And thus wisdom is not in respect of any one true thing but in respect of many. This can be made persuasive, because every necessary proposition is either a principle or a conclusion. If it be a principle, there is intellect with respect to it; if a conclusion, {1.223} there is science with respect to it. Therefore if wisdom were in respect of anything one, just like intellect and science, wisdom would not be distinguished from intellect and science. 58. There is a confirmation from the Philosopher in Ethics 6.6.1141a2, “For it is a mark of a wise man to have demonstration about certain things.” Therefore wisdom is true demonstration or knowledge of demonstration, and consequently it is both in respect of principles and in respect of the conclusion. Similarly Ethics 6.7.1141a16-19, “It is manifest that the most certain of sciences will be wisdom. Therefore it is necessary for the wise man to know not only what follows from the principles but also to state the truth about the principles; wherefore indeed will wisdom be intellect and science.” From this authority it is plain that wisdom is in respect of principles and in respect of conclusions, and that it is science and intellect. But it is not really and formally science and intellect, because then it would not be a habit distinct from them; therefore it will be science and intellect equivalently, because it is in respect of those things of which there is science and intellect. 59. If it be said that then wisdom would be in respect of everything necessary: 60. Likewise, then wisdom and demonstration would be the same, because demonstration includes both principles and conclusions: 61. To the first of these I say that wisdom is taken in two ways: strictly and broadly. In the first way it is only in respect of the noblest things. Because of this the Philosopher says, Ethics 6.1.1141b2-3: “From what has been said it is indeed manifest that wisdom, science, and intellect are of the noblest things in nature.” And thus does the Philosopher speak of wisdom in Metaphysics 1.2.982a4-23. In the second way {1.224} it is taken for every habit in respect of first principles and the conclusions following from them. And in this way wisdom is found also in the mechanical arts. Because of this the Philosopher says, Ethics 6.7.1141a9-11, “The arts among the most certain arts we reckon to be wisdom, as Phidias a wise stonemason and Polycleitus a wise sculptor etc.” And it is in 7.1141a9-b8 where he expressly points to this distinction. 62. To the second, that not of every demonstration is there wisdom, but of every demonstration why there is wisdom broadly taken. Hence in no art is he who knows only the ‘that’ called wise but he who knows the ‘why’.

Response to the Reasons of Henry of Ghent Page 115

63. To the first argument for the first opinion [in fact the second opinion, 1.211ff.]: that when conclusions are known from principles then the principles are more perfectly known, because then an act with respect to the principles is elicited and the habit of the principles is intensified; for the same reason, when one conclusion is known next to another, it is more perfectly known. But if the act of knowing be elicited about one conclusion and not about another, not for this reason is it more perfectly known than the other. 64. To the second I say that of one subject there is one science, not by numerical unity but by unity of the same order, as an army is said to be one or a city to be one. And so when taking unity of aggregation for every unity that is not of something one in number, I concede that such science is one by unity of aggregation. But this science {1.225} is one by the numerical unity that is of one conclusion or that inclines to an act of knowing the conclusion because of the principles. And so there are as many sciences as there conclusions that have the same subject and yet diverse predicates. And a science does not vary in number more with variation of the subject than with variation of he predicate, because a science has regard to the predicate just as to the subject; because it first regards the conclusion of which the subject and predicate are parts. 65. To the other it is plain how metaphysical science is one by unity of aggregation. 66. If it be said that then many metaphysics would be lacking to us and many natural sciences, I concede that to anyone for this present state are many partial sciences lacking. 67. To the other I concede that there is a stand at one first, and that first is a science of one first conclusion, or one habit inclining to an act of knowing the first conclusion because of prior principles.

Response to the Main Arguments

68. Hereby is plain the answer to the first main argument [1.207], that the habit of theology includes many habits and among them there is one first, whatever that one be. 69. To the second it is plain that of one kind of subject there is one science if its property is one, or it will be one by unity of order. 70. To the third too it is plain that metaphysics, insofar as it means the whole book of the Metaphysics, is only one by such unity of order.

{1.226} Question 9: Whether God under the Proper Idea of Deity is the Subject of Theology

1. Fifth I ask whether God under the proper idea of deity is the subject of theology. 2. That he is not: 3. Because to God under the idea of deity do not belong first all the properties of this science; first because many belong first to certain creatures, as that the rational soul is Page 116 able to be beatified in the vision and enjoyment of God, that there will be a future resurrection, and the like; second because some things belong first to persons, as ‘the Father generates’ etc. But that is the first subject to which first belong all the properties of the science. Therefore etc. 4. Second, because every subject of a science can be known distinctly and indistinctly, because indistinct knowledge of it is presupposed and distinct knowledge is acquired. But God cannot be know distinctly and indistinctly because, Metaphysics 9.10.1051b17-26, the simple is either totally known or totally unknown; but God is at the limit of simplicity. Therefore etc. 5. Third, because God is the subject of some science naturally acquired, not therefore of theology. The antecedent is plain because in metaphysics many properties are proved of God. The consequent is plain, {1.227} because the same thing under the same idea is not the subject of diverse sciences. 6. There is a confirmation: what is proved in a lower science cannot be the subject in a higher science; but God is proved in natural science and in metaphysics; therefore he cannot be the subject of theology. The antecedent is plain, because the subject is simply first in a science, and consequently there would be something prior to the subject of a higher science. 7. To the opposite: 8. The noblest habit has the noblest subject under the noblest idea; theology is the noblest habit; therefore etc. 9. In this question there is a difficulty: what belongs to the idea of the first subject of any science? Therefore one must first see about it; second to the question.

The Opinion of Scotus about the Idea of the First Subject

10. About the first there is an opinion [Scotus, Ordinatio I, Prol. p.3 qq.1-3, nn. 142-149; Reportatio I Prol. 1 a.2 nn.5-15] that “the idea of the first subject is to contain in itself first virtually all the truths of the habit. This is proved first as follows: because the first object contains immediate propositions, because the subject of them contains the predicate and so the evidence of the whole proposition; but immediate propositions contain the conclusions; therefore the subject of immediate propositions contains all the truths of the habit.” 11. {1.228} It is proved “secondly as follows: because firstness, from Posterior Analytics 1.4.73b32-33, is taken from the definition of the universal, according to the fact that it states adequacy. But the object is disposed to the habit as cause to effect; and a cause is not adequate unless it contain virtually the whole effect; therefore etc.”20 12. “Now the exposition of ‘first virtually’ is that ‘first’ is what does not depend on another but another depends on it. Therefore ‘to contain first virtually’ is not to depend on others in containing but others on it. This is because when, per impossibile, everything

20 The second sentence here was actually canceled by Scotus. Page 117 else is removed, and the understanding of it remains, it would still do the containing. But nothing else save in its idea does it contain.” 13. Again elsewhere [Scotus, Reportatio I Prol. q.1 a.1 n.5] the same thing is made clear as follows: “in things essentially ordered it is necessary to stand at something simply one. But the knowable things of any science have an essential order among themselves in knowability, because conclusions are known from principles and principles are in the end, if they are immediate, known from the terms. The predicate term too of the principle is known from the idea of the subject, because the principles are commonly per se in the second mode, therefore the subject falls into the definition of the predicate, from Metaphysics 7.1.1030b14-17. Therefore in this order some simple subject is at length reached which is the subject of the principle, from the knowledge of which are known all the things that belong to the science, and it is not known from the other things.”

{1.229} Attack on the Opinion of Scotus about the Idea of the First Subject

14. Against this opinion: that it does not belong to the idea of the subject to contain knowledge of the property virtually; second, that neither does it belong to the idea of the subject to contain the property virtually. 15. I prove the first as follows: an efficient cause does not contain its effect less virtually or less perfectly than a subject contains its property; but notwithstanding such containing, knowledge of the cause does not virtually contain knowledge of its effect; therefore notwithstanding the fact that a subject would contain its property, knowledge of a subject would not contain knowledge of its property. The major is manifest, because among all containings, when the contained thing is totally and really distinguished from the container, that is more perfect which is container of the efficient cause with respect to the effect, or is container of the final cause; because that which is material is more imperfect; similarly that alone belongs to God. The minor is manifest because, according to him [Scotus, Ordinatio II d.3 q.10 n.15: “…an angel has, for knowing distinct quiddities, distinct ideas of knowing”], for knowing distinct quiddities distinct ideas of knowing are required; therefore distinct knowledge of one quiddity without the idea of knowing what is proper in respect of another quiddity does not suffice for knowing the other quiddity. 16. If it be said that then distinct ideas of knowing with respect to distinct quiddities are required when one is not contained virtually in the other, on the contrary: then, for knowing distinctly {1.230} all the inferior quiddities, a distinct idea of knowing the sun itself would suffice, because the sun contains virtually all these quiddities. 17. If it be said that it is not sufficient, because the sun is not the total cause of these inferior things, on the contrary: if so, then another cause is required for this, that the effect be distinctly known. Since, therefore, a subject is, in the same way, not always total cause of the property, a distinct knowledge of the subject does not suffice for having a distinct knowledge of the property. Page 118

18. If it be said in another way that there are many dependencies of property to subject, and more intimate ones than of an effect to its cause, and therefore knowledge of the subject suffices but not knowledge of its cause, on the contrary: sometimes a property does not depend on its subject save as an accident depends on its subject; but that is more imperfect than the dependence of an effect on its efficient cause. 19. Besides, according to this doctor, in Reportatio I Prol. q.1 a.2 n.7, when certain things have a respect to some power or habit such that any of them is, by its formal idea, of a nature to have a respect to such power or habit, there none of them is the first object of the power by primacy of virtue; therefore knowledge there of one does not contain knowledge of the other. But subject and property are frequently so disposed that they are distinct things, according to him. This is plain because elsewhere [Op. Oxon. IV d.12 q.3 n.10] this Doctor proves that the subject is efficient cause of its property, for otherwise the proposition would not be necessary. But any distinct absolute thing is, by its {1.231} formal idea, mover of the intellect, because when something is the adequate first object of a power, anything contained is mover of that power. But the adequate object of the intellect is being, therefore any thing is per se mover of the intellect. Therefore no thing is first object by primacy of virtue with respect to another. 20. There is a confirmation: because what moves the senses has the virtue for moving the intellect that is in potency to understanding; but an accident is a mover of the senses by its proper virtue; therefore etc. 21. Likewise, that absolute thing could come to be without a subject, and consequently it could be intuitively seen and yet knowledge of the subject would not be obtained; therefore the property is per se mover of the intellect and consequently knowledge of one does not contain knowledge of the other. 22. This idea is confirmed by the Philosopher, Posterior Analytics 1.13.81a38-39, that “when a sense is lacking, science according to that sense is lacking.” But sometimes the object of one sense is cause of the object of another sense; just as, according to many, and it seems to be the intention of the Philosopher [De Anima 2.10.422a8-9], tangible qualities, which are the objects of the sense of touch, are causes of colors and flavors. Therefore, however much one might have a perfect knowledge of tangibles, if the sense of sight were lacking knowledge of colors could not be had. Therefore knowledge of the cause does not contain first virtually knowledge of its effect. And in the same way, although these tangible qualities were subjects of other qualities, and the latter were the properties of the former, still, if the sense of sight be lacking, the latter would not be known {1.232}. Therefore knowledge of the subject is not sufficient for knowing the property. 23. Second, I argue as follows, according to his [Scotus’] principles: what contains perfect knowledge of something, contains imperfect knowledge of it. But knowledge of a subject does not contain the most imperfect knowledge of the property, because it does not contain the ‘what’ of the name, because then it would not be pre-cognition. Therefore the subject does not virtually contain knowledge of the property. 24. Third, I argue as follows: virtual containing of knowledge of the conclusion is to be attributed most of all to the middle term; but the subject is not the middle term; Page 119 therefore the subject does not first virtually contain knowledge of the conclusion. The major is manifest, because “middle and cause are the same,” Posterior Analytics 2.2.90a6-7; but virtual containing is attributed most of all to the cause. 25. Similarly, it is possible to have distinct knowledge of the subject and yet not to know that the property is in it, because of ignorance of its extrinsic cause. For example, it is possible to understand the moon in the abstract and yet not to know whether it is eclipsed, because whether the earth is interposed is not known. 26. If it be said that the middle term is the definition of the subject [1.166; Scotus, Ordinatio I Prol. p.3 qq.1-3, n.191], and consequently is really the subject, and so if virtual containing is attributed to the middle term, it must be attributed also to the subject, on the contrary: the middle is the cause of inherence of the property in the subject, according to them, but the cause of the inherence is frequently an extrinsic cause, which is really distinguished from the subject. It is plain in the adduced example {1.233}. Therefore, the virtual containing is attributed rather to some other thing than to the subject. 27. There is a confirmation, because according to the Philosopher in diverse places, Physics 1.1.184a10-14 and Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b8-12, knowledge of a thing depends on knowledge of all its causes. How this is to be understood, however, will be plain later [1.255]. Therefore knowledge of a property depends not only on knowledge of the subject but on the knowledge of other causes; therefore the subject does not first contain it. 28. Fourth, I argue as follows: according to this Doctor [Scotus, Ordinatio I d.3 p.1 qq.1-2 nn.35, 48], nothing leads to a knowledge of something else save because it contains it virtually or essentially. But there are many relational properties (or connotative properties according to another way of speaking) that can in no way be known save when something is pre-known that is not contained in the subject either virtually or essentially. Therefore knowledge of the subject does not contain knowledge of those properties, because it does not contain virtually knowledge of the things that are presupposed to knowledge of the properties. The minor is plain, because being beatifiable is a property of a rational creature, and this property can in no way be known unless blessedness is known; because if it is a relational property, since knowledge of a relation depends on knowledge of its term, the term must be known beforehand; in the same way if it is a connotative term. Likewise, to be creatable is a property of a creature; likewise, to be able to have charity is a passion of a rational creature; and likewise to be able to receive form is a property of matter. And yet form, charity, beatitude {1.234} and the like, which are either the terms of these properties or are connoted by these properties, are not contained in the subjects either virtually or essentially. And consequently knowledge of them is not caused by knowledge of the subject, nor consequently is knowledge of the properties to which is the knowledge of them presupposed. 29. If it be objected against this reasoning that these are not properties properly speaking, because the subject is always more perfect than its property; it is not so here. Likewise, the subject is an efficient cause of its property; it is not so here. Page 120

30. This does not hold, because these are properties; for these propositions, since they are necessary, must be per se in the first or second mode, as has been made clear in one of the questions [1.178-181]. But they are not per se in the first mode, therefore in the second mode; and consequently the predicate is a property of the subject. However it is not necessary that it always be a proper property. 31. And when it is said that the subject is not more imperfect than the property, I say that whether the property in itself is more perfect or more imperfect, sometimes something imported by the property is more perfect than the subject, as it is in the case at hand. And so, since knowledge of the more imperfect does not virtually contain knowledge of the more perfect, according to them [1.233], it follows that the subject does not virtually contain knowledge of what is imported by the property, nor consequently knowledge of the property. 32. And {1.235} when it is said that the subject is efficient cause of its property, this will be shown later [1.252-253] to be false. 33. If it be said in another way that it is sufficient to know the thing imported by the property in a concept common to it and to other things, and that the subject virtually contains that sort of knowledge of it, on the contrary: not only are they properties as they import something in common but as they import something in particular, as ‘to be creatable by three supposits existing in a single nature’. And yet these properties can never by known by virtue of the subject. 34. Fifth, I argue as follows: if the subject were thus to contain the predicate etc., it would follow that, when some subject is known, any property about it could be evidently known. The consequent is simply false. The consequence is plain: because knowledge of the property could be had by virtue of knowledge of the subject and, when these are had, knowledge of the premises could be had, and finally knowledge of the conclusion. The falsity of the consequent is plain, because if so, all these sort of things would be evidently knowable: the intellective soul is beatifiable, it can see the divine essence, it can have charity. These things cannot be known naturally but only supernaturally. 35. If it be said, as this Doctor says [Scotus, Ordinatio I Prol. p.1 q.un. n.28], that the soul or the intellective power is not naturally knowable to us “under that proper and special idea under which it is ordered to such an end and under which it is capable of consummate grace,” and so on of the rest. “For the soul is not known by us, nor is our nature, for this present state save {1.236} under some general idea that can be abstracted from sensible features,” under which it is not ordered to beatitude nor to the vision of the divine essence. And therefore these properties cannot be known by us by virtue of the knowledge of the subject that is possible for us in this present state. 36. On the contrary: our soul under that idea is naturally knowable either by itself or by some other intellectual nature, and yet the end is naturally knowable by no intellectual nature. 37. Similarly, to be able to be perpetuated to infinity is a property of these things here below, and yet it cannot be evidently known, however much the subject be distinctly known. Page 121

38. Further, these accidents, according to him [Scotus, Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 7 q.3], are distinctly known by us for this present state, and yet their dependence on the substance cannot be known in particular, just as neither the substance itself on which it depends, according to this Doctor. 39. Similarly, from these accidents, however much they be known distinctly and in particular, cannot be known all their causes in particular. And so it seems sufficiently manifest that many are the properties of creatures that cannot be naturally known, however much the subjects of them may be known. 40. Sixth I argue: that if so, then any property of being would be known self-evidently about being. The consequent is false. Proof of the consequence: because if the subject does thus contain the predicate, then any such proposition declaring of being the properties of being would be known from knowledge of the terms. Because when the subject and predicate are distinctly known, the proposition is at once known, for you [Scotus, Ordinatio I d.2 p.1 qq.1-2 n.18]. But being can only be known distinctly {1.237}, because it is simply simple, for you [Scotus, Ordinatio I d.3 p.1 qq.1-2 n.80]; therefore any such proposition would be self-evident. 41. Similarly, I take one such proposition: it is either known from the terms or it is not. If it is, the proposed conclusion is obtained; if not, then distinct knowledge of the subject does not contain it virtually first, but something else is required that contains the knowledge, at least partially. 42. If it be said that there is a prior property that being contains virtually, and it contains the posterior property, and so without it the other cannot be known by virtue of the knowledge of being, on the contrary: your exposition [1.228] is that ‘it contains it virtually when everything else is per impossibile removed’. Therefore when the property that you put first is removed, it will still contain it virtually. 43. Besides, at least there follows the fact that by us for this present state all the properties of being can be known evidently of being. Because once the knowledge of being is had, which knowledge can only be distinct according to them [Scotus, Ordinatio I d.3 p.1 qq.1-2 n.80], at once is knowledge of the first property had, and consequently knowledge of the second property and the third and fourth and so on about all the rest. But that is manifestly false, because it cannot be evidently known by us that every being is intuitively knowable by us, and so on about many things, even according to this Doctor [Ordinatio I Prol. p.1 q.un n.33]. 44. If it be said to all these things that this opinion does not understand conceptual knowledge of the subject to be a cause of conceptual knowledge of the property, but understands it of propositional knowledge, on the contrary: this does evidently seem to be his intention {1.238}. Because in his first reason [1.227] he says that conclusions are contained in the principles, and it is certain that the sole containing is that which is between propositions; but afterwards he says that propositions are contained in the terms and the predicate term in the subject. Therefore, in this process, he understands that conceptual knowledge contains conceptual knowledge. 45. Similarly, it is plain from his exposition about ‘containing first’. Because he says [1.228] that that ‘contains first’ which contains such that “it does not depend on others in Page 122 containing but all the others depend on it.” But this could not be true unless the subject were to contain conceptual knowledge of the property. 46. Further, this is plain from his second reason [ibid.], because he there accepts that the subject is adequate cause of the whole habit, therefore it is cause of conceptual knowledge of the property. 47. Similarly, I argue from his other reason [1.228]: that in things essentially ordered it happens that a stand is made at one first thing. But these conceptual knowledges are essentially ordered, according to him [ibid.], so there is a first one containing another. 48. Similarly, this is plain from his example in the same place [actually Scotus, Reportatio I Prol. q.1 a.2 n.5]. Because he says that an isosceles triangle contains all the properties of a triangle; therefore a triangle, which is a certain [incomplex] unity, virtually contains its properties. 49. Besides, in diverse places [Ordinatio I d.3 p.1 qq.1-2 n.35] he takes this proposition, that “any object whatever, with the agent or possible intellect cooperating {1.239} to the ultimate of their power, makes, as an adequate effect, its own proper concept and a concept of everything essentially or virtually included in it.” But it does not make a concept of other things that are essentially included through the sort of discourse that there is between propositions. Therefore neither does it of other things virtually included. 50. And it is plain that his understanding is not about conceptual knowledge with respect to propositional knowledge, because such containing is always discursive, or through some consequence. But he himself means, ibid., that things virtually included in some subject are not known discursively from that subject. Hence he says, ibid., as follows: “Besides its own adequate concept and the things included in it, in one of the two stated ways, nothing can be known from the object save discursively. But a discursive process presupposes knowledge of the simple to which the discourse proceeds.” 51. Further, directly in the same place, he takes this proposition: “No object makes in any intellect a simple concept proper to itself and a simple concept of another object unless it contain that other object essentially or virtually.” Therefore, according to him, the object makes a simple concept of that which is virtually included in it. But a simple concept is either conceptual knowledge or known by conceptual knowledge. 52. Against the second [1.229], because the subject does not always virtually include the property. Because if it did, this is only either because it causes some really distinct thing inhering in it or because {1.240} it causes a concept of that thing. It cannot be said to do so in the second way, because it can never cause a concept of a thing unless it cause knowledge of the thing. But it is not a cause of knowledge, as was proved [1.235, cf. also 252-253]; therefore not of a concept either. Nor can it be said to do so in the first way, because the properties are not always absolute things really distinct, according to them [e.g. John of Reading, 1.131], because creative, true, good, and the like are properties of certain things and yet are not things distinct from them. 53. Further, sometimes a property imports something more perfect than the subject, just as being in potency to form imports form, which is more perfect than the matter. But Page 123 what is more perfect in this way is not contained in the more imperfect. For then knowledge of the more imperfect would virtually contain knowledge of the more perfect, contrary to them [1.234].

The Author’s Own Opinion

54. Therefore as to this article I first say that, universally, conceptual knowledge of one external thing is never a sufficient cause, even along with the intellect, as regard the first conceptual knowledge of another thing. Second, that a subject does not always contain its property virtually. Third, that not always are distinct conceptual knowledge of a subject and distinct knowledge of a property sufficient for knowledge of a proposition composed of this subject and that property. Fourth, I will show what belongs to the idea of a first subject.

{1.241} Conceptual Knowledge of One Thing does not Cause Conceptual Knowledge of another Thing

55. The first is made clear by experience, because anyone at all experiences in himself that, however much he may intuitively and perfectly know some thing, never does he by it know another thing unless he first have knowledge of that other thing. For example, if I know these bodies below and have never seen the bodies above, I would have no knowledge of the sun, moon, and stars, and suchlike bodies. And the reason is that all knowledge abstractive of some thing in itself, or simple knowledge proper to some thing, presupposes, naturally speaking, intuitive knowledge of the same thing. But intuitive knowledge of some thing can never naturally be had save effectively from that thing, whether mediately or immediately; therefore neither can knowledge abstractive of the same thing be had, and consequently not any knowledge. The major is plain, and especially about acquired knowledge, although it could be done otherwise by divine power. Because, as was argued before [1.229], between cause and effect there is a maximally essential order and dependence, and yet conceptual knowledge there of one thing does not contain conceptual knowledge of another thing. This too does anyone experience in himself, that however perfectly he may know some thing, that never will he think, with a simple and proper thought, about another thing which he has never apprehended before either by the senses or the intellect. Just as if someone were intuitively to see a substance, he would never thereby distinctly know some accident in particular. 56. If it be said that if a subject were known according to all its being, that then all its properties would be known. For example, if it were known {1.242} according to the being according to which it is the subject of this property, this property would be known, and so on of other things: 57. Similarly, if a cause were known under the idea of cause, the effect would be known: Page 124

58. The first of these has no validity, because I ask about those reasons: either they state something on the part of the thing or they state nothing. If nothing, then the subject can be distinctly and perfectly known without them. If something, they state either the quiddity of the thing or a part of the quiddity or something accidental to it. If in the first way, the proposed conclusion is obtained, that the whole quiddity of a thing can be known without knowledge of any property at all. If it be said in a third way: the ‘being’ or ‘reasons’ will be certain properties of the thing, and consequently to say that if the subject were known according to all its being or all its reasons then all its properties would be known, is to say that if the subject were known along with its properties the properties would be known. Similarly, to know something insofar as it is the subject of a property necessarily presupposes knowledge of the property; therefore to know the subject in this way is not cause of knowledge of the property but rather the effect of it. 59. From this it is plain that the same subject under the same idea on the part of the subject (which idea must be presupposed to the property) can be the subject of diverse properties. Just as the same thing under the same idea on the part of the subject can be the subject of diverse accidents, although, because of the diversity of accidents, diverse denominations may follow; but these thus denominating properties will have rather the idea of properties than of subjects. For example, the same thing under the same idea on the part of the subject is able to be made cold and to be made hot, such that to these ideas that are ‘able to be made cold’ and ‘able to be made hot’ no distinction is presupposed {1.243} on the part of the subject. And just as was made clear in another question [1.144], ‘able to be made hot’ and ‘able to be made cold’ and the like, since they are necessarily predicated of the same thing, and consequently in the first or second per se mode of speaking, and since not in the first mode but the second, they must be properties. And thus is it about ‘movable’, about ‘how much’, and all things of this sort with respect to substance, because those ideas (on account of which many posit [Aquinas, ST Ia q.1 a.2 ad2] that about the same subject under different ideas there are distinct sciences) are distinct properties of the subject. Just as about body insofar as it is movable there is natural science, about body insofar as it is a quantum there is mathematics, because these ideas, namely to be movable and to be a quantum, are properties of body. From this it follows that, because of distinction of properties without any distinction on the part of the subject, there can be distinct sciences about the same subject. And consequently science depends as essentially on the property as on the subject, and so science is virtually contained, in its own way, in the property as in the subject. And so the subject does not contain the science first, because it depends, in its containing, on the property. 60. The second [1.242, n.57] is also not valid, because to know a cause under the idea of cause presupposes knowledge of the thing that is the effect. Because according to them [Scotus, Quodl. q.14 n.23], a cause insofar as it is a cause states a respect, but a respect presupposes knowledge both of the foundation and of the term. Therefore that knowledge is not cause of knowledge of the effect but rather conversely. Similarly, just as he who knows a cause under the idea of cause knows {1.244} the effect, so he who knows the effect under the idea of an effect knows the cause. So, for this reason, knowledge of the cause does not more contain virtually knowledge of the effect than vice versa. Similarly, Page 125 anything at all has such ideas in respect of everything, because there is not a thing to which it does not have a certain excess in perfection, such as to exceed or be exceeded. And consequently it cannot be known under such ideas unless everything is known; and so anything whatever would virtually contain knowledge of everything. 61. If it be said, as some say, that ‘knowledge of a property being contained virtually in something’ can be understood in three ways: either only as in efficient cause, or as in a representing object, or as in a subject immediately containing such a property that is necessarily said of that subject. What is contained in the two first ways virtually in something does not belong necessarily to the science of it, but that which is contained in the third way does: 62. But this does not seem to be to the purpose, because then the subject’s virtually containing knowledge of the property is not other than the subject’s virtually containing the property. But a subject can virtually contain the property although it not be able to cause knowledge of the property. Therefore etc.

The Subject does not always Contain the Property Virtually

63. Secondly, I say that the subject does not always contain the property virtually, because frequently are properties certain relational concepts, according to some [cf. John of Reading, 1.131], or connotative ones, according to others {1.245} [Ockham himself, 1.139, Peter Aureol, Scriptum I d.8 sect. 23 nn.189-195], and they import certain things the are not contained virtually in the subject; and so neither are the concepts contained virtually in the subject.

What is Required for Knowledge of a Proposition?

64. Third, I say that also not always do distinct knowledge of the subject and distinct knowledge of the property immediately contain virtually knowledge of the immediate proposition. Because, according to this Doctor [Scotus, Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle I q.4 n.18], this proposition is immediate: heat is maker of heat. Nor is any other cause to be asked for as to why heat is maker of heat save that heat is heat. And yet the subject can be known distinctly, and the passion likewise distinctly, and not this proposition: heat is maker of heat. Therefore etc. The assumption is plain, because if someone were to see heat intuitively through the intellect and were to know distinctly that the sun would heat these lower bodies, if he never knew through experience that heat would produce heat, because nothing heatable would be close to him, such a one would no more know evidently that heat is maker of heat than that whiteness is productive of whiteness. And so distinct knowledge of the subject and the property do not suffice for knowledge of such an immediate proposition. 65. Therefore I say that, for knowledge of such truths, intuitive knowledge is frequently required, by mediation of which is received evident knowledge of a contingent truth, and without this knowledge, evident knowledge of a universal and necessary proposition cannot be had, as was made clear above [1.245, 147] {1.246}. It is the same Page 126 way about man and able to laugh, because if someone never knew from experience that man laughs, he would know that man was capable of laughter or not.

What belongs to the Idea of the First Subject

66. About the fourth I say that it is not of the idea of the subject to contain the properties virtually, as has been made clear [1/244-245]. Nor even that science be determined and specified by it, because the subject can be simply the same in reality and in idea and yet can belong to a distinct science because of the distinction of properties. Nor is it of the idea of the subject that science get its dignity from the subject because, while the subject is the same, one science can be nobler than another because of the greater nobility of one property over another. Just as the science by which I know that every man is capable of being beatified is nobler than the science by which I know that man is capable of laughter, and yet the subject is the same, but one property is nobler than the other. Similarly, the science by which I know that the intellective soul is capable of being beatified (on the supposition that this were evidently known) is nobler than the science by which I know that the intellective soul is able to sin (positing too that this were known by science properly speaking). Nor is it of the idea of the subject that it be the first thing that occurs to the intellect in that science and another science under the idea of it, because sometimes the property happens to be prior to the subject both in primacy of generation and in primacy of perfection, because sometimes properties are both more known and more perfect. For example, properties importing accidents are more known than their subjects, and almost universally the acts and operations from which {1.247} properties are taken are more known than their subjects. Similarly, the form that is imported by a property of matter is more perfect than matter itself. And from this follows that it is not of the idea of the subject that it be the first thing that moves, nor that it be the first idea of moving, the intellect to all the knowledge to which such a habit [of science] inclines. Nor is it of the idea of the subject that the knowledge of it be principally intended in science, because principally intended is knowledge of the whole proposition. Similarly, sometimes the subject is equally perfectly known first, just as the moon is not known more perfectly because it is known that it is eclipsed, but something else is known about it that was not known before.21

21 Cod. F has: “Giles [of Rome] posits the opposite of these things, in the first book in the first question of the Prologue. And therefore response is made to his first [point], that he takes the subject improperly for that which is considered in a science. For not everything considered is the subject, but what is considered first and principally and in every way. And thus there is only one subject in a science; and as such nothing can be considered by diverse sciences. — To his second point one must say that no property is nobler than the subject save in a certain respect, and this it has from the subject insofar as it is a property. — To the third one must say that it always occurs according to imperfect knowledge, because perfect knowledge of it is the end of science; because of which it is not inappropriate that some property be perfectly known first. — What he says about matter is not properly said, because matter is not the subject in any science, since it is pure potency. — As to what he says about the proposition that is principally intended, it is plain too the it is false, because the proposition is intended because of knowledge of the subject. — Note subtly the conclusions that he says are not of the idea of the subject in science, the opposite of which, however, was said, although badly. — Note that the same thing is the subject virtually of science and of conclusion. Note this (Giles of Rome, 1 Sent. I Prol. q.1). Page 127

67. Therefore I say that of the idea of the subject of science there is not anything save that it be made subject in respect of the predicate in a proposition known by science {1.248} properly speaking, such that universally the same thing and under the same idea is the subject of the science and the subject of the known conclusion. 68. This is made clear: because either the subject of the science and the subject of the conclusion are simply the same, and the proposition is gained; or they are not the same; but this is impossible, because it is impossible for science to be had without knowledge of the subject of the science. But science can be had without knowledge of anything that is not one of the premises, nor is the conclusion, nor the subject of the conclusion, nor the predicate, nor the middle term. Therefore the subject of the science is one of these; but it is not a premise, nor the conclusion, nor the predicate, nor the middle term; therefore what is left is that it is the subject of the conclusion. 69. There is a confirmation: because every subject of a science is some concept. But besides the subject of the conclusion and the predicate, nothing is a concept save the middle term. And it is not the predicate of the conclusion, nor the middle term; therefore etc. 70. If it be said that this reasoning proceeds only of a science of one conclusion that is had through one demonstration, but now the question is about the subject of a science through which many conclusions are known: 71. This objection is not valid because just as (as in the case of distinct partial sciences) the subject of any partial science is related to any partial science, so the subject of the whole science that includes (whether formally or equivalently) all the partial sciences is, if it be one, disposed to the whole of that science. Therefore, just as the subject of a partial science and the subject of the conclusion are simply the same, so the subject of the whole science and the subject of all the conclusions will be simply the same. 72. {1.249} Further, according to everyone [Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.28.87a38-39], the subject is that of which the features and properties are considered; but such is always the subject of the conclusion or of the conclusions; therefore it belongs to the idea of the subject that it be the subject of the conclusion. 73. Further, that is the first idea of a subject, which when posited (with everything else removed), something can be a subject, and which, when not posited (whatever else is posited), there cannot be a subject. But when this alone is posited, that something is the subject of a conclusion (or conclusions) known by science properly speaking, and everything else is removed (as that the subject not contain it virtually, and so on about other conditions), it will truly be the subject of the science, because this science will truly have some subject. And it is certain that no subject can be given save the subject of the conclusion. Similarly, whatever other condition is posited, if it not be the subject in the conclusion, cannot be the subject in the science. 74. In the same way I say that the idea of the subject either is the subject of the conclusion, and then the idea of the subject and the subject are simply the same, or is a part of the subject. This is plain because it is impossible to have a science when the idea of the subject is not known. But science can be had when that which is not some Page 128 proposition in the demonstration, nor a term nor a part of the term of the demonstration, is unknown. Therefore it is necessary that the idea of the subject be either some proposition or some concept or a part of a concept. And it cannot be a proposition nor a middle term or a predicate, therefore it is the subject or a part of the subject. 75. There is a confirmation: because just as the idea of acting is disposed to action, so in some way is the idea of the subject disposed to science; but for an action {1.250} there always concurs the idea of acting; therefore, in the same way, for science there always concurs the idea of the subject. Therefore when the idea of the subject is unknown or not expressed, science cannot be had. 76. If it be said that when this conclusion is known ‘every man is susceptible of learning’, there the idea of the subject is the intellective soul, because by it does this property belong to man, and yet the intellective soul is not there the subject nor a part of the subject: 77. This is not valid, because the idea of the subject (according as we are now speaking of it) is distinguished both from the predicate and from the middle term. And therefore, because the soul is that by which this property belongs to man, it will be the middle term for demonstrating this property of man, and not the idea of the subject, according as we are now speaking of the idea of the subject.

Objections against the Aforesaid

78. But against the aforesaid some objections arise. First because it seems that knowledge of the subject would virtually contain knowledge of the property. Because, as some things are disposed in entity so are they disposed in knowability [Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1.993b30-31]; but the subject is cause of the entity of the property; therefore knowledge of the subject is cause of knowledge of the property. 79. Further, through the definition of the subject are known all the features and properties of it, according to the Commentator [Averroes], On the Soul 1 t.11, and Physics 4. t.31. Hence he says in the Physics, comment 31: “A definition, which gives the quiddity, must have in place three things. Of these things one is that through it are dissolved the questions that arise in it. But the second {1.251} is so that through it may appear the cause of the things existing in it through sense, namely the cause of all the sensible accidents in it. For complete definitions are of a nature to give the cause of all the accidents existing in the thing.” From this authority it is plain that when something is known distinctly and definitively, every accident of it can be known by virtue of that knowledge, and so, much more strongly, all the properties. 80. Further, knowledge of the principles virtually contains knowledge of the conclusion; similarly, knowledge of a lower [e.g. in classification] contains knowledge of a higher; therefore it is not unacceptable for one knowledge to contain another. 81. Further, knowledge of a likeness, as of a statue, causes knowledge of that of which it is the likeness. Page 129

82. A second doubt is that it seems that knowledge of causes is sufficient to cause knowledge of the effect, as the Philosopher seems to mean in Physics 1.1.184a10-14 and other places [De Anima 1.1.402b21-22, Ethics 1.4.1095b1-8]. 83. A third doubt is that it does not seem that the same thing is subject of the science and subject of the conclusion, because in the case of any science, as metaphysics, mathematics, and natural philosophy, there is one subject and yet there is not one subject of a conclusion, but there are many subjects of many conclusions. 84. Further, as the object is to the power so is the subject to the science; but the first object of a power is something common to all the others; therefore the first subject of a science is something common to all the others. 85. {1.252} Further, the Commentator on Metaphysics IV t.2 says, “Just as one science considers all the things that are attributes of health, namely medicine, so one science should consider all the things that are attributes of being.” Therefore it seems that being is a first subject and yet it is not the subject of all the conclusions. 86. A fourth doubt is what is the subject of the habit by which the principles and conclusion are known? 87. A fifth doubt is how can there be distinct sciences of the same thing under the same idea?

Solution of the Doubts

88. To the first of these [1.250, n.78] I say that, positing that the subject would virtually contain the property, still knowledge of the subject would not virtually contain knowledge of the property. And when it is said ‘as something is disposed to entity etc.’, I say that as to something it is alike and as to something it is not alike. For it is alike as to this, that as the entity of one thing is nobler than the entity of another, so the knowability of one is nobler than the knowability of another, and the knowledge of one is nobler than knowledge of the other. But as to causality it is not so, because if it were so then just as knowledge of the effect, at least propositional knowledge, can be cause of the propositional knowledge of the cause, so the effect itself could be cause of the cause itself, which is false. Similarly, the sun is cause of a worm and cause of a color, and yet conceptual knowledge of the sun {1.253} is not cause of conceptual knowledge of a worm or of a color. And so, notwithstanding that the entity of one thing could be cause of the entity of another, yet it would not be necessary that the knowledge be cause of knowledge. 89. To the other [1.250-251, n.79], it can be said that a definition is cause of all of them etc., because, in the acquiring of propositional knowledge of a property or properties and of accidents of some subject, the definition of the subject concurs as a partial cause. And this the definition does itself or a part of it, because sometimes one part is the reason for demonstrating some properties of the subject, sometimes another part is the reason for demonstrating other properties of it. Just as of man is demonstrated through his rational soul, as through a middle term, that he can discourse, syllogize, sin, and the like; and of man is demonstrated through his body, as through a middle term, that Page 130 he is capable of laughter, changeable, and so on. And thus does the cause of all the accidents appear through the definition, and this either thought the definition itself or through some part of it. However such things cannot be known without experience, and so the definition of the subject is not the total cause. — In another way: because the Commentator is speaking [1.250-251] of a definition given through an addition, which sort of definition alone can belong in place. And it, if it be complete, must express the things by which its distinction from other things is distinguished or can become known to us. And thus by its definition as through a partial cause are the things known that belong to it, and the difficult questions about its nature are solved; however, not by this is knowledge of other things excluded. 90. As to the other [1.251, n.80] I concede that knowledge of one object contains knowledge of another object. And this happens by inference, as when a conclusion {1.254} is inferred from premises; or by composition, as when from knowledge of a term or terms is some proposition, whether contingent or necessary, evidently known; or by abstraction as, after some singular is known, something common can, by virtue of that knowledge, be abstracted and thus known; and yet without all previous knowledge of some singular or other it could not be known. And therefore knowledge of the singular will be cause of the knowledge of that something common, but knowledge of one singular is never a sufficient cause (along with the intellect) of the knowledge of another singular which is not common to it. 91. To the other [1.251, n.81], that when knowledge of a likeness causes knowledge of that of which it is the likeness, it is not, along with the intellect, a sufficient cause, but there is necessarily required habitual knowledge of that of which it is the likeness. Hence if someone were to see a statue of Hercules, and he had altogether no knowledge of Hercules, he would by this no more think of Hercules than of Achilles. But because he first knew Hercules and habitual knowledge of Hercules remains in him, therefore when afterwards he sees his likeness, he is led by virtue of that habitual knowledge and of this seeing of the likeness to an act of remembering Hercules, and not to a first knowledge of Hercules himself. 92. And therefore was it said before [1.254, n.90] that knowledge of one thing outside does not sufficiently lead, along with the intellect, to a first conceptual knowledge of another thing in itself. And I call knowledge of a thing in itself when by that conceptual knowledge {1.255}, and not by some part of it, something other than the thing is understood. By this is excluded the objection by which it is proved that I know the Pope whom I have never seen. 93. And if it be asked what is the cause of these statements, I say that it is the nature of the thing. But this is certain for us through experience. For we experience all the aforesaid in us. 94. To the second doubt [1.251, n.82] I say that knowledge of all the causes together does not suffice for causing conceptual knowledge of the effect. However, knowledges of the causes come together, at least as partial causes, for propositional knowledge of the effect. And this does the Philosopher [1.251] mean, because he speaks of discursive knowledge, which sort alone is between concepts. Page 131

95. To the third [1.251, n.83] I say that of metaphysics and likewise of mathematics there is not one subject, speaking of the force of speech, but there are as many subjects of the sciences as there are subjects of the conclusions. However, between the subjects there can be a multiple order, as when there is an order of predication, because in the science some properties are demonstrated of what is common, some of those inferior to them. There can also be an order of perfection, because one is more noble and another less noble. There can also be an order of totality, because one, or what is imported by one subject, is the whole, another is an essential or integral part. And frequently the first subject among all the subjects is assigned to be the first subject of the whole science; which however is in truth not one, because as the science is not one so it does not have one subject. However {1.256} among all these subjects there can be one that is first by some primacy. As in the book of the Physics the first subject [is first] by primacy of predication with respect to some things, and by primacy of perfection with respect to others, and by primacy of totality with respect to others, namely with respect to matter and form is material body posited by many [as first]. And yet according to the truth of the thing it is not the subject of the whole book of the Physics but only of that part in which the properties of the natural body are demonstrated, and not of the contents of it nor of its parts nor of anything else. This is plain, because the same thing is posited as subject of the book of Physics and of the whole of natural philosophy, because in the book of Physics determination is made about it in common and in the other books about the contents of it. Similarly, the same thing is posited as the subject of the book of the Prior Analytics and of the whole of logic, because in the book of the Prior Analytics determination is made about syllogism in common and in other books about the contents of it, as in the book of the Posterior Analytics etc., or about its parts, as in the book of Categories and of De Interpretatione. And yet this notwithstanding distinct subjects are posited by them of distinct books. And consequently it does not have only one subject but there are many subjects according to the multitude of books. So I say in the matter at hand that there are many subjects according to the multitude of conclusions having distinct subjects, among which however there is one first thing with diverse primacies in respect of diverse things; and sometimes there is one first with one primacy and another first with another primacy. And this is perhaps the cause why some [e.g. Avicenna, Metaphysics I ch.2] have posited that being is the subject of metaphysics, and others [e.g. Averroes, On Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV t.1] that God is {1.257}; because among all subjects God is first by primacy of perfection, and being is first by primacy of predication. 96. Therefore I say that just as, according to everyone, natural philosophy is one science (extending the ‘oneness’), and likewise mathematics, and yet any one of them has distinct parts having distinct subjects, and consequently they do not have only one subject, so the book of Physics and geometry and suchlike parts of the aforesaid sciences have distinct parts having distinct subjects, among which however there is an order, as has been made clear [1.225-227]. And so neither of the book of Physics nor of the book De Anima is there only one subject, but there are distinct subjects of the distinct parts, in which the properties of the distinct parts are shown. And there is one subject of the part in Page 132 which determination is made about the soul in common, and another subject in the part in which determination is made about the sensitive soul, and another of the part in which determination is made of the intellective soul, and so on of others. 97. And the proof of this is that soul and intellective soul and sensitive soul have the sort of order according to higher and lower that body and celestial body and generable and corruptive body have. But these, body and celestial body and generable and corruptible body, are put as subjects of distinct parts of natural philosophy; therefore in the same way too are other parts put as distinct subjects of the parts of the science in which determination is made about them. 98. Similarly {1.258}, just as there is one subject of the book of Categories, in which determination is made about concepts that are part of propositions, and another subject of the book De Interpretatione, in which determination is made about the propositions that are parts of syllogisms, and another of the book Prior Analytics, in which determination is made about syllogism in common, of which the predicates are the parts, so I say, equally reasonably, that there is one subject of the part in which determination is made about prime matter, and another subject of the part in which determination is made about form, and another subject of the part in which determination is made about the composite. 99. To the other [1.251 n.84]: that a subject is not related to the science as an object to the power, because the object is that which is term of the act of the power, but the subject is not the thing which is known, nor is it the term of the act of the science, save partially, so the case is not alike. 100. To the other [1.252 n.85] I say that the Commentator is taking one science there broadly, and taking the first subject for that which is first by a certain priority among all the subjects. And in this way I say being is the first subject of metaphysics, because it is first among all the subjects by primacy of predication, and yet along with this stands that there are distinct subjects of distinct parts. 101. And so, by virtue of speech, the statement of the Commentator [1.252] is false when he says that being is the subject of metaphysics. Because, since being is not the subject of all the parts of metaphysics but of one part or of some certain parts, it cannot be said that it is {1.259}, by virtue of speech, the subject of the whole science. However, according to his intention, being is the subject of metaphysics, because by this proposition ‘being is the subject of metaphysics’ he understands this proposition ‘among all the subjects of the diverse parts of metaphysics being is first by primacy of predication’. And then there is a likeness between the question by which is asked what the subject of metaphysics is or of the book Categories, and the question by which is asked who is the king of the world or who is the king of all Christianity; because just as diverse kingdoms have diverse kings and none is king of the whole, and yet sometimes these kings can have an order among themselves, namely because one is more powerful than another or richer, so nothing is the subject of the whole of metaphysics but there are diverse subjects of diverse parts. And yet those subjects can have an order among themselves, as was said before [1.255-257]. 102. To the fourth doubt [1.252 n.86] I say that the habit which is equivalently understanding of principles and science of the conclusion, because it is one with respect Page 133 to principles and conclusion, has the subject of the conclusion for subject; because it is necessary that the subject be some concept, and besides the subject of the conclusion there is no other concept save the predicate or the middle term, neither of which is posited as the subject of the science. 103. Similarly I say that if it be possible that there be some one habit with respect to principles and conclusions that have distinct subjects, there is not any one subject of that habit but it has many subjects, namely all those that are subjects of the distinct sciences to which this one habit is equivalent. 104. {1.260} To the last doubt [1.252, n.87] it is plain before that about the same subject, because of diversity of predicates, there can be distinct sciences. 105. And if it be said that something is considered in metaphysics insofar as it is being and in another science insofar as it is the subject of some determinate properties; and yet here there are not distinct properties but only distinct modes of consideration; therefore only a diverse mode of consideration causes a diversity in sciences: 106. I reply that the same thing is considered in metaphysics and in another science, such that there are distinct sciences about it because of the distinction of properties. Because in metaphysics the properties of being are shown about it (and this is to consider it insofar as it is being), and in another science the proper properties of it are considered, and thus there is a diversity of the sciences having the same subject because of the diverse properties that are shown, and therefore a diverse mode of considering does nothing for diversity of science. This is plain, because either this diversity in mode of consideration is on the part of the object, so that there is some diversity in the object, or it is precisely on the part of the intellect doing the considering. If in the first way, since on the part of the object there is only a proposition or a concept, it must be either some proposition or some complex. But there cannot be variation in a concept unless a variation follows in the proposition; therefore it must be that there are different propositions there. Either then there will be a different conclusion or a different premise. If there is a different premise, there will still be the same science, because {1.261} it was made clear before [1.9-10] that the science of the same conclusion proved through diverse principles is the same. But if there is another conclusion, the proposed result is gained, because since the subject is the same, it must be that the property is different if the conclusion is distinct. If it be said in the second way, this cannot be save by variation of act. But it does not seem possible that with respect to the same conclusion simply there could be acts of knowing distinct in species. And so it is not properly said that a diverse way of considering causes a diversity of sciences, and that the same way of considering causes an identity of sciences, but always does a distinction of sciences require a distinction of subjects or predicates. 107. And this is plain from those [1.243] who speak thus, because they say natural philosophy considers something insofar as it is changeable, and metaphysics considers the same thing insofar as it is being. But this is not possible save because the consideration is about something that is changeable and that is being, and so on about others. And it is manifest that these are distinct predicates. Page 134

108. There is also a confirmation of this: because a science is always in respect of some proposition, therefore, when a stand is made precisely at the same subject, a distinction of science will not be obtained. And this is what the Commentator says expressly On Aristotle’s De Anima, I t.17, where he makes clear how metaphysics and natural science consider diverse properties and are thereby distinguished, as is plain to someone who inspects them. 109. {1.262} And therefore I say universally that about the same subject there cannot be several sciences properly speaking save because of diversity of properties.

Response to the Reasons of Scotus

110. To the reasons for the first opinion. As to the first [1.227], when it is said that the first subject contains immediate propositions, because the subject of them contains the predicate, I say, as was proved before [1.244-245], that neither does the subject contain the predicate first nor does knowledge of the subject contain knowledge of the predicate first, according to what he himself expounds as ‘contain first’ because, for having these, there are distinct ideas of knowing required, according to this Doctor [1.228]. Likewise, sometimes the predicate is more perfect than the subject, as has been made clear [1.246], therefore etc. I say too, as has been made clear [1.245], that not always do the terms virtually contain knowledge of an immediate principle, because it was made clear before that some immediate principles are not known from the known terms. 111. As to the second [1.228]: that the subject is not the adequate cause of the whole habit, but the knowledge itself of the subject is disposed to the habit as partial cause to effect. Because, in respect of per se known principles, knowledge of the subject and knowledge of the predicate are two partial causes, neither of which suffices without the other. 112. And if it be said that these two causes are not accidentally ordered, therefore essentially ordered, and consequently one virtually contains {1.263} the other, I reply, according to the principles of this Doctor [Scotus, Ordinatio I d.3 p.3 q.2 nn,289-298], which I reckon true in this part, that in respect of any effect there can occur two partial causes neither of which receives virtue from the other; and consequently neither is contained virtually in the other nor moved by the other, as he himself posits about the intellect and the object in respect of intellection. So it is, I say, in the matter at hand, that knowledge of the subject and knowledge of the predicate are two partial causes, and yet neither is contained virtually in the other, but each is a container through its own idea. And therefore the subject is not first a container virtually, because in containing it as depends on the predicate as the predicate depends on it; and sometimes it depends more on the predicate in containing than the predicate on it, by the fact that the predicate is sometimes a container more perfectly. However, one must understand that, in these naturally discovered sciences, properly speaking neither the subject nor the predicate is a container, but the knowledges of them. And this according to the opinion that posits that universals have only objective being [1.30 note 3]. Page 135

113. To the third reason [1.228] I say that in things essentially ordered a stand happens to be made at some first, but it is not necessary that the order of the first to the second be always of like sort with the order of the second to the third or of the third to the fourth. For example, the object of the intellect and intellection and volition have in some way an essential order. And yet, positing that the object is first, there is not then a like order of object to intellection and of intellection to volition, because volition cannot be without intellection, and is caused by it. {1.264} Not so is intellection always caused by the object, because abstractive intellection can be without an object. Similarly, sometimes love is more perfect than the cognition and yet the cognition is more imperfect than the object. Similarly, the following have an essential order: the composite, form, and matter. For matter is prior in nature to form, and form is prior in nature to the composite, and yet form is cause of the composite and matter is not cause of form. Similarly the following are ordered: matter, form, and an accident of form; and form is more perfect than and cause of its accident, and yet matter is not more perfect than nor cause of form. And so it is plain that there is not always a like order of first to second and of second to third. And therefore, although knowledge of the principles virtually contain knowledge of the conclusion, yet it is not necessary that knowledge of the term do always in the same way virtually first contain knowledge of the other term, though it may be prior to it with some other priority. Similarly, not every order is an order of causality, and in particular of efficient causality, for genus and species are ordered and yet not according to an order of efficient causality. 114. And therefore it can be conceded that the subject is first among all knowables with some priority, but not with priority of causality; and therefore it is not necessary that it virtually contain the predicate. 115. Likewise {1.265}, as to the accepted fact [1.228] that a principle, if it be an immediate proposition, is known from the terms: it was said before [1.245-246] that not every first principle or immediate proposition is self-evidently known. 116. Similarly, when the view is taken [1.228] that ‘the predicate term is known from the idea of the subject’, it is false. 117. And when it is said [ibid.] that ‘the subject falls into the definition of the predicate’, let it be conceded when taking definition commonly for the ‘what’ of the thing and the ‘what’ of the name. But a definition does not only depend on one part but also on another. Therefore, a subject that is only part of the definition must not alone suffice for knowledge of the predicate, but another part can be required; and so knowledge of the subject is not sufficient.

The Author’s Opinion about the Subject of Theology

118. With these things seen, response must be made to the question. About which must some things first be prefaced necessary for the purpose; secondly to the form of the question.

Preliminary Distinctions Page 136

119. Concerning the first I first distinguish the subject, which is taken in two ways: either as it holds on the part of the object (and the prior discussion was about that), and thus does the question proceed; or as it is taken for that which is informed by the science, and thus is it the soul; and the question is not understood to be about this. 120. Second {1.266}, I say that the subject stated in the first way can be taken doubly: either for that which supposits in the conclusion, or for that for which it is supposited (and then the subject is taken improperly, for what supposits and what it is supposited for is not always the same. This is plain for in this proposition, ‘every man is capable of laughter’, that which supposits is something common to all men, whether it be a concept or not; but that for which it is supposited is some singular, because by this proposition no more is denoted than that every singular contained under ‘man’ can laugh; and it is not denoted that something common can laugh. Similarly, in this proposition ‘every being is created or uncreated’, that which supposits is something common to God and creature, whether in speech or concept I care not now; and yet it only supposits for some singular being. However, one needs to know that sometimes the same thing is that which supposits and that for which it is supposited, as in this proposition it is the same, ‘being is univocal to God and creature’. 121. From this follows a third thing, that there is a difference between the subject of science and the object of science, because the subject of science is the subject of the conclusion, but the object of science is that which is known and terminates the act of knowing. And of this sort is the known conclusion. And so the subject is part of the object; and if it be an object, it is only a partial object. 122. Fourth, I say that God, and universally every real being, can be understood (i) either in itself, such that altogether nothing else terminates the act of understanding, just as nothing other than whiteness [sc. whiteness as including all colors] terminates the act of seeing. And in this way it is not possible for us to understand God for this present state {1.267}, because never in this present state can God be as understood by us in particular as this whiteness can be seen. Or (ii) God can be understood in something else, namely a concept or, according to another opinion [1.267-268], he can be understood by some cognition common to himself and other things, whether according to the whole cognition or according to its parts. And then, if he have to be understood, the concept must be proper to him and, with respect to God, it can be only a composite concept. And in this way do we understand God for this present state. For we only understand this whole phrase ‘a being first and supreme and infinite’, or something the like. And so here it is something besides God in himself that terminates the act of understanding, and it is not really God although it be truly predicated of God, because then it would not be suppositing for itself but for God. 123. According to the opinion [1.30 n.3] which posits that a concept or an intention predicable of a thing for the thing is really the intention itself, it can be said, as was touched on before [1.266-267], that God cannot be understood without something else being understood either with the whole understanding or with parts of it. And then something can be understood by us in two ways: either that it alone is understood by Page 137 some intellection or at least by an intellection equivalent to such intellection in respect of it alone; and thus can God not, of common law, be understood by us. Or that it is understood by some intellection common according to itself or its parts, that is not proper simply or by equivalence according to itself or its parts {1.268}. And thus is God understood by us both in simple and in composite intellection, according to this mode of positing. 124. Fifth I make a distinction about science, because sometimes it is one with numerical unity, sometimes not. And if it is not, this happens in two ways: Either because it is in respect of diverse conclusions having the same subject; for example if being susceptible of teaching, being capable of sin, being capable of laughter, and so on as to other things, be shown of man. Or it is in respect of diverse conclusions not having the same subject; as if some properties be shown of animal and some of man and some of an ass. 125. Sixth, I make a distinction between our theology possible for us in this present state, and theology possible by divine power in the intellect of the wayfarer. And the latter can be taken in two says: either that it be totally in respect of the same things that our theology is in respect of, or that it is in respect of truths that God himself in himself or the Father is subject of etc. or it is simple knowledge proper to God.

Response to the Form of the Question

126. From the aforesaid, and from what was said in a prior question [1.207-225], I respond to the form of the question. And I say first that, when taking the subject for that which supposits, that God under the idea of deity is not the subject of our theology. This is plain because the subject said in this way is a term of a conclusion. But God is not a term of a conclusion because that is the term of a conclusion which immediately {1.269} terminates an act of understanding, or is an act of understanding. But God in himself does not terminate an act of understanding immediately but mediately by some concept proper to him; nor is God a concept. Therefore the concept, not God, will be the subject of our theology. 127. Second, I say that, when taking the subject for that for which it is supposited, in this way, in respect of a part, is God under the idea of deity the subject, and in respect of some part the Father is or the Son or the Holy Spirit, and in respect of a part the creature is. This is plain, because in some truths the term supposits first for God himself in himself, as in this truth: God creates, God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and so on of others. In some truths the term supposits first for the Father, as in these: the Father generates, the Father is constituted from paternity; and so on of Son and Holy Spirit and a creature. But that for which it is supposited is the subject that is said in this way, improperly speaking. Therefore etc. 128. From these points it follows that of diverse parts of theology there are diverse subjects, and that of theology there is not one subject. And understanding this both of science properly speaking, and of faith, and of the habit of apprehending, because perfect Page 138 theology (according to the perfection of theology possible for us as wayfarers) contains all the habits above stated. 129. Third, I say that the theology of the blessed, if it is in respect of the same propositions in respect of which our theology is — thus I speak of the subject of that theology in the same way proportionally as of the subject of our theology. But that theology of theirs, which is in respect of {1.270} certain truths in which God himself in himself is subject (because he is understood in himself and not in any concept) — in that theology can God under the idea of deity be the subject in both ways, because he will both be the supposit and will supposit for himself; but in respect of other truths the Father himself in himself will be the subject, and so on of the others. And I speak in the same way about the intellect that knows abstractly the divine essence and the persons in themselves. 130. But if the opinion be held which posits that predicables are intentions of the soul that are themselves really cognitions of the intellect [1.267-268], then God will neither in the theology of the blessed nor in our theology be the subject as that which is supposit; but in the theology of the blessed the subject, in respect of some truths, will be a simple cognition proper to God and, in respect of some truths, the subject will be a cognition not simple but common (or composed of things common), yet proper to God. 131. And these things above said I do not understand only of the theology of things necessary but also of the theology of things contingent, because the subject in the theology of things necessary and in the theology of things contingent is not to be taken differently. Because the subject of a known proposition (whether it be known properly and scientifically or not scientifically) will be the subject of the sort of science that is relative to such proposition; and this, whether it be a predicate known first about it or about something else, matters not. 132. {1.271} From this it follows that the subject of contingent truths is not always that in which the predicate is first but that which is the subject in the proposition, whether the predicate is in it first or not. And if that in which the predicate is first is something other, then of those truths there will be distinct subjects.

Concordance of the Various Opinions

133. Through the aforesaid can in some way be verified almost all the opinions about the subject of theology, although not perhaps as to the intention of those who posit them. 134. For the opinion that God under the idea of deity is the subject of theology [e.g. Aquinas, ST I q.1 a.7, Scotus, Ord. I, Prol. p.3, q.1 nn.151-157, 168-171] can be verified by understanding the subject that for which it is supposited and which is first by any primacy. For, among all the things for which the subjects of theological propositions can supposit, God himself has some primacy; for with respect to creatures he is the first thing by primacy of nature and causality; in respect also of persons God is in some way prior, as will be stated later [Sent. I d.9 q.3]. However the first subject is not the knowledge of him in this way in the created intellect, that it contain virtually the knowledge of all truths; nor is it the first subject of just any part of theology, because it is not the subject of Page 139 that part in which are predicated the properties or predicates of the Father or of the Son or of the Holy Spirit or of the creature. And the reason for this is that that is the first subject of any knowledge to which the predicate first {1.272} belongs and which is the subject in the proposition known. But the predicate here: ‘the Father generates’, belongs first to the Father and he is the subject; therefore he is the first subject. And so on of others. 135. The opinion also can in some way be verified that posits Christ to be the subject of theology [Grosseteste, In Hexaemeron ch.1, Bonaventure I. Sent. Prol. q.1; John of Berwick, in William of Nottingham I. Sent. Prol. 1.3], because he is first among subjects by a certain primacy; for he contains the divine nature and creatures. And because he contains the divine nature, he has some unity with all the divine persons; and because he contains creatures, he has some unity with creatures. And so, very improperly, he can be called the first subject. 136. Similarly it can be said or posited that things and signs are the subject of theology [Augustine, On Christian Doctrine I ch.2 n.2; Lombard, Sent. I d.1 ch.1 nn.1-2], because in theology determination is made about things and signs. And so some things are subjects, as God and creature, and some signs are subjects, as the sacraments both of the New and of the Old Law {1.273}. However not all things nor all signs are subjects of theology, either of our theology or of that of the blessed. 137. But the opinion about respects, namely that God is the subject of theology under the idea of glorifier [Giles of Rome, I Sent. Prol. q.3], seems altogether irrational, because all such things are certain predicates attributed to subjects. Hence this is a theological proposition: God is glorifier, God is redeemer, God is repairer, and so on of others; and so such things are not the idea of the subject but predicates attributed to the subject. 138. But then there is a doubt: what things is theology about? Is it namely about all things or about some things and not other things? 139. To this it can be said that theology can be taken in two ways: either for the habit that for us in this present state is necessary for attaining eternal life; and in this way does Augustine speak On the Trinity 14.1 n.3, “Not indeed whatever can be known by man etc.” In another way theology is taken for any simply theological habit, whether necessary for us in this present state and needing to be investigated or not. In the second way I say that theology is about all concepts but not about all propositions. 140. The first point is plain, because there is not any concept of which some theological property may not be predicated; but of everything of which a theological property can be predicated theology can prove its property; therefore it can consider anything of this sort. The assumption is plain because these properties: creatable, annihilable, perpetuable and separable {1.274} from everything else absolute, makable without any extrinsic second cause, are theological properties, and many others. And these properties, either all or many, are predicated of every concept, and in no other science are they made clear or considered; but only in theology are they considered. Hence, just as the metaphysics that considers being can establish all the properties of being of any content (and, as to such common properties, metaphysics is about any quiddity in particular at all, because those properties are considered in no particular science), so it can establish that God, who is considered in theology, is most common by Page 140 causality. Some common theological properties there are that belong to every fact (as those just given as examples); therefore, as to such properties, theology has to consider each being in particular. And thus is it plain that theology in this way is about all things conceivable. 141. The second point [1.273] is plain, because there are many propositions that in no one at all are theological, as ‘every triangle has three angles equal to etc.,” and the like; and so about these there is no theology as there is about some things that are known in theology, save perhaps by predicating some theological property of them. But when speaking of theology in the first way, I say that our theology is not about everything, neither propositions nor concepts. For since time scarcely suffices for what is necessary for salvation, so a man, for this present state, need not investigate other things, or should not, especially in particular.

Response to the Principal Arguments

142. As to the first principal argument [1.226], it is plain that God is not the subject of every part whatever of theology, but of some part one person is subject and of another part another person, and of another some creature, according as diverse properties about them are considered. 143. To the second [1.226] I concede that what is simply simple, if it is known in itself without any other intermediate object, that it is totally known, or if it is not thus known it is totally not known. But God cannot be thus known by us but only by means of some intermediate concept, which is the first object of the knowledge; or it is known by an intermediate concept common as a whole or in its parts to God and other things. And when it is said that ‘every subject can be known distinctly or indistinctly’, I deny it. But if suffices that first the subject be known without anything else, and that afterwards knowledge be acquired of something else about it. And this can well happen about what is itself simple. 144. As to the third it is plain, in the first question [1.9-10], that it is not inappropriate for the same thing to be subject in some truth belonging to diverse sciences, on account of the diverse principles by which the same conclusion is concluded. Similarly it is plain previously [1.242-243] that it is not inappropriate for the same thing to be the subject of diverse sciences because of diversity of properties. So it is in the case at hand: because this truth, ‘God is the first cause’ {1.276}, belongs to the metaphysician and to the theologian, because perhaps one and the other draws this conclusion from diverse principles. Similarly the theologian considers these truths, ‘God is three and one’ and ‘God is creator’, and the metaphysician these, ‘God is good’ and ‘God is wise’ and the like. Page 141

{1.276} Question 10: Whether only the Operation of the Sensitive Power is Action (Praxis)

1. Finally it must be asked whether theology is practical or speculative. But to make this question clear I will ask first about the action itself that some knowledge is called practical with respect to; second how speculative knowledge is distinguished from practical; third about the main thing intended. 2. About the first I ask whether only the operation of the sensitive power is action. 3. That it is: 4. The Commentator [Eustratius, On Aristotle’s Ethics I p.11] says: “Action, which they were accustomed to transfer to ‘act’, is the activity, that is, the operation, of man in accord with choice.” So it seems, according to this authority, that only the operation that follows choice is action. But only the operation of the sensitive power follows choice, because the operation of the intellect precedes it, and choice itself is an operation of the will. Therefore etc. 5. To the opposite: 6. {1.277} Moral virtue is not acquired without action; but moral virtue can exist in the will without the operation of the sensitive power; therefore action can exist without any operation of the sensitive power.

Opinion of Robert Cowton

7. About this question there are diverse opinions. One opinion [Robert Cowton, Sent. I, Prol. q.7] is that only exterior operation, or the operation of a power inferior to the intellect and will, is action. The explanation is “because the practical intellect has regard to contingent things doable by us; now a work of this sort, which the intellect has for necessary end, is a work about contingent things. For all authors take action in this way, namely insofar as it concerns what is doable or makable, which are things subject to practical intellect and choice. And by reference to these are the active and contemplative life distinguished.” 8. Further, “any action is an operation in accord with moral virtue. Therefore that is properly action or praxis which choice is about; but choice is of things that are for an end and that are contingent; therefore etc.” 9. Further, “in Ethics 6 ch.3 [1139a31-33] the Philosopher says, ‘Choice then is a principle of act, hence of motion. Now the principle {1.278} of choice is appetite and reason that is for the sake of something’, namely of action that follows the choice that the appetible power follows.” 10. Further, “Gregory On Ezekiel [I hom.4 n.9] says: ‘the virtue of a work is under the wings of contemplation’.” Therefore it seems that action is always under contemplation or under an act of intellect, and consequently under an act of will. But such act is precisely an act of the inferior power. Page 142

11. It is said, therefore, that “this is the right order [Gregory, On Ezekiel I hom.4 n.9], that practical intellect, which concerns itself with contingent things, inquires into what is to be pursued, what to be fled from, what to be loved and what to be repudiated. When this is done, there follows a choice of the will choosing the proposed good as against its contrary, namely evil. Now choice is a principle effective of action. And this action is formally praxis, because after the will has preferred one to the other of the things shown to it by the practical intellect, it then gives command to the inferior powers and also to the practical intellect to find out the means by which that which it chooses may be attained; and it commands the other inferior powers to obey and carry them out. And the command of the will is an action passing over to the inferior powers, and it is praxis formally or action according to the moral virtue by which one moderates one’s passions. And that action is the end of the practical intellect. But it is not the love with which someone loves the end through his will, for that operation is not action or making but an operation following speculation about the thing.” 12. 1.279} This is confirmed by Aristotle in Metaphysics VI.1.1025b24], who says that “the doable and choosable are the same;” therefore etc.

Attack on the Opinion of Robert Cowton

13. But this opinion seems false. First because all operation the directive knowledge of which is practical is action. Or as follows: all operation that is the object of practical knowledge is action. But interior operations are objects of practical knowledge; therefore etc. The major seems manifest, because if operation were purely speculative and in no way action, the knowledge of it would be speculative and not practical. The minor is plain because everyone distinguishes practical knowledge from speculative, because practical knowledge is about our works but speculative is not. Hence the philosopher, in Metaphysics 6.1.1025b23-27, distinguishes speculative knowledge from practical; because practical is of things the principle of which is in the knower, speculative is of things the principle of which is not in the knower. But the principle of interior operations is in us, therefore the science of them is practical. 14. Further, every act that is in our power is speculative or practical or is action; but the operation of the will is in our power and it is not speculative or practical, because these are conditions of acts of the intellect; therefore it is action.

Opinion of Scotus

15. {1.280} So there is another opinion [Scotus, Ord. I, Prol, p.5 qq.1-2, nn.228-269], that “action is the act of a power other than the intellect, naturally posterior to intellection, of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right reason so as to be right.” 16. “The first condition is plain, because when a stand is made precisely at acts of intellect, there is no extension of the intellect, because it does not extend itself externally save as its act has regard to the act of another power. And if you say that an act is extended to another which is directed by it, not for this reason does it follow that it is Page 143 action, as we are now speaking of action. Nor is first knowledge practical, because then logic would be practical, because it gives direction in acts of discursive reasoning.” 17. “The second condition is plain, because acts that do not have an order to the intellect (of which sort are vegetative acts or those that naturally precede intellection, as sense acts) are not called actions, nor is practical knowledge extended to them as they are prior to intellection. Similarly, an act of the power of sense appetite, to the extent it precedes an act of intellect, is not action; for in this way it is common to us and to brutes. Nor is practical knowledge in respect of these acts, save because it in some way moderates these acts; and these acts follow moderative intellection as they are moderated by it.” 18. {1.281} The third condition is plain from the Ethics [6.2.1139a23-25], “because right choice necessarily requires right reason. Which is not only true of choice strictly taken but, for equal reason, of any right volition, because it requires the right reason in conformity with which it is elicited. But all action is either volition or follows volition.” Therefore etc.

Attack on the Opinion of Scotus

19. Against this opinion. First, against the first condition [1.280], I show that intellection can be action, as was argued against the first opinion [1.279], as follows: all operation about which, as about its object, there is practical knowledge is action, because, according to this Doctor [Scotus, Ord. I, Prol. p.5 qq.1-2, nn.227-228], practical knowledge is spoken of in an extension to action. But about speculation and the act of understanding there is practical knowledge, because practical knowledge is about our works, and this is to be understood of works that are in our power. Therefore intellection itself, since it is a work existing in our power, is action. 20. Further, all operation that follows choice is action. But the act of understanding follows choice and counsel; for anyone can take counsel whether he should study or not, and afterwards choose to study. Therefore this study that follows counsel and choice is truly action. 21. Further, every act of the intellect that is directive of another act through the mediation of an act of will is a practical act, and the act directed is an action {1.282}; but an act of intellect does truly direct another act by means of an act of will; therefore the first directing act will truly be practical, and the other directed act will truly be action. The major is manifest, because such an act is truly extended to another that needs to be directed by it. The minor is plain, because the dictate, whereby it is dictated that one must, at a time and place, study in theology or some other faculty, truly directs by means of an act of will. For the will can command that study conformably to the way dictated previously by the intellect. Therefore etc. 22. If it be said [as Scotus says, ibid.] that it is not extended in the way we are now speaking of extension, because it does not tend outside itself, this is not sufficient, because it is very true that the signification of the word could thus be restricted, and with the same ease could the signification of the word be restricted that action would be called Page 144 when there is extension only to an exterior act. But neither limitation seems usual among philosophers, because when they distinguish these sciences they say one is about our acts and the other is not. Therefore any extension to our work, as to the object, suffices for practical knowledge; and consequently any work of ours is action or the object of action. And so any intellection which is ours, that is, in our power, will be truly action or object of action. And it is not the object of action, therefore it will be action itself. 23. And if it be said that then any intellectual habit would be practical, because any at all is extended to the act that is our act {1.283}, this instance is not valid, because the extension of an intellectual habit to our work is as an extension to the object, according to the usage of philosophers and doctors, because they say that it is with works just as it is with objects. Not in this way is any intellectual habit extended to act, because not just any of them has the act for object, but some habit has the act for something elicited by the habit. 24. Further, I argue the way he himself argues [Scotus, l.c. n.282] to prove that love of the end is action: because “that operation is truly action which an appetitive virtue inclines to, because any such virtue is a habit of choice, Ethics 2.6.1106b36, and choice is action,” according to him. But to knowledge and study does an appetitive habit or virtue incline. For someone can be inclined to studying and speculating as to time and place, and according to the other due circumstances, according to command of the will, as to praying and to other exterior works. Therefore that knowledge will truly be action. 25. Further, every act commanded by the will is action; but some intellection is commanded by the will, just like the act of another power; therefore etc. 26. To this the aforesaid Doctor replies [Scotus, ibid. n.232] that “although speculation is a certain operation and so action (by extension of the word), yet as only the operation to which the intellect can be extended is called action, no intellection is action. And in this way is the word taken when practical knowledge is said to be extended to action. When therefore it is argued that ‘intellection is commanded by the will, therefore it is action’, this does not follow; but {1.284} ‘therefore it is practical’ does follow. For that is of a nature to be denominated accidentally by action to which it is extendable, but it is not the term of such extension.” 27. Against this response was argument made before [1.280f.], because intellection itself is a term of extension, and to it is another intellection truly extended, because the one gives command about eliciting the other, and the other intellection cannot be right in the genus of morals unless it be elicited in conformity to right reason. For just as no exterior act, nor any act of any sensitive or motive power or even of the will, can be morally good unless it be elicited in conformity to right reason (and if any of these be elicited in conformity to right reason it will be right in the genus of morals), so intellection cannot be right in the genus of morals unless it be elicited in conformity to right reason. And if it be elicited in conformity to right reason it will be right. Therefore such intellection can truly be action. 28. Further, as to what is said [1.283-284], that this does not follow ‘intellection is commanded by the will, therefore it is action; but this follows, therefore it is practical’, this is not true, because the consequence does well hold ‘it is commanded by the will, Page 145 therefore it is action’. Because according to this Doctor [Scotus, Ord. I Prol. p.5, qq.1-2, nn.229-230], an act of the sensitive power is only called action because it is commanded by the will, so for the same reason if intellection itself be equally perfectly commanded, it will equally be called action. 29. There is a confirmation: because when a commanding act is action, the commanded act is also action. 30. {1.285} Similarly, the consequence does not hold, ‘intellection is commanded, therefore it is practical’ [1.283-284], because pure speculation, which can in no way be practical, can be commanded by the will, and yet it cannot be practical. 31. Against the second condition [1.280]: if he understand that it is posterior to the intellection that it is conformed to, it is thus not true, because conceptual knowledge alone suffices for action according to the principles of this Doctor, and according to the truth. But if he understand that some intellection is presupposed, he says what is true, because never is any act an action unless it is an elicited or commanded act of the will, and any such act presupposes some intellection. 32. Against the third condition [1.281]: some operation is an action that can perhaps in no way be elicited in conformity with right reason, as that which is elicited in conformity with what is a necessary opposite to right reason. Hence, just as some dictate is about what is necessary, so some dictate is about its opposite, which is the impossible, and in conformity with it can some action be elicited, and yet it cannot be elicited in conformity with right reason either so as to be right or so as not to be right. 33. There is a confirmation: because the same reason that makes an act elicited in conformity with right reason an action will make an act elicited in conformity with false reason an action. Therefore not every action is of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right reason.

Ockham’s own Opinion about Action

34. Therefore to this question I say that the difficulty consists rather in the name than in the thing. For everyone or almost everyone posits the following {1.286}: that there is intellection showing the end there and what is for the end, and that there is volition of the end there, and also counsel about what is for the end. After this counsel or investigation, there follows, or can follow, a judgment whereby command is given about what is for the end. And after this judgment, whereby is commanded that one thing is to be chosen and another not, there follows, or can follow, a choice whereby what is commanded or judged as needing to be chosen is preferred to what is not thus judged as needing to be chosen. And after this choice, there follows what has thus been commanded or judged unless there is some impediment. For example, it is shown by the intellect to someone infirm that health needs to be acquired, and then the intellect has, with respect to the end, a practical principle by which it commands that health needs to be acquired. And after this command, a volition follows in the will whereby it desires health, although perhaps not necessarily. And on this volition follows counsel or inquisition of the intellect whereby it inquires what it can better attain this health by, namely whether by a walk or a drink or Page 146 cooking or in some other way. And after this counsel or inquiry an opinion follows whereby it is determinately opined that health is better attained in this way determinately or in another way determinately. And on this opinion or command follows, or can follow, a choice of the will, whereby one determinately wills to walk or to take a drink {1.287}, and so on about other things. And afterwards there determinately follows — if there be no impediment — either the walking or something else. 35. And this process is conceded by almost everyone, even when they think differently about action, and few in this way disagree on the matter. But there are opinions as to which of them should be called action and which not. And therefore, because words are to be used as authors use them and, because among authors who spoke about this word, the Commentator on the Ethics [Eustratius, On Aristotle’s Ethics 1] used it more frequently, therefore I will according to his intention say what action is, because he too himself used this word in accord with Aristotle [Ethics 6.2.1138b35-39b13] and with his commentator Averroes [On Aristotle’s Ethics 6 ch.2] and other philosophers. 36. I say therefore that according to this Commentator [Eustratius, ibid.] on Ethics 1, action [praxis] can be taken in four ways, namely broadly, strictly, more strictly, most strictly. In the first way action is the same as the operation of any virtue, whether free or natural virtue. This is plain because actuality [energeia] and action [praxis] said in this way are the same; but actuality is the the operation of any virtue; therefore etc. The major is plain from the Commentator [Eustratius, ibid.] when he says, “So although action and actuality, that is act and operation, are distinguished according to their appropriated significations, however, when the names are taken commonly, action is put indifferently for actuality and contrariwise.” Therefore all actuality is action. The minor is plain from the same commentator [Eustratius, ibid.] saying, “Actuality {1.288} or operation is the natural virtue or movement of each substance.” And again [Eustratius, ibid.], “Actuality is the natural innate movement of every substance.” From this authority it is plain that actuality said in one way is the movement or action or act of any virtue or power or substance. 37. In the second way [sc. strictly; Eustratius, ibid.] action [praxis], just like actuality, is said to be any operation or undergoing consequent to a knower insofar as he is a knower, that is, insofar as he follows knowledge, and in this way knowledge itself [is called action]. Also every act of any power that is cognitive or appetitive, and undergoings, namely delights, sadnesses, and the like, can be called actualities or actions. Hence the Commentator there [ibid.] says, “Actuality is natural and first always the mobile virtue of the intellective soul. This is always the mobile idea of it, naturally always irrigated from itself.” This can be understood of the cognitive act of the intellect itself. Now, for the other operations elicited by the appetitive power there follows [ibid.]: “They too are called actualities, that is operations, praxis, that is, acts or actions, as: to speak, to walk, to eat, to drink, and the like.” And for undergoing there follows [ibid.]: “Natural undergoings are also many times called actualities or operations, as hunger, thirst, and the like.” And for the same reason other undergoings, namely delights and sadnesses can be called actualities. Page 147

38. In the third way is action [praxis] taken more strictly. And action said in this way is the same as what operation existing in our power is. This is plain {1.289}, because every operation existing in our power is a work of virtue or of vice, because every such operation can be virtuous or vicious. But action is a work of virtue and of vice. Therefore etc. The minor is plain from the Commentator (Eustratius as above, ibid.) who says, “Actuality is again said to be a work of virtue, that is, what is done by virtue’s operation.” But the reason for which a work of virtue is called action is the same reason for which a work of vice will be called action. 39. Fourth, it is taken most strictly for an operation elicited in conformity with a dictate of reason and of choice of will. And in this way is action elicited always in conformity with deliberative intellect, and consequently it is elicited in conformity with an elicited choice of will, because according to the Philosopher [Metaphysics 6.1.1025b24], “The deliberable and the choosable are the same.” But the fact that action is thus taken is plain from the Commentator [Eustratius as above, ibid.] who says, “Now action, which they are accustomed to transfer to act, is actuality, that is operation, according to a man’s choice.” And that by actions he understands an act following choice is plain from what, after interposing certain words, he adds [ibid.], “But choice is a man’s judgment putting this before that when two things are proposed. And after choice follows movement and impetus to act, then follows use, and in this way does appetite cease after use.” Now the movement and impetus to act he calls action most strictly taken, which he said before [ibid,] is “operation according to a man’s choice {1.290}.” And use he calls the attainment of the end, because appetite does not cease before attainment of the end, 40. As to the matter at hand, I say that the doctors do not speak of action in the first and second way when treating of which science is speculative and which practical, because by extension to it is practical knowledge not spoken of. But in the third and fourth way the doctors do speak of action, because to action said in the third way (to some at least) practical intellect is extended, and with respect to action said in the fourth way there is always deliberative intellect.

Solution of the Question

41. And so, for the solution of this question, one must first see how practical and deliberative intellect are distinguished. Second one must see what operation is action said in the third way. Third, what operation is action said in the final way.

Distinction between Practical and Deliberative Intellect

42. About the first point I say that the practical intellect regards practical principles and regards also practical conclusions. And therefore the practical intellect regards the end, namely when the judgment is made about some end that it is to be desired or pursued. And the way to understand this is that it regards a proposition which affirms that some end is to be desired; and this is the first practical principle in an operative act. And the Philosopher in this way says [Physics 2.9.200a15-24] {1.291} that “as the principle is Page 148 in theoretical things so the end is in doable things.” And the reason for this is that the will does nothing except for an end, and this either for an end dictated by reason or for an end that it has, of its own freedom, presented to itself. And so every action of the will, and consequently every action, which does not regard the end, necessarily presupposes volition of the end. And practical intellect regards practical principles taken from the end; and it not only regards principles but also conclusions conclusions, because every truth that is disposed confessedly to right appetite is practical [Aristotle, Ethics 6.2.1139a30-31], and consequently knowledge of that truth is practical. But deliberative intellect is only in respect of practical conclusions. For when it is dictated by the intellect (without any preceding deliberation) that some end is to be desired, and when the will desires that end, the intellect deliberates by what means it can better attain that end, and when investigation has been made, it at length concludes that the end is to be attained through such determinate means. For example, the intellect dictates to someone sick that health is to be desired; afterwards the will desires this health. But because health can be acquired by many means, and what means is better is unknown, the intellect deliberates and inquires by what means health can be more easily and better acquired. And after much investigation it concludes that it is through some determinate means. And intellect is said to be deliberative with respect to that conclusion. 43. And so it is plain that deliberative intellect is in respect of the same things that practical intellect is in respect of. Hence one needs to know {1.292} that the numerically same intellect is practical and theoretical and deliberative. However, these terms are distinguished and have distinct definitions expressing the ‘what’ of the name. And thus must the statement of authors be understood when they distinguish between theoretical and practical intellect, because these have distinct definitions expressing the ‘what’ of their name. Hence if the theoretical intellect, that is, this term ‘theoretical intellect’, is to be defined, it is must be stated as follows: theoretical intellect is the intellect that is able to consider those things that are not in our power. Practical intellect as follows: practical intellect is the intellect able to consider or to have science of those things that are in our power. And so on of other things.

Which Operation is Action in the More Strict Sense?

44. About the second I say, as was said [1.277], that every operation that is in our power is action. And therefore since knowledge as well as volition and other exterior acts are in our power, it follows that any of them will truly be able to be called action. However action is said first of the act of will, since it is first in our power and since no other act is in our power save by means of it; and so no other will be called action first. 45. And that every such operation could be called action seems to be so because every act that is in our power can be virtuous or vicious; and everything such is action; therefore etc. So, therefore, this can be called the description of action in general. 46. Now this action is divided into virtuous and vicious action, because each of these is in our power. And virtuous action can be described thus: virtuous action is an operation existing in the power of the will, of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right reason Page 149 so as to be right. The first condition is plain, because no operation that does not exist in the power of the will is virtuous but rather natural. The second condition is plain because, according to the Philosopher [Ethics 6.2.1139a32-35], no right choice, and consequently no right operation either, is without right reason, because reason about one operation is not greater than about another. And vicious action is an operation existent in the power of the will, of a nature to be elicited against conformity with right reason, or in conformity with erroneous and false reason. The first condition is plain because otherwise it would not be imputable [to us], because what is not in the power of our will is in no way imputable. The second condition is plain because it can be a dictate about any elicited evil that it should not be elicited. 47. From these points some conclusions follow. One, that not in respect of any action is there a practical science to which knowledge should be conformed, or more properly, to which knowledge is of a nature to be conformably elicited so as to be right. And this because however much there could be about any action some true dictate that it should be elicited or not elicited (and thus is in some way conformed to it), yet some is an evil action that can in no way be elicited in conformity with right reason, because no right reason can dictate that it should be elicited, just as no right reason can dictate that an enemy is to be hated contrary to the divine precept. 48. {1.294} Another conclusion follows, that there is some action that is elicited neither in conformity nor against conformity with right reason, as the action that is elicited when only the displaying of the object through the intellect is posited without any dictate true or false. 49. A third conclusion follows, that action does not state formally precisely any act, but it states an act by connoting the will by which it is effectively and freely produced, just as holds of a meritorious act. And from this it follows that an operation the same in species, or perhaps in number, can first be action and afterwards not action. Because if the will freely and contingently elicit some operation, then that operation is called action; and if afterwards God were to continue the same action without any causation or conservation of the [creature’s] will with respect to it, then it would truly be called non- action, because it would not be in his [the creature’s] power.

Which Operation is Action in the Most Strict Sense

50. About the third point I say that action said in the final way is every operation existing in the power of the will, deliberated about by the intellect, with respect to which there is choice of will. And in this way action is said or can be said of action of the will and of operation of the intellect and also of external operation. For that it could be said of the operation of the will is plain, because when appetite exists with respect to health, as with respect to an end to be acquired, there can be doubt whether this health could be acquired better through external operation or through love or hate of the will or also through study and exercise of the intellect. Because according to doctors (and experience teaches this) {1.295}, any one of these can be a cause of infirmity, at least a partial one, and also a partial cause of health. So there can be investigation about these, as to which Page 150 of them health is to be better acquired by; and consequently each of them can be deliberated about and consequently chosen. And consequently, since each of them is operation and act, each of them will be able to be an operation following a choice of will; and consequently there will be action said in the final way. Because, according to the Commentator, Eustratius on Ethics 6 ch.2, “From choice an act is generated. For when we choose from its contrary what has been shown by the mind to be good, we operate and act so as to attain it.” And thus I concede that pure speculation can be action said in this way, because there can be deliberation about it, and with respect to it there can be choice. 51. From this follows too that exterior operation commanded by the will is not always action said in this way, because when operation is prescribed by the will as the end it is not then something to deliberate about or to choose, and consequently neither is it action said in this way, according to Aristotle when he says, Ethics 3.5.1112b11-17, “Now we deliberate not about ends but about what is for ends. For neither will a doctor deliberate if he will heal nor an orator if he will persuade nor a statesman if he will make peace nor any of the rest about the end. But when they set down some end, and this either according to right reason {1.296} or prescription of will, they pay attention to how and by what it will come to be.” However, although not just any exterior operation commanded by the will is always action in this final way, yet because it will be able to be ordered to a further end it will truly be able to be action. 52. Thus therefore to the question is it plain that not only is the operation of the sensitive or inferior power action, but also the operation of intellect and will can be action most properly said.

Response to the Arguments of Robert Cowton

53. To the first argument for the first opinion [1.277] I reply that it is a good discovery that practical knowledge is about our works and about contingent things doable by us, but it is never discovered that the action or work, which practical knowledge is of, is about something that can be otherwise, nor about something that is in our power, although the operation itself, which is the action itself, is something that can be otherwise and is doable by us. And so pure speculation, and delight similarly, because they are doable by us, though they do not have such doable things for their objects, are truly actions, and about them there will truly be practical knowledge. 54. If it be said that all practical knowledge is in respect of doing or making; but action is about the doable and making about the makeable; therefore doing and making, which are actions, have something that can be otherwise for object: 55. I reply that never is it found by the Philosopher that practical habits are about doing and making, and action and making about the doable {1.297} and makeable; but he says that the practical arts are about the doable and makeable, and then he takes these for action and making. Hence he says in Ethics 6.4.1140a1-2: “Of what can be otherwise something is doable and makable; but action and making are another thing.” See the Commentator in his comment following the cited passage [Eustratius, On Aristotle’s Ethics 6.4], where he says that the practical, that is the active, is one thing, and that Page 151 praxis, that is action, is another; and that the factive, that is making, is another. From which it is pain that with respect to action alone and making alone will the active and factive truly be said, however much there be nothing there that can be otherwise save the action or making alone. This is plain, because there are many mechanical arts that are factive, some of which regard nothing contingent operable by us save the making itself, and yet they are truly practical, as the art of playing the cithara, singing, and so on about suchlike. And the things that these operations are about are not operable by us. Therefore however much speculation itself is about an object that is not operable by us, provided however speculation itself is truly operable by us, it will truly be able to be called action. This is also plain from the Philosopher in Ethics 1.1.1094a4-5 and Metaphysics 9.8.1050a30-b2, that there are some operations beyond which there are works and some beyond which there are not. And yet about both can there be practical knowledge, as the Philosopher makes clear in Ethics 1.1.1094a1-18. Hence the Commentator says in the same place [Eustratius On Aristotle’s Ethics 1], “When indeed a musician is operating according to the musical art, that is, singing or using {1.298} an organ musically and operating with it then resting, no work of his remains or is left.” But music is truly practical, and yet nothing there is operable by us save the operation itself — though the musical instrument is operable by us through another art [sc. the art of making instruments], not through music. 56. To the other [1.277] I concede that action most strictly taken is operation according to moral virtue. And I concede that there is choice about it, and so it can be otherwise and is doable by us. However, as has been made clear [1.296], it is not necessary that the object itself of the action be able to be otherwise. And therefore because pure speculation itself is doable by us and not its object, therefore it itself will be able to be called action but not able to be called practical. 57. If it be said that then moral virtue would exist in respect of intellection, because a habit of choice, and consequently moral virtue, would be in the intellect, which is against the Philosopher in Ethics 1.13.1103a3-7 and 6.2.1138b35-39a1: 58. I reply that when taking moral virtue for any virtuous habit which is not intellectual, that some moral habit does exist in respect of intellection, because just as one can have a good and bad act about intellection so also a [good and bad] habit. Hence just as one sins when studying at an undue time and place, so one acts meritoriously when studying according to place and time and other requisite conditions; and consequently one of these acts is meritorious {1.299} and the other demeritorious. So it is not unfitting that such habits are generated corresponding to the acts, and yet not for this reason will there be a moral habit in the intellect properly speaking, because properly speaking every moral habit is in the will, as shall appear in the third book [Sent. III q.20]. 59. Hence just as a habit of will generated from volitions whereby one wills to use, according to time and place and other circumstances, things necessary for health, is morally virtuous, existing subjectively in the will and which is also not intellectual — so from volitions whereby the will wills to study and to consider intellectually, according to due circumstances, there is generated a morally virtuous habit existing subjectively in the Page 152 will, which also is not intellectual, although from acts of intellect commanded by the will there be generated an other intellectual habit. 60. To the other argument [1.277-278] I concede that of action most strictly taken choice is always the effective cause. But I say that in this way choice is in respect of an intellection that is purely speculation just as it is in respect of any exterior operation, and in this way it is effected by choice of will just as is the exterior operation. For I can in this way doubt and deliberate whether I should consider something purely speculable just as I can doubt and deliberate whether I should eat or not. And so I can judge and conclude that I should consider such a speculable, and after this judgment I can chose to consider ig, and {1.300} finally I can consider it, and in this way can intellection follow choice just as can an exterior operation. 61. To the authority of Blessed Gregory [1.278] I say that he takes work for exterior work, and so do the Saints frequently take it, because in respect of many such works there is deliberation and choice, although it could also be in respect of contemplation. Hence frequently, on account of attainment of eternal life, some do very solicitously inquire and deliberate whether they should free themselves for contemplation or for preaching and such exterior actions, and thus contemplation itself is truly after a choice. For sometimes the Saints conclude and judge that they should free themselves for contemplation, and so is contemplation then truly action. 62. From the aforesaid it is plain that that process [sc. of reasoning by Cowton, 1.278] concludes that speculation is truly action, because the practical intellect does not only inquire that an exterior work is to be avoided, that it is to be pursued, but also makes all these inquiries about interior works. And afterwards choice follows, and afterwards follows a choosable prosecution [of the work], even as to the intellect and will. Therefore etc. 63. To the final authority [1.279]: that the doable and choosable are the same; and therefore just as this interior operation, namely speculation and also volition, just as it is doable, so is it choosable, and therefore is it truly action.

Response to the Reasonings of Scotus

64. To the first argument of the second opinion [1.280]: that it is not of the idea of the practical intellect that it extend itself beyond the whole rational part {1.301}, but it is enough that it extend itself to the will, and to any act mediated by an act of will; and therefore one act of the intellect sufficiently extends itself to another act of the intellect as to its object. And when it is said that ‘then logic would be practical’, this conclusion is to be conceded, as will be plain later [1.316]. 65. The argument for the second condition [1.280] does conclude what it proves, that action is posterior to intellection, because some intellection precedes every action, just as some intellection precedes every act of the will; however an intellection that dictates is not required, nor is any prior complex intellection. 66. To the argument for the third condition [1.281]: that a condition of good action is that which the Philosopher, Physics 2.6.197b5, calls eupraxia, but it is not a condition of Page 153 action in general. And therefore every right action requires right reason, but not every action is right nor can it be, just as neither is every volition; therefore etc.

Response to the Principal Argument

67. As to the principal argument [1.276], it is plain that the operation alone that follows choice is action said in the fourth way [sc. most strictly, 1.289-290]. But not only does the operation of an inferior power follow choice, but intellection follows it {1.302} (although another intellection precede it), and also does operation of the will. For someone can consult and deliberate whether he should deliberate and whether he should consider or not; therefore etc. But action said in the third way [sc. more strictly, 1.288-289], with respect to which knowledge is called practical, does not always follow choice, but the choice itself and the preceding will is action, since it is our work that practical knowledge is about. But the Commentator in the authority cited [1.276] takes action in the fourth way and not only in the third way.

{1.302} Question 11: Whether Practical and Speculative Knowledge are Distinguished by Ends or by Objects

1. Secondly I ask whether practical and speculative knowledge are distinguished by ends or by objects. 2. That by ends: 3. Because Metaphysics 2.1.993b20-21: “The end of speculative science is truth, and of practical science a work.” Therefore etc. 4. On the contrary: 5. Avicenna, Metaphysics 1 ch.1, says that the practical sciences are about our works, but not the speculative.

{1.303} Opinion of Henry of Ghent

6. To this question some say [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.36 q.4 ad 2] that speculative and practical science are distinguished by their ends. A distinction, however, is drawn about the end, because one is the end of the science and one of the knower. The end of the science is that toward which the science is ordered; the end of the knower is that to which the knower orders the science. Similarly, the end of science is double, namely per se and per accidens, principal and secondary. The per se end of science is that to which of its nature it has to be ordered. The per accidens or non-principal end of the science is that to which it is not per se ordered but to which it can be ordered by the intention of the knower. A science is not called speculative or practical by the end of the knower, namely what the knower himself intends; but a science is called speculative or practical by the Page 154 per se and principal end of the science and not by the non-principal end, because the science that is of itself ordered to knowledge of what is true is speculative, and that which is ordered to operation of the good is practical. 7. It is said, therefore [sc. by Henry], that practical science is distinguished from speculative by the per se and principal end of the science, because that end is work, but the end of speculative science is truth. 8. The proof is this: because each effect is distinguished by its nobler cause. But among all causes the final cause is noblest {1.304}, since it is the cause of causes, according to Avicenna, Metaphysics 6 ch.5. Therefore practical knowledge has to be distinguished from the other by its end. 9. Further, one science is distinguished from another either by the subject or by the end. But practical knowledge is not distinguished from speculative by the subject, because speculative and practical science can be about the same subject. Therefore by the ends. 10. Further, “as the principle is in speculative matters, so the end is in operable matters,” Physics 2.9.200a15-24; but speculative science is distinguished from another science by its principles; therefore etc. This is plain from the Philosopher on Metaphysics 2.1.993b20-23 and On the Soul 2.10.433a14-17, where he says: “now it differs for the speculative in its end;” likewise he says [ibid.], “The intellect that reasons on account of something is practical.”

Against the Opinion of Henry of Ghent

11. Against this opinion… Page 155 Page 156

{1.324} Question 12: Whether the Habit of Theology is Speculative or Practical

1. Third I ask whether the habit of theology is speculative or practical. 2. That it is speculative: it seems to be speculative because according to the Philosopher Ethics 6.2.1139a3-15, the scientific part of the soul, whereby it understands speculative science, is about necessary things; but the calculative part of the soul – whereby it understands practice – is about contingent things. But theology is about necessary things. Therefore it is speculative. 3. Further, all speculative knowledge is nobler than practical; but no speculative knowledge is nobler than theology; therefore theology is not practical. The major is plain, because when something common is divided into several lower kinds, everything contained under a nobler one is nobler than everything contained under a less noble one. But science is divided into speculative and practical kinds, and the speculative is nobler, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 1.2.982a14-17. Therefore every speculative science is nobler than every practical one. 4. Further, many theological truths are also metaphysical; but metaphysical truth is speculative; therefore etc. 5. {1.325} To the opposite: the knowledge that is directive of voluntary action is practical; theology is of this sort, because the wayfarer needs something to direct him in the fulfilling of the divine commands; but such a directive thing is nothing but theology; therefore etc.

Opinion of Henry of Ghent, Robert Cowton, William of Alnwick and Others

6. On this question there are diverse opinions. One is the opinion that posits theology to be simply speculative [Henry of Ghent, Robert Cowton], because just as moral science, although it speculates about truth, yet because it does so only for the sake of good action, it is called not speculative but practical, so theology, because the labor of action in it is for the sake of speculation – just as all practical sciences are ordered to speculation, and the practical life to the contemplative – so it should be called purely speculative, not practical. Although it can, for the most part, be called practical, and not wisdom, because it considers things to be done, yet it should simply be called speculative wisdom, because of the consideration of eternal things to which temporal things are directed. 7. The proof of this conclusion given by others [William of Alnwick] is first as follows: