Page !1 This translation of the Prologue of the Ordinatio of the Venerable Inceptor, William of Ockham, is partial and in progress. The prologue and the first distinction of book one of the Ordinatio fill volume one of the critical edition of the Latin text of Ockham’s theological works edited by the Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, NY. These translations are works in progress and may contain infelicities or errors or (through oversight) omissions. Apologies in advance, therefore, and requests that readers who notice such faults would communicate them to the translator for his information and correction. The paragraph numbers are my own additions for ease of reference. The numbers in bold italics inside {} brackets that are embedded within the text indicate, for reference purposes, what the relevant volume and page number of the Latin critical edition is at that point, so {1.4} means volume 1 page 4 of that edition. These numbers are not in italics when they are referred back to or forward to elsewhere in the text. The headings and subheadings are in the text of the critical edition. Peter L.P. Simpson September, 2021 Page !2 THE ORDINATIO OF THE VENERABLE INCEPTOR, WILLIAM OF OCKHAM Prologue Question 1: Whether it is Possible for the intellect of the Wayfarer to (page 5) have Evident Knowledge of the Truths of Theology [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Exposition of the Terms of the Question Num. 6 Objections against the Last Affirmation Num. 12 Response to the Objections Num. 16 About the Meaning of the Question Num. 29 Division of the Question Num. 30 Article One: Preparatory Distinctions about Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge of the Same Thing Num. 31 Preparatory Conclusions: First Conclusion Num. 35 Objections against the First Conclusion Num. 36 Response to the Objections Num. 39 Second Conclusion Num. 43 Third Conclusion Num. 44 Proof of the First Conclusion First Reason Num. 45 Objection to the First Reason Num. 48 Response to the Objection Num. 50 Second Reason for the First Conclusion Num. 55 Exposition of the First Article Num. 58 Conclusions Inferred from the First Article against the Opinion of Scotus Num. 64 Opinion of the Author about the Difference between Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge Num. 76 Corollary I: Intuitive Knowledge of a non-existent Thing is Possible Num. 77 Corollary II: There is Intuitive Knowledge of Things Purely Intelligible Num. 80 The Second Corollary is Confirmed by the Authority of Scotus Num. 89 Articles Two to Four: About Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge with Respect to the Deity Num. 95 Article Five: Response to the Form of the Question Num. 98 Article Six: Ten Doubts about the Question Num. 104 Page !3 Solution to the Doubts Num. 119 Response to the Principal (Opening) Arguments Num. 158 Question 2: Whether Evident Knowledge of the Truths of Theology is (page 39) Science Properly Speaking [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Article One: What Proposition is Knowable by Science Properly Speaking Num. 9 Objections to the Second and Third Condition Num. 15 Response to the Objections Num. 20 Article Two: What is Science? Num. 37 Objections against the Last Condition Num. 41 Solution of the Objections Num. 43 Article Three: Diverse Opinions First Opinion Num. 63 Opinion of Scotus Num. 69 Against the Opinion of Scotus Num. 78 Ockham’s own Solution Num. 96 Conclusions Inferred from the Above Num. 100 Doubts about the Aforesaid Num. 124 Response to the Arguments of the Subtle Doctor Num. 127 Solution to the Doubts Num. 148 Response to the Arguments of the First Opinion Num. 151 Response to the Opening Arguments Num. 154 Question 3: Whether a Property Knowable of Something by Science (page 65) Properly Speaking Differ from it Really [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Opinion of John of Reading Num. 5 Against the Opinion of John of Reading Num. 8 Solution of the Author Num. 14 Response to the Arguments of John of Reading Num. 22 Response to the Principal Argument Num. 36 Question 4: Whether Every Property is Demonstrable a Priori of its (page 72) First Subject [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Distinction of Properties Num. 6 Which Properties are Demonstrable First Conclusion Num. 7 Second Conclusion Num. 15 Third Conclusion Num. 21 Fourth Conclusion Num. 22 Page !4 Objections Num. 25 Response to the Objections Num. 30 Response to the Principal Argument Num. 43 Question 5: Whether in Every Demonstration a Definition is the Middle (page 79) Term for the Demonstrating [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Opinion of Richard of Conington Num. 7 Attack on the Opinion of Richard of Conington Num. 15 The Author’s own Response Num. 23 Refutation of the Arguments of Richard of Conington Num. 28 Opinion of the Author about Formal Definition Num. 34 Response to the Principal Argument Num. 44 Question 6: Whether only a Proposition per se in the Second Mode of (page 88) Speaking is per se Knowable by Science Properly Speaking [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 What Proposition is Per Se in the Second Mode Num. 6 What sort of Proposition is Demonstrable Num. 15 Response to the Principal Argument Num. 18 Question 7: Whether the Theology that of Common Law is Possessed (page 91) by Theologians is a Science Properly Speaking [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Opinions that Hold the Affirmative Side Num. 7 Rejection of these Opinions in General Num. 18 Against the Same Opinions in Particular Num. 23 Opinions that Hold the Negative Side Num. 34 Ockham’s Opinion Num. 36 Opinion of Peter Aureol about the Theological Habit Num. 38 Rejection of Peter Aureol’s Opinion Num. 43 Ockham’s Opinion about the Theological Habit Num. 46 Response to the Arguments for the Other Opinions Num. 55 Response to the Opening Arguments Num. 76 Question 8: Whether the Habit of Theology is Really One in Number (page 103) [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Opinion of St. Thomas [Aquinas] Num. 8 Attack on the Opinion of St. Thomas Num. 9 Opinion of Henry of Ghent Num. 18 Against the Opinion of Henry of Ghent Num. 23 The Author’s own Response Num. 38 Doubts about the Aforesaid Num. 46 Page !5 Solution of the Doubts Num. 50 Response to the Reasons of Henry of Ghent Num. 63 Response to the Opening Arguments Num. 68 Question 9: Whether God under the Proper Idea of Deity is the Subject (Page 114) of Theology [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 The Opinion of Scotus about the Idea of the First Subject Num. 10 Attack on Scotus’ Opinion about the Idea of the First Subject Num. 14 The Author’s Own Opinion Num. 54 Conceptual Knowledge of One Thing does not Cause Conceptual Knowledge of another Thing Num. 55 The Subject does not always Contain the Property Virtually Num. 63 What is Required for Knowledge of a Proposition? Num. 64 What belongs to the Idea of the First Subject? Num. 66 Objections against the Aforesaid Num. 78 Solution of the Doubts Num. 88 Response to the Reasons of Scotus Num. 107 The Author’s Opinion about the Subject of Theology Num. 118 Preliminary Distinctions Num. 119 Response to the Form of the Question Num. 126 Concordance of the Various Opinions Num. 133 Response to the Principal Arguments Num. 142 Question 10: Whether only the Operation of the Sensitive Power is (Page 140) Action [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Opinion of Robert Cowton Num. 7 Attack on the Opinion of Robert Cowton Num. 13 Opinion of Scotus Num. 15 Attack on the Opinion of Scotus Num. 19 Ockham’s own Opinion about Action Num. 34 Solution of the Question Num. 41 Distinction between Practical and Deliberative Intellect Num. 42 Which Operation is Action in the More Strict Sense? Num, 44 Which Operation is Action in the Most Strict Sense Num. 50 Response to the Arguments of Robert Cowton Num. 53 Response to the Reasonings of Scotus Num. 64 Question 11: Whether Practical and Speculative Knowledge are (Page 153) Distinguished by Ends or by Objects [Opening Arguments] Num. 1 Opinion Page !6 Page !7 Prologue {1.3} Question 1: Whether it is Possible for the intellect of the Wayfarer to have Evident Knowledge of the Truths of Theology 1. Concerning the prologue I ask first whether it is possible for the intellect of the wayfarer to have evident knowledge of the truths of theology. 2. That it is not: Because evident knowledge of the truths of theology cannot be had without a distinct knowledge of the deity under the proper idea of deity; but a distinct knowledge of the deity is impossible for the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore impossible for it too is evident knowledge of the truths of theology. Proof of the major: because indistinct knowledge of the deity does not suffice, because if it did, since it would be possible for us from our pure natural powers, the consequence would be that we could from our pure natural powers have evident knowledge of the truths of theology, which is manifestly false; therefore for evident knowledge of the truths of theology {1.4} there is required a distinct knowledge of the deity. The minor is plain: because knowledge of the deity under the proper idea of deity, since it is of the infinite and beatific object under the idea of beatific, is itself beatific; but beatific knowledge is impossible for the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore etc. 3. Second as follows: if the intellect of the wayfarer had evident knowledge of the truths of theology, those truths would either be known per se or would be known by other things that are more known to it. Not in the first way because the truths would be known when the terms are known; but such propositions, which are per se known, are known by everyone who apprehends the terms, and so they would be naturally known to anyone who apprehends the terms, which is manifestly false.