Between Faith and Knowledge: "Theological Knowledge" in Gregory of Rimini and his Fourteenth-Century Context Author: Jeffrey Charles Witt Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/2622 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2012 Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted. Boston College The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Department of Philosophy BETWEEN FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE: “THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE” IN GREGORY OF RIMINI AND HIS FOURTEENTH-CENTURY CONTEXT a dissertation by JEFFREY C. WITT submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May, 2012 © copyright by JEFFREY CHARLES WITT 2012 Abstract BETWEEN FAITH AND SCIENCE: GREGORY OF RIMINI ON THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE IN HIS FOURTEENTH-CENTURY CONTEXT By Jeffrey C. Witt Directed by Jean-Luc Solère The professional theologian attempts to distinguish herself by claiming some kind of “epistemic advance” over the person of mere belief. This claim to knowledge—and the relation of this knowledge to the other sciences—can therefore be subject to philosophical analysis. What is the subject matter of this discipline? What is the method by which it secures its results? And how does its practitioner “know” when she has passed beyond mere belief? The theologians of the high and late Middle Ages faced a unique historical challenge. At this time, “theology” first emerged as a distinct academic discipline, and the theological doctors were perpetually engaged in a debate about the exact nature of theology. On the one hand, they were eager to assert that theology made a real epistemic contribution that should be respected by the other sciences. On the other hand, these same theologians struggled with the fact that their discipline did not neatly meet the conditions of epistēmē or scientia laid down by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics. The main historical focus of this study is Gregory of Rimini, an Augustinian hermit, who flourished in the mid-fourteenth century. But I aim to consider Rimini’s thought as embedded within its fourteenth-century context. Within the writings of Rimini and his interlocutors, the main conceptual focus of this study is on the debates about how the components of a science (subject, object, premises, etc.) are employed in a theological discourse. I also consider whether and how the results of this discipline should be counted as a genuine science. The first part of the study is concerned with some preliminary debates. Here I look at how theology distinguishes itself from metaphysics and why a separate discipline called theology is needed. These questions fall under the categories of the subject matter and purpose of theology. They involve extensive definitions and clarifications about the meaning of the “subject” of any science, what constitutes a true “practice,” and how “knowledge” does or does not extend to “practices.” On the question of the subject of theology, Gregory of Rimini can be seen as closely following the intellectual father of his Order, Giles of Rome. Rimini, like Giles, sees theology as an intellectual discipline that does not extend to all that is knowable about God, but only to God as viewed from a specific vantage point. On the purpose of a theological discipline, Rimini follows the tradition of his order in emphasizing love as the primary goal of the theological endeavor, but shows some independence from Giles in asserting that this knowledge should be considered “practical knowledge” rather than “affective knowledge.” In emphasizing theology’s role as directive of the proper love of God, Rimini opposes the position of his main interlocutor, Peter Aureoli, who uniquely suggests that theology should be understood as primarily directive of a separate act of faith and only indirectly directive of an act of love. The second part of the study turns to the question of method and the epistemic status of the results claimed within the theological discipline. Part two looks first at the ideas of theological method and its scientific status in the work of Giles of Rome. It then considers the development of his ideas in two Augustinians writing at the turn of the fourteenth-century: Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio. The study then turns to an alternative view of theological method advanced by Peter Aureoli and the reception of his position first by William of Ockham and then Gregory of Rimini. Having articulated Rimini’s disagreements with Aureoli and Ockham and having considered his own positive position, the final chapter turns to identify precisely the kind of “knowledge,” scientific or otherwise, that Rimini’s methodology produces. Part II is the heart of the dissertation. The general thesis is that two distinct traditions emerge. One tradition, associated primarily with Peter Aureoli, looks to provide a kind of justification for theology among the other sciences. It focuses on finding reasons that would strengthen and support, albeit not demonstrate, the claims of faith, reasons that would hold sway even with those outside the religious community. For some, like Peter Aureoli, this meant trying to find supportive probable reasons that would bolster and direct the claims of faith. But for others, like Francis of Marchia, this meant finding a way to declare that theology was a true science, which can provide “evidence” for the claims of faith. Distinctive of this trend is the sharp divide between the habit of faith (which belongs to every believer) and the habit of theology (which uniquely belongs to the professionally trained theologian). The second tradition, which I label the Aegidian tradition, and of which I argue Rimini should be counted as a member, describes the theologian as more internally focused—focused on the deduction and clarification of the consequences of belief. On this view, the distinctive mark of the theologian is his or her ability to make explicit what the simple believer only believes implicitly. This position closely assimilates faith and theology, claiming that theology never proceeds beyond faith nor finds alternative points of justification for its claims. This conception of theology is less concerned with legitimization and justification in the eyes of the other sciences. Rather, its primary aim lies in the ability to establish and prove the consequences of what the members of the religious community implicitly claim to believe. Thus, the unique ability (and claim to knowledge) possessed by the professional is the power of “self-description.” Acknowledgments | i Acknowledgments I have dreamed of finishing my doctorate in philosophy for many years. But it has been a longer and more difficult journey than I ever anticipated. That I am now approaching the end says less about me than about the people and institutions that have supported me over the last ten years. I am forever indebted to everyone who has taught, encouraged, put up with, and loved me. At the risk of creating an inevitably incomplete list, I offer special thanks to those who have helped me reached the finish line. To my parents I owe an immeasurable amount of gratitude. The maxim amor magnus doctor est never ceases to be true. Their unconditional love has given me the confidence to pursue my passions recklessly. I know that I would not be at this point without their unqualified support. My father also read several drafts of this dissertation, and I am grateful for his help. Boston College has been a very supportive institution. It has provided me with the resources and financial support I needed to complete this project. In particular, I am grateful for the one year dissertation fellowship that has allowed me to complete my thesis. I am especially grateful to the philosophy and theology departments at BC, both to the faculty and to the students. I have been immeasurably enriched through my fellowship in this academic community. The classes I have taken, conversations I have had, and friendships I have made have enriched my work and my life. Special thanks are due to John Slotemaker, who, as an older and wiser friend, has helped shape my path through Boston College. He has continually shared research Acknowledgments | ii materials, conference and funding opportunities, and plenty of ideas. Much of what I have written in this dissertation was possible only because of our conversations together. I would also like to thank my committee: Jean-Luc Solère, Eileen Sweeney, Stephen Brown, and Steven Marrone. Each member has helped me in different ways. I would not have been able to access most of the texts cited in this dissertation without the help of Stephen Brown. Professor Brown sacrificed much of his time to teach me how to read medieval manuscripts. His generosity and care for students is something I will forever try to emulate in my own career. Professor Eileen Sweeney has been a valuable adviser from the moment I arrived at Boston College. Her philosophical acumen and practical counsel have been important parts of my philosophical education. She has always been extremely generous with her time and ready to offer me poignant advice in my path to completion. I consider it a great honor that she is on my committee. Professor Marrone is responsible for introducing me to Henry Ghent. He gave of his time generously, and I owe him my gratitude. Lastly, thanks are due to Professor Solère. His expertise in the fourteenth century has been an invaluable resource for me in my own research. There are few puzzles that I have not been able to solve by simply knocking on his office door. My progress would not have been possible without his teaching and guidance. Finally, I owe special thanks to the person who has stood by me throughout the entirety of this long journey.