Guerilla War in Zimbabwe: a Talk with Eddison Zvobgo
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From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe.Pdf
THE S.A. ' "!T1!TE OF INTERNATIONAL AFi -! NOT "(C :.-_ .^ FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE Ah Analysis of the 1980 Elections and an Assessment of the Prospects Martyn Gregory OCCASIONAL. PAPER GELEEIMTHEIOSPUBUKASIE DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT MN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Martyn Gregory* the author of this report, is a postgraduate research student,at Leicester University in Britain, working on # : thesis, entitled "International Politics of the Conflict in Rhodesia". He recently spent two months in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, : during the pre- and post-election period, as a Research Associate at the University of Rhodesia (now the University of Zimbabwe). He travelled widely throughout the country and interviewed many politicians, officials and military personnel. He also spent two weeks with the South African Institute of International Affairs at Smuts House in Johannesburg. The author would like to thank both, the University of Zimbabwe and the Institute for assistance in the preparation of this report, as well as the British Social Science Research Council which financed his visit to Rhodesia* The Institute wishes to express its appreciation to Martyn Gregory for his co-operation and his willingness to prepare this detailed report on the Zimbabwe elections and their implications for publication by the Institute. It should be noted that any opinions expressed in this report are the responsibility of the author and not of the Institute. FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE: an analysis of the 1980 elections and an assessment of the prospects Martyn Gregory Contents Introduction .'. Page 1 Paving the way to Lancaster House .... 1 The Ceasefire Arrangement 3 Organization of the Elections (i) Election Machinery 5 (i i) Voting Systems 6 The White Election 6 The Black Election (i) Contesting Parties 7 (ii) Manifestos and the Issues . -
CAP. 10:14 Names (Alteration) (Amendment Of
Statutory Instrument 167 of 2020. Names (Alteration) (Amendment of Schedule) Notice, 2020 S.I. 167 of 2020 [CAP. 10:14 Names (Alteration) (Amendment of Schedule) Notice, 2020 City/Town Old Name New Name Hellet Street Shuvai Mahofa Street IT is hereby notifi ed that the Minister of Local Government, Hughes Street Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa Public Works and National Housing has, in terms of section 4(1) of the Names (Alteration) Act [Chapter 10:14], made the following Mutare Aerodrome Road Kumbirai Kangai Road notice:— First Street Maurice Nyagumbo Street Edgar Peacock Road Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa 1. This notice may Be cited as the Names (Alteration)(Amendment Second Street Moven Mahachi Street of Schedule) Notice, 2020. Jelf Road Edgar Tekere Road 2. The Schedule to the Names (Alteration) Act [Chapter 10:14] is amended in Part VII by the repeal of certain names of roads and substitution of the following— “PART VII ROADS, SQUARES, BUILDINGS, ETC., IN URBAN AREAS City/Town Old Name New Name Bulawayo 9th Avenue Simon Muzenda Avenue 12th Avenue Joseph Msika Avenue 6th Avenue up to end of Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa 6th Avenue Extension Way 8th Avenue Liberation Legacy Avenue 3rd Avenue Nelson Kutshwekhaya (N.K.) Ndlovu Avenue 4th Avenue through to 7th John Landa Avenue Street up to King George 5th Avenue Maria Msika Avenue 1st Avenue Lazarus Nkala Avenue 10th Avenue Nikita Mangena Avenue 11th Avenue Daniel Madzimbamuto Avenue 13th Avenue to include Clement Muchachi Road Anthony Taylor Ave 14th Avenue George Nyandoro Avenue Connaught Avenue Cephas Cele Avenue Cecil Avenue continuing Albert Nxele Way up to Wellington Road Fife Street and Queens Queen Lozikeyi Street Supplement to the Zimbabwean Government Gazette dated the 17th July, 2020. -
OTHER ISSUES ANNEX E: MDC CANDIDATES & Mps, JUNE 2000
Zimbabwe, Country Information Page 1 of 95 ZIMBABWE COUNTRY REPORT OCTOBER 2003 COUNTRY INFORMATION & POLICY UNIT I SCOPE OF DOCUMENT II GEOGRAPHY III ECONOMY IV HISTORY V STATE STRUCTURES VIA HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES VIB HUMAN RIGHTS - SPECIFIC GROUPS VIC HUMAN RIGHTS - OTHER ISSUES ANNEX A: CHRONOLOGY ANNEX B: POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS ANNEX C: PROMINENT PEOPLE PAST & PRESENT ANNEX D: FULL ELECTION RESULTS JUNE 2000 (hard copy only) ANNEX E: MDC CANDIDATES & MPs, JUNE 2000 & MDC LEADERSHIP & SHADOW CABINET ANNEX F: MDC POLICIES, PARTY SYMBOLS AND SLOGANS ANNEX G: CABINET LIST, AUGUST 2002 ANNEX H: REFERENCES TO SOURCE MATERIAL 1. SCOPE OF THE DOCUMENT 1.1 This country report has been produced by the Country Information and Policy Unit, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office, from information obtained from a wide variety of recognised sources. The document does not contain any Home Office opinion or policy. 1.2 The country report has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the asylum / human rights determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in asylum / human rights claims made in the United Kingdom. 1.3 The country report is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the source material is readily available in the public domain. 1.4 It is intended to revise the country report on a six-monthly basis while the country remains within the top 35 asylum-seeker producing countries in the United Kingdom. -
Fake Heroines and the Falsification of History in Zimbabwe 1980 - 2009
African Journal of History and Culture (AJHC) Vol. 1 (5), pp. 076-083, December, 2009 Available online at http://www.academicjournals.org/ajhc © 2009 Academic Journals Full Length Research Paper Fake heroines and the falsification of history in Zimbabwe 1980 - 2009 Dorothy Goredema1 and Percyslage Chigora2* 1Department of History and Development Studies, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe. 2Department of History and Development Studies, Midlands State University, Private Bag 9055,Gweru, Republic of Zimbabwe. Accepted 10 December, 2009 The ideology of femocracy is so entrenched in Zimbabwean politics that it has become a tradition. It started as a tendency during the liberation struggle of making room and integrating a few women into politics. After independence, it developed into a habit of promoting the same women who had been exposed during the liberation struggle into political offices. Finally, at independence it became a tradition whereby the state confers heroine status to the very women who had held position during the war. However, one feature that stands glaring at the national heroes’ acre is that the heroines who were lay, are all related to men in political positions in both current ruling party and the state. This paper will demonstrate that most Zimbabwean heroines are forgotten. It also proves that even at death the patriarchal nature of Zimbabwean politics manifests itself when one considers that the number of male heroes vis-à-vis the heroines who lay at the acre. Finally the paper will show how femocracy as an ideology has led to the falsification and misrepresentation of historical facts all in an attempt to promote nationalist history. -
Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) Emerged, but Then Disintegrated Rapidly
African Studies Quarterly | Volume 7, Issues 2 & 3 | Fall 2003 Opposition Politics in Independent Zimbabwe LIISA LAAKSO Abstract: Zimbabwe has implemented a multi-party system on a universal franchise for more than two decades. This era has witnessed consolidation of power into the hands of the ruling ZANU party and its leader Robert Mugabe, and a gradual evolution of political crises. All general elections have shown support for the opposition among the voters. However, the opposition has changed a lot. Between 1980 and 1987 there was a strong regional party, ZAPU, which transformed from a partner of the ruling party to repressed dissident. The second period after the unity between ZANU and ZAPU witnessed mobilisation in defence of multipartyism and against corruption, and the birth of a populist party ZUM. ZUM’s disintegration was followed by massive electoral apathy in 1995. The third period started with civic organization for constitutional reform in 1997 and led to the emergence of the MDC, a wide coalition of interest groups united by their aim to seize ZANU from power. State responses to opposition politics help to clarify its unstable nature. Introduction Consolidation of the authoritarian power of Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in independent Zimbabwe has not proceeded through the withering away of dissent. All general elections have witnessed support for other parties. But the parties and their support base have changed radically. On the one hand this reflects the government’s different strategies to silence its critics. On the other hand it tells about changes in Zimbabwean society itself. -
AC Vol 44 No 23
www.africa-confidential.com 21 November 2003 Vol 44 No 23 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL ANGOLA 3 ZIMBABWE Holding the cash Big questions are to be decided Marching to Masvingo when the MPLA holds its congress President Mugabe’s exit plans are prompting unrest ahead of the in Luanda on 6-10 December: the ZANU-PF party congress selection of the party’s flagbearer and whether the party can tackle History is catching up with President Robert Gabriel Mugabe as he prepares for the party congress in graft in what bankers and diplomats Masvingo next month. Even political allies concede that Mugabe is well into extra time and must use the regard as one of the world’s most congress to set out his exit plan. First, he must find reliable candidates for two key posts: the vice- corrupt regimes. presidency of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) to replace Simon Vengesayi Muzenda, who died on 20 September, and a Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Force to ANGOLA 4replace 60-year-old General Vitalis Zvinavashe, who retired this month. The appointments are not entirely in Mugabe’s gift but unfriendly occupants could sabotage his efforts to secure legal protection Luanda’s money-go- and an acceptable successor in State House. Opposition optimists are convinced that Mugabe will use ZANU-PF’s congress in Masvingo to round announce his retirement. Yet that would leave a lame-duck leader presiding over the world’s fastest Mystery surrounds the ‘social shrinking economy: not an appealing prospect for Mugabe and his shrewd political planners. -
Fiddling While Zimbabwe Burns
Institute for Security Studies Situation Report African Security Analysis Programme Date issued: 13 October 2003 Author: Chris Maroleng Distribution: General Contact: [email protected] Fiddling While Zimbabwe Burns Introduction The death on 20 September 2003 of eighty-one-year-old Vice President Simon Vengesayi Muzenda- staunch ally of Mugabe and veteran nationalist- has intensified the battle about who will succeed President Robert Mugabe. It has emerged that the Vice President’s death has prompted the various factions in the ruling party to begin vying with each other for the vacant second-vice-presidential post. It is widely believed that the appointment of the new Vice President will indicate who Mugabe prefers as his successor in the party and the government. It is possible that Muzenda’s death has meant that Mugabe in particular and ZANU PF in general have had to consider seriously the question of succession sooner than expected - a situation that “could prematurely end the heated succession debate by giving glimpses into the candidate President Mugabe would want to occupy the most powerful office when he retires.”1 More ominous for the ruling party is the fact that Muzenda’s death has left a power vacuum in the deeply divided and province of Masvingo, where the veteran politician acted as a stabilising force, ensuring that infighting did not get out of hand. A permanent split in this key province would inevitably result in serious costs to the governing party. Muzenda’s death has increased the likelihood of the party splitting in this important province, as the two competing factions contest the vacant leadership of Masvingo. -
ZIMBABWE COUNTRY REPORT April 2004
ZIMBABWE COUNTRY REPORT April 2004 COUNTRY INFORMATION & POLICY UNIT IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY DIRECTORATE HOME OFFICE, UNITED KINGDOM Zimbabwe April 2004 CONTENTS 1 Scope of the Document 1.1 –1.7 2 Geography 2.1 – 2.3 3 Economy 3.1 4 History 4.1 – 4.193 Independence 1980 4.1 - 4.5 Matabeleland Insurgency 1983-87 4.6 - 4.9 Elections 1995 & 1996 4.10 - 4.11 Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 4.12 - 4.13 Parliamentary Elections, June 2000 4.14 - 4.23 - Background 4.14 - 4.16 - Election Violence & Farm Occupations 4.17 - 4.18 - Election Results 4.19 - 4.23 - Post-election Violence 2000 4.24 - 4.26 - By election results in 2000 4.27 - 4.28 - Marondera West 4.27 - Bikita West 4.28 - Legal challenges to election results in 2000 4.29 Incidents in 2001 4.30 - 4.58 - Bulawayo local elections, September 2001 4.46 - 4.50 - By elections in 2001 4.51 - 4.55 - Bindura 4.51 - Makoni West 4.52 - Chikomba 4.53 - Legal Challenges to election results in 2001 4.54 - 4.56 Incidents in 2002 4.57 - 4.66 - Presidential Election, March 2002 4.67 - 4.79 - Rural elections September 2002 4.80 - 4.86 - By election results in 2002 4.87 - 4.91 Incidents in 2003 4.92 – 4.108 - Mass Action 18-19 March 2003 4.109 – 4.120 - ZCTU strike 23-25 April 4.121 – 4.125 - MDC Mass Action 2-6 June 4.126 – 4.157 - Mayoral and Urban Council elections 30-31 August 4.158 – 4.176 - By elections in 2003 4.177 - 4.183 Incidents in 2004 4.184 – 4.191 By elections in 2004 4.192 – 4.193 5 State Structures 5.1 – 5.98 The Constitution 5.1 - 5.5 Political System: 5.6 - 5.21 - ZANU-PF 5.7 - -
Intelligence and the Politics of Zimbabwe's Presidential Succession
INTELLIGENCE AND THE POLITICS OF ZIMBABWE’S PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION BLESSING-MILES TENDI* ABSTRACT Since the late 1990s, Zimbabwean politics has been shaped by the political succession war raging within the ruling ZANU PF party. The internal fight to succeed President Robert Mugabe pitted a faction controlled by retired General Solomon Mujuru, who was fronting his wife Joice Mujuru, against another faction led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, a government minister. The competition between these factions reached a crucial stage in 2014, when Mugabe dismissed Joice Mujuru as vice president and purged her key allies in ZANU PF and the government. This article examines the role of state intelligence in this struggle, arguing that the Military Intelligence (MI) leadership, which supported Mnangagwa in the succession war, surveilled Joice Mujuru and constructed a controversial gendered case to destroy her bid to succeed Mugabe. In contrast, some elements in the principal civilian intelligence institution, the Central Intelligence Organization, surveilled the Mnangagwa faction in order to support Joice Mujuru’s power bid. Mugabe was persuaded by MI to purge Joice Mujuru because she posed a threat to his hold on power. This course of action was also given some impetus by Mugabe’s longstanding grievance against her faction. The article widens scholarship on the security sector’s political interventions in Zimbabwean politics, whilst emphasizing how the gendered dimensions of surveillance can reinforce patriarchal national politics. President Robert Mugabe has led the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) party and Zimbabwe since 1977 and 1980, respectively. Mugabe, a nonagenarian, is Africa’s oldest serving president. -
Zimbabwe: a Strategy of Tension
UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research WRITENET Paper No. 04/2000 ZIMBABWE: A STRATEGY OF TENSION By Richard Carver Independent Researcher Oxford, United Kingdom July 2000 WriteNet is a Network of Researchers and Writers on Human Rights, Forced Migration, Ethnic and Political Conflict WriteNet is a Subsidiary of Practical Management (UK) E-mail: [email protected] THIS PAPER WAS PREPARED MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION, ANALYSIS AND COMMENT. ALL SOURCES ARE CITED. THE PAPER IS NOT, AND DOES NOT PURPORT TO BE, EITHER EXHAUSTIVE WITH REGARD TO CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY SURVEYED, OR CONCLUSIVE AS TO THE MERITS OF ANY PARTICULAR CLAIM TO REFUGEE STATUS OR ASYLUM. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND ARE NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF WRITENET OR UNHCR. ISSN TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................1 2. ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS............................................................................................1 2.1 THE MATABELELAND CRISIS...........................................................................................................1 2.2 ECONOMIC CRISIS ...........................................................................................................................3 2.3 LAND ..............................................................................................................................................4 2.4 CONCENTRATION OF POLITICAL -
ZIMBABWE Injustice and Political Reconciliation
ZIMBABWE Injustice and Political Reconciliation Edited by Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage Published by The financial assistance of the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation is gratefully acknowledged Prelims 1 2/14/05, 1:42 PM ii Published by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 46 Rouwkoop Road, Rondebosch 7700, Cape Town, South Africa www.ijr.org.za © 2004 Institute for Justice and Reconciliation All rights reserved. ISBN: 0-9584794-4-5 Produced by Compress www.compress.co.za Cover design by Chaz Maviyane-Davies Marketing and sales agent: Oneworldbooks www.oneworldbooks.com Distributed by BlueWeaver Orders to be placed with Blue Weaver PO Box 30370, Tokai 7966, Cape Town, South Africa Fax: +27 21 701 7302 E-mail: [email protected] Prelims 2 2/14/05, 1:42 PM iii CONTENTS Foreword v Acknowledgements vii Introduction Unreconciled differences: The limits of reconciliation politics in Zimbabwe Brian Raftopoulos viii Chapter 1 The promised land: From expropriation to reconciliation and Jambanja Lloyd M. Sachikonye 1 Chapter 2 Memories of underdevelopment: A personal interpretation of Zimbabwe’s economic decline Rob Davies 19 Chapter 3 ‘Gukurahundi’ The need for truth and reparation Shari Eppel 43 Chapter 4 Reintegration of ex-combatants into Zimbabwean society: A lost opportunity Paul Themba Nyathi 63 Chapter 5 Contextualising the military in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2004 and beyond Martin R. Rupiya 79 Chapter 6 Whither judicial independence in Zimbabwe? Charles Goredema 99 Chapter 7 Liberating or limiting the public -
AC Vol 41 No 4
www.africa-confidential.com 18 February 2000 Vol 41 No 4 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL ZIMBABWE/BRITAIN 2 ZIMBABWE Hawks or doves? Britain is maintaining an informal Saying no to the yes-men arms embargo on Zimbabwe, ZANU’s referendum defeat is a political watershed but it doesn’t defence sources told Africa guarantee the opposition a victory in the April polls Confidential in Harare. This is despite Prime Minister Tony Blair ‘We’ve won this war, so we’re all guerrillas now,’ a young man shouted out at a crowded civic over-ruling Foreign Secretary meeting in Harare, just hours after the Zimbabwean people had learned of the first electoral defeat Robin Cook - who wanted to block since Independence for the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front. Though it won arms export licences. 578,210 ‘Yes’ votes in the 12-13 February referendum, the ‘No’ votes were a convincing 697,754. Like so many speakers at the meeting, the young man triumphantly saw the government’s defeat as CONGO-KINSHASA 3 automatically translating into an opposition victory in the elections due in April. That’s too easy. With about 1.3 million people voting in the referendum from an electorate of 5 Hanging on mn., the turnout was even lower than the 36 per cent who voted in the 1996 presidential election. It was clearly a massive protest vote against President Robert Mugabe’s government but the loyalist Laurent Kabila seems to have applied to his presidency the rules forces were hardly mobilised, as shown by the huge stayaways in ZANU-PF’s core constituencies he followed as a rebel leader for 20 in the rural areas which make up 70 per cent of Zimbabwe.