Why Are Arab Ministerial Appointments Being Delayed? Artical Subject : Why Are Arab Ministerial Appointments Being Delayed? Publish Date: 06/03/2017

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Why Are Arab Ministerial Appointments Being Delayed? Artical Subject : Why Are Arab Ministerial Appointments Being Delayed? Publish Date: 06/03/2017 Artical Name : Why are Arab Ministerial Appointments being Delayed? Artical Subject : Why are Arab Ministerial Appointments being Delayed? Publish Date: 06/03/2017 Auther Name: Future for Advanced Research and Studies Subject : There have been instances in the region where the formation of a government is delayed over a lengthy period of time, including, but not limited to, Sudan, Morocco, Lebanon, and Egypt. There are several reasons for this phenomenon, such as authoritative ruling parties, having two ruling regimes, differences among the ruling coalition regarding ministerial appointees, ethnic divisions, differences over regional issues, and questioning of the regime¶s legitimacy and the subsequent rejection of candidates to their posts. This has created a negative backlash in the region and could possibly lead to a halt in the political process, a return to street politics, early parliamentary elections, an exacerbation of domestic issues, hampering of economic progress and an enforcement of international sanctions on political figures. Moroccan ³Blockage´A clear example of delays in ministerial appointments in the region can be seen in Morocco. Since the announcement of the parliamentary results that took place on October 7, the Justice and Development party won the majority, forcing King Mohammad VI to mandate Abdelilah Benkirane to form the new government. Negotiations to create the government have lasted over the last 5 months. The Moroccan press calls this a ³Blockage´or as some have considered it a ³Soft Coup´against the ballot boxes. At the opening session of the National Union for Work (The Syndicate Arm of the Justice and Development Party) on February 18, Benkirane criticized hampering cabinet formation. He stated that it is not possible or even acceptable that for over 5 years the government has worked seamlessly, to the extent that constitutional rights were given up and cooperation prevailed over confrontation, to have the formation of the government be hindered like this.On the eve of Benkirane¶s participation in the 2nd International Parliamentary Forum on social dialogue that took place on February 20, he also mentioned that, King Mohammad the VI has undertaken a vital role by returning Morocco to the AU, attracted large amounts of investment to Morocco and to the people of Africa, and yet the political parties have not been able to form a government. Benkirane, stated ³we must hold steadfast and use democracy to serve our country´It is worth noting that King Mohammed the VI¶s choice for the Secretary General of the Justice and Development party is no longer voluntary, after the Arab Spring and the new Moroccan constitution, it has become mandatory. One of the articles of the new constitution states that the King must appoint the head of the government from the party that leads in the elections, but without any time limits on how soon the new government should be formed. More generally, the factors that have hindered successive governments in some regimes in the Arab world during the last couple of years are represented as follows:Ongoing Differences:1. The Authoritarian Nature of Ruling Regimes: The delay in the announcement of the National Unity Government in Sudan is due to the refusal of the National Council and government-supported political parties in backing down from their positions and shares. They have also not adhered to the outcomes of the National Dialogue regarding the status of the Prime Minister. There are no indicators that point to the formation of the government anytime soon, despite Sudanese citizens looking forward to the creation of the National Unity Government in order to deal with ongoing economic and social challenges faced by the country.Two Captains, One Ship2. Having Two Ruling Regimes: After the Arab Spring, some Arab countries, such as Libya, have witnessed multiple centers of power based on geographical locations. Currently, there are two governments and two parliaments in Libya, and each has their own armed forces. In this respect, it is understandable that there has not been the chance to establish a unity government with Fayez Sarrag (who takes Tripoli as his headquarters), and why he was unable to gain the trust of the internationally recognized parliament in Tobruk during 2016. The deadlock forced authority to be transferred to the Prime Minister, despite pressures from International powers, specifically Europe, to have the new unity government be approved as per the recommendations of the Presidential Council supported by the UN. The difference between both governments is focused on the person who will lead the Ministry of Defense. The negotiations in February 2016 ended with the appointment of that ministry to Colonel Mahdy El Barghaty who is opposed to the head of the Libyan National Army Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, which pushed the representatives of the Presidential Council Ali El Qatrani and Omar El Eswed to not sign the formation of the new government as the choices were not made in a transparent manner. In the near future, there could possibly be an attempt to include Field Marshal Haftar in the Security and Political Equation in Libya and the Unity Government. The duality in centers of power is also seen in the South of Sudan, as it has helped in hindering the creation of one national unity government and has prevented the warring parties, Silva Kir and Ryack Mashar, from settling their conflict as per the peace accords signed on August 26, 2015. This came as a result of the forces being loyal to Kir insisting that the number of governorates in South Sudan be increased to 28 instead of 10, putting them at an advantage over the others. The case is the same in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and has also hindered the formation of a unity government between the movements of Fatah and Hamas.3. Structural Differences Between the Political Parties: The main reason for the delay in the formation of a government in Morocco is due to the behind-the-scenes pressures exerted by the party members of the ³Asala and Maasaara´party on members of the ³National Unity Party´and the ³Socialist Union´to not enter into a coalition government with the ³Justice and Development Party´It is important to take into consideration that the three parties, should they form an alliance, do not have enough seats to form a government. The JDP has 125 seats, the ³Independence Party´has 46 seats and the ³Progression and Socialist Party´has 12 seats.The total of the three allied parties is 183 seats, and since the majority requires 198 seats, this makes the government formed closer to a minority 9/27/2021 4:39:17 AM 1 / 2 government. Despite there being an alternative to the ongoing issue, the ³National Unity Party´(which recently gained 37 seats) could be a solution to this issue, however, the head of the party Aziz Akhnoosh has called on Benkirane to remove the ³Independence Party´from the coalition government and replace them with the ³Constitutional Unity Party´Akhnosh was not content with that demand, but also asked for Benkirane to re-evaluate his support to certain segments in society through the Maqasa Fund.Benkirane considered that a transgression by a supposed member of the coalition government an affront to the duties and responsibilities of the head of the government. He stated that ³I will not accept from anyone, whomever they were, to act as if they were the head of the government and not myself.´The National Unity Party and the ³People¶s Movement´stated in January their willingness to conduct negotiations under the condition that they include the ³Socialist Union for the People¶s Power´and the ³Constitutional Unity Party´in order to create a strong majority government. However, Benkirane does not want either of the two parties to be part of the coalition government.Lack of Hybrid Solutions4. The Lack of Experience in Creating Coalition Government: The parties and powers in the Arab world are still new to the idea of forming coalition governments that include multiplicity in both a political and social context. A loose term would be ³The Lost Parties,´as they continue to search for mechanisms of support that would help settle internal disputes. This was all the more apparent in Tunisia in 2016 after the ³Tunis Calling Party´lost the majority in parliament when a number of their own party members resigned from the parliament bloc, which would go to show that there were larger internal party conflicts going on at the time.Dividing Up the Gains5. Distributing the Ministerial Packages: the time period for the creation of the Moroccan government might be extended even after the distribution of the Ministerial Posts. There is expected to be an intense conflict around the issue, in light of the lack of negotiating experience the political parties have. Ministerial packages are one of the reasons behind the delay in the creation of a Lebanese government in the Michel Aoun era, as he assigned Saad El Hariri, the head of the ³Future Movement´to create a national unity government in Lebanon as of November 3.The buildup to the creation of a government between the political factions and heads of the various ethnic groups has taken over a month and a half as per the divisions put in place since the Taif Accords in 1990. There has been fear expressed towards the empty seat of the Presidency since the political powers insisted on their positions and demands, as well as the opponents of Michel Aoun who wanted larger shares of the government seats. They even threatened to go to the opposition in case their demands were not met. The outrage does not exclude divisions over the regional crises, especially the war in Syria and Hezbollah¶s part in it.
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