Endgame in Burma 349

Chapter 10 Endgame in Burma: August 1944–15 August 1945

Introduction

The dominant view is that after the Japanese defeat at Imphal and Kohima, the IJA as a potent combat instrument was finished and what followed was a mop- ping up operation by the victorious Commonwealth air-land forces. The reality was a bit more complex. The post-Imphal-Kohima period could be subdivided into three interrelated phases: the battles for Mandalay, and Meiktila and the race for Rangoon. The Japanese commanders named this struggle as the Battle of the Irrawaddy. As the British commanders prepared to pursue and defeat the retreating IJA in the aftermath of Imphal-Kohima, the former took stock of the military effectiveness of the forces at their disposal and their opponents. The first section of this chapter analyzes the combat effectiveness of the Commonwealth forces and its opponent. And the next two sections portray the nature of combat in central and south Burma. The last section, in order to put things in a global perspective, attempts an assessment of the scope and intensity of the Mandalay-Meiktila-Rangoon Campaign in comparison with the gargantuan battles of the Ostfront.

Combat Effectiveness of the British and Indian Armies

Williamson Murray writes that during war there is little time to understand the behaviour of the interactive, adaptive opponent. However, feedback from combat results can suggest some necessary adaptations only if the proper les- sons are identified and then learnt.1 The Commonwealth military organization attempted to initiate the above-mentioned process. In November 1944, Brigadier I.E.M. Stewart assessed the Japanese strengths and weaknesses in the following words: ‘It still requires a considerable superiority in men to take on the Jap in close country. He is outstanding in defence and in attack by maneu- ver, but poor in assault.’2 Japanese doctrine emphasized the overcoming of the

1 Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 2. 2 Brigadier I.M. Stewart, Short Description of Indo-Burma Country and Main Characteristics of Fighting, Appendix C, p. 20, L/WS/1/777, IOR, BL, London.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004306783_013 350 Chapter 10 weight of hostile firepower through ‘spirit’. The Japanese attempt to offset the material superiority of the Allied side was their willingness to fight and die. The warrior codes of Bushido and Senshi did not tolerate survival from a losing battle.3 Stewart warned that for this reason, the Commonwealth troops should always fight in circumstances where they could bring forward their material resources and the need for manpower was kept at a minimum. If possible, attacks by manoeuvre should be undertaken and direct assault were to be avoided because the Japanese were at their best in defending strong points. The manoeuvre attack involved principles which in many cases were similar to those used by the IJA at Malaya and Burma during the heady days of 1942. Stewart noted that the object of manoeuvre attack was to induce the Japanese to attack the Commonwealth troops on ground of the latter’s choosing. This could be done by seizing, if possible without fighting, some features of Japanese communications or places of tactical importance. The objective was always to move to the high ground. It could be done by marching round their defensive positions or infiltrating through or just flying over the top (the last option was not available to the Commonwealth forces in 1942). This would force the Nipponese to counter-attack in order to drive off the Commonwealth troops. The Japanese were bound to counter-attack with an ineffective fire plan due to inadequate artillery at their disposal.4 As will be seen later, Slim at Meiktila did exactly that. And the IJA also responded by launching frontal attacks with inadequate heavy artillery. During the attack, noted Stewart, tanks should be used, as tank fire for close support of infantry was vital. A sort of combined arms approach involving tanks, engineers and infantry paid dividends.5 This was actually practised dur- ing the dash to Meiktila. From June 1944, dive bombing demonstrations to study the effect of dive bombing attacks on fortified positions were carried out. The targets were indicated to the aircraft involved by a combination of R/T and mortar smoke bombs. This method was considered most effective. Mortar smoke bombs proved very effective also in attacking entrenched German posi- tions along the mountainous terrain of Italy. However, the operation of wireless sets by the regimental signallers and especially the Indian recruits (probably

3 William Bruce Johnson, The Pacific Campaign in World War II: From Pearl Harbour to Guadalcanal (2006, reprint, London/New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 286; Tarak Barkawi, ‘Peoples, Homelands, and Wars? Ethnicity, the Military, and Battle among British Imperial Forces in the War against Japan’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 46, no. 1 (2004), p. 151. 4 Stewart, Appendix C, pp. 20–22. 5 Ibid., p. 21.