ING BANK N.V. (A Limited Liability Company (Naamloze Vennootschap) Incorporated in the Netherlands with Its Statutory Seat in Amsterdam)

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

ING BANK N.V. (A Limited Liability Company (Naamloze Vennootschap) Incorporated in the Netherlands with Its Statutory Seat in Amsterdam) Dated 27 March 2020 ING BANK N.V. (A limited liability company (naamloze vennootschap) incorporated in The Netherlands with its statutory seat in Amsterdam) REGISTRATION DOCUMENT This document constitutes a registration document, as supplemented from time to time (the "Registration Document") for the purpose of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129, as amended (the "Prospectus Regulation") in relation to ING Bank N.V. (the "Issuer" or "ING Bank") and has been drawn up in accordance with Annex 6 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/980, as amended. This Registration Document has been approved by the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (the “AFM”) on 27 March 2020 in its capacity as competent authority pursuant to Article 20 of the Prospectus Regulation. Together with any securities note for non-equity securities, as supplemented or replaced from time to time (each a “Securities Note”) of the Issuer, in each case, this Registration Document forms part of any prospectus of the Issuer consisting of separate documents within the meaning of the Prospectus Regulation in respect of the relevant securities (this Registration Document together with the respective Securities Note, in each case the “Prospectus”). The AFM only approves this Registration Document as meeting the standards of completeness, comprehensibility and consistency imposed by the Prospectus Regulation. Such approval should not be considered as an endorsement of the Issuer that is the subject of this Registration Document. Investors should have regard to the risk factors described under the section headed "Risk Factors" in this Registration Document. This Registration Document does not describe all of the risks regarding the Issuer, but the Issuer believes that all material and specific risks relating to it have been described. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................... 2 RISK FACTORS ................................................................................................................................................ 3 IMPORTANT NOTICES ..................................................................................................................................26 DOCUMENTS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE .....................................................................................28 DESCRIPTION OF ING BANK N.V. ..............................................................................................................31 SELECTED FINANCIAL INFORMATION ....................................................................................................56 OPERATING AND FINANCIAL REVIEW AND PROSPECTS ....................................................................59 SELECTED STATISTICAL INFORMATION .................................................................................................83 GENERAL INFORMATION ..........................................................................................................................105 2 RISK FACTORS Any of the risks described below could have a material adverse effect on the business, results, financial condition and prospects of ING. The Issuer may face a number of the risks described below simultaneously and, where a cross-reference to another risk is included, the risks described below may be interdependent. While the risk factors below have been divided into categories, some risk factors could belong in more than one category and investors should carefully consider all of the risk factors set out in this section. Additional risks of which the Issuer is not presently aware, or that are currently viewed as immaterial, could also affect the business operations of ING and have a material adverse effect on ING’s business, results, financial condition and prospects. The market price of ING shares or other securities could decline due to any of those risks including the risks described below, and investors could lose all or part of their investments. Although the most material risk factors have been presented first within each category, the order in which the remaining risk factors are presented is not necessarily an indication of the likelihood of the risks actually materialising, of the potential significance of the risks or of the scope of any potential negative impact to the Issuer’s business, results, financial condition and prospects. ING Group is a holding company whose principal asset is its investments in the capital stock of ING Bank, its primary banking subsidiary. As a result, the risks applicable to ING Bank are substantially similar to those impacting ING Group. 1 Risks related to financial conditions, market environment and general economic trends Because the Issuer is a financial services company conducting business on a global basis, its revenues and earnings are affected by the volatility and strength of the economic, business, liquidity, funding and capital markets environments of the various geographic regions in which it conducts business, and an adverse change in any one region could have an impact on its business, results and financial condition. Because ING is a multinational banking and financial services corporation, with a global presence and serving around 38.4 million customers, corporate clients and financial institutions in over 40 countries, ING’s business, results and financial condition may be significantly impacted by turmoil and volatility in the worldwide financial markets or in the particular geographic areas in which the Issuer operates. In Retail Banking, ING’s products include savings, payments, investments, loans and mortgages in most of the Issuer’s retail markets. In Wholesale Banking, the Issuer provides specialised lending, tailored corporate finance, debt and equity market solutions, payments & cash management and trade and treasury services. As a result, negative developments in financial markets and/or regions in which the Issuer operates have in the past had and may in the future have a material adverse impact on its business, results and financial condition, including as a result of the potential consequences listed below. Factors such as interest rates, securities prices, credit spreads, liquidity spreads, exchange rates, consumer spending, changes in client behaviour, business investment, real estate values and private equity valuations, government spending, inflation or deflation, the volatility and strength of the capital markets, political events and trends, terrorism, pandemics and epidemics (such as COVID-19, as described in greater detail below under the heading ‘–The COVID-19 pandemic may lead to longer-term uncertainty in, and have longer-term adverse effects on, the global economy and financial markets and adversely affect the Issuer’s business, results and financial condition’) or other widespread health emergencies all impact the business and economic environment and, ultimately, the Issuer’s solvency, liquidity and the amount and profitability of business the Issuer conducts in a specific geographic region. Certain of these factors are often experienced globally as well as in specific geographic regions and are described in greater detail below under the headings ‘–Interest rate volatility and other interest rate changes may adversely affect the Issuer’s business, results and financial condition’, ‘– Inflation and deflation may negatively affect the Issuer’s business, results and financial condition’, ‘–Market 3 conditions, including those observed over the past few years and the application of IFRS 9 may increase the risk of loans being impaired and have a negative effect on the Issuer’s results and financial condition’ and ‘– Continued risk of political instability and fiscal uncertainty in Europe and the United States, as well as ongoing volatility in the financial markets and the economy generally have adversely affected, and may continue to adversely affect, the Issuer’s business, results and financial condition’. All of these are factors in local and regional economies as well as in the global economy, and the Issuer may be affected by changes in any one of these factors in any one country or region, and more if more of these factors occur simultaneously and/or in multiple countries or regions or on a global scale. In case one or more of the factors mentioned above adversely affects the profitability of the Issuer’s business, this might also result, among other things, in the following: • reserve and provisions inadequacies, which could ultimately be realised through profit and loss and shareholders’ equity; • the write-down of tax assets impacting net results and/or equity; • impairment expenses related to goodwill and other intangible assets, impacting net result; and/or • movements in risk weighted assets for the determination of required capital. In particular, the Issuer is exposed to financial, economic, market and political conditions in the Benelux countries and Germany, from which it derives a significant portion of its revenues in both Retail Banking and Wholesale Banking, and which present risks of economic downturn. Though less material, the Issuer also derives substantial revenues in the following geographic regions: Turkey, Eastern Europe (primarily Poland among others), Southern Europe (primarily Spain among others), East Asia (primarily Singapore among others) and Australia which also present risks of economic downturn. In an economic downturn, the Issuer expects that
Recommended publications
  • Network Risk and Key Players: a Structural Analysis of Interbank Liquidity∗
    Network Risk and Key Players: A Structural Analysis of Interbank Liquidity∗ Edward Denbee Christian Julliard Ye Li Kathy Yuan June 4, 2018 Abstract We estimate the liquidity multiplier and individual banks' contribution to systemic liquidity risk in an interbank network using a structural model. Banks borrow liquid- ity from neighbours and update their valuation based on neighbours' actions. When the former (latter) motive dominates, the equilibrium exhibits strategic substitution (complementarity) of liquidity holdings, and a reduced (increased) liquidity multi- plier dampening (amplifying) shocks. Empirically, we find substantial and procyclical network-generated risks driven mostly by changes of equilibrium type rather than net- work topology. We identify the banks that generate most systemic risk and solve the planner's problem, providing guidance to macro-prudential policies. Keywords: financial networks; liquidity; interbank market; key players; systemic risk. ∗We thank the late Sudipto Bhattacharya, Yan Bodnya, Douglas Gale, Michael Grady, Charles Khan, Seymon Malamud, Farzad Saidi, Laura Veldkamp, Mark Watson, David Webb, Anne Wetherilt, Kamil Yilmaz, Peter Zimmerman, and seminar participants at the Bank of England, Cass Business School, Duisenberg School of Finance, Koc University, the LSE, Macro Finance Society annual meeting, the Stockholm School of Economics, and the WFA for helpful comments and discussions. Denbee (ed- [email protected]) is from the Bank of England; Julliard ([email protected]) and Yuan ([email protected]) are from the London School of Economics, SRC, and CEPR; Li ([email protected]) is from the Ohio State University. This research was started when Yuan was a senior Houblon-Norman Fellow at the Bank of England.
    [Show full text]
  • Testimony of Jamie Dimon Chairman and CEO, Jpmorgan Chase & Co
    Testimony of Jamie Dimon Chairman and CEO, JPMorgan Chase & Co. Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission January 13, 2010 Chairman Angelides, Vice-Chairman Thomas, and Members of the Commission, my name is Jamie Dimon, and I am Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of JPMorgan Chase & Co. I appreciate the invitation to appear before you today. The charge of this Commission, to examine the causes of the financial crisis and the collapse of major financial institutions, is of paramount importance, and it will not be easy. The causes of the crisis and its implications are numerous and complex. If we are to learn from this crisis moving forward, we must be brutally honest about the causes and develop an understanding of them that is realistic, and is not – as we are too often tempted – overly simplistic. The FCIC’s contribution to this debate is critical as policymakers seek to modernize our financial regulatory structure, and I hope my participation will further the Commission’s mission. The Commission has asked me to address a number of topics related to how our business performed during the crisis, as well as changes implemented as a result of the crisis. Some of these matters are addressed at greater length in our last two annual reports, which I am attaching to this testimony. While the last year and a half was one of the most challenging periods in our company’s history, it was also one of our most remarkable. Throughout the financial crisis, JPMorgan Chase never posted a quarterly loss, served as a safe haven for depositors, worked closely with the federal government, and remained an active lender to consumers, small and large businesses, government entities and not-for-profit organizations.
    [Show full text]
  • PUBLIC SECTION BNP Paribas 165(D)
    PUBLIC SECTION OCTOBER 1, 2014 PUBLIC SECTION BNP Paribas 165(d) Resolution Plan Bank of the West IDI Resolution Plan This document contains forward-looking statements. BNPP may also make forward-looking statements in its audited annual financial statements, in its interim financial statements, in press releases and in other written materials and in oral statements made by its officers, directors or employees to third parties. Statements that are not historical facts, including statements about BNPP’s beliefs and expectations, are forward-looking statements. These statements are based on current plans, estimates and projections, and therefore undue reliance should not be placed on them. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and BNPP undertakes no obligation to update publicly any of them in light of new information or future events. CTOBER O 1, 2014 PUBLIC SECTION TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................4 1.1 Overview of BNP Paribas ....................................................................................... 4 1.1.1 Retail Banking ....................................................................................... 5 1.1.2 Corporate and Investment Banking ....................................................... 5 1.1.3 Investment Solutions ............................................................................. 6 1.2 Overview of BNPP’s US Presence ........................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Bank Resolution Concepts, Trade-Offs, and Changes in Practices
    Phoebe White and Tanju Yorulmazer Bank Resolution Concepts, Trade-offs, and Changes in Practices • As the 2007-08 financial crisis demonstrated, 1. Introduction the failure or near-failure of banks entails heavy costs for customers, the financial During the recent crisis, some of the world’s largest and sector, and the overall economy. most prominent financial institutions failed or nearly failed, requiring intervention and assistance from regulators. Measures • Methods used to resolve failing banks range included extended access to lender-of-last-resort facilities, debt from private-sector solutions such as mergers guarantees, and injection of capital to mitigate the distress.1 and acquisitions to recapitalization through Chart 1 shows some of the largest financial institutions the use of public funds. that failed and/or received government support during the recent crisis. As we can see, these institutions were • The feasibility and cost of these methods large and systemically important. For example, for a brief will depend on whether the bank failure is period in 2009, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) was the idiosyncratic or part of a systemic crisis, and largest company by both assets and liabilities in the world. on factors such as the size, complexity, and Table 1 summarizes the interventions and resolutions of interconnectedness of the institution in distress. major financial institutions that experienced difficulties during the recent crisis. The chart and the table indicate • This study proposes a simple analytical the extraordinary levels of distress throughout the system framework—useful to firms and regulators and the unprecedented range of actions taken by resolution alike—for assessing these issues and determining the optimal resolution policy 1 For a discussion of the disruptions and the policy responses during the in the case of particular bank failures.
    [Show full text]
  • Fitch Ratings ING Groep N.V. Ratings Report 2020-10-15
    Banks Universal Commercial Banks Netherlands ING Groep N.V. Ratings Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR A+ Short-Term IDR F1 Derivative Counterparty Rating A+(dcr) Viability Rating a+ Key Rating Drivers Support Rating 5 Support Rating Floor NF Robust Company Profile, Solid Capitalisation: ING Groep N.V.’s ratings are supported by its leading franchise in retail and commercial banking in the Benelux region and adequate Sovereign Risk diversification in selected countries. The bank's resilient and diversified business model Long-Term Local- and Foreign- AAA emphasises lending operations with moderate exposure to volatile businesses, and it has a Currency IDRs sound record of earnings generation. The ratings also reflect the group's sound capital ratios Country Ceiling AAA and balanced funding profile. Outlooks Pandemic Stress: ING has enough rating headroom to absorb the deterioration in financial Long-Term Foreign-Currency Negative performance due to the economic fallout from the coronavirus crisis. The Negative Outlook IDR reflects the downside risks to Fitch’s baseline scenario, as pressure on the ratings would Sovereign Long-Term Local- and Negative increase substantially if the downturn is deeper or more prolonged than we currently expect. Foreign-Currency IDRs Asset Quality: The Stage 3 loan ratio remained sound at 2% at end-June 2020 despite the economic disruption generated by the lockdowns in the countries where ING operates. Fitch Applicable Criteria expects higher inflows of impaired loans from 4Q20 as the various support measures mature, driven by SMEs and mid-corporate borrowers and more vulnerable sectors such as oil and gas, Bank Rating Criteria (February 2020) shipping and transportation.
    [Show full text]
  • USCOURTS-Ca9-10-56219-0.Pdf
    Case: 10-56219 02/01/2012 ID: 8052139 DktEntry: 50-1 Page: 1 of 15 FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT GECCMC 2005-C1 PLUMMER STREET OFFICE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Delaware limited partnership, Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 10-56219 v. D.C. No. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, National 2:10-cv-01615- Association, JHN-SH Defendant-Appellee, OPINION FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as receiver for Washington Mutual Bank, Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Jacqueline H. Nguyen, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 15, 2011—Pasadena, California Filed February 1, 2012 Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, William A. Fletcher, and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Goodwin 957 Case: 10-56219 02/01/2012 ID: 8052139 DktEntry: 50-1 Page: 2 of 15 GECCMC 2005-C1 v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK 959 COUNSEL Peder K. Batalden, Horvitz & Levy, Encino, California, for the plaintiff-appellant. Allyson N. Ho, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Houston, Texas, Kathleen MacFarlane Waters, Morgan, Lewis & Bock- ius LLP, Los Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellee. Case: 10-56219 02/01/2012 ID: 8052139 DktEntry: 50-1 Page: 3 of 15 960 GECCMC 2005-C1 v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK Joseph Brooks, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Arlington, Virginia, for the defendant-intervenor-appellee. OPINION GOODWIN, Circuit Judge: This case arises from a landlord-tenant dispute in the wake of the Washington Mutual Bank (“WaMu” or the “Failed Bank”) failure in September 2008. Appellant GECCMC (“GE”) alleges that JP Morgan Chase Bank (“Chase”) failed to pay rent on two properties under lease agreements that Chase assumed after it purchased WaMu’s assets and liabili- ties from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) pursuant to the terms of a written Purchase & Assumption Agreement (the “P&A Agreement” or “Agreement”).
    [Show full text]
  • The Failure of Northern Rock: a Multi-Dimensional Case Study
    THE FAILURE OF NORTHERN ROCK: A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CASE STUDY Edited By Franco Bruni and David T. Llewellyn Chapters by: Tim Congdon Charles A.E. Goodhart Robert A. Eisenbeis and George G. Kaufman Paul Hamalainen Rosa M. Lastra David T. Llewellyn David G. Mayes and Geoffrey Wood Alistair Milne Marco Onado Michael Taylor SUERF – The European Money and Finance Forum Vienna 2009 CIP THE FAILURE OF NORTHERN ROCK: A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CASE STUDY Editors: Franco Bruni and David T. Llewellyn; Authors: Tim Congdon, Charles A. E. Goodhart, Robert A. Eisenbeis and George G. Kaufman, Paul Hamalainen, Rosa M. Lastra, David T. Llewellyn, David G. Mayes and Geoffrey Wood, Alistair Milne, Marco Onado, Michael Taylor Vienna: SUERF (SUERF Studies: 2009/1) ISBN-13: 978-3-902109-46-0 Keywords: Northern Rock, retail banking, mortgages, nationalisation, bank failure, United Kingdom, LPHI risk, lender of last resort, deposit insurance, market discipline, Countrywide, IndyMac, United States, deposit guarantees, supervisory failure, bank regulation, return on equity, business model, securitisation, financial regulation, financial stability, crisis management, banking law, insolvency, emergency liquidity assistance, cross-border bank insolvency, moral hazard, penalty rates, teaser rates, capital-asset ratios, Basel I, Basel II JEL Classification Numbers: D14, D18, D4, E21, E5, E51, E53, E58, G18, G2, G21, G28, G32, G33, G34, G38, K2, L1, L5, L51 © 2009 SUERF, Vienna Copyright reserved. Subject to the exception provided for by law, no part of this publication may be reproduced and/or published in print, by photocopying, on microfilm or in any other way without the written consent of the copyright holder(s); the same applies to whole or partial adaptations.
    [Show full text]
  • Bank Failures in Theory and History: the Great Depression and Other "Contagious" Events
    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES BANK FAILURES IN THEORY AND HISTORY: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND OTHER "CONTAGIOUS" EVENTS Charles W. Calomiris Working Paper 13597 http://www.nber.org/papers/w13597 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 November 2007 This paper was prepared for the Oxford Handbook of Banking, edited by Allen Berger, Phil Molyneux, and John Wilson. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. © 2007 by Charles W. Calomiris. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Bank Failures in Theory and History: The Great Depression and Other "Contagious" Events Charles W. Calomiris NBER Working Paper No. 13597 November 2007 JEL No. E5,G2,N2 ABSTRACT Bank failures during banking crises, in theory, can result either from unwarranted depositor withdrawals during events characterized by contagion or panic, or as the result of fundamental bank insolvency. Various views of contagion are described and compared to historical evidence from banking crises, with special emphasis on the U.S. experience during and prior to the Great Depression. Panics or "contagion" played a small role in bank failure, during or before the Great Depression-era distress. Ironically, the government safety net, which was designed to forestall the (overestimated) risks of contagion, seems to have become the primary source of systemic instability in banking in the current era. Charles W. Calomiris Graduate School of Business Columbia University 3022 Broadway Street, Uris Hall New York, NY 10027 and NBER [email protected] “Contagion” vs.
    [Show full text]
  • Dexia – Rise & Fall of a Banking Giant ______
    DEXIA – RISE & FALL OF A BANKING GIANT __________________________________________________ LES ETUDES DU CLUB N° 100 DECEMBRE 2013 DEXIA – RISE & FALL OF A BANKING GIANT __________________________________________________ LES ETUDES DU CLUB N° 100 DECEMBRE 2013 Etude réalisée par Monsieur Nicholas Whitbeck (HEC 2013) sous la direction de Monsieur Ulrich Hege Professeur à HEC Paris Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 3 I. How Dexia conquered the world ............................................................................................................ 4 A. Marriage of convenience ............................................................................................................................................... 4 B. Consolidation .................................................................................................................................................................. 6 C. Expansion in all directions ........................................................................................................................................... 8 D. Kempen & Labouchère – Dexia’s first warnings ................................................................................................... 10 E. Short-term liabilities fuelled the expansion of Dexia’s balance sheet ................................................................. 11 F. Under the leadership of Axel Miller, Dexia continued
    [Show full text]
  • Why Ireland: How Bank Failure Was Their Key to Success Nia R
    Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union Volume 2016 Article 3 9-22-2016 Why Ireland: How Bank Failure Was Their Key To Success Nia R. Gillenwater Scripps College Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, International Economics Commons, Macroeconomics Commons, Political Economy Commons, and the Regional Economics Commons Recommended Citation Gillenwater, Nia R. (2016) "Why Ireland: How Bank Failure Was Their Key oT Success," Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union: Vol. 2016, Article 3. DOI: 10.5642/urceu.201601.03 Available at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2016/iss1/3 This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Claremont at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 17 2 Why Ireland: How Bank Failure Was Their Key To Success Nia R. Gillenwater Scripps College Abstract Despite Ireland’s status as the first European Union (EU) country to receive a bailout, Ireland appears to be bouncing back extremely well from the ongoing financial crisis in Europe and the EU. Looking at recent Irish economic statistics it begs the question whether the government’s complete guarantee of all Irish debts was the best response. Ireland’s fi- nancial crisis seemed quite similar to America’s: for both the root causes are freely lending for real estate and property.
    [Show full text]
  • Volume 11 Issue 1
    Volume 11, Number 1 Printed ISSN: 1939-2230 PDF ISSN: 1939-2249 ACADEMY OF BANKING STUDIES JOURNAL Kurt Jesswein Editor Sam Houston State University The Academy of Banking Studies Journal is owned and published by the DreamCatchers Group, LLC. Editorial content is under the control of the Allied Academies, Inc., a non-profit association of scholars, whose purpose is to support and encourage research and the sharing and exchange of ideas and insights throughout the world. Page ii Authors execute a publication permission agreement and assume all liabilities. Neither the DreamCatchers Group nor Allied Academies is responsible for the content of the individual manuscripts. Any omissions or errors are the sole responsibility of the authors. The Editorial Board is responsible for the selection of manuscripts for publication from among those submitted for consideration. The Publishers accept final manuscripts in digital form and make adjustments solely for the purposes of pagination and organization. The Academy of Banking Studies Journal is owned and published by the DreamCatchers Group, LLC, PO Box 1708, Arden, NC 28704, USA. Those interested in communicating with the Journal, should contact the Executive Director of the Allied Academies at [email protected]. Copyright 2012 by the DreamCatchers Group, LLC, Arden NC, USA Academy of Banking Studies Journal, Volume 11, Number 1, 2012 Page iii EDITORIAL REVIEW BOARD Bora Aktan Tor Brodtkorb Yasar University American University of Sharjah Turkey United Arab Emirates Susan Coleman Richard
    [Show full text]
  • Barclays Bank
    NOT A NEW ISSUE–BOOK–ENTRY ONLY Ratings† On December 28, 2005, the date of the issuance of the Series B-3 Bonds, Jones Hall, A Professional Law Corporation, San Francisco, California (the “2005 Bond Counsel”), rendered their opinion (the “2005 Opinion”) to the effect that interest on the Series B-3 Bonds was exempt from State of California personal income taxes, and that interest on the Series B-3 Bonds was not excluded from gross income for federal income tax purposes under Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. The 2005 Bond Counsel expressed no opinion regarding any other tax consequences relating to the ownership or disposition of, or the accrual or receipt of interest on, the Series 2005 OPEB Bonds. The 2005 Opinion has not been updated subsequent to the date of the original issuance of the Series B-3 Bonds, or as of the date of this Reoffering Circular. See “TAX MATTERS.” $43,175,000 PERALTA COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA TAXABLE 2005 LIMITED OBLIGATION OPEB (OTHER POST-EMPLOYMENT BENEFIT) BONDS, SERIES B-3 (WEEKLY RATE) Dated: Date of Original Delivery (December 28, 2005) Price: 100% Due: August 5, 2025 The purpose of this Reoffering Circular is to furnish information in connection with (i) the issuance of an irrevocable direct-pay letter of credit (the “Letter of Credit”) by Barclays Bank, PLC on August 5, 2020 (the “Letter of Credit Issuance Date”) to secure the Peralta Community College District Taxable 2005 Limited Obligation OPEB (Other Post-Employment Benefit) Bonds, Series B-3 (the “Series B-3 Bonds”) as further described herein and (ii) the remarketing of the Series B-3 Bonds in Weekly Rate Mode.
    [Show full text]