Salz Review. Barclays Will Consider and Decide for Itself Whether, and If So How, to Act on the Views, Findings and Recommendations Contained in This Report

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Salz Review. Barclays Will Consider and Decide for Itself Whether, and If So How, to Act on the Views, Findings and Recommendations Contained in This Report 0 Salz Review An Independent Review of Barclays’ Business Practices April 2013 Salz Review An Independent Review of Barclays’ Business Practices April 2013 Salz Review An Independent Review of Barclays’ Business Practices Disclaimer This Report has been prepared by Anthony Salz with Russell Collins acting as Deputy Reviewer (the Salz Review). The Review was set up by Barclays as an independent review reporting to a non-executive committee of Barclays. The views, findings and recommendations included in this Report are entirely those of the Salz Review. Barclays will consider and decide for itself whether, and if so how, to act on the views, findings and recommendations contained in this Report. The Review's Terms of Reference and the approach to the Review are described in Appendix A. The views, findings and recommendations are based on the Salz Review's assessment of the documents provided by Barclays or others in response to requests and information gained from interviews. The Salz Review has not conducted a forensic investigation or an audit of the information made available to it. In some cases restrictions were placed on the Salz Review's access to documents or documents were redacted by Barclays, in each case for legal reasons. The Salz Review has generally assumed the veracity of information provided. Other individuals considering the same information could form a different assessment of it. Similarly, the Salz Review might have formed a different assessment had it considered other information. Accordingly, the findings of the Salz Review should not be treated as determinative of any fact, nor of the performance of, or compliance with, any legal or regulatory obligation. The Report is not for the purpose of guiding or influencing the conduct or decisions of any person other than Barclays, including any investment or other financial decisions. Accordingly, it must not be relied upon for that purpose. In this respect and generally, Anthony Salz and Russell Collins accept no legal responsibility or liability for the contents of, or any omissions from, the Report. This Report is published at the request of Barclays PLC, consistent with the Terms of Reference. Salz Review Sir Michael Rake 4, Lombard Street Chairman, Business Practices Review London, EC3V 9HD Committee Barclays PLC 1 Churchill Place 3 April 2013 E14 5HP I am pleased to present to you my Report on Barclays’ business practices. This Review, in which I have been ably assisted by Russell Collins, sets out a number of recommendations. As contemplated in our Terms of Reference, we have developed these recommendations from conclusions we reached as to why, in a number of specific instances, Barclays’ behaviours fell below the standards it expected. Reports like this one inevitably concentrate on what went wrong, in order to find a better way forward. Accordingly they tend to read critically and negatively. We have sought to be balanced, but are mindful that some of this will be lost if our comments are taken and used out of context. Two points are worth making here. First, the problems faced by Barclays are to some extent industry problems – though Barclays should take no comfort from this. More importantly, despite the problems, there are many really good things about Barclays – not least that the overwhelming majority of its people are focused on doing their best for its customers, as reflected in the tens of millions of successful interactions every day. Since I was appointed to carry out the Review, there have been a number of significant changes, including the appointments of Sir David Walker as Chairman and of Antony Jenkins as Group Chief Executive. Together, you have already started the work to restore trust in Barclays. Our recommendations should not be taken to suggest otherwise. They reflect the position when we started our work last summer. We believe they should provide a valuable road map for the future. Barclays is a leading UK institution, with significant global businesses. The public rightly has high expectations. The changes envisaged in this Review will take time to have their effect. I welcome the start you have made. Anthony Salz Salz Review 1 An Independent Review of Barclays’ Business Practices Contents 1. Introduction to the Review .............................................................................................. 2 2. Overview and Recommendations ................................................................................... 4 3. The Importance of Banks and the Roots of a Crisis .................................................. 20 4. Barclays’ Evolution .......................................................................................................... 28 5. The Struggle for Survival through the Financial Crisis .............................................. 39 6. Conduct Matters .............................................................................................................. 52 7. Regulatory and Tax Matters ........................................................................................... 68 8. Culture ............................................................................................................................... 76 9. Board Governance .......................................................................................................... 98 10. People .............................................................................................................................. 120 11. Pay .................................................................................................................................... 130 12. Management Oversight and Risk Management ........................................................ 150 13. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 163 14. Appendices ..................................................................................................................... 165 Appendix A – About the Review ................................................................................ 166 Appendix B – What is Culture and How Can it Go Wrong? ................................. 177 Appendix C – Complaints Statistics ........................................................................... 196 Appendix D – Business Practices: Lessons from other Industries ........................ 198 Appendix E – Barclays Timelines: Overall and Main non-UK Geographies ....... 201 Appendix F – Barclays’ Governance Structure at Group Level ............................. 209 Appendix G – Barclays’ Employees ........................................................................... 211 Appendix H – Barclays’ Financial Evolution ............................................................ 212 Appendix I – Selected Bank Financial Ratios ........................................................... 222 Appendix J – Variability in Risk Weighted Assets Calculations ............................. 225 Appendix K – Correspondence between Lord Turner and Marcus Agius .......... 226 Appendix L – Glossary ................................................................................................. 231 Salz Review 2 An Independent Review of Barclays’ Business Practices 1. Introduction to the Review 1.1 The Board of Barclays PLC (Barclays or the Group) announced in July 2012 that it had commissioned this independent external Review of its business practices and had appointed me to lead it. The Review’s mandate is to determine how Barclays can rebuild trust and develop business practices which make it a leader, not only among its banking peers, but also among multinational corporates more generally. I take this as a commitment by Barclays not to be satisfied with following industry and regulatory standards if there are other higher standards that are attainable and meet the interests of its various stakeholder groups. Indeed, I regard this as entirely appropriate given Barclays’ position as a leading UK financial institution. Nevertheless I recognise that the extent to which Barclays is able to implement some of our recommendations depends on how the industry as a whole responds to the challenges it faces. It is in the interests of all its stakeholders that Barclays is successful and is able to compete effectively in each of its markets. 1.2 I have reported to a sub-committee of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) of Barclays’ Board (the ‘Sub-Committee’). The Sub-Committee is chaired by Sir Michael Rake, Deputy Chairman and Senior Independent Director, and comprises Sir David Walker, David Booth and Sir John Sunderland. The Terms of Reference for the Review appear within Appendix A. 1.3 With the agreement of Barclays, I appointed Russell Collins as my deputy for the Review. I appointed The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and Herbert Smith Freehills (HSF) to assist us. In this report I will tend to refer to the joint views of myself and Russell Collins by using the word ‘we’. 1.4 The Review was commissioned as an independent assessment of Barclays’ values, principles and standards of operation. We have considered Barclays’ Board governance, organisation and operating model, as well as its culture, people management and pay arrangements, and its risk and control systems. 1.5 As part of our work, we considered a number of significant ‘events’ which appear to have materially affected Barclays’ reputation. Our purpose was not to prove or disprove any allegations surrounding those events. Our brief
Recommended publications
  • 9 August 2012 Barclays PLC Sir David Walker Appointed to Succeed
    9 August 2012 Barclays PLC Sir David Walker appointed to succeed Marcus Agius as Chairman Barclays PLC and Barclays Bank PLC (“Barclays”) announce that Sir David Walker has been appointed as a non-executive Director of Barclays with effect from 1 September 2012 and will succeed Marcus Agius as Chairman of Barclays with effect from 1 November 2012. Marcus Agius will step down as a Director and as Chairman of Barclays with effect from 31 October 2012. Sir David Walker is currently a Senior Adviser to US bank Morgan Stanley International, having previously held the position of Chairman. He has held a number of high profile positions over the past 30 years including Assistant Secretary at the Treasury; Executive Director at the Bank of England; Chairman and Chief Executive of the Securities and Investment Board; Deputy Chairman at Lloyds Bank; Vice Chairman of Legal & General; and Chairman of the London Investment Bankers' Association. Since 2007 he has completed two independent reports and made recommendations regarding the private equity industry and corporate governance at financial institutions. He also co-led the independent review of the report that the FSA produced into the failure of Royal Bank of Scotland. Commenting, Marcus Agius said, “Barclays is fortunate to have attracted Sir David Walker to succeed me as Chairman. He will be taking over at a time when Barclays universal banking model is delivering a strong performance in difficult markets. I wish him every success as he leads Barclays at this important time.” Sir John Sunderland, who led the process to appoint a successor to Marcus Agius, said today, “I am delighted that Sir David Walker has accepted the Board’s invitation to become Chairman.
    [Show full text]
  • Network Risk and Key Players: a Structural Analysis of Interbank Liquidity∗
    Network Risk and Key Players: A Structural Analysis of Interbank Liquidity∗ Edward Denbee Christian Julliard Ye Li Kathy Yuan June 4, 2018 Abstract We estimate the liquidity multiplier and individual banks' contribution to systemic liquidity risk in an interbank network using a structural model. Banks borrow liquid- ity from neighbours and update their valuation based on neighbours' actions. When the former (latter) motive dominates, the equilibrium exhibits strategic substitution (complementarity) of liquidity holdings, and a reduced (increased) liquidity multi- plier dampening (amplifying) shocks. Empirically, we find substantial and procyclical network-generated risks driven mostly by changes of equilibrium type rather than net- work topology. We identify the banks that generate most systemic risk and solve the planner's problem, providing guidance to macro-prudential policies. Keywords: financial networks; liquidity; interbank market; key players; systemic risk. ∗We thank the late Sudipto Bhattacharya, Yan Bodnya, Douglas Gale, Michael Grady, Charles Khan, Seymon Malamud, Farzad Saidi, Laura Veldkamp, Mark Watson, David Webb, Anne Wetherilt, Kamil Yilmaz, Peter Zimmerman, and seminar participants at the Bank of England, Cass Business School, Duisenberg School of Finance, Koc University, the LSE, Macro Finance Society annual meeting, the Stockholm School of Economics, and the WFA for helpful comments and discussions. Denbee (ed- [email protected]) is from the Bank of England; Julliard ([email protected]) and Yuan ([email protected]) are from the London School of Economics, SRC, and CEPR; Li ([email protected]) is from the Ohio State University. This research was started when Yuan was a senior Houblon-Norman Fellow at the Bank of England.
    [Show full text]
  • Barclays Poaches Citi Executive to Be Card Unit CEO Barry Rodrigues Expected to Take Over Position in November
    DOW JONES, A NEWS CORP COMPANY DJIA ▲ 21858.32 0.07% S&P 500 ▲ 2441.32 0.13% Nasdaq ▲ 6256.56 0.64% U.S. 10 Yr ▲ 2/32 Yield 2.190% Crude Oil ▲ 48.78 0.39% Euro This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers visit http://www.djreprints.com. https://www.wsj.com/articles/barclays-poaches-citi-executive-to-be-card-unit-ceo-1502368381 MARKETS Barclays Poaches Citi Executive to Be Card Unit CEO Barry Rodrigues expected to take over position in November The New York office of Barclays. Barclays PLC’s international credit card unit is getting a new chief executive. PHOTO: MARK LENNIHAN/ASSOCIATED PRESS By AnnaMaria Andriotis Aug. 10, 2017 8:33 a.m. ET ̖ Barclays BCS -1.62% ̖ PLC’s international credit card unit is getting a new chief executive. Barclaycard International has hired longtime card industry executive Barry Rodrigues to run its operations, a position that he is expected to take over in November, according to an internal memo reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Mr. Rodrigues joins from ̖ Citigroup Inc., C -0.65% ̖ where he was the head of digital payments in the global consumer bank, in charge of new payment solutions and the team that manages the bank’s partnerships with PayPal and Apple and its relationship with Mastercard . He will replace Amer Sajed, who retired in July. Mr. Sajed became interim CEO in May 2015 and took on the role permanently in April 2016.
    [Show full text]
  • How to Enter a Request for Transfer - Nordea Sweden
    How to enter a Request for Transfer - Nordea Sweden Transfer type Request Name and address of Beneficiary’s account number BIC code / Name of banker Reference lines code beneficiary SWIFT address Transfer between own 400 Min 1, max 4 lines Account number is used: Receiving bank’s BIC This field must not be Max 4 lines x 35 char accounts with Nordea Sweden (address information is retrieved 1) Personal account no = pers code - 8 or 11 filled in from the register of account reg no (YYMMDDXXXX) characters. This field numbers of Nordea, Sweden) 2) Other account nos = must be filled in 11 digits. Currency account NDEASESSXXX indicated by the 3-letter ISO code in the end Transfer to third party’s 401 Always fill in the name When using bank account no., Receiving bank’s BIC This field must not be 12 char account with Nordea Sweden see the below comments. In code - 8 or 11 filled in or to an account with another Sweden account nos consist of characters. This field Swedish bank 10 - 15 digits. must be filled in IBAN required for STP (straight through processing) Domestic payments to 402 Only fill in the name in line 1 Enter bankgiro no consisting of BGABSESS. This field This field must not be filled Max 4 lines x 35 char Bankgiro number - SEK only (other address information is 7 - 8 digits without blank spaces must be filled in. in. Instead BGABSESS retrieved from the Bankgiro etc should be entered in the register) In other currencies BIC code field than SEK: Receivning banks BIC code and bank account no.
    [Show full text]
  • Chronology, 1963–89
    Chronology, 1963–89 This chronology covers key political and economic developments in the quarter century that saw the transformation of the Euromarkets into the world’s foremost financial markets. It also identifies milestones in the evolu- tion of Orion; transactions mentioned are those which were the first or the largest of their type or otherwise noteworthy. The tables and graphs present key financial and economic data of the era. Details of Orion’s financial his- tory are to be found in Appendix IV. Abbreviations: Chase (Chase Manhattan Bank), Royal (Royal Bank of Canada), NatPro (National Provincial Bank), Westminster (Westminster Bank), NatWest (National Westminster Bank), WestLB (Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale), Mitsubishi (Mitsubishi Bank) and Orion (for Orion Bank, Orion Termbank, Orion Royal Bank and subsidiaries). Under Orion financings: ‘loans’ are syndicated loans, NIFs, RUFs etc.; ‘bonds’ are public issues, private placements, FRNs, FRCDs and other secu- rities, lead managed, co-managed, managed or advised by Orion. New loan transactions and new bond transactions are intended to show the range of Orion’s client base and refer to clients not previously mentioned. The word ‘subsequently’ in brackets indicates subsequent transactions of the same type and for the same client. Transaction amounts expressed in US dollars some- times include non-dollar transactions, converted at the prevailing rates of exchange. 1963 Global events Feb Canadian Conservative government falls. Apr Lester Pearson Premier. Mar China and Pakistan settle border dispute. May Jomo Kenyatta Premier of Kenya. Organization of African Unity formed, after widespread decolonization. Jun Election of Pope Paul VI. Aug Test Ban Take Your Partners Treaty.
    [Show full text]
  • A Behavioral Finance Analysis of the Barclays-LIBOR Case
    Corporate Culture and Frauds: A Behavioral Finance Analysis of the Barclays-LIBOR Case Enrico Maria Cervellati Luca Piras Matteo Scialanga University of Bologna University of Cagliari Luiss Rome Abstract The aim of this paper is to use behavioral finance to explain the factors that brought Barclays Plc. to face a £290 million fine (about $440 million), having deliberately tried to manipulate the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate). This sums to the £59.5 million fined by the British Financial Services Authority (FSA) – the highest fine imposed by this organization – and respectively £102 million and £128 million by the US Department of Justice and by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). To achieve this goal, we analyze the reports of the American and British regulatory agencies, and those of financial analysts. Even though the focus of analysis are Barclays’ actions, we compare them with what other market participants did, to give a comprehensive look on financial industry and its dominant culture. In particular, after describing LIBOR rate determination methodology and the behavior of Barclays personnel when violations occurred, we presents Barclays’ failures in organizing its own control systems and establishing a proper corporate culture. Finally, we analyze the behavior of market participants and supervisory authority in evaluating Barclays’ financial and ethical performance. 1 “Barclays had a cultural tendency to be always pushing the limit” Lord Adair Turner, Financial Services Authority Chairman Introduction The aim of this paper is to use behavioral finance to explain the factors that brought Barclays Plc. to face a £290 million fine (about $440 million), having deliberately tried to manipulate the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate).
    [Show full text]
  • Testimony of Jamie Dimon Chairman and CEO, Jpmorgan Chase & Co
    Testimony of Jamie Dimon Chairman and CEO, JPMorgan Chase & Co. Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission January 13, 2010 Chairman Angelides, Vice-Chairman Thomas, and Members of the Commission, my name is Jamie Dimon, and I am Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of JPMorgan Chase & Co. I appreciate the invitation to appear before you today. The charge of this Commission, to examine the causes of the financial crisis and the collapse of major financial institutions, is of paramount importance, and it will not be easy. The causes of the crisis and its implications are numerous and complex. If we are to learn from this crisis moving forward, we must be brutally honest about the causes and develop an understanding of them that is realistic, and is not – as we are too often tempted – overly simplistic. The FCIC’s contribution to this debate is critical as policymakers seek to modernize our financial regulatory structure, and I hope my participation will further the Commission’s mission. The Commission has asked me to address a number of topics related to how our business performed during the crisis, as well as changes implemented as a result of the crisis. Some of these matters are addressed at greater length in our last two annual reports, which I am attaching to this testimony. While the last year and a half was one of the most challenging periods in our company’s history, it was also one of our most remarkable. Throughout the financial crisis, JPMorgan Chase never posted a quarterly loss, served as a safe haven for depositors, worked closely with the federal government, and remained an active lender to consumers, small and large businesses, government entities and not-for-profit organizations.
    [Show full text]
  • Credit Suisse First Boston
    SUPPLEMENTAL LISTING DOCUMENT If you are in doubt as to any aspect of this document, you should consult your stockbroker or other registered dealer in securities, bank manager, solicitor, professional accountant or other professional adviser. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (the “Stock Exchange”) and Hong Kong Securities Clearing 1 Company Limited (“HKSCC”) take no responsibility for the contents of this document, make no representation as to its accuracy or completeness and expressly disclaim any liability whatsoever for any loss howsoever arising from or in reliance upon the whole or any part of the contents of this document. Offer of 180,000,000 European Style (Cash Settled) Average Return* Call Warrants in Global Registered Form due May 18, 2005 relating to the existing issued ordinary H shares of RMB1.00 each of Huaneng Power International, Inc. (Stock Code: 9945) issued by Credit Suisse First Boston 7 (incorporated under the laws of Switzerland) 8 Exercise Price: HK$8.88 per Warrant Expiry Date: May 18, 2005 This Supplemental Listing Document is published for the purpose of obtaining a listing of all of the above warrants (the “Warrants”) relating to the existing issued ordinary H shares of RMB1.00 each of Huaneng Power International, Inc. (the “Company”) to be issued by Credit Suisse First Boston (the “Issuer”) on the Stock Exchange, is supplemental to and should be read in conjunction with a base listing document published on April 23, 2003 (the “Base Listing Document”) (as amended or updated from time to time) and contains particulars given 1 in compliance with the Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (the “Rules”) for the purpose of giving information with regard to the Issuer and the Warrants.
    [Show full text]
  • Barclays Bank Plc $10,000,000,000 Global
    Supplement Number 1 dated 15 May 2013 To the Base Prospectus dated 7 December 2012 BARCLAYS BANK PLC (Incorporated with limited liability in England and Wales) $10,000,000,000 GLOBAL COLLATERALISED MEDIUM TERM NOTES supported by a limited recourse undertaking by Barclays CCP Funding LLP This base prospectus supplement (the “Supplement”) is supplemental to, forms part of and must be read in conjunction with, the base prospectus dated 7 December 2012 (the “Base Prospectus”) prepared by Barclays Bank PLC (the “Bank” or the “Issuer”) with respect to its $10,000,000,000 Global Collateralised Medium Term Note Series (the “Global Collateralised Medium Term Note Series”). The Supplement has been approved by the Central Bank of Ireland (the “Central Bank”), as competent authority under Directive 2003/71/EC (the “Prospectus Directive”). The Central Bank only approves this Supplement as meeting the requirements imposed under Irish and EU law pursuant to the Prospectus Directive. This Supplement constitutes a base prospectus supplement for the purposes of the Prospectus Directive. Terms defined in the Base Prospectus have the same meanings when used in this Supplement. The Issuer accepts responsibility for the information contained in this Supplement. To the best of the knowledge of the Issuer (having taken all reasonable care to ensure that such is the case), the information contained in this Supplement is in accordance with the facts and does not omit anything likely to affect the import of such information. This Supplement is supplemental to, and should be read in conjunction with, the Base Prospectus. To the extent that there is any inconsistency between any statement in this Supplement or any statement incorporated by reference into the Base Prospectus, the statements in this Supplement will prevail.
    [Show full text]
  • Speech by Antony Jenkins, CEO Retail and Business Banking
    May 23rd 2011 Antony Jenkins Barclays Capital Americas Select Conference Good evening and thank you all for coming. I want to start by thanking the organisers of this event for inviting me to speak on behalf of Barclays. It’s a pleasure to do so. For those of you who don’t know me, I’m Antony Jenkins. I’m CEO of Retail and Business Banking, or “RBB” for short. Over the next 20 minutes or so I’ll talk a little bit about Barclays and about RBB. I’ll then focus on our strategy and plans in Barclaycard. I will talk in detail about what we are doing in that business to take advantage of the growth opportunities that we see but also to illustrate to you how we manage all the RBB businesses. Before I do, let me say a few words on how pleased we are with BarCap hosting this event here in London and we are pleased to be doing business with so many of you. As you know we have made great strides in building our Equities franchise here in Europe since 2008. We now have over 450 staff across Research, Distribution, Trading and Origination in Equities Europe located in Frankfurt, London, Madrid, Milan, Paris, Tel Aviv and Zurich 1 We currently cover 460 companies across 12 industries and 36 unique sectors with plans to expand coverage to 550 companies by the end of 2011. Barclays Capital has moved into the top ten of the annual Institutional Investor All‐Europe Research Team survey of equity research analysts.
    [Show full text]
  • Large Cap Equity Fund
    North Carolina Supplemental Retirement Plans Annual Review FEBRUARY 2013 Table of Contents • Defined Contribution Trends – Streamlining Investment Choices – DC Spend Down • Service Provider Disclosures – ERISA 408(b)(2) Regulations • Fee Review – NCSRP Fees – Stable Value Fund Fees • GoalMaker Discussion (Separate Slides) • Considering Other Fund Lineup Options • Fund Performance Review •Disclaimer MERCER 1 Defined Contribution Trends Trends for Large Plan Sponsors • Streamline number and types of investments offered – Combine style-specific (value/growth) choices for participants - Removes need to rebalance among styles - One fund choice that includes multiple underlying strategies across the style spectrum • Focus on retirement income MERCER 3 Streamlining Investment Choices • Research has shown that participants are neither good at making their own investment choices nor happy about this responsibility • Limited participant understanding remains one of the most significant challenges for plan sponsors • Plan sponsors are looking to: – Reduce redundant investment choices – Blend styles and managers – Lower risk for participants • Offering limited options allows clear and simple communication of plan • Allows each participant to create a portfolio that fits their risk tolerance and time horizon MERCER 4 Custom Funds Sample Large Cap Multi-Manager Structure Large Cap Equity Fund • Combining strategies with low or negative excess return correlations are expected to reduce the Index tracking error and increase the fund’s expected 5% information
    [Show full text]
  • Direct Testimony of Joseph S. Fichera, Chief Executive Officer
    Fichera Testimony Exhibit 3-C Direct Testimony of Joseph S. Fichera, Chief Executive Officer Saber Partners, LLC Proprietary Page 1 of 28 Saber Partners, LLC 2018 Fichera Testimony Exhibit 3-C 1 DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH S. FICHERA, CPUC R.17-06-026 2 Q. Please state your name and business address. 3 A. Joseph S. Fichera, Saber Partners, LLC, 44 Wall Street, New York, New York 10005 4 Q. By whom are you employed and what is your position? 5 A. I am a member of Saber Partners, LLC and serve as its Chief Executive Officer. I am also 6 Senior Advisor to The Williams Capital Group. L.P. 7 Q. Please describe your duties and responsibilities at Saber Partners. 8 A. I manage the organization and execute assignments for clients by providing confidential, 9 independent, senior level analysis, advice, and execution for Chief Executive Officers, Regulators, 10 Elected Officials, Chief Financial Officers, Treasurers, and others. 11 Q. Please describe your educational background and professional experience. 12 A. I have a bachelor’s degree in Public Affairs from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson 13 School of Public and International Affairs. I also have a master’s degree in Business Administration 14 from Yale University’s School of Management. In 1995-1996, I was an executive fellow in residence 15 at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton. 16 I have worked in the fields of finance and investment banking since 1982. I began as an 17 Associate in the Public Finance Department of Dean Witter Reynolds 1982-1984 (now a part of 18 Morgan Stanley).
    [Show full text]