102 | Mission Notes

4.1 Mission Notes Caucasus and Moldova

n the 1990s, the Organization for Security and I Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) deployed a significant number of missions to former Soviet states in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. These included operations in Estonia, Georgia, Latvia and Ukraine and an assistance group in (Russia). Today, the organization’s footprint in the region is reduced, but it still maintains missions in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova in addition to offices in Belarus and Ukraine. The EU has also deployed a number of Special Representatives (EUSRs) and civilian missions to the region in the

last decade. OSCE/Laura Hayruni The outlook for the international presence in Armenian police officers undergo public order management training in Yerevan these former Soviet states is uncertain. The 2008 during an assessment conducted by the OSCE Office, 22 February 2010. war between Russia and Georgia led to a significant shake-up of the political and monitoring presences with which the OSCE has long been involved. By in the country. Prior to the war, a UN peacekeeping contrast, there have been signs that Russia and the operation (UNOMIG) had patrolled the seces- EU may cooperate to resolve the frozen conflict in sionist region of Abkhazia while OSCE monitors Moldova and the secessionist Transdniestrian region. covered South Ossetia, which also claimed indepen- dence. Both of these missions survived the war, but have since been closed due to political differences South Caucasus between Russia (which now recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign states) and other Since the closure of its mission in Georgia in members of the UN Security Council and OSCE 2009, the OSCE field presence in the South Ministerial Council. The UN and OSCE continue Caucasus has consisted of offices in and to co-facilitate talks on the secessionist regions in Yerevan, the capitals of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Geneva with the EU, which maintains both a mon- However, the OSCE’s engagement in the dis- itoring mission and a number of EUSRs covering pute over Nagorno-Karabakh is also channeled Georgian affairs. through an envoy (the Personal Representative In the last year attention has switched to of the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt mounting tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan with by the OSCE Minsk Conference) based in over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, Tblisi, Georgia. CaucasUs and Moldova | 103

The offices in Baku and Yerevan are relatively small (there are twelve and seven international CiO Representative on Minsk Conference staff in the respective offices) and both have wide-ranging mandates to work with both Authorization Date 10 August 1995 (DOC. 525/95) Start Date January 1997 government and civil society on political, security, Head of Mission Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk social and economic issues. Much of their work (Poland) involves supporting government activities through Budget $1.5 million commissioning independent studies of policy (1 January 2010- challenges: in 2010, for example, the office in 31 December 2010) Strength as of International Staff: 6 Yerevan published reports on issues ranging from 1 August 2010 Local Staff: 11 religious tolerance to military detention. Both offices also monitor human rights, the For detailed mission information see p. 286 administration of justice and press freedom, work- ing closely with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). In EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia 2008, ODIHR published a critical report on the Azeri presidential election. Authorization 15 September 2008 The broad mandates of both missions mean (2008/736/ CFSP) Start Date February 2009 (2008/760/CFSP) that they sometimes become involved in issues most Head of Mission Pierre Morel political missions would not. In 2010, the Office in (France) Yerevan – coordinating with the World Bank and Budget $.7 million the UN Food and Agriculture Organization – laid (1 March 2010-31 August 2010) out proposals for dealing with a hazardous chemical waste dump which the government implemented. However, while the two offices are specifically EUSR for the South Caucasus charged with tracking political developments, both Authorization and 7 July 2003 (2003/496/CFSP) are explicitly distinct from the OSCE’s efforts to Start Date resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute through the Head of Mission Peter Semneby Minsk Process. Nagorno-Karabakh is an Armenian- (Sweden) majority area within Azerbaijan, and was in a state Budget $2.4 million of civil war from 1988 to 1994. The OSCE launched (1 March 2010-31 August 2010) diplomatic efforts to resolve the war in 1992, over- seen by the “Minsk Group” of states concerned with for operational preparations. Since 1995, the Per- the conflict. In 1994, OSCE members decided to sonal Representative has been the OSCE’s primary deploy a peacekeeping force to Nagorno-Karabakh face in the region itself – literally so, as the widely- in the event of a peace agreement. respected Andrzej Kasprzyk of Poland has held the While large-scale hostilities ended in 1994, no post since its inception. such agreement has been made. The “Republic” of The Personal Representative has “field Nagorno-Karabakh, which has no international assistants” in Baku, Yerevan and Nagorno-Karabakh recognition, remains outside Azeri government itself. With a very limited number of staff, control. Armenian forces control not only Nagorno- Ambassador Kasprzyk is required to monitor a Karabakh but also Azerbaijani territory to the west frontline of nearly two hundred kilometers. Thomas and south of the secessionist region. de Waal, an expert on the conflict, notes that “the The OSCE has maintained an unusual set of monitors must give advance warning of several days mechanisms to deal with the frozen conflict and if they wish to visit a section of the frontline” and prepare the way for a peacekeeping mission if one argues that their main function is to act as “a means is ever required. These include not only the Minsk of communication between the Armenian and Group but a High-Level Planning Group of six Azerbaijani military commanders.” military staff officers based in Vienna responsible 104 | Mission Notes

OSCE Office in Baku

Authorization Date 16 November 1999 (PC DEC/318) Start Date July 2000 Head of Mission Ambassador Bilge Cankorel (Turkey) Budget $3.7 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010) Strength as of 1 International Staff: 11 August 2010 Local Staff: 27

For detailed mission information see p. 265

OSCE Office in Yerevan

Authorization Date 22 July 1999 (PC.DEC/314) Start Date February 2000 Head of Mission Ambassador Sergey Kapinos (Russian Federation) Budget $3.9 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010) Strength as of 1 International Staff: 21 August 2010 Local Staff: 74

EUBAM For detailed mission information see p. 273 A Moldovan border guard and friend.

The frontline has become increasingly about the escalating conflict in parallel with the unstable in 2010, with a series of clashes resulting Minsk Group. in fatalities for both sides. The number of incidents In spite of this engagement on Nagorno- spiked in August and September, and the co-chairs Karabakh, the role of the EUSR for the South of the Minsk Group (France, Russia and the US) Caucasus – originally created in 2003 – was more appealed for calm. Russia has made sustained dip- closely associated with Georgian affairs before lomatic efforts to handle the crisis this year, hosting the 2008 war. Ambassador Semneby’s predecessor the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers for Heidi Talvitie played a mediating role in the peace- bilateral talks in June. Nonetheless, there is a risk ful re-entry of the breakaway region of Ajara into that the conflict may deteriorate, leaving the Minsk Georgia in 2004. In 2005, the EU deployed a one- Process’s future in question. year justice mission to Georgia and also considered The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is also on the deploying a border monitoring mission to replace a agenda of the European Union’s Special Represen- previous OSCE monitoring operation. tative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus, currently Apparently concerned by Russian objections Peter Semneby of Sweden. The EUSR’s involve- to the deployment of a full-scale EU mission, ment in the conflict is complicated by the fact that the EU instead created a Border Support Team the EU is not formally represented in the Minsk (BST) answering to the EUSR. Launched in 2006, Group but Ambassador Semneby (who took up the BST consists of six international staff and three his post in 2006) has attempted to ease tensions. Georgian experts, that work closely with the national To assist him, the EU appointed political advisers authorities on improving border management. Even to the EUSR based in Yerevan and Baku in 2007. prior to the 2008 war, the BST could not operate in In 2010, the EUSR publicly underlined concerns Abkhazia and South Ossetia. CaucasUs and Moldova | 105

The 2008 war resulted in an expansion and complication of the EU presence in Georgia. The OSCE Mission to Moldova EU not only deployed a stand-alone monitoring Authorization Date 4 February 1993 (19-CSO/ mission reporting directly to Brussels (EUMM) Journal No. 3, Annex 3) but also designated a new EUSR for the Crisis Start Date April 1993 in Georgia. Pierre Morel (who also acts as the Head of Mission Ambassador Philip N. Remler EUSR for Central Asia) is responsible for giving (United States) political guidance to the EUMM and co-moder- Budget $2.7 million (1 January 2010- ates the talks in Geneva with the OSCE and the 31 December 2010) UN. Twelve rounds of talks had taken place by Strength as of International Staff: 13 mid-2010, but this process has largely focused on 1 August 2010 Local Staff: 37 technical issues rather than addressing the causes For detailed mission information see p. 254 of the conflict. In June 2010, Abkhaz negotiators threatened to suspend participation, but relented shortly afterwards. EUSR for Moldova Peter Semneby has continued to be involved in

Georgian affairs, following the formula of “engage- Authorization Date 23 March 2005 (2005/265/CFSP) ment with recognition” with Abkhazia and South Start Date November 2005 Ossetia. However, in July 2010 it was decided that Head of Mission Kálmán Mizsei the EUSR for the South Caucasus’s mandate would (Hungary) end in early 2011. Budget $2.7 million (1 January 2010 - 31 December 2010)

Moldova EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova (EUBAM) In 1992, tensions between Moldova and the secessionist region of Transdniestria escalated to Authorization Date 7 October 2005 civil war. The conflict was complicated by the (The Memorandum fact that, while Transdniestria is relatively small, of Understanding) significant numbers of Russian troops are based there. Start Date 30 November 2005 In February 1993, the OSCE deployed a mission Head of Mission Udo Burkholder (Germany) Budget About $30.9 million to Moldova, mandated to help facilitate a politi- (December 2009- cal settlement. Although there has been no return November 2011) to war, talks on a political settlement broke down Strength as of International Staff: 100 in 2004 and stalled again in 2006 and the conflict 27 May 2010 Local Staff: 100 remains unresolved. The OSCE mission is relatively small, with In 2009, Moldova was briefly gripped by riot- just thirteen international staff, but has played a ing after presidential elections. In 2010, opposition variety of technical roles aimed at mitigating the parties instigated a referendum aimed at nullifying effects of the frozen conflict. These have included those elections. The OSCE was criticized in Mol- the verification of the withdrawal and destruction dovan media for not monitoring this – criticisms of Russian military equipment under the Conven- the head of mission dismissed as “baseless” – but the tional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty; developing turnout was below the legally-required minimum. proposals to increase military transparency between The EU has engaged heavily in Moldovan Moldovan and Trandniestrian forces; and efforts affairs since 2005, when it appointed its first EUSR to combat human trafficking. The mission has to the country. That year, the EU also launched a also monitored elections and rule of law issues, Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) aimed at developing new trial-monitoring mechanisms in cracking down on smuggling between Ukraine recent years. 106 | Mission Notes

and Moldova (unusually, the EU does not run this up a joint EU-Russia Security Committee, and mission directly but sub-contracts it to the UN suggested that Transdniestra top its initial agenda. Development Programme). This went down badly Better cooperation between Brussels and with the Transdniestrian authorities, who control may help end the frozen conflict. It would also part of the border area and profited from illegal reduce the role of the OSCE as a mediator in this cross-border trade. EUBAM is headquartered in long-running stand-off. , Ukraine, and operates in both Ukraine and Moldova. In a complex arrangement, the EUSR does Conclusion not have direct authority over EUBAM, but the border mission’s leader is double-hatted as a politi- While there may be new openings for a settlement cal advisor to the EUSR. The EUSR also has a in Moldova, the situations in Georgia and Nagorno- support team of advisors based in Moldova and Karabakh do not seem set for imminent resolution. Ukraine – the EUSR himself is based in Brussels. In Although the EU is rationalizing its role in the July 2010 it was decided to terminate the EUSR’s region, and the OSCE has a much-reduced role over mandate in 2011. Georgia, it is likely that a variety of political mis- There have been some positive signs of progress sions will be required in these former Soviet states towards a political settlement in Moldova however. for some time yet – especially as the potential for In mid-2010, Germany and Russia proposed setting further conflicts remains significant.

notes

1 Details on EUSRs in this mission note draw heavily on Giovanni Grevi, “Pioneering Foreign Policy: the EU Special Representatives,” Chaillot Paper No. 106, Institute for Security Studies, October 2007. 2 Thomas de Waal, “Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process,” Survival, Vol. 52, No. 4, August 2010, p166.