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Book Reviews the .SU Naval War College Review Volume 58 Article 10 Number 1 Winter 2005 Book Reviews The .SU . Naval War College Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation War College, The .SU . Naval (2005) "Book Reviews," Naval War College Review: Vol. 58 : No. 1 , Article 10. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/10 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. War College: Book Reviews BOOK REVIEWS THE EXPANSION OF NATO Simon, Jeffrey. Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. 131pp. $26.95 Simon, Jeffrey. Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. 195pp. $28.95 Simon, Jeffrey. NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil-Military Relations. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. 307pp. $34.95 The enlargement of the European Union stability and security stem from con- and the consummation of the second structive military-societal relations, so- wave of the North Atlantic Treaty phisticated defense expertise, and well Organization’s expansion in the spring institutionalized democratic of 2004 would tempt one to believe that accountability. the postcommunist transition is com- In each of the three volumes, which ing to a close as a kind of normalcy set- cover Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslo- tles over the region. Jeffrey Simon’s vakia (now the Czech and Slovak re- careful and informative series of books publics) respectively, Simon provides a concerning civil-military relations in detailed chronology of defense reforms four Central and Eastern European since communism’s collapse. In all countries reminds us that in important cases, Simon’s narrative is set against respects, transition is still under way. Or four consistent criteria to which he rather, given the state of civil-military continually refers as he assesses the relations across the region, we should merits and shortcomings of reform. hope that it is, for the difficulties that The four criteria revolve around: postcommunist states face in democra- the division of civilian authority in tizing, rationalizing, and strengthening democratic societies; parliamentary their military-security apparatuses are oversight, especially in matters of bud- still manifold. Placing Simon’s insights geting; subordination of general staffs against the backdrop of NATO’s own to civilian institutions; and military strategic transition—the outcome of prestige, trustworthiness, and account- which is very unclear—one has contin- ability. According to Simon’s analysis, uing reason to worry about the stability Poland has clearly been the best at of postcommunism. By extension, Eu- transforming its military-security appa- ropean security is at stake insofar as ratus, despite some fairly serious Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005 1 Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 1, Art. 10 156 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW setbacks in the early 1990s. Measured in for the literature on postcommunist terms of the four criteria, the Czech Re- transition. For example, Poland and public has fared somewhat better than Hungary are very often grouped to- its Slovak counterpart, which, after the gether as states whose strong opposi- “velvet divorce” of 1993, found itself tion to state socialism made them building a range of military and secu- especially susceptible to Westernizing rity institutions from scratch. The big- reform. The more repressive nature of gest surprise in the series for students of the Czechoslovak regime contributed to the postcommunist transition will be relatively less political competition after how poorly Hungarian civil-military re- the transition, allowing policy errors to lations have developed—especially endure. Although Poland’s ability to ex- given Hungarian politicians’ strenuous ploit NATO’s criteria for membership efforts to enter the alliance. in order to achieve reform confirms the These books are essential reading for democratic opposition hypothesis, anyone writing on NATO, because, con- Hungary’s relatively poor performance cerning as they do half of NATO’s new- in restructuring the military and ac- est members, the problems within these companying political oversight raises states will no doubt have some bearing new questions about what provides the not only on the functioning of the alli- impetus for reform. The military could ance but also on its political orienta- require explanations distinct from those tion. Certainly, there are few people that cause variation in other kinds of better placed to report on events and political and economic reform. On the persons crucial to the military-security other hand, the logic underpinning the reform process than Jeffrey Simon, democratic opposition hypothesis is given his long-standing role as a leading sufficiently broad that national defense American adviser to postcommunist establishments should be susceptible to governments on how to advance Westernizing influences. institutional change in this area. More With specific respect to military-security generally, those interested in the post- reforms, Simon points repeatedly in all communist transition and cross-national three volumes to problems that can variation would do well to spend time plague civil-military relations generally, trying to understand this somewhat as well as to those issues that may be arcane sector’s evolution, not least be- peculiar to the region. The lack of civil- cause military-society relations carry ian expertise in former Warsaw Pact with them implications for democratic countries figures prominently in the consolidation. Admittedly, Simon does initial failure to formulate effective re- not make this an easy or inviting task. structuring such that new lines of au- He has evidently been so close to the in- thority allow ministries of defense to tricacies of reform that one unfamiliar take on the bulk of planning and man- with the issues or the personnel could agement. From lack of civilian expertise conceivably drown in the detail. flow other problems, including the fail- Despite the particular challenges that ure to provide transparency, discipline Simon’s intimate portrayal poses, I military malfeasance, or dedicate ade- would nevertheless suggest that his find- quate funding to militaries in decline. ings provide some puzzling questions Other perennial issues have included https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/10 2 War College: Book Reviews BOOK REVIEWS 157 the lack of acceptance of civilian con- variation across countries, and what trol as NATO defines it—among both difference has NATO made to the do- military personnel and civilians, ten- mestic politics and foreign policies of sion between general staffs and minis- Central and Eastern European coun- tries of defense, and a behavioral gap tries? Although standard explanations between formal institutions and lived of postcommunist performance by experience. themselves generally do not explain this The news from Central Europe is, of variation very well, Simon’s analysis course, not all bad. Probably owing to does provide some starting points. The the legacy of some form of political combination in Poland of having had a control dating back to the Warsaw Pact, strong democratic opposition commit- in combination with public enthusiasm ted ultimately to Westernization and a for communism’s collapse, none of the relatively high level of public respect for militaries in question has in any serious the armed forces as an institution, de- way attempted to interfere in the demo- spite the military’s past participation cratic transition. More often than not, in domestic repression, proved to be a politicization of the armed forces has big advantage relative to the Czech Re- been the will of errant politicians rather public or Hungary. In the latter two than ambitious generals. On the whole, instances, while the existence of demo- attempts at reform have been consistent cratic oppositions under communism with NATO’s objectives of improving (albeit in different forms) certainly in- transparency and accountability. Parlia- formed transition in positive ways, the mentary committees have gradually very low standing of the armed forces gained competence over a decade and a in these societies inhibited complete half and are increasingly comfortable reform. Slovakia is the reverse of both exercising their authority over defense variables—it has a relatively high level budgets. Nevertheless, in spite of the of respect for the military coupled generally positive trajectory, Central with a political ambivalence toward and Eastern European states continue Westernization, as opposition move- to have real trouble committing the ments in the other three countries con- necessary resources to reorient their ca- ceived of it under state socialism. pabilities toward NATO’s evolving stra- On the second question, concerning the tegic challenges, democratic political extent to which NATO enlargement has control has not been fully established in shaped domestic political reform and, some instances, and, in the Czech Re- equally important for regional stability, public and Hungary in particular, back- informed
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