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BOOK REVIEWS

THE EXPANSION OF NATO

Simon, Jeffrey. Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. 131pp. $26.95 Simon, Jeffrey. Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. 195pp. $28.95 Simon, Jeffrey. NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil-Military Relations. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. 307pp. $34.95

The enlargement of the European Union stability and security stem from con- and the consummation of the second structive military-societal relations, so- wave of the North Atlantic Treaty phisticated defense expertise, and well Organization’s expansion in the spring institutionalized democratic of 2004 would tempt one to believe that accountability. the postcommunist transition is com- In each of the three volumes, which ing to a close as a kind of normalcy set- cover Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslo- tles over the region. Jeffrey Simon’s vakia (now the Czech and Slovak re- careful and informative series of books publics) respectively, Simon provides a concerning civil-military relations in detailed chronology of defense reforms four Central and Eastern European since communism’s collapse. In all countries reminds us that in important cases, Simon’s narrative is set against respects, transition is still under way. Or four consistent criteria to which he rather, given the state of civil-military continually refers as he assesses the relations across the region, we should merits and shortcomings of reform. hope that it is, for the difficulties that The four criteria revolve around: postcommunist states face in democra- the division of civilian authority in tizing, rationalizing, and strengthening democratic societies; parliamentary their military-security apparatuses are oversight, especially in matters of bud- still manifold. Placing Simon’s insights geting; subordination of general staffs against the backdrop of NATO’s own to civilian institutions; and military strategic transition—the outcome of prestige, trustworthiness, and account- which is very unclear—one has contin- ability. According to Simon’s analysis, uing reason to worry about the stability Poland has clearly been the best at of postcommunism. By extension, Eu- transforming its military-security appa- ropean security is at stake insofar as ratus, despite some fairly serious

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setbacks in the early 1990s. Measured in for the literature on postcommunist terms of the four criteria, the Czech Re- transition. For example, Poland and public has fared somewhat better than Hungary are very often grouped to- its Slovak counterpart, which, after the gether as states whose strong opposi- “velvet divorce” of 1993, found itself tion to state socialism made them building a range of military and secu- especially susceptible to Westernizing rity institutions from scratch. The big- reform. The more repressive nature of gest surprise in the series for students of the Czechoslovak regime contributed to the postcommunist transition will be relatively less political competition after how poorly Hungarian civil-military re- the transition, allowing policy errors to lations have developed—especially endure. Although Poland’s ability to ex- given Hungarian politicians’ strenuous ploit NATO’s criteria for membership efforts to enter the alliance. in order to achieve reform confirms the These books are essential reading for democratic opposition hypothesis, anyone writing on NATO, because, con- Hungary’s relatively poor performance cerning as they do half of NATO’s new- in restructuring the military and ac- est members, the problems within these companying political oversight raises states will no doubt have some bearing new questions about what provides the not only on the functioning of the alli- impetus for reform. The military could ance but also on its political orienta- require explanations distinct from those tion. Certainly, there are few people that cause variation in other kinds of better placed to report on events and political and economic reform. On the persons crucial to the military-security other hand, the logic underpinning the reform process than Jeffrey Simon, democratic opposition hypothesis is given his long-standing role as a leading sufficiently broad that national defense American adviser to postcommunist establishments should be susceptible to governments on how to advance Westernizing influences. institutional change in this area. More With specific respect to military-security generally, those interested in the post- reforms, Simon points repeatedly in all communist transition and cross-national three volumes to problems that can variation would do well to spend time plague civil-military relations generally, trying to understand this somewhat as well as to those issues that may be arcane sector’s evolution, not least be- peculiar to the region. The lack of civil- cause military-society relations carry ian expertise in former Warsaw Pact with them implications for democratic countries figures prominently in the consolidation. Admittedly, Simon does initial failure to formulate effective re- not make this an easy or inviting task. structuring such that new lines of au- He has evidently been so close to the in- thority allow ministries of defense to tricacies of reform that one unfamiliar take on the bulk of planning and man- with the issues or the personnel could agement. From lack of civilian expertise conceivably drown in the detail. flow other problems, including the fail- Despite the particular challenges that ure to provide transparency, discipline Simon’s intimate portrayal poses, I military malfeasance, or dedicate ade- would nevertheless suggest that his find- quate funding to militaries in decline. ings provide some puzzling questions Other perennial issues have included

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the lack of acceptance of civilian con- variation across countries, and what trol as NATO defines it—among both difference has NATO made to the do- military personnel and civilians, ten- mestic politics and foreign policies of sion between general staffs and minis- Central and Eastern European coun- tries of defense, and a behavioral gap tries? Although standard explanations between formal institutions and lived of postcommunist performance by experience. themselves generally do not explain this The news from Central Europe is, of variation very well, Simon’s analysis course, not all bad. Probably owing to does provide some starting points. The the legacy of some form of political combination in Poland of having had a control dating back to the Warsaw Pact, strong democratic opposition commit- in combination with public enthusiasm ted ultimately to Westernization and a for communism’s collapse, none of the relatively high level of public respect for militaries in question has in any serious the armed forces as an institution, de- way attempted to interfere in the demo- spite the military’s past participation cratic transition. More often than not, in domestic repression, proved to be a politicization of the armed forces has big advantage relative to the Czech Re- been the will of errant politicians rather public or Hungary. In the latter two than ambitious generals. On the whole, instances, while the existence of demo- attempts at reform have been consistent cratic oppositions under communism with NATO’s objectives of improving (albeit in different forms) certainly in- transparency and accountability. Parlia- formed transition in positive ways, the mentary committees have gradually very low standing of the armed forces gained competence over a decade and a in these societies inhibited complete half and are increasingly comfortable reform. Slovakia is the reverse of both exercising their authority over defense variables—it has a relatively high level budgets. Nevertheless, in spite of the of respect for the military coupled generally positive trajectory, Central with a political ambivalence toward and Eastern European states continue Westernization, as opposition move- to have real trouble committing the ments in the other three countries con- necessary resources to reorient their ca- ceived of it under state socialism. pabilities toward NATO’s evolving stra- On the second question, concerning the tegic challenges, democratic political extent to which NATO enlargement has control has not been fully established in shaped domestic political reform and, some instances, and, in the Czech Re- equally important for regional stability, public and Hungary in particular, back- informed foreign policies, Simon has sliding away from initial goals has been remarkably little to say. This is a shame, evident since their accession in 1999. because someone of Simon’s stature The massive variation over time and could be a powerful advocate for across the issues under consideration NATO’s engagement in domestic policy leaves one wishing that Simon had used reform on the basis that the consolida- his vast knowledge to impose some or- tion of democratic oversight, defense der on the data. This is especially the budget transparency, and humane case with respect to the following two treatment of conscripts improves the questions: What accounts for such quality of governance in postcommunist

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states. We might infer from Simon’s democratic civil-military relations, it books that he is skeptical of NATO’s is worth asking where these countries transformative capacity and truly does would be if NATO had never intro- view the evolution of civil-military rela- duced the norm as a desirable and tions as primarily a domestically gener- functional feature of democratic ated phenomenon. This would be a governance. difficult conclusion to defend, however, For those concerned with NATO’s im- given that Simon himself points out pact on the region, Simon’s series is, of that NATO made the Czech-Slovak re- course, an invaluable resource in un- lationship much easier to manage after derstanding exactly what happened. Yet the split than it otherwise would have one has to look further than Simon to been. Beyond that single, very impor- see the subtle, as well as the not-so- tant insight, the reader is left wondering subtle, ways in which NATO has trans- whether the logic of NATO’s stabilizing formed the politics of postcommunist capacity could be extended elsewhere. Europe. Now would be a particularly In all likelihood, NATO’s inclusiveness apt time for Simon to contribute to the has not only stabilized relations be- debate about whether NATO has salu- tween states in Central Europe and tary political effects, because as the stra- between Russia and former Soviet tegic environment has worsened, the satellites, but it also improved the qual- United States in particular is manifest- ity of a range of domestic institutions ing less interest in the quality of demo- throughout the region. Speculating cratic institutions in new member states about postcommunist Europe without than in foreign policy support for wars NATO’s engagement, one imagines a in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although cul- historically vulnerable set of states with tivating policy loyalty might be politi- all the domestic dysfunctions that ac- cally expedient, NATO could be company acute military insecurity. All missing an opportunity afforded by of the democratic adaptations that the transition’s political and institu- NATO requires to improve the inter- tional fluidity to facilitate reforms that face with its members and consolidate a would not only improve the quality of particular set of values would have been domestic governance but also help con- the subject of protracted debate. More- solidate a widening democratic over, without NATO’s support, those community. values, even in the most Western- RACHEL EPSTEIN oriented societies, might never have Graduate School of International Studies prevailed. There is indeed evidence of University of Denver the contingent nature of democratic civil-military relations in the Polish case, where a series of crises and dissent over the value of democratic control delayed the subordination of the gen- Kaufman, Joyce P. NATO and the Former Yugo- eral staff to the Ministry of Defense. Al- slavia: Crisis, Conflict and the Atlantic Alliance. though Hungary, Slovakia, and, to a Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. 231pp. $74 lesser extent, the Czech Republic con- tinue to have problems in consolidating

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As the world steps farther away from to lose focus. However, as Kaufman the Cold War, the evolving structure of develops the story with names, person- the international system continues to alities, and events, the reader can watch fascinate informed citizens as well as these theories come to life. professional scholars. In this work, No one expects that alliance strategy Joyce Kaufman, professor of political would be made in a vacuum, and this science at Whittier College, contributes work clearly and persuasively shows to the debate on the evolution and fu- how constraints of domestic politics ture of the Atlantic Alliance, particu- must be factored into NATO politics. larly as the situation in the Balkans Of particular interest to makers of confronted a post–Cold War (and ex- American foreign policy is Kaufman’s panding) NATO. In detailing the events documentation of how the United between the collapse of Soviet commu- States evolved from an attitude that the nism (1990) and the attack on the twin Balkans was a “European problem” to towers (2001), the author makes a being the alliance’s most forceful advo- forceful case for the need for a unified cate for military intervention. NATO alliance that is willing to use This work’s principal flaw is that its force if necessary to quell international sources are almost exclusively official instabilities. NATO documents and interviews with Kaufman’s effort is particularly helpful the people directly associated with in plotting the movement of theory into those documents. The story is told practice in international relations. from NATO’s viewpoint by someone While no one at NATO headquarters in who spoke to insiders but was not her- 1990 suggested that the world had not self a member. Unfortunately, this materially changed with the fall of the provides the reader with a conven- Berlin Wall, the alliance’s premier strat- tional, albeit well supported, interpreta- egists could only make reasonable tion of events. guesses about this “new world,” as they However, this work’s positive attributes drew up the alliance’s Strategic Concept overwhelm this shortcoming. This easy- of 1991. It took the decade-long disso- to-read historical account provides lution of the former Yugoslavia to force significant value for the student of in- alliance planners to appreciate the de- ternational affairs, because it docu- tailed complexities of this world. ments a perfect contemporary test case In one sense, this book is merely a con- of how alliances evolve in the face of a firmation of much of the conventional changing security environment. While wisdom on diplomatic theory and the most pundits saw the Balkans as the operations of alliances. On numerous most likely spot for crisis and conflict occasions the author explicitly makes in Europe a decade ago, few would have the point that diplomatic threats with- guessed that the NATO alliance would out military power are in vain; collec- have ultimately achieved such a preemi- tive decision making is tortured, nent role in its resolution. Indeed, just difficult, and slow; domestic politics in- prior to the signing of the London Dec- trude on the capacity to be statesman- laration in 1990, numerous editorials like; and the absence of a clear enemy were suggesting that while NATO had provides an inducement for an alliance done an admirable job during the Cold

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War, we should make preparations to would only have a “soda straw” view of “turn out the lights” in Brussels. Today, the war and would thus miss the big as we find ourselves involved in a global picture. Others (primarily the media) war on terrorism, the United States is were concerned that reporters would faced with a similar quandary. Does lose their objectivity once the shooting NATO have the capacity, flexibility, and started. However, Purdum’s profes- will to engage the international terrorist sional work puts that argument to bed. movement? Do our European allies Early on, Purdum states that his task view the threat of terrorism as we do, was to “draw the work of my colleagues allowing for unity of action and willing- into a single narrative.” In other words ness to use force? Do adversaries such his job was to bring those “soda straws” as al-Qa’ida allow the alliance to con- together into a comprehensive and con- sider the entire globe its ultimate area cise chronicle of the war. He certainly of responsibility? Can NATO, as has the necessary credentials for the Madeleine Albright asked, move to a task—he has worked for the New York more expansive concept of collective se- Times for over twenty-five years and is a curity? These questions may also re- former White House and diplomatic quire a decade to resolve, but Kaufman correspondent. previews the kind of difficulties the alli- Although Purdum’s narrative style is ap- ance is likely to encounter en route and pealing, it is his ability to bring together sheds some light on the ultimate all the different material that makes this answers. book hard to put down. One reads of the TOM FEDYSZYN Bush administration’s intensive efforts Naval War College to convince a skeptical world of its case for invasion and of the debate over UN Security Council Resolution 1441. Divi- sions deepened as Secretary of State Colin Powell and France’s charismatic Purdum, Todd S. A Time of Our Choosing: Amer- foreign minister Dominque de Villepin ica’s War in Iraq. New York: Times Books, 2003. both courted the United Nations and 319pp. $25 public opinion. Meanwhile, military The late Washington Post publisher planning proceeded at the Pentagon and Philip Graham once said that journal- U.S. Central Command. Defense Secre- ism is the first draft of history. Todd S. tary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Sec- Purdum’s A Time of Our Choosing: retary Paul Wolfowitz, expecting the America’s War in Iraq, is the first draft Iraq army to implode, deployed a force of the history of the U.S. occupation of much smaller than that of the nearly Iraq. Months before the Department 550,000 troops in Operation DESERT of Defense made the controversial deci- STORM. Their plan was a test of a new sion to embed reporters within U.S. American style of warfare that engaged units, Purdum was in Iraq reporting large numbers of special operations the war. forces and used highly accurate preci- The military’s major criticism of the sion weapons and new technology in practice is that those assigned to the the form of unmanned aerial vehicles. same unit throughout the campaign

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The book’s primary focus is the relent- conflict—is also a major drawback. To- less twenty-one-day fight to Baghdad by ward his conclusion, Purdum recounts the Marines on the right flank and the the events of July 2003 surrounding the Army on the left flank. Purdum excels deaths of Saddam Hussein’s infamous in tying together all the resulting re- sons, Uday and Qusay. One of the vex- porting. What emerges is a factual and ing questions remaining was the where- very human account of the intense abouts of Saddam Hussein. The ground campaign. Included are events coalition would wonder about the fate of 23 March, which saw the ambush of of the former Iraqi leader for another the 507th Maintenance Company and five months. The book concludes before the devastating losses suffered by the Saddam’s capture in December. 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment. The Future historians and scholars will no brief campaign also saw some excellent doubt revisit this war and debate end- soldiering, such as the feint and race for lessly on the merits of preemptive the Karbala Gap and the “Thunder self-defense, the effectiveness of the Run” armored thrusts into central coalition of the willing, and whether the Baghdad. Ever the concise chronicler, outcome achieved was the one desired. Purdum also discusses the northern For now, however, Todd Purdum’s A front that was opened by the airdrop of Time of Our Choosing will more than a thousand paratroopers, and the oper- suffice as the first draft of history. ations conducted by the British in and around Basra. Purdum weaves all this D. L. TESKA U. S. Transportation Command together in such a way as to make this Scott Air Force Base, Illinois work an excellent read for military pro- fessionals and armchair strategists alike. It is a bit thin on the air and naval as- pects of the war, due to the lack of threat posed by the Iraqi air force and navy and Bush, Richard C. At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan because the bulk of the embedded re- Relations since 1942. Armonk, New York: M. E. porters accompanied ground units. Sharpe, 2004. 320pp. $27.95 One of the successes of the program, For years, “one China” has meant two however, was how the reporting completely different Chinas masquer- brought out the human side of the war. ading as one country—the People’s Re- Purdum discusses numerous examples public of China (PRC) and Taiwan of how the war directly affected such (a.k.a. the Republic of China [ROC]). individuals as the U.S. Army officer The PRC is huge, with a population of who, after witnessing the results of an 1.3 billion, while Taiwan has only air strike, commented, “It’s a helluva twenty-two million people in compari- thing watching people die,” or how an son. There are other differences as well: Iraqi man, his hands swollen from re- Taiwan is rich, with a per capita income cent beatings by Iraqi security forces, in 2003 of over $23,000, versus the emotionally thanked the Americans for PRC’s per capita $5,000; Taiwan’s 5 saving him. percent unemployment rate is half, its 1 The book’s main strength—its immedi- percent poverty rate is a tenth, and its acy in telling the whole story of the seventy-seven-year life expectancy is

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five years more than those of the PRC. Decision, by lobbing “test” missiles off More importantly, during the past de- Taiwan’s shores. cade Taiwan adopted a multiparty After World War II, the U.S. govern- democracy, while the PRC has only ment quickly found itself in a dilemma, one legal political party that is holding since it appeared obliged to support the tightly onto its autocratic powers—the repressive Kuomintang. February 28, Chinese Communist Party. 1947, was the beginning of the massacre How can two such divergent Chinas by the Nationalists, who arrested and possibly reunite? What role has the killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of United States played in their sixty-year Taiwanese; it was followed by an era standoff? These are the questions that known as the “White Terror.” Nation- Richard C. Bush, former chairman and alist repression on Taiwan continued managing director (September 1997 to for more than three decades, until 10 June 2002) of the American Institute in December 1979 and the Kaohsiung In- Taiwan (AIT—the pseudo–American cident, which was the turning point in embassy in Taipei), asks in At Cross Taiwan’s transition to democracy. Purposes. Following Washington’s decision to Bush starts with an extremely useful recognize the People’s Republic of historical summary of the origins of the China in 1978 (part of America’s Cold PRC-Taiwan problem. He asks, for ex- War strategy aimed at the Soviet ample, what would have happened if Union), Taipei’s increasing dependence Chiang Kai-shek had not requested in on Washington for security actually 1942–43 that Japan cede Taiwan to gave the United States greater leverage China. Would there even be a PRC- to sponsor democratic reforms. Thus, Taiwan problem today? After all, China quixotically, democratic reforms in Tai- at one point considered, then rejected, wan appear to have been spurred rather demanding Okinawa as well. If circum- than halted by U.S. recognition of the stances had been different, could Tai- PRC. wan have remained a part of Japan or a It is understandable that Bush, as for- UN protectorate, or even been given its mer head of the American Institute of independence? Taiwan, would want to credit U.S. dip- Bush argues that the great powers’ (the lomats and government officials with United States, the United Kingdom, sponsoring Taiwan’s democratic devel- and China) decision at Cairo to return opment (one chapter even investigates Taiwan to China was the real origin of the impact of the U.S. Congress and the “one China” problem, even though Taiwanese-Americans on this process). cross-strait tensions did not erupt until Granted, this is a subject he knows well; after the Nationalist retreat from the however, lest Taiwanese democracy be mainland in 1949. To this day, the PRC mistaken as simply an American knock- takes this World War II decision very off, even Bush is forced to admit that seriously. For example, from 21 to 26 these non-Taiwanese factors “made but July 1995, the PRC marked the fiftieth a tertiary contribution to the democra- anniversary of the July 1945 Potsdam tization of Taiwan” when compared to Declaration, which confirmed the Cairo the impact of Taiwanese reformers both inside and outside of the Nationalist

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party. For better or worse, Taiwan’s de- mocracy is completely homegrown.

To evaluate how Taiwan’s democracy Goldman, Emily O., and Leslie C. Eliason, eds. The and the Sino-U.S. Cold War diplomacy Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. Stan- impacts relations today, Bush discusses ford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2003. 415pp. $75 the four diplomatic communiqués and This book offers a rich collection of re- congressional acts that have regulated search papers on very important top- U.S.-PRC-Taiwanese relations, includ- ics: the much discussed revolution in ing the Shanghai communiqué (1972), military affairs (RMA), and the less dis- the U.S.-PRC normalization communi- cussed diffusions of new military tech- qué (1978), the Taiwan Relations Act nology and the accompanying changes (1979), and the U.S.-PRC communiqué in military doctrine to other countries. on arms sales to Taiwan (1982). The The authors were carefully chosen ex- commitments included in these four perts in history, political science, and “sacred texts” were not trivial and have sociology, who address the very impor- created fixed constraints on Washington’s tant factors of national culture as they and Beijing’s behavior. Although neces- affect the application of new military sary to defeat the Soviets, these diplo- technologies. matic agreements have often worked to The product of a series of workshops, the PRC’s advantage in putting diplo- this work owes a considerable debt to matic pressure on Taiwan to accept its the prodding of Andrew Marshall, Di- “one country, two systems” formula. rector of Net Assessment in the Office As for what will happen in the future to of the Secretary of Defense, who has this “one China” conundrum, Bush been encouraging scholarly analysis of cautions that Taiwan’s recent demo- the full implications of the RMA. cratic reforms have not given twelve Although recognizing the ambiguities million voting Taiwanese their own seat relating to the exact definition of such a at the table in any future cross-strait “revolution,” the book does not get talks leading to Chinese reunification. bogged down in the debate, but rather Democracy will make any satisfactory directs its analysis to the sociological, political solution of the PRC-Taiwan cultural, bureaucratic, intellectual, and divide even more difficult to negotiate. other processes by which such revolu- He cautions, therefore, that the “Tai- tions are, or are not, replicated. Military wan and China positions are suffi- weapons may spread through arms ciently at odds that they cannot be sales, the commercial development of papered over. If the stalemate is to be “dual-use” technologies, or by simple broken peacefully, either Beijing will imitation, but the military doctrines ap- have to abandon one country, two sys- propriate to such new kinds of weaponry tems, or Taipei will have to accept it.” sometimes do not spread so rapidly. Since neither of these options appears likely, one is forced to conclude that There are some very stimulating and PRC-Taiwan reunification can only be provocative historical case studies, in- accomplished as a result of war. cluding the foreign penetrations of the past five centuries into South Asia, the BRUCE ELLEMAN Naval War College development of “blitzkrieg” armored

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warfare in World War II, aircraft carri- central to this work is the finding that ers, and the Soviet impact on Arab ar- “software”(ideas and doctrine) does not mies (Soviet tanks were delivered, but travel as well as “hardware” (physical Soviet doctrine was not adopted). More weapons). The explanation for this last recent examples include the Soviet limitation is the basic theme of the en- approach to managing the Warsaw tire book. Pact, the “special relationship” that Collections of conference papers often has existed since 1945 among English- do not hang together well, or when they speaking democracies, and the patterns do, they typically do not wander far of nuclear proliferation and the spread enough away from a simple theme. This of information technology. book suffers from neither drawback, This work is directed to both the social being rich and eclectic in the materials scientist and the policy practitioner. it offers, yet at the same time remaining The chapters are well written and rich focused on an important set of ques- in detail, with excellent footnotes, thus tions. It offers a great deal for anyone making this a handy volume for anyone concerned with the military-technology doing research in these areas. revolution.

There are times when the unifying GEORGE H. QUESTER theme of the diffusion of “technology University of Maryland and ideas” becomes so broad that it seems to include everything militarily that has happened or that is going to happen, for what else is there to a stra- tegic confrontation but the weapons Record, Jeffrey. Making War, Thinking History. owned and how they will be used? Yet Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002. this work brings the subject into 216pp. $28.95 sharper focus, revealing how ideas Jeffrey Record is professor of strategy about the appropriate use of weapons and international security at the Air do not always travel as well as the weap- War College, Maxwell Air Force Base. ons themselves. The introductory out- He is the author of four books and nu- line thus helps to maintain that focus, merous monographs on U.S. military and the concluding chapter by Emily strategy and has extensive Capitol Hill Goldman and Andrew Ross is extremely experience, including service as a pro- valuable for sifting out the recurring fessional staffer for the Senate Armed patterns that emerge from the evidence Services Committee. presented. This work assesses how the experiences Among the important conclusions of Munich and Vietnam influenced mentioned are that transformation presidential decisions on the use of leaders do not long monopolize their force in every administration from transformations; leaders are frequently Harry Truman to Bill Clinton. Both surpassed by followers; leadership ef- Munich and Vietnam are regularly in- fecting a military transformation is no voked in current political debate in an guarantee of victory; and wholesale rep- attempt to justify a viewpoint, espe- lications of the innovations of a trans- cially since the Cold War foreign policy formation may not be necessary. Most consensus has broken down in recent

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years. The terms have become short- Record traces the predominant post- hand for “appeasement” and “quag- Vietnam schools of thought that influ- mire.” Yet the real influence of these ence political discussion today. He two cases on presidential decision mak- discusses major intellectual themes, ing about the use or nonuse of force such as Caspar Weinberger’s six “tests” has been subtler, and has depended for use of U.S. military force, later sub- considerably on the background of in- sumed by Colin Powell’s principle that dividual presidents and on the forma- “winning meant going in with over- tive experiences they brought with whelming force, getting the job done them into office. quickly, and getting out cleanly”— For some presidents, historical analogy though he notes wryly that the real was an explicit factor in their use of world is rarely that immaculate. An- force. After 1945, there was broad con- other policy discussed is the imperative sensus that “Munich is about whether to to avoid anything like Vietnam. Presi- use force and about what can happen dents have been more willing to cut when force is not used.” Thus Truman their losses in places like Lebanon and based his 1950 decision to intervene in Somalia. “On balance, post-Vietnam Korea on what happened, or more pre- presidents have displayed significantly cisely on what did not happen, in Mu- greater risk aversion, and especially sen- nich, noting that a president “must sitivity to incurring casualties, than make the effort to apply this knowledge their predecessors. In this they have [of history] to the decisions that have to been reinforced by an even more timid be made.” John F. Kennedy was heavily Pentagon.” influenced during the Cuban missile The consequences have been great. In- crisis of 1962 by Barbara Tuchman’s deed, the lessons of Munich were the The Guns of August (1962). Munich basis for U.S. Gulf intervention in was a powerful factor in leading both 1990–91. “The haste with which the Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson into Bush administration terminated the Vietnam, on the basis of the imperative war...reflected a Vietnam-driven to stop cross-border aggression. dread of involvement in postwar Iraq. Vietnam is a more complex matter. In- This fear of getting sucked into a deed, thirty years after Vietnam, there is bloody Arab quagmire drove the Bush still little agreement on the lessons from administration to end the war prema- that conflict. There are many argu- turely,” with all the dire consequences ments about how force should have that follow today. Similarly, “U.S. be- been used there, many implying that havior before and during Operation the “right” use of force would have re- ALLIED FORCE [in Kosovo] constituted sulted in a U.S. victory, or at least not a the most dramatic display to date of the defeat. Others argue that Vietnam Vietnam syndrome at work and its op- “teaches that force should have never erational and political consequences for been used in the first place, thus ren- American foreign policy.” Indeed, dering moot discussions about the Saddam was not wholly foolish to won- amount of force necessary and how it der whether the United States would re- should have been employed.” ally invade Iraq in March 2003.

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Moreover, the continuing differences implementation, it is clear that policy within administrations over what Viet- makers will continue to be influenced nam means has been actively harmful by past events and what they believe to American policy. The deeply hostile those events teach. It is also clear that a relationship between George Shultz and presidents’ (and key advisers’) knowl- Caspar Weinberger, based on their dif- edge of history varies widely and that fering views of the post-Vietnam use of reasoning by historical analogy is but force as a tool of American foreign pol- one of a host of factors at play in presi- icy, damaged the Reagan administra- dential decision making, that “every tion. Similar ongoing antagonism president’s knowledge of past events is between Colin Powell and Donald different and is subject to political Rumsfeld has done considerable harm bias.” Perhaps the greatest actual effect to U.S. post–11 September strategy and of historical analogy is how it frames policy execution. the worldviews of key protagonists, not Record briefly ponders whether the how it may lead to “the right answer” in 1991 Iraq war constitutes a third semi- new situations. nal case that could serve as a historical The 2003 Iraq invasion and its after- marker, but then suggests not, because math make this book particularly inter- it did not entail “bloody and soul- esting and topical. While the cases searing foreign policy disasters.” Yet it discussed end in the 1990s, surely the suggests another key issue, namely the “lessons” of Munich and Vietnam (and recurrent American failure to tie in a likely the first Gulf War) influenced the war’s military ending with political and post-9/11 views of President George W. strategic objectives. Examples include Bush and other key actors about how to the abandonment of Europe in the af- react to al-Qa’ida and what to do about termath of World War I; the failure to Iraq and Saddam and other perceived take Berlin in April 1945, when doing threats. In fact, one of the reasons the so might have forestalled some of what Bush administration has come under was to come in the Cold War; and the such fierce criticism in the national se- premature cease-fire ordered by George curity realm is that its decisions and ac- H. W. Bush, which is not unconnected tions are so counter to the general run with why we occupy Iraq today (which of post-Vietnam American policy, as de- in itself may yet become another scribed in Making War, Thinking History. instance). This book provides a good framework Reasoning by historical analogy has for thinking about the vital security is- many pitfalls. While analogy may be sues the United States faces today.

helpful in making decision makers ask JAN VAN TOL the “right questions” in a current crisis, Captain, U.S. Navy “past employment and deployment of the Munich and Vietnam analogies sug- gest that they can teach effectively at the level of generality, but are insensitive to differences in detail.” Whatever the Wright, Evan. Generation Kill: Devil Dogs, utility of reasoning by historical anal- Iceman, Captain America, and the New Face of ogy as a tool of policy formation and American War. New York: Putnam, 2004. 354pp. $24.95

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Generation Kill may be the best war “disposable,” or abandoned. Wright book to have such an interesting title also marvels at the disparity in social since The Naked and the Dead. The origin among the enlisted ranks. It was book’s author, Rolling Stone contribut- ever so. A writer in World War II ob- ing editor Evan Wright, was an embed- served that the Marine Corps seemed to ded journalist with 1st Recon Battalion be made up of a combination of dead- when it made its rush north into Iraq at end kids and boys named Percival. The the head of the 1st Marine Expedition- language, music, and mores have ary Force (I MEF) during the 2003 inva- changed, but more continuities exist sion. The title might lead one to expect than Wright appears to realize. a sensational account of young people Just as the people who fought and are desensitized by video games and brutal- fighting in Iraq now are both different ized by rap music engaging in random from and similar to those who fought in acts of violence—a book perhaps com- previous wars, the conflict is both similar bining titillation and moral censure in to and different from those of the past. an uneasy mixture. It would be a mis- The invasion of Iraq was distinguished take to pass up Wright’s book because by a rapid advance into an enemy coun- of its title. He has produced a thought- try, unexpected resistance by irregulars, ful, well written story that people in the and a great preponderance of accurate military should read. This book perhaps firepower on the part of U.S. forces. belongs to the genre of “hip” journalis- None of this was exactly unique or un- tic accounts of war like Michael Herr’s precedented, but all these factors gave Dispatches about Vietnam, or Bob the war its tenure and feel for those in- Shachochis’s The Immaculate Invasion volved. Wright experienced all this, and about Haiti. Lacking any military back- he lets us know again and again that the ground, Wright proves to be a quick sum of these characteristics was to study, as a good journalist must be. His make problematic the notion and prac- fresh viewpoint provides valuable in- tice of rules of engagement (ROE). sights into the world of a Marine unit in Marines found themselves moving combat. quickly through unfamiliar and often The title does betray one of the book’s hostile territory, opposed by an enemy few incorrect assumptions, which is who usually wore no uniform and who that the generation of young men in was often unscrupulous about using ci- their late teens and early twenties who vilians for deception and concealment. fought in this war are different in some These Marines had at their disposal essential way from the Marines of the enormous firepower, and in general past. Wright says that the Marines of they hit what they aimed at, but where Iraq belong to “what is more or less to fire and how much? America’s first generation of disposable No one encountered these questions children,” but his observations about more often than the men of 1st Recon. the men of 2d Platoon, B Company, Based on his observations, Wright 1st Recon are similar to those made states that the ROE give the illusion of by Phillip Caputo and James Web order amid chaos, when in fact it is left about the Marines of Vietnam. Many up to the individual or small unit leader were dispossessed, underprivileged, to make a determination in a situation

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that may be changing from minute to realize that sometimes leaders must risk minute. The decision will be based on their own in war, and that he himself instinct born of training, individual dis- must have the courage to accept his role position and character, and the percep- as a tactical pawn when his profession tion of immediate danger. These as journalist requires it. perceptions were often as limited as Recon units are different. They proba- those of soldiers in any war. For all our bly contain a higher percentage of the new technology, the fog of war de- “natural warrior” type than do other scended as quickly and completely as a Marine Corps units. These fine-tuned desert sandstorm, and even on sunny combat thoroughbreds often come days and clear nights it could blank out across as sensitive and complex. Despite an individual’s surroundings beyond a the implications of the title, it is often narrow range. these young men, rather than the elders, These are points worth having driven who display the greatest humanity and home, and Wright’s descriptions of the restraint. The Marines of 2d Platoon events he witnessed are vivid and often were sometimes surprised to find that moving. Some of the best writing is in they preferred saving or preserving life the quotations of the Marines of 2d to taking it. Platoon. When the Marines accidentally Make no mistake, these are the Marine shoot and kill an Iraqi child in her fa- breed—“Generation M.” No apologies ther’s car at a roadblock, a corporal are needed for the wars they fought. We later states, “War is either glamorized— should be humbled and instructed by like we kick their ass—or the opposite— their example. After the rush of combat look how horrible, we kill all these civil- comes reflection, and after the battle is ians. None of these people know what it’s the effort to restore and rebuild. Cour- like to be there holding that weapon.” age will always be required of soldiers Wright’s book represents American war in war, but it is also required of us to be writing in its maturity. He avoids the wise, if we can. pitfalls of glamorizing or moralizing. REED BONADONNA Many of the Marines he writes about Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps are complex men. The staff sergeant nicknamed “Iceman” is an efficient and a somewhat emotionally remote profes- sional fighting man who is also a sym-

pathetic figure. It would be easy for Saccone, Richard. Negotiating with North Korea. Wright to dislike General James N. Hollym International Corp., 2003. 215pp. $22.95 Mattis as a man of a different genera- Perhaps the potentially most volatile tion and completely different outlook, part of the world is North Korea. Talks especially once Wright learns that he between the United States and North and the rest of Recon Battalion have Korea seem to be a series of impasses, been functioning as a diversion, a vir- confrontations, brinkmanship, threats, tual decoy, during the attack north. The and blusters. The usual explanation for portrait of Mattis that emerges, how- this state of perpetual frustration for ever, is understanding and even admir- U.S. negotiators is that they are dealing ing. Wright has the common sense to with an enigmatic regime that has no

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regard for peaceful resolution of the Fully half the book concerns itself with confrontations between it and the rest the tactics used by North Korean nego- of the world. This work provides an al- tiators. Saccone enumerates them in ternate path for understanding and forty specific categories, which include working toward more successful negoti- threats, loaded questions, requests for ations than has been the historical case compensation, red herrings, and ap- for over half a century. peals for fairness. This by itself is useful, Richard Saccone, retired U.S. Air Force, but the author offers specific examples alumnus of the Naval Postgraduate and provides countertactics that will School, has spent over fourteen years in help negotiations go forward to a mu- the Koreas. He has written six books on tually acceptable conclusion. The forty Korea covering history, culture, tour- specifics are grouped into eight general ism, and business, and he is well quali- headings: coercion, offensiveness, ma- fied to discuss the topic of negotiations. nipulation, assertiveness, confounding, He is a former representative for KEDO, obstruction, persuasion, and coopera- the Korean Peninsula Development Or- tion. Understanding and appreciating ganization, building nuclear power the analysis and advice provided by plants as required under the 1994 Saccone should allow U.S. negotiators Agreed Framework between the United greater success. States and the Democratic People’s Re- For example, one category, labeled “Les- public of Korea. Saccone currently sons of History,” points out that North teaches international relations and na- Korean negotiators are generally much tional government at St. Vincent’s Col- better versed in past meetings and ne- lege in Latrobe, Pennsylvania. gotiations than American negotiators, Saccone explains such concepts as Juche who tend to be constantly rotated. (self-reliance), Kibun (spirit), and Saccone provides the following advice, Cheymyon (saving face) in a manner “The best counter to lessons from his- that goes deeper than the caricature- tory is another lesson of history. This like definitions found in the common requires considerable preparation. press. Examination allows the reader to U.S. negotiators are notoriously igno- appreciate that the concept of commu- rant of history. If one is ignorant of the nication requires both sending and re- record you cannot even be sure that ceipt of information and ideas by at what the opponent is quoting is correct. least two parties. When I was a college Do your homework and counter history student, I read an essay by the noted se- with lessons of your own choosing.” manticist S. I. Hayakawa about denota- Saccone’s advice appears obvious, but tion and connotation. Negotiating with the United States too often neglects to North Korea reveals that American ne- heed the obvious. gotiators may have been concentrating This work should be required reading on the denotative aspects of communi- for all who must deal with North Korea. cation and neglecting the connotations. Saccone understands its negotiating be- It gives me hope that negotiations can havior. He distinguishes between myths progress beyond the cultural misunder- and reality, and offers alternatives to standing and confrontational nature of improve U.S.-Korea relations. How- U.S.–North Korea relations. ever, this work should not be confined

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only to those involved with North Ko- situation additional noise. Handel also rea. Anyone involved in negotiations stresses the paradox of estimating risk. will benefit from this book. The riskier a military course of action, the less a rival anticipates and prepares XAVIER K. MARUYAMA Monterey, California for it, paradoxically making its eventual adoption less risky. Handel also sug- gests that successive intelligence suc- cesses increase not only the agency’s credibility but also the risk of strategic

Betts, Richard K., and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds. surprise, because its conclusions will Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor be less subject to critical questioning. of Michael J. Handel. London: Frank Cass, 2003. There is also the self-negating proph- 210pp. $114.95 ecy. A warning of an impending attack The essays in this collection were writ- triggers military preparations that in ten for an international conference held turn prompt the enemy to delay or can- in honor of the late Michael J. Handel cel his plans. Such a scenario makes it at the U.S. Naval War College. Handel almost impossible even in retrospect to wrote several seminal pieces in the rela- know if the military preparations were tively new field of intelligence studies, warranted. Another scenario that may and his colleagues are to be compli- lead to a strategic surprise is a quiet mented for producing this impressive international environment that may Festschrift. Betts and Mahnken put to- be used to conceal the preparations gether an impressive group of practitio- for an attack. Following a fascinating ners and academics to write on various analysis of the problems of percep- aspects of the work of intelligence tion, the politics of intelligence, and agencies. It begins with four articles of the organizational and bureaucratic a theoretical nature, followed by three features, Handel reaches the realistic articles that focus on historic case conclusion that surprise is almost al- studies. ways unavoidable. This volume appropriately opens with a The second article, by editor Richard K. classic by Handel on strategic surprises, Betts, starts with the unconventional published almost thirty years ago, premise that politicization of intelli- which serves as an excellent introduc- gence services is not necessarily bad, tion to a book devoted to intelligence. and sometimes it is even advisable. It is typical of Handel’s general thinking Betts presents two opposing models of on strategic affairs, pointing out several intelligence work. The first portrays paradoxes inherent to the potential for the intelligence agency striving to strategic surprise that have become the achieve professional credibility by pre- common wisdom of the intelligence senting thorough analysis, while the field. Handel claims that due to the second depicts the intelligence organi- great difficulties in differentiating be- zation stressing the supply of data that tween “noise” and “signals” (relevant is useful and relevant to decision mak- information), all data amounts to noise, ers. In the second case, the managers making the collection of additional of intelligence organizations make information designed to clarify the compromises and tailor the information

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to influence the decision-making pro- the United States must do their best to cess. Betts points out that there is inev- prevent unpleasant surprises—such as itable tension between maximizing 9/11, for example. credibility and utility, but he makes a John Ferris reviews the evolution of convincing case for reducing this ten- British military deception during the sion by accepting a certain level of un- two world wars. He provides a detailed defined politicization. Betts’s narrative on the deception efforts that recommended recipe for minimizing were highly regarded by the British gen- the damage of politicization in the in- erals. Ferris argues that deception telligence community is organizational benefits the stronger player in the con- pluralism. flict and the one holding the initiative, Woodrow J. Kuhns, a senior CIA offi- but he displays skepticism of its final cial, next points out that despite the utility. This article could have benefited fact that a significant number of intel- from heavy editing, as it is deficient in ligence failures have been docu- organization and in the use of theoreti- mented, there is no clear track record cal concepts. for estimates or warning judgments is- Uri Bar-Joseph’s article addresses the sued by the intelligence community. question of why some Israeli intelli- Moreover, there is no accumulated gence officers—even at the highest knowledge for distinguishing between rank—erred in their estimates of the failures attributed to collection, or to probability of an imminent war in analysis. Nevertheless, Kuhns still 1973. He argues convincingly that the tends to regard intelligence forecasts as two officers most responsible for the in- closer to science than to pseudo- telligence failure were Y. Bandman and science, despite the methodological E. Zeira, making the more general point problems in producing forecasts, and that organizations cannot transcend the suggests additional systematic research weaknesses of their personnel. How- to clarify the issues he has raised. ever, Bar-Joseph could have made this James J. Wirtz then discusses the theory important point concerning the human of strategic surprise and admits to oper- factor by explaining the lack of a strate- ational difficulties. Wirtz claims that gic warning before the 1973 war with- every curriculum of the officers corps out belittling other reasons for the main stresses strategic surprise as a force misfortunes of the Israeli military in its multiplier, and as such, military doc- encounter with the Egyptian and Syrian trine is predispositioned to carry out armies. surprises. Wirtz elaborates on the risk The final chapter, by Mark M. Lowenthal, paradox first mentioned by Handel, who is also with the CIA, looks at the pointing out the attraction of surprise U.S. war-fighting doctrine that originally for the weaker parties of the conflict. At emphasized information dominance this point, Wirtz argues that surprises (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), and subse- may produce only temporary spectacu- quently more modestly aspired to supe- lar results, leaving the general balance riority only (2000). Lowenthal warns of forces to finally determine the result against the belief that technological ad- of armed conflict. Nevertheless, Wirtz vances can remove the fog of war. Even concludes that strong countries such as the best technologies need appropriate

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doctrine to be useful. He argues cogently assignment as the sixth commander in that advanced intelligence systems have chief of Central Command. We are in- their own vulnerabilities, and that lacu- troduced to the refined thinking of a nae of information are inevitable both fighting soldier and leader, thinking before and during war. Moreover, by based on his extensive tactical, opera- using examples from the American Civil tional, and strategic experience in war, War, Lowenthal demonstrates that conflict resolution, and peacemaking. good information about the enemy’s At that time, Zinni’s immediate focus moves and intentions is not enough for was Saddam Hussein and supporting winning the battle. It is generalship, the the UNSCOM (United Nations Special human factor, that will continue to be Commission) inspectors under Richard decisive in the outcome of a war. Butler. By mid-December, UN teams This is an excellent introductory collec- began departing Iraq. What follows is tion for students and the professional the four-day, preplanned attack of reader to the gamut of issues with Operation DESERT FOX. Although the which the field of intelligence grapples. planning for the attack provides insight into General Zinni’s war-fighting skills, EFRAIM INBAR such as the importance and execution of Director, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Bar-Ilan University, Israel surprise, it is the introduction to his breadth of strategic thinking that is most interesting. At the start of his command in August 1997, Zinni proposed a six-point strate- Clancy, Tom, with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and gic program for Central Command to Tony Koltz. Battle Ready. New York: Putnam, President Clinton’s secretary of defense, 2004. 440pp. $28.95 William Cohen. His objective was to This excellent book documents the mil- take a more balanced approach to a itary and postmilitary career of General wide range of evolving security issues, Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret.). It should ap- not just Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Af- peal to any reader interested in the U.S. ter presenting the program to Cohen military, the U.S. Marine Corps, and and senior members of Congress, Zinni national security affairs. was politely told to “stay out of policy and stick to execution.” That raises an The book follows an engaging and important point for military officers mixed style. Clancy and Koltz use short preparing themselves for high com- biographical sections to introduce mand. Civilian control of the military phases of General Zinni’s career. At the and selfless military service to the coun- end of each phase, Zinni’s own words try are fundamental to our government, (in italics) pick up the action. One has going back to George Washington and the sense of being right there with the George Marshall. Based on the rest of general, sharing his experiences and the book, it is apparent that Zinni con- watching him develop into an excep- sistently struck that delicate profes- tional military role model and leader. sional balance between the truthful, The book actually begins with the end informed, and forceful advice and re- of Zinni’s career. It is November 1998, spect for civilian authority. and he is halfway through his last

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A further example of this followed effectively within other cultures, a skill DESERT FOX. General Zinni asked him- he developed during his first tour as an self what would happen if Iraq suddenly adviser with the South Vietnamese collapsed. Who would pick up the marines. pieces and help rebuild the country? To Zinni’s rise to the rank of general in examine these questions, Zinni spon- December 1986 followed command, sored a war game called “Desert Cross- staff, and professional military educa- ing” in late 1999, with a wide range of tion assignments, emphasizing opera- government agencies and representa- tional competence. However, it is his tives. In his words, “The scenarios first assignment as general to deputy di- looked closely at humanitarian, secu- rector of operations at the U.S. Euro- rity, political, economic, and other re- pean Command in 1990 that impressed construction issues. We looked at food, upon him the nature of the rapidly clean water, electricity, refugees, Shia changing world following the collapse versus Sunnis, Kurds versus other of the Soviet Union. Iraqis, Turks versus Kurds, and the The reader is taken through Zinni’s power vacuum that would surely follow subsequent assignments: director of op- the collapse of the regime (since erations for Combined Task Force RE- Saddam had pretty successfully elimi- STORE HOPE in Somalia, commander of nated any local opposition). We looked the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force at all the problems the United States (I MEF), and commander in chief of faces in 2003 trying to rebuild Iraq. And Central Command. After his retirement when it was over, I was starting to get a from the military in the summer of good sense of their enormous scope and 2000, Zinni’s experience and diplomatic to recognize how massive the recon- skills are further called into service for struction would be.” Although the peacemaking and conflict resolution game failed to stimulate government- around the world, offering us further wide planning, the episode at the start insight into such complex, ongoing sit- of the book is compelling. One wonders uations as the Israeli-Palestinian at Zinni’s background, and how he de- conflict. veloped the interest, knowledge, and experience to conceptualize and deal Battle Ready makes clear that Zinni has with such complex theater-level issues. the credentials, both professional and personal, to present his forceful and The general served two tours in Viet- unvarnished opinions, honed by a life- nam, where he suffered life-threatening time of service to his country. This combat wounds and illnesses. His time book should be of particular value to there was fundamental to his develop- military officers of all services preparing ment: “The biggest lesson, in fact, is for higher command in this volatile learning how to be open to surprising world. new experiences and then turning that openness into resourceful and creative HENRY BARTLETT ways of dealing with challenges you Naval War College face.” Zinni builds on that insight along with the sensitivity and ability to work

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Naval War College; and his entry into the naval aviation world at the age of fifty-two. As Commander Aircraft Wildenberg, Thomas. All the Factors of Victory: Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of Squadrons, Battle Fleet onboard the ex- Carrier Airpower. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, perimental carrier USS Langley, Reeves 2003. 326pp. $27.50 challenged his flyers to solve a “thou- Admiral Joseph Reeves was an impor- sand and one questions” to which even tant influence on the development of he did not have the answers. He con- American naval aviation during the centrated the squadrons for intensive interwar period, but like many other se- training and practice with new types of nior officers who served in peacetime, aircraft then being delivered. After a he has not received the attention he de- short stint with the U.S. delegation to serves. Thomas Wildenberg, building the 1927 Geneva Conference, Reeves upon his previous work on dive bomb- was promoted to rear admiral and re- ing in the U.S. Navy prior to the Battle turned to lead naval aviation from an of Midway, strives to honor Admiral experimental status to full-fledged inte- Reeves with a scholarly biography fo- gration into the fleet. cused on his professional life and Wildenberg’s description of Reeves, contributions. with entourage in tow, personally di- Wildenberg argues that Reeves’s back- recting the movement of planes around ground, attention to improved training Langley’s flight deck when a subordi- and doctrine, and ability to push inno- nate officer named John Towers dared vation within the existing organiza- to report that no more could be tional structure were key factors behind crowded onboard, is priceless. The new the nascent idea of carrier strike forces, purpose-built aircraft carriers USS which subsequently came to maturation Lexington and Saratoga provided the during the U.S. Navy’s Pacific opera- means for Reeves to test novel concepts tions in World War II. Like another of deployments in peacetime fleet exer- well known admiral, William Moffet, cises on a larger scale—the turning Reeves was a true pioneer in naval avia- point being Fleet Problem IX in January tion. He was among the first to recog- 1929, when Reeves launched the mock nize its potential and work out the aerial strikes against the Panama Canal practical application of this new form described so well by Wildenberg at the of warfare within the fleet. book’s opening. Thereafter, Reeves quickly rose in responsibility before his Reeves followed a unique career pro- retirement as commander in chief of the gression. Wildenberg traces Reeves’s U.S. Fleet with the rank of admiral in scholastic and athletic achievements as 1936—the first naval aviator to hold the a young engineering naval cadet at appointment. Annapolis; his combat experience dur- ing the Spanish-American War; conver- During World War II Reeves returned sion to an ordnance specialization; to the Department of the Navy to coor- various sea and shore appointments be- dinate Lend-Lease activities on behalf fore reaching command of the battle- of Secretary Frank Knox, as well as to ship USS North Dakota; time as a act as U.S. naval representative on the student and tactical instructor at the Combined Munitions Assignment

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Board alongside Harry Hopkins. much weight to the man than to larger Having given so much to his country, international trends in naval aviation at Reeves died on 25 March 1948. the time, Reeves clearly pressed, with Although a powerful speaker and ora- single-minded determination, the exist- tor, Reeves published very little and left ing technological and doctrinal limits of behind no personal papers. In writing U.S. naval aviation and prepared his this biography, Wildenberg has done an forces accordingly. admirable job of detective work, col- The book, which offers interesting in- lecting together information from a di- sights into experimentation and inno- verse range of official and private vation for future warfare in peacetime sources. He uses a 1943 Princeton Uni- navies, is highly recommended for spe- versity undergraduate thesis based on cialist historians and interested general interviews with Reeves, but little re- readers. mains known of the admiral’s family CHRIS MADSEN and personal life, other than the im- Canadian Forces College pression that he was a lonely man de- Toronto, Ontario voted full-heartedly to the navy. A ruthless streak in Reeves’s character, however, comes out in his treatment of hapless Lieutenant Commander Robert Molten—an episode to be repeated De Kay, James Tertius. A Rage for Glory: The Life during a run-in with a Royal Navy ord- and Times of Commodore Stephen Decatur, USN. nance officer, Stephen Roskill, in Wash- New York: Free Press, 2004. 237pp. $25 ington, D.C., during the summer of Accomplished historian and author 1944. Wildenberg’s conclusions about James de Kay captures the essence of an Reeves’s attitude toward the British age, as well as the spirit of a man, in his might have been tempered by closer biography of Commodore Stephen study of his wartime work on the Com- Decatur. This finely written narrative, bined Munitions Assignment Board. aimed at a general readership, may lack No reference is made in the book to the scholarly apparatus expected of his- Reeves’s working files from the Lend- torical monographs, but it certainly does Lease Office of Record in Record Group not lack the scholarship and analysis 38 at the National Archive and Records that is the hallmark of de Kay’s work. Administration, or the diaries of Vice Yet if this book sometimes appears to Admiral James Dorling, his British naval be a cross between an action-thriller counterpart on the Combined Muni- and a hagiography, there is a reason. tions Assignment Board at Greenwich’s Decatur’s active quest for fame and National Maritime Museum. In Reeves’s glory, as well as the deep sense of honor second service tour, he facilitated that would clip short his thread of life American production behind the global at age forty-one, earned the commo- war effort at sea and actually excelled in dore a place in the hearts of his coun- office work and the numbers game. trymen perhaps more appropriate for a Even though biographies are somewhat saint. His name still echoes in those of out of fashion today and Wildenberg some forty-five towns, five warships, and shows a tendency to give a little too numerous other pieces of Americana.

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Born amidst the upheaval of the Ameri- using imagery appropriate to the con- can Revolution in 1779, Stephen cepts of glory, fame, and honor, central Decatur spent his youth steeped in the to the story. More importantly for gen- twin influences of a national hubris eral readers, naval jargon of the era is born of victory against the tyrannical minimized; thus they do not become British Empire and a family tradition of lost somewhere between the gudgeons seafaring, usually against that same en- and the mainsail clewlines. tity (Dutch and French ancestry, and The commodore spent his few remain- the master of a privateer as a father). ing years as a member of the Board of His time as a midshipman during the Navy Commissioners. Then, on 22 Quasi-War with France may have March 1820, Stephen Decatur paid the lacked in naval action, but it certainly ultimate price for his honor. Fellow imbued in Decatur the ethos of the captain and former mentor James quarterdeck, that almost mystical tri- Barron and he exchanged shots on a umvirate of glory, fame, and honor that traditional dueling ground outside not only defined a gentleman but all Washington. Mortally wounded, too frequently forced recourse to the Decatur died a few hours later. Wind- Code Duello. It is de Kay’s analysis and ing through de Kay’s last chapters in presentation of this triumvirate that is the life of this American hero is a fas- the strength of his study of Decatur. cinating conspiracy theory involving From 1801 through 1815, Decatur the “bad boys” of the early U.S. Navy: earned a place in the pantheon of naval Jesse Duncan Elliot, Captain William heroes. His part in the burning of the Bainbridge, and Captain James Barron. frigate Philadelphia at Tripoli in 1804 In de Kay’s mind, there exists little made him the darling of the nation. doubt that both Elliot and Bainbridge Further daring actions against the Bar- contributed as much as Barron to the bary corsairs catapulted the young lieu- death of Decatur. His arguments are tenant over the heads of other officers convincing. to the rank of captain. In October 1812, Historians, particularly those familiar Decatur steered his United States to vic- with the era, may be somewhat disap- tory over HMS Macedonian, then pointed with this book. De Kay presents fought an even harder battle with a narrative driven by specific events; Washington for prize money. Trapped thus, details such as Decatur’s contribu- in New London by a British blockade in tions to strategic planning during the 1813, he shifted his flag to the large War of 1812 are missing. On the other frigate President in 1814. Beset by a hand, those souls less knowledgeable of British squadron shortly thereafter, the U.S. Navy during the Age of Sail Decatur surrendered the largest Ameri- will have little to disappoint them and can warship lost during the War of much to gain from reading this exciting 1812. Exonerated by a court of inquiry, biography of a most famous American he proceeded to regain his lost honor naval officer. by leading a squadron to thrash soundly the Barbary corsairs in 1815. De Kay’s WADE G. DUDLEY East Carolina University portrayal of these actions is excellent,

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BOOK REVIEWS 177

by Congress. Jones watched desirable commands handed over to corrupt and incompetent hacks, and he suffered mu- Thomas, Evan. John Paul Jones: Sailor, Hero, Fa- ther of the American Navy. New York: Simon and tinous crews and disloyal officers. In- Schuster, 2003. 381pp. $26.95 deed, comparison with Benedict Arnold, another prickly sort, is instructive. Both America seems to have lately rediscovered gifted men were at times disgracefully its founding fathers, if recent best-seller ill used. The difference is that Jones ul- lists are any indication. As much as the timately placed duty over self. infant republic needed thinkers and statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson, John In Thomas’s hands, the real-life story of Adams, and Ben Franklin, it also required this courageous master and commander those who were willing to fight and turn is every bit as enthralling and humor- their aspirations into reality. Francis ous as any Patrick O’Brien novel. Marion, Daniel Morgan, “Mad” Anthony Thomas writes colorfully of black- Wayne, and even Benedict Arnold were guards and mistresses, salty sea dogs among the warriors who concretized fine and young midshipmen, bloody quar- words and ideas into battlefield deeds. terdecks and Parisian salons. He also One more name that belongs on this provides a thrilling description of fierce list is John Paul Jones, the father of Jones’s apotheosis—the Bonhomme the American navy. Richard and Serapis duel. His depiction of riding out a terrific storm is better Thomas, a Newsweek editor and ama- than the obligatory chapter found in teur sailor, offers a marvelous portrait of fictional yarns, as are the evocations of a proud, insecure, ferocious, and highly the sights, sounds, and smells of ship- ambitious figure. He convincingly sug- board life in the age of sail. Simulta- gests that Jones was that most elemental neously, Thomas perceptively evaluates of American characters, the self-made Jones as tactician, strategist, and leader. man. Although Jones most likely never Unparalleled at tactics, Jones was also made the celebrated declaration “I have surprisingly advanced as a strategic not yet begun to fight” during the epic thinker who devised schemes to bring sea battle between his Bonhomme Rich- the war to the British home islands ard and HMS Serapis, he did possess an and foresaw the need for the United unconquerable spirit. This is a splendid States to field a blue-water navy. It is biography of John Paul Jones. only as a leader that Thomas finds The penniless son of a Scottish gar- Jones wanting. Audacious, persistent, dener on the run from the law, John and visionary, the brittle Jones lacked Paul adopted the surname Jones and what we today would call team-building sailed to America. Possessing an skills to inspire subordinates to consis- unslakable thirst for glory, a genius for tent greatness. Nevertheless, Jones’s leg- seamanship, a combative nature, and a acy is well summarized by the words Gatsby-like desire to be recognized as a engraved on his tomb at Annapolis: “He gentleman, Jones offered his services to gave our navy its earliest traditions of the cause of American independence. heroism and victory.” Along the way, he accumulated many ALAN CATE grievances—some imagined, many not. Colonel, U.S. Army He did not feel appreciated or rewarded Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

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