S. Pindyck Chapter 4 1 INNOVATION and INCLUSION in the ARMED
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S. Pindyck Chapter 4 INNOVATION AND INCLUSION IN THE ARMED FORCES CHAPTER 4: POPULATION-BASED COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) Shira E. Pindyck University of Pennsylvania Draft Prepared for GSISE, December 2020 Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission Abstract: The integration of population-based counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine has been difficult. Like other military innovations, implementing COIN involved a reorientation in doctrine, education, training, and culture, and an elevation of new positions and areas of expertise. Unsurprisingly, this reorientation has met resistance and posed conceptual and practical challenges. While many scholars have examined the pitfalls and processes of COIN as a military innovation, few have considered the role of gender. Unlike traditional combat operations that primarily rely on masculine “warriors,” counterinsurgency requires cultural sensitivity, state building, and intelligence gathering – soldiers ready “both to fight and to build.” The use of all- female teams, like the Lioness program in Iraq and Female Engagement Team (FET) in Afghanistan, have been framed as essential to force protection and operational effectiveness through enabling searches of women, gathering information and building societal trust through engagement with the female population. The elevation of noncombat roles, cultural awareness, and the strategic use of gender difference amongst soldiers have proven challenging for military organizations seeking to implement COIN. This chapter of my dissertation examines how military organizations with higher levels of institutional commitment to gender inclusion will better able to implement such disruptive changes. Moreover, I propose that the organized and strategic use of gender difference (as exemplified by FETs) may constitute a military innovation itself. I test my theory through a comparative case analysis, leveraging variation in institutional commitments to gender inclusion between two military organizations who participated in the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) coalition in Afghanistan – the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). A note to readers: This paper is a chapter of my dissertation, which builds a broad theory of gender and military innovation. Thus, COIN is one of several innovations I consider (others include drones, military-medical collaborations, nuclear weapons, and advances in logistics.) I have included a shortened version of my theory in this draft and would be happy to answer any clarifying questions. While all suggestions are welcome, I am particularly interested in avenues for further analysis – especially given the current limitations of archival and interview-based research due to COVID-19. 1 S. Pindyck Chapter 4 “…a mimeograph machine may turn out to be more useful that a machine gun, a soldier trained as a pediatrician more important than a mortar expert, cement more wanted than barbed wire, clerks more in demand than riflemen” (Galula 1964, 66). In 2006, the U.S. military was undergoing a reorientation. While the doctrine, education, training, and culture of the organization had historically prioritized the destruction of military targets, setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan during the early years of the “War on Terror” demonstrated a need for increased acceptance of military operations that do not resemble conventional war fighting. Rather than focusing on massing firepower at the right time and place, population-based counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns would require taking on a variety of tasks beyond combat in order to win the support of the populace. The armed forces would need to conduct operations that included foreign internal defense, stability operations, and reconstruction. This shift refashioned classical theories from the 1950s and 1960s into a new framework that emphasized the need for the counterinsurgency soldier to “be ready both to fight and to build” (FM3-24, 1-105). By year’s end, the publication of the US Army and Marines Counterinsurgency Manual (FM3-24) would signal the top-down implementation of an approach involving psychological and information operations and the integration of aid and governance to win over a largely uncommitted civilian population. While readiness to fight (and not flee) under painful and uncertain conditions is a common starting point for theories of combat motivation and effectiveness, readiness to build, negotiate, and win over hearts and minds typically falls outside of common and reoccurring constructions of “warrior values” within military organizations: Warriors are expected to be physically courageous – i.e. risk death, be able to endure pain and suffering, be strong and skillful, and be loyal to fellow soldiers and leaders. Such traits have long been gendered, reflecting and reinforcing dominant and dichotomous notions of masculinity and femininity. Traditionally, these gendered roles are performed within a militarized culture that privileges institutions and individuals who embody masculine values (Tickner 1999; Goldstein 2001; Enloe 2000, 2004; Sjoberg 2013). Implementing COIN doctrine, on the other hand, requires officers and service members to rethink the traditional lines drawn to distinguish between civilian and military, the home front and front lines, governing and military strategies. Unlike the conventional combat soldier, the counterinsurgent requires a different set of skills – those of “a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout” (Galula 1964, 88). The elevation of lower-status tasks associated with containment, mediation, dialogue with local residents, and humanitarian assistance requires qualities that fall outside the purview of traditional “warriors.” Moreover, by placing civilians as objects of military operations in doctrine and practice, COIN brings women, 2 S. Pindyck Chapter 4 non-combatant men, and spaces of home life to the battlefield. The struggle for the allegiances of the local population and reconstruction of their social world challenges the binary categorization which forms the basis of mainstream discourses about war, where “civilian (feminine) is the opposite of combatant (masculine)” (Khalili 2010, 1473-4). Finally, counterinsurgents responsible for both lethal and nonlethal operations operate in a high-risk environment, often requiring them to engage in direct ground combat. This dynamic creates unique challenges for military organizations that impose occupational restrictions on the basis of sex, with important implications for the training and retention of personnel and, as a result, the effectiveness operations. For military organizations that invest heavily in the adoption and integration of COIN, these challenges are significant and addressed through a range of solutions. I theorize that such solutions are conditioned by a military organization’s gender inclusion (or exclusion) regime. Militaries that invest in institutional commitments to inclusion – for example through the reduction of occupational restrictions on the basis of sex, the expansion of family programs, and sexual assault and harassment monitoring – are more likely to have the needed flexibility when it comes to the elevation of roles that fall outside of the combat warrior framework, and thus greater success with the integration of COIN. I argue that the ways the gendered challenges of COIN are addressed has important implications for military effectiveness, the gendered division of labor in the military, and the likelihood of further military innovation. To test this theory, I examine two comparative cases of military organizations that participated in the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) coalition in Afghanistan, with varying levels of institutional commitment to gender inclusion – the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the Australian Defense Force (ADF). While both militaries have historically relied heavily on the performance of gendered roles in service to the nation, the TAF has remained resistant to any institutional reforms aimed towards inclusion overtime. The TAF gender regime rests on the maintenance of the nuclear family and future generations of Turks, with particular attention paid to the duty of women as patriotic mothers and the sexuality of male soldiers. On the other hand, ADF efforts to recruit and retain a female force began, in earnest, at the end of the 20th century, with the most substantive changes to their gender regime occurring in the midst of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. These shifts involved substantive institutional reforms, concluding with the opening of all occupations to female soldiers in 2014. The subsequent analysis draws from a range of primary source material including interviews with military personnel, official reports and field manuals, newspaper articles, and military journal entries to examine each military’s integration of COIN doctrine and the gendered 3 S. Pindyck Chapter 4 challenges that arose. In what follows, I first discuss the development and adoption of COIN doctrine and why it constitutes a military innovation. I then explain why, unlike other military innovations, COIN challenges traditional, masculine constructions of war fighting – and thereby provides a useful case for testing the broader theory. Next, I outline the specific gendered challenges that arise with the integration of COIN, and make several predictions for how I military communities are likely to address these challenges. I then lay out my research design and case