Revisiting Southeast Asian Regionalism

December, 2006

Focus on the Global South c/o CUSRI, Chulalongkorn University Bangkok 10330 THAILAND Tel : 662 218 7363 / 7364 / 7365 / 7383 Fax: 662 255 9976 Email: [email protected] Web page : http://www.focusweb.org on the FOCUSGlobal South Revisiting Southeast Asian Regionalism

A publication of FOCUS ON THE GLOBAL SOUTH December 2006 FOCUS on the GLOBAL SOUTH is a policy research and advocacy center based in Bangkok, Thailand with offices in Manila, Philippines and Mumbai, India.

Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute (CUSRI) Wisit Prachuabmoh Bldg. Chulalongkorn University Phyathai Road Bangkok 10330 Thailand Tel: +66 2 218 7363 to 65 Fax: +66 2 255 9976 E-mail: [email protected] Web page: www.focusweb.org

Printed in the Philippines by Cor-Asia, Inc. Table of Contents

Building Community: The Search for Alternative Regionalism in Southeast Asia 1 Jenina Joy Chavez

Neo-liberalism and the Working People of Southeast Asia 11 Rene Ofreneo

China and Southeast Asia: Emerging Problems in an Economic Relation 23 Walden Bello

Welcome China!: China’s Rise and its Increasing Role in ASEAN 27 Dorothy Guerrero

Development and Plunder in the Mekong Region 33 Shalmali Guttal

Raising a Different Flag: Struggles for Self-Determination in Southeast Asia 49 Herbert Docena

Democracy and Human Rights in ASEAN 63 Rashid Kang

The Role of Non-State Actors in ASEAN 71 Alexander Chandra

Engaging the ASEAN Charter Process: 83 Submissions to the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy

Submission on the Security Pillar 83 Submission on the Economic Pillar 91 Submission on the Socio-Cultural Pillar 99

ANNEXES: Understanding ASEAN 105 Julie de los Reyes and Mary Ann Manahan

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 118

Building Community The Search for Alternative Regionalism in Southeast Asia jENINA JOY CHAVEZ hen the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967, the original members did not have an a priori vision of what they wanted the Association to be. It Wwould take another 30 years before the vision of an ASEAN Commu- nity would emerge. ASEAN members are now preparing to flesh this out in an ASEAN Charter.

ASEAN Leaders, “ASEAN Vision 2020”,(Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1997). An Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter was formed in December 2005 to draft recommendations on the content of the Charter. The Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) Working Group on ASEAN made three submissions to the EPG in April, June and November 2006. In coordination with SAPA WG on ASEAN partners, seven national consultative processes on the Charter and on general issues of engagement with ASEAN were also held between September and November 2006. The complete set of submissions is included in this volume.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | The ASEAN Charter has drawn a lot of Integration without interest among civil society and social a Clear Vision movements who see the process as an op- At 40, ASEAN is considered one of the portunity to bring to the regional arena most established regional groupings in aspects of their advocacy that are region- the world. However, this staying power al in nature. Throughout 2006, many civil veils the absence of a clear vision for the society groups expressed their aspirations region. ASEAN still has no strong iden- for regionalism by submitting inputs to tification with or articulation of regional the Charter. Despite limited engagement interest despite its years. It has achieved with ASEAN in the past, the submissions success in cozy diplomatic relations that were put together with relative ease be- serves the interest and provides comfort cause they are based on existing local, na- to the political leadership of its members, tional and global advocacy. but accomplishes little for its peoples. It remains to be seen to what extent When it started to take economic coop- civil society input will be included in the eration seriously, objectives were limited Charter. ASEAN has largely been inac- to developing the region as a platform cessible to civil society, and is not known for third country exports and to attract- for initiatives that directly target broad ing foreign investments into the region sections of the ASEAN population. Many through trade liberalization. Broader groups therefore question the value of objectives beyond opening up were left engaging the ASEAN Charter process, or behind. Initial dreams of regional im- ASEAN itself. port substitution or the development The skepticism with ASEAN, how- of regional production bases were aban- ever, is not generalized to the idea of doned. Most regional initiatives cater to regionalism and regional integration. big business, but there were no projects Outside of Southeast Asia, there are directly targeting basic producers and many attempts at regional cooperation workers. As a result, ASEAN has yet to and integration. Recent examples from establish itself as a popular concept, and South America suggest that it may be failed to elaborate its rhetoric to popular possible to have “an integration of, and consciousness. for, the peoples”. This idea of alterna- In its first 25 years, political and security rather than economic cooperative regionalism provides the motivation tion had been ASEAN’s main focus. A to engage ASEAN. Civil society’s ap- voluntary preferential trading arrange- proach to ASEAN should be the same as ment introduced in the late 1970s cov- their approach to their government, be- ered a measly two percent and five per- cause they lay as much claim to what it cent of intra-ASEAN trade in 1980 and does in ASEAN as in their country. With 1986, respectively. It was not until 1993 ASEAN, two major weaknesses provide that a more comprehensive ASEAN Free the starting point for engagement. First, Trade Area (AFTA), through the Com- ASEAN has failed to identify a clear vi- mon Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) sion to guide regional integration. Sec- Scheme, was established as the key eco- ond, ASEAN has also failed to act ap- nomic project of ASEAN. AFTA’s goal preciably on issues requiring regional is the complete abolition of tariffs for response. Addressing these weaknesses the ASEAN-6 by 2010 and 2015 for the would be the first step towards building a regional community. See Jenina Joy Chavez, “Economic Integration in ASEAN: In Need of another Miracle” in Asian Exchange, vol. 13 no.2, 1997 for a discussion of ASEAN’s early trade and economic integration initiatives. “Let’s construct a real Community of South American Nations in order to ‘live well’.” (Proposal from President The next chapter, Rene Ofreneo’s “Neo-liberalism and Evo Morales to the head of states and people of South the Working People of Southeast Asia”, gives a more America, October 2, 2006). Available online: http:// detailed discussion of AFTA www.integracionsolidaria.org. ASEAN-6 refers to Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phil-

| REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM newer members, with flexibility on some since the 1990s. Intra-ASEAN trade as sensitive products until 2018. To date, a percentage of total ASEAN trade is more than 99% of tariff lines in the in- 22.5% in 2004. Japan, the United States clusion list of ASEAN-6 are within the (US), the European Union (EU), China 0-5% range; almost two-thirds of which and Korea remain as ASEAN’s largest have 0% tariff. More notably, with the trading partners, together accounting for full inclusion of Malaysia’s completely more than 51% of ASEAN trade in 2003. built-up and completely knocked-down Though CEPT tariff levels are gener- automotive units in 2004, there are no ally far lower than those committed by more ASEAN-6 products temporarily ex- ASEAN Members to the World Trade cluded from the CEPT scheme. A short Organization (WTO), intra-ASEAN list of highly sensitive agricultural prod- trade is limited and the Association has ucts (e.g. rice for Indonesia, Malaysia and not really paid attention to addressing the Philippines) has until 2010 to be inte- this limitation. From its inception, AFTA grated in the trade arrangement. Average was not seen as a vehicle to address the tariff for the ASEAN-6 under the CEPT sluggish intra-ASEAN trade. Rather, it Scheme is now down to 1.87%. was designed to boost the competitive- Yet even with AFTA, there had been ness of ASEAN and to attract foreign marginal increases in intra-ASEAN trade investments into the region. The preferential nature of AFTA was not the main ippines, Thailand and Singapore. interest for ASEAN members. This is ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Annual Report 2003-2004 the reason why in some instances, WTO (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2004). ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Annual Report 2005-2006 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2006). ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistical Pocketbook 2005 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2005). Table 1a : Status of Free Trade Agreement in ASEAN Member Countries (As of September 2006)

Source: http://aric.adb.org/10.php a/ parties are considering a free trade agreement, establishing joint study groups or joint task force, and conducting feasibility studies to determine the desirability of entering into an FTA b/ parties initially negotiate the contents of a framework agreement (FA), which serves as a framework for future negotiations c/ parties begin negotiations without a framework agreement d/ parties sign the agreement after negotiations have been completed; some FTAs would require legislative or executive ratification e/ when the provisions of an FTA becomes effective, e.g., when tariff cuts begin

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | commitments are realigned to CEPT and use the region as a platform for pro- rates, as in the case of Singapore (com- duction and export. Meanwhile, national plete liberalization) and the Philippines industries are eaten up by foreign capi- (some CEPT rates become the most fa- tal, weakened or decimated, further di- vored nation10 rates). luting the possibility that ASEAN as a bloc would someday be able to speak of Another indication that a bigger a regional capital and production base. intra-regional market network is not the While there are dreams for an ASEAN raison d’etre for AFTA or ASEAN is its brand, it is not necessarily a dream for involvement in a network of trade and having regionally integrated production investment arrangements outside the using regional capital selling to the region immediate economic integration initia- and using the region’s vast human and tives the Association itself has initiated. knowledge resources. Rather, it is to con- Individual ASEAN member countries solidate regional production networks are involved in a total of 128 free trade that will make it possible for foreign in- agreements (FTAs) in varying stages of vestors to base all the different stages of development. Almost two out of five production in the region, selling both to of these agreements have either been the region and outside. signed or are under implementation. Sin- gapore, Thailand, and Malaysia have the Nor is ASEAN able to play a sig- most number of FTAs proposed, signed nificant role in the different trade initia- or implemented (See Table 1a). Out- tives entered into by its members. In the side of AFTA, ASEAN as a bloc is in- WTO, ASEAN is not known to carry common positions even as some ASEAN volved in six other FTAs with Australia 11 and New Zealand, China, the EU, India, members are part of various coalitions. Japan, and South Korea. The FTAs with ASEAN members in the WTO only Australia and New Zealand, India, and came together to support the appoint- Japan are under negotiation (with Frame- ment of Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi as Director General in 2002; and in Decem- work Agreements signed with India and 12 Japan). The ASEAN-China FTA is being ber 2005 there was a joint proposal by implemented, initially with an Early Har- ASEAN WTO members on the services vest Programme for Indonesia, the Phil- negotiations. The Association was not, ippines and Thailand; while the ASEAN- for example, able to provide substantial Korea FTA has been signed and is due assistance to Cambodia in its accession for implementation in January 2007. The process. In the end, Cambodia had to of- FTA with the EU is still under study. An fer more than what existing WTO mem- East Asia Free Trade Area, covering the bers offered initially, and give up many Plus Three countries (China, Japan and of the flexibilities it was entitled to as a South Korea) and the other East Asian least developed country (LDC). Overall, Summit countries (India, Australia and Cambodia “accepted limitations not only New Zealand), has also been proposed (See Table 1b). 11 Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand are members of the G20, a coalition with strict focus on agriculture, That ASEAN seems to be uninter- specifically on the reduction of domestic support, ested in developing its own internal mar- tighter controls on export credits, and access to markets of developed countries. Indonesia and the Philippines ket is rooted in the extreme competition take the lead in the G33, an alliance for special products among its members. ASEAN’s response and special safeguard mechanisms. to the low level of complementarity in 12Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and the region is to invite foreign investors Thailand made a joint submission for the retention of the bilateral request and offer process and against the multilateral benchmarking system proposed by the 10Most Favored Nation (MFN) rates refer to the best developed countries (led by the EU and Japan). Under tariff rates a country gives to all of its trading part- benchmarking, developing countries will be compelled ners without discrimination; also WTO rates. This is to open up a number of sectors from among a few distinguished from preferential tariffs, which are rates selected sectors. Under the request and offer method, of concession a country extends to a smaller number of WTO member countries set their own limits and are countries it has special trade arrangements with. allowed to liberalize at their own pace.

| REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM with respect to trade policies, but also nized region-wide positions in multilat- limitations in other areas…associated eral fora. It is even more difficult to come with…rights to benefit from special and up with common policies to present to differential treatment”.13 external partners, whether ASEAN is ne- How do ASEAN members’ appe- gotiating as a bloc or the members nego- tites for bilateral FTAs affect initiatives tiating individually. like AFTA? Do they strengthen them or ASEAN places its strategic sights do they dilute them? The signed FTAs14 on steering East Asian regionalism, want- approximate the ambitions of AFTA ing to be a “winning gate to Asia”16 by and other ASEAN economic initiatives15 securing linkages with the bigger Asian within periods very close to ASEAN tar- economies through the different FTAs. gets, a clear indication that whether in As mentioned, an East Asian FTA had trade, investments or services, ASEAN been proposed, amidst thorny debates on does not prioritize the region but uses it whether or not non-Asians (particularly as the platform to get more deals from Australia and New Zealand) should be outside the region. part of it. The proposal is already being In short, the importance of engag- challenged by yet another proposal for ing ASEAN on these issues lies not just an Asia Pacific Free Trade Area, pushed on what it does, but also on what it does as deserving serious consideration by no not. less than U.S. President George W. Bush himself during the November 2006 Asia Signing bilateral agreements is a Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) country’s prerogative, but the absence of Summit in Vietnam. While ASEAN and institutions in ASEAN to facilitate better most of its East Asian partners led by Ja- coordination among members erodes not pan would want to consolidate East Asia only ASEAN’s relevance as a bloc, but first, the US is adamantly against it. The also weakens the negotiating position of US view is articulated by former US As- its members. For the ASEAN-China Free sistant Treasury Secretary Fred Bergsten Trade Area (ACFTA), there is an absence who believes that instead of “draw(ing) of mechanism for common positions to a line down the middle of the Pacific”, be developed, and most negotiations both EAFTA and the Asia Pacific FTA are done on a bilateral basis. This was 17 should be implemented simultaneously. the case when terms of the Early Har- Now it becomes not just a question of vest Program were negotiated between whether ASEAN can be an effective driv- China and Indonesia, the Philippines er for East Asia. It is also a question of and Thailand separately. Lacking is the whether ASEAN can stand up to the US mechanism by which ASEAN members and thwart its attempts to foil the already can process among themselves how con- limited East Asian consolidation it hopes cessions and/or commitments should be to steer. made, and how the group as a whole can be more supportive of the more hesitant Integrating Southeast Asia eco- or otherwise more economically vulner- nomically is a complicated process, one able members. It is this lack that makes that requires the support of all sectors it difficult for ASEAN to develop harmo- 16 “ASEAN: A Winning Gate to Asia!”, Address by ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong, 7th 13 United Nations Commission on Trade and Develop- ASEAN Forum, Jakarta, 6 December 2005. Available ment, The Least Developed Countries Report 2004 (Geneva: online: http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:PAjYc- UNCTAD, 2004). G4vOxIJ:www.aseansec.org/17985.htm+East+Asian+Free 14FTAs are not limited to trade in goods but also cover +Trade+Area+ong&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=6 services, and in some cases investments. 17AFP, “US, Asia differ over free trade mechan- 15Aside from AFTA, ASEAN has also agreed to establish ics”, posted 01 December 2006. Available online: an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) which will confer http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:_jbHG60GJ5AJ: national treatment to ASEAN investors by 2010; and www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific_busi- has signed the Framework Agreement on Services ness/view/244682/1/.html+east+asian+free+trade+agreem (AFAS) which envisions free flow of services by 2020. ent&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=11.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | to succeed. Unfortunately, ASEAN’s way a high 17.7 and 22.1, respectively . The dif- of integration is confined to opening up ference can be attributed to the relatively regionally, and opening up some more to broader base of growth and planning in outside the region. While this strategy Japan and South Korea, and the narrower may satisfy ASEAN’s desire to be inte- financial base of the nouveau prosperity grated with its bigger neighbors, it does in Malaysia and Singapore. not capture the breadth of economic im- The lack of a broad vision constrains peratives for the region. Integration suc- ASEAN from developing more appropri- cess should not be limited to increases in ate, even activist responses to bridge the trade or the economic growth rate, but gap between members. ASEAN needs should strengthen the region’s produc- to better appreciate its own economic tive sectors. It is in this area that ASEAN history. The fastest growth in Asia came fails miserably. from various experiments in the 1970s, Weakness in Other Significant 1980s and until the early 1990s. ASEAN Trans-boundary Concerns benefited from these patently non-neo- If in its more developed initiatives liberal experiments, yet it is more than ASEAN does not hold a glowing record ready to set aside these lessons because in terms of community building, it is a liberalization is now regarded as the key disappointment in most other areas. In- to growth and development. Not enough equality between and among members, attention is given to facilitating the pro- intra-regional migration, internal con- cess of preparation and maturation for flicts and human rights, regional health, newer members, or even older members and regional identity – these are some of with weaker economies. There are no the issues where ASEAN response leaves systematic catch-up mechanisms and/or much to be desired. programs for smaller (e.g. the CLMV Inequality and the Development countries or Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar Gap. The optimism about ASEAN’s am- and Vietnam) members. The assistance bitious economic initiatives is tempered available now pertains mostly to tech- by the stark realities in the region. Huge nical assistance to help newer members disparities in-country and among mem- cope with liberalization. ber countries exist. ASEAN is character- ASEAN would do community ized by different stages of development building a great service if it starts to con- and variable economic structures, rang- sider and implement programs that more ing from the most open economy Singa- proactively bring all members to a higher pore, to predominantly agricultural Laos level of development, by seriously pool- and petroleum-based Brunei. Per capita ing alternative sources of development income ranges between $191 for Myan- finance, and promoting economic and mar and $25,209 for Singapore ; while social policies that integrate the lessons unemployment can be as good as 1.5% in of ASEAN’s own tigers. Thailand and as bad as 10.9% in the Phil- ippines . Intra-ASEAN Mi g ra t i o n . The distribution of the in-country ASEAN has a population of more than growth achieved in the region in the last half a billion people, and is home to one of 20 years had been highly skewed. In the the biggest migrant sending countries in older Asian tigers Japan and South Korea, the world (the Philippines). The econom- the richest 10 percent of the population ic changes in the last two decades, and captures a proportion of income that is long-standing internal conflicts in some only 4.5 times and 7.8 times more than the countries, prompt the continuous rise of poorest 10 percent, respectively. In con- intra-ASEAN migration, and the increase trast, in the richest ASEAN countries of in the population of undocumented in- Singapore and Malaysia, the proportion is tra-ASEAN migrants. Estimates place the number of undocumented Southeast | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Asian workers in ASEAN at 2.6 million. the region. This is considered a feat con- Majority of the undocumented migrants sidering the volatile context surrounding (82%) are Indonesians and Filipinos, and ASEAN’s founding, and the involvement 83% of them are in Malaysia and Thai- of some members in territorial disputes land. Aside from workers lacking of- that have yet to find final resolution. ficial credentials to work legally in the Yet internal conflicts, punctuat- countries of destination, refugees fleeing ed by struggles for self-determination, conflicts at home (e.g. Myanmar/Burma, pervade and persist in the region. Aceh Mindanao in the Philippines) add to the and Irian Jaya/West Papua in Indone- numbers of undocumented migrants. sia, the south of Thailand, Mindanao in Migration is an issue that ASEAN the Philippines, and Myanmar/Burma conveniently dances around despite are conflict areas that ASEAN have so its ability to create tensions among its far neglected to discuss officially. Such members. There is yet to be a substan- internal conflicts affect ASEAN’s -over tive recognition of the contribution of all security, which can only deteriorate migrant workers to the economy, unless unless ASEAN stops hiding behind the they are skilled and professional talents. principle of non-interference and starts ASEAN has initiatives towards mutual discussing principles and mechanisms recognition arrangements (MRAs) of in- that will bind members to certain norms tra-ASEAN migrant professionals, but is and standards (e.g. human rights). Ironi- silent on the issue of the mass low- and cally, some members find motivation to unskilled or otherwise undocumented speak about the issue of Mynmar/Burma migration that persists in the region. from the US’ expressed displeasure over Discussion of undocumented migration the worsening situation, rather than on a is limited to issues of trafficking in per- clear commitment to facilitate transition sons, a security concern. in the country. A comprehensive discussion of mi- The issue of internal conflicts is re- gration is needed in ASEAN to (1) ac- lated to the issue of democracy and hu- knowledge the contribution of migrant man rights. ASEAN is known to have workers in the region’s development; (2) cuddled dictator governments in the past, address the social impacts of migration, and at present host two military govern- including the need to protect migrants’ ments. The concept of human rights is rights; and (3) come up with regionally ac- not something expressed explicitly in its ceptable mechanisms to tackle migration, official documents, and ASEAN remains and promote/protect migrants’ rights. the only regional association that has yet Integration implies greater movements to establish a human rights mechanism. of people across the region, and provides In fact, not all ASEAN members have an occasion for the socialization of an national human rights bodies (courts or ASEAN identity. And because ASEAN commissions). Despite persistent advoca- also exports workers to countries outside cy for human rights in the region, ASEAN of the region, a regional framework on has not been particularly responsive, yet migration will increase ASEAN mem- another reason why ASEAN peoples do bers’ capacity to negotiate migration is- not feel a strong affinity with it. sues with those countries, especially the Regional Environment and Plus 3 partners where a sizeable number Health. Southeast Asia is an environ- of Southeast Asian migrants are undocu- mentally diverse region that enjoys abun- mented. dant land, mineral, forest, and aquatic Internal Conflicts and Human resources. These resources often become Rights. Part of what is considered the cause of conflict between govern- ASEAN success is the Association’s abil- ments and/or between their citizens. ity to mute political conflicts, and the ab- Increasingly access to these resources is sence of raging wars between countries in being privatized, and negative externali-

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | ties related to their exploitation are dealt sociation these days, the political leader- with market mechanisms (polluter pays, ship of ASEAN needs to give attention etc.). ASEAN approach to environmen- to the issues of great concern to them. tal resources tends to be piecemeal, and Mechanisms to ensure the equitable dis- often contingent on the exigencies dic- tribution of benefits of, and protection tated by commercial needs (e.g. need to from the negative impacts of, integra- develop intellectual property regimes). tion; positive assistance from the bigger What is needed now is a comprehensive and stronger to the smaller and weaker approach that defines not only the rights members; the establishment of a regional of access, but also the responsibilities for instrument on migration; the establish- stewardship, protection and renewal. ment of a regional human rights mech- On health, the threat and/or inci- anism; the protection of the regional dence of infectious diseases like HIV/ environment; increasing the capacity of AIDS, severe acute respiratory syndrome members to protect their citizens from (SARS) and avian flu continues to increase regionally pervasive communicable or in the region. There are various initiatives infectious diseases – these are some of at the ASEAN level to address this, also the minimum initiatives ASEAN need to in collaboration with its external part- institutionalize to be relevant to people. ners and international institutions. To be Failing this, ASEAN will remain a gov- more effective, there needs to be sharper ernment-centered Association pursuing a focus on the welfare of ASEAN citizens floating dream of community, unable to rather than on the negative impact of foster an ASEAN identity that Southeast these diseases to the economy (e.g. bad Asians will happily embrace. for tourism or agriculture). Ways Forward for Southeast Culture and Identity. The idea of Asian Regionalism ASEAN has to be explained to the peo- Southeast Asia is a region of diverse people of the region, and this is best done ples and cultures, of variable economic by emphasizing the regional aspects and political structures, and of uneven that can bring the peoples of ASEAN capacities and resources. The region’s together. A common understanding of diversity is often used as an excuse for ASEAN’s proud history and legacy, pro- many things, from the slow pace of de- moted through the media and national mocratization to the shallowness of eco- and regional educational institutions nomic integration. But Southeast Asia is would be a good start. For it to go be- also home to common threats (e.g. en- yond a public relations campaign, new vironmental degradation, trans-bound- ideas and trends that define the region ary health problems), aspirations (e.g. (mobility and migration, international rights, democracy), and needs (e.g. social labor solidarity) should be incorporated. development, economic growth). De- The search for identity should not turn veloping common agenda around these a blind eye to the phenomenal diversity threats, aspirations and needs will be a ASEAN is known for, and instead should big bold step towards defining a commu- celebrate it. nity. Embracing the common agenda is Most importantly, identity is best crucial in developing a regional identity. ensured by common agenda that peoples That is, a regional identity can be devel- of ASEAN can identify with. A platform oped through a common imagination of for third country exports and attractor of a regional set-up, something the region’s foreign investments is hardly an appeal- people can build together. ing identity that will make the peoples As an institution for regional com- of ASEAN support the idea of a region- munity building, ASEAN is wanting. Its al community. For ASEAN to be truly milestones have been alien to people, people-centered or people-empowered, because it has proceeded with a very key terms being mainstreamed in the As-

| REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM government-oriented perspective and history is marked by the glaring absence involved highly-specialized groups. How- of wide-ranging participation from civil ever, there are people’s and community society and social movements, and it is issues involving ASEAN countries, and high time that the situation is rectified. spaces to respond to these issues should The process must be taken to the people, be explored at the regional level. Being the streets, the schools, the local com- an inter-governmental body, ASEAN munities. It is time to wrest the initiative has the responsibility to represent the from the political elite, and let the people region’s people, and it should be taken to define what kind of regional governance task for this responsibility. they want, and to articulate their vision In engaging institutions like for the region. ASEAN, the operative terms should be To be effective, regional engagement stakes claiming and demanding account- should have strong local and national ability. Evaluating ASEAN should lead foundations, and should complement civil society and social movements to the global advocacies. It only makes sense conception of alternative regionalism, in- that the issues brought to the regional cluding what kind of ASEAN will work arena are the same issues that groups for them. Presently, the process of creat- promote in their own countries. At the ing an ASEAN Charter provides an op- same time, local and national advocacies portunity for engaging ASEAN organiza- should be given a regional articulation, tionally as civil society/social movements not because it is a natural progression in clarify what kind of regional alternatives campaigning, but because it can facilitate will work for them. regional solidarity. Only in the spirit of However, the process of engagement solidarity can truly regional alternatives n should not be limited to and should not emerge. stop with the official process. ASEAN’s

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | Table 1b : Status of Selected Key FTAs in ASEAN

Source of Basic Information: http://aric.adb.org/regionalcooperation/integration_initiatives.asp?s=1&ss=3 a/ A joint feasibility study on ASEAN-EU Economic Cooperation (called the Report of the ASEAN-EU Vision Group: Transregional Partnership for Shared and Sustainable Prosperity, including a possible FTA, was completed in May 2006. b/ South Korea and nine ASEAN members signed the agreement in May 2006. Only Thailand refused to sign over issues on rice. If signed, implementation to commence in January 2007. c/ FTA undergoing Senate ratification process in the Philippines.

10 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Neo-liberalism and the Working People

Rofene E. Southeast Ofreneo Asia n its Summit in Bali, the Heads of the ten member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – the original ASEAN-6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore Iand Thailand) and the new ASEAN-4 (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) -- adopted a historic declaration called Concord II. In the said Concord, ASEAN Heads of States declared that like the European Community, ASEAN territory shall be one contiguous ASEAN Com- munity by the year 2020. This borderless ASEAN Community shall be composed of three communities: the ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, and the ASEAN Economic Com- munity, or AEC

This paper was prepared for the ASEAN Inter-University Forum in Hanoi. July 19-21 2006.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 11 Since then, the vision of a robust and rap- With the ASEAN Plus 3 trade talks heat- idly integrating regional ASEAN econo- ing up, other countries have decided to my has attracted a lot of media mileage, pursue their own separate trade nego- both within and outside the individual tiations with ASEAN member countries, ASEAN countries. Home to over 500 both at the bilateral and regional levels. million people, the ASEAN region is These countries are Australia, New Zea- seen as the core of an even bigger eco- land, India, the EU, and, yes, the United nomic community – the East Asia Eco- States. nomic Community (EAEC). The EAEC Yet, amid all this flurry of talks on unites the ASEAN bloc with the dragon regional economic integration, the work- economies of Japan, China (including ing people in ASEAN – workers, farm- Hong Kong), South Korea and Taiwan. ers and other ordinary citizens – appear Some statistics on the potentials of a uninformed and, not surprisingly, indif- bigger East Asia grouping have naturally ferent to the varied ASEAN economic captured the imagination of economic programs, which are understood mainly and political commentators – two billion by the economic technocrats of various East Asian consumer markets, a collec- ASEAN governments. The ASEAN tive GDP bigger than those of the United Trade Union Council (ATUC), in exis- States’ or the European Union’s, and the tence since the l980s, has not been invited world’s largest manufacturing base. to any formal discussion or consultation Public attention on the AEC proj- on any of the trade programs mentioned ect and the work-in-progress EAEC has above. ASEAN deliberations on AFTA, been further buttressed by the following PIPs, ACFTA, EPAs with Japan and oth- developments: er economic projects are generally limited to government officials and members • The decision of ASEAN to further of the ASEAN Business Advisory Coun- deepen the program for the ASEAN cil (ABAC). Overall, there are no serious Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) with attempts on the part of ASEAN govern- the launching of the 11 Priority Inte- ments to inform the working population gration Projects or PIPs; about the implications of these economic programs on their lives. Thus, small pro- • The holding in 2005 of an East ducers in Southeast Asia are generally un- Asia Summit involving ASEAN Plus informed about ASEAN economic proj- 3 (Japan, Korea and China) right af- ects such as AFTA . ter the annual Summit of ASEAN Heads of States; The AFTA-CEPT Project: A Narrow Liberalization • The approval in 2002 of a Frame- Program work Agreement for an ASEAN- To achieve economic integration, China Free Trade Agreement ASEAN has adopted economic liber- (ACFTA), which provides for some alization, mainly through a tariff-bust- modalities by which the individual ing program called AFTA. Under the ASEAN countries can conclude an AFTA, a Common Effective Preferential ‘early harvest agreement’ with China Tariff Program (CEPT) was supposed to by the mid-2000s and a full-blown reduce tariffs on products traded within free-trade agreement by 2010; and, the ASEAN region to 0-5% by the year 2008. The AFTA-CEPT was launched in • The announcement in 2002 that l992 with an original 15-year time frame. Japan shall pursue its own bilateral or 2 Aurora Alarde-Regalado, “The Impact of the ASEAN Economic Partnership Agreement Free Trade Area (AFTA) on ASEAN Economies and (EPA) talks with ASEAN countries. Small Producers in Southeast Asia”, Research Report submitted to the Southeast Asian Council for Food Security and Fair Trade (Selangor, Malaysia, 2005).

12 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM In their 2001 Hanoi meeting, ASEAN • The Sensitive List (SL): this list leaders became ambitious and decided to contains unprocessed agricultural fast-track the application of the zero tar- products such as rice and sugar, iffs for 60% of ASEAN products of the which are given a longer period for ASEAN-6 to 2003. integration into the free trade area. For the SL category, the commit- The AFTA-CEPT is implemented ment to reduce tariffs to 0-5% and through a schedule involving four prod- to remove non-tariff barriers is- ex uct lists: tended up to the year 2010 for the ASEAN-6, up to 2013 for Vietnam, • The Inclusion List (IL): products in 2015 for Lao PDR and Myanmar, the IL are those that have to under- and 2017 for Cambodia. go immediate liberalization through the reduction of intra-ASEAN tariff • The General Exception List rates, and the removal of quantita- (GEL): the products in this list are tive restrictions and other non-tariff permanently excluded from the free barriers. Tariffs on these products trade area for reasons of national se- should have been reduced to a maxi- curity, the protection of articles of mum of 20% by the year 1998, and cultural value, and other reasons. to less than 5% by the year 2002 and by 2006 or later, for new members Based on the 2001 CEPT Package, of ASEAN – Vietnam, Cambodia, all ASEAN-6 states were able to meet Laos and Myanmar. the target of reducing tariffs to 0-5% for 90% of their IL. In fact, the ASEAN- • The Temporary Exclusion List 4 members are not too far behind in the (TEL): products in TEL are shield- liberalization process. As shown in Fig- ed from trade liberalization for a ure 1, the average tariffs have gone down temporary period, after which, all to 2.68% as of January 2003. According of these products would have to be to the ASEAN Secretariat, as of January transferred to the IL and subjected 2004, the ASEAN-6 was also able to re- to the usual process of tariff reduc- duce to zero tariff 60% of the products tion. covered by the IL. From the various re-

Figure 1: ASEAN-CEPT tariffs tumbling down

Source: ASEAN Secretariat.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 13 ports of the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakar- the European Union, two-thirds of trade ta, it appears that no ASEAN member is intra-EU trade; in North America, the has any major problem in complying with North American Free Trade Agreement the AFTA-CEPT program. (NAFTA) accounts for more than half of the global trade of the United States, The ultimate target of ASEAN is Canada and Mexico. that by 2010, the ASEAN-6 would have eliminated all import duties (2015 for the ASEAN countries have been trad- ASEAN-4) with some flexibility for the ing with one another by as much as one- sensitive products. To publicize the CEPT fourth of their total exports and imports. Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area This is a significant development, since to the business community, a series of the intra-trade of ASEAN countries had workshops on the CEPT Scheme (CEPT been very limited till the l980s. Howev- Outreach Program) is being held in key er, it should be noted that intra-ASEAN cities in ASEAN, with the help of the trade, both at the export and import ASEAN Centre, Japan, and in coopera- sides, have not increased significantly tion with the ASEAN Secretariat and the since the second half of the l990s. This National AFTA Units of host countries. means the AFTA-CEPT is quite limited. The tremendous intra-ASEAN trade In the area of differing tariff no- expansion in the early l990s can be ex- menclatures, ASEAN tried to develop an plained not by AFTA but by the unilat- ASEAN Harmonized Tariff Nomencla- eral trade liberalization policy that most ture, an 8-digit level tariff nomenclature ASEAN countries adopted in the l990s. based on the Harmonized System (HS) In fact, the greatest expansion in trade by of the World Customs Organization. the individual ASEAN countries is with Five ASEAN member countries – Indo- the People’s Republic of China despite nesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore the latter’s relatively high tariff rates. and Thailand – have also implemented While intra-ASEAN exports and intra- customs valuation method in accordance ASEAN imports have been increasing, with the World Trade Organization extra-ASEAN exports and extra-ASEAN (WTO) Valuation Agreement. imports are rising even faster. It is abundantly clear that integra- Moreover, intra-ASEAN trade is not tion is simply seen as opening up each evenly distributed between and among other’s economic borders. ASEAN re- member countries. Take the experience cords do not contain any major studies of the Philippines. Half of the country’s and recommendations on complementa- trade with ASEAN is with Singapore. A tion of economies, such as the issue of closer scrutiny shows that most Philip- how those lagging in development can pine exports to Singapore are assembled catch up with the more advanced ones, electronic products. The ostensible or on addressing issue-based social di- reason for this is that the Philippines is mensions, such as inequity and jobless- engaged in lower-level electronics assem- ness. There were only some discussions bly work, while Singapore is into higher on brand-to-brand complementation, electronics assembly or application. On human resources development (e.g., on importation, Singapore is a major trans- mutual recognition or certification of shipment center for products distributed skills), and sharing of some agricultural in the region. technology. The limited impact of AFTA in Integration Successes boosting intra-regional trading did not and Failures Gijsbert van Liemt, “Trade, labour and employment One success indicator of integration is the in the ASEAN,” in Labour and Employment Implications level of intra-trading that has developed of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, ed. Anne Trebilcock (Geneva: ASEAN Secretariat and the International among ASEAN member countries. In Labour Office, 2005).

14 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM escape the attention of WTO econo- regional and global reach. They hap- mists. In the 2003, the WTO wrote: pen to be the transnational corporations (TNCs) that have either regional “It does not appear that the prefer- operations in Southeast Asia, or in the ences under AFTA have significantly individual ASEAN countries. Some au- boosted intra-regional trade…First, tomotive TNCs set up assembly plants within ASEAN about 66% of the and even parts manufacturing in the in- tariff lines have the same MFN and dividual ASEAN countries to overcome CEPT rates. As far as the remaining high tariff and non-tariff barriers and one third of tariff lines is concerned, capture the domestic markets for their since many ASEAN countries have products in the l970s-1980s. With the also automatically reduced their tariffs and trade restrictions going down, tariffs in the l990s, the difference these TNCs are now able to re-align and between MFN and CEPT rates is optimize their regional operations by small…Hence, less than 5% of intra- changing their regional division of labor regional trade is covered by CEPT such as developing automotive hubs in preferences.” areas with large emerging markets such as Thailand, while promoting specialized The CEPT preferences can be parts production in others, such as the availed of by ASEAN importers/export- Philippines having become a major pro- ers by filling up the so-called ‘Form D’ ducer of wire harnesses, etc. The point is indicating that the products being traded that trade liberalization across the region are ‘ASEAN products’ with at least 40% has made it possible for TNCs to move ASEAN content. Many in the business products and processes more freely and community have not heard of Form D or, to locate some aspects of work in certain even if they have, do not bother to use it countries based on profit maximization for the simple reason that the most fa- and market optimization. vored nation (MFN) and CEPT rates are The above observation is validated virtually the same for most of the traded by the fact that the main participants in products. the original ASEAN industrial comple- ASEAN economies of Indonesia, mentation program are TNCs. ASEAN Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Viet- industrial complementation projects are nam have similar agro-industrial struc- projects based in two or more ASEAN tures; they produce similar industrial countries complementing one another. products such as shoes, rubber, garments, In the past, several names had been giv- rice, corn, sugar and so on. As a result, en to this initiative. The latest name is there is limited intra-trading among AICO – ASEAN Industrial Cooperation them except for some vital products, (AICO) Scheme, supposedly to promote such as rice. Very often, these countries ‘a more competitive ASEAN industry’. even compete with one another, as with An AICO project enjoys preferential tar- the example of getting investments for iff rates of 0-5% on all intermediate and export-oriented garments. raw material inputs. However, the AICO list shows So who is integrating mainly the following big TNCs as AICO ASEAN? producers: So who is doing economic integration for ASEAN – given its ultra-liberal approach • Auto and motorcycles – Toyota, as the mode for integration and for indi- Volvo, Nissan, Isuzu, Honda, Ford, vidual national growth? Harada, Daihatsu; Apparently, these are entities with • Electronics – Matsushita, Mit- World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2003 subishi, Mitsubishi, Samsung, Showa, (Geneva: WTO, 2003), 54. Sony, Yamaha;

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 15 resources, and ASEAN cooperation on • Others – Asahi, Bowden, Denso, varied agriculture-related issues. How- Mistuba, Sanden, Yanmar; and ever, despite the numerous meetings and declarations on the above thrusts, there • Food – Nestle. hasn’t been much progress in regional agricultural integration. This is so because The only identifiable ‘ASEAN’ com- there is hardly any budget and concrete pany in the AICO list is Thai Steel Ca- organizational structures to back up ble, although it is not clear if this is really ASEAN intents in these priority areas. dominated by Thai nationals. So who is doing agricultural Integration in Agriculture? integration? As for agriculture, the trajectory of the A closer scrutiny of developments in the integration process taking place is not region will reveal the following actors in clear, if not totally confusing. One reason the agricultural integration process: is that most ASEAN countries do not necessarily complement one another in • Home-grown ASEAN agri-based terms of food and agricultural produc- TNCs. The big agribusiness corpo- tion. With the exception of Singapore rations such as CP of Thailand, San and Brunei, most are producing their own Miguel of the Philippines, the palm oil agricultural requirements, with some like interests in Malaysia and the big food Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia able to processors in Singapore are active in produce enough surplus for exports. the region. Their operations are not limited to trading posts; it includes Another source of confusion is the putting up production plants in the lack of unified trade and tariff regimes in various ASEAN member states. For agriculture, exacerbated in recent years by example, San Miguel Corporation of the tendency of some countries to forge the Philippines has several brewery bilateral free trade agreements (BFTAs) projects and agribusiness undertak- with non-ASEAN countries. For exam- ings in Thailand, Vietnam and Malay- ple, Singapore has BFTA with Australia, sia. US, Japan, Chile and other countries. Thus, strangely, Singapore is able to mar- In May 2006, ASEAN came up ket canned juices and other agri-based with a short list of 11 PIPs— Priority products in ASEAN even if it is not an Integration Projects—one of which is agricultural producer. Singapore’s beha- agri-based. In this agri-based project, vior is highly opportunistic; it is a source the development of a white shrimp of trade diversion in the region. It shows project in Luzon in the Philippines, why ASEAN really looks like a Confused has been identified. This is going to ASEAN, while EU is known as Fortress be developed by a well-known Thai Europe. TNC, CP Thailand, together with its sister company in Indonesia, CP In- On paper, ASEAN has launched nu- donesia. merous agricultural initiatives. In 1993, ASEAN adopted the following as its • Traders-investors from South Korea, Ja- priorities on the agricultural front: food pan and China. These giant economies security, intra-/extra-ASEAN trade, tech- in Asia are now major agriculture- nology transfer and productivity, human deficit countries. Via the proposed resources development, private sector ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Japan, and participation, conservation of natural ASEAN-South Korea agreements, all

Dr. Rene Ofreneo, “From the Green Revolution to the these countries are competing with Gene Revolution: Agriculture, AFTA and the TNCs” one another to transform ASEAN- (paper submitted to the Asia-Pacific Network on Food with its rich land and water resources- Sovereignty, 2005).

16 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM into their backyard garden: a source problems of food and hunger in Asia can of food and raw materials. This is the only be solved through trade liberaliza- deeper meaning of China’s initiative, tion and food production intensifica- the ‘Early Harvest Program’, focused tion. But since the Green Revolution of on agricultural products. China it- the l960s-l970s is an exhausted project, self is not coy in baring its intent, they are promoting the Gene Revolution as demonstrated by the cooperation as the logical sequel to the Green Revo- programs it forged recently with the lution. In promoting the Gene Revolu- Philippines. It wants to help develop tion, the agribusiness TNCs are working the Philippine coconut industry, as at several levels: first, at the policy level, China needs all the coco fiber and by mobilizing the support of the region’s other coco materials it can get a hold leading rural creditor, the ADB, and by on for its varied industrial and raw convincing ASEAN governments on the material requirements. It also wants importance of free trade and food pro- Philippine fruits such as banana and duction intensification through biotech- mango, which it is unable to produce nology; second, through back-channeling in commercial quantities. and talks with ASEAN and its member states; and third, through training, dem- • Agribusiness firms from US, Canada, onstration farms and technical assistance Australia and EU. The agribusiness on biotechnology extended in each of TNCs from these countries look at the targeted countries. Since the geneti- ASEAN, with its half a billion popu- cally modified organism (GMO) -tech lation and a large land-sea territory, as nology, part of the larger biotechnology, a huge market with huge economic is a controversial issue in many parts of potentials. Aside from looking at the world and some publics in Asia, the ASEAN as a market destination for agribusiness TNCs keep their marketing surplus goods such as corn and soya of biotechnology as quietly and unobtru- beans, these western agribusiness sively as possible. They take care that the TNCs also view ASEAN as a poten- word ‘biotechnology’ (which also cov- tial market for farm inputs, seeds, and ers other forms of hybrid agriculture) is agricultural machinery. mentioned rather than the controversial term GMO. Food security is also defined From the Green Revolution as having access to the market, and such to the Gene Revolution access is made possible by a free-trade ar- The biggest agricultural integration rangement and earnings by a developing project taking place in the region is hap- country from GM-based production. pening not through formal trading and The leading TNCs supporting investment arrangements, but through GMO/biotechnology propagation in Asia technology—specifically biotechnology. are Cargill and Monsanto. They happen Quietly and without much fanfare, the to be very active in ASEAN policy cor- big agri-based biotech companies such as ridors through the ASEAN-US Business Cargill, Monsanto, and Dupont are trans- Council, which organizes regular policy forming the ASEAN countryside, with meetings and consultations. The most some help from the Asian Development active committee in the ASEAN-US Bank (ADB) and the ‘converted’ agricul- Business Council is the food and agricultural ministries of the different ASEAN tural committee. Meetings of the food governments, into a giant biotech lake. and agriculture committee are generally well attended, involving senior agricul- How is this happening? tural ministers and officials of the- dif The agribusiness TNCs have taken the ferent ASEAN governments. The com- bull by the horns, selling to ASEAN mittee is headed by no less than Cargill, governments the idea that the perennial which openly bats for the adoption of

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 17 GMO/biotechnology (visit their website shops introduced and discussed GMO for their views) and free markets, so that rice, GMO corn, GMO soy bean and they can do business in the region freely. GMO papaya. They are done annually in Among the priority policy issues identi- various ASEAN capitals. fied by the committee and the Council There are no records of any ASEAN are the following: government or ASEAN agriculture ministers opposing GMO/biotechnology. • ‘Recognition of the food sector in What is recorded are comments on how bilateral and multilateral trade agree- to overcome civil society opposition to ments,’ the propagation of GMO/biotechnology in each ASEAN country. Technical • ‘Fair, scientific, and regionally con- assistance is also provided to the indi- sistent treatment of biotechnology,’ vidual ASEAN countries. Because of the support they get, ASEAN countries are • ‘Commitments by ASEAN govern- into GMO/biotechnology research and ments to reduce tariffs/non-tariff bar- production – exemplified by Thailand’s riers to food products, ’and Biotec, Malaysia’s Bio Valley (a hub for biotech companies and research institu- • ‘Advancing the APEC Open Food tions, with special focus on agriculture), System.’ and the Philippines’ experimentation Robert McRae of Cargill, in the with Bt corn. In 2005, Singapore initi- ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting in ated the move for the establishment of Manila on August 6, 2003, stressed “pro- an ASEAN Genetically Modified (GM) viding MNCs opportunities effectively is Food Testing Network. providing your citizens opportunities”, as if the interests of MNCs and ASEAN Economic Integration: citizens are one and the same. Cargill Quo Vadis? and Monsanto, in the 17th ASEAN-US The economic integration taking place in Dialogue, held in Bangkok January 2006, the ASEAN region is happening outside argued that ASEAN is a significant im- the control of the working peoples, or of porter of food, while the US is a major the urban and rural masses of the region. producer of agricultural products. They The integration is in the hands of the said that ASEAN should establish an transnational corporate interests, which ‘open food system’ to benefit from trade. naturally have their own regional and In the promotion of the GMO- global programs. In agriculture, one in- based agriculture, ASEAN has adopted tegration instrument is the propagation several protocols and conducted work- of GMO/biotechnology, which is in the shops and experiments, with the help hands of agribusiness TNCs that have of the governments and agribusiness managed to worm their way to ASEAN firms from the US, Canada and Australia. policy corridors. Since 2001, ASEAN has been the ‘ben- These TNCs take advantage of eficiary’ of annual GMO/biotechnology the neo-liberal policy in place in most workshops conducted by the US-based ASEAN countries as well as the frame- International Life Sciences Institute work of the ASEAN integration program (ILSI), Health Canada, Australia/New under AFTA, PIPs and so on. In agricul- Zealand Food Authority, Sante Canada ture, the TNC-favored economists argue and AVA. The workshops focused on for the loose definition of food security how to apply the ASEAN Guidelines on to mean access to food. Such access, by Risk Assessment of Agriculture-related their definition, means trade liberaliza- GMOs, which have been developed with tion, industrial export orientation and technical assistance from these countries GMO/biotechnology propagation. and the agribusiness TNCs. These work-

18 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Will the above neo-liberal econo- jobs or business niches under globaliza- mic formula solve unemployment, in- tion and economic liberalization. Even equality, poverty and hunger in the devel- in tiny Singapore, you have a growing seg- oping countries of the region? ment of old redundant workers who cannot find meaningful and secure jobs in a This is doubtful. Unemployment, liberalized and globalized economy. Such inequality, poverty and hunger are rooted a situation is not politically and e-co- in the unequal distribution of resources nomically sustainable. Terrorist threats, and access to economic opportunities insurgency, and social unrest breed in the in society. They are also rooted in the fertile ground of social inequality and the uneven development of the economy, exclusion of large sectors of the popula- which is partly a legacy of past colonial- tion from the benefits of growth. ism, bad economic advice by neo-liberal economists, and poor global and regional Still, ASEAN’s response to develop- integration. Note that in the neo-liberal ment issues tends to be one-sided: more economic thinking, space is neither given and more economic liberalization with- for state intervention to regulate capital out any clear regulatory framework. in order to preserve jobs nor to assert the Thus, it is up to the enlightened nation’s ability to determine its food and academics and civil societies to take up agricultural priorities in the service of its the cudgels for the cause of balanced, in- people. Structural issues, such as the ab- clusive, and equitable economic integra- sence of sustainable industry and agricul- tion. ture, are not given reference to either. Four decades after ASEAN’s concep- In fact, the region has been develop- tion, ASEAN members are talking about ing in a very uneven manner under eco- the need for an ASEAN Charter and the nomic liberalization and globalization. challenge of developing an ASEAN eco- Development has also been very uneven nomic community. Now it is time for in the individual ASEAN countries, with certain assumptions and approaches on some benefiting from economic integra- economic integration to become subject tion, while many others are left out. In to a more rigorous scrutiny. Economic some countries, the number of those integration per se is not bad. And so is excluded constitutes the large majority. increasing trade between and among Civil societies in Indonesia, Philippines, member ASEAN countries. The issue is and Thailand have extensive documenta- on how to make integration balanced, in- tions on how liberalization and globaliza- clusive, equitable and welfare-enhancing tion tend to benefit a few included. These for all. How can ASEAN become truly few are mainly the economic partners an Economic Community of the ASEAN of transnational corporations and some majority, the working population? skilled professionals, like IT program- mers. It is important that organizations of the under-represented sectors in ASEAN At the same time, these processes continue and enhance the process of en- of globalization and liberalization tend gaging the ASEAN Leadership on the so- to marginalize many —the short-term cial and economic directions of ASEAN. employee hires, the small farmers, com- In line with this, a number of civil soci- munal fisherfolk, small and micro enter- ety formations held the First ASEAN prises with no global linkages, domes- Civil Society Conference in Kuala Lum- tic industries producing for the home pur, in December 2005. The Conference market, indigenous peoples who do not came up with the following ten demands, comprehend the meaning of ‘tradeables’ which they were able to formally present and ‘exportables’, workers displaced by to ASEAN Heads of States: privatization and corporate restructur- ing, and others who have no sustainable • Share information with civil societies REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 19 on the proposed ASEAN Constitution. ASEAN Secretariat, 2003. Handbook on Selected ASEAN Political Documents. Jakarta: ASEAN • Set up mechanism for engagement with Secretariat. civil societies on regional concerns. ASEAN Secretariat, 2003. ASEAN Statistical • Transform ASEAN Parliamentary Pocketbook. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. Caucus into ASEAN Parliament with ASEAN Secretariat, 2004. ASEAN Documents Series peoples’ representation. 2003. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. • Translate commitments to rights of Asian Development Bank, 2002. Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 2002. workers, women, children, migrants, Manila: Asian Development Bank. elderly and refugees into doable instruments. Asian Development Bank, 2003. “Competitiveness in Developing Asia”, in Asian Development • Take decisive action on trans- bound- Outlook 2003. New York: Oxford ary security/ environmental concerns, University Press e.g., haze, bird flu, migration, etc. Biothai, Grain, Masipag and Pan Indonesia, August 1999. The corporate takeover of corn in • Seek end to suppression of civil Southeast Asia: Whose agenda?. College, and political rights. Laguna: Grain/Masipag. • Ensure that global, regional and bilat- Claparols, Antonio, 25 July 2004. “After Bt corn, comes now Bt rice”, in Philippine Daily Star. eral trade talks lead to justice and equity. Manila: Philippine Star Publishing. • Reverse unsustainable consumption, Crispin, Shawn W., 28 October 2004. “Thailand’s GMO production and development patterns. Growing Pains”, in Far Eastern Economic Review. Hong Kong: Review Publishing. • Empower youth, women and indigenous peoples through access to education, em- David, Cristina C, 1996. “Agriculture and Food ployment and decision-making processes. Security: Protection versus Liberalization”, in Paderanga, Cayetano, ed., The Philippines • Forge people-centered ‘ASEAN identity’ in the Emerging World Environment: Globalization at a Glance. Quezon City: through better understanding of history, University of the Philippines Press. culture and diversity as well as shared values of ASEAN peoples. Habito, Cielito, 30 September 1999. “Farms, Food and Foreign Trade: The World Trade Organization and Philippine Agriculture”. Report submitted For ASEAN Leaders, answering the to AGILE, San Juan. ten demands will be a good beginning in ensuring that the next four decades of Jayaseelan, Risen, August 2004. “Biotech ambitions: Malaysia gets serious about developing the nascent ASEAN will truly serve the interests of industry”, in Asia Inc. Kuala Lumpur: Asian, the working population of the region. n Inc.

References: JETRO, 2003. 2003 JETRO White Paper on International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment. Tokyo: AFP, 22-23 October 2004. “India, China in race on JETRO. biotechnology”, in Business World. Quezon City: Business World Publishing. Ofreneo, Rene, 2005. “From the Green Revolution to the Gene Revolution: Agriculture, AFTA and the AFP, 8 December 2003. “Biotech firms muscle in on rice TNCs”, paper submitted to the Asia-Pacific research”, in BusinessWorld. Quezon City: Network on Food Sovereignty, Manila. BusinessWorld Publishing. (unpublished).

ASEAN Cooperation in Food, Agriculture and Rosegrant, Mark and Hazell, Peter, 2000. Transforming Forestry, c2000. ASEAN Guidelines on Risk the Rural Asian Economy: The Unfinished Assessment of Agriculture-Related Genetically Revolution. New York: Oxford University Modified Organisms (GMOs), Biotechnology Press. Publi-cation Series No. 1. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. Runge, Ford and Senauer, Benjamin, May-June 2000. ASEAN Cooperation in Food, Agriculture and “A Removeable Feast”, in Foreign Affairs,Vol. Forestry, c2000. Frequently Asked Questions 79, No. 3. Washington: Council on Foreign (FAQs) on Genetically Modified Organism Relations. (GMOs), Biotechnology Publication Series No. 2. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. Searice, November 2002. Profile of Farmer-Breeders in Central Mindanao. Quezon City: Searice.

20 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Tolentino, Bruce, 2002. “The Globalization of Food Security: Rice Policy Reforms in the Philippines”, in Philippine Journal of Development, XXIX, 2, 2nd semester. Makati City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

Volraith, Thomas L., cl998. RTA’s and Agricultural Trade: A Retrospective Assessment. Washington: USDA Economic Research Service.

Wilson, John S., March 2002. Liberalizing Trade in Agriculture, Policy Research Working Paper 2804. Washington: World Bank Development Research Group (Trade).

______, 2001. Report of the 1st ASEAN-ILSI Training Workshop on Safety and Risk Assessment of Agriculture-Related Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). Singapore.

Internet sources: http://www.asean.org (to look for the various documents on food and agriculture agreements) http://www.pecc.org (PECC stands for the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council. Many members of the food and agriculture committee of the US-ASEAN Business Council are also active in the PECC, which conducts policy consultations in various ASEAN countries.) http://www.us-asean.org

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 21 22 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM China and Southeast Asia: Emerging Problems in an Economic Relation1 WALDEN BELLO

he much publicized wooing of African countries by China exemplified by the China-Africa meeting that took place in Beijing in the first week of November brings up the question: how is China faring in its economic Trelations with its closest neighbors?

1 This essay was prepared for the Navutilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 23 Southeast Asia, formally grouped into the most dynamic foreign investors in the re- Association of Southeast Asian Nations gion, much apprehension in the ASEAN (ASEAN), is probably the region most capitals greeted a Japanese government courted by China, so the latter’s relations survey that revealed that 57% of Japa- with the area would give some indication nese manufacturing TNCs found China of the likely evolution of Beijing’s eco- to be more attractive than the ASEAN-4 nomic diplomacy toward other parts of (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the the global South. Philippines). At first glance, it seems like the China-ASEAN relationship has been Snags in a Trade positive. After all, demand from a Chi- Relationship nese economy growing at a breakneck Trade was another, perhaps greater, area pace was a key factor in Southeast Asian of concern. In the last few years, China growth beginning around 2003, after a has aggressively sought free trade agree- period of low growth dependent on do- ments with the ASEAN governments. mestic demand. Indeed, this was also the This push appears to have met with some case for Korea and Japan. For Asia as a success. Thailand and China concluded whole, in 2003 and the beginning of 2004, an “early harvest” free trade pact in 2003. noted an UNCTAD report, “China was a At the 10th ASEAN Summit held in major engine of growth for most of the Vientiane, Laos, in November 2004, the economies in the region. The country’s ASEAN countries issued a joint state- imports accelerated even more than its ment expressing agreement with the goal exports, with a large proportion of them of removing all tariffs between ASEAN coming from the rest of Asia.” and China by the year 2010. At that meeting, a positive spin on the proposed A More Complex Picture China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement Yet the picture was more complex than was provided by Philippine President that of a Chinese locomotive pulling Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who hailed the rest of East Asia along with it on a the emergence of a “formidable regional fast track to economic nirvana. There grouping” that would rival the United have been widespread fears that China’s States and the European Union. growth is, in fact, taking place at South- Yet things have not proceeded as east Asia’s expense. Low wages, many in smoothly as Beijing would have want- Southeast Asia feared, has encouraged ed. In the experimental arrangement local and foreign manufacturers to phase between Thailand and China, the two out their operations in relatively high- countries agreed that tariffs on more waged Southeast Asia and move them to than 200 items of vegetables and fruits China. There appears to be some support would be immediately eliminated. Un- for this. China’s devaluation of the yuan der the agreement, Thailand would ex- in 1994 had the effect of diverting some port tropical fruits to China while winter foreign direct investment away from fruits from China would be eligible for Southeast Asia. The trend of ASEAN the zero-tariff deal. The expectations losing ground to China accelerated after of mutual benefit evaporated after a few the financial crisis of 1997. In 2000, for- months, however, with most Thai com- eign direct investment in ASEAN shrank mentaries admitting that Thailand got a to 10% of all foreign direct investment in bad deal. As one assessment put it, “de- developing Asia, from 30% in the mid- spite the limited scope of the Thailand- nineties. The decline continued in 2001 China early harvest agreement, it has had and 2002, with the United Nations World an appreciable impact in the sectors cov- Investment Report attributing the trend ered. The “appreciable impact” has been partly to “increased competition from to wipe out northern Thai producers of China.” Since the Japanese have been the garlic and red onions and to cripple the

24 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM sale of temperate fruit and vegetables Also key, noted Hu, was the Chinese gov- from the Royal projects.” Thai news- ernment’s plan to attracting investment papers pointed to officials in Southern “into the western region of China from China who refused to bring down tariffs ASEAN nations, weaving the western re- as stipulated in the agreement while the gion more thoroughly into the fabric of Thai government brought down the bar- regional and international trade.” riers to Chinese products. Resentment at the results of the ASEAN: a Net Beneficiary? China-Thai “early harvest” agreement Despite brave words from President Ar- among Thai fruit and vegetable growers royo and other ASEAN leaders, it was was, in fact, one of the factors that con- much less clear how ASEAN would ben- tributed to widespread disillusionment efit from the ASEAN-China FTA. It was with the Thaksin government’s broader highly doubtful that China would depart free trade agenda. Opposition to free from what Hu has characterized as Chi- trade was a prominent feature of the na’s “half open model,” which is marked popular mobilizations that culminated in by “open or free trade on the export side the ouster of that regime in mid-Septem- and protectionism on the import side.” ber by a military coup. Certainly, the benefits would not The Thai early harvest experience come in labor-intensive manufacturing, created consternation not just in Thai- where China enjoyed an unbeatable edge land but throughout Southeast Asia as due to the constant downward pressure well. It stoked fears of ASEAN becoming on wages exerted by migrants from a a dumping ground for China’s extremely seemingly inexhaustible rural work force competitive industrial and agricultural that makes an average of $285 a year. Cer- sectors, which could drive prices down as tainly not in high tech, since even the US a consequence of cheap urban labor that and Japan were scared of China’s remark- was continually replenished by dirt cheap able ability to move very quickly into high labor streaming from the countryside. tech industries even as it consolidates its People wondered if FTAs with China edge in labor-intensive production. Cer- would not simply legalize the dumping tainly not in labor services either, since of Chinese goods, a great deal of which China could produce engineers, nurses, were already being smuggled across their and domestic workers that would per- land borders with China or, in the case of form the same work but at lower wages the Philippines, across the South China than their ASEAN counterparts. For Sea. instance, China’s recent deployment of seafarers has threatened the Philippines’ The Chinese View premier position as a source of seamen For Chinese officials, the benefits to -Chi globally. na of an FTA with ASEAN were clear. Would agriculture in ASEAN be a The aim of the strategy, according to net beneficiary? But, as the early harvest Chinese economist Angang Hu, was to experience with Thailand showed, China more fully integrate China into the glob- was clearly super-competitive in a vast al economy as the “center of the world’s array of agricultural products: from tem- manufacturing industry.” A central part perate crops to semi-tropical produce, of the plan was to open up ASEAN mar- and in agricultural processing. Vietnam kets to Chinese manufactured products. and Thailand might be able to hold their In light of growing protectionist senti- own in rice production, Indonesia and ment in the US and European Union, Vietnam in coffee, and the Philippines in Southeast Asia, which absorbed only 8.2 coconut and coconut products, but there percent of China’s exports, was seen as might not be many more products to add an important market with tremendous to the list. potential to absorb more Chinese goods.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 25 What about raw materials? Yes, of take is downwards. At this juncture, an course, Indonesia and Malaysia had oil ASEAN-China FTA or, what is more that was in scarce supply in China, Ma- likely, separate Chinese FTAs with differ- laysia did have rubber and tin, and the ent ASEAN countries, can only lead to Philippines had palm oil and metals. de-industrialization and agricultural cri- But a second look made one wonder if sis in ASEAN. the relationship with China was not re- The relationship between ASEAN producing the old colonial division of and China is not a colonial relationship. labor, whereby low-value-added natural It cannot even be said to be an exploit- resources and agricultural products were ative one at this point. But unless con- shipped to the center while the South- siderations of equity are front and center east Asian economies absorbed high-val- in the negotiation of economic relation- ue added manufactures from Europe and ships between Beijing and its neighbors, the United States. the old structural patterns marking the relations between Southeast Asia and Eu- Hard Truths rope, the United States, and Japan could Thus, drastic imbalance would likely be easily be replicated.n the result of free trade agreements between the ASEAN countries and China. In the view of many, the problem lies largely with ASEAN; since despite the rhetoric of regional integration, ASEAN’s economies are still largely ten separate economies. The vision of creating an integrated market of 450 million consumers that was expressed by the original ASEAN plan for regional import substitution industrialization—one that would have been achieved via increasingly freer trade among member countries accompanied by high tariffs and quotas against third country products— was never implemented. The Southeast Asian nations had over 30 years to build an “ASEAN house,” and they had squan- dered the opportunity. Had ASEAN evolved along the lines envisioned by its founders, it would not have displayed the disarray with which its members con- fronted the rise of China. In short, ASEAN remains a very weak economic entity. Moving quickly to conclude a free trade agreement with China is likely to lead to the same consequences that the early harvest agreement between China and Thailand had lead to. Even if China agreed with many ASEAN exemptions from steep tariff reductions, ASEAN would be locked into a process where the only direction that barriers against super-competitive Chinese industrial and agricultural goods would

26 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Welcome China! China’s Rise and its Increasing Role in ASEAN Dorothy-grace guerrero ince joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China increased its involvement in Asia to enhance its global competitiveness. The Chinese government shifted its diplomatic strategy from Sthat of a developing country focused on issues of domestic concerns towards one that is taking regional and global leadership. This raised questions concerning the nature of China’s rise and its implications. To assuage suspicions of Chinese hegemonic ambitions, Chinese leaders often emphasize in global meetings and high-level visits to the region that China intends to strengthen mutual political trust and economic co-prosperity with its neighbors.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 27 The prediction by many analysts that mote peace in the region. China will be the world’s most power- As developing countries, ASEAN ful economy by 2050 was echoed by a members and China share a common in- warning from US Congress representa- terest to strengthen economic relations. tives about such overtake. The countries China initiated the establishment of an within the Association of Southeast Asian Expert Group within the ASEAN-China Nations (ASEAN) started to strengthen Joint Cooperation Committee to study their bilateral relationship with China in the various areas for trade and econom- recognition of China’s growing role as a ic cooperation between China and the source of investment. ASEAN leaders are ASEAN. increasingly recognizing the benefit of a growing Chinese demand for ASEAN The financial crisis that hit Asian products to the economic growth of its countries in 1997 brought the region to- members. gether to discuss common responses to the crisis during the ASEAN meeting in China is indeed rapidly becoming Kuala Lumpur that year. The evolution the predominant power in the Asia Pa- of the ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China, cific and is starting to challenge the role and South Korea) was a recommendation of both the United States and Japan in of the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), the region. The question is: will China’s formed to propose possible areas of co- increasing importance in the region operation for ASEAN Plus Three. The make ASEAN countries more prosper- EAVG suggested an East Asian Summit ous, more stable, and equitable? To ad- arrangement, which led to the creation dress this question, one must understand of a Study Group that prepared a report the current importance of China and the about its process. The group’s final report many challenges that come with China’s was presented to the 2002 ASEAN Plus new role in the region. Three Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambo- dia. ASEAN-China Relations ASEAN adopted the Asean Plus The ASEAN-China relations began in Three (APT) Framework during the 2004 1991 when China first expressed its inter- ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos. It est for closer cooperation with ASEAN will be recalled that the idea of an East during the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Asian formation was originally proposed Meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Then Chinese by former Malaysian Prime Minister Ma- Foreign Minister Qian Qichen attended hathir Mohamad as an East Asian Eco- the meeting as a guest of the Malaysian nomic Caucus in 1991. PM Mahathir’s Government. Relations were formalized proposal, which was then dubbed as the during the Bangkok Ministerial Meeting “Caucus without Caucasians”, failed due through an exchange of letters between mainly to the strong opposition by the then ASEAN Secretary General Dato US which was excluded in the all-Asian Ajit Singh and Qian Qichen in 1994. caucus. When current Malaysian Prime Qian was also China’s Vice Premier at Minister Abdullah Badawi resurrected that time. Two joint committees were set his predecessor’s idea of an East Asian up as a result: the Scientific and Techno- Community in the 2004 APT meeting in logical Cooperation and the Economic Vientiane, Chinese Premier Wen Jiaobao and Trade Cooperation. immediately supported it. This resulted China gained full dialogue status in the historic First East Asian Summit with ASEAN during the 29th Ministerial (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur in 2005. Meeting in Jakarta in 1996. All mechanisms at the working level were coordi- Two Giants in the Same nated through the ASEAN-China Joint Mountain Cooperation Committee. During this The First East Asian Summit (EAS) was meeting China also agreed to the estab- held despite tensions that surfaced in the lishment of the ASEAN-China Coop- latter part of its formation. The fact that eration Fund. The ASEAN-China Senior it was realized despite the stark differ- Officials Political Consultation was also ence between the original proposal and set up as a forum on political and security the one that was actually inaugurated issues. A Code of Conduct on the use of showed the resilience of the ASEAN Plus the South China Sea was also established Three. Indeed instead of just an ASEAN as a means to prevent conflict and pro- + 3 Summit, it became an ASEAN + 3 + 3 for the Summit also brought along India, Jonathan Watts, “China’s Powerhouse vision for 2050”, Australia, and New Zealand. The Guardian, February 10, 2006.

28 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM The Summit was China’s trial bal- US interests. China, on the other hand, loon for the realization of an East Asia wanted to ensure that India remains at Community, which was inspired by the the margins of an emerging East Asian case of the European Union. China saw Community. an opportunity to steer East Asian multi- In the end, because of conflicting lateralism, along the lines of the Shanghai objectives, the First EAS was not able Cooperation Organization, to serve Bei- to come up with a common declaration. jing’s strategic goals and further weaken APT deepening supporters led by China the US influence in East Asia. Beijing’s did not want a joint Summit Declaration diplomatic offensive was met by Japan’s referring to an East Asia Community that strategy of including India, Australia and includes non-East Asians. Those support- New Zealand. In effect the 2005 EAS was ing APT+3, on the other hand, did not a proxy battle between China and Japan. want a narrow ASEAN Plus Three focus. China’s proposal to divide the EAS ASEAN took the steer by making sure members into core (APT with China as that the hosting of future EAS remains dominant player) and secondary (India, with it, ensuring that ASEAN drives the Australia, New Zealand) categories in initiative towards an East Asian Commu- the eve of the EAS met strong opposi- nity. tion from Japan, which insisted that an The rift in the First EAS mimicked enlarged framework beyond the ASEAN the Sino-Japanese conflict. If their feud Plus Three is more viable for an East continues to be stoked, Japan and Chi- Asian Community. Japan’s inclusion of na may well be a case of the proverbial the three countries was aimed at coun- two giants sharing a mountain. The feud terbalancing Chinese influence in East is continually reignited by a number of Asia. China’s proposal of a further deep- sparks, including: Beijing’s blocking of ening of the ASEAN+3 structure, which Japan’s bid to have a permanent seat in China sees as the foundation on which an the UN Security Council; the competing eventual East Asian Community would claims to petroleum deposits and islands be based, was supported by South Korea, in the East China Sea; and China’s irrita- Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia. Japan’s tion at the visits of former Prime Minis- view of enlargement was supported by ter Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine where Indonesia. Japan’s war dead, fourteen of whom are Though not invited to the ASEAN considered war criminals by China and Plus Three, the US supported Japan’s pro- South Korea, are buried. Unless these posal. The US Secretary of State Condo- two giants settle their historical differ- leezza Rice made comments to the effect ences, it is doubtful whether a broader that the inclusion of such “democratic East Asian Community is possible. states” as Australia, New Zealand, and The European Community is said India in the East Asia Summit would be to have inspired the building of an East a most welcome initiative. India saw its Asian Community. Unlike the EC, how- inclusion in the EAS as an opportunity to ever, East Asians are glued together by promote its “Look East” policy, which is economic drive and constrained by very in line with the “congage China” strategy incompatible politics. Bridging the con- hatched by a US-India-Japan alliance. flicting politics between Japan and China The “congage” (contain plus engage) requires the settling of debts. Germany’s China strategy first came out in the late owning up to its accountability for past 1990s when the US realized that neither adventurisms may well be a key example prevention-containment nor engagement for Japan. Germany apologized to the with China serves the US interest. “Con- Jews for the crimes committed to them gagement” seeks to accomplish three by the Nazis. Despite the debate in Ger- things: preserve the hope inherent in the many about the limitations of the man- engagement policy of the US with China datory Holocaust Education, there is while deterring China from becoming commitment in the teaching of this part hostile, and hedge against the possibil- of history to German students. The is- ity that a strong China might challenge sues about Japanese history textbooks that downplay Japan’s treatment of Chi- Mohan Malik, “The East Asia Summit: More Discord na during World War II, on the contrary, Than Accord,” Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, remain unsettled. (February 2006). Noriko Hama, “How Not to Build an East Asian Community”, (December 9, 2005); available from: www. opendemocracy.net. Zalmay Khalilzad, “Congage China”, RAND Issue Malik, p.4. Papers 187, (1999).

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 29 ASEAN-China Free Trade Chinese and ASEAN economies comple- Agreements ment one another. But China’s expansion is not being welcomed by everyone. In The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agree- fact, reaction to China’s growing eco- ments (ACFTA) is a crucial component nomic presence is increasingly becoming of East Asian regional economic integra- negative, especially from small farmers tion. In 2002, Chinese and ASEAN Lead- and manufacturers in the region. Those ers signed the Framework Agreement on in electronics, furnitures, motorcycles, Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and fruits and vegetables increasingly and decided that an ASEAN-China FTA see China as a threat. In Thailand, farm- would be set up in 10 years. When real- ers are despairing that they could not sell ized, the ASEAN-China FTA will be the their own produce anymore because of largest FTA in Asia. It will also be the big- the low-priced Chinese vegetables that gest FTA between developing countries; invade the markets in rural towns and biggest in terms of population covered cities in the country. Malaysian and In- representing a market of 1.85 billion con- donesian workers are also complaining sumers and a combined gross domestic about jobs being lost to Chinese workers product of almost 2.5 trillion dollars. The due to closures of enterprises that are los- ACFTA will be fully implemented for ing orders to China. Increased Chinese the ASEAN-6 in 2010, and will integrate textile exports since 2005 to Cambodia Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia and Vietnam started to supplant local by 2015. producers in the two countries. On January 1, 2004 the two parties The strong drive and interest by the began implementing what China called ASEAN elite to deepen economic ties an “Early Harvest Plan” or EHP. This with China is not shared by farmers and plan grants a 3-year duty free entry for small businesses that fear the competi- ASEAN goods into the Chinese markets. tive advantage of China in churning out After this, China’s manufactured goods low-priced goods. Environmentalists and will have full free tariff access to South- interests groups also worry about the im- east Asian markets. This secures China’s pacts of Chinese demand on natural re- access to the region’s raw materials and sources in the region. at the same time removes barriers to China’s exports. The EHP cut tariffs on more than 500 products as part of the ef- Development Cooperation forts to facilitate the FTA. The ACFTA In recent years, the flow of Chinese de- will strengthen China’s clout by making velopment assistance to Southeast Asia, it the center of gravity in Asia and sur- especially to Laos, Burma, and Cambo- passing the influence of Japan and the dia, has been increasing. In the Greater US. The 8th China-ASEAN Summit on Mekong Sub-region in general, China November 29, 2004 in Vientiane result- is actively pursuing cooperation for the ed in a package of agreements on trade construction of power plants and regional in goods and dispute settlement. China grid interconnection. China also finances and ASEAN began to cut tariffs on more projects in Vietnam Kon Giang 2 and Bao than 7,000 products-- a move indicating Loc and the rest of Southeast Asia.10 In the start of the substantial tariff reduc- Malaysia, it supports an ongoing project tion phase between the two parties. for the rehabilitation of Tenompangi hy- Trade between China and ASEAN dropower plant in Sabah. Laos’ Nam Tha has been on the rise, growing at an an- and Tha Som and Myanmar’s Kun are nual average of 19% between 1995 and also benefiting from China’s external de- 2002. The 2002 trade record is US$ 54.8 velopment assistance. billion. This leapt to more than US$100 China is balancing its deepening billion for the first time in 2004 and fur- trade partnership with ASEAN with de- ther increased to US$130.37 billion in velopment support. China is now trying 2005. ASEAN trade with Japan and the to match Japan’s role in development as- US remained higher at $136 billion each sistance, which remains dominant. Clear- in 2004, but this is expected to be over- taken by ASEAN-China trade soon. Supara Janchitfah, “Lost in Statistics”, Bangkok Post, (August 13, 2006).. Supporters of ACFTA argue that Denis Gray, “Anxiety and Opportunities Mount as Chinese Colossus Exerts Influence on Southeast Asia”, Bian Shen, “New Opportunity for ASEAN-China Associated Press, (March 30, 2004). Trade”, Beijing Review, (May 1, 2003). 10 Please see details of these projects at the Rivers Li Guanghui, “China-Asean FTA both necessary and Watch East and Southeast Asia webpage, www.rwesa. beneficial,”China Daily, (November 6, 2006). org .

30 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM ly, the current swirl of Chinese money to sued through trade, confidence building development projects within ASEAN is measures, development cooperation, and intended to warm the relationship be- assistance. There is also a growing per- tween China and its neighbors. ception that China is not challenging the However, China is perceived as a US, rather, it is “filling-up” the space va- source of many environmental problems. cated by the US as it gets pre-occupied Its development of the Mekong River somewhere else. within its border negatively affects the With ASEAN, China has never been countries downstream, which include aggressive. It signed in October 2003 Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation,12 Chinese logging companies are also noto- which indicates China’s commitment to rious for violating Forestry Laws in Bur- respect the ideals long held by ASEAN : ma and Indonesia; and for contributing sovereignty and non-interference in each to severe deforestation in the two coun- other’s internal affairs, and settlement of tries. As China continues with its charm disputes in a peaceful manner. In terms offensive through government assistance of military cooperation, China initiated and regional investment, it must also own Security Policy Conferences in the Asian up to increasing responsibility. Regional Forum (ARF), which were held in Beijing in 2004 and in Vientiane in From Pax Americana to 2005. There are now Joint Military exer- Pax Asia Pacifica?: China- cises with Australia, the Philippines, and ASEAN Military Cooperation Thailand, training of ASEAN officers China’s diplomatic offensive in South- and provision of language trainings to east Asia has raised concerns about the military personnel from ASEAN coun- implications of China’s rise on the bal- tries. All this is done to show that China ance of power in Asia Pacific. Those fear- identifies with the regional security ide- ing a China threat scenario see China’s als of ASEAN. increasing influence and political muscle China’s initiative on the Code of flexing as signals of its interest to attain Conduct that will come up with plans for regional hegemony. The US, for instance, joint development in the South China has reason to be threatened as China’s Sea also pacifies, at least for the time be- rise could disrupt its preeminent role in ing, ASEAN Member claimants of the Asia, including its ability to shape region- disputed territories. In the past, con- al politics to serve its interests. flicts between the Philippines, China and China skeptics argue that as Chi- Vietnam erupted over control of islands na’s economic power grows, it may seek in the South China Sea. In March 2005, to expand its political power because it state-owned oil companies from the wants to protect and affirm its interests. three countries signed a three-year agreement for joint exploration for oil and gas They fear that over time China might use 13 its growing military capability to control in the disputed area. politics in Asia in the same manner as the However, there remain security is- US. China, on the other hand, is continu- sues involving China that pose a challenge ally taking pains to ensure that its rise is to ASEAN and to Asia generally. The is- perceived as non-threatening. Chinese sue of Taiwan is key. China’s insistence officials always point out that China is on the One China Policy may not match expanding its political influence through the economic imperatives of ASEAN all the institutional approach; that is, by of the time. The Singaporean Deputy means of international cooperation. It Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (son has established itself as an Asian power of former leader Lee Kuan Yew) visit to and world power through increased in- Taiwan in July 2004 displeased Beijing tegration into the international commu- and caused the cancellation of the visit of nity. From an economic viewpoint, the Chinese Central Bank Governor Zhou benefits of China’s alliance with the US Xiaochuan to Singapore.14 still outweigh the possible gains from At this point, it will still take some challenging US political and military hegemony. 12 “China joins Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia”, People’s Daily, (October 9, 2003). China’s leaders call their vision 13 ASEAN, “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in “heping jueqi” or the peaceful rise of the South China Seas”, (November 4, 2002), available 11 China. This peaceful rise is being pur- online www.aseansec.org/13163htm. 14 Elizabeth Economy, “China’s Rise in Southeast Asia: 11 Yiwei Wang, “The Dimensions of China’s Peaceful Implications for Japan and the United States”, Japan Rise”, available online: http://www.atimes.com. Focus, (October 10, 2005).

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 31 more time to see whether China’s ges- of the big meeting, which was attended tures of non-interference, cooperative se- by 43 African heads of state. A stronger curity, and “filling-in” moves will indeed civil society participation in ASEAN af- eat at the role of the US in the region. fairs will most certainly not be champi- Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review oned by China. released in February 5, 2006 reaffirms Asian movements, NGOs, and cam- that the US will not allow the rise of a 15 paign groups are increasingly recognizing compet ing superpower. Indeed, the US the importance of engaging China. To do has taken steps to re-establish relation- so, it is important to understand China ships with ASEAN countries. However, better and know their counterpart/ like- the Bush administration’s blinkered focus minded organizations within the main- on military response to the challenge of land. It is crucial to engage China and terrorism increased anti-American senti- work with the increasing number of ments among Muslims in Asia. people and organizations there that are While China has yet to gain the working to make China more responsive status of an alternative to US leadership to social concerns. n in the region, ASEAN could always use China’s potential as a possible alternative in its balancing act with the US and Japan in various political, economic and security negotiations.

The Way Ahead… Will People Matter? ASEAN is the “mother of all regional formations” in Asia. It has gone through a long history, of challenges and rebirths. The presence of China in the evolving regional community and its role in the governance of the region’s economic, political and security relations have potential benefits to member countries. China’s leadership in combating drug trafficking in its border could contribute to the so- lution of transnational crimes. Its initiatives for deeper cooperation on health issues like the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and HIV/ AIDS will certainly give a big push to efforts toward addressing these problems. If successful, China’s efforts to solve its internal problems through its new social policies for the countryside may provide a good model for a redefined activist state’s role in economic governance. However, China’s growing influence does not necessarily ensure human security, deeper democracy, political transparency, protection of the environment, and human rights in the region. Despite growing sentiment of anti-Americanism in the region, the US is still considered by many as a more democratic country and a better supporter of human rights. The China-Africa Summit held in Beijing in November 2006 showed Chi- na’s very limited appreciation for the participation of civil society organizations in geo-political events. NGOs were not part

15 Japan Focus, (April 2006).

32 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Development and Plunder in the Mekong Region SHALMALI Guttal

The Mekong Region

he Mekong region encompasses the province of Yunnan in the Peoples’ Republic of China (China), Burma, Thailand, the Lao Peoples’ Democratic Republic (Laos), Cambodia, and Vietnam. TThe region derives its name from the Mekong river, which emerges from a source in Tibet, approximately 5500 meters above sea level, and flows 2161 km through China’s southern provinces of Qinghai and Yun- nan, and then flows another 2719 km through Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, where it finally joins the South China Sea.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 33 Except for China, all Mekong countries Mekong Delta in the lower Mekong. The are members of ASEAN. Thailand is Mekong freshwater system is the third one of the original ASEAN-5 countries. most diverse in the world and home to Burma (Myanmar) is the newest entrant. at least 1200 species of fish, the Irrawad- China, however, has started to cement dy Dolphin, Giant Catfish, and Siamese economic ties with ASEAN through a Crocodile. free trade agreement and an “Early Har- More than 250 million people vest Program”. The Mekong region is inhabit the region, of which at least 80 possibly one of the wealthiest regions million live in the basin itself. The region within the ASEAN grouping in terms of is brought alive by over 70 distinct eth- environmental resources and bio-diver- nic and linguistic groups, who are often sity. found in varying proportions across the The Mekong river is the world’s 12th countries of the region. About eighty longest river in the world (about 4,200 km percent of the population in the region long) and 10th largest in terms of annual is dependent on small holder agricul- water yield (about 475,000 million cubic ture and artisanal fisheries as the main meters) with a massive drainage area of sources of livelihood. More than half of approximately 795, 000 square km across the protein intake of the region’s people six countries. It is one of the most sea- comes from fish, and fish is an important sonal rivers in the world as measured by source of income and livelihoods for lo- the difference between maximum and cal communities and commercial fishers minimum monthly flows. From its ori- alike. For most rural communities—up- gins in the snow-fed plateau of Tibet, the land and lowland alike—forests, wood- river passes through and shapes a wide lands and plains serve as crucial sources range of topographies and geographies, of food, medicinal plants, raw materials including the gorges of the Upper Me- for housing and occupational tools, and kong in China, the uplands of Burma and forest products for local trade. Laos, the flood plains of Cambodia and The region is also home to an ex- the nine-tailed dragon of the Mekong traordinary variety of agricultural prac- Delta in South Vietnam. tices and land, forest and water stew- The Mekong region is a region ardship methods, many of which have of immense environmental, social, cul- evolved from age-old traditional practice tural, biological and economic wealth, and local knowledge. These include up- and diversity. From water, timber, flora land swidden fields, wet rice cultivation, and fauna, to gemstones and minerals, river-bank gardens and horticulture. Ru- the natural wealth of the region provides ral communities tend to meet their food a strong base for diverse domestic and and income needs through rice cultiva- local economies. Although the Mekong tion, horticulture, hunting, fishing, and region extends well beyond the river ba- foraging. sin, the Mekong River drains much of The region has a varied politi- the region, especially downstream from cal history. Four of the region’s coun- the Golden Triangle. Changes in the Me- tries—China, Laos Cambodia and Viet- kong River or its tributaries can effect nam—are moving from centrally planned significant changes in the entire region’s to market based economies. Thailand is environment and economy. The high rise a constitutional monarchy with an elabo- and falls of water flows in the Mekong rate market economy. Burma is rule by river and its tributaries between wet and a military junta. In a span of just over dry seasons support numerous lake, river- sixty years, countries in the region have ine, swamp, wetland and backwater eco- variously moved through numerous po- systems that are rich in biodiversity such litical-economic formations—colonies, as Cambodia’s Tonle Sap lake (also called monarchies, military dictatorships and the Great Lake) and South Vietnam’s vast

34 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM communist republics—as they estab- of natural resources and environmental lished their current identity as modern wealth, they surpass their larger neigh- nation states. bors, who have aggressively depleted and degraded their natural reserves through The Mekong region has been ill-considered and poorly planned devel- marked by political conflicts for -hun opment strategies. Thailand is the most dreds of years, many among neighbors prosperous in terms of income and con- from within the region. Some of the sumption, and has been the hub for much most visible imprints on the region have of the post-cold war economic activity in come from the colonial aggressions of the the region. China, Thailand, and to a sig- nineteenth and twentieth centuries from nificant extent, Vietnam have made im- Britain, France, Imperial Japan, China, portant investments in health, education, and most recently, the United States basic and financial services, science and (US). During the 1960s and 1970s, much technology, and labor-force development. of the lower Mekong was consumed by Burma, Laos, and Cambodia, however, war, whose human, social, economic, and continue to have poor social indicators environmental costs have yet to be fully with little national public investments in mapped and acknowledged. The cold war key social sectors. provided the US and its allies with the impetus for full-blown war (in Vietnam); Development in the Mekong region the heaviest bombing recorded in history is increasingly market led. Development (in Laos); and political manipulation with models across five Mekong countries tragic consequences (in Cambodia). Chi- (Burma not included) prioritize rapid na and Thailand, while quick to protect economic growth, integration with re- their own lands from becoming theatres gional and global markets, and increasing of war, colluded with external aggressors the role and share of the private sector at various times. in the domestic economy. Private sector involvement is particularly sought in sec- Now it is peacetime and the regions’ tors such as physical and social infrastruc- peoples are exhorted to look towards the ture, tourism, finance, energy, power, and future rather than at the past. But collec- agriculture. National development plans tive memory is more difficult to rewrite are augmented by regional economic co- than history books. Despite a newfound operation frameworks promoted by the spirit of inter-governmental cooperation Asian Development Bank (ADB), the in the Mekong region, old suspicions World Bank, The International Financial and prejudices linger. Former occupy- Corporation (IFC), northern bilateral doing powers too seem unable to give up nors, and private venture capital funds. their spheres of influence. What they At the heart of all development plans, na- are no longer able to do with colonial ad- tional and regional, is the exploitation of ministration, artillery and bombs, they the region’s immense environmental and attempt to do through economic policy natural wealth, water resources, and agri- and development assistance. cultural potential. The ADB has summed up the prevailing vision of development Development Trends as follows: in the Mekong Region

The countries of the Mekong region are “The economic potential of the riv- not on the same economic footing. Bur- er and that of the land and peoples ma, Laos, and Cambodia are categorized its passage defines is huge, although as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) until now it has been largely unde- and are the smallest economies in GDP/ veloped…. Water from the Mekong per capita income terms. Along with Viet- River supports agriculture, and its nam, they are less economically powerful fish yields are a source of both pro- than China and Thailand. But in terms tein and income. It can also be used

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 35 to generate electricity and as trans- into the region to stake their claims to port corridors. Forests in the Mekong the region’s relatively untapped water re- region protect hydro-power projects sources. Quick on their heels have been and agriculture from siltation and the timber, pulp and paper industries, fol- erosion, contribute to tourism poten- lowed by tourism and mining companies. tial, and provide subsistence to rural The region’s water ways, forests, wet- communities…” lands, river-banks and agricultural lands are seriously threatened by dams, com- According to the ADB—and the mercial mono-crop agriculture, planta- World Bank—the Mekong region has the tions, tourism, mining and road projects. natural resources, a growing and train- Land-grabbing by local/national elites able labor force, abundance of land and (including powerful government officials) strategic location for it to fast become an is rife; hundreds of thousands of people economic growth area. What it lacks is across the region are being ousted from capital, technology, know-how and politi- traditional occupations and territories. cal will among the Mekong countries to But all this seems to be of little interest effect their transformation from subsis- to the region’s governments, develop- tence to hypermarket economies. This ment policy advisors, bankers and donors. lack is now quickly being made up for by Majority of the region’s peoples are sys- a plethora of development, investment, tematically excluded from development and “capacity building” projects, with nu- planning; have little hope of legal redress merous development professionals and when their lands, rivers and forests are “experts” ready to advice governments stolen; and are routinely intimidated by on how to transform their natural wealth state and non-state actors if they dare ex- into GDP growth figures and bank- ac press dissent against the prevailing devel- counts. opment wisdom of the day. Although many development projects in the smaller Mekong countries do STAKING CLAIMS emphasize social sectors such as health, education, water supply, and sanitation, “With vision and capacity, Swedish busi- “development” in the Mekong seems to ness has an excellent opportunity to play mostly imply hydroelectric dams, massive an important part in supplementing irrigation and electricity-transmission Swedish development cooperation in one systems, logging of the region’s ancient of the world’s most dynamic regions, while forests, extractive industry, the con- generating profits at the same time. This struction of roads, highways and ports, means more than simply selling goods and tourism, massive irrigation and electric- services paid for by Swedish aid; it is a ity-transmission systems, industrial tree question of whether business and aid can plantations, commercial, chemical- in- work together to contribute to develop- tensive and mono-crop agriculture, and ment in line with Sweden’s Global Devel- aquaculture of exotic (non-native) fish opment Policy.” species. -- Johan Brisman, Consultant at SIDA’s The Mekong river basin has long Asia Department been coveted by the dam industry. Since the onset of economic liberalization in Development financing in Mekong coun- the 1980s, dam builders-- backed by In- tries comes from multilateral and bi- ternational Financial Institutions (IFIs), lateral sources. China, Laos, Cambodia UN agencies and donors—have flocked and Vietnam are under World Bank-In- A Wealth of Opportunity, Development Challenges in the Mekong Region (Asian Development Bank, 2000). “Open door to investments in the Mekong region” Dave Hubbel, “Development in the Mekong Region”, (In-depth information 28 Mar 2006), available online available online: http://www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/ http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=1328&a=23299&lan no_30/02.html. guage=en_US.

36 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) loan Sub-region Economic Cooperation Pro- regimes, which mandate privatization, gram (GMS), and the more recent Ayeyy- liberalization and market-friendly regu- awadi-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic lation as conditions for credits. These Strategy (ACMECS) framework. With countries are also heavy borrowers from the exception of Laos and Burma, all the the ADB, which prioritizes the establish- Mekong countries are members of the ment of free market conditions in all loans World Trade Organization (WTO). Viet- and technical assistance grants. Bilateral nam signed a bilateral trade agreement donors to the Mekong countries include (BTA) with the US a few years ago; Thai- Japan, China, Canada, Ireland, the Neth- land is currently negotiating BTAs with erlands, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Fin- the US and Australia respectively; and land, Australia, the US, Britain, South Cambodia has entered into a Trade In- Korea, Switzerland, and Thailand. vestment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the US. In 1997, the World Bank’s IFC set up the Mekong Private Sector Development The most sustained and high pro- Facility (MPDF). The MPDF operates in file impetus for market led development Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam and aims in the region has come from the ADB to reduce poverty through sustainable through the GMS. Initiated in 1992, the private sector development. Support for GMS is an ambitious master plan to cre- the MPDF comes from the ADB and the ate a “frontier” of rapid economic growth governments of Australia, Canada, Fin- through regional economic cooperation. land, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, the The GMS aims to transform the rich Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzer- human and natural endowments of the land, and the United Kingdom. Mekong region into a region-wide free trade and investment area, fueled and led In 2002, with support from the by private sector growth. Majority of the MPDF, the Mekong Enterprise Fund capital investment in the GMS has been (MEF) was launched as the first venture in the areas of transportation infrastruc- capital fund to make equity investments ture (road, railways, air and waterways), in small and medium sized private busi- power/electricity, tourism, and trade and nesses in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. investment facilitation. Since 1992, more The $16 million Fund aims to provide in- than 100 projects in transportation, en- vestment capital and technical support to ergy, telecommunications, trade and in- private companies founded and managed vestment, tourism, environment, human by private entrepreneurs, with a focus on resources, and agriculture have been export industries and local service pro- launched through the GMS, although in- viders. MEF investors include the ADB, vestment capital for most of these proj- the Nordic Development Fund (NDF), ects is still to be secured. GMS projects the Finnish Fund for Industrial Coopera- are developed almost entirely by ADB tion Ltd. (Finnfund), the State Secretar- staff and private consultants and firms. iat for Economic Affairs of Switzerland (SECO), and other private investors. The On July 4-5, 2005, the Heads of Investment Manager of the Fund is Me- States of the GMS countries met in Kun- kong Capital Ltd, and the Advisor to the ming at the second GMS Summit and Fund is MPDF. declared that, “the GMS is committed to creating a conducive and competitive Mekong region countries have environment for trade, investment, and signed on to a host of bilateral trade and private sector development. To strength- investment agreements, as well as to re- en market fundamentals, we will pro- gional cooperation agreements through mote financial efficiency, a sound policy, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast and institutional, legal and regulatory Asian Nations), the Greater Mekong framework; and undertake further facili- See IFC MPDF website for more information. tation and harmonization of trade and

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 37 investment regimes.” And further, “A movement, forestry and pharmaceutical well-built, seamless, multi-modal infra- industry working actively on forest issues structure is essential to the facilitation of and biological diversity?” trade, movement of people and the pro- Another important regional cooper- vision of basic services throughout the ation framework is the ACMECS, which whole region. We therefore commit our- brings together Burma, Laos, Thailand, selves to fully ‘connecting GMS’.” Cambodia, and Vietnam. Named after According to ADB Vice-President the three major river systems that run Liqun Jin, “The vast development po- through these countries, the ACMECS tential of the GMS makes it an attrac- aims to increase cooperation in five main tive trading partner, investment location areas: trade and investment facilitation; and tourist destination.” In a bid to woo agricultural and industrial cooperation; investors and leverage private capital for regional transport linkages; tourism; and, infrastructure projects in the region, the human resource development. ACMECS ADB has established a Mekong Devel- aims to transform the border areas of opment Forum. It serves as a rotating its five members into special economic platform to bring private companies, zones of high growth. With the fertile investors, donors and Mekong country lands and hydro-power potential that the governments to discuss future coopera- river basins offer, key areas of investment tion. In November 2005, the Forum was are agriculture and energy. held in India, in collaboration with the Regional agreements do not dimin- Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). ish the roles of old and new heavy-hitters According to the CII, trade and invest- in the Mekong development-investment ment opportunities in the transport, business. Over the past 15 odd years, energy, information technology, agribusi- China has started to play a leading role ness, and tourism sectors are of particu- in speeding up investments in the region lar interest to India. In March, 2006, independently and through the GMS and the Forum met in Singapore to discuss ASEAN + 3 frameworks. China is argu- the investment opportunities for Singa- ably becoming the most dominant driver porean companies in the Mekong sub- of trade and investment in the region, as region. In April, 2006, the Forum was well as one of the most sought after mar- organized in Stockholm and this time it kets for exports of the region’s raw mate- was Swedish investors who gathered with rials and processed products. China has the ADB, Swedish Governments, and signed numerous agreements with other Mekong region governments. In a news GMS member countries in areas such as brief to the Swedish International Devel- transportation, animal epidemics preven- opment Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Jo- tion, information technology, superhigh- han Brisman, Consultant at SIDA’s Asia way construction, power trade, tourism Department asked, “Might we get to see and environmental protection. Accord- Vattenfall and ABB invest in the energy ing to an official Chinese daily newspa- infrastructure of the region, Skanska and per, “Ever since the inception of the GMS Vägverket becoming involved in trans- Program, China has been both a benefi- port, and the Swedish environmental ciary of, and a contributor to it and has made large investments in infrastructure Available online http://www.adb.org/Media/Ar- construction within the region.”10 ticles/2005/7879_Greater_Mekong_Subregion_declara- tion/default.asp?RegistrationID=guest. Ibid. China is also pouring massive “Mekong Development Forum in Singapore to Explore amounts of money into transportation $15 Billion in Potential Investment” (ADB Media Release, March 3, 2006), available online http://www. “Open door to investments in the Mekong region” adb.org/Media/Articles/2006/9416-Singapore-Mekong- (In-depth information 28 Mar 2006), available online Development-Forum/default.asp. http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=1328&a=23299&lan Available online http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/hol- guage=en_US. nus/006200511061010.htm. 10 Hu Xuan, China Daily, July 7, 2005, p. 4

38 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM and energy facilities including hydro-pow- China’s growing influence in the er dams on the Lancang (as the Mekong Mekong region is also viewed with con- is called in China), Laos and Cambodia. cern by Japan, which has attempted to China has funded the “North-South Cor- maintain a large economic and political ridor,” a highway that links Kunming to presence in the region. As far back as Bangkok via Laos (scheduled to be fully the mid-1960s, Japan attempted to be a operational by 2007), and several other “bridge builder” among the newly formed smaller roadways in Laos and Cambo- ASEAN and the communist regimes of dia. It is the largest investor in Laos and Indochina. In 1993, Japanese Prime Min- the 3rd largest investor in Cambodia. For ister Kiichi Miyazawa proposed the cre- China, one of the most important trade ation of the “Forum for Comprehensive routes is the 4,425 km long Mekong River Development of Indochina,” which held itself and it has blasted rapids in the Up- its first ministerial-level meeting in- To per Mekong to make it navigable. On kyo in February 1995. Japan is the largest March 6, 2006, the Joint Coordination bilateral donor in Cambodia, Laos, Bur- Committee of Navigation on Lancang- ma, and Vietnam (CLMV). On its own, Mekong11 River met in Champassak, as well as in collaboration with the ADB, Laos, to discuss commercial navigation Japan has funded several regional infra- on the Lancang-Mekong as a way to structure projects. Most high-profile boost trade activities among the upper among these is the “East-West Corridor,” Mekong countries. A Lancang-Mekong a super highway—including a bridge over navigation channel is being developed the Mekong River—that links Muktahan through inter-governmental cooperation in northeastern Thailand, Savannakhet among China, Laos, Burma, Thailand and in southern Lao PDR and the port of Da Vietnam. It is estimated that a total of Nang in central Vietnam. Scheduled for US $ 36.11 million of capital assistance completion next year, the highway is ex- will be committed to Lancang-Mekong pected to be extended to Mawlamyine in navigation development and manage- southern Burma at a future date. A sec- ment by the ADB, governments of the ond “East-West Corridor” is also in the Netherlands, Sweden and Britain, and works to link Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and other international organizations.12 Ho Chi Minh City, scheduled for completion in 2006-2007. China’s growing influence is in direct competition with the region’s tradi- Capturing the Waters tional economic “hub” Thailand. With its well developed export capacity and long Some of the most serious threats to the standing relationship with the world’s environments, ecologies, economies and large capitalist powers, Thailand has livelihoods in the Mekong region come been the most voracious consumer of the from the frenzy of dam building on the region’s natural resources; it is also the Mekong and its tributaries. More than region’s favored destination for capital, 100 dams have been planned for the re- labor, goods, services, and tourism. Since gion, some already built and many still its recovery from the 1996-98 economic in the design and survey stages. While crisis, Thailand has aggressively promot- some dams are billed as multi-purpose, ed itself as a champion of Asian self-suf- majority are hydro-power dams aimed at ficiency with Thai businesses leading the meeting the ostensible power/electricity charge. Thai corporate interests in the needs of a rapidly growing region. region are largely focused on agriculture, electricity, and tourism. Hydro-power development in the Mekong is largely catalyzed and sup-

11 The Mekong River is known as the Lancang in China ported by the World Bank, ADB, the 12 Xiao Yu-hui, Kunming Daily, March 7, 2006; United Nations Development Program available online http://news.yninfo.com/yunnan/ (UNDP), export credit agencies (ECAs) jingji/2006/3/1141712581_18/.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 39 and bilateral donors including Norway, its Great Lake system are alarming. The Sweden, China, France, Japan, Thailand, Tonle Sap in Cambodia and the Mekong and Australia. The ADB estimates that Delta in South Vietnam, which encom- the Mekong Basin has a “theoretical” hy- pass some of the most fertile and rich dro-power generating potential of 58,000 rice growing and fisheries areas, will be MW and of this, about 37,000 MW of in- particularly endangered by dams on the stalled capacity is actually feasible. One Mekong. Fish migration, feeding and re- of the flagship projects of the ADB sup- production cycles in the Mekong River ported GMS is the Mekong Power Grid basin are likely to be disrupted, thus that aims to purchase electricity from hy- decreasing the productivity of Mekong dro-power projects in China, Burma and fisheries and affecting the food supply Laos and distribute it across the region of millions of people living in the basin. (mainly to Thailand) through a regional Impacts within Yunnan itself give cause power grid. for concern. The Yunnan Resettlement and Development Bureau estimates that Hydro-power projects in the Me- about 500,000 local people will be dis- kong are lucrative businesses for con- placed by Yunnan’s hydro-power develop- sulting and engineering companies from ment plans in the coming 15 years. The Europe, North America, Australia and province will have to move an average of Thailand, who are able to secure relative- 40,000 people every year to pave the way ly risk free contracts to survey and build for hydro-power projects—possibly the dams under Build-Own-Operate (BOT) largest known figure for dam displaced arrangements. Many companies have peoples anywhere in the world over the formed international consortia of public past 50 years.13 In addition to this is the and private sector companies to bid for massive flooding of agricultural lands, large hydro-power projects, and are able river bank farms, forests and fallows that to secure financing because of the guar- are crucial sources of livelihoods for the antees and subsidies provided by IFIs province’s rural communities. and ECAs. While Laos and Cambodia rely on IFI and donor support for hydro- The Central Highlands of Vietnam power development, China and Vietnam are fast turning into a hub of hydroelec- have been able to leverage capital for tric development. It is estimated that their dam building projects from private by 2010, the Central Highlands will have capital markets. an installed capacity of 5,000 MW (one- third of the current national electricity Upstream on the Lancang, China capacity) through more than 20 large and has started to develop a huge cascade of medium sized dams on the Sesan, Se Re hydro-power projects in Yunnan, which Pok, Ba, and Dong Nai rivers. The Yaly has already started to change the Me- and Sesan 3 hydro-power plants have al- kong’s seasonal ebbs and flows. Huaneng ready been in operation for some years Power International, China’s largest en- now. The plethora of hydro-power proj- ergy generator, has been given most of ects in Vietnam are justified by the gov- the hydro-power development rights on ernment as necessary for generating elec- the Mekong and Yangtze rivers. At least tricity to meet the country’s development eight dams are in the pipeline; the Man- needs and for providing employment for wan and Dachaoshan dams have already thousands of workers. However, there been built; and the Xiaowan dam is under is little acknowledgment by the govern- construction. The Xiaowan dam alone ment of the long term negative impacts of will be able to capture some 25 per cent these projects on downstream communi- of the Mekong’s total annual volume of ties (many in neighboring Cambodia), or water flowing downstream from Yunnan. on communities that have been forcibly The potential impacts of the Yunnan

dams on the natural flow of the Mekong 13 Chuncheng Wanbao, Kunming Evening Daily, May 23, River all the way down to Cambodia and 2006.

40 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM relocated to make way for the projects, or and grants. Contrary to IFI assertions, on the lands and forests that are flooded hydro-power development in Laos will by the dam reservoirs. increase rather than decrease its aid de- pendency. Laos is a haven for hydro-power projects partly because of its abundance Although the gains to Thailand and of rivers and appropriate topography for the dam building industry from Laos’ dam projects, but more so because the hydro-power projects are evident, it is Lao Government has willingly accepted far more difficult to estimate how Laos’- hydro-power as its only long term revenue -mostly rural—population will benefit option. Laos is estimated to have the po- from these projects. Rural electrifica- tential capacity to generate 18,000 MW tion is still a distant dream in the coun- and more than 50 dams are proposed to try; hydro-power generation is primarily be built in this small, largely rural and for export and the state simply does not environmentally rich country over the have the cash to put in place the required next 25 years. Almost every province of systems for distributing electricity across Laos is abundant with streams and riv- its vast (at many places mountainous and ers, many of which have already started remote) rural areas. On the other hand, to be dammed over the past two decades. thousands of families have been relo- Dams proposed and already built include cated without adequate compensation those on the Namngum, Namleuk, Nam- to alien environments to make way for kading, Namtheun, Seset, Senamnoi, dams. Communities living downstream Sekaman, and Sekong rivers. from dam projects have lost their seasonal river bank gardens and have reported Hydro-power development in Laos losses in fish species and numbers, as well is driven completely by IFIs, bilateral as losses of other local flora. Primary, as donors, and specialized consulting firms; well as abundant secondary growth for- at present, Thailand is more or less the ests have been indiscriminately logged sole market for Laos’ electricity. All rein and around dam sites, and fertile ag- cent and new projects are variations of ricultural lands and woodlands have been the BOT model. Consortia made up of flooded by dam reservoirs. The World public and private sector companies (in- Bank funded Nam Theun 2 dam in cen- cluding Electricite du France, Transfield, tral Laos will divert millions of cubic me- Snowy Mountains Engineering Corpo- ters of water from the Theun River into ration, John Holland Holdings Limited, the Se Bang Fai River, thus completely al- Tasmanian Hydroelectric Commission tering the natural flow of the Se Bang Fai Enterprises Corporation, and GMS have and potentially destroying the fisheries made hefty profits through consultancy and riverbank vegetable gardens of more services, procurement, and construction than 100,000 people living along the Xe contracts. Laos is considered a “high risk” Bang Fai and its tributaries. Widespread investment destination; private financing logging in and around the proposed dam for infrastructure projects is leveraged sites of the upper Sekaman and Sekong through an elaborate system of IFI bro- Rivers have resulted in loss of precious kered guarantees and counter-guarantees old growth forests. that ensure that investors recoup their money before the government. The The Lao Government, IFIs and do- people of Laos are left with infrastruc- nors justify dam projects as necessary for ture that they don’t have the funds for, “poverty reduction.” But there is little and equipment to maintain with, and evidence to back this claim. Field re- a mounting external debt. In order to ports indicate quite the opposite—dams keep the dam infrastructure running af- in Laos are severely impoverishing rural ter investors have recouped their profits communities as well the entire country and left, the Lao government will remain through mounting external debts and the bound to IFIs and donors for more loans loss of environmental wealth that cannot

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 41 be replaced. fully studied nor acknowledged by the dam industry, IFIs and governments. Al- Rivers know no boundaries. Togeth- though dam projects are promoted in the er, the Se Kong River in Laos and Cam- name of “regional development,” no at- bodia, the Se San River in Vietnam and tempts have been made by any of these Cambodia, and the Nam Theun River institutions to comprehensively assess in Laos contribute approximately 20 per the cumulative impacts of existing and cent of the Mekong’s annual flow volume proposed dams on the ecologies and live- and nurture some of the most biological- lihoods of the region’s peoples. ly diverse ecosystems in Southeast Asia. They are also home to thousands of com- Selling the Forests and munities many of whom are ethnic mi- Grabbing the Lands norities and indigenous peoples. Dams on any of these rivers in any country will One of the most crucial features of the affect the ecologies and lives of peoples Mekong region, its forests, are being rap- in another. More that 50,000 people liv- idly eroded as a result of dams, rampant ing along a 200 kilometer-stretch of the and indiscriminate logging, rapid expan- Se San River in northeast Cambodia have sion of industrial tree plantations, and experienced deaths by drowning, sudden land grabs by local/national elites and for- and abnormal flooding, and severe dam- eign companies. Forests in the Mekong age to their fisheries because of the Yali region are a mix of lowland and highland Falls dam located upstream on the Se San tropical, deciduous, semi-evergreen, ev- in Vietnam. ergreen, peat, and mangrove formations. Over the past two decades, about 50 per- As elsewhere, dams in the Mekong cent of this forest cover may well have region have far-reaching and long term vanished due to dams, logging, commer- negative impacts that can neither be re- cial agriculture, plantations, tourism and versed nor mitigated. Large scale logging; roads. flooding of forests; agricultural, foraging and grazing lands; loss of local diverse Forests are not only crucial reposi- flora and fauna; and, the destruction of tories of much of the region’ biological entire micro ecosystems in interrelated wealth and diversity, but equally impor- watersheds are habitual companions to tant, they are intrinsic parts of the lives, these dams. Thousands of families are cultures and economies of majority of resettled to alien, inhospitable environ- the region’s peoples. For rural communi- ments where they are expected to start ties, forests and woodlands are a source life anew without the resources, know- of medicinal herbs and plants, fuel-wood, ledge, and skills required to do so. Many housing materials such as wood, leaves are not able to survive and move on look- and grasses, small animals for food, and ing for more hospitable environments. a variety of products such as mushrooms, Fish, shrimp, and crabs are some of the bamboo and rattan shoots, honey, vines, most important sources of protein and resin, roots and wild vegetables for food income for nearly 65 million people living and income. Many communities — par- in the Lower Mekong Basin. Dams, navi- ticularly indigenous or animist communi- gation channels, rapid economic region- ties—have sacred, spirit forests that are alization and infrastructure development governed and shared through stringent are all contributing to unprecedented rules and practices. Many sacred forests changes in water resources and rural live- are sources of local rivers and streams and lihood opportunities.14 protecting the forest also means protecting the communities’ water sources. For- However, these impacts are neither ests are also important for local folklore, 14 Dr. Simon R Bush and Le Nguyet Minh, Fish Trade, education and knowledge; children learn Food and Income Security: An overview of the constraints and the value of plants, animals, poisons and barriers faced by small scale fishers, farmers and traders in the medicines by accompanying their parents Lower Mekong Basin, (Oxfam America, 2005).

42 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM to forests. In both upland and lowland ar- meter) and Cambodian timber companies eas, the demarcation between forest and have generated tens of millions of dollars agricultural lands is often blurred. Swid- from their operations. A forestry law was den cultivation is rotational and letting passed in 2002 that makes it illegal to cut the forest regenerate on fallows is impor- trees outside forest concession areas and tant to preserve the fertility of swidden in areas designated as national parks and fields. The system of rotating production wildlife sanctuaries. The Cambodian fields and fallows is common in lowland Government also placed a moratorium farming as well. It is common for farm- on granting further forestry concessions ers to say that fields that are not planted during this period. While these have on become forests. Vegetable gardens significantly reduced logging, the - mora and small fruit orchards are often planted torium does not cover economic land in forests and woodlands to provide hos- concessions which are owned by many pitable growing conditions. logging companies and on which logging continues, albeit on a much smaller scale Such multiple uses of forests among than before. local communities is not romantic, but a reality. Forests and the water systems Commercial logging has been go- they support—streams, rivers, lakes, and ing in Laos for more than 30 years now. wetlands—are crucial to ensure food and By the end of the 1980s, timber prod- livelihood security in a region where most ucts accounted for half of the country’s governments have more or less abandoned export earnings. Commercial logging in their obligations to citizens. However, Laos has been supported by the World this is not acknowledged by the region’s Bank, the ADB, UNDP, the Food and policy makers and development experts. Agriculture Organization (FAO), and bi- In the prevailing development imagina- lateral donors such as Sweden, Australia tion, forests are economic resources for and Finland. In 1990, Laos adopted the timber, non-timber forest products (NT- World Bank-UNDP-FAO initiated Trop- FPs) for commerce, and sources for new ical Forest Action Plan (TFAP), which pharmaceuticals. Already logged forests laid out a framework for land and forest are designated as ‘degraded forests’ and management, and recommended a log- handed over to companies for industrial ging rate of 280,000 cubic meters a year tree plantations. Forestry “experts” ac- and the establishment of industrial tree cept that some forests do need to be plantations.16 protected for maintaining important In the following years, commercial watersheds (and preserving hydro-power logging reached unprecedented scales potential), flora, and fauna. To achieve with clear cutting of high-value hard this, it is imperative that some forests be wood forests well beyond the permitted designated as protected and conservation limits. Private companies from neigh- areas, barring local communities from us- boring countries and Lao military owned ing these areas. Ironically, most of the companies (such as Bolisat Phattana Khet region’s forests have been destroyed as a Phudoi –BPKP— and DAFI) sparred result of modern forest governance sys- for the best cuts. By the mid-1990s, a tems and not by the use of forests by ru- worried Lao Government attempted to ral communities. ban all commercial logging in the hope In Cambodia, forestry officials and of curbing illegal logging. But both le- experts estimate that the country has gal and illegal logging continue with the lost about 2.6 million hectares of forest tacit assent of forestry and highly placed over the past twenty years15, much of it government officials, and much of the to logging companies. Cambodian hard logging revenues do not reach state cof- wood fetches a high price (US $ 120 per 16 “Making money from trees? Commercial tree planta- 15 Available online http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South- tions in Lao PDR,” Watershed, volume 9, no. 3 (March- east_Asia/DH30Ae01.html. June 2004).

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 43 fers. Although precise figures are hard engaging in logging and equally impor- to come by, it is possible that Laos has tant, they could use the roads and other already lost at least 40 percent of its total infrastructure developed by logging com- forest cover and most of its hard wood panies to transport arms and scale up the reserves. war against rebel groups.17 For the rebel armies, the main motivation was money; With the TFAP also came catego- they needed the logging revenues to pur- rization of forests as production, con- chase sophisticated arms and weaponry, servation, protection, regeneration and much of which was supplied by the Thai degraded forests. Although the Lao military. Government recognized that rural communities need forests to meet their food, Because of the risky nature of op- health, livelihood and spiritual needs, a erations—logging in war zones—logging key objective of forest categorizations companies speeded up their operations and management plans was to restrict and cut all the trees they could, big and the access of ‘unauthorized’ rural people small, mature or not. Between 1988 into the forests. Those who are consi- and 1992, Burma’s forest areas along the dered properly authorized are forestry Burma-Thai border were completely officials, logging and plantation compa- devastated by Thai logging; the devasta- nies, selected donors, and conservation tion extended 100 km deep into Burma. organizations. Often, forests that villages Because of international outcry against have used for decades for foraging and destruction of one of the world’s richest firewood are declared off bounds for vil- tropical forests, the Burmese Govern- lage residents. If village residents need ment canceled all logging concessions to cut a few trees to build or repair their between 1992 and 1995. But this did not homes, the village meeting house, or a lo- stop the logging. Logs that were already cal wat (Buddhist temple), they must get cut and stored at border areas were still permission from district authorities, or it claimed by Thai companies. Also, the is likely they will be penalized. But com- Burmese Government has no authority panies that extract more than the permit- over the rebel armies who continue the ted amount of timber, or log protected timber trade with Thai companies.18 areas are rarely chastised. Such contra- Organized commercial logging is an dictions have led to increasing tensions old story in Thailand and was possibly first between rural communities (especially established by the British logging indus- those who are already impoverished) and try, which expanded its operations from forestry officials. Burma into northern Thailand. While In Burma, abundant teak and hard- the early logging era focused on teak, wood forests along the Burma-Thailand after World War II, commercial logging border have sustained more damage in continued with non teak trees and was the past 25 years because of logging by Thailand’s predominant form of forest Thai companies than during 100 years of exploitation until it was banned in 1989. colonial timber extraction. In the mid- The ban, however, did not end timber 1980s, about 18 Thai firms were granted extraction from natural forests.19 Thai- permission by both the ruling Military land’s wood industry simply switched its junta in Burma, as well as some rebel supply chain to illegal logging inside the groups to log forests in Burmese territory along the Burma-Thai border from 17 Veerawat Dheeraprasart, “Until No Trees Remain: Il- Chiang Rai in the north to Ranong in the legal logging in the Salween Forest,” in After the Logging Ban, Politics of Forest Management in Thailand (Thailand: South. For the military junta, the main Foundation for Ecological Recovery, 2005). motivations for granting logging conces- 18 Ibid. sions were that they could get money 19 Dr. Pinkeaw Luangaramsri, “The Politics of Nature Conservation in Thailand,” in After the Logging Ban, Poli- from timber extraction (through royal- tics of Forest Management in Thailand (Thailand: Founda- ties) in rebel territories without actually tion for Ecological Recovery, 2005).

44 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM country and legal and illegal imports from also a favored consultancy firm for many Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. The wood IFIs, ECAs and donors. industry also found a new supply source: Although the specifics vary accord- commercial tree plantations. ing to country, the overall story of planta- Industrial tree plantations in the tions in the Mekong region is a story of Mekong region are a scourge as wide- forest destruction, land grabs and impov- spread and deadly as large dams. Planta- erishment of peoples and environments. tions are an old phenomena in the region Fast wood plantations are generally ac- dating from French and British colonial companied by processing plants close at eras when colonial companies established hand. Paper and pulp mills in the region large hard wood and rubber plantations. have poisoned local water systems and In the past twenty odd years, however, ev- soils with chemicals and wood particles. ery country in the region has handed tens Plantations and their processing plants of thousands to hundreds of thousands of consume huge amounts of energy and wa- hectares of agricultural and forest lands ter which are denied to local communi- over to private companies for commercial ties living in and around the plantations. and industrial tree plantations. These in- Eucalyptus plantations create aridity and clude eucalyptus, pine, and acacia plan- rapidly deplete the soil of moisture and tations for the pulp and paper industry, nutrients. Plantations are mono-cultures teak and other hard wood for the timber and repeated planting of the same crop/ industry, and commercial crops such as tree in close cycles requires intensive use rubber, cassava, sugar cane, palm oil and of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and cashew-nuts. The tree/crop species that herbicides, which leach into the soil and are planted are generally fast growing in ground water and reduce the fertility of order to maintain a steady supply of raw surrounding areas. In some cases (e.g., materials for industry, and all of them are the Green Sea concession in Northeast- alien to the region. A new category of ern Cambodia and Lao World Coconut plantations that has recently emerged is concession in central Laos) the primary “carbon sink” plantations through which, objective is logging of tropical forests. countries can purchase “carbon credits” Plantations are displacing people by financing tree plantations. from their villages, fields, forests, and Plantations have been heavily pro- traditional occupations. In many cases moted by donors, IFIs, ECAs and private (as in Cambodia, Vietnam and Yunnan), forestry consulting firms as a develop- village residents are actually forced to ment strategy to maximize the econom- relocate to new areas to make way for ic use of “degraded” forests and unused the plantations. In other areas, village land, prevent soil erosion and flooding, residents can remain in their villages increase reforestation and alleviate pov- but not use the surrounding forests and erty. One of the most notorious forestry woodlands for foraging and cultivation consulting firms is Jaako Poyry from Fin- since these are now under the control of land. Poyry promotes a purely industrial plantation companies. A common occur- approach to forests based on a northern rence in every country is encroachment model of sparse population and low bio- by plantation companies on village, for- diversity, which is completely opposite to est and public lands, well beyond the area the dense populations and high bio-diver- permitted in concession contracts. Vil- sity of tropical forest areas.20 Poyry is the lagers in Southern Laos report that Viet- darling of the pulp and paper industry (it namese plantation companies have put has carried out over 400 projects for the fences around their grazing lands and are industry over the past 40 odd years). It is claiming them as part of the plantation areas. Although this is in violation of ver- 20 Tove Selin, “Jaakko Poyry and the Fin(n)ished Forests of the Mekong Region,” Watershed, volume 9, no. 3 bal and written agreements, government (March-June 2004). authorities have not taken action against

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 45 the companies. processing industry. The long-term objective is to develop an efficient In Cambodia, a handful of power- and equitable sub-sector to acceler- ful companies with high political con- ate the pace of economic develop- nections have secured “economic land ment, reduce poverty, and improve concessions” across the country for rub- the environment. ”21 ber, eucalyptus, pine, acacia, teak, palm oil, sugar cane, and cassava. Many of Alarmingly, the above loan was ap- these concession areas are not actually proved barely months after the ADB’s being used for the agreed purposes, for Operations Evaluation Department example, the Pheapimex area in central (OED) found that the precursor to this Cambodia. The common wisdom in the project--which also promoted eucalyptus country is that these lands have been plantations among family farmers--was grabbed by companies for speculation completely unsuccessful and ridden with and tourism development and that they fraud and corruption. From 1993-2003, not be returned to the communities. In the ADB financed a US $ 11.2 million loan northeastern Cambodia, land grabbing project to promote eucalyptus tree plan- by powerful local elites and private com- tations among small and medium scale panies has become so commonplace that farmers. In its evaluation of the project, local communities often remark that the the OED concluded that because of the only reason the government supports project, people were driven further into road building projects is so that their poverty by having to repay loans for failed lands can be stolen more easily. plantations, and that the ADB’s perfor- mance was completely unsatisfactory.22 One of the most irresponsible sup- As in the dam building industry, porters of industrial tree plantations is plantation companies get subsidies, pref- the ADB. In Laos, the ADB and JICA erential financing and other supports (Japanese official aid) are promoting from the institutions such as the ADB, “small holder” plantations of 2 – 3 hect- World Bank, UNDP, and FAO, and from ares whereby farmers are contracted to northern donors such as Canada, Britain, grow trees under private companies sub- Japan, Australia, Finland, and Sweden. sidized by the ADB and JICA. However, Each Mekong country is also supporting Lao farmers are not mono-culture pro- its own private companies to corner land ducers and plantation production sys- concessions for plantations. Although tems are completely alien to their defi- many plantation companies operating in nition of agriculture. On April 6, 2006, the region are Asian, their know-how and the ADB approved a Forest Plantations equipment comes from northern consul- Development Project for Laos. With a tancy and engineering firms, who in turn budget of US $ 15.35 million, the project are promoted by northern donors and aims to establish 9,500 hectares of small IFIs.23 livelihood plantations (SLPs) and a Lao To date plantation promoters have Plantation Authority. The loan document not provided any empirical evidence that states that: plantations have provided employment, “The goal of the Project is to sup- 21 port the establishment of financially ADB Loan Agreement (Special Operations, For- est Plantations Development Project) between Lao viable SLPs and MEPs and to facili- Peoples’ Democratic Republic and the Asian Develop- tate industrial plantation development Bank. Loan Number 2209-LAO(SF). 22 ment and the associated process- Chris Lang and Bruce Shoemaker, “Creating Poverty in Laos, the Asian Development Bank and Industrial ing industry, to create a substantial Tree Plantations,” in World Rainforest Movement (April plantation resource base. The Proj- 2006). 23 For a comprehensive analysis of industrial tree planta- ect will catalyze large-scale foreign tions in the Mekong region, see Chris Lang “The Pulp direct investment in forest planta- Invasion, the International Pulp and Paper Industry tions to develop an efficient wood in the Mekong Region,” in World Rainforest Movement (December 2002).

46 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM regenerated forests or generated revenues ers into the regional and global econo- that governments have used for national my. While contract arrangements may development and poverty reduction. provide some income to farmers in the Grabbing land and replacing diverse, short term, contract terms do not gener- natural forests with mono-culture plan- ally favor the producers. In Cambodia, tations is thus relatively cost-less for the small hold farmers are facing acute finan- companies. But it has proved extremely cial distress because of contract farming expensive for the rural communities that related debts. Thailand’s experience over depend on these forests and lands for the past thirty years of leaving its small their very survival. hold farmers vulnerable to market forces with no protection is a cautionary tale. The High Cost of Real farm income in Thailand has not Development increased since 1977, whilst spending on Every country in the Mekong region has agricultural inputs has increased over the special government departments devot- same period. Small farmers are increased to wooing and negotiating contracts ingly indebted and many farming families with private and public investors, donors have lost their lands due to heavy debts and creditors. But no such facility exists that they are unable to service. Out of to systematically document the loss of 5.7 million farming families, 4.7 million waters, forests, fish, bio-diversity, lands, do not have enough land to sustain them- livelihoods, and incomes, or to record selves. In Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, testimonies of local communities about distress migration from rural to urban ar- how their lives and environments have eas is rapidly increasing. Those who were changed as a result of the largely unregu- once able to live off their lands, forests lated investment pouring into the region. and rivers are now trying to survive as Whatever documentation exists on these workers in the construction, services and issues has been carried out by national hospitality industries. and international civil society organiza- Where is the wealth of the Me- tions, independent researchers and aca- kong region going? Certainly not to the demics, often under insecure political majority of the region’s peoples. Instead, conditions. the region is being plundered to feed the There are several issues that this pockets and bank accounts of govern- paper does not cover, for example the ment officials, national elites, and do- impacts of roads, mining, tourism and mestic and foreign private companies. agribusiness activities on the region’s re- Mekong country governments, IFIs, sources and livelihoods. Tourism, for ex- bilateral donors and regional groupings ample, is an extremely complex phenom- like ASEAN are pushing development enon whose effects extend to changes in projects in which the Mekong region has social and cultural organization, labor and little meaning beyond being a source of trafficking of humans, flora and2 fauna. 4 raw materials and cheap labor to feed Roads, although necessary for connect- the needs of wealthy consumers and de- ing national communities, are also the structive industries. Despite their prattle means of carrying the region’s precious about human rights, good governance, resources to markets over which local and the rule of law, national and interna- people have no control. tional policy makers are blind and deaf to the realities and voices of the communi- Contract farming is being ag- ties whose rights to their environments gressively promoted in every Mekong and livelihoods are being trampled on in country to “integrate” small hold farm- the name of development.n

24 For excellent analyses on tourism, see New Frontiers, “Briefing on Tourism, Development and Environment Issues in the Mekong Sub region”; available online: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/nf7.htm.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 47 Figure 1: A map of the Mekong Region

48 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Raising a different flag Struggles for Self-Determination in Southeast Asia HERBERT DOCENA he Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has chosen the slogan, “One Caring and Sharing Community” for its 12th summit in Cebu this December. While such a slogan re- Tmains a promise, it is true that at the very least, no open fighting has broken out among the nation-states that comprise this regional grouping. Since the 1960s , when Thailand and the Philippines sent military contingents to Vietnam under the command of the United States and, most recently, in 1978 when Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia, no Southeast Asian country is known to have sent ground troops to another country in Southeast Asia, thereby laying the ground for “sharing and caring” in the region.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 49 This picture of calm, however, hides the discussed below. ASEAN governments bloodletting within. Despite the seeming have attempted to sweep the issues raised harmony among Association of South- by these self-determination struggles un- east Asian Nation (ASEAN) members, der the rug in the name of “mutual non- certain countries within the ten-nation interference” and, in the past few years, grouping are still wracked by long-run- the “war on terror” has not only served ning conflicts that remain unresolved. to detract from the fundamental causes This article looks in particular at the behind the conflicts; it has also promot- Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and ed military solutions to problems that Burma where, for decades now, central- undoubtedly require more complex solu- izing states – driven by domestic and for- tions. eign interests – have used various instruments of power against groups of people Continuing colonialisms struggling for self-determination within The struggles for self-determination in their territories. In each of these cases, Southeast Asia are inextricably bound to the state’s attempts to subjugate minor- the history of colonialism as well as to ity groups politically, economically, and the continuing attempts by foreign and culturally and to control or gain access to indigenous powers to secure their inter- resources have been met with organized ests in the region today. As in other parts – at times wavering, at other times esca- of the world, the boundaries of the states lating – resistance. that comprise the ASEAN today were to Because of this decades-long dy- a large extent drawn by the Western co- namic, the political and territorial integ- lonial powers that once directly ruled ter- rity of some of the states that comprise ritories in the region and the indigenous ASEAN are still being actively contest- ruling classes and groups that replaced ed. In the Philippines, despite decades them after gaining formal independence. of war, attempts to secure lasting peace The decision as to which areas were to be through negotiated settlements with included in the emerging states, however, the Moros in Mindanao have all but fal- often did not have the expressed demo- tered. In southern Thailand, separatist cratic consent of the people living in sentiments among the Muslim Malays them. One day, they would wake up in a – earlier thought to have been doused colony; the following day, they would find – are believed to be on the resurgence. In that they had become citizens of a state Burma, various ethnic-based movements not of their own choosing. have been struggling for greater autono- Prior to the arrival of the Span- my or independence for nearly fifty years. ish colonizers starting in the early 16th Signed in August 2005, the ink on the century, what is now known as the Phil- peace agreement between Jakarta and ippines was but a collection of smaller the Gerekan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh settlements of people with different Movement) is still fresh and it is perhaps, cultures and languages and uneven lev- given the record of past failures, too early els of political organization. It was only too tell whether peace will hold. Mean- through Spain’s attempts to centralize while, among the Melanesian people of its rule throughout the archipelago and West Papua, called Irian Jaya by Indo- the eventual struggle for independence nesia, the pro-independence movement by the indigenous population that the remains popular and is gaining more in- idea of a nation-state to be eventually ternational attention. called the Philippines emerged. But what Though there are important differ-

ences and complications, the similarities This piece is the beginning of a wider research project among these cases are striking, as will be on the issue. It is an initial and not an exhaustive attempt to survey and flag some of the similarities among the self-determination struggles in order to guide further research.

50 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM constituted this idea was contested even 1942 when the Japanese invaded. In 1949, then. The Muslim Moros living in the in negotiations that the Acehnese were southern areas considered themselves of not privy to, the Dutch “gave up” some- a distinct identity and culture from the thing they did not even own by including rest of the Christianized population gov- Aceh among the territories handed over erned by the Spanish. Despite not having to the newly independent Indonesian totally established political control over state. the Moro-dominated areas, however, the Unlike Aceh, however, the Dutch Spanish proceeded to cede these areas refused to give up West Papua to Indone- to the United States in 1898. The British sia. In an attempt to hold on to a piece of would also relinquish an area claimed by land in Asia, they instead promised a sep- a Moro sultanate to their colony of Ma- arate and independent state to the West laya. Papuans, a non-Muslim people who have After the United States took over more in common culturally with their from the Spanish, Moro leaders wrote to fellow Melanesians from Papua and its the US government to reiterate their de- neighboring islands than with the Malays mand that they not be made part of the who dominate the rest of Indonesia. This Philippines if it was given independence. incurred the ire of Indonesian President Due largely to the efforts of US and do- Soekarno and other nationalists who in- mestic elites who had economic interests sisted that West Papua be made part of in securing control over the lands and Indonesia, threatening to invade it if the their investments in the south – as well Dutch refused. as to the nationalists determined not to Eager to appease Soekarno, partly lose territory – no effort was made to for fear that he would move closer to the find out whether the Moros and the in- Soviets, the United States quickly inter- digenous people really wanted to become vened to broker a compromise between “Filipinos.” the Indonesians and the Dutch. But the The story of the Moros is analogous “stone-age Papuans,” as Walt Rostow, with the story of the Acehnese. Though who was then presidential adviser to John the colonial powers never established full F. Kennedy, called them, were not at control over the once independent Aceh- the table. Pressured by the US, the Dutch nese kingdom because of the strong resis- agreed to hand over West Papua to the In- tance by the locals, they passed it around donesians but on the condition that a ref- as though they had possessed it. In 1824, erendum be conducted to give the West the British handed over all of Sumatra is- Papuans a chance to vote for or against land to the Dutch even if they had held independence. Out of a population of no actual power over Aceh on its western 800,000, the Indonesian military pro- flank. In 1873, the Dutch attempted to ceeded to hand-pick 1,022 tribal leaders bring the area under control by invading who were told that they would be guilty it. The resistance was so fierce and unre- of treason and would thereby have to be lenting that between 50,000 to 100,000 shot if they voted to break from Indone- Acehnese were killed in the war that last- sia. In the end, all of them voted against ed for over thirty years. Even then, the separation. The United Nations supervi- Dutch were only able to exercise tenta- sor raised issues about the exercise and tive rule over the area and parts of the there was a chance that the vote could be province remained out of its control until questioned at the General Assembly. But by that time, General Soeharto had – in

Aijaz Ahmad, “Class and Colony in Mindanao” and “The War against the Muslims,” in Rebels, Warlords, Ben Terrall, “A Brief History of Aceh,” Estafeta (East and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War Timor Action Network/U.S.) Vol 7 No. 1 Winter 2001. in Southern Philippines, ed. Kristina Gaerlan and Mara US Department of State, Office of the Historian, Stankovitch (Quezon City: Institute for Popular De- Bureau of Public Affairs, “Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, mocracy, 2000). Vol XXIII Southeast Asia,” (March 6, 1995).

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 51 a coup that killed over 600,000 Indone- ernment sided with the Japanese during sians – taken over. More cooperative with World War II, the Malay leaders in the the US than Soekarno, Soeharto opened south forged a “gentlemen’s agreement” up Indonesia’s economy to foreign inves- with the British, extracting the promise tors and gave a concession to the Ameri- that they would be given independence can company Freeport to operate in West as soon as the Japanese were driven out. Papua. Despite being aware of Jakarta’s This was not to happen. As with the case machinations, US officials told the UN of Indonesia, the United States treasured supervisor that he should accept “politi- the Thai government as an anti-commu- cal realities” and indicated to the General nist ally. Not wanting to destabilize it, Assembly that the referendum results the US pressured the British to put their would not be challenged by the US. common interests over their promise to The history of the mostly Muslim the Malays. The British agreed. and Malay people who constitute the Similar accounts of conquest and majority in the southern provinces of betrayal characterize Burma’s fractured Thailand – but a minority in the Bud- past. Possibly Southeast Asia’s most eth- dhist-majority country – is a bit different nically divided country, an estimated half in that a non-Western colonizer was in- of the population belong to the Burman volved. The provinces formed what was ethnic group while the rest are divided once the core of the independent king- among the Karen, Shan, Chin, Mon, dom of Patani that was invaded and an- Kachin, Wa, Karenni, Pa’o, Palung, Naga, nexed by the kingdom of Siam in 1784 Lahu, and Akha peoples. Most are Bud- and which became part of the nation- dhists but Muslims and Christians con- state subsequently named Thailand. That stitute sizeable segments of certain eth- annexation was not accepted passively by nic groups. In the centuries prior to the the Malays: in various revolts in the 18th arrival of the British in 1824, the area that and 19th centuries, they rose to challenge now more or less make up current Burma Siamese control. At the same time, the was the domain of various kingdoms and British and French colonizers that had groups locked in a protracted struggle for entered the scene by then were pressing control and territory. For a time, no one Siam from the south and the east respec- group was able to dominate the scene for tively. In 1904 and 1909, without the loan extended period. By the 18th century, cals’ consent, the Siamese and the British the Burman kingdom gained ascendancy; imposed a settlement in which the Brit- even then, it could only exact tributes ish would recognize Siam’s annexation from – but not totally dominate – the of the former Patani kingdom so long as other kingdoms who managed to retain Siam accepted British control over the much of their autonomy. other Malay states further south. It was only when the British colo- The locals’ demand to be under nized the area that “Burma” began to be neither the Siamese nor the British did considered a single geographic unit, even not dissipate, however. As the Thai gov- as it was to become more splintered. Un- der British rule, colonial administrators fueled antagonism and distrust among “Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of the ethnic groups. They divided Burma Indonesian Control,” Allard K. Lowenstein Internation- into two spheres and ruled each differ- al Human Rights Clinic Yale Law School, (April 2004); ently: one was for the Burman people “Indonesia’s 1969 Takeover of West Papua Not by “Free Choice,” National Security Archive, (July 9, 2004); who were viewed with suspicion and were “Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions,” Inter- ruled directly; the other was for all the national Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 5, (September 5, other non-Burman groups who were given 2006); John Wing with Peter King, “Genocide in West Papua: The role of the Indonesian state apparatus and more autonomy. As a result, resentment a current needs assessment of the Papuan people,” Uni- against the British was stronger among versity of Sydney Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, (August 2005). the Burmans; the non-Burmans, on the

52 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM other hand, felt they were liberated from political and economic goals. Extended in Burman repression by the British. When the belief that these states’ stability were World War II came, the Burmans, hav- more important in the pursuit of these ing been promised by the Japanese that goals than issues of self-determination, they will be given independence once US support contributed heavily, if not the British left, initially fought alongside decisively, to quelling the separatist and the Japanese against the British; the non- other movements that emerged in the re- Burmans for the most part, having been gion. Military equipment sold and donat- promised their own independent states ed to the governments were used against by the British, fought with the British movements that challenged the hold of against the Japanese. Both were to be be- US allies on power and the stability of trayed. the states. In exchange, these allies gave After the war, Burman resistance the US access to military bases necessary leader Aung San brokered an agreement for staging intervention in the region. To with selected ethnic groups – the Shan, the extent that challenges to the region’s the Kachin, and the Shin – in which they states were also threats to US interests, agreed to drop their demands for their local militaries also served as frontliners own independent states and instead cre- for fighting common enemies. ate the Union of Burma. Under this agree- Burma proved to be an exception. ment, certain groups would be allowed The post-independence U Nu govern- to govern in their own states and would ment was, along with India’s Nehru and be given an equal share of the country’s Indonesia’s Soekarno, among the main wealth; some would have the right to se- proponents of non-alignment between cede from the Union if they so decide the US and the Soviet Union during after ten years. The problemwith this se- the Cold War. In the 1960s, the US at- lective granting of rights was that other tempted to win Burma over and shed groups – such as the Karen, the Mon, its neutrality but the strategy backfired: and the Rakhine – were left out in the it prompted Burma to renounce the US cold and the agreement soon unravelled. and move closer to Peking instead. Since Shortly after it came into being in 1948, then and through the Vietnam War, Bur- the new state of Burma was besieged by ma’s “socialist” military junta has kept the Karen and other ethnic groups who the US at an arms length, even as the – having first used non-violent means but Philippines and Thailand, and to a lesser were repressed – took up arms to fight extent Indonesia, embraced it. In recent for federalism or independence. Other years, and in response to US’ attempts to ethnic groups with similar demands punish it with sanctions, Burma has re- would likewise mount their own armed lied on China to supply it with over a bil- challenge to the state in the succeeding lion dollars worth of military equipment years. The 1962 coup which catapulted a used against pro-democracy and separat- military junta to power ushered in an era of heightened repression that has yet to In the 1960s, defeated Chinese Nationalist forces from end. Taiwan had taken refuge in bases in Burma and were Even after the colonial powers for- launching operations against the Chinese communist regime with the help of the US. In an apparent effort mally withdrew starting in the 1940s, they to turn Burma against Peking and favor Washington continued to intervene in the domestic instead, the US provoked China to retaliate and attack Burma. But it did not work. Burma sided with the com- struggles for power in the region. In the munists instead and attacked the Nationalists. (William Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, the Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions US consistently backed authoritarian gov- Since World War II (London: Zed Books, 2003) ernments, their militaries, and the ruling US Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, elites that allied with them, through vast Vol XXIII Southeast Asia,” (March 6, 1995); US Depart- sums of economic and military aid in ex- ment of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Vol XXVII change for their support for the US’ geo- Mainland Southeast Asia,” (September 21, 2000)..

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 53 ist fighters. As with the US’ relationship to confiscate West Papuan lands. Other with Thailand and the Philippines, China Jakarta-based companies and foreign cor- helps protect Burma from external and porations mowed down West Papuan for- internal pressures for reform while Bur- ests for their plantations, timber estates, ma gives it access to its military bases and and forest concessions. As with Aceh, the to its resources. Apart from China, the revenues and taxes went back to Jakarta regime has also survived on the revenues and to the home companies but little of exports to Thailand and on aid from was spent in West Papua itself. Driven Japan. Despite the sanctions, revenues away from their lands by the companies, from concessions granted to US corpora- many West Papuans became homeless in tions have also kept the regime alive, as their own land. Deprived access to their will be discussed below. source of survival and livelihood, many were conscripted as forced labor. Old-style privatization Even before Philippine indepen- The incorporation of the Malays of dence, multinational corporations, land- southern Thailand, the Moros, the Aceh- lords and other powerful elites from the nese and West Papuans, and the various north of the country had seized owner- ethnic minorities into Thailand, the Phil- ship over vast tracts of fertile lands in ippines, Indonesia, and Burma facilitated Mindanao. On areas previously owned or the establishment of control over these collectively accessed by the indigenous regions’ lands and natural resources. Us- population, they developed cash-crop, ing their state powers, governments ef- fruit, and rubber plantations, logging, fectively expropriated these resources mining, and other resource-extraction and put them into the hands of foreign operations. As with West Papua, the and domestic interests. money flowed back north to Manila and Indonesia is the world’s largest nat- abroad, with little trickling down to the ural gas exporter; in 2000, its oil and gas south. The fishing grounds, too, became exports accounted for as much as 30% of increasingly dominated by trawlers from its gross domestic product. A large part the capital, displacing the small fishers of this, up to 40% of total revenues in who depend on the seas for their sur- 2000, comes from Aceh, the largest natu- vival. ral gas field in the world. Granted a con- Incidentally, unknown to many, one cession to tap this field is ExxonMobil, of the first demands of the Abu Sayyaf which considers its operations in Aceh as Group, whose members broke away from the “jewel in the company’s crown.” But the mainstream separatist movement little of the wealth generated trickled and which eventually became associated down to the Acehnese as a large percent with kidnapping and other criminal ac- of the revenues went to the central gov- tivities, was that trawlers from the north ernment and to the foreign companies. be banned from fishing in the south. It Indonesia is also home to the world’s larg- is also telling that the current peace ne- est gold-mine and second largest copper- gotiations between the government and mine, both of which are located in West the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, one Papua, and operated under a concession of the two main separatist groups, have given to a US company Freeport. Under foundered precisely on the question of its contract with the government, Free- control over land and resources. While it port was, like other investors, allowed has been willing to concede some mea- sure of political and cultural autonomy to the group, the government is adamantly Ashild Kolas and Stein Tonnesson, “Burma and Its Neighbors: The Geopolitics of Gas,” Austral Policy refusing to give up control over the re- Forum 06-30, (August 24, 2006). gion’s mines. Robert Jereski, “Activist and Press Backgrounder on Exxonmobil Activities in North Aceh,” International Issues relating to control over natu- Forum for Aceh, May 27, 2001.

54 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM ral resources are also acute in southern regime but also the political support of Thailand, which – like Mindanao and neighboring Thailand and energy-starved West Papua – holds a disproportion- China and India. To extract these re- ate share of some of the country’s total sources, concessions have been sold to resources. For instance, Thailand is the state and multinational companies, with world’s largest natural rubber exporter, their revenues split between the junta 70% to 80% of which is produced in the and the shareholders. Ethnic minorities south. But it is not the locals who own who live in the area of the timber opera- the rubber plantations or the mines; they tions, mines, plants, dams, and pipelines, are owned by Thais, usually Buddhist and are not only deprived a share, they have often of Chinese origin. Neither have also been displaced from their lands, cut they benefited from the severe defores- off from their sources of livelihood, and tation caused by logging concessions in forced to work at gunpoint with no com- their area. An overwhelming majority of pensation. them are either small farmers or fishers.10 But as in Mindanao, fish stocks have been Displacement and sharply depleted as a result of over-fish- marginalization ing by large-scale operators from outside In all four cases, efforts to subordi- the region. Incidentally, the escalation in nate people politically under the nation- the violence in the region since 2001 has state and thereby ensure control over been linked by some locals to government resources were pursued by employing a plans for the south that would have accel- common method: resettlement or de- erated the depletion of marine resources population. Governments deliberately there. A plan to give private property drove the indigenous people from their rights over certain plots of the sea would lands while encouraging the migration of have further taken access to what is oth- mostly landless people from other parts erwise communal property away from of the country in order to change the bal- the locals, privileging outside investors, ance of the population in the contested and effectively privatizing the sea. regions, create tensions between differ- But it is in Burma where the most ent groups, and dilute the demand for au- skewed distribution of resources could tonomy or separation. At the same time, be found: the wealth from the country’s these internal migration policies served resources accrues mostly to a small group to defuse growing social pressure from of people composed of the military junta, the landless rural people while strength- their families, and their cronies while the ening the landholders’ grip on their lands rest of the population languishes in ab- elsewhere in the country. ject poverty. With its economic difficul- Starting in the early 20th century, ties exacerbated by sanctions imposed the Philippine government encouraged by the US and Europe, the military junta landless families from the north to in- has managed to endure by living off the stead go and settle in what was billed revenues earned in the exploitation of as the “Land of Promise” that is Mind- the country’s vast natural resources, in- anao. Fleeing from rural misery and re- cluding timber, gems and minerals, and pression, thousands took the offer and hydroelectric energy potential. From headed south, cultivating land that had a political and economic perspective, not already been acquired by the multi- however, the single most important com- national corporations and the local elites. modity is natural gas, access to which has So successful was the program that by not only earned hard currency for the the time the war broke out in the 1970s, Moros and other indigenous people ac- 10Moshe Yagar, Between Integration and Secession: The counted for only 40% of the population Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern and owned less than 17% of the lands, Thailand, and Western Burma. (Myanmar, Lanham, Mary- land: Lexington Books, 2003) with over 80% of them landless. Just 60

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 55 years ealier, in 1913, they constituted 98% atically driven away ethnic minorities of the region’s population and “owned” from their lands not only to cut commu- all of the lands prior to colonization. The nity support for resistance movements resulting demographic shift in the region but also to get them out of the way of the has subsequently affected the outcome of junta’s and the corporations’ resource-ex- referendums reflecting the extent of local traction operations. Thousands of villag- support for the separatist political proj- es have been forcefully relocated, many ect. In other words, if a referendum ask- razed, in order to make way for dams, ing local residents whether they wanted mines, or pipelines. For the construction to be part of the Philippine nation-state of the Japanese-funded Lawpita hydro- were conducted today, its results would power and Mobye dam in the 1960s, for be very different if the same referendum example, more than 12,000 mainly Shan had been conducted a century ago. and Karenni villagers were displaced. In the 1960s, the Thai military gov- Recently, the most controversial example ernment launched the “Self-Help Land has been that of the Yadana pipeline proj- Settlement Project” in order to move ect, owned by a consortium that includes poor landless families from the parched the multinational energy corporations northeast into the south. Each family Unocal and Total. Halliburton, of which was given seven to ten acres of land. By current US Vice President Dick Cheney 1969, a total of around 160,000 Thais – was former chief executive officer, was who are predominantly Buddhists – had also involved in the project. The junta resettled in the south. Officials admitted chose a path that would minimize costs that the project was aimed at tilting the but it happened to be inhabited by Kar- demographic balance in order to dilute en, Mon, and Tavoy peoples. Not only the proportion of Muslims in the region. were they forced out of their lands by the military, they were also conscripted to Similarly, in 1969, having taken the clear the path for the pipeline by cutting province from the Dutch, Indonesia an- through dense swathes of jungle. nounced an “open door policy” for all its citizens who wished to settle in West Expelled from their lands and torn Papua. Partly funded by the World Bank, away from the resources that had previ- the transmigration policy has led to a sit- ously sustained their communities, the uation where non-Papuan migrants now people of southern Thailand, Mindanao, account for about 35% of the popula- Aceh, West Papua, and Burma have a par- tion, with Papuans projected to become adoxical existence: while their traditional a minority if the trend continues. While lands generate immense wealth for the settlers have been given lands, Papuans state and the elites, they are among the have been driven to barren hills or deep- most impoverished and most marginal- er into the forests, by the newly arrived ized of their country’s population. West migrants. The movement of mainly Ja- Papua has Indonesia’s highest poverty vanese migrants to Aceh and other ar- level, double the national average. The eas outside Java has been encouraged by standards of living – educational attain- the Dutch since the 19th century and ment, health care, life expectancy – are continued through the Suharto regime,11 among the worst. Southern Thailand although possibly with less success in provinces are among the least developed changing the demographic balance than in the country, with monthly incomes just in West Papua. a small fraction of those in the north and center. The Moro-dominated provinces in In Burma, the military has system- the southern Philippines have consistently been ranked among the poorest in the 11Tamara Renee Shie, “Indonesia’s Aceh Conflict in entire country and living conditions have Perspective: Security Considerations for Tsunami Relief and U.S.-Indonesia Relations,” Institute for National been gauged to be among the most mis- Strategic Studies (National Defense University) Back- erable. While abject poverty cuts across ground Paper, (February 1, 2005).

56 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Burma’s ethnic cleavages, minorities in last remaining source of legitimacy, their the eastern regions have been found to appeal to Burman nationalism. Cultivat- have the worst health conditions not just ing this has meant promoting the Burman in Burma but in the world. language over all the other languages in the education system, privileging mem- Cultural annihilation bers of the group in the civil service and Just as the states attempted to displace or the military, and stressing the superiority de-populate the contested regions, they of Burman culture over others. The ob- also sought to suppress anything which verse of this “Myanmarfication” process, might serve as a common reference for or the state-sponsorship of Burman cul- collective action. Indigenous cultures, tural hegemony, has been the denigration languages, and other expressions of self- of the cultural practices and identities of identification were punished, repressed, the other ethnic groups within present- replaced – if not totally obliterated by day Burma. ones approved by the state. From the moment it took control In Thailand, ultra-nationalist rein 1963, the Indonesian government has gimes banned the use of the Malay lan- likewise worked determinedly to erode guage and forced civil servants to shed Papuan identity. As in Thailand, it en- their Malay names and adopt Thai names forced the use of Indonesian as the of- instead. People were forbidden to wear ficial language. Singing the West Papuan traditional Malay dress. The names of national anthem and raising of the Morn- streets were changed from Malay to Thai. ing Star flag, a prominent symbol of the While the teaching of English, German, pro-independence movement, are con- and French were allowed, the teaching of sidered treason. Anyone caught singing Malay was not.12 Islamic religious schools songs in local languages could face execu- were obliged to adopt a secular curricu- tion. As ethnic groups were decimated lum; statues of Buddha were erected in or became overwhelmed by the influx public schools and Muslims were forced of outsiders, many local dialects disap- to bow before them. Though some of peared completely. these policies have been relaxed, some Though perhaps less severely and remain and the over-all intent stays the probably more successfully than Indone- same: for the Muslim Malays to be as- sia or Thailand, the Philippine govern- similated into the dominant Thai culture. ment has also through the years sought That these policies have not endeared to assimilate the Moro people into the the central government to the locals is nation by privileging officially designated evident in that different generations have norms and practices. The most effective had the same demands: that they be re- purveyor of approved national expres- pealed. sions has been the educational system In 1989, in a gesture reminiscent which transmits the “national” language of the Thai leader Phibun’s changing and other national symbols through the name of Siam to Thailand to rein- thousands of schools throughout the ar- force Thai nationalism, Burma’s military chipelago. Since the time of the Spanish, junta also changed the name of Burma the Catholic Church has also persevered to Myanmar – a name that makes sense in its proselytizing mission, establish- only in the Burman language but not in ing churches and schools in the farthest other minorities’ languages. Such a move reaches of the Muslim areas. offended and further estranged the non- Burman groups and highlighted the ex- The language they speak tent to which the junta leaders continued If by force they were incorporated to appeal to what some believe to be their into the states, so by force have they remained with them. In the absence of ex- 12“Southern Thailand: Insurgency, not Jihad”; True. pressed consent or in the case of active

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 57 resistance, state authorities in Thailand, guard their facilities, some have argued the Philippines, Indonesia, and Burma that these security forces should, in fact, have in various periods used violence to be considered ExxonMobil employees. retain control over the contested terrains Despite public accusations of murder, and suppress stirrings of dissent. In all rape, torture, destruction of property, four countries, a large fraction of their and other acts of terror against them, standing military have been deployed to ExxonMobil continues to engage their and stationed at the troubled regions for services, prompting some to accuse the years. Their mission has not changed: to company of willful complicity in human secure continuing access to the resources rights violations. Like in West Papua, and to pacify the displaced population. the Indonesian military has conducted In this mission, Indonesia’s armed various military offensives in Aceh at dif- forces is perhaps the most extreme ex- ferent times for the past fifty years. The ample of the nexus between state power rise of the Free Aceh Movement and lo- and corporate interests: not only is the cal support for it is often attributed to military directly profiting from resource- the military’s repressive presence in the extraction businesses such as logging and province. In the late 1980s, after the mining, its members are also directly paid province was officially designated by the by corporations to secure them. In West Indonesian armed forces as a “Military Papua, for example, the military’s special Operational Area,” atrocities blamed on operations unit, the Kopassus, has been the military escalated. Thousands were hired by Freeport to guard its mines.13 imprisoned and there were numerous ac- That the state’s use of violence is aimed at counts of rape, torture, massacres, and securing the continued extraction of re- disappearances. In 2003, martial law was sources is confirmed by one study which declared and a new wave of repression found that abuses against West Papuans followed. Between 9,000 to 15,000 are were “caused by military and police pres- estimated to have died since 1976. ence aimed at protecting mining firms, In Burma, the security forces’ re- forest concessions, and timber estates lationship with the investors has like- exploiting natural resources.” Since the wise been institutional: the concession 1970s, thousands of civilians – one esti- agreements between the regime and the mate puts it at over 100,000 – have been corporations stipulate that the military killed by the Indonesian military in West are obliged to protect their operations. Papua. The history of massacres, repeat- Unocal officials, for example, have dis- ed aerial bombardment, the use of chem- closed that their consortium for the ical weapons, cases of torture and assas- Yadena pipeline “hired the Burmese mil- sinations has prompted some to accuse itary to provide security for the project.” the Indonesian military of committing In fact, documents reveal that the com- genocide against the West Papuan popu- pany held meetings with military com- lation. While such a charge is disputed manders in order to instruct them where owing to the strict technical definitions they required roads, military facilities, of the term “genocide,” a human rights and security. To render their services, the organization at Yale University has con- Burmese military increased their pres- cluded that the Indonesian government’s ence along the pipeline, drove out locals actions “clearly constitute crimes against at gunpoint, forced them to work for the humanity under international law.” project, and prevented them from run- As in West Papua, Indonesian secu- ning away. In 1996, victims sued Unocal rity forces are also on the payroll of Exx- and Total before American and European onMobil in Aceh; because they receive courts, accusing the companies of know- direct payment from the company to ingly abetting the Burmese military in cases of murder, rape, torture, and slavery. The companies denied they had any 13“Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions.”.

58 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM knowledge about the military’s actions what are now remembered as the Krue but a US Federal Court concluded that, Se and Tak Bai incidents. In Krue Se, the “the evidence does suggest that Unocal military shot at and killed over 32 poorly knew forced labor was being utilized.” armed or completely unarmed young men The companies agreed to an out of court inside a mosque; others were reportedly settlement. executed. In Tak Bai, the military round- There are no known estimates of ed up over 1,300 men into army trucks the total number of people killed or af- and stacked them lying down, one on fected by the Burmese state’s five-decade top of another five to six layers deep. At 15 attempt to crush the ethnic minority least 79 died, mostly due to suffocation movements. In the first two years after and despite knowing about the deaths in 1948 alone, an estimated 60,000 were some trucks, nothing was done to alert killed.14 Through the decades, the mili- those in other trucks in order to prevent tary has mounted various large-scale and more deaths. These are just the most smaller offensives against the various spectacular cases but, especially with the armed groups throughout the country. imposition of martial law in the south In recent years, the junta has waged a in July 2005, there have been numerous full-scale counter-insurgency war that cases of arbitrary arrests and detentions, deliberately targets civilians in the hope disappearances, torture, and other hu- of preventing communities from provid- man rights abuses. ing support to the resistance fighters. In In the Philippines, over 100,000 the past ten years, in the eastern region are estimated to have died as a result of alone, attacks against Karen and other the full-scale war that erupted between civilians have resulted in around 3,000 the Philippine military and the separat- villages being destroyed; more than a mil- ist movements that emerged starting in lion displaced. An estimated 15,000 fled the early 1970s. While there are differing to the jungles at one point. Of the Karen’s theories as to the spark that ignited it population of seven million, over a mil- all, it is known that in the late 1960s, the lion have fled since 1988. In 1992, during Philippine military - widely believed to a crackdown on the Muslim minorities, be backed by loggers and politicians - or- 300,000 escaped to neighboring Bangla- ganized and financed paramilitary groups desh. There are conceivably thousands that massacred entire Muslim communi- of cases human rights abuses – including ties in order to drive them out from their rape, torture, beheadings and mutilations lands. This provoked organized resistance – but they are difficult, if not impossible, on the part of the Moros who in 1972 to verify or document because of the formed the Moro National Liberation junta’s restrictions on local and foreign Front (MNLF). In the ensuing war, cit- media and non-government organiza- ies were razed and tens of thousand were tions. Some have accused the regime of displaced. Though the MNLF eventually conducting “ethnic cleansing” against the split and entered into peace negotiations minorities. with the government, the military con- In various episodes when the Ma- tinues to keep a tight grip on the region. lays became more assertive throughout Locals accuse troops of acting with near- the 20th century, the Thai security forces ly absolute impunity in areas under their quickly moved to crush them. Hundreds control as accusations of beheadings, ex- died, many went underground, while an tra-judicial killings, and other atrocities undetermined number went missing. In blamed on the military have gone unre- the latest resurgence of what is believed solved. to be separatist violence, the brutality of the Thai military was on full show in

14Kolas and Tonneson. 15“Southern Thailand: Insurgency, not Jihad.”

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 59 Terrorists and thereby contributing to an atmosphere of freedom-fighters conspiracy and fear. Such an atmosphere Recent years have seen increased militari- has, in turn, proven conducive to gov- zation and repression in these contested ernments justifying acts of repression by areas as governments seek to portray and claiming they are necessary to be crack justify their actions as part of the “global down on heartless criminals with sinis- war against terror” launched and led by ter intentions. The “war against terror” the United States since 2001. has served to obscure the larger issues by reducing fundamental questions of jus- In order to bolster their warfight- tice and sovereignty to a simple matter ing capabilities, the United States has of criminality. By giving the institutions increased its military aid to both Thai- of coercion more power and money, the land and the Philippines and has revived “war on terror” will ensure that only mili- military ties with Indonesia, which were tary solutions are applied to problems suspended due to pressure following that cannot be solved by force. widespread human rights violations per- petrated by the Indonesian military in Caring and sharing East Timor. US Special Forces are now in the southern Philippines ostensibly As ASEAN leaders meet for its sum- to pursue the Abu Sayyaf, a group des- mit in Cebu, the larger issues raised by ignated a “terorrist organization” by the self-determination struggles will not be US but there are allegations that joint on the agenda. In the name of “non-in- operations with the Philippine military terference,” members of the ten-mem- have also been aimed against the MNLF. ber grouping have traditionally turned While packaged as training exercises and a blind eye to their fellow members’ ac- humanitarian work, the larger unstated tions towards movements for self-deter- mission of the deployment is evidently mination within their borders. At times, to ensure the capability to mount rapid despite the appeal to “non-interference,” intervention against challenges to Philip- they have also lent a hand to fellow gov- pine and US control in the region. ernment’s efforts to crack down on these movements. At other times, they have Throughout Southeast Asia, a raft instrumentalized the struggles in their of repressive anti-terror measures and neighboring countries to pursue their legislation that clip civil liberties and own geo-political goals. strengthen the security agencies have either been adopted or introduced. The Instead, the priority agenda of the targets of these increased military and ASEAN will be on how to strengthen punitive capabilities are ostensibly the regional cooperation in the “war against officially designated“terorrists” but the terror.” This, however, will again be fo- net has been cast wide: government and cused on how best to employ coercion military officials often use the word to through increased intelligence-sharing refer to local separatist and other armed and closer law enforcement ties, rather movements.16 The media is replete with than on addressing the factors that peo- stories claiming shadowy linkages among ple claim compel them to take up arms. groups or individuals. Though often based If history is to be a guide, these on information that is impossible to ver- problems cannot be solved by force. ify, such reports are passed off as facts, Despite the long-drawn-out and often heavy-handed attempts by the states to 16Even the Burmese junta, which is not a US ally, calls stifle dissent, the demand for self-deter- the ethnic resistance movement Karen National Union as “terrorists.” It also claims to support the US “war on mination still resonates. While people terror” against elements among the Muslim Rohingya have grown increasingly disappointed community. (John Aglionby, “Inside Burma: Fear and and disenchanted with organized lib- Repression,” Guardian, May 23, 2006; Amitav Acharya, “Democracy in Burma: Does Anybody Really Care?” eration movements in the Philippines, YaleGlobal, September 1, 2005.

60 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM the demand for sovereignty draws deep popular support. In southern Thailand, a splintered separatist movement that was dismissed as dead in the 1980s is said to be reviving. In Aceh, the big question now is whether the signing of the peace agreement will actually translate to empowerment. In Burma, despite five decades of unrelenting attacks from one of the most brutal regimes in the world, at least five liberation armies are still standing and opposition to the regime is nearly as universal as the call for a change in the relations among the ethnic groups. In West Papua, despite being continually told that theirs is a lost cause, people continue to fly the Morning Star flag. Theirs is but the continuation of a long history of struggles for self-determination that has surged and ebbed through the decades, expressed in various manifestations, articulated through different if divided organizational ve- hicles, employing differing tactics and strategies, and appealing to various ideologies and justifications. Some are willing to pursue self-determination by pushing for greater autonomy within the current nation-states; others remain resolute in their belief that self-determination can only be had through independence and the establishment of their own nation-state. Some have mobilized popular support by invoking nationalism; others summon religion, or both. Some have been subverted by indigenous elites; others instrumentalized by other states and interests. Some have chosen to confront state violence with violence; others have chosen to take the path of unarmed civil and political resistance. How self-determination could be achieved and in what ways it should be pursued have been re- curring questions. But the ultimate aim -- that people regain greater control of their fate -- remains the same. That they are able to do so remains an unmet pre- requisite for the creation of “one caring and sharing community.” n

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 61 62 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Democracy and Human Rights in ASEAN Rashid Kang

conomic integration, and the building of a stronger regional bloc, seems to be the major force behind the current efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to createE a more cohesive community. Will democracy and human rights have significant roles to play in this process? Can community building contribute to the meaningful improvement of democracy and human rights in ASEAN?

Referring to the final goals emulated in the documents like ASEAN Vision 2020, Hanoi Plan of Action (1999-2004), Bali Concord II (2003), Vientiane Action Plan (2004-2010), ASEAN Initiative for ASEAN Integration, Roadmap for the Inte- gration of ASEAN (RIA).

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 63 ASEAN Ambition and Road result of the considerable change in the to an ASEAN Charter Association’s mission in the recent two Some of the most significant events decades. The end of the Cold War, the in ASEAN happened in its fourth de- advent of economic globalization, and cade of existence. ASEAN celebrated the rise of China as an economic super its 30th anniversary in 1997 by adopting power have witnessed ASEAN’s shift its ASEAN vision 2020. A year later, it from its original preventive diplomacy of entered the period of concrete planning maintaining peace and harmony among with the adoption of the Hanoi Action its neighboring countries–through agree- Plan (1999-2004). In 1999, ASEAN comments like the Treaty of Amity and Coop- pleted its full house of 10 member states eration (Bali, 1976) and the Zone of Peace, when Cambodia joined the group. In Freedom and Neutrality (1971)--and into 2003, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Con- the constructive diplomacy of communi- cord II (Bali Concord II) and, in 2004, ty-building to cope with increasing com- the Vientiane Action Plan (2004-2010), petition in a globalized world. which replaced the Hanoi Action Plan. The 1997 economic crisis also In 2005, ASEAN formed an Eminent prompted ASEAN to respond to the Persons Group (EPG) to propose “bold needs of new regionalism. ASEAN Vision and visionary” principles for an ASEAN 2020 commits to establish “caring socie- Charter. ties” in which “all people enjoy equitable Two major events are expected to access to opportunities for total human happen in 2007 as ASEAN prepares to development regardless of gender, race, celebrate its 40th anniversary. First, un- religion, language, or social and cultural der the 2006 chairmanship of the Phil- background.” It also proclaims ASEAN ippines, it applied for observer status in as an “outward-looking” organization and the United Nations (UN). The only inter- “an effective force for peace, justice and governmental body in the world without moderation in the Asia-Pacific and in the a statutory document, ASEAN has been world.” denied official status in the UN system A similar tone was further expand- for years. Once the observer status is ed in the 2003 Bali Concord II where granted, it is expected that ASEAN will ASEAN proclaims that the “ASEAN take a collective voice in UN meetings of Community shall be established com- interest to it. prising three pillars, namely political and Second, ASEAN is set to adopt the security cooperation, economic coop- ASEAN Charter. The EPG will submit eration, and social-cultural cooperation its recommendations at the 12th ASEAN that are closely intertwined and mutually Summit in Cebu, Philippines. A fast track reinforced for the purpose of ensuring High-Level Panel on the Drafting of the durable peace, stability and shared pros- ASEAN Charter will be formed for the perity in the region”. Such a shift in pri- actual drafting of the ASEAN Charter orities may provide a new paradigm for based on the Blueprint formulated by ASEAN to revisit democracy and human the EPG. The final draft is expected to rights from a regionalist perspective. be completed by July 2007. Whether or not ASEAN will be viewed as a credible Democracy, Human Rights entity and be able to carry its weight in and “Asian Values” international affairs depends on how im- The discourse on human rights and de- portant benchmarks, especially in human mocracy in ASEAN is framed by way of rights and democracy, will be enshrined “Asian Values”, a concept first asserted in the ASEAN Charter. ASEAN’s original purpose was primarily about con- The ASEAN Charter process is a taining regional conflict among diverse neighbors, and uniting as a region against external threats (which then meant the communist world).

64 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM after the Cold War to promote Asian In global fora, ASEAN finds iteasier capitalism and the efficacy of the devel- to engage the West in polemical debates opmental state. This framing was also a than come up with practical approaches response to the strengthening of UN hu- to strengthen human rights in the region. man rights mechanisms since the 1980s Key ASEAN governments such as Ma- that put some ASEAN member states laysia and Singapore claim that they pay (with bad human rights records) on the more attention to the enjoyment of Eco- defensive. The preparation toward the nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) first World Conference on Human Rights than to Civil and Political Rights, but fail (Vienna, 25 June 1993) saw ASEAN form- to ratify the International Covenant on ing an alliance with larger Asian Gov- ESCR. At the national level, they refuse ernments in an effort to distinguish its to acknowledge that fundamental civil stance from the Universal Declaration of and political rights of its citizens are being Human Rights (UDHR). Only the Phil- violated due to the denial of their ESCR, ippines, at the time, refused to accept demonstrated, for instance, by numerous that economic development must entail incidents of forced evictions of citizens sacrifice of individual and political rights, from their land and livelihood. asserting that the nation’s experience The general discourse on demo-cra- had demonstrated that this was a false cy in ASEAN during the growth years of choice. The rest of ASEAN stressed cul- its key members evolved around the ar- tural relativism. gument that democracy is inimical to de- Universality won out in Vienna velopment. The “Asian Values” argument, when the World Conference reaffirmed however, became vulnerable during the the spirit of the UDHR and adopted the Asian Financial Crisis. There had been three core principles of human rights, some recognition of the strong connec- namely universal, indivisible and inter- tion between (they are after all indivis- dependent. As a gesture of good will, ible) economic and political rights. For the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting example, Musa Hitam, former Malaysian (AMM) in Singapore in July 1993 de- deputy Prime Minister, pointed out in clared that, “in support of Vienna Decla- an interview in 1998 that “in the pres- ration and Program of Action of June 25, ent social economic scenario, the human 1993 … ASEAN should also consider the rights cause seems to be [the] winner.” establishment of an appropriate regional Lee Kuan Yew also admitted in 1998 mechanism on human rights.” This was that nepotism is a Confucian weakness. subsequently followed by a declaration However, such nascent recognition of hu- by the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Or- man rights in official discourse was short- ganization (AIPO) during its 14th Gen- lived. September 11 and the war on ter- eral Assembly in September 1993, assert- rorism had given ASEAN governments a ing that it is the task and responsibility of new impetus to pick up the discourse of the ASEAN Member States to establish “state security” and retreat from recep- an appropriate regional mechanism on tivity to commitments on human rights human rights. But while the AMM con- and democracy. tinues to include a paragraph in its annual Joint Communiqués reiterating its Decoding the ASEAN Way commitment to a regional mechanism ASEAN is fond of grand documents (e.g. for human rights, its individual mem- ASEAN Vision 2020, Bali Concord II, bers’ policy on human rights continues to be defensive in nature, and no region- New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), June 1, 1998. al mechanism has been established by Amitav Archarya, “Southeast Asia’s Democratic Mo- ment”, Asian Survey, Vol. 30 (May-June 1999). ASEAN to date. Maznah Mohammad, “Toward a Human Rights Regime in Southeast Asia: Charting the Course of State Hitchcock, The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Commitment,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 24, Asia, ed. Philip J. Elridge (UK: Routledge, 2002). Number 2, (August 2002).

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 65 etc.) that talk about end goals such as “a larations, ASEAN is reluctant to put community of cohesive, equitable and down its values or principle on democ- harmonious societies, bound together in racy in its official documents. Unlike solidarity for deeper understanding and other international or regional inter- cooperation” , “a concert of Southeast governmental bodies, ASEAN does not Asian nations, bounded together in part- have a document like the Organization nership in dynamic development and in a of American States’ (OAS) Santiago Dec- community of caring societies, commit- laration which expresses an explicit com- ted to uphold cultural diversity and social mitment to democracy as a key principle harmony”. But when it comes to human of regionalism; or that of the Organiza- rights, ASEAN neglects to define mile- tion of African Unity, which endorses stones that will guide implementation. democratic governance as a way of deal- Most glaring is the critical omission of the ing with Africa’s political conflicts and universality criteria. This exposes propos- economic ills. ASEAN does not insist als, such as that for the establishment of on democratic political systems as neces- ASEAN human rights mechanism(s), to sary criteria for gaining and maintaining risks of becoming a rights meeting ven- membership in the Association. In fact, ue “that doesn’t mention the wronged.” this was the main argument of ASEAN Other principles that could open up new when it decided to admit Myanmar as possibilities for better human rights pro- member in 1997, despite international motion and protection, which had been civil society’s outcry against ASEAN’s proposed in the past but were not accept- acceptance of a military dictatorship. As ed or implemented by ASEAN, include a result, ASEAN now faces tremendous “constructive intervention” , “flexible challenges arising from the “ill-thought engagement”10 , “enhanced interaction”11 policy of enlargement.” Using low stan- and “the Minus X formula”. It remains dards in admitting members to a forum to be seen if the current effort to draft where all decisions are taken by consen- an ASEAN Charter will be able to make sus further lowers the possibility of com- meaningful breakthrough on this aspect. ing up with common denominators. This has been exploited similar to veto power, On the other hand, there are well- posing a dilemma similar to that faced by defined values in ASEAN that hamper a the UN Security Council where no deci- better appreciation of human rights and sion can be taken up unless it is endorsed democracy both at national and regional by the five veto countries. level. In addition to non-interference, ASEAN also operate on the principles Unlike other regional groups, the of quiet diplomacy, non-use of force, and theory and practice of democratic as- decision making process through con- sistance (like election monitoring, pro- sensus, which altogether constitute the grams to assist members to establish and “ASEAN Way”.12 consolidate democratic institutions) were never an agenda of ASEAN because of its Despite its fondness for grand dec- principle of non-interference. ASEAN thus cannot officially have a role in en- The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Plan of Action. couraging the democratic transitions of Bali Concord II. its members. In the case of Myanmar, The concept first appeared the Newsweek Interna- it was the intervention of the ASEAN tional article in July 1997 by Anwar Ibrahim, former Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus deputy prime minister of Malaysia. 10 Proposed by Foreign Minister of Thailand Surin Pit- (AIPMC), not the ASEAN Leaders that suwan in the 1998 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) produced proposals for the resolution of 11 Renamed from the “flexible engagement” by the the democratic crisis in Myanmar. ASEAN in response to Thailand proposal in 1998. 12 Hiro Katsumata, “Reconstruction of Diplomatic The word democracy does not ap- Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adher- ence to the ‘ASEAN Way’,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, pear at all in the ASEAN Vision 2020 Volume 25, Number 1 (April 2003). (1997). In the Bali Concord II (2003),

66 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM democracy was not mentioned as value Plan, ASEAN does not articulate the re- or principle but found its way in the lationship between democratization and document in the form of an end goal of economic liberalization. a “democratic and harmonious environ- Aside from the lack of elaboration ment” thus, of the principles of democracy, ASEAN “The ASEAN Security Community is also lags behind other regional bodies in envisaged to bring ASEAN’s political terms of human rights institutions and and security cooperation to a higher mechanisms. For example, the OAS has plane to ensure that countries in the its Inter-American Commission on Hu- region live at peace with one another man Rights and Inter-American Court of and with the world at large in a just, Human Rights; the European Union has democratic and harmonious environ- its European Court of Human Rights and ment….” a Commissioner for Human Rights; and the African Union has its African Court In the elaboration of the Bali Con- of Human and Peoples’ Rights and the cord II under the ASEAN Security Com- African Commission on Human and Peo- munity (ASC) Plan of Action, ASEAN ples’ Rights. ASEAN only has informal made a bold attempt to define the ap- mechanisms such as the regular meetings plication of democracy while not refer- (since 1988) between ASEAN foreign min- ring explicitly to the values of democracy. isters and senior officials and the Work- The following paragraph is considered ing Group for an ASEAN Human Rights ASEAN’s first attempt to define the Mechanism during the annual ASEAN principle of democracy. Ministerial Meeting (AMM). The inter- “…ASEAN Member Countries shall action was enhanced in 2005 after Senior promote political development in Officials in Vientiane, Laos, engaged the support of ASEAN Leaders’ shared Working Group to help implement four vision and common values to achieve human rights related programs in the- peace, stability, democracy and pros- VAP.13 On a relevant set-up, the Working perity in the region. This is the high- Group itself has also organized regional est political commitment that would workshops with ASEAN governments on serve as the basis for ASEAN politi- the mechanism proposal pursuant to the cal cooperation. In order to better suggestions of the Senior Officials them- respond to the new dynamics with- selves. Five such regional workshops had in the respective ASEAN Member been held so far, all co-organized by the Countries, ASEAN shall nurture such Working Group with ASEAN govern- common socio-political values and ments and the national human rights in- principles. In this context, ASEAN stitution of the host country (Indonesia, Member Countries shall not condone 2001; Philippines, 2002; Thailand, 2003; unconstitutional and undemocratic Indonesia, 2004; and Malaysia 2006). changes of government or the use of ASEAN is also far behind in terms their territory for any actions under- of norm setting. The EU has its Euro- mining peace, security and stability of pean Convention on Human Rights other ASEAN Member Countries.” and Fundamental Freedoms (1953), the Unfortunately, reflecting the strug- OAS has its American Convention on gling mindset of ASEAN, the ASC Plan Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa of Action also carries other conflicting principles, particularly on the “prin- 13 These four areas of VAP are: i) establishment of a commission on the promotion and protection of the ciples of non-interference (and) respect rights of women and children, ii) elaboration of an for national sovereignty” vis-à-vis the as- ASEAN instrument on the promotion and protection sertion that ASEAN shall not condone of the rights of migrant workers, promoting education and public awareness on human rights institutions in undemocratic regimes. In the detailed the region; and iv) networking among existing national ASEAN Economic Community Action human rights institutions in the region.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 67 Rica” (1969), the African Union has its Globally, the inter-linkage between African Charter on Human and Peoples’ human rights and democracy is widely Rights (1986), and even the Council of recognized. There is growing recogni- the League of Arab States has come up tion that democracy provides the only with its own Arab Charter on Human political structure within which human Rights. In ASEAN, the words “human rights can be guaranteed. On the one rights” have yet to find their way to of- side, democratic political institutions ficial documents. It was only included in are recognized not only to be insuffi- the annex of the ASEAN Security Com- cient, but also will be ineffective without munity Action Plan. In the annex, a list an underpinning of basic human rights. of activities14 is given, without mention This recognition finds expression in the of how they will be implemented. The ideas of ‘substantive (versus procedural) Vientiane Action Plan (2004-2010) fur- democracy’, of ‘inclusive democracy’ or ther elaborates the list of activities to be ‘human rights-based democratization’, undertaken on the promotion of human and so on.16 Stuck in the ASEAN Way, rights and obligations.15 ASEAN is still far away from this global discourse. From these plans of actions, it is clear that ASEAN is still at the stage of Asserting New Norms in norm setting and is more ready for the ar- ASEAN Regionalism ticulation of the element of human rights promotion, but less so on human rights In the construction of an ASEAN Com- protection. This also shows that “human munity the question of democracy and rights” is still considered a very sensi- human rights becomes even more press- tive term to be given a higher status in ing. ASEAN has to confront unresolved ASEAN documents, much less given dis- issues if it wants coherent actions and tinctive declaration. All of this is rooted coordination among members. on ASEAN’s insistence on the principle First, can a cohesive community of “non-interference”. and regionalism be built while ASEAN remains a consensus based body? In politics based on consensus-building, deci- 14 The activities mentioned are: Promotion of human rights and obligations: sions are always subject to the test of po- a. Establishing a network among existing human litical feasibility. It is doubtful whether rights mechanisms; b. Protecting vulnerable groups including women, an inter-governmental body can be ef- children, people with disabilities, and migrant workers; fective if the decision-making process or and enforcement of a collectively decided ac- c. Promoting education and public awareness on human rights. tion is always subject to political negotiation and compromise. The indication of 15 The direct quote follows: an ongoing shift from a consensus-based Under the Program Areas and Measures ref no 1.1.4: Promote human rights: to rules-based platform (such as through 1.1.4.1 Completion of a stock-taking of existing human the planned Charter) is welcome. Howev- rights mechanisms and equivalent bodies, including er, it remains to be seen whether ASEAN sectoral bodies promoting the rights of women and children can go beyond applying the rules-based 1.1.4.2 Formulation and adoption of MOU to establish mechanism exclusively on the ASEAN network among existing human rights mechanisms Economic Community, and recognize 1.1.4.3 Formulation of work program of the network 1.1.4.4 Promote education and public awareness on the importance of the principles of de- human rights mocracy and human rights. The incom- 1.1.4.5 Establish a network of cooperation among existing human rights mechanisms patibility of ASEAN’s non interference 1.1.4.6 Elaboration of an ASEAN instrument on the principle and of applying a rules-based protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers 16 David Beetham, “Democracy and Human Rights: 1.1.4.7 Establishment of an ASEAN commission on the Contrast and Convergence,” paper presented in the promotion and protection of the rights of women and Seminar on the Interdependence between Democracy children and Human Rights, (Geneva: Office of the High Com- missioner for Human Rights, November 25-26, 2002).

68 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM mechanism should be recognized. nizing “that deepening and broadening the integration of ASEAN must be ac- Second, ASEAN faces many chal- companied by technical and develop- lenges and non traditional security ment cooperation”18 . It should also em- threats that are cross-boundary in na- brace the principle of redistribution to ture. These include: human trafficking; ensure equitable and substantiated sup- drug trafficking; migration and migrant port among ASEAN members. workers; social impact of brain drain; diseases and pandemic; dam building and Fourth, a system of monitoring and river diversion; cross boundary pollution reporting the progress of the current and toxic waste dumping; transnational blueprint of ASEAN Community Action crimes; economic crimes; and food se- Plan is important. ASEAN should adopt curity. Most of these challenges imply a rights based approach (RBA) – with the power relations—receiver-sender, win- four basic principles of accountability, ner-loser, or perpetrator-victim. It should participation, indivisibility, and non-dis- be noted that such power relations are crimination – in checking against plans not only vertical relationships between and the actual implementation of its pro- people and governments, but also hori- grams. zontal interaction between richer or Fifth, community also implies the stronger and poorer or weaker govern- concurrent needs for increased account- ments. These are issues that can only be ability and democratization at both na- met effectively by neighboring states act- tional and regional levels. The process ing in coordination. De-politicizing these of democratization at the country level trans-boundary issues is the better way to needs to be complemented by a democra- deal with them. Thus, a regional mecha- tization of the institutions at the regional nism bound by internationally accepted level. The challenge is to define the in- norms and standards, and with a system stitutions that will advance ASEAN as of democratic check and balance to fa- a democratic inter-governmental body. cilitate and deliver binding decisions, is Internationally, a set of three criteria the way forward for ASEAN regionalism (namely electoral authorization, on-going in a long run. accountability, and responsiveness to pub- A community implies recognition of lic opinion), is considered the minimum the inter-linkages of the social, political, for democratic institutions.19 For such and economic forces binding the shared institutions to emerge, ASEAN needs interests of its people. The challenge to break away from its practice of being for ASEAN, as articulated by Malaysian predominantly the business of the execu- Prime Minister Ahmad Badawi17, is the tive branch of its member governments. “universal acceptance that community Involving parliaments, and empowering interests would prevail over national in- forums like the ASEAN Inter-Parliamen- terests on issues affecting the communi- tary Organization, can help build a more ty…The challenge for ASEAN is to find a democratic ASEAN. formula where the larger community in- Sixth, a vibrant civil society is the terest should never become subordinate key to a successful democratization pro- to the interest of only a few members.” cess. ASEAN needs the proactive role of Third, in order to address the de- civil society. It should strengthen coop- velopment gap among members who are eration with civil society organizations at different stages of nation building, in the cultivation of a healthy check and ASEAN must go beyond merely recog- balance mechanism and in forging partnerships for development. It should ex-

17 PM Badawi’s keynote address in the National Col- pand the definition of civil society which loquium on ASEAN, (Malaysia: Malaysian Ministry of 18 Foreign Affairs and ASEAN Study Centre, (August 7, Vientiane Action Plan (VAP). 2004).. 19 Ibid..

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 69 is currently limited to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), technical as- sociations, and professional groups, and academic groups. It should also relax its strict and selective NGO accreditation process, which has affiliated a measly 55 NGOs as of May 2006. Civil society participation should be mainstreamed and integrated in all relevant ASEAN bodies, meetings and processes. Enshrining civil society role in documents like the ASEAN Charter will be a good indicator of the ASEAN commitment to bring ASEAN down to its peoples. Finally, the role of the existing national human rights institutions (NHRIs) in the ASEAN region (namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) and its regional network remains important even as a regional human rights mechanism is pushed. ASEAN should give important reference to the roles of NHRIs in protecting and promoting human rights at the national and regional level. Remaining ASEAN governments that have yet to create its NHRIs should also commit itself to the creation of an independent commission in line with the Paris Principles within a definite time frame. Governments that already have NHRIs should respect, protect and preserve their independence, and allow them to develop their practice to guard against their deterioration into toothless bodies. n

70 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM The Role of Non-State

AActorslexander C. Chandra in ASEAN

ince its establishment in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has shown little interest in facilitating the participation of non-state actors in its decision-making processes. SASEAN is well-known for its elitist tendencies and for how few of its policies correspond to the needs of Southeast Asian people. At the same time, it could also be argued that ASEAN has become this way due to the lack of pressure from non-state actors on the Association. However, during its infancy, most ASEAN member countries were governed by authoritarian regimes which made it difficult for social pressure to emerge, both at the national and regional levels.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 71 In recent years, non-state actors have substantial changes in its modus operan- gained importance in the regionalization di. Unless such attempts are made, the process in Southeast Asia. The business Association will lose its significance to community, the academic community, and the people of the region. non-government organizations (NGOs) get increasing recognition as critical par- The relevance of ticipants in the creation of a regional civil society engagement community and identity. However, their with ASEAN participation in ASEAN has been limited to conferences, symposia, and seminars The idea that people should partici- focusing on various regional issues. It pate in ASEAN decision-making pro- was only after the financial crisis of 1997 cesses had already emerged in the 1980s that the involvement of a wider range of among prominent figures within the elite non-state actors in the association inten- ASEAN circle. Former Indonesian For- sified, partly due to the process of rela- eign Minister and one of the founding fa- tive democratization in the region. thers of ASEAN Adam Malik once stated that “the shaping of a future of peace, In time for ASEAN’s plan to intro- friendship and cooperation is far too duce an ASEAN Charter and to establish important to be left to government and an ASEAN Community, the Association government officials… [as such, there is has begun to realize that there is wide- a need for] ever-expanding involvement spread criticism of ASEAN’s closed and and participation of the people”. Ma- exclusive nature. There are now sev- lik’s idea, however, only became an issue eral forums through which civil society of discussion between those involved in groups can find a voice in ASEAN, from Track 1 and Track 2 diplomacies. It was the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and which was convened in Batam, Indone- International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), es- sia in 2000, all the way up to the ASEAN tablished in 1988, that submitted an idea Civil Society Conference, which was first to have “an assembly of the people of held in Shah Alam, Malaysia in December ASEAN” in 1995 which subsequently re- 2005. Civil society groups have also been sulted in the launching of the first ASEAN invited to provide input to the members People’s Assembly (APA) in 2000. It was of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), only then that the participation of the which was tasked to prepare recommen- people was finally recognized by ASEAN dations to the ASEAN Charter by the and its member governments. 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu City in De- cember 2006. These developments not Concrete interaction between civil only suggest that ASEAN should address society groups and ASEAN predates its democracy deficit, but also that civil

society groups are now ready to engage As cited in Ali Alatas, ASEAN: An Association in Search with ASEAN and its activities. ASEAN of People or the People’s Search for an Association, Report of is indeed under pressure from the citi- the First ASEAN People’s Assembly, (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2001). zens of its member countries to make Track 1 refers to the practice of diplomacy amongst government officials. Track 2 diplomacy can be consid- Noda Makito, ‘The Role of Nonstate Actors in Build- ered as the practice of bringing public intellectuals, aca- ing an ASEAN Community’, in Road to ASEAN 10: demics, government, business, media and other relevant Japanese Perspectives on Economic Integration, eds. S. Sueo sectors in their private capacity to discuss economic, and N. Makito (Tokyo: Japan Center for International political, and security issues at both the domestic, Exchange, 1999), 167-94. regional, global levels. For detailed definitions of Track Desmond Ball, ‘CSCAP: The Evolution of ‘Second 1 and Track 2 diplomacy, see, for example, Carolina Track’ Process in Regional Security Co-operation’, in G. Hernandez, ‘Track Two and Regional Policy: The Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific Region, eds. D. Ball, ASEAN ISIS in ASEAN Decision Making’, in Twenty R. Grant, and J. Wanandi (Washington, DC: Centre Two Years of ASEAN ISIS: Origin, Evolution and Challenges for Strategic and International Studies, 1993); C. G. of Track Two Diplomacy, eds. H. Soesastro et al., (Jakarta: Hernandez, A People’s Assembly: A Novel Mechanism for Centre for Strategic and International Studies and the Bridging the North-South Divide in ASEAN, (unpublished ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Stud- manuscript, 1995). ies, 2006).

72 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM APA. An example of such interaction is ness sector is known to provide substan- the involvement of the business sector tial input to regional economic integra- in many of ASEAN’s economic integration initiatives. tion initiatives, which resulted in the es- The academic community has also tablishment of the ASEAN Chambers of been playing a key role in ASEAN. It has Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI) been known to articulate its own vision in 1972. ASEAN-CCI became an impor- for an integrated ASEAN. The ASEAN- tant vehicle through which the business ISIS and the Institute for Southeast community channels inputs and concerns Asian Studies (ISEAS), for example, have on regional economic issues to ASEAN. provided much-needed input to ASEAN. It also played a key role in the creation Members of ASEAN-ISIS, which include of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). the Brunei Minister of Foreign Affairs, Following the surge of trade liberalization the Cambodian Institute for Co-opera- in the mid-1980s, the ASEAN business tion and Peace (CICP), the Indonesian community began to realize the increas- Centre for Strategic and International ing production diversity and complemen- Studies (CSIS), the Laos Institute for tary nature of ASEAN economies, result- Foreign Affairs, the Malaysian Institute ing from the process of industrialization for Strategic and International Studies, and the operations of transnational cor- the Philippines’ Institute for Strategic porations (TNCs) in the region . These and Development Studies (ISDS), the factors, among others, justified ASEAN’s Singapore Institute of International Af- introduction of AFTA in the early 1990s. fairs (SIIA), Thailand’s Institute for Se- During the 1980s and 1990s, a re- curity and International Studies (ISIS), gional production network, ethnic busi- and Vietnam’s Institute for International ness network, and sub-regional economic Relations (IIR), are influential not only at zones have emerged, all of which have the national level, but also at the regional helped initiate an informal bottom- level. This influence allows ASEAN-ISIS up regionalization process throughout to play a bridging role between ASEAN East Asia. In Southeast Asia, this pro- and wider civil society through its steer- cess played a crucial role in influencing ing of the APA initiative. This bridging ASEAN to look towards many other re- role reflects a close relationship between gional economic integration initiatives. ASEAN and national and regional think- Although political co-operation may have tanks. been at the forefront of ASEAN’s overall agenda, economic integration has been Unfortunately, civil society involve- at the heart of many of the Association’s ment with ASEAN has been limited to regional integration initiatives. Within the academic circle and the business the ASEAN Secretariat, for example, community. Indeed, it was only after funding has been concentrated mainly the economic crisis of 1997 that more on economic integration initiatives. Al- civil society groups became involved in though the Secretariat has well-trained economists and trade experts, the busi- Although both ASEAN-ISIS and ISEAS have similar research programs (i.e. economics, politics and strategic studies, social and cultural studies, etc.), the Paul Bowles, ‘ASEAN, AFTA, and the “New Regional- two institutions differ in that the former is comprised ism”’, s, Vol. 70, No. 2 (1997), 219-33. Pacific Affair of think-tanks with regional interests at the national J. L. Tongzon, The Economies of Southeast Asia, 2nd level while the latter is simply a regional think-tank. edition (Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward ISEAS attended the formation of ASEAN-ISIS in Bali, Elgar Publishing Ltd., Inc, 2002), 182. Indonesia in 1984. However, since ISEAS considers Dajin Peng, “Invisible Linkages: A Regional Perspec- itself a regional think-tank, the Singapore Institute of tive of East Asian Political Economy”, International International Affairs (SIIA) joined in the ASEAN-ISIS Studies Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 4 (2002), 423-47. instead to represent Singapore (an informal discussion, An informal discussion was conducted with a staff on September 7, 2006, with a researcher in one of the member whose name will remain anonymous through- academic think-tanks that is part of the ASEAN-ISIS. out this paper at the ASEAN Secretariat on August The name of this individual will remain anonymous 2006.. throughout the paper)..

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 73 ASEAN and its activities, also largely as a munity by 2020, as enshrined in the Bali result of the process of democratization Concord II (2000). This agreement pro- in the Southeast Asian region.10 ASEAN motes political, economic, and socio-cul- became of interest to non-governmental tural co-operation through the ASEAN organizations (NGOs). The participation Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN of NGOs and other civil society organi- Economic Community (AEC), and the zations (CSOs) is occasioned partly by ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community their work at the grassroots and reflects (ASCC) respectively. During the 38th an immediate response to public need.11 ASEAN Economic Ministerial Meeting CSOs in general are also “naturally issue- (AEM) held in Kuala Lumpur in August oriented or even issue specific”,12 which 2006, ASEAN announced the accelera- makes them ideal advisers to regional and tion of the creation of AEC to 2015, five international organizations. years earlier than originally planned13. Many regard the ASEAN Community as Meanwhile, Southeast Asian ASEAN’s most ambitious plan, one that CSOs themselves have been questioning has forced CSOs to take ASEAN more the need to engage with ASEAN at all. seriously. Prior to the economic crisis (1997-98 period), most Southeast Asian CSOs, apart Secondly, Southeast Asian CSOs are from the academic community, were in- increasingly of the opinion that ASEAN different to the Association. Many CSOs is a platform from which to influence saw ASEAN as an elitist club for the policy at the regional level. Although member countries’ foreign ministers, -- a the prevailing view is that regional policy club that made many regional integration is determined by domestic politics, re- initiatives without any firm commitment gional organizations influence policies at to implement them. Although NGOs the national level. In trade related issues, and grassroots organizations in South- for example, the ASEAN Secretariat has east Asia have been involved in various been keen to promote bilateral free trade regional networks, most of their activi- agreements (BFTAs), an initiative that ties have focused on campaign and advo- draws both support and concern from cacy on multilateral bodies and their ar- government officials and CSOs in the re- rangements. They paid more attention to gion. Some are concerned that BFTAs the threats posed by international orga- might damage multilateral trade negotia- 14 nizations such as the International Mon- tions under the auspices of the WTO, etary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and while others are concerned about the the World Trade Organization (WTO). potential damage that this form of trade ASEAN, on the other hand, was regarded liberalization may have on ASEAN’s 15 as a weak organization with little power own integration process. Apart from to impact on the well-being of Southeast the trade-diversion effect, pursuing dif- Asian people. ferent trade commitments can also be confusing. Headed by a staunch neo-lib- There are numerous reasons why eral, Ong Keng Yong, ASEAN believes civil society is now keen on engaging that bilateral deals are ways to iron out ASEAN. First and foremost is ASEAN’s intention to establish an ASEAN Com- 13 Global Justice Update, “ASEAN Sepakat untuk Per- cepat Integrasi Ekonomi Hingga Lima Tahun (ASEAN Agrees to Accelerate Economic Integration Until Five 10 Alexander C. Chandra, “Indonesia’s Non-State Actors Years”, Global Justice Update, Vol. IV, No. 69-70, (1-31 in ASEAN: A New Regionalism Agenda for Southeast August 2006). Asia?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2004), 14 See, for example, Martin Khor, “Bilateral/Regional 155-74. Free Trade Agreements: An Outline of Elements, 11 Leo Gordenker and T. G. Weiss, “Pluralizing Global Nature and Development Implications”, Third World Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions’,” Resurgence, Issue No. 182-183 (2005), 11-15. in NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, eds. T. G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (London: Lynne Riener Publishers 15 See, for example, Alexander C. Chandra, ‘Indonesia 1996), 17-47. and Bilateral Trade Agreements (BTAs)’, The Pacific 12 Makito, op. cit. p. 177. Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2005), 541-88.

74 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM thorny issues between two trading part- civil society can engage ASEAN and ners before they stymie larger negotia- ASEAN issues. However, civil society tions.16 While ASEAN has been actively groups have yet to consolidate among involved in this type of trade liberaliza- themselves regarding how and to what tion, Southeast Asian CSOs have been extent their engagement should be, nervously watching out for the potential thereby limiting their engagement with impacts of faster and more comprehen- ASEAN. Currently, there are two for- sive trade liberalization under BFTAs. mal forums for civil socie-ty engagement Yet, few civil society groups in the region with ASEAN, namely the ASEAN Peo- showed any interest in the BFTA nego- ple’s Assembly (APA) and the ASEAN tiations between ASEAN and China. As Civil Society Conference (ACSC). Of the a result, the ASEAN-China Free Trade two, APA is the one more recognised by Agreement was implemented in 2004 ASEAN; it is incorporated in the Vien- with little response from civil society tiane Action Program (VAP) signed dur- groups. In fact, in some countries such ing the 10th ASEAN Summit in Laos on as Indonesia, the deal went into the im- November 29, 2004. A formal network plementation phase without even parlia- represents the academic community (the mentary ratification17. ASEAN-ISIS) while some groups that attended the first ACSC in Kuala Lumpur Thirdly, while increasingly aware of in December 2005 started the Solidarity the potential harm ASEAN policies may for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) to have on policies of member countries, promote broader civil society engage- ASEAN CSOs also acknowledge the po- ment with ASEAN.18 In essence, both tential benefits that ASEAN might gen- ACSC and SAPA are considered an alter- erate for its member countries. In spite native forum and network for engaging of the 1997-98 economic crisis, ASEAN ASEAN. The new way many civil society is still in existence, proving that member groups want to engage ASEAN produced countries still believe the Association can the ACSC and subsequently SAPA. be useful. ASEAN is regarded as one of the most successful regional groupings ASEAN-ISIS and SAPA: in the world by many regional integra- Networking the Region tion observers for, inter alia, its ability to maintain stability and sustained econom- As mentioned earlier, the Southeast ic development. Member countries have Asian business community was one of enjoyed peace, and have thus been able to the few civil society groups that carried concentrate on their own economic de- out some networking within the region velopment. In other words, ASEAN can through the ASEAN-CCI. However, it be seen as a useful tool, a buffer to pre- was the academic community that has ac- vent the conflicts that plagued its mem- tive influence on many ASEAN policies. ber countries before the Association was The ASEAN-ISIS can be considered as established in 1967. the most established academic network working on ASEAN. While some might Networks and forums for engagement with ASEAN 18 There are other formal and informal networks among Southeast Asian civil society groups working on specific Over the years, forums were opened so issues. The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (WGAHRM) is one of the most no- 16 D. Arnold, Attracting FDI Through the Spread of table networks of individuals and groups that work with Free Trade Agreements: Unraveling the Rationale and governments and NGOs on the issue of human rights. Impact on Labour Conditions in ASEAN (Hong Kong, Another network of specific groups that has strong SAR: Asia Monitor Resource Centre, 2004); available advocacy is the Asia and Pacific Regional Organization from ; of Union Network International (UNI-APRO), which Internet. is a trade union network in the Asia-Pacific region. It is 17 Daniel Pambudi and Alexander C. Chandra, The not the purpose of this paper to elaborate on either of Impacts of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement on the these networks despite their increasing significance in Indonesian Economy (Jakarta: IGJ, 2006). influencing the policy of ASEAN.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 75 describe ASEAN-ISIS as a loose asso- is its attempts to act as a bridge between ciation of think-tanks, a policy-network, ASEAN policy-makers (Track 1) and the or a policy-community, those within the rest of civil society, particularly NGOs ASEAN-ISIS circle or those who have (or Track 3).22 In its Report of the Eighth been in contact with the network would Southeast Asian Forum, which was sub- see it as Track 2 diplomacy.19 The idea mitted to the ASEAN SOM in July 1998, of forming an ASEAN-ISIS emerged ASEAN-ISIS urged ASEAN to allow the from a discussion between Juruf Wanan- participation of civil society groups in its di of CSIS and an American scholar on decision making processes23. This and ASEAN Donald Emerson, in the early similar efforts facilitated the launching 1980s.20 A number of subsequent meet- of the APA. ings among like-minded Southeast Asian SAPA is another important net- institutes finally resulted in the creation work. It is a new network of South and of an ASEAN-ISIS as a formal network East Asian civil society groups, particu- of international and strategic institutes in larly NGOs, with a specific working key Southeast Asian countries. It was at group on ASEAN and the ASEAN Char- the fourth meeting of these institutes in ter. The network itself was a result of the Singapore in June 1988 that the ASEAN- Strategic Action Planning for Advocacy 21 ISIS was formally launched. meeting that was organised by several re- ASEAN-ISIS has become the key gional NGOs in Bangkok on February 3- actor in developing the concept of Track 4, 2006. The Bangkok meeting was held 2 diplomacy, or the policy dialogue be- as a result of informal consultations between government officials, think-tanks, tween the regional CSOs that attended and policy analysts. According to Caroli- the Kuala Lumpur ACSC in December na Hernandez, one of the leading figures of the previous year. The participants in the ASEAN-ISIS, the relative success at that informal meeting felt the need to of the ASEAN-ISIS in penetrating the come up with a new mechanism, either a foreign and security policy-making pro- forum or a platform, where information cesses at the regional level can be seen in and resources could be shared in order “(1) the institutionalization of meetings to enhance the effectiveness of civil so- between ASEAN-ISIS and the ASEAN ciety engagement with the various inter- Senior Official Meeting (SOM); (2) the governmental processes that have rap- 24 acknowledgement of the role of ASEAN idly risen in the region in recent years . ISIS in the Joint Communiques of the Shortly after, five regional and interna- AMM since 1991; [and] (3) the solicita- tional NGOs, including Forum Asia, the tion by ASEAN SOM of the views of Southeast Asian Committee for Advoca- ASEAN ISIS on issues they wish to be cy (SEACA), the Third World Network studied further prior to making official (TWN), and the Asian Partnership for policy.” Another important role of ISIS the Development of Human Resources in Rural Asia (AsiaDHRRA), agreed to ini- 19 Hadi Soesastro, Clara Joewono, and Carolina Hernan- tiate and facilitate the creation of SAPA. dez, ‘Introduction’, in Twenty Two Years of ASEAN ISIS: During the Bangkok meeting, working Origin, Evolution and Challenges of Track Two Diplomacy, eds. H. Soesastro et al., (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic groups were established to discuss spe- and International Studies and ASEAN Institutes for cific issues, such as the WG on Human Strategic and International Studies 2006), 1- 15. Rights Education, the WG on the Asian 20 Soesastro et al., op. cit., p. 5. People’s Charter and World Social Forum 21 The signatories of the Statutes of ASEAN-ISIS were Jusuf Wanandi (Indonesian Centre for Strategic and In- 22 ternational Studies – CSIS), Noordin Sopiee (Malaysian See, for example, Hernandez, op. cit., p. 20. 23 Institute of Strategic and International Studies – ISIS), ASEAN-ISIS, Report of the Eighth Southeast Asian Carolina Hernandez (Center for Integrative and De- Forum (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and Inter- velopment Studies – CIDS), Lau Teik Soon (Singapore national Studies, 1998). Institute of International Studies - SIIA), and Kusuma 24 Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy, SAPA: Snitwongse (the Thai Institute of Security and Interna- Background and Context, (Bangkok, Unpublished SAPA tional Studies – ISIS). documentation, 2006).

76 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM (WSF), and the WG on ASEAN and the civic organizations; it provided little op- ASEAN Charter. To date, however, it portunity to directly influence the agen- is only the WG on ASEAN that is fully da-setting of the Association. Another functional. reason for the emergence of alternative During its Consultation Meeting in forums for CSOs is the differences of Singapore on September 19, 2006, SAPA opinion between academics, such as the members agreed that the network should ASEAN-ISIS and ISEAS, and the rest of serve as an open platform for consulta- civil society, about the way ASEAN inte- tion, co-operation, and co-ordination gration should be pursued. With regard among Asian social movements and civil to economic integration, for example, society organizations, including NGOs, ASEAN-ISIS supports an open economy people’s organizations, and trade unions for ASEAN and favors trade liberaliza- who are engaged in action, advocacy, and tion26. National and regional NGOs, on lobbying at inter-governmental processes the other hand, are more cautious, fear- and organizations.25 The network also ing the possible adverse effects of trade aims to enhance co-operation among its liberalization and open economies. members and partners to increase the impact and effectiveness of their- en ASEAN-recogniZed civil gagement with inter-governmental bod- society forums ies. The main areas of engagement for SAPA include issues of democracy and APA is “a general meeting of civil soci- human rights, peace and human security, ety organizations, non-government orga- sustainable development and environ- nizations, and civic organizations from ment, as well as globalization and trade, the ten member-states of ASEAN.” ... finance and labour. Apart from ASEAN, [It] aims to serve as a vessel for articu- therefore, SAPA’s main targets include lating and conveying the people’s view the South Asian Association for Regional and interests outside of the formal po- Co-operation (SAARC), the Asian De- litical channels’”27. It was convened on velopment Bank (ADB), the Asia-Europe the rationale that the process of commu- Meeting (ASEM), the United Nations nity-building in ASEAN must include all (UN), etc. layers of society to make the Association more relevant to the ordinary citizens.28 Unlike the ASEAN-ISIS and its Prior to the launching of APA, ASEAN- APA, both ACSC and SAPA are not men- ISIS—the core of this initiative—already tioned in any existing formal ASEAN argued that interaction between Track 1 documents. The initiative to set up and Southeast Asian NGOs (or Track 3) both ACSC and SAPA was due partly should be enhanced.29 When the Thai to increasing dissatisfaction with APA’s slow progress. In fact, many CSOs that 26 See, for example, Hadi Soesastro, “ASEAN Economic participated in APA later attended the Community: Concept, Costs, and Benefits”, in ACSC and subsequently joined SAPA. Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community, ed D. Hew (Singapore: ISEAS 2005), 13-30; Dennis Hew, R. Sen, L. APA was, indeed, successful in building P. Onn, M. Sellakumaran, S. Mentreevat, and N. K. Jin, a bridge between ASEAN bureaucracy ‘ISEAS Concept Paper on the ASEAN Economic Com- and the region’s CSOs, two worlds that munity’, in Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community, ed. D. Hew (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), 293-310. had been apart for far too long. But in spite of APA, little actual engagement 27 C. G. Hernandez, “Introduction and Summary: has taken place between ASEAN and re- ASEAN People’s Assembly 2003”, in Towards an ASEAN Community of Caring Societies, ASEAN Institute of gional CSOs. After all, APA is only a gen- Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and eral meeting place for CSOs, NGOs, and Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) (Manila: ISDS, 2003), 1-9. 28 E. T. C. Cheow, “Socioeconomic Challenges for the 25 Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy, Agreement and ASEAN People’s Assembly’”, The Jakarta Post, (24 July Decisions: 2nd SAPA Consultation Meeting, Singapore, 2004); available from ; Internet. documentation, 2006). 29 M. Caballero-Anthony, ‘ASEAN ISIS and the ASEAN

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 77 Foreign Minister called for the establish- that NGOs also played a role in the for- ment of the congress of ASEAN people mation of ACSC. The ACSC, which was during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting attended by more than 120 participants (AMM) in Brunei in 1995, ASEAN-ISIS from CSOs throughout Southeast Asia, responded by introducing the idea of produced a statement to be presented to an assembly of the peoples of ASEAN, the ASEAN heads of state. This was the which transcended the idea of ASEAN first time that ASEAN Leaders had invit- officials at the time to set up a regional ed to hear representatives from civil soci- inter-parliamentary union. ASEAN-ISIS ety groups in the region on their views on wanted a more broadly representative the process of ASEAN community-build- people’s assembly that would include ing. Initially, ACSC was meant to be a representatives from various elements of one-off event, with no follow-up events civil society. planned for the subsequent ASEAN Sum- After confronting various setbacks, mit. However, during meetings between such as lack of funding and the reserva- ASEAN leaders and representatives of tion of ASEAN officials towards the civil society groups at the 11th ASEAN idea,30 the first APA was finally launched Summit, ASEAN leaders recognised the in Batam, Indonesia on November 24-25, ACSC and supported its annual conven- 2000. Currently, APA and the ASEAN- ing. ISIS are seen in the VAP as initiatives to bring the people of the region closer to The ASEAN Charter, the Association, along with the ASEAN Eminent Persons’ Group, Business Advisory Council (ABAC), the and Civil Society ASEAN Parliamentary Organization (AIPO), and the ASEAN University Net- At the 11th ASEAN Summit, with the work. There had been three additional theme “One Vision, One Identity”, APA meetings after the first one in Ba- ASEAN Leaders announced the drafting tam. The second APA was held in Bali, In- of an ASEAN Charter which would serve donesia in 2002, and the third and fourth as the legal and institutional framework in Manila, Philippines in 2004 and 2005 for ASEAN. The Charter would codify respectively. The fifth APA will again be all ASEAN norms, rules, and values, as held in Manila in December 2006. well as reaffirm many other agreements that ASEAN signed prior to the ASEAN The First ACSC, on the other hand, Charter.31 An Eminent Persons Group, was the initiative of the Malaysian govern- composed of highly distinguished and ment, which commissioned the ASEAN well respected citizens from ASEAN Study Center of the Universiti Teknologi member countries, was set up to exam- MARA (UiTM) to hold the event paral- ine and provide practical recommenda- lel to the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala tions in the making of an ASEAN Char- Lumpur, Malaysia in December 2005. ter.32 Recommendations from the EPG The event was supported by the ASEAN Secretariat, as well as another Malaysian 31 For the Declaration on the Establishment of the NGO, the Third World Network (TWN). ASEAN Charter, see ASEAN Secretariat Kuala Lumpur Although UiTM, an academic organiza- Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter (2005); available online: . difference between ACSC and APA was 32 For Terms of Reference of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter, see ASEAN Secretariat, Terms of Reference of the Eminent Persons People’s Assembly (APA): Paving a Multi-Track Ap- Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter (2005); available proach in Regional Community Building’, in Twenty Two from ; Internet; Years of ASEAN ISIS: Origin, Evolution and Challenges of Members of EPG include: Pehin Dato Lim Jock Seng Track Two Diplomacy, eds. H. Soesastro et al. (Jakarta: (Brunei), Dr. Aun Porn Moniroth (Cambodia), Ali Alatas Centre for Strategic and International Studies and (Indonesia), Khamphan Simmalavong (Laos), Tan Sri ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Stud- Musa Hitam (Malaysia - also the Chairman of the EPG), ies. 2006), 53-73. Dr. Than Nyun (Burma), Fidel V. Ramos (Philippines), 30 Caballero-Anthony, op. cit., p. 65. Prof. S. Jayakumar (Singapore), Kasemsomosorn Kasem-

78 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM will be taken into consideration during eration. The meeting was also attended the next ASEAN Summit and forwarded by representatives of the ASEAN Inter- to a High Level Task Force responsible Parliamentary Organization (AIPO) and for drafting the ASEAN Charter. Since the Working Group for an ASEAN Hu- December 2005, the EPG has met seven man Rights Mechanism. Prior to that times: the first time in Kuala Lumpur meeting, on the same day, members of after the 11th ASEAN Summit; the sec- the EPG held another special consulta- ond time in Bangkok on February 14-15, tion with representatives of ASEAN- 2006; the third in Ubud, Bali, on April ISIS. CSO representatives, under the 17-19, 2006; the fourth in Singapore on auspices of SAPA, submitted a joint in- June 27-29, 2006; the fifth in Kuala Lum- put on ASEAN political and security co- pur on August 22-24, 2006; the sixth in operation. On its first submission to the Siem Reap on September 24-26, 2006; members of EPG on the ASEAN Char- and, finally, the seventh in Brunei Darus- ter, members of SAPA expressed great salam, on November 28-29, 2006. EPG enthusiasm for an ASEAN Charter and members and civil society representa- the opportunity to engage with ASEAN tives met during the aforementioned Bali during the Charter’s creation.35 and Singapore meeting, concentrating on The second meeting between civil issues pertaining to political and security society groups and EPG members took cooperation and economic cooperation place in Singapore on June 28, 2006, respectively. Subsequently, Southeast and concentrated on economic issues in Asian civil society groups also met with the ASEAN Community. The meeting, the Special Adviser to the Philippines’ hosted by the Singaporean based think- EPG member, Fidel Ramos, to make tank, the Institute for Southeast Asian their submission on the socio-cultural Studies (ISEAS), was attended by NGO pillar and institutional mechanism issues representatives, members of the regional on November 10, 2006 in Quezon City, and national academic community based Philippines.33 Representatives of civil in Singapore, and the business commu- society groups also submitted a letter to nity (with a special meeting between the members of EPG on November 24, the EPG and an international consult- 2006, reiterating the main elements of ing firm, McKinsey and Co., conducted their three submissions34. later). SAPA reaffirmed its commitment to engage in the formation of an ASEAN Civil society submissions Charter and committed to carrying on to the EPG on the ASEAN the process after the EPG’s task would Charter have been completed. As mentioned above, the first meeting The last submission of SAPA, on took place in Ubud, Bali and concentrat- the socio-cultural pillar and ASEAN in- ed on the first main pillar of the ASEAN stitutional mechanism, was submitted in Community: political and security co-op- Quezon City, on November 10, 2006. For some practical reasons, the meeting was sri (Thailand), Nguyen Manh Cam (Vietnam). For details regarding the list of members of EPG, see ASEAN mainly attended by representatives of Secretariat 2005, List of Members of the Eminent civil society groups from the Philippines. Person’s Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter; available From the EPG side, Ambassador Rosario from ; Internet.. 33 This section gives special attention to the inputs from Manalo, special adviser to former Presi- 36 members of the civil society groups that are part of dent Ramos ,received the submission . SAPA. Inputs from the ASEAN-ISIS are well documented in Soesastro et al., op. cit., 177-91. 35 Alexander C. Chandra, “Civil Society and ASEAN 34 See, for example, Solidarity for Asian People’s Advo- Charter”, The Jakarta Post, (10 May 2006), 6. cacy, SAPA’s Letter to the Members of EPG Reiterating 36 For further details of SAPA’s submission on socio- the Main Elements of the Solidarity for Asian People’s cultural pillar and ASEAN institutional mechanism, see Advocacy (SAPA) Submissions to the Eminent Persons Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy, Solidarity for Group on the ASEAN Charter, Unpublished SAPA Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) Working Group on document (2006). ASEAN Submission on the Socio-Cultural Pillar and In-

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 79 (Editor’s note: the complete set of submissions Philippines also participated actively of the SAPA WG on ASEAN is included in in the discussion.39 Others, particularly this volume.) those representing the less democratic countries of Southeast Asia, were rela- Responses and reactions tively silent and appeared cautious about of the Eminent Persons confronting the civil society groups. It Group to civil society in- would, of course, have been more inter- puts esting if more EPG members, particularly those from Cambodia, Laos, Myan- Participation in all ASEAN decision- mar, and Vietnam (CLMV countries), making processes is a key concern for not to mention those from Singapore, civil society. CSOs are demanding a dem- showed more clearly their reactions to ocratic and inclusive process with clear the process of civil-society engagement mechanisms for participation in national with ASEAN. and regional consultations. In general, At the second meeting, the EPG the EPG concurred with the idea that Chairman again expressed his satisfac- ASEAN and the decision-making pro- tion with the contribution of civil society cess of the ASEAN Charter should be groups. There was also an interesting ex- open to civil society participation. At change on the issue of people-to-people the first meeting between the EPG and engagement. In relation to the specific civil society, members of the EPG appre- terminology used by SAPA, for example, ciated civil society’s contributions to the Fidel Ramos felt that the term people ASEAN Charter.37 In fact, SAPA was empowerment, rather than pro-people, the only group present at the meeting would be more appropriate in a Char- that had prepared a written submission. ter, as the term pro-people connotes Others, including the representatives of a top-down elitist approach that civil the Working Group on Human Rights society would rather put aside . Some Mechanism and AIPO made only oral EPG members, however, expressed their statements during the meeting. Dur- views in more subtle ways by throwing ing the meeting, Ali Alatas of Indonesia back the question on how CSOs propose stressed that the dilemma for the EPG to implement a “pro-people” policy in was whether to decide on basic princi- ASEAN . ples that provide norms, guidelines, and a framework for ASEAN cooperation It is clear that civil society groups and policy implementation; or, simply are starting to show keen interest in the to draft a recommendation that incorpo- ASEAN regional project. However, it rates all important issues that emerge in the region. He did, however, hint that has a very active civil society. He tried to assure the audience by saying that the EPG would certainly listen the EPG favored the former over the not only to the views of civil society groups, but also latter option38. Fidel V. Ramos of the parliaments and academic think tanks. For further details of Alatas’ views on the ASEAN Charter and the EPG’s engagement with representatives of civil society stitutional Mechanisms to the Eminent Persons Group groups, see, for example, The Leaders, “Interview with on the ASEAN Charter (Quezon City: Unpublished Ali Alatas”, The Leader (N/A) available online: . 37 As expressed by the EPG Chairman, Tan Sri Musa 39 Fidel Ramos was in fact one of the most active Hitam of Malaysia, during the first EPG-civil society members of the EPG in the overall EPG-civil society meeting in Ubud, Bali. engagement process. In his letter to the President of 38 In a media interview, Ali Alatas once said that civil the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, dated April society should definitely be involved in the creation 25, 2006, which reports his activities during the EPG of an ASEAN Charter. In his view, ASEAN has been and CSO meetings, former President Ramos wrote accused of being a rather comfortable club for the that he was the first EPG member who initiated con- governing elites of ASEAN for a long time. Having sultations with civil society at the national level. The served under the former Indonesian Foreign Minister, event took place in the Department of Foreign Affairs Adam Malik, or in the early years of ASEAN, Alatas of the Republic of the Philippines, on March 23, 2006, was aware of Malik’s intention to reinvent ASEAN and was attended by 30 NGO representatives as well more as a people’s organization, but with little suc- as members of the ASEAN Business Advisory Council cess. He has recently come to believe that the region (ABAC).

80 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM remains to be seen how the recommen- ASEAN and its activities is therefore tre- dations from the EPG to the High Lev- mendous. Without such popularization, el Task Force (HLTF) will be taken up. ASEAN will remain elitist. It is impera- Some CSO demands may be seen as too tive to build on the recent relative suc- radical by some ASEAN member govern- cess in widening the door for civil society ments. The participation of civil society engagement with ASEAN. Civil society groups in decision-making processes in participation must be expanded at the countries such as Burma is still limited national and local level, before this new while freedom of expression in some CSO engagement develops its own elitist of the older ASEAN members, such as tendencies. n Singapore, is still constrained. Yet, the EPG-civil society consultation process is an important step in guaranteeing an ASEAN Charter that reflects the needs and interests of all Southeast Asians.

Is There a Future for ASEAN-CS Engagement?

The long-term future of civil society engagement with ASEAN depends entirely on the ability of regional CSOs to come up with a united stance vis-à-vis ASEAN. Currently, civil society groups in South- east Asia are very much fragmented. As mentioned previously, members of the academic community and many NGO representatives hold divergent views on the way in which the ASEAN integration process should be pursued. Given ASEAN’s limited experience in allow- ing civil society groups to participate in the agenda-setting, it might be difficult for the Association to deal directly with the numerous civil society groups in the region. Another key challenge to civil society engagement with ASEAN is the Association’s lack of openness to civil society participation. Less democratic member- countries are still unsure about civil society engagement in the ASEAN process. Countries such as Burma, and even Singapore, would wish to stop civil society groups from participating in the Association’s decision-making processes.

ASEAN and its existing CSO network still need to familiarise local and national CSOs with the Association and its activities. Currently, only national and regional CSOs with regional and / or international interests are actively engaged with ASEAN. The task of popularising

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 81 82 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Engaging the ASEAN Charter Process: Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) Working Group on the ASEAN Submissions to the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter SUBMISSION ON THE SECURITY PILLAR 17 APRIL 2006, UBUD, BALI, INDONESIA

I. Introduction

e are representatives of the Solidarity for Asian People’s Ad- vocacy (SAPA), a network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations engaged in cam- Wpaigns and advocacy on various issues of public interest at the national and regional levels. SAPA network members have varied competencies in the key pillars of ASEAN cooperation, with many of us working on cross-cutting issues and advocacies.

The members of the EPG on the ASEAN Charter are: Brunei – Pehin Dato Lim Jock Seng (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade II of Brunei Darussalam); Cambodia – Dr. Aun Porn Moniroth (Advisor to the Prime Minister and Chairman of the Supreme National Economic Council of Cambodia); Indonesia – Ali Alatas (Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia); Laos – Mr. Khamphan Simmalavong (Former Deputy Minister of Lao People’s Democratic Republic); Malaysia – Tan Sri Musa Hitam/Chairman (Former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia); Myanmar – Dr. Than Nyun (Chairman of the Civil Service Selection and Training Board of the Union of Myanmar); Philippines – Fidel V. Ramos (Former President of the Philippines); Singapore – Prof. S. Jayakumar (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Law of Singapore); Thailand – Mr. Kasemsamosorn Kasemsri (Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand); Viet Nam – Mr. Nguyen Manh Cam (Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam).

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 83 SAPA welcomes the move by ASEAN as the process progresses. Our ultimate Leaders to develop an ASEAN Charter aim is to help facilitate the development as a step towards deepening integration of an ASEAN thinking and action on the in the region through the formalization Charter and on the broad issue of region- of agreements and understanding, the alism not only among organized civil so- regional recognition of rights, and the ciety groups but also among the ASEAN regionalization of standards and mecha- people. nisms. The framing of an ASEAN Char- ter represents the transformation of II. Perspectives on ASEAN and a leap towards establishing a Regionalism rules-based organization that carries the Southeast Asia is a region of diverse basic aspirations, values and ideals of the peoples and cultures. There is uneven ASEAN people. development between and within coun- SAPA acknowledges the impor- tries. The borders and political systems tant task placed upon the Eminent Per- of many nation-states of Southeast Asia sons Group on the ASEAN Charter and today were molded by colonial powers pledges its support to the EPG in this and remain colonial constructs. In a span process. SAPA commends the EPG’s rec- of less than four decades, ASEAN polity ognition of civil society’s right to partici- has developed in leaps and bounds, with pate in its deliberations, and reiterates palpable successes as well as areas in need its appeal to broaden such inclusiveness of more attention. Appreciation and rein both national and regional venues. As alization of deeper ASEAN regionalism part of civil society, we share your ideals will contribute to the resolution of long- of cogent cooperation and mutual pros- standing issues; facilitate the tackling perity for ASEAN; and, of shared rights of issues yet to be addressed in regional and benefits for its people, towards the discussions; and, forge firmer regional construction of a community of caring commitments from and among ASEAN societies. Member States and peoples. Culled from the results of the vari- Regionalism is a step towards the ous processes that civil society has initi- advancement of ASEAN people’s inter- ated and participated in, including the 15- est, by stressing mutual benefit and co- 16 April meeting in Ubud, Bali, we hereby operation among states and people. The offer our initial submission to the EPG on articulation of a people’s aspirations in a the ASEAN Charter. In this submission regional forum is a progressive step to- we outline the broad principles and high- wards protecting and furthering those light civil society perspectives that we aspirations. believe should be reflected in an ASEAN Regionalism should go beyond re- Charter. This initial submission also gives gional integration and incorporate genu- special focus on the aspects of people’s se- ine regional solidarity. The regionalism curity in line with the agenda of the EPG we opt for is people-centered and peo- meeting this week. Our subsequent sub- ple-empowered. Regionalism should be missions will focus on the other aspects a tool that will promote and strengthen of regional cooperation which will be the ASEAN cohesion; carry provisions for focus of succeeding EPG meetings. We catch-up mechanisms, and close the eco- commit to engage the entire EPG pro- nomic and political gaps among Member cess, and to pursue this process even af- States and their citizens while recogniz- ter the EPG’s task has been completed. ing diversity and promoting tolerance We are consolidating our perspectives, among Member States. Regional moni- proposals and recommendations for in- tors and regulatory mechanisms, and a clusion in the ASEAN Charter, including progressive and democratic regional po- the more specific provisions which we litical and security system, are important hope to develop and share with the EPG elements of regionalism. It is not a tool

84 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM by which Member States can retreat to cally and legally binding and enforceable the least common denominator but one in terms of providing practical remedies which will facilitate the establishment of for victims. regional rights and standards aligned to ASEAN should recognize the ur- internationally recognized and accepted gent need to establish an effective and norms. Therefore, regionalism is both an viable ASEAN human rights mechanism, offensive and defensive tool. which process has been too slow over the Regionalism is the foundation for past decade. The ASEAN Charter should ASEAN’s venture into external relations. facilitate the establishment process of ASEAN’s dealings and partnerships with such a body that is compatible with glob- its neighbors and the global community ally accepted norms and standards. should articulate and be guided by agreed The ASEAN Charter needs to rec- regional agenda. ognize the rights of workers – formal and It is with these perspectives on re- non-formal – and all migrant workers by gionalism and the importance of regional highlighting the importance of the Inter- institutions that SAPA proposes to ad- national Convention on the Protection vance the following principles for inclu- of All Migrant Workers and Members of sion in the ASEAN Charter. their Families and ILO core labor standards, and other relevant instruments. III. Regional Recognition The ASEAN Charter should also of Human Rights and clearly recognize the rights of many vul- Human Dignity nerable and marginalized groups such as Human rights and dignity are part of ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples, core values and guiding principles that farmers, fisherfolk, women, children, ASEAN has sought to uphold. Promo- migrants, internally displaced persons tion and protection of human rights and (IDPs), refugees, people with disability, dignity should be the primary goal of all etc. efforts for regional integration and cooperation undertaken by ASEAN. IV. Institutions for Re- There is a need for ASEAN to ex- gional Policy and Coop- plicitly recognize all human rights - civil, eration cultural, economic, political and social - including recently developed interna- ASEAN Security Community (ASC) tional human rights norms and standards, Our submission is based on the spirit of such as the Right to Development (1986) the ASEAN Security Community, which and the UN Declaration on Human has expressed its commitment to explore Rights Defenders (1998) at the regional innovative ways to implement the six level by ratifying existing international components and non-exhaustive list of human rights conventions. areas of activities of the Plan of Action to ensure a coordinated process of coop- The ASEAN Charter should reaf- eration with the ASEAN Security Com- firm human and people’s rights as the munity. basic foundation for ASEAN, and articulate them in terms of the promotion and Our submission focuses on op- protection of human rights in accordance erationalizing principles and references with the principles of universality, indi- with an aim to complement the current visibility, interdependence, and inter-re- framework proposed in the ASC aiming latedness. for broader definition of Security. The ASEAN Charter should take into account emerging regional contexts and conditions in order to develop effective working modalities which are politi-

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 85 Principle 1: Broader definition and Despite the effort to adopt a comprehen- reference to security sive conception of security, ASC’s threat perception is clearly objectivist in the i. Security Framework of the People: sense that threats exist and must be responded to. It is also important to con- Current ASC definitions of conventional ceive threats as risks produced by State and non-conventional security issues are policy. As such, the sources of threats comprehensive but not inclusive in terms to ASEAN security can be less external of perspective. References are made only than internal. to the State but not to the people. Given the fact that perceived non- The ASEAN Charter should have conventional security threats can also be distinctive chapters that address conven- the result of well-intentioned policies tional and non-conventional security is- which fail to adequately define and ad- sues with reference to the State as well dress the root causes of such perceived as to the people. We have enumerated in threats, the ASEAN Charter should in- Annex 1 a list of non-conventional secu- clude provisions for a more holistic analy- rity issues that ASEAN should discuss, sis of non-conventional security threats. which discussions SAPA intends to participate in. Principle 2: A more conducive polit- The ASEAN Charter should define ical environment for peace, security clearly that the responsibilities of the and stability state to protect, promote and fulfill its The ASC Plan of Action contains two obligations in respecting the rights of its conflicting statements on principle. On citizens supersede the obligations it im- one hand, the plan of action declares poses on its citizens. that the ASC process “shall be guided by well-established principles of non-inter- In addition to its recognition of ference (and) respect for national sover- women, children and migrant workers eignty”; on the other hand it asserts that as defined in the ASC plan of action, the ASEAN shall not condone undemocratic ASEAN Charter should also recognize regimes. the unique roles and rights of the Human Rights Defenders. In this regard, the ASEAN should translate into prac- ASEAN Charter should incorporate the tice its position on the ASEAN Security norms and standards in accordance with Community Plan of Action on political the United Nations (UN) Declaration on development which states that “ASEAN the Rights and Responsibilities of Indi- Member Countries shall not condone un- viduals, Groups and Organs of Society to constitutional and undemocratic changes Promote Universally Recognized Human of government or the use of their terri- Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (UN tory for any actions undermining peace, Declaration on Human Rights Defend- security and stability of other ASEAN ers, 1998). Member Countries“. On conflict prevention, conflict ASEAN also has existing security resolution and post-conflict building, the instruments such as ZOPFAN, TAC and ASEAN Charter should provide a frame- SEANWFZ and is also a member of the work and mechanisms to ensure the par- political alliance NAM. ticipation of civil society, especially at the ASEAN Charter should harmonize grassroots level, in conflict prevention the norms and standards contained in and achieving sustainable peace. these instruments that will eventually lead to a joint foreign policy to proac- ii. Objective and Non-objective security tively create a peaceful, prosperous and threats independent zone that is free from all external military influences. This includes

86 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM inter alia the eventual removal and ban of enshrined in the Right to Development, any foreign military bases in ASEAN. and further define clearly the inter-linkage of the Rights to Development and Principle 3: Introducing Human Se- disarmament, by reducing the military curity expenses and increasing spending on de- The current ASC Framework does not velopment issues, in line with the ASC’s contain any specific reference to Human overall goal to create a conducive politi- Security based on the protection and em- cal atmosphere for states to live in har- powerment of the people. mony and peace with each other. Human Security encompasses not only freedom from violence but also free- Principle 5: Defining ASEAN key dom from threats to people’s lives, includ- stakeholders ing hunger, poverty, disease, marginaliza- The full realization of ASEAN Vision tion and exclusion. Human security also 2020, especially in the areas of the com- hinges upon environmental integrity and prehensive security, will require the full ecological security that safeguard against participation of the various stakehold- degradation and destruction that cause ers with their distinctive identities. Each disease, harsh living conditions, and loss of these stakeholders takes on different of lives and livelihoods. Competition for roles and operates within a specific set of and over-exploitation of the environment values at the various stages of the com- also causes displacement and breakup of prehensive security framework. communities, and give rise to aggression The ASEAN Charter should recog- and armed conflicts. nize clearly this diversity and the poten- The ASEAN Charter should broad- tial contributions of these key stakehold- ly define human security, allocate a spe- ers in the full realization of the vision of cific chapter addressing the issue, and the ASC. These key stakeholders include contain provisions that will lead to the inter alia: implementation of its values. i. Peoples Movements/organizations Principle 4: Harmonizing existing ii. Trade Unions ASEAN instruments and norms iii. NGOs with international norms and iv. Media standards v. Parliamentarians The current ASC Plan of Action under vi. National Human Rights Institutions/ section 1.2 Shaping and Sharing of Norms domestic human rights institutions does not contain adequate reference to vii. Academic institutions the international human rights framework, which should serve as a common The ASEAN Charter should facilitate framework regardless of ideologies and the effective engagement of these diverse historical cultural differences. stakeholders within ASEAN mechanisms. The ASEAN Charter should mainstream rights based approaches in har- The ASEAN Charter should clearly mony with international standards and provide for the participation of the peo- norms in all its deliberations and in per- ple in the policy making processes which forming its collective responsibilities for affect them. the region. V. Advancing a Process for The Right to Development has been an ASEAN Charter the ardent framework by the majority of The ASEAN Charter outlines the re- ASEAN members at various global plat- sponsibilities and obligations of Member forms. In line with this sprit, the ASEAN States as well as the rights and freedoms Charter should adopt the full norms as of ASEAN people, and determines how

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 87 much of their national flexibilities they tations on the Charter must be con- will yield in favor of regional agreements. ducted. There must be parallel na- As such, the ASEAN Charter will have tional EPG consultation processes wide ranging impacts on the citizens of similar to the ones carried out in the ASEAN and its various institutions. The Philippines. drafting of the ASEAN Charter there- • When mainstreaming the idea of fore requires the broad participation of a Charter, creative forms of commu- citizens from all Member States. While nication should be employed to reach constructive engagement is one of our the widest segment of the ASEAN responsibilities as civil society, it is the population. Such forms of communi- obligation of ASEAN and its Member cation should enable concerned citi- States to provide mechanisms for trans- zens not otherwise able to participate parent and democratic participation and directly in consultation meetings to genuine consultation. register their views on the process We propose a democratic and inclu- and substance of the ASEAN Char- sive process for the ASEAN Charter that ter. will include the following: We in SAPA are more than willing to engage in this process, to devote time • Regional civil society consulta- and other resources to facilitate the in- tions must be called not only by the clusion of various stakeholders, and to EPG but also by the ASEAN Leader- work with the EPG and ASEAN to create ship when considering the EPG rec- awareness and develop a discourse on the ommendations. Consultations initi- ASEAN Charter. We offer our distinct ated by the EPG must not supplant strengths: experience with grounded re- national processes and mechanisms ality, engagement at the national level, for consultations and discussions commitment to regional solidarity, and meant to gather as many views and global perspective. inputs on the Charter from the wid- We will be conducting national and est possible segment of the popula- regional civil society meetings to dis- tion. cuss regionalism and the ASEAN, and to • Civil society should be encour- gather inputs for the ASEAN Charter. In aged to initiate consultations and these meetings, we expect the participa- discussions among their constituents tion of the EPG members and ASEAN and community partners on various related bodies, at both national and re- aspects of the Charter, and submit gional levels. the results of these discussions to the In addition to this initial submis- designated national and/or regional sion, we will continue our engagement mechanisms as their formal inputs to and contribute further submissions in the Charter. This should give us the subsequent EPG consultation processes, space to conduct our own consulta- and our members will actively partici- tions and discussions, and ensure that pate in parallel national EPG processes. our inputs from such engagement are In particular, we express our desire for recognized as official contributions a similar open consultation process to to the Charter. be held for the EPG meeting to discuss • ASEAN must adopt mechanisms economy and trade in Singapore in June, for consultation at the regional level. and register our intention to join that This is particularly important for process. n countries where there is little space for civil society to engage or even be consulted at the national level. • For both the EPG and ASEAN processes, broader national consul-

88 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM ANNEX List of Non-Conventional Security Issues 1. Banned weapons; 2. Trans-boundary environmental issues (e.g. haze and pollution, over extraction); 3. Transnational crimes; 4. Drug trafficking; 5. Trafficking in persons (including women and children for prostitu tion and labor); 6. Terrorism; 7. Transnational Corporate crimes; 8. Enforced slavery; 9. Economic crimes; 10. Trans-boundary health problems (e.g. SARS, HIV/AIDS, etc.); 11. Internal conflicts (including isues on refuges and internally displaced persons); 12. People’s mobility, including undocumented migration; 13. Non-objective security threats (e.g. food security, economic/structural adjustments); 14. etc.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 89 90 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM SUBMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC PILLAR 28 JUNE 2006, SINGAPORE

I. Introduction

e are the Working Group on ASEAN of the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA), a network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations, Wtrade unions, and participants in the First ASEAN Civil Society Con- ference (ACSC I, 2005), engaged in campaigns and advocacy on various issues of public interest at the national and regional levels. SAPA network members have varied competencies in the key pillars of ASEAN cooperation, with many of us working on cross-cutting issues and advocacies.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 91 SAPA WG on the ASEAN thanks the regionalism. Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Regionalism is founded on citizen’s Charter for continuing the engagement rights and the cultivation of democratic with civil society on the ASEAN Charter processes. An active citizenry that par- process. SAPA WG on ASEAN reaffirms ticipates in democratic political life pro- its commitment to engage in the process motes dynamic economic development initiated by the Eminent Persons Group and peaceful diversity. An accountable on the ASEAN Charter, and recommits public leadership and efficient govern- itself to engage in the process beyond the ment should take place amidst popular completion of the EPG’s task. mandate and legitimacy. This is a follow-up to our initial Economic regionalism promotes submission on people’s security in the economic justice. The goal of economic last meeting of the EPG on the ASEAN cooperation is the pursuit of sustainable Charter in Ubud, Bali. development, equity, inclusion, and empowerment. The pursuit of ASEAN eco- II. Perspectives on nomic development shall not be at the Economic Regionalism expense of labor, environment, and hu- The SAPA Working Group on the man rights standards. Regional economic ASEAN reiterates its broad perspectives initiatives should be open and transpar- on regionalism, as articulated in its initial ent. It puts people at the center and submission. seeks their participation. o Regionalism is a step towards Economic regionalism promotes the advancement of ASEAN people’s solidarity. Regional economic coopera- interest, by stressing mutual benefit tion and integration facilitates greater in- and cooperation among states and teraction and understanding among citi- people. zens of ASEAN, helps define identity and o Regionalism should go beyond promotes solidarity. It also brings about regional integration and incorporate increased welfare that helps reduce social genuine regional solidarity. and border tension. Regional economic integration should prioritize people to o Regionalism is the foundation people exchange (trade, interaction etc.) for ASEAN’s venture into external as its core principle. relations.

Southeast Asia is an economically III. Institutions for diverse region, with countries having vari- Regional Policy and able levels of development and capacities Cooperation to respond to globalization and change, and to the needs of its citizens. The de- ASEAN Economic Community velopment gap reduces the capability of (AEC) the region to maximize its potentials and increases social tensions. Many ASEAN Principle 1: Economic Integration countries also face the challenge of un- In the ASEAN region and worldwide, sustainable debts. Moreover, the financial there are diverse markets whose linkages crisis of 1997 showed the vulnerability of must be explored and creatively inter- even the more prosperous countries to connected. A “one size fits all” economic the impacts of the global market. policy of trade and financial liberaliza- This is the backdrop against which tion will only lead to the greater concen- economic cooperation and integration tration of market shares for transnational of ASEAN takes place. It is within this corporations and consequently marginal- context that SAPA proposes to advance ize other markets. the following perspectives on economic

92 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Most of the member countries of cial resources and expertise. ASEAN are agricultural economies, with The ASEAN Charter should have a primarily rural population whose live- principles that protect regional curren- lihood depends on subsistence agricul- cies from the vagaries of the global domi- ture. Hunger, poverty and dispossession nant currency exchange system. It should brought about by unsustainable agribusi- also prepare the region for an indepen- ness and industrial policies plague small- dent exchange system based on mutu- scale agricultural producers. The region ally beneficial and acceptable values to is prone to natural and human-made di- ensure stability and encourage increased sasters which make the agriculture sector intra-regional trade. It should uphold most vulnerable. principles that increase the capacity to There are significant numbers of generate capital from within the region, people in ASEAN countries depending and values that guide the judicious use of on the informal sector whose contribu- such capital. tion to the ASEAN economy should be The ASEAN Charter should have recognized. specific provisions for the disciplining and regulation of the financial market, The ASEAN Charter should: and increase the capacity of the region - Recognize a policy mix that to monitor fluctuations and impending is informed by heterodox economic crises. thinking and policy analyses; and, The ASEAN Charter should have - Integrate a strong social pro- provisions for the establishment of a tection element in economic devel- workable ASEAN Development Fund for opment that is founded on redistrib- innovative home-grown initiatives, with utive justice, poverty eradication and easy access for Member Countries expe- growth with equity and non-discrimi- riencing balance of payments problems. nation. There should be specific provisions to develop capacity and mechanisms to as- The ASEAN Charter should en- sist Members with unsustainable debts. shrine the values of agrarian reform, justice, and food sovereignty. It should have The ASEAN Charter should envi- provisions for institutions to safeguard sion a ‘debt free’ ASEAN. capacity for social reforms like land reform, urban reform, etc. and mechanisms Principle 3: Regional Harmoniza- to level the playing field. tion and Complementation in In- dustry, Agriculture and Services The ASEAN Charter should inte- An export-oriented growth strategy based grate a Food and Water framework that on unsustainable natural resource and un- upholds every ASEAN citizen’s human skilled labor extraction has been proven right to food, water and livelihood. as a failure. A dynamic agro-industrial model underpinned by a strong science Principle 2: Financial and Monetary and technology program responds to sus- Stability tainable growth and the collective good. The realization of the ASEAN Economic The ASEAN Charter should en- Community will require that regional fi- shrine principles that: nancial and monetary volatilities are ad- - Move away from economic dressed; the development gap between activities based largely on natural re- and among Member States and citizens source extraction; are closed; and national potentials are fully developed through innovative ap- - Promote economic growth an- proaches and exchange/sharing of finan- chored in and driven by rural industrialization;

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 93 - Promote appropriate sustain- ASEAN foreign direct investments. able industrial development based on The ASEAN Charter should harmonization and complementation strengthen the legal and policy frame- of industries; work that upholds the “social function of - Promote public investment property”. through regional support mechanisms, example of which is the pro- On Intellectual Proper- motion of science and technology for ty Rights (IPR): the regional collective good. A sound Intellectual Property Rights regime is a means, but is not an end in itself; On the ASEAN Free Trade the public good is the ultimate standard Area (AFTA): which IPRs must serve. As a community The ASEAN Charter should have prin- of developing nations, ASEAN should ciples that affirm the rights of Member review and creatively adjust such IPR re- States to implement national/regional gimes against the benchmark of how well measures that: they achieve development goals. - Regulate/manage trade of sen- The ASEAN Charter should: sitive products (e.g. food); and, - Ensure food security and pro- - Uphold the Convention on tect the livelihoods of small-scale pro- Biodiversity that is a key instrument ducers and vulnerable communities. for sustainable development and poverty eradication, including strength- On the ASEAN Framework ening regional capacity for combating Agreement on Services bio-piracy by transnational corpora- (AFAS): tions; - Encourage research and man- The ASEAN Charter should recognize ufacture of generic drugs and the the different types of labor movements practice of compulsory licensing and and support full labor rights. It should parallel importing to respond to pan- promote equality in the development of demics and illnesses; human resources, and provide for mechanisms to develop standards and certifica- - Translate the precautionary tion. principle into concrete pro-people policies and programs; and, On ASEAN Investment Area - Promote alternatives to the (AIA): enclosure of knowledge by promot- Strong economic integration implies the ing Open Standards, Open Access to need for greater capacity to generate do- content, and Free/Open Source Soft- mestic savings and investments. It also ware etc. requires the just recognition of labor’s contributions and their rights, includ- Principle 4: Human Resources ing those of migrant workers. Labor export promotion should not substitute for People are not tradable commodities. sound national domestic employment The ASEAN Charter should pro- policy. mote and respect the human and trade The ASEAN Charter should provide union rights of its people and formulate for mechanisms that increase Member policies and programs on human resource Countries’ capacity for internal savings development that will not infringe on generation, investment and job creation. these rights. The ASEAN Charter should uphold The ASEAN Charter should have labor rights especially in relation to inter- specific chapters on cooperation -in re

94 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM gional human resource development. It Principle 6: Harmonizing Existing should provide for mechanisms and in- Norms and Mechanisms to Address centives to ensure domestic employment Trans-Boundary Economic Con- in critical industries and services. cerns Economic integration requires that Trans-boundary concerns in ASEAN en- citizens of ASEAN are equipped with compass environmental, trade and human necessary skills and training that match rights-related issues. These issues are of- the needs of their own economies first ten the result of unbridled economic de- to ensure sustainable development and velopment in the ASEAN region. equitable growth. The ASEAN Charter should provide for enhanced cooperation The ASEAN Charter should: and exchange in science and technology - Have provisions that address research and development. cross-border economic and social issues like smuggling, dumping of toxic Principle 5: Labour Rights wastes, migration, trans-boundary Economic integration should promote pollution, transnational territorial decent and full employment as well as waters, trafficking, etc.; non-discrimination in labor rights. - Enshrine the principles for en- Southeast Asia has a large popula- gaging the international trading sys- tion of labor migrants, many of whose tem, primarily targeting the follow- rights are violated on the basis of their ing: elimination of dumping; curbing race, ethnicity, gender or creed. Labor of overproduction; regulation of migration provides significant economic transnational corporations; control contributions to both sending and receiv- of imports through various trade in- ing countries. Remittances from labor struments, and the strengthening of migrants can be an additional means for state interventions in domestic and just and people-centered development, external trade to stabilize domestic provided that appropriate institutional price and supply; and ensure that the support and economic opportunity ex- poor has access to cheap and nutri- isted. tious food at all times;

The ASEAN Charter should: - Recognize that Member States - Enshrine international core labor have the primary responsibility to standards: freedom of association, promote, protect and fulfill human the right to organize and bargain col- rights recognized in international as lectively, elimination of all forms of well as national law, including ensur- forced or compulsory labor, abolition ing that all transnational corpora- of child labor, and elimination of all tions and other business enterprises forms of discrimination at the work- operating in the ASEAN region re- place. spect human rights and not control - Provide for a mechanism for the the market; mutual recognition and accreditation - Adopt the Bangkok Declara- of skills by Member States; tion on Irregular Migration and the - Enshrine the principle of equal UN Optional Protocol on Trafficking treatment, and adopt standard em- of Persons, Especially Women and ployment contracts that protect the Children; rights and well-being of native and - Incorporate the precautionary migrant labor alike; principle (Principle 15 of the Rio Dec- - Uphold the International Con- laration) in regional development and vention on the Protection of the mechanisms to address trans-bound- Rights of All Migrant Workers and ary environmental and health issues; Members of their Families.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 95 - Adopt Principle 10 of the Rio Principle 8: Sustainable Production Declaration (access to information, and Consumption, Energy and public participation in decision mak- Development ing processes, environmental justice) Countries in the ASEAN are endowed and ensure freedom of expression with rich and diverse natural resources, (media and press) to facilitate a time- but these resources are under threat of ly regional response to trans-bound- overexploitation and extinction. ary environmental disasters; Economic development is invari- The ASEAN Charter should: ably linked to a secure and peaceful so- - Enshrine the principle of ciety where peoples are able to enjoy sustainable development espoused fundamental freedoms and quality of life. by the Rio Summit of 1992 and reaf- Regional cooperation, therefore, should firmed by the World Summit of Sus- not use security legislation and controls tainable Development in 2002; to impede the movement of workers and - Adopt the principle of sus- their families, or destroy informal cross- tainable food, water and agricultural border trade on which rural communities system at the local and national lev- depend for their livelihood. els; - Envision an industrial produc- Principle 7: Increased Support to tion system that is clean, resource- Small-Scale Producers to Build and energy- efficient and sustainable; their Potential - Establish mechanisms for Small-scale producers refer to owner-cul- the promotion of renewable energy tivators with small landholdings, landless sources; and, tenants, subsistence and artisanal fish- - Promote sustainable con- erfolks, indigenous peoples, agricultural sumption. workers, home-based and informal workers, and producers. A just economic inte- Principle 9: Implementation, gration prioritizes and primarily benefits Monitoring and Mechanisms for these sectors. Adherence The ASEAN Charter ASEAN Member Countries have ad- should: opted many regional and international agreements to promote socio-economic - Operationalize the commit- principles, but they have different capac- ments made during the 1996 World ities to adhere to those agreements. Food Summit convened by the Food And Agriculture Organization at the The ASEAN Charter should pro- United Nations; vide mechanisms that will help member - Enshrine pro-poor policies countries to adhere to the ideals of the ensuring equitable access to and own- Charter. ership of markets and productive Principle 10: Social Dialogue resources such as land, water, seeds, capital, and appropriate technology. Full and meaningful participation of civil The ASEAN shall also provide sup- society at all levels of decision-making port services, safety nets and social ensures more effective and equitable ben- protection measures to small produc- efits sharing, and strengthens economic ers; and, integration. - Institutionalize disaster management mechanisms. The ASEAN Charter should uphold the principle of social dialogue and consultation with civil society and social movements.

96 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM IV. Moving Forward SAPA commits itself to enrich its inputs to a series of national consultations on the ASEAN Charter, and in the Second ASEAN Civil Society Conference to be held in the Philippines, December 2006. It is also committed to further consultation with the EPG members, and in the follow-up processes leading to the drafting of the ASEAN Charter. SAPA expresses its continued appeal to the EPG to broaden their consultation process to include other civil society groups at the national and regional levels. SAPA also appeals to ASEAN member governments and the ASEAN Secretariat to assist the EPG to make such a process possible. n

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 97 98 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM SUBMISSION ON THE SOCIO-CULTURAL PILLAR AND INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM 10 NOVEMBER 2006, QUEZON CITY, PHILIPPINES

I. Introduction

The Working Group on ASEAN of the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) thanks the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter for continuing the engagement with civil society on the ASEAN Charter process. This is the last installment of our submission, following initial submissions on people’s security and the economic pillar during the EPG on the ASEAN Charter meetings in Ubud, Bali in April and Singapore in June.

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 99 The Philippine-based members of the Socio-cultural community promotes Working Group specially appreciate tolerance and respect for diversity as it this meeting with Ambassador Rosario forges an ASEAN identity and celebrates Manalo, Special Adviser to the Philippine common cultural heritage. Genuine re- EPG Member, Former President Fidel V. gional cooperation builds social cohesion Ramos, at which time this submission is by promoting participation, dialogues formally conveyed. and convergences thus minimizing conflict arising from political and cultural II. Perspectives on Socio- differences. Cultural Community Regional integration leads to com- The SAPA Working Group on the mon prosperity, where everyone has a ASEAN reiterates its broad perspectives dignified place on the table. Regional- on regionalism, as articulated in its initial ism promotes equity not just between submissions. ASEAN states and societies but also o Regionalism is a step towards between social groups within societies. the advancement of ASEAN people’s A truly functioning regional community interest, by stressing mutual benefit acknowledges that the promotion and and cooperation among states, com- protection of social, gender, and environ- munities and people. mental justice and equity, is a responsibility that cuts across the local, national, o Regionalism should go beyond regional and international governance regional economic integration and in- spheres. corporate genuine regional solidarity. A caring and sharing community is o Regionalism is the foundation people-centered and people-empowered. for ASEAN’s venture into external The goal of regional integration is to pro- relations. mote the interest of peoples and commu- o Regionalism is founded on nities through active citizenship, coop- citizen’s rights and the cultivation of eration and democratic participation. democratic processes. o Regionalism promotes eco- III. Regional Recognition nomic justice and well-being. of Human Rights and Southeast Asia enjoys a diversity of Human Dignity as cultures, peoples, religions and heritage. Foundation of Community This diversity shapes the differing ways Human rights and dignity are part of that people and communities respond core values and guiding principles that to political and economic realities and ASEAN has sought to uphold. Promo- changes within the region. It is in celebra- tion and protection of human rights and tion of this diversity that SAPA proposes dignity should be the primary goal of all to advance the following perspectives on efforts for regional integration and coop- ASEAN as a socio-cultural community. eration undertaken by ASEAN. Regionalism is founded on the rec- There is a need for ASEAN to ex- ognition, promotion and protection of plicitly recognize all core human rights human and community rights. The foun- including recently signed international dation of our envisioned regionalism agreements that expand on human rights is the increasing realization of human norms and standards. rights in ways that acknowledge human The ASEAN Charter should strong- beings as members of socio-cultural com- ly reaffirm human rights as its basic foun- munities in which all work together to- dation, and articulate these through the ward achieving common ethical norms adoption of appropriate mechanisms. and set of obligations for ensuring human dignity. IV. Institutions for Region-

100 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM al Policy and Cooperation peace, development and regional solidarity through interfaith dialogue. ASEAN Socio-Cultural Com- munity (ASCC) Principle 3: Entitlements and Freedoms Principle 1: Adherence to Interna- Every ASEAN citizen is entitled to en- tional Norms joy all the freedoms and rights enshrined ASEAN states and governments commit in the UN Charter, declarations, trea- to honor international obligations to pro- ties, conventions, and other multilater- mote human rights and sustainable devel- ally agreed instruments. ASEAN states opment. and governments are bound to honor and The principles should not be com- promote these rights and freedoms, as promised by economic and trade, as well reaffirmed in the 2000 Millennium Dec- as security commitments. laration. The right to food, water, shelter, basic health services, essential medicines, Principle 2: Harmony and Cultural education, and other social services Diversity should be inviolable and not subject to the vagaries of the market and negative The ASEAN Charter should rec- state imposed practices. ognize the diversity of cultures, peoples, religions and heritage of ASEAN societies. It should therefore uphold equality, Principle 4: Environmental inclusion, and non-discrimination, and Sustainability should provide mechanisms for states to Development of the region must be sus- enable citizens, regardless of ethnicity, to tainable and therefore within the carry- deepen and enrich this diversity. ing capacity of its ecosystems and must The ASEAN Charter should rec- not destroy cultures and the rights of ognize the vital link between culture, communities to their resources. language and traditional knowledge and ASEAN commits to the highest people’s ways of life to the procurement environmental standards enshrined in of people’s basic needs and achievement various multilateral environmental agree- of happiness and freedoms. States should ments (MEAs) by translating this into protect traditional knowledge and pro- local, national and regional sustainability vide the enabling environment for the plans and environmental policies and pro- preservation and enhancement of peo- grams. It shall adhere to the principle of ple’s language, culture and heritage, in common but differentiated responsibility pursuit of sustainable development and in addressing past damage, and present vibrant democracy. and future efforts in rehabilitation of the ASEAN should provide a mecha- environment. It commits to reverse the nism to regulate production, consump- decline of biodiversity and to restore the tion and distribution systems that tend rich biological diversity of the region. It to “homogenize culture” including food commits to the stabilization of the global consumption systems, especially those climate by striving for an urgent shift to that impact negatively on people’s rights, clean production and renewable energy people’s health and the environment. systems. It will adhere to the precautionary principle in face of uncertainty of The ASEAN Charter should have impacts of development activities and principles that ensure Member States’ re- adoption of technologies. spect for religious beliefs and practices. It should also create an enabling environment for religious dialogue and pluralism, and enable peoples to tap their cultural and religious resources for tolerance,

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 101 Principle 5: Rights to Shared rights, empowerment and development, Resources in particular the International Bill of Rights for Women (CEDAW). It should We recognize that certain natural, ma- upgrade the existing regional mechanism terial, and nonmaterial resources are by for the advancement of women, and in- their very nature part of a shared resource stitutionalize gender statistics in the (communal resources, ancestral domains, ASEAN Baseline Monitoring Indicators. the “commons”) which should transcend conventional property rights as they rep- The ASEAN Community should resent shared environmental resource achieve and surpass the universally agreed and/or socio-cultural heritage. minimum targets on women’s participation in decision making and leadership. A rich public domain of knowledge available to all is essential and provides the grounds for the positive development Principle 8: Protection of the of intellectual creativity, technological Rights and the Development of innovation, and effective use of these the Full Potentials of Children and technologies. This is threatened by the Youth increasing privatization of knowledge ASEAN should provide special protec- production, and restrictive intellectual tion to children and youth because they property rights rules that result in mo- are still in the dependent, formative and nopoly control over knowledge, innova- potentially vulnerable stage. Support tions and public goods. from government and society is needed for them to be able to enjoy their equal The ASEAN Charter should estab- rights and to be protected from violence, lish an appropriate regime that protects armed conflicts, exploitation, abuse and shared resources, and the intellectual and neglect. cultural rights of citizens and communities from commercial exploitation. The ASEAN Charter should ensure the full implementation of the Conven- Principle 6: Recognition and tion on the Rights of the Child as well Protection of Migrants as the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed Regardless of the reasons for movement, conflict. The ASEAN Charter should ex- migration contributes to economic de- plicitly prohibit the use of child soldiers velopment, the socialization of ASEAN in situations of armed conflict. identity, and the fostering of greater cultural understanding, including work ethic and social interaction. Principle 9: The Role of a Free, Independent and Plural Media The ASEAN Charter should recog- The role of media in producing, gathering nize the valuable multi-faceted contribu- and distributing information and knowl- tion of migrants, and thus promote the edge is integral to advancing sustainable human rights of migrants as workers and and people-centered development, and as inhabitants. Such a human rights ap- fostering democratic governance. The proach to migration should not be jeop- ASEAN Charter should ensure media ardized by security, population and labor freedom and plurality, and protect the management policies. independence of media professionals and creators. Universal access programs Principle 7: Women’s Socio- through various means including the in- Cultural Rights ternet and community media should be The ASEAN Charter should have spe- promoted. Security and other similar cific provisions that echo and implement considerations should not compromise already existing agreements signed by freedom of expression, media freedom ASEAN Countries regarding women’s and diversity.

102 | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Principle 10: Appropriate and awareness on human rights among peo- People-Centered Science and ple in the region; and, providing effective Technology Development compliance and redress mechanisms. ASEAN Member Countries have differ- ASEAN should be an institution ent levels of science and technology de- that is capable of addressing trans-bound- velopment. ary economic, social and environmental conflicts in a peaceful and just manner, Regional programs and initiatives through diplomacy beyond the current should be adopted to facilitate the shar- ineffective ASEAN Way. ASEAN should ing of appropriate knowledge and tech- not use force or the threat of force against nologies among Member Countries. its Member States or any member of the Technology sharing and exchange should community of nations. respond to the actual needs of the people and should empower communities. ASEAN should be an institution ASEAN Member States should adopt that upholds people’s participation. The collective measures to improve the qual- ASEAN Charter should incorporate ity of education in the region. mandatory social dialogue and consultation with civil society, workers organiza- The ASEAN Charter should pro- tions and social movements, to ensure mote access of people to knowledge and their access to decision making processes technologies that respond to their needs at all levels, and guarantee their full par- and situations. ticipation in economic, social, cultural Clear provisions should be laid and political life. This will help ensure down in the Charter to ensure that IPR responsive decisions, effective and equi- will not be used as a tool for biopiracy table benefits sharing, and to strengthen and monopoly control over the commer- regional cohesion and integration. Spe- cial utilization of natural resources. cifically, the ASEAN Charter should institutionalize the ASEAN Civil Society V. Institutional Conference that provides an open and Mechanisms for accountable space for civil society to dia- Responsive Regionalism logue with ASEAN, even as civil society The ASEAN we aspire for represents a continues to pursue various tracks of en- community of states and nations that gagement and employs a range of actions. champions human rights, democracy, It should also provide for automatic civil peace, human development, economic society observer seats in key regional de- justice, tolerance, cooperation and soli- cision making bodies involving economy darity. It is a community that strengthens and trade, environment, security and so- the interaction and exchange between cio-cultural concerns. peoples and communities. To have credibility, ASEAN re- ASEAN should be an institution gional agreements should be subject to that recognizes universally-accepted stringent rules of accountability and har- rights and standards, including core labor monization with human rights standards. standards, and provides mechanisms for Regional agreements should be affirmed monitoring and securing compliance at by National Parliaments. ASEAN should the national and regional levels. establish mechanisms for the dissemi- nation of and consultation on regional In the area of human rights, the agreements and institute regular review ASEAN Charter should mandate the clauses therein. immediate creation of a regional human rights body responsible for, among others: ASEAN should be an institution monitoring and reporting human rights that provides institutional, political and conditions within the region; investigat- financial support for security, econom- ing human rights violations; developing ic and socio-cultural cooperation. The

REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | 103 ASEAN Charter should enshrine the termining the future of ASEAN. principle of coordination and harmoni- The SAPA Working Group on zation of national and regional initiatives ASEAN thanks the EPG on the ASEAN in the different pillars of cooperation. It Charter, especially Former President Fi- should clearly identify budgetary and fidel V. Ramos, through his adviser Am- nancial responsibilities of Member States bassador Rosario Manalo, for the op- for regional initiatives. portunity to make submissions. We will consolidate this and the two prior sub- V. Securing a Process for missions and will make the consolidated the ASEAN Charter submission our basis for a broad public The Solidarity for Asian People’s Advoca- education program on the ASEAN Char- cies (SAPA) Working Group on ASEAN ter.n entered the ASEAN Charter process with the view of pushing for the kind of regionalism that we want, with good faith and seeking meaningful engagement. We understand that the finalization of an ASEAN Charter may take a long time. However, while awaiting the finalization of the ASEAN Charter, SAPA WG on ASEAN maintains that the principles, perspectives and proposals advanced in this and prior submissions should already be given expression and implemented in ASEAN through the Vientiane Action Plan and subsequent ASEAN work programs, and other ASEAN regional initiatives. On the issue of drafting the ASEAN Charter, we reiterate our call for broad- based consultations at the regional and national level. The Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter opened up spaces for civil society to have some engagement in the process. Such engagement was made possible by the relative independence and autonomy of the EPG process from the day to day business of ASEAN and its structure. SAPA strongly recommends that the High Level Task Force that will take over from the EPG and take on the task of drafting the ASEAN Charter should enjoy a similar independence and autonomy from the ASEAN structure. Before the ASEAN Charter can take effect, it should be ratified through referendum in all Member States. This is to ensure that the ASEAN Charter is made known to all ASEAN citizens, and that they are given the direct hand in de-

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