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Revisiting Southeast Asian Regionalism December, 2006 Focus on the Global South c/o CUSRI, Chulalongkorn University Bangkok 10330 THAILAND Tel : 662 218 7363 / 7364 / 7365 / 7383 Fax: 662 255 9976 Email: [email protected] Web page : http://www.focusweb.org on the FOCUSGlobal South Revisiting Southeast Asian Regionalism A publication of FOCUS ON THE GLOBAL SOUTH December 2006 FOCUS on the GLOBAL SOUTH is a policy research and advocacy center based in Bangkok, Thailand with offices in Manila, Philippines and Mumbai, India. Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute (CUSRI) Wisit Prachuabmoh Bldg. Chulalongkorn University Phyathai Road Bangkok 10330 Thailand Tel: +66 2 218 7363 to 65 Fax: +66 2 255 9976 E-mail: [email protected] Web page: www.focusweb.org Printed in the Philippines by Cor-Asia, Inc. Table of Contents Building Community: The Search for Alternative Regionalism in Southeast Asia 1 Jenina Joy Chavez Neo-liberalism and the Working People of Southeast Asia 11 Rene Ofreneo China and Southeast Asia: Emerging Problems in an Economic Relation 23 Walden Bello Welcome China!: China’s Rise and its Increasing Role in ASEAN 27 Dorothy Guerrero Development and Plunder in the Mekong Region 33 Shalmali Guttal Raising a Different Flag: Struggles for Self-Determination in Southeast Asia 49 Herbert Docena Democracy and Human Rights in ASEAN 63 Rashid Kang The Role of Non-State Actors in ASEAN 71 Alexander Chandra Engaging the ASEAN Charter Process: 83 Submissions to the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy Submission on the Security Pillar 83 Submission on the Economic Pillar 91 Submission on the Socio-Cultural Pillar 99 ANNEXES: Understanding ASEAN 105 Julie de los Reyes and Mary Ann Manahan ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 118 Building Community The Search for Alternative Regionalism in Southeast Asia JENINA JOY CHAVEZ hen the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967, the original members did not have an a priori vision of what they wanted the Association to be. It Wwould take another 30 years before the vision of an ASEAN Commu- nity1 would emerge. ASEAN members are now preparing to flesh this out in an ASEAN Charter. 1ASEAN Leaders, “ASEAN Vision 00”,(Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1997). An Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter was formed in December 005 to draft recommendations on the content of the Charter. The Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) Working Group on ASEAN made three submissions to the EPG in April, June and November 006. In coordination with SAPA WG on ASEAN partners, seven national consultative processes on the Charter and on general issues of engagement with ASEAN were also held between September and November 006. The complete set of submissions is included in this volume. REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | The ASEAN Charter has drawn a lot of INTEGRATION WITHOUT interest among civil society and social A CLEAR VISION movements who see the process as an op- At 40, ASEAN is considered one of the portunity to bring to the regional arena most established regional groupings in aspects of their advocacy that are region- the world. However, this staying power al in nature. Throughout 006, many civil veils the absence of a clear vision for the society groups expressed their aspirations region. ASEAN still has no strong iden- for regionalism by submitting inputs to tification with or articulation of regional the Charter. Despite limited engagement interest despite its years. It has achieved with ASEAN in the past, the submissions success in cozy diplomatic relations that were put together with relative ease be- serves the interest and provides comfort cause they are based on existing local, na- to the political leadership of its members, tional and global advocacy. but accomplishes little for its peoples. It remains to be seen to what extent When it started to take economic coop- civil society input will be included in the eration seriously, objectives were limited Charter. ASEAN has largely been inac- to developing the region as a platform cessible to civil society, and is not known for third country exports and to attract- for initiatives that directly target broad ing foreign investments into the region sections of the ASEAN population. Many through trade liberalization. Broader groups therefore question the value of objectives beyond opening up were left engaging the ASEAN Charter process, or behind. Initial dreams of regional im- ASEAN itself. port substitution or the development The skepticism with ASEAN, how- of regional production bases were aban- ever, is not generalized to the idea of doned. Most regional initiatives cater to regionalism and regional integration. big business, but there were no projects Outside of Southeast Asia, there are directly targeting basic producers and many attempts at regional cooperation workers. As a result, ASEAN has yet to and integration. Recent examples from establish itself as a popular concept, and South America suggest that it may be failed to elaborate its rhetoric to popular possible to have “an integration of, and consciousness. for, the peoples”.3 This idea of alterna- In its first 25 years, political and security rather than economic coopera- tive regionalism provides the motivation tion had been ASEAN’s main focus. A to engage ASEAN. Civil society’s ap- voluntary preferential trading arrange- proach to ASEAN should be the same as ment introduced in the late 1970s cov- their approach to their government, be- ered a measly two percent and five per- cause they lay as much claim to what it cent of intra-ASEAN trade in 1980 and does in ASEAN as in their country. With 1986, respectively.4 It was not until 1993 ASEAN, two major weaknesses provide that a more comprehensive ASEAN Free the starting point for engagement. First, Trade Area (AFTA)5, through the Com- ASEAN has failed to identify a clear vi- mon Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) sion to guide regional integration. Sec- Scheme, was established as the key eco- ond, ASEAN has also failed to act ap- nomic project of ASEAN. AFTA’s goal preciably on issues requiring regional is the complete abolition of tariffs for response. Addressing these weaknesses the ASEAN-66 by 010 and 015 for the would be the first step towards building a regional community. 4See Jenina Joy Chavez, “Economic Integration in ASEAN: In Need of another Miracle” in Asian Exchange, vol. 13 no., 1997 for a discussion of ASEAN’s early trade and economic integration initiatives. 3“Let’s construct a real Community of South American 5 Nations in order to ‘live well’.” (Proposal from President The next chapter, Rene Ofreneo’s “Neo-liberalism and Evo Morales to the head of states and people of South the Working People of Southeast Asia”, gives a more America, October , 006). Available online: http:// detailed discussion of AFTA www.integracionsolidaria.org. 6 ASEAN-6 refers to Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phil- | REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM newer members, with flexibility on some since the 1990s. Intra-ASEAN trade as sensitive products until 018. To date, a percentage of total ASEAN trade is more than 99% of tariff lines in the in- .5% in 004. Japan, the United States clusion list of ASEAN-6 are within the (US), the European Union (EU), China 0-5% range; almost two-thirds of which and Korea remain as ASEAN’s largest have 0% tariff. More notably, with the trading partners, together accounting for full inclusion of Malaysia’s completely more than 51% of ASEAN trade in 003.9 built-up and completely knocked-down Though CEPT tariff levels are gener- automotive units in 004, there are no ally far lower than those committed by more ASEAN-6 products temporarily ex- ASEAN Members to the World Trade cluded from the CEPT scheme.7 A short Organization (WTO), intra-ASEAN list of highly sensitive agricultural prod- trade is limited and the Association has ucts (e.g. rice for Indonesia, Malaysia and not really paid attention to addressing the Philippines) has until 010 to be inte- this limitation. From its inception, AFTA grated in the trade arrangement. Average was not seen as a vehicle to address the tariff for the ASEAN-6 under the CEPT sluggish intra-ASEAN trade. Rather, it Scheme is now down to 1.87%.8 was designed to boost the competitive- Yet even with AFTA, there had been ness of ASEAN and to attract foreign marginal increases in intra-ASEAN trade investments into the region. The prefer- ential nature of AFTA was not the main ippines, Thailand and Singapore. interest for ASEAN members. This is 7ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Annual Report 2003-2004 the reason why in some instances, WTO (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 004). 8 ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Annual Report 2005-2006 9 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 006). ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistical Pocketbook 2005 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 005). Table 1a : Status of Free Trade Agreement in ASEAN Member Countries (As of September 2006) Source: http://aric.adb.org/10.php a/ parties are considering a free trade agreement, establishing joint study groups or joint task force, and conducting feasi- bility studies to determine the desirability of entering into an FTA b/ parties initially negotiate the contents of a framework agreement (FA), which serves as a framework for future negotia- tions c/ parties begin negotiations without a framework agreement d/ parties sign the agreement after negotiations have been completed; some FTAs would require legislative or executive ratification e/ when the provisions of an FTA becomes effective, e.g., when tariff cuts begin REVISITING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM | commitments are realigned to CEPT and use the region as a platform for pro- rates, as in the case of Singapore (com- duction and export. Meanwhile, national plete liberalization) and the Philippines industries are eaten up by foreign capi- (some CEPT rates become the most fa- tal, weakened or decimated, further di- vored nation10 rates).

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