Prospects on Characteristics of the North Korean Succession System and Its Foreign Policy in the Post-Kim Jong Il Era Seung Joo Baek*
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The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 20, No. 3, September 2008, 215Á230 Prospects on characteristics of the North Korean succession system and its foreign policy in the Post-Kim Jong Il era Seung Joo Baek* Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), Seoul, Korea The succession issue that arises under North Korea’s Kim Jong Il (Kim Cho’ng-il) system may be handled with Kim Jong Il taking the lead in making the preparations or it could proceed without regard to Kim Jong Il’s intention. However, if a sudden change takes place in the North Korean system, including Chairman Kim Jong Il’s fall from power, with Kim Jong Il failing to make proper preparations for the succession, the forces that are capable of seizing control of the situation, based on the ‘‘partyÁ governmentÁmilitary’’ structure of dynamics established at the time of the sudden change, will come to power. Considering the process of the Kim Il SungÁKim Jong Il succession, there is a possibility of the power succession taking place, either substantially or institutionally, while Kim Jong Il is alive or after he is dead. A survey of specialists on this issue in the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) on the types of succession showed the following forecasts: (1) 43.5 percent predicted a high possibility of the emergence of a ‘‘type of collective leadership after Kim Jong Il’s death by natural causes.’’ (2) 36.4 percent saw a high possibility of succession by the second son, Kim Cho’ng-ch’o’l. (3) North Korea’s succession outcome, regardless of the type, is expected to place greater importance on the United States than on China. (4) Considering the power base, in the event that Kim Cho’ng-nam-Chang So’ng-t’aek rises to power, they will attach importance to Northeast Asian countries, including China, Japan, and the ROK. In view of the influence Deng Xiaoping’s experience in studying in Paris had on his reforms and opening, Kim Cho’ng-un, if he rises to power, may boldly pursue a pro- West and pro-U.S. policy. Introduction As of January 2008, North Korea’s Kim Jong Il was stably managing the system. Kim Jong Il, who marked the 10th anniversary of his election as the party general secretary in 1998, is stably managing his power by maintaining firm control of the factors of change at home and abroad. Nevertheless, interest in North Korea’s succession issue is rising, due to the natural aging process of Kim Jong Il, who was born in 1942; the worsening environment for maintaining the system caused by North Korea’s nuclear issue; and the anti-Kim Jong Il political consciousness of the more than 14,000 North Korean escapees living in the Republic of Korea (ROK). The purpose of this paper is to make forecasts for each subject that draws attention in connection with the power succession in the post-Kim Jong Il era. It designs a scenario and makes forecasts for the succession process in the post-Kim Jong Il era, the type of system that will be established after the succession, the most likely type of succession, and the policy direction to be adopted by the North Korean system after the succession. The *Email: [email protected] ISSN 1016-3271 print/ISSN 1941-4641 online # 2008 Korea Institute for Defense Analyses DOI: 10.1080/10163270802309105 http://www.informaworld.com 216 Seung Joo Baek decisive factors that will influence the succession process are connected with Kim Jong Il’s personal circumstances. First, will Kim Jong Il transfer power to another person while he is alive, or will the succession take place after his death? Second, is there a possibility of the power system converting into a collective leadership system after the succession, or will the one-man system centered on Kim Jong Il continue to be maintained? Third, will the system that will emerge after Kim Jong Il maintain the current foreign and security policy or aspire to a different policy? The purpose of this paper is particularly to forecast whether there will be differences in Pyongyang’s policy toward the United States according to each type of succession. It is actually impossible to conclusively make a scientific forecast of the process and details of the succession to take place in North Korea in the post-Kim Jong Il era. Even in such a closed society as North Korea, efforts to look inside the most secretive and closed power apparatus and forecast the near future are akin to investing in an academic gamble, rather than being academic efforts. The knowledge of how difficult it is to make a forecast means that there is comparatively less fear about the results of the forecast. Even if it turns out to be correct, it will not result in earning a reputation as a specialist at a stroke; and even if the forecast proves to be wrong, the voices of censure will not be so loud. In 1996, about 20 leading U.S. experts on China made forecasts1 on the changes in power and direction of foreign policy in the post-Deng Xiaoping era by relying on ‘‘intuition.’’ In response to the questions asking whether China (1) will return to a strong totalitarian system or an imperative socialist system, (2) whether it will develop into a progressive reform-oriented or democratic China, or (3) whether the huge country of China will collapse due to internal and external factors like the former Soviet Union, (1) 30 percent of the 20-odd experts on China predicted a possibility of returning to an authoritative economic system; (2) 20 percent projected an advance toward a progressive China, and (3) 50 percent predicted the disintegration of China. A review of the power succession that took place and the external policy adopted by China after Deng Xiaoping’s death, however, shows that the majority of U.S. experts on China had failed to make a proper forecast. The experts had shown limits in predicting power changes in the closed entity of China. Despite the difficulties experienced by experts in predicting changes in power and the external policy of a socialist country, there is no choice but to use the ‘‘intuition of experts.’’ This paper used three basic methods in connection with the type of power succession likely to take place in North Korea in the post-Kim Jong Il era. The first is an analysis of preceding studies. It introduced the ‘‘3Ps X theory’’ presented by Professor Holmes, who analyzed the power succession in former socialist countries and used this as a basis for analyzing the process of Kim Jong Il’s power succession.2 It also attempted to gain the insight necessary for forecasting the future by studying the example of power succession in North Korea. Second, it used a method of utilizing the insight of domestic (ROK) specialists into the types of succession to Kim Jong Il’s power. Those who helped the study are 22 specialists currently working at the Korea Institute of Defense Analyses (KIDA) in Seoul, as of March 2008. The six types of power succession designed by the writer were presented to these specialists, and their answers were measured to quantify and present the forecast for the types of power succession to take place in North Korea. Third, an ‘‘institutional (chedojuu’ijo’g) approach’’ to studying the system centered on North Korea’s governing apparatus was basically adopted, but it attempted to enhance the validity of the study results by also using the power elite and politico-cultural methods. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 217 3Ps X theory and characteristics of Kim Jong Il’s succession The ‘‘3Ps X theory,’’ which is a process of the emergence of a leader theorized by Professor Holmes, is judged to be useful in comparing the process of succession in the communist countries ruled by the absolute power of one person. The ‘‘3Ps X’’ refers to the four factors necessary to inherit power. The person intending to inherit power from a person of absolute power should (1) reinforce the power base, (2) acquire the personality qualifications (chajil) of a leader, and (3) win confidence in his policymaking ability. Even if the person possesses these three factors, the power succession can take place only when the special circumstances requiring the emergence of a new leader are created, through the development of such political situations as the preceding leader’s death or fall from power.3 The factor connected with securing a power base refers to the measure that enables the successor to personally assume the highest position in the important power organs of the state and also allows the successor’s followers to seize control of important power organs in the process of preparing for the succession. The personality qualifications of the leader refer to the leadership qualifications that are projected onto the leader and the people, and the policymaking ability signifies the ability to develop and implement the policies that are capable of winning over other leaders at home and drawing political support from the people, as well as the diplomatic ability to maximize the pursuit of national interests in international relations. Apart from these three aforementioned factors, the development of such special political situations as the incumbent leader’s sudden death, natural disasters, and unexpected changes in the international situation has an important effect on the succession of the newly emerging leader. For example, it is generally evaluated that Liu Shaoqi, who had acquired personality qualifications, policymaking ability, and a power base at a satisfactory level, failed to succeed to power due to the domestic power situation of Mao Zedong remaining alive and healthy and the external situation of the intensifying Sino-Soviet conflict.