Dissension in the Ranks an Argument for Conscientious Objection

DISSENSION IN THE RANKS AN ARGUMENT FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

PETER HATHORN C o n t e n t s

* 1) Introduction

2)Arguments for Participation — A Critique

i.Civil or External War

ii.Support for the Guerillas

iiiSADF Involvement in Civilian Actions

iv. Implications of Civil War

3)The Nature of the Conflict

4) The Roots of the Conflict

5)The SADF as Foreign Aggressor

i.N am ibia

ii. Destabilization

6) Conclusion Introduction SADF acts as an army of foreign occupation in Namibia. Moreover, the SADF has a long The law demands that every white South record of armed incursions into neighbour African male does military service. ing states that dates back to the invasion Having struggled with the issue for a of Angola in 1975. Recently it has become number of years, I have come to the quite clear that South Africa is involved conclusion that I have little alternative in destabilising neighbouring states by but to break that law and object to mili supporting armed rebels and by promoting tary service. economic disruption.

I stress at the outset that it is military, Arguments for Participation-A Critique not national service, to which I object. I would have no qualms about doing non Most people going into the SADF would military national service that did not justify their action with an argument contribute to the efforts of the South such as this: given the threat of armed African Defence Force (SADF) and that was guerillas coming across the border, the open to all who have genuine convictions government has every right to expect that it is wrong to serve in the military. people to serve in the army to help pre serve law and order. No-one can take the decision to undergo military training lightly. The moral Military service is seen as "doing one's implications of allowing oneself to be bit for the country" - one is protecting placed in a situation where one could be the population from the threat of external required to kill are so far-reaching that violence. people have to come to reasoned decisions about the rights and wrongs of participa However, this line of reasoning is inade tion. To go unthinkingly into the SADF quate. It does not meet any of the three (or any army) constitutes a total abdica points mentioned above as forming the tion of the responsibilities of citizenship. basis for conscientious objection. It also ignores the "profoundly unjust and While the decision to object to military immoral" (1) nature of the order one service is a controversial one, I don't is fighting to maintain. think it can be termed unreasonable. I build the case for objection around three Once these factors have been allowed for, points. it becomes considerably more difficult to justify participation in the SADF. Firstly, since the conflict in this country is a civil, not an external war, partici One could argue that although the cause pation in the SADF is a profoundly political the SADF is defending is abhorrent, one's action. Participation does not act in the long-term contribution to the country interests of the nation as a whole; it would be greatest if one did military contributes only to the cause of the service in order to remain in the country dominant minority. and thereafter work for change.

Secondly, the current conflict must be seen However, service in the military detracts within the context of this country's considerably from one's ability to do any history of oppression and resistance to thing constructive. Many black people that oppression. Jhe history of resis working for change would find it unaccept tance tells of a long period of non-violent able to work with someone who has been struggle, a reluctant transition to armed compromised to the extent that they have struggle and then the use of selective fought to maintain apartheid. Furthermore, violence. The people they call us to fight as the war increases in intensity and cannot be regarded as terrorists. call-ups escalate, one would end up spend- ong almost as much time in as outside the Finally, the activities of the South African SADF. Lastly, by confronting the state army are such that it cannot accurately be with the fact that members of the elector termed a defence force. In terms of inter ate are dissatisfied with the system they national law and in the opinions of most are called upon to defend, one generates of the inhabitants of the country, the pressure for change. Another argument is that all who live, These methods are applied in every con work and pay taxes in this country are ceivable field, against all possible to some extent upholding an unjust system. targets, military as well as civilian, Since all are compromised, one can justi wherever and whenever the enemy believes fiably opt for non-combatancy. he can score a mark." (2)

However, there is a fundamental difference Who these "enemies" are is never clear. A between paying taxes and serving in the former Anglican Archbishop shows greater military. The difference arises with insight into the origins of the "total regard to one's status in the conflict. onslaught". He said in his enthronement sermon: The difference in status between the civilian and the combatant soldier is "We need to grasp the significance of the quite obvious. Soldiers receive military fact that some black South Africans, many training, are given arms and fight on of whom are Christians, are outside the command. They expect to be endangered country seeking to change our power struc and are legitimate targets for attack - ture by force." (3) they are partisans in the conflict in a way fundamentally different to tax- Gerald Shaw, political correspondent for paying civilians. the Cape Times, in an article entitled "Call-up. Who is the enemy?" comes to The non-combatant is no less a soldier the conclusion that: than the combatant. It is estimated that six or seven non-combatants are required "The truth is that we are sliding into a to back up each combatant. To the civil war, albeit one of low intensity. military it is irrelevant which indivi duals fill the non-combatant or combatant The enemy is not some faceless communist roles - the most one can achieve by re horde from behind the Iron Curtain. The fusing to carry arms is to dislodge someone enemy are our own people, fellow South else from the former to the latter position. Africans, a guerilla army of young people Thus, non-combatants who wear the uniform; who fled from South Affica after the who submit to the authority structures of Soweto unrest of 1976 in their thousands the army and who perform the minimal dut and were recruited into the army of the ies expected of someone in the military, African National Congress." (4) are no less responsible for the actions of the SADF than those who pull the One need only read the court statements of triggers. ANC guerillas captured over the past few years to confirm Shaw's statement.

The Nature of the Conflict However, it is ironical that it is the state appointed Rabie Commission of i) Civil or External War Inquiry into Security Legislation that provides final confirmation of the fact The state would have us believe that South that South Africa is involved in a civil Africa is involved in a defensive war war: against an external aggressor. There is great play on the idea that we are "de "After the riots (sic) in Soweto and fending our borders" against "the total elsewhere in the Republic in 1976 and onslaught" being waged by "terrorists" 1977 many Black people - mostly young armed with Russian weapons. people - left the country. The SAP * (South African Police) believe that the Lt General R F Holthauzen is a fairly number who had left the Republic up to typical exponent of the "total onslaught" the end of 1979 might be as high as theory: 5 000 or perhaps even 6 000....About half - probably about 2 000 men - of these "The total onslaught against the Republic people were recruited by the ANC". (5) of South Africa is a continuing onslaught which the enemies of South Africa are In its essence the South African conflict waging with every means at their disDosal. is a low intensity civil war. The gueril las do receive training arid aid from citizen force troops in the Umgeni and Eastern European and other African states; Highway Commandos were put on continual but this does not alter the fact that the standby. At one state, when it was people we are called on to fight are thought that the police were unable to South Africans. There is also evidence deal with the strikers, troops from the that these "enemies of South Africa" have Umgeni Commando were issued with live considerable support amongst the South ammunition and loaded into Bedfords. African people. Only the news of the worker's dispersal prevented the commandos being used.

ii) Support for the Guerillas In the 1976/7 student uprising troops were used to protect key installations and It is difficult to measure the black placed on standby for deployment in the population's support for the guerilla townships (10). Since then soldiers have forces, but the evidence indicates it is been used on roadblocks outside black considerable. townships, as well as on "open roads".

Thousands of people have attended the During the schools boycott in June 1981 funerals of guerillas and activists - troops were used in "coloured" townships an estimated 20 000 turned out to bury (Bosmont and Eldorado Park) along with the Solomon Mahlungu. SAP to carry out house-to-house searches.

The Rabie Commission's report quotes an To.go into the SADF is to take sides in opinion poll conducted in Soweto shortly the struggle in this country - for one is after the Silverton bank siege which putting oneself in a situation where one showed that three out of four black could be commanded to forcibly "resettle" people had strong or qualified sympathy people, where one could be issued with for the gunmen. (6) live ammunition and instructed to disperse striking workers, or to go into the town This sympathy is reflected in the black ships to "put-down" a student uprising. press. After the Silverton incident, Post editorialized: One cannot go into the army and take on "On the one hand, the white community the role of the soldier, the oppressor, and and its newspapers regard these people then protest about the system of white as nothing else but mere terrorists. domination and oppression. The black community on the other hand continues to vocally acclaim these men iv) The Implications of Civil War as heroes as was demonstrated at the funeral of all three." (7) "The Defence Force acts as a shield to enable South Africa not only to live .in iii) SADF, Involvement in Civilian Actions peace, but also to effect changes by constitutional means. The Defence Force No-one who goes into the SADF can escape is a shield to protect South Africa from the fact that they are putting themselves oppression and violence while South Afri in a situation where they can be commanded cans seek by peaceful means to find to act against South African civilians. solutions for co-existence." (11)

The military have been used on a number of The statement above has been accepted by occasions to assist the police in "re the Progressive Federal Party as part of settling" people at gunpoint. its Defence policy.

The two best known examples of this happen It is of course patently absurd to speak ing are the removal of more than 3 000 of the SADF as a shield behind which people from Ditakwaneng to Deerward (8) change can take place in the context of a and the resettlement of 20 000 people from civil war. Gatlhose - Maremane to Boputhatswana. (9) If the "enemy" are fellow South Africans During the Durban strikes of February 1973 who have been oppressed, then participa tion in the SADF is a direct contribution teers broke discriminatory laws and then to the cause of the oppressor. offered themselves for arrest. When the number of arrests exceeded 8 500 The Roots of the Conflict and the jails were full to overflowing, the government passed legislation making The current conflict cannot be viewed it a serious criminal offence to break a * outside the context of the history of law by way of protest against that or any resistance by black South Africans to other law. the system imposed on them. .With the Defiance Campaign abruptly halted, When one views the war in this context, even Albert Luthuli (later to win the one must come to the conclusion that Nobel Proze for Peace) came to question the the forces one is called upon to fight path of moderation: against have made strenuous efforts to bring about change by peaceful means. "Who will deny that thirty years of my On the other hand, the state has re life have been spent knocking in vain, peatedly demonstrated its readiness to patiently, moderately and modestly at a use violence to crush peaceful opposition. closed and barred door? What have been the fruits of moderation? The past thir One can also understand why the black ty years have seen the greatest number of opposition came to feel that they had laws restricting our rights until today little hope of bringing about fundamental we have reached the stage where we have change without recourse to violence. almost no rights at all." (12)

From thq Act of Union in 1910 until the The decade of mass action also saw bus boy late 1940's, the ANC, the.largest black cotts, education boycotts and the Congress political organisation had been dominated of the People (at which the Freedom Charter by small groups of intellectuals. They which pointed the way to a non-racial future hoped, by means of petitions and deputa for South Africa, was drawn up), and came tions, to persuade the government to to a head with the pass campaign of March extend the franchise to blacks. 1960.

In 1949, under the influence of its Youth On the 21st, Pan African Congress (PAC) League, the ANC adopted a more militant supporters at Langa and Sharpeville left Programme of Action. The Programme de their passes at home, presented themselves clared that the primary vehicle of struggle to the nearest police station and demanded should be mass action. There was still a arrest. strong and explicit commitment to non violence. The events that followed are now history. The police opened fire, killing 59 people The next decade saw the passage of a barr and wounding 178. Of those killed or age of discriminatory laws, and in response wounded, 155 were shot in the back. strike action, non-collaboration and boy cotts. A week later, a general strike was called to mourn those killed. The economy was On May 1, 1980 a stay-away was called to paralyzed for almost three weeks. protest against the racial policies of the government. Throughout the country there Sharpeville marked the end of the commit were work stoppages and peaceful demonstra ment to non-violence. On April 8, the tions. But at Alexandra township the ANC and PAC were declared unlawful organ police opened fire killing 18 and wounding isations and their leaders went under 30 people. The following month, a strike ground to prepare for an armed struggle.

called to mourn the dead resulted in a f nationwide display of unity. Nelson Mandela, when tried in 1963 for sabotage and conspiracy to overthrow the In 1952 the South African Indian Congress government, justified the formation of (SAIC) and the ANC luanched the "Campaign the armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we for the Defiance of Unjust Laws". Volun Sizwe, in these terms: from civilians. Hence my reluctance to take up arms against them.

The SADF as Foreign Aggressor

Under what General Coristand Viljoen calls a policy of "offensive defence" South Africa seems to have claimed the right to invade neighbouring countries at will and to de stabilize foreign economies. The object ive of destabilization is to preoccupy neighbouring states with defence and internal security, and to prevent economic growth that might lessen dependence on South Africa. A second goal is to dis courage support for the ANC, PAC and SWAPO.

My objections to service in the SADF are not based solely on the activities of the army within South Africa. The SADF has shown an increasing tendency to undertake acts of foreign aggression throughout Southern Africa. But the hard facts were that fifty years of non-violence had brought the African In terms of international law, South Afri people nothing but more and more repres ca's presence in Namibia is illegal, and ^ sive legislation, and fewer and fewer it has become clear that most of the rights. people there regard the SADF as a force of foreign occupation. In contrast to Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the PAC, Poqo, did not restrict its activities to sabotage. i) Namibia In the early 1960's a number of civilians died as a result of their attacks, but There are a number of parallels between by the end of the decade Poqo had been the war in Namibia and the local con almost entirely crushed. flict. However, the conflict there is in a more advanced stage, and its status From the nature of the ANC's activities in terms of international law is very since 1960, it seems that it is still different to that in South Africa. their policy to avoid acts of random terrorism. Their attacks are almost The legal position is clear. In 1920 the invariably directed at symbols of League of Nations gave South Africa a oppression or towards installations of mandate of trusteeship over Namibia. strategic and economic significance. Following World War II, the League was dissolved and replaced by the United My purpose in discussing the history of Nations (UN). black resistance is not to show that the violence of the resistance movements is South Africa alone refused to acknowledge justified. But the discussion does show the UN as the lineal, legal descendant that the guerillas cannot simply be dis of The League. Arguing that the mandate missed as "terrorists", firstly because had lapsed with the dissolution of The they have behind them a history of League, South Africa "annexed" the patient, non-violent resistance, and territory in the late 1940's. secondly, because the violence now em ployed is selective and directed away This action prompted a request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for white with one exception had no doubt a ruling, and the court decided that the that SWAPO had the support of the large UN had taken over the supervisory funct majority of the people of the country and ion of The League. South Africa ignored they knew this support was growing almost the ruling. every day with the continued presence of the South African security forces." (16)

The General Assembly of the UN terminated In late 1980, Major General Jannie South Africa's mandate in 1966, demanded Geldenhuys (then head of the SADF in a complete withdrawal from the country Namibia), made it clear that he believed and placed the country under the direct the Namibian war to be unwinnable, and supervision of the UN. In 1970, the that the "boys" should be withdrawn to Security Council declared South Africa's "fight communism at home". He and presence in Namibia to be illegal, and Administator General Viljoen (who appears the following year the ICJ upheld the to have held similar views) were rapidly . decisions of the General Assembly (1966) promoted out of Namibia. (17) and the Security Council (1970). ii) Destabilization The SADF is also regarded as a force of foreign occupation by most Namibians. This conclusion is based on the findings Of the other Southern African states, of four independent church studies on Angola has suffered most at the hands of Namibia. (13) the SADF.

It is substantiated by the response of In 1975 South African forces invaded al black Namibians to conscription, which most as far as Luanda. The estimated cost was introduced in 1980. Young men who of the damage done to Angola in the six had previously been able to stay out of month invasion is $6 000 million. politics were forced to take sides. Despite the fact that the four northern In August 1981 South Africa invaded again bantustans were excluded from the draft and since that time has been in permanent (because support for SWAPO was too strong occupation of large parts of Southern in these areas), thousands left the country Angola. President dos Santos claims that to join SWAPO rather than fight fellow two brigades of South African troops Namibians. Demonstrations were held (5 500 men) are permanently stationed in throughout Namibia with one common theme: side Angola and that 500 people have been killed since the time of the invasion. "The so-called enemy is your own brother (18) who was forced to leave the country be cause of oppression. The enemy of the At the present time, the most important South African army is SWAPO - who is aspect of South African involvement in SWAPO? SWAPO is the people." (14) Angola is the practice of economic dis ruption, carried out largely by support This claim is reinforced by the findings of for UNITA rebels. The intention is to the Department of Justice and Reconcilia prevent any normal life or economic tion of the Church of the Province of activity. Traffic is strafed, bridges South Africa: bombed and towns andcommunitiesreduced to rubble. "Far from being considered "terrorists", our overwhelming impression is that In the South, UNITA operates in unison SWAPO is of the people and its forces with regular South African forces, and were referred to on several occasions as is trained and supplied by them. In 'our sons', 'our brothers and fathers'". other areas, UNITA is engaged in sabotage • (15) with direct logistic support from the South Africans. The feature of the de- It seems virtually certain that SWAPO stabilization policy has been the success would win any UN supervised election with achieved in disrupting the Benguela rail ' a large majority. link with Zaire, which would be an im portant factor in the development of the "All the church leaders both black and Angolan economy. *.< ' i»

In Mozambique one sees a similar pattern. Conclusion y There have been raids on Matola (January 1981), Ressana Garcia (July 1982) and My objections to service in the SADF re Namacha (August 1982), but the principal volve around three points. j . means of destabilization is through sup port for the Mozambique National Resis- Firstly, since the conflict in this count * tance (MNR). The objective is twofold. ry is a civil rather than an external war, Firstly to spread chaos through as much participation in the SADF cannot be re of Mozambique as possible, giving the garded as an action which serves the impression that the country is unstable, interests of all the people of this country. discouraging foreign aid and accentuating By going into the army one is takinr sides the country's economic crisis. The second in the conflict - one is actively con objective is to disrupt transport links tributing to the continued domination of and the Beira - Umtali pipeline. one group of South Africans over another.

In Zimbabwe South African forces operated Secondly, the guerillas cannot simply be in support of the Muzorewa forces in the dismissed as terrorists. They have behind final stages of the guerilla war. Since them a long history of non-violent resis independence, the Zimbabwean Army inter tance, and the violence now employed seems cepted an SADF raiding party in the disigned to avoid civilian casualties. Sengwe communal area (August 1981). Their standing is further enhanced by the Three of the four raiders killed were fact that they appear to have the support identified as former Rhodesians serving of a large proportion of the population. in the SADF. The SADF claimed the men were on an unauthorized mission. Thirdly, the SADF does not restrict its activities to defence. It operates The Zimbabwean economy has suffered from primarily in Namibia, where it acts as MNR sabotaging of oil and rail links with a force of foreign occupation. The SADF Beira. In 1981 South Africa acted more also occupies a large part of Southern . directly by withdrawing badly needed Angola and strikes at will into Lesotho, locomotives from Zimbabwe Railways and Mozambique and Zimbabwe. There is also ending the preferential trade agreement virtually incontrovertable evidence that between the two countrys. Both the South Africa is actively destabilizing locomotives and the agreement were restored the economies of neighbouring states. in 1982, reportedly as a result of United States and British pressure. Given these three factors, given the "profoundly unjust and immoral" nature Lesotho has not gone unscathed. The raid South African society, I cannot see that on Maseru (December 1982) resulted in the the question of how one ought to respond deaths of 42 refugees and Lesotho civilians. to conscription raises any profound Chief Jonathan has also repeatedly claimed moral dilemmas. For me going into the that South Africa shelters and supports SADF would involve a complete denial of the Lesotho Liberation Army, which has the ideals I value most highly, of been responsible for a number of attacks standards I have held throughout my life. in rural areas, acts of sabotage and assassinations. The only way I can do my duty to the people of this country is by taking an Finally, the Seychelles coup. The govern uncompromising stand against the call ment would have us believe that mercenaries to fight, and to accept the consequences planning a coup in a foreign country are of that action. armed by the SADF without the knowledge of either the head of the SADF, the But the matter does not end with my con Minister of Defence, the Prime Minister viction here today, the prospects for or the intelligence services. The fact future objectors are bleak. Parliament that no disciplinary action has been taken | is in the process of debating the Defence against those involved in the issue of Amendment Bill. The Bill discriminates weapons is an indication that the affair against conscientious objectors who do ’ had been authorized from the top. not hold strong religious pacifist con-

I A victions. While it recognizes that (14) Desert Conflicts - The Catholic In religious pacifists may have legitimate stitute of International Relations moral objections to service in the SADF, (Oct 1981); the South African it seeks only to punish other objectors. Council of Churches report on This is, in effect, denying the validity Namibia (Feb 1982); the Catholic of any moral decision not made on religious Bishops report on Namibia (South grounds. African Outlook, July 1982); and the report of the Department of The Defence Amendment Bill is an extreme Justice and Reconciliation of the measure - a desperate attempt to crush Church of the Province of South people who have moral objections to joining Africa (Seek, March 1983). the military. However, no punitive measure can touch upon the fundamental problem of (15) Rand Daily Mail, 15-12-82. a growing lack of conviction about the justice of this war, or intimidate comit- (16) Department of Justice and Reconcilia ted South Africans into joining the SADF. tion, op cit.

(17) SACC, op cit.

(18) Desert Conflicts, p 30. Notes (19) Africa Now, Oct 1982. (1) The terminology is that of the 1982 Provincial Synod of the Anglican Church.

(2) SADF publication accompanying ca..-up instructions.

(3) Quoted in "Church and Conscience" a publication of the Christian Citizenship Department of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa.

(4) Cape Times, 26-3-82.

(5) Report of the Rabie Commission of Inquiry into Security Legislation, p 58.

(6) ibid, p 69.

(7) Post, 11-2-80.

(8) Star, 16-11-73.

(9) Diamond Fields Advertiser, 28-12-77.

(10) Rand Daily Mail, 17-6-76.

(11) Harry Schwartz, former PFP Defence Spokesman, speaking in Parliament.

(12) Quoted by Roland Stanbridge in R M Price and C G Rosberg (eds), "The Apartheid Regime", p 73.

(13) ibid, p 78. DISSENSION IN THE RANKS

AN ARGUMENT FOR

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

PETER HATHORN

STATEMENT SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION The law demands that every white South African male does military service. I have come to the conclusion that I have little alternative but to break that law. Three factors are fundamental to this decision — the fact that South Africa is engaged in a civil not an external war, the history of non-violent resistance to oppression, and the aggressive nature of the SADF’s activities.

1. THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT ii. Support for Guerillas

i. External or Civil War It is difficult to measure the black population’s support for guerilla forces, but evidence indicates it is consider The state would have us believe that South Africa is able. involved in a defensive war against an external aggle&bY. Thousands of people have attended the funerals of There is great play on the idea that we are defending our guerillas and activists — an estimated 20 000 turned out to borders against the “total onslaught” being waged by bury Solomon Mahlangu. “terrorists” armed with Russian weapons. The Rabie Commission Report quotes an opinion poll However, little attempt is made to define who “the conducted in Soweto shortly after the Silverton battle enemy” is. Gerald Shaw, writing in the Cape Times, siege which showed that three out of four black people shows a little more insight into the origins of the “total had strong or qualified sympathies for the gunmen. onslaught”: “The enemy is not some faceless communist horde iii. SADF Involvement in Civilian Actions from behind the Iron Curtain. The enemy are our own people, fellow South Africans, a guerilla army of young No-one who goes into the SADF can escape the fact that people who fled from South Africa after the Soweto they are putting themselves in a situation where they can unrest of 1976 in their thousands and were recruited into be commanded to act against South African civilians. the army of the African National Congress.” The military has been used on a number of occasions One need only turn to court statements of ANC to assist the police in “resettling” people at gunpoint. guerillas captured over the past few years to confirm During the Durban strikes of February 1973 citizen Shaw’s statement. force troops in the Umgeni and Highway Commands were It is ironical to find the state-appointed Rabie Com put on continual stand-by. At one stage, when it was mission of Inquiry into Security Legislation providing thought the police were unable to deal with the strikers, final confirmation of the fact that South Africa is invol troops from the Umgeni Commando were issued with live ved in a civil war: ammunition and loaded into Bedford trucks. Only news “After the riots (sic) in Soweto and elsewhere in the of the workers’ dispersal prevented the commandos being Republic in 1976 and 1977 many Black people - mostly used. young people — left the country. The SAP (South In the 1976/77 student uprising troops were used to African Police) believe that the number who had left the protect key installations and placed on stand-by for country up to the end of 1979 might be as high as 5 000 deployment in the townships. or perhaps even 6 000 . . . About half — probably about During the schools boycotts in June 1981 troops were 2 000 men - of these people were recruited by the ANC.” used in “coloured” townships (Bosmont and Eldorado If one accepts that “the enemy” are fellow South Park) along with the SAP to carry out house-to-house Africans who have left the country because they have searches. been oppressed, then one cannot avoid the conclusion To go into the SADF is to take sides in the struggle in that participation in the SADF is a direct contribution to this country - for one is putting oneself in a situation the cause of the oppressor. where one could be commanded to forcibly “resettle” people, where one could be issued with live ammunition In the South African Council of Churches report on and instructed to disperse striking workers, or go into Namibia one reads: townships to “put-down” a student uprising. “All the church leaders both black and white with one One cannot go into the army and take on the role of exception had no doubt that SWAPO had the support'of soldier and oppressor, and then protest about the system the large majority of the people of the country and they of white domination and oppression in this country. knew this support was growing almost everywhere with the continued presence of the South African security 2. THE ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT forces.” The current conflict cannot be viewed outside the context ii. Destabilisation of the history of resistance by black South Africans to the system imposed on them. Since the time of the Angola invasion of 1975, South The history of black opposition in this century can be Africa seems to have claimed the right to invade neigh divided into three periods. Until the 1950’s, black politi bouring states at will and destabilise foreign economies. cal organisations restricted themselves to attempting to The objective of destabilisation is to pre-occupy countries persuade the government to extend the franchise to with defence and internal security, and prevent economic1 blacks, by means of petitions and deputations. growth that might lessen dependence on South Africa. A The 1950’s was a time of mass activity. It saw the second goal is to discourage support for the ANC, PAC Defiance Campaign, mass strikes, bus boycotts, education and SWAPO. boycotts, and the historic Congress of the People at which The most important aspect of destabilisation is the the Freedom Charter was drawn up, pointing the way to a support given to armed rebel groups operating in neigh non-racial future for South Africa. The decade of mass bouring countries. Unita, MNR, and (according to Chief action came to a head with the pass campaigns of March Jonathan) the Lesotho Liberation Army all receive South 1960. African support and training. These groups disrupt vital What happened at Sharpeville and Langa is now his rail and oil links, mine roads and bridges, and try to pre tory. The police killed 69 people and wounded 178. Of vent any normal life or economic activity. those killed or wounded, 155 were shot in the back. The advantages to South Africa are that the impres Sharpeville and the subsequent banning of the leading sion is generated that the independent states are unstable, black political organisations brought to an end the foreign aid is discouraged, and their economic difficulties commitment to non-violence and saw the transition to the are accentuated. third stage of resistance. Nelson Mandela, when on trial in 1963, justified me CONCLUSION decision to turn to violence on the grounds that because of government action, violence from blacks had become My objections to service in the SADF revolve around inevitable, and responsible leadership was needed to chan three points. nel and control that violence. Firstly, since the conflict in this country is a civil Secondly, without violence there would be no way the rather than an external war, participation in the SADF black people could succeed in their struggle against white cannot be regarded as an action which serves the interests supremacy. Fifty years of non-violence had brought the of all the people of this country. By going into the army black people nothing but more and more repressive legis one is taking sides in the conflict - one is actively contri lation and fewer and fewer political rights. buting to the continued domination of one group of Mandela’s statement illustrates the point that the deci South Africans over another. sion to turn to violence was a reasoned one, was made Secondly, the guerillas cannot simply be dismissed as reluctantly, and came only after a long period of non terrorists. They have behind them a long history of non violent struggle. violent resistance, and the violence now employed seems The violence the ANC has used since 1960 has been designed to avoid civilian casualties. Their standing is directed towards symbols of oppression or installations of further enhanced by the fact they they appear to have the strategic and economic significance. support of a large proportion of the population. Thirdly, the SADF does not restrict its activities to 3. THE SADF AS FOREIGN AGGRESSOR defence. It operates primarily in Namibia where it acts as a force of foreign occupation. The SADF also occupies a i. Namibia large part of Southern Angola and strikes at will into Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. There is also In terms of international law, South Africa’s presence in virtually incontrovertable evidence that South Africa is Namibia is clearly illegal. South Africa’s mandate over actively destabilising the economies of neighbouring Namibia was terminated by the General Assembly of the states. United Nations in 1966. In 1970 the Security Council Given these three factors, given the “profoundly declared South Africa’s presence in Namibia illegal. The unjust and immoral” nature of South African society, I following year the International Court of Justice upheld cannot see that the question of how one ought to respond both these decisions. to conscription raises any profound moral dilemma. For The SADF is also regarded as a force of foreign occu me, going into the SADF would involve a complete denial pation by most Namibians. This is a common theme of the ideals I value most highly, of standards I have held running through the reports of four independent church throughout my life. studies in Namibia. The only way I can do my duty to the people of this On the other hand, support for SWAPO is widespread. country is by taking an uncompromising stand against the It seems virtually certain that it would win any indepen call to fight, and to accept the consequences of that dent UN-supervised election with a large majority. action.

Collection Number: AG1977

END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN (ECC)

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