<To DISSENSION IN THE RANKS AN ARGUMENT FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION PETER HATHORN C o n t e n t s * 1) Introduction 2)Arguments for Participation — A Critique i.Civil or External War ii.Support for the Guerillas iiiSADF Involvement in Civilian Actions iv. Implications of Civil War 3)The Nature of the Conflict 4) The Roots of the Conflict 5)The SADF as Foreign Aggressor i.N am ibia ii. Destabilization 6) Conclusion Introduction SADF acts as an army of foreign occupation in Namibia. Moreover, the SADF has a long The law demands that every white South record of armed incursions into neighbour­ African male does military service. ing states that dates back to the invasion Having struggled with the issue for a of Angola in 1975. Recently it has become number of years, I have come to the quite clear that South Africa is involved conclusion that I have little alternative in destabilising neighbouring states by but to break that law and object to mili­ supporting armed rebels and by promoting tary service. economic disruption. I stress at the outset that it is military, Arguments for Participation-A Critique not national service, to which I object. I would have no qualms about doing non­ Most people going into the SADF would military national service that did not justify their action with an argument contribute to the efforts of the South such as this: given the threat of armed African Defence Force (SADF) and that was guerillas coming across the border, the open to all who have genuine convictions government has every right to expect that it is wrong to serve in the military. people to serve in the army to help pre­ serve law and order. No-one can take the decision to undergo military training lightly. The moral Military service is seen as "doing one's implications of allowing oneself to be bit for the country" - one is protecting placed in a situation where one could be the population from the threat of external required to kill are so far-reaching that violence. people have to come to reasoned decisions about the rights and wrongs of participa­ However, this line of reasoning is inade­ tion. To go unthinkingly into the SADF quate. It does not meet any of the three (or any army) constitutes a total abdica­ points mentioned above as forming the tion of the responsibilities of citizenship. basis for conscientious objection. It also ignores the "profoundly unjust and While the decision to object to military immoral" (1) nature of the order one service is a controversial one, I don't is fighting to maintain. think it can be termed unreasonable. I build the case for objection around three Once these factors have been allowed for, points. it becomes considerably more difficult to justify participation in the SADF. Firstly, since the conflict in this country is a civil, not an external war, partici­ One could argue that although the cause pation in the SADF is a profoundly political the SADF is defending is abhorrent, one's action. Participation does not act in the long-term contribution to the country interests of the nation as a whole; it would be greatest if one did military contributes only to the cause of the service in order to remain in the country dominant minority. and thereafter work for change. Secondly, the current conflict must be seen However, service in the military detracts within the context of this country's considerably from one's ability to do any­ history of oppression and resistance to thing constructive. Many black people that oppression. Jhe history of resis­ working for change would find it unaccept­ tance tells of a long period of non-violent able to work with someone who has been struggle, a reluctant transition to armed compromised to the extent that they have struggle and then the use of selective fought to maintain apartheid. Furthermore, violence. The people they call us to fight as the war increases in intensity and cannot be regarded as terrorists. call-ups escalate, one would end up spend- ong almost as much time in as outside the Finally, the activities of the South African SADF. Lastly, by confronting the state army are such that it cannot accurately be with the fact that members of the elector­ termed a defence force. In terms of inter­ ate are dissatisfied with the system they national law and in the opinions of most are called upon to defend, one generates of the inhabitants of the country, the pressure for change. Another argument is that all who live, These methods are applied in every con­ work and pay taxes in this country are ceivable field, against all possible to some extent upholding an unjust system. targets, military as well as civilian, Since all are compromised, one can justi­ wherever and whenever the enemy believes fiably opt for non-combatancy. he can score a mark." (2) However, there is a fundamental difference Who these "enemies" are is never clear. A between paying taxes and serving in the former Anglican Archbishop shows greater military. The difference arises with insight into the origins of the "total regard to one's status in the conflict. onslaught". He said in his enthronement sermon: The difference in status between the civilian and the combatant soldier is "We need to grasp the significance of the quite obvious. Soldiers receive military fact that some black South Africans, many training, are given arms and fight on of whom are Christians, are outside the command. They expect to be endangered country seeking to change our power struc­ and are legitimate targets for attack - ture by force." (3) they are partisans in the conflict in a way fundamentally different to tax- Gerald Shaw, political correspondent for paying civilians. the Cape Times, in an article entitled "Call-up. Who is the enemy?" comes to The non-combatant is no less a soldier the conclusion that: than the combatant. It is estimated that six or seven non-combatants are required "The truth is that we are sliding into a to back up each combatant. To the civil war, albeit one of low intensity. military it is irrelevant which indivi­ duals fill the non-combatant or combatant The enemy is not some faceless communist roles - the most one can achieve by re­ horde from behind the Iron Curtain. The fusing to carry arms is to dislodge someone enemy are our own people, fellow South else from the former to the latter position. Africans, a guerilla army of young people Thus, non-combatants who wear the uniform; who fled from South Affica after the who submit to the authority structures of Soweto unrest of 1976 in their thousands the army and who perform the minimal dut­ and were recruited into the army of the ies expected of someone in the military, African National Congress." (4) are no less responsible for the actions of the SADF than those who pull the One need only read the court statements of triggers. ANC guerillas captured over the past few years to confirm Shaw's statement. The Nature of the Conflict However, it is ironical that it is the state appointed Rabie Commission of i) Civil or External War Inquiry into Security Legislation that provides final confirmation of the fact The state would have us believe that South that South Africa is involved in a civil Africa is involved in a defensive war war: against an external aggressor. There is great play on the idea that we are "de­ "After the riots (sic) in Soweto and fending our borders" against "the total elsewhere in the Republic in 1976 and onslaught" being waged by "terrorists" 1977 many Black people - mostly young armed with Russian weapons. people - left the country. The SAP * (South African Police) believe that the Lt General R F Holthauzen is a fairly number who had left the Republic up to typical exponent of the "total onslaught" the end of 1979 might be as high as theory: 5 000 or perhaps even 6 000....About half - probably about 2 000 men - of these "The total onslaught against the Republic people were recruited by the ANC". (5) of South Africa is a continuing onslaught which the enemies of South Africa are In its essence the South African conflict waging with every means at their disDosal. is a low intensity civil war. The gueril­ las do receive training arid aid from citizen force troops in the Umgeni and Eastern European and other African states; Highway Commandos were put on continual but this does not alter the fact that the standby. At one state, when it was people we are called on to fight are thought that the police were unable to South Africans. There is also evidence deal with the strikers, troops from the that these "enemies of South Africa" have Umgeni Commando were issued with live considerable support amongst the South ammunition and loaded into Bedfords. African people. Only the news of the worker's dispersal prevented the commandos being used. ii) Support for the Guerillas In the 1976/7 student uprising troops were used to protect key installations and It is difficult to measure the black placed on standby for deployment in the population's support for the guerilla townships (10). Since then soldiers have forces, but the evidence indicates it is been used on roadblocks outside black considerable. townships, as well as on "open roads". Thousands of people have attended the During the schools boycott in June 1981 funerals of guerillas and activists - troops were used in "coloured" townships an estimated 20 000 turned out to bury (Bosmont and Eldorado Park) along with the Solomon Mahlungu.