DOCSLIB.ORG

The Cold War Title and Author of Packet: ___The German Question

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Cold War Title and Author of Packet: ___The German Question Topic 5: The Cold War Title and Author of Packet: ___The German Question by John Lewis Gaddis _____________________________________________________________________________ Major Theme: Origins of the Cold War Ideological Differences Altruistic idea of Democracy to Soviet Control Mutual Suspicion and Fear Nuclear Weapon Buildup created a stalemate, neither side wanted to risk war Both sides used the external enemy for politics No agreement reached by UN on Nuclear Weapons "Hitler was the architect of German disunity" - wars on several fronts, different treaties All Allies unsure of what to do Attempting to unify Germany w/o idea of who would benefit meant unification was impossible - affirmed stability, they would not become and more asymmetrical Fears of exploitation From Wartime Allies to Post-War Enemies Both sides refused to accept anything short of victory Berlin Blockade from 1948 to 1949 - attempt to prevent Western Bloc with Germany Behind the scenes conflict in the Korean war Destruction caused by Red Army Historiography The Cold War was not inevitable nor is the conception that it could only disappear once the Soviet Union did the only way of through - Gaddis The German Question was an opportunity to end the Cold War early - Gladdis "Our people are unwilling to contemplate at any time within the foreseeable future, under any conceivable agreement with the Russians, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Germany," - Kennan Major Theme: Nature of the Cold War Ideological Opposition Three Groups 1. Supporters of Morgenthau Plan/Treasury - wanted reparations 2. General Lucus Clay wanted a quick unification and saw not the Soviets but the French as resistant 3. Supported Clay on rehabilitation but thought reunification unlikely Superpowers and Spheres of Influence 1946 - peace treaties for former German Satellites Failure to dismantle in Cold War Summits Left Germany divided Construction of Berlin wall in 1961 Both sides began to consider a strengthened Germany more beneficial to their power Stalin planned to elicit support of Social Democrats and others on the West to bring all of Germany under Russian control London Conference allowed West Germans full governmental responsibility Division of Germany would end stability in Europe - nothing could evolve, most powerful nation divided Civilian population could become tired of European funding - withdraw troops/supplies - Russian exploitation U.S. slow to develop policy West Germans drove "magnet policy" - that strong West German economy would pull East Germans into West Germany and unify Soviet conventional force superiority - 175 divisions to 12 Alliances and Diplomacy in the Cold War The British were left to pressure the Truman administration to choose between alts British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin maneuvered Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to propose consolidation of West Germany Consensus that strong Germany better to resist Soviets West considered Germany more as an ally than past enemy American forces in Germany would have to leave eventually - John Foster proposed tactical withdrawal in 1953 to bolster relations Danger of being too productive, West Germans may never protect themselves French refused to ratify the EDC British stepped in an suggested Germany become part of NATO - everyone agreed American leadership indecisive - allowed allies to decide fate of Germany Warsaw treaty organized in Soviet Union in response Divided Germany became seen as stable - but impossible to do so equally Historiography The issue of how to not pressure Germany into an alliance with the other side made its future a "central issue" and was the origins of that conflict. - Gaddis There were more communists where the Red Army had not been than were it had (in Berlin) - Soviet Official "We have no choice but to lead our section of Germany - the section of which we and the British have accepted responsibility - to a form of independence so prosperous, so secure, so superior, that the East cannot threaten it." - George Kennan No one saw the division of Germany or the Cold War as permanent - Gladdis "The German problem was analogous to the dual key system that the Americans use to control the launch of nuclear tipped missiles - nothing happens unless both operators agree to turn their keys simultaneously." - Frank Ninkovich Major Theme: Development and Impact of the Cold War Global Spread of the Cold War from its European Origins Cold War Policies of Containment, Brinkmanship, Peaceful Sentiments strongly against rearming Germany again Coexistence, Détente Role of the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement Cold War Summit 1955 at Geneva Truman administration difficulty in persuading Congress to arm NATO allies Role and Significance of Leaders Indochina settlement in 1954 French insistence on German punishment (again) Mutual withdrawal of Occupation forces from Austria in 1955 Stalin's saw Germany as a Cold War problem before the Americans - met with German leaders on June 4, 1945 - Red Army would control occupation and KPD seek support Stalin's "relaxed remarks" motivated Marshall to find initiative and prevent Stalin's mysterious goals Kennan advocated for free elections throughout Germany, formation of central government, and withdrawal of occupation forces - hoped Germany would not align with West or East but maintain 3rd party status - plan failed for withdrawal was leaked Militarily decisions such as rearming Germany and building bases in Fascist Spain made sense but political cost high Stalin increasingly desperate to reverse unfavorable trend and try to reunify Germany Stalin proposed 10 March 1952 for a four-power conference to arrange free elections throughout Germany for an independent state - Capitalists unwilling, Britain formed Western response, both sides drafted notes, West delayed Stalin never wanted a separate East German State Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 - relations with Soviet Union increased Yuri Andropov's goal to delay arming of West Germany with nuclear weapons Arms Race, Proliferation and Limitation Not addressed in Cold War Summits Armies integrated into multinational European Defense Community coordinated with but apart from NATO Dwight D. Eisenhower would lead NATO in emergency Western buildup of forces in Western Europe Stalin still afraid of Germany and Japan "rising up" Eisenhower 16th April 1953 speech deploring costs of nuclear arms race Uncertainty - U.S. didn't want to retreat from nuclear basis in West Europe Large conventional Russian force stationed against American nuclear weapons in Europe Social, Cultural, and Economic Impact Europe couldn't revive without Germany Stalin expected economic problems to bring Western Europe to Communism Stalin unable to provide nationalism unlike Hitler - brutal Soviet troops and forced merging Stalin "Clung, almost to the end of his life to the illusion that ideology sooner or later would override nationalism" and unify Germany Marshall plan gave immediate economic assistance in contrast to uncertain Soviet help Ulbricht's forced industrialization/collectivization in East Germany failed East Germans fleeing (120,000 a year) Plan to force payment from West Germany for unification West Germany a "miraculous" recovery West Germany recovered - began to see unification as unlikely and shouldn't be pursued 1/6 East Germans left from 1945 to 1961 East Germans insisted they could not prosper while West Germany existed Historiography Russia failed to occupy a socialist country because it had never done so before. - Tiul'panov If no means for the Germans to fight were given to them the West would have lost them - John J. McCloy West's unwillingness to test Stalin's proposal for elections in Germany meant a missed opportunity to have moderated the Cold War - Gaddis German government unstable and new - James B. Conant Reith Lectures - peace unlikely, division of Germany had to happen, but "there is danger in permitting it to harden." Major Theme: End of the Cold War Break-Up of Soviet Union: Internal Problems and External Red Army destruction of East Europe Pressures 10 June 1953 revolt in East Germany suppressed - Beria's idea suppressed and him executed After revolts Russia committed itself to maintenance of regime Near rebellion in Poland in 1956 and one in Hungary Breakdown of Soviet Control Over Central and Eastern Europe Historiography Had Beria succeeded Stalin Germany might have been reunified and West East relations improved. - Gaddis "The German people have not yet had time to be educated in the great advantage of Communism" - Khrushchev - unification of Germany would be a retreat from the Capitalists .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project
    The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project JOHN W. MCDONALD Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: June 5, 1997 Copyright 2 3 ADST TABLE OF CONTENTS Background Born in Ko lenz, Germany of U.S. military parents Raised in military bases throughout U.S. University of Illinois Berlin, Germany - OMGUS - Intern Program 1,4.-1,50 1a2 Committee of Allied Control Council Morgenthau Plan Court system Environment Currency reform Berlin Document Center Transition to State Department Allied High Commission Bonn, Germany - Allied High Commission - Secretariat 1,50-1,52 The French Office of Special Representative for Europe General 6illiam Draper Paris, France - Office of the Special Representative for Europe - Staff Secretary 1,52-1,54 U.S. Regional Organization 7USRO8 Cohn and Schine McCarthyism State Department - Staff Secretariat - Glo al Briefing Officer 1,54-1,55 Her ert Hoover, 9r. 9ohn Foster Dulles International Cooperation Administration 1,55-1,5, E:ecutive Secretary to the Administration Glo al development Area recipients P1480 Point Four programs Anti-communism Africa e:perts African e:-colonies The French 1and Grant College Program Ankara, Turkey -CENTO - U.S. Economic Coordinator 1,5,-1,63 Cooperation programs National tensions Environment Shah of Iran AID program Micro2ave projects Country mem ers Cairo, Egypt - Economic Officer 1,63-1,66 Nasser AID program Soviets Environment Surveillance P1480 agreement As2an Dam Family planning United Ara ic Repu lic 7UAR8 National
    [Show full text]
  • In a Rather Emotional State?' the Labour Party and British Intervention in Greece, 1944-5
    ORE Open Research Exeter TITLE 'In a rather emotional state?' The Labour party and British intervention in Greece, 1944-5 AUTHORS Thorpe, Andrew JOURNAL The English Historical Review DEPOSITED IN ORE 12 February 2008 This version available at http://hdl.handle.net/10036/18097 COPYRIGHT AND REUSE Open Research Exeter makes this work available in accordance with publisher policies. A NOTE ON VERSIONS The version presented here may differ from the published version. If citing, you are advised to consult the published version for pagination, volume/issue and date of publication 1 ‘IN A RATHER EMOTIONAL STATE’? THE LABOUR PARTY AND BRITISH INTERVENTION IN GREECE, 1944-45* Professor Andrew Thorpe Department of History University of Exeter Exeter EX4 4RJ Tel: 01392-264396 Fax: 01392-263305 Email: [email protected] 2 ‘IN A RATHER EMOTIONAL STATE’? THE LABOUR PARTY AND BRITISH INTERVENTION IN GREECE, 1944-45 As the Second World War drew towards a close, the leader of the Labour party, Clement Attlee, was well aware of the meagre and mediocre nature of his party’s representation in the House of Lords. With the Labour leader in the Lords, Lord Addison, he hatched a plan whereby a number of worthy Labour veterans from the Commons would be elevated to the upper house in the 1945 New Years Honours List. The plan, however, was derailed at the last moment. On 19 December Attlee wrote to tell Addison that ‘it is wiser to wait a bit. We don’t want by-elections at the present time with our people in a rather emotional state on Greece – the Com[munist]s so active’.
    [Show full text]
  • Europe's Rebirth After the Second World War
    Journal of the British Academy, 3, 167–183. DOI 10.5871/jba/003.167 Posted 5 October 2015. © The British Academy 2015 Out of the ashes: Europe’s rebirth after the Second World War, 1945–1949 Raleigh Lecture on History read 2 July 2015 IAN KERSHAW Fellow of the Academy Abstract: This lecture seeks to explain why the Second World War, the most destruc- tive conflict in history, produced such a contrasting outcome to the First. It suggests that the Second World War’s maelstrom of destruction replaced a catastrophic matrix left by the First — of heightened ethnic, border and class conflict underpinned by a deep and prolonged crisis of capitalism — by a completely different matrix: the end of Germany’s great-power ambitions, the purging of the radical Right and widescale ethnic cleansing, the crystallisation of Europe’s division, unprecedented rates of economic growth and the threat of nuclear war. Together, these self-reinforcing components, all rooted in what soon emerged as the Cold War, conditioned what in 1945 had seemed highly improbable: Europe’s rise out of the ashes of the ruined continent to lasting stability, peace and prosperity. Keywords: Cold War, Germany, ethnic cleansing, economic growth, matrix, Europe’s division, radical Right, nuclear war. It is a great honour to deliver this Raleigh Lecture. When invited to do so, I was asked, in the context of the 70th anniversary of the end of the most terrible war in history, to speak on some topic related to the end of the Second World War. As the war recedes into history the recognition has grown that it was the epicentre and determin- ing episode in the 20th century in Europe.
    [Show full text]
  • Yalta, a Tripartite Negotiation to Form the Post-War World Order: Planning for the Conference, the Big Three’S Strategies
    YALTA, A TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION TO FORM THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER: PLANNING FOR THE CONFERENCE, THE BIG THREE’S STRATEGIES Matthew M. Grossberg Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in the Department of History, Indiana University August 2015 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Master’s Thesis Committee ______________________________ Kevin Cramer, Ph. D., Chair ______________________________ Michael Snodgrass, Ph. D. ______________________________ Monroe Little, Ph. D. ii ©2015 Matthew M. Grossberg iii Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the participation and assistance of so many of the History Department at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. Their contributions are greatly appreciated and sincerely acknowledged. However, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the following: Dr. Anita Morgan, Dr. Nancy Robertson, and Dr. Eric Lindseth who rekindled my love of history and provided me the push I needed to embark on this project. Dr. Elizabeth Monroe and Dr. Robert Barrows for being confidants I could always turn to when this project became overwhelming. Special recognition goes to my committee Dr. Monroe Little and Dr. Michael Snodgrass. Both men provided me assistance upon and beyond the call of duty. Dr. Snodgrass patiently worked with me throughout my time at IUPUI, helping my writing progress immensely. Dr. Little came in at the last minute, saving me from a fate worse than death, another six months of grad school. Most importantly, all credit is due Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Planning the Peace and Enforcing the Surrender: Deterrence in the Allied Occupations of Germany
    Journal of Interdisciplinary History, xl:1 (Summer, 2009), 33–56. PLANNING THE PEACE Melissa Willard-Foster Planning the Peace and Enforcing the Surrender: Deterrence in the Allied Occupations of Germany and Japan “A well behaved occupied country,” writes Schelling in Arms and Inºuence, “is not one in which violence plays no part; it may be one in which latent violence is used so skillfully that it need not be spent in punishment.” If violence does not en- sue after a war, Schelling explains, it is because in the course of surrender negotiations, “the capacity to inºict pain and damage was successfully used in the bargaining process.” Schelling cites examples of Genghis Khan marching hostages ahead of his troops to deter resistance, the ancient Persians burning neighboring vil- lages of clans that they sought to control, and the British conduct- ing air raids in an attempt to pacify rebellious Arabian tribes. Bombings, hostage takings, publicized executions, forced evacua- tions, and compulsory labor are just a few among the many deter- rent strategies that occupiers have used for centuries to prevent re- sistance and keep defeated populations quiescent.1 Much in contrast to this traditional notion of ruthless con- quest is the conventional wisdom surrounding the reasons for suc- cess in the post-World War II (wwii) occupations of Germany and Japan. The perception that these occupations were largely peaceful enterprises, with respect to both the policies used and the re- sponses attained, supported early arguments from the administra- tion of President George W. Bush that similar results could obtain in Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • Open A. Niebauer Master S Thesis
    The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School Communication Arts and Science CONSTRUCTIONS OF GUILT AND LOGICS OF PUNISHMENT: AMERICAN NARRATIVES OF GERMAN GUILT AFTER WORLD WAR II A Thesis in Communication Arts and Sciences by Allison Morris Niebauer © 2016 Allison Morris Niebauer Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts August 2016 The thesis of Allison Morris Niebauer was reviewed and approved* by the following: Stephen Howard Browne Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences Thesis Advisor Thomas W. Benson Edwin Erle Sparks Professor Emeritus of Rhetoric Michele Kennerly Assistant Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences John Gastil Department Head and Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences *Signatures are on file in the Graduate School iii ABSTRACT This thesis investigates how American war crime planners conceived of German guilt after World War II, and how it influenced their prescriptions for punishment. I examine three separate proposals for the punishment of German war criminals and the rhetorical, philosophical, and material ramifications of each. Using different aspects of narrative theory, I explore how each construction of guilt created a different propulsive logic for punishment. Recognizing that narratives have consequences both within and outside the story, I argue that each plan highlights a different conception of the relationship between guilt and punishment. The logics promoted by each plan have been carried into different aspects of transitional justice
    [Show full text]
  • Military Government Officials, US Policy, and the Occupation of Bavaria, 1945-1949
    Coping with Crisis: Military Government Officials, U.S. Policy, and the Occupation of Bavaria, 1945-1949 By Copyright 2017 John D. Hess M.A., University of Kansas, 2013 B.S., Oklahoma State University, 2011 Submitted to the graduate degree program in the Department of History and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Chair: Adrian R. Lewis Theodore A. Wilson Sheyda Jahanbani Erik R. Scott Mariya Omelicheva Date Defended: 28 April 2017 The dissertation committee for John D. Hess certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Coping with Crisis: Military Government Officials, U.S. Policy, and the Occupation of Bavaria, 1945-1949 Chair: Adrian R. Lewis Date Approved: 28 April 2017 ii Abstract This dissertation explores the implementation of American policy in postwar Germany from the perspective of military government officers and other occupation officials in the Land of Bavaria. It addresses three main questions: How did American military government officials, as part of the institution of the Office of Military Government, Bavaria (OMGB), respond to the challenges of the occupation? How did these individuals interact with American policy towards defeated Germany? And, finally, how did the challenges of postwar Germany shape that relationship with American policy? To answer these questions, this project focuses on the actions of military government officers and officials within OMGB from 1945 through 1949. Operating from this perspective, this dissertation argues that American officials in Bavaria possessed a complicated, often contradictory, relationship with official policy towards postwar Germany.
    [Show full text]
  • Marshall Plan
    Marshall Plan From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Map of Cold-War era Europe showing countries that received Marshall Plan aid. The red columns show the relative amount of total aid per nation. The Marshall Plan (from its enactment, officially the European Recovery Program (ERP)) was the primary plan of the United States for rebuilding the allied countries of Europe and repelling communism after World War II. The initiative was named for United States Secretary of State George Marshall and was largely the creation of State Department officials, especially William L. Clayton and George F. Kennan. The reconstruction plan was developed at a meeting of the participating European states in July 1947. The Marshall Plan offered the same aid to the Soviet Union and its allies, if they would make political reforms and accept certain outside controls. In fact, America worried that the Soviet Union would take advantage of the plan and therefore made the terms deliberately hard for the USSR to accept. The plan was in operation for four fiscal years beginning in July 1947. During that period some $13 billion of economic and technical assistance- equivalent to around $130 billion in 2006- was given to help the recovery of the European countries which had joined in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. By the time the plan had come to completion, the economy of every participant state, with the exception of Germany, had grown well past pre-war levels. Over the next two decades, Western Europe as a whole would enjoy unprecedented growth and prosperity. The Marshall Plan has also long been seen as one of the first elements of European integration, as it erased tariff trade barriers and set up institutions to coordinate the economy on a continental level.
    [Show full text]
  • Senior Scholars Spring 2017 Week 1 January 31
    2/5/17 The European Union: History, Structure, Future Senior Scholars Spring 2017 Prof. Kenneth F. Ledford [email protected] 368-4144 DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY Frank-Walter Steinmeier “But among most U.S. allies, Trump’s attitudes ‘caused astonishment and excitement, not just in Brussels,’ German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier told reporters Monday in Brussels. Coming directly from a meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Steinmeier said NATO had listened to Trump’s comments ‘with concern.’” DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY The European Union Sigmar Gabriel “’Those were highly nationalistic • “Talking Shop” sounds,’ he said to ZDF about the – Quasselbude inaugural address. ‘The only things missing were concepts such as calling • “System Parties” the parliament a ‘talking shop,’ or – Systemparteien talking about the ‘system parties.’ • “Lying Press” Then you would reach the political rhetoric of the Conservatives and – Lügenpresse Reactionaries of the twenties in the • Goebbels and Hitler in the 1920s twentieth century. He really means it • Rhetoric every German knows; now used by neo-Nazis in the seriously, and I think that we need to get ready for a rough ride.’” NPD and in the United States DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 1 2/5/17 The European Union The European Union • New York Times, Sunday, • New York Times, Sunday, January 27, 2017, page A6 January 29, page A6 – Will “Brexit” cause instability? – Will Turkey turn away from Europe? – Can Greece find relief? – Can Italy’s banks stay afloat? – Will Catalonia leave Spain? – Will the United States stand with Europe? – Will nationalists triumph elsewhere? DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY The European Union The European Union • First five weeks, January 31-February 28 • Reference works: – Survey of current EU, its evolution, chronology to present – John Pinder and Simon Usherwood, The European Union: A Very Short rd • Two weeks off Introduction, 3 ed.
    [Show full text]
  • Part I. History, Diplomacy, Democracy and Development – 11
    PART I. HISTORY, DIPLOMACY, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT – 11 Part I. History, Diplomacy, Democracy and Development THE MARSHALL PLAN: LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE 21ST CENTURY CHAPTER 1. THE MARSHALL PLAN: HISTORY AND LEGACY – 13 Chapter 1. The Marshall Plan: History and Legacy by Gerard Bossuat The Marshall Plan, officially called European Recovery Program (ERP), was in place from April 1948 to September 1951. Most contemporary actors considered that it played an essential role in the economic successes of postwar Western Europe. The various European programs of modernization greatly benefited from the ERP, since it financed imports essential to reconstruction and modernization. It produced counterparts in European currencies, the allocation of which needs to be clarified, and generated a debate on their use. Moreover, the Marshall Plan was at the origin of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), created to encourage European unity. The Marshall Plan was a political tool in the hands of the American administration in the context of the Cold War and the defense of the West. What was the role of the Marshall Plan in the development of a consumer society? Was the Marshall Plan Americanizing European societies? The ERP thus also held a socio-cultural dimension. Finally, over the last 60 years the Marshall Plan has become a myth. Whenever our countries are hit by a crisis, the media or politicians ask for a “new Marshall Plan”. The Marshall Plan was, and remains, appreciated, but it also raised criticisms in Europe. So we have to separate what belongs to history and what belongs to the collective memory or to the myth.
    [Show full text]
  • Cold War Timeline
    Cold War Timeline Jun 44 – D-Day, allied invasion at Normandy. Provisional French government headed by Gen Charles DeGaulle formed. Jul 44 – Bretton Woods Conference Aug 44 - Paris liberated, Soviet territory is liberated of all Axis troops Sep 44 – Oct 44 – Morganthau Plan to pastoralize Germany. Churchill and FDR agree that post- war Germany should have no heavy industry. Nov 44 – Dec 44 – Jan 45 –. Soviets on the Oder River 28 miles from Berlin Feb 45 – Yalta conference of allied leaders. New United Nations will replace failed League of Nations. Mar 45 – Apr 45 – Italy liberated. FDR dies, Truman becomes president May 45 – Soviet ultimatum to Turks for Bosphorus/Dardenelles for unlimited naval access. German surrender Jun 45 – Truman rejects Morganthau Plan for Germany. Unity government established in Poland between London Poles (western-supported govt. in exile) and Lublin Poles (Soviet supported govt.). Mikoljczk is western allies’ choice for president. Jul 45 – Potsdam Conf., plans announced for 4-power occupation of Berlin. Truman tells Stalin about atomic bomb. Churchill replaced by Clement Atley halfway through conference. Konigsberg to remain with Soviet Union until final peace treaty (it is still with Russia today). Aug 45 – Potsdam Conf, USSR enters war against Japan, New borders for Poland agreed upon. Atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima & Nagasaki Sep 45 – Japan surrenders on USS Missouri, Council of Foreign Ministers meet (COFM- 1) in London to draft peace treaties Oct 45 – Nov 45 – International Military Tribunal (IMT) begins in Nuremberg, Air corridor agreement for Berlin. Dec 45 – COFM 2 Moscow, Soviet Marshall Zhukov rejects free interzonal trade Jan 46 – Austria reconstituted.
    [Show full text]
  • Collective Guilt Ferdinand A
    Notre Dame Law Review Volume 23 | Issue 4 Article 1 5-1-1948 Collective Guilt Ferdinand A. Hermens Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Ferdinand A. Hermens, Collective Guilt, 23 Notre Dame L. Rev. 431 (1948). Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol23/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTRE DAME LAWYER A Quarterly Law Review VOL. XXIII MAY, 1948 No. 4 COLLECTIVE GUILT FEW problems are beset by so many complications as that of collective guilt. It raises issues in the social sciences, as well as in social ethics. A volume on political ethics, which in turn would have to be based on a discussion of the major problems of current politics, would be needed in order to provide an adequate framework for a discussion of collective guilt. This article, must, of necessity, limit itself to a few major aspects of the problem, and this creates the danger that not all of the remarks which follow may be understood as intended. The practical implications of a policy based upon the assumption of collective guilt are, however, so im- portant that an attempt to analyze the problem might seem justified if not all pertinent issues are properly discussed- even if some conclusions are tentative, or do not rest upon as large a body of evidence as would be desirable.
    [Show full text]