Refugee Review Tribunal

AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: AFG17438 Country: Afghanistan Date: 3 August 2005

Keywords: Afghanistan – Paktia Province – Taliban – Pashtuns – Sunnis – Karzai Government – Najibullah Government

This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions

1. Has Afghanistan generally been traditionally, and does it remain, a society divided deeply between mutually antagonistic tribal/religious/political groupings? 2. What is the general security situation and control by the government now? 3. Are there independent assessments available to indicate whether the security situation at present is improving, stable or deteriorating? 4. With regard to Khankhail, Saidkaram, Paktia, can you indicate on a map where this is? 5. What is the general security situation and control there by the government now, and is it an area marked by Taliban activities? 6. Are there independent assessments available to indicate whether the security situation at present is improving, stable or deteriorating? 7. What is the situation there for Pashtuns? 8. What is the situation there for Sunnis? 9. What is the situation there for functionaries of the Karzai government and their families? 10. With regard to Ghardez, where is it (please include map)? 11. Are there indications the Taliban are active there? 12. Are there reports of retribution having being taken, and still being taken, against people (and their family members) associated with the former Najibullah government? 13. Is there any evidence of people being targeted by the Taliban generally, or in Khankhail, Saidkaram, Paktia, for having come from, or being associated with, Australia?

RESPONSE

Note: As there are spelling variations translating into English, for the purposes of this RRT Country Research Response the spelling is as per the source document.

1. Has Afghanistan generally been traditionally, and does it remain, a society divided deeply between mutually antagonistic tribal/religious/political groupings? Information on the Norwegian Refugee Council’s database states:

• Afghanistan has a long history of internal strife due its geographical and ethnic fragmentation

"[F]or decades, Islamic movements, communists and tribal warriors have struggled for control of a nation that is geographically and ethnically fragmented. Afghanistan is still largely a tribal society, divided into many tribes, clans and smaller groups. Considerable variation in the types of terrain, and obstacles imposed by high mountains and deserts, account for the country's marked ethnic and cultural differences. Muslims comprise 99 per cent of the population of Afghanistan, approximately 80 per cent of them Sunni and the remainder Shi’a followers. The Shi’a minority is concentrated in central and western Afghanistan.

The Pashtuns (also called Pathans) are the largest single ethnic group constituting some 40% of the population of Afghanistan. They are predominantly Sunni Muslims and live mainly in the center, south and east of the country. The British-drawn Duran Line of 1893 demarcated the border of modern-day Pakistan and Afghanistan with little or no thought to the Pashtun people who lived on either side.

The Tajiks are the second largest group, whose language is Persian. Most of them are Sunni Muslims, but Shi’a Muslim Tajiks are also found in the West of the country (around and in the city of Herat), and in Kabul.

The Hazaras are of Eastern Turkic origin and followers of the Shi’a Muslim confession using Farsi as their lingua franca.

The Uzbeks and Turkomans are followers of the Sunni Muslim tradition and are ethnically and linguistically Turkic.

Other Afghan Turkic groups include the Kypchak, Kazakh, Aimaq, Wakhi and Kirghiz. The Nuristanis live in the middle of the Hindu Kush mountain range in four valleys, with each valley having its own district language/dialect - Kati, Waigali, Ashkun and Parsun. The Baluchis and Brahuis practise Sunni Islam and their languages are Brahui and Baluchi." (FAS September 1998) (Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project 2004, Profile of Internal Displacement: Afghanistan, 25 October, p.13, 200 – Attachment 1).

The UK Home Office quotes a range of sources relating to ethnic groups (UK Home Office 2004, Afghanistan Country Report, April, paras. 6.114-6.120 – Attachment 2).

Saikal has concluded in his book Modern Afghanistan:

Afghanistan’s politics and society in modern history have been shaped by interaction between variables with which few other countries have had to cope. The variables royal polygamy, major power rivalry and ideological extremism, which underlined the themes of this book, have not all been of equal weight with equal impact in the process. However, their confluence, in conjunction with certain peculiar geo-strategic aspects of Afghanistan as a traditional, ethno-tribal and a crossroad, landlocked Muslim country, has played a determining role in the evolution of the Afghan state and politics and in influencing the material life and psyche of its citizens as well as the country’s relevance to the outside world…(Saikal, Amin 2004, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, I. B. Tauris, London, p.231 – Attachment 3).

Rubin writes:

The territory of today’s Afghanistan consists of a major mountain range, the Hindu Kush, with its fertile but isolated valleys, and the deserts and river valleys that flank it. This territory spreads over many geographical and ecological zones, and its peoples and societies are correspondingly distinct. Only their incorporation into a state has made them into a single society (Rubin, Barnett R. 2002, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, Yale University Press, 2nd ed. New Haven, p.22 – Attachment 4).

Maley mentions:

…Afghanistan has encompassed a kaleidoscopic collection of ‘micro-societies’ (often identified by the label qawm, or ‘network’), with porous and flexible boundaries. One scholar even went so far as to dub Afghanistan a ‘Nation of Minorities’ (Jawad, 1992). Ethnicity, religion, occupation, and gender have historically offered to Afghans a range of bases upon which they may seek to identify with their fellows, and while some of these are effectively ascriptive – that is, unchangeable, or changeable only at enormous social cost – the relative emphasis given to one over another is frequently a matter of strategic choice…(Maley, William 2002, The Afghanistan Wars, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, p.8 – Attachment 5).

Hamid Hussain describes how ethnicity affects the political question (Hussain, Hamid (undated, after 2002), ‘Ethnic factor in Afghanistan’, Afghanology website http://www.afghanology.com/ethnicfactor.htm - Accessed 26 July 2005 – Attachment 6).

2. What is the general security situation and control by the government now?

In January 2005 Griffin wrote in the Jane’s Intelligence Review that there are “fiefdoms controlled by regional and district commanders, not the government” and:

These commanders range from former communists, such as Abdul Rashid Dostum in the northern city of Shiburghan, to relative newcomers like Jalalabad's Hazrat Ali, a former chef who rose to power on the springboard of the US war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and his home province's opium-rich economy. Until recently, commanders also included leading figures in Karzai's administration, such as Mohammed Fahim, Minister of Defence, who is from the Panjshir Valley; Karim Khalili, the Hazara Vice-President; Gul Agha Shirzai, Minister of Public Works; Sayeed Hussain Anwari, Agriculture Minister; and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the Pashtun leader of the Ittehad-i-Islami faction, whose informal role in government extends to control of the Supreme Court (Griffin, Michael 2005, ‘Hard road ahead for Afghan leader’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 February – Attachment 7).

A February 2005 United Nations Development (UNDP) press release notes on security and civil rights:

Security and Civil Rights: Positive: Afghanistan successfully elected a president for the first time in history. The new Constitution and upcoming parliamentary elections – though postponed – should yield increased government accountability, a forged link between the people and their government, better-trained and more centralized state security, and separation of civilian and military policing. Negative: “Factional elements” are still in power in many areas, with their own privatized security forces, outside of central government control. Physical violence by armed militias continues, as does torture by security forces, deadly attacks by Taliban, hostage taking, street gangs, and domestic violence against women and children (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2005, ‘Afghanistan’s future holds promise and peril’, Press Release, 21 February http://www.undp.org/dpa/pressrelease/releases/2005/february/pr21feb05.html# - Accessed 27 July 2005 – Attachment 8).

A March 2005 United Nations report states:

15. The overall security situation has been relatively calm for almost four months. The severe winter season has presented a significant impediment to the operations of extremists, terrorists, factional forces and criminal (including narcotics) elements. In areas least affected by winter conditions (particularly the south-eastern and southern regions), the coalition forces, the Afghan National Army and Government institutions continued to be targeted by extremist elements employing anti-tank mines, small unit ambushes and rocket attacks, albeit at a lower level that in the latter part of 2004 (United Nations 2005, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’, General Assembly: Security Council, A/59/744 – S/2005/183, 18 March, p.4 – Attachment 9); and 17. However these positive developments should not lead to complacency. There have been several recent cases of improvised explosive devices and landmines being used to target coalition forces, the Afghan National Army and Government structures. Significant weapons caches have been found by the Government forces and ISAF in Kabul and Parvan provinces. These developments suggest that those opposed to the Government (including the Taliban and Al-Qaida) will continue to try to demonstrate their capability to plan and stage high-profile attacks, such as hostage taking, suicide attacks and vehicle bombs. On 7 March, a British adviser to the Government was murdered by unknown gunmen in Kabul (United Nations 2005, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’, General Assembly: Security Council, A/59/744 – S/2005/183, 18 March, p.4 – Attachment 9).

Human Rights Watch reported that violence in Afghanistan surged in May 2005 (Human Rights Watch 2005, Afghanistan: Violence Surges, 24 May http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/05/23/afghan10995.htm - Accessed 27 July 2005 – Attachment 10).

STRATFOR stated in June 2005:

Incidents such as the seizure of Mian-e Shin show that despite recent claims by Afghan President Hamid Karzai's administration, the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda are far from subdued. In addition, sources in the region have said that the Taliban are still very much a part of life in Afghanistan. In some parts of the country, entire areas are under Taliban control and are patrolled by Taliban fighters. Afghan government sources have said that in some cases, the Taliban act as an informal government, providing social services and meting out justice (STRATFOR 2005, Afghanistan: Militant Activity Escalates, 23 June – Attachment 11).

In June 2005 the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan on Violence in Afghanistan stated:

After a period of relative security since the presidential election in October of last year, Afghanistan is witnessing an escalation in violence. This is illustrated by the murder of cleric Maulawi Abdullah Fayaz and the massacre at the Abdul Rab Akhundzada Mosque in Kandahar city; the murder of eleven employees of Chemonics and their relatives in Zabul and Helmand; the murder of five deminers in Farah; the beheading of Mullah Ida Khan in his madrassa in the Barmal district of Paktika province; last week’s cold-blooded execution of at least four Afghan police in Kandahar province; and several fatal attacks against people involved in the upcoming elections.

While the country’s South has been most affected, other parts of the country are far from immune. In Paktika, members of local shuras, a teacher and a religious figure have been killed by extremist elements. And in Kunar, Nuristan and districts of Nangarhar, insecurity has also worsened. … Not all violence is caused by extremist attacks. Drugs, local rivalries, corruption and common crime are also involved. But the current offensive by extremist groups, including the Taliban, is playing a primary role in today’s escalation, with what appears to be more funding, more deadly weaponry, more powerful media for propaganda and more aggressive, cruel and indiscriminate tactics (Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan on Violence in Afghanistan 2005, The United Nations condemns the escalation of violence in Afghanistan, insists on renewed cooperation to bring it to an end, 25 June http://www.unama-afg.org/news/_statement/SRSG/2005/05jun25.htm - Accessed 28 July 2005 – Attachment 12).

3. Are there independent assessments available to indicate whether the security situation at present is improving, stable or deteriorating?

In April 2005 the UK Home Office summarised reports on the general security situation covering the years 2003-2004 (UK Home Office 2005, Afghanistan Country Report, April, paras. 5.95-5.112 – Attachment 13).

FAST has released the attached risk assessment for Afghanistan for the period December 2004 to May 2005. FAST (Early Analysis of Tensions and Fact-finding) is a political early- warning system introduced in 1998 for Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) to support decision-makers in policy, administration, and business produced by Swisspeace (FAST (undated), Afghanistan: Semi-annual Risk Assessment: December 2004 to May 2005 http://www.swisspeace.org/uploads/FAST/updates/FAST%20Afghanistan%201_2005.pdf – Accessed 27 July 2005 – Attachment 14; ‘Fast International’ (undated), Swisspeace website http://www.swisspeace.org/programs/default.htm - Accessed 28 July 2005 – Attachment 15).

A July 2005 report states:

There will probably continue to be reassurances that the Taliban is “on its last legs” by the senior Western military, despite which there will probably be an increase in the number of “Taliban” attacks. It should be noted that many attacks could simply be attributed to the Taliban, where in actual fact they could have been performed by smaller, more extreme groups. Overall, violence is likely to remain a feature of the country, due to the burgeoning drugs trade, low-level commanders wishing to retain local influence, and of course due to the smaller hardcore of militants such as al- Qaeda or HIG, whose attacks will probably cause many to believe that there has been little improvement in the country (AKE Intelligence 2005, Afghanistan: AKE Bespoke Intelligence Reports – 1 July 2005, 1 July – Attachment 16).

In another July 2005 paper, STRATFOR wrote that fighting had escalated and summarises:

The fighting in Afghanistan will continue throughout the summer, possibly decreasing slightly and then surging before the September elections. Beyond that, it is likely that in a country that has been the scene of constant warfare for the last 26 years, the various militias, insurgents and warlords will continue fighting the government in Kabul and each other - and U.S. forces as long as they stay - for years to come (STRATFOR 2005, Afghanistan: The Insurgency continues, 1 July – Attachment 17).

The ‘Executive Summary and Recommendations’ of an International Crisis Group (ICG) report also outlines the security situation (International Crisis Group 2005, Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?: Executive Summary and Recommendations, Asia Report No. 101, 21 July – Attachment 18).

See also question 2 above.

4. With regard to Khankhail, Saidkaram, Paktia, can you indicate on a map where this is?

Specific reference to Khankhail, Saidkaram was not found in the sources consulted. However, this may refer to Khanokhel in the district of Sayid Karam in the province of Paktya.

Paktya province is located south of Kabul in eastern Afghanistan on the Pakistan border (‘Afghanistan Administrative Divisions’ (undated), HIC/ProMIS – Attachment 19).

A map of Sayid Karam district is also attached (‘Sayid Karam District’ 2002, AIMS, August – Attachment 20).

Khanokhel is also highlighted on the map of Sayid Karam district (‘Sayid Karam District’ 2002, AIMS, August – Attachment 20). Khanokhel and the surrounding area on this district map has also been enlarged for easier reading (‘Sayid Karam District’ 2002, AIMS, August – Attachment 21).

5. What is the general security situation and control in Khankhail, Saidkaram, Paktia, by the government now, and is it an area marked by Taliban activities?

No information was found in the sources consulted specifically on the general security situation in Sayid Karam district.

In respect of the situation in Paktia province, one report identifies the province as part of a belt which is considered to be “very active” (AKE Intelligence 2005, Afghanistan: AKE Bespoke Intelligence Reports – 1 July 2005, 1 July – Attachment 16).

News articles also state that there are military bases located in the province (‘7 policemen, 5 insurgents killed in raid on post in southern Afghanistan’ 2005, The Canadian Press, 15 July – Attachment 22; ‘Karzai inaugurates military compound in eastern Afghanistan’ 2005, BBC Monitoring South Asia, source: Radio Afghanistan, 30 June – Attachment 23).

In March 2005 a STRATFOR advice indicated that US forces were in four provinces in eastern Afghanistan, one of which was Paktia. Further forces were to be deployed to eastern Afghanistan (STRATFOR 2005, Afghanistan: Girding for Battle in the Spring?, 25 March – Attachment 24).

In April 2005 it was reported:

Three years after U.S. forces routed hundreds of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in the battle of Shahi Kot, in the mountains of southern Paktia province, villagers reluctantly admit the U.S. and the Afghan government forces have almost won the war.

But an anticipated spring offensive in the last few weeks showed the Taliban were still in business after a long winter lull that followed their failure to disrupt Afghanistan's presidential poll last October (‘Taliban just won’t go away’ 2005, South Asian Media Net, 7 April http://www.south asianmedia.net/index_story.cfm?id=196821 &category=Frontend&Country=AFGHA NISTAN - Accessed 13 April 2005 – Attachment 25).

Recently the Paktia’s governor outlined the provinces achievements in the following terms:

The governor promised that security would be established in Paktia Province. He pledged completion of the first phase of the DDR programme, the prevention of narcotics' cultivation by the people of the province, and the enrolment of the province's youth in the police force and the national army. He said that Paktia Province had been ignored by previous regimes even though its people possessed great talent. He added that about 130,000 girls and boys had been studying in the province and 5,000 policemen had completed their training. A reconciliation commission has been set up and talks have been under way with opposition commanders. Forest cutting has been banned and the public has extended its cooperation in this regard. Tribal groups defend the province's borders (‘Governor of Afghanistan's Paktia Province notes achievements’ 2005, BBC Monitoring South Asia, source: Radio Afghanistan, 30 June – Attachment 26).

Recent reports associated with the Taliban in Paktia province are (most recent first):

July 2005:

Meanwhile, authorities said provincial highway police arrested two Taliban activists planting a mine by the roadside Sunday night. They also seized a Kalashnikov assault rifle and a motorbike from the miscreants.

Provincial highway police official Najibullah said the miscreants held on the Paktia- Ghazni Highway were being grilled (‘Taliban claim killing two soldiers in Ghazni clash’ 2005, Pajhwok Afghan News, 25 July – Attachment 27).

July 2005:

Twelve other soldiers were killed 10 July by a land mine in Paktiya Province. It is not clear if their convoy was deliberately targeted or if the blast was from an old mine planted during the last 27 years of fighting (Esfandiari, Golnaz 2005, ‘Violence increasing in south and east’, RFE/RL Afghanistan Report, 25 July, Vol. 4, No. 21 – Attachment 28).

July 2005: …one Afghan national army soldier was killed and another injured when suspected Taliban fighters fired rockets at their base in Paktia province, near Pakistan (‘7 policemen, 5 insurgents killed in raid on post in southern Afghanistan’ 2005, The Canadian Press, 15 July – Attachment 22).

July 2005:

Mine explosion killed 13 Afghan policemen in southeast Paktia province on Sunday. Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack (‘Major news items in leading Afghan newspapers’ 2005, Xinhua News Agency, 13 July – Attachment 29).

June 2005:

…In neighbouring Paktia province 17 landmines were defused on the main road from the provincial capital Gardez to Sayed Karam district.

Remote-controlled bombs are a favourite tool of the Taleban regime. Four US soldiers were wounded in a roadside bomb explosion on the same road earlier this month (‘Afghanistan: Five Afghan policemen killed in attack; Govt says Taleban fragile’ 2005, Agence France Presse, 29 June – Attachment 30).

May 2005:

An Afghan newspaper reported:

It is reported that Serajoddin Haqqani, the son of Mawlawi Jalaloddin Haqqani, has been appointed as the [Taleban] leader in the southeastern provinces of Paktika, Paktia and Khost. Malem Mohammad Zaman, has been appointed as his deputy.

A senior Taleban member added that Mawlawi Saiforrahman, a known Taleban commander, is alive and conducting operations against the US forces in the provinces of Logar and Paktia.

He also said that there were Arab mojahedin [holy warriors] in the provinces of Khost, Paktika and Paktia and they were led by Abolhais Aljaziri. Abu Akhlas is commanding more than 100 mojahedin in the [eastern] provinces of Konar and Nurestan (‘Al-Qai’dah, Taleban appoint new leaders in Afghan southeast’ 2005, BBC Monitoring Alert, source Arman-e Melli, 19 May – Attachment 31).

February 2005:

The governor of a southeastern province said last month that hundreds of Taliban fighters may abandon their insurgency as a result of peace talks under way between local commanders and President Hamid Karzai's government.

In return, the tribal chiefs and local officials wanted Khalilzad to urge U.S. forces not to harass Taliban members who quit the insurgency, Paktia governor Assadullah Wafa said.

Khalilzad has said in the past that the amnesty was open to all Taliban guerrillas and their allies except those guilty of major crimes.

Senior Taliban officials have denied that the guerrillas have held negotiations with either the Afghan or the U.S. governments and have vowed to continue their struggle (Brunnstrom, David 2005, ‘U.S Envoy Says Senior Taliban Take Up Amnesty Offer’, Reuters, source: AOP Afghan News, 14 February – Attachment 32).

6. Are there independent assessments available to indicate whether the security situation at present is improving, stable or deteriorating in Khankhail, Saidkaram, Paktia?

Specific assessments on the situation in Sayid Karam and Paktia were not found in the sources consulted. Although not specifically mentioning Paktia province recent reports state:

July 2005:

Since the arrival of spring in March, the Taliban and their allies have increased their attacks in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan.

The attacks have resulted in the death of hundreds of people, mostly militants (Esfandiari, Golnaz 2005, ‘Violence increasing in south and east’, RFE/RL Afghanistan Report, 25 July, Vol. 4, No. 21 – Attachment 28).

July 2005:

A resurgent Taliban and other anti-government elements threaten to deter candidates and intimidate voters primarily in the eastern and southern provinces. Growing numbers of attacks on coalition and Afghan forces, the assassinations of four pro- government clerics and a suicide attack on a mosque in Kandahar are destabilising border regions. Following the first mullah's killing, pamphlets were distributed threatening a similar fate to anyone involved in the election (International Crisis Group 2005, Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?, Asia Report No. 101, 21 July, pp.18-19 – Attachment 33).

June 2005:

Mr. Jean Arnault, a UN envoy to Afghanistan, reportedly stated:

“The country is confronted with an escalation of both the number and gravity of incidents that affect several provinces,” he said.

“The situation is especially worrying in the southern provinces... and in Pashtun regions bordering with Pakistan.”

Mr Arnault said that the Afghan and Pakistani governments should reverse the tide of instability (‘UN warns about Afghan instability’ 2005, BBC News, 25 June http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4622167.stm - Accessed 28 July 2005 – Attachment 34).

See also question 5 above.

7. What is the situation in Khankhail, Saidkaram, Paktia, for Pashtuns?

A map shows that Paktia is ethnolinguistically Pashtun (‘Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan’ 1997, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/middle_east_and_asia/Afghanistan_Eth noling_97.jpg - Accessed 2 December 1999 – Attachment 35). According to Adamec the population of Paktia is largely Ghilzai Pashtun - other tribes are the Jadran in the south and west; and the Jaji, Mangal, Tanai and Waziri in the east (Adamec, Ludwig W. 2003, Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, The Scarecrow Press, Inc, 3rd ed. Lanham, p.291 – Attachment 36).

One June 2005 article on Lowgar province mentions Paktia and inter-tribal rivalry:

Lowgar is a multiethnic province, where Pashtuns, Hazaras and Tajiks live together relatively peacefully devoid of inter-tribal rivalry - unlike other central provinces such as Khowst, Paktia and Gardez, which remain unstable (‘Afghanistan: Focus on security in Lowgar province’ 2005, IRIN, 13 June http://ww w.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=30638 &SelectRegion=Central_Asia&Selec tCountry=AFGHANISTAN - Accessed 14 June 2005 – Attachment 37).

Hussain notes that the Ghilzai and Durrani tribes “have mutual hostilities going back centuries” (Hussain, Hamid (undated, after 2002), ‘Ethnic factor in Afghanistan’, Afghanology website http://www.afghanology.com/ethnicfactor.htm - Accessed 26 July 2005 – Attachment 6).

It is of interest that Adamec notes that many of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) were Ghilzais from Paktia (Adamec, Ludwig W. 2003, Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, The Scarecrow Press, Inc, 3rd ed. Lanham, p.291 – Attachment 36).

8. What is the situation in Khankhail, Saidkaram, Paktia, for Sunnis?

Adamec writes that “Except for the Turis and a few groups in Pakistan, all Pashtuns are Sunni Muslims” (Adamec, Ludwig W. 2003, Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, The Scarecrow Press, Inc, 3rd ed. Lanham, pp.298-299 – Attachment 36).

See question 7 above.

9. What is the situation in Khankhail, Saidkaram, Paktia, for functionaries of the Karzai government and their families?

Specific information on the situation in Khankhail, Saidkaram was not found in the sources consulted. In respect of Paktia, however, the following information may be of interest.

A listing of incidents during the period 20 April – 20 May 2005 included the kidnapping of a village elder en route to NGO training; the report did not identify the kidnappers (‘Afghanistan: Rebuilding Afghanistan: Weekly Activity Update for May 16 – May 20: Issue 86’ 2005, USAID, 20 May http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near _east/afghanistan/weeklyreports/052005_r eport.html - Accessed 10 June 2005 – Attachment 38).

One article refers to Paktia’s relations with the Karzai government as follows:

Elders from Paktiya Province have criticized Hamid Karzai for not addressing the problems of their province, Pajhwak News Agency reported on 5 April. Malak Modir, identified as a tribal elder, complained at a community gathering that Paktiya is not represented in the Afghan government and officials from Kabul ignore the provincial problems. Wakil Gol Mangal and Aminullah Zazi told the gathering that 94 percent of the voters in Paktiya supported Karzai’s presidential bid, but “he hasn’t even given 40 percent of his time and efforts” to address the problems of the Paktiya region. A female attendee at the gathering, Sharifa Zurmati Wardak, discussed the issue of women’s rights and warned that “old habits from the past eras,” such as forced marriages, are returning to Paktiya. Paktiya supported Karzai’s candidacy with 95.6 percent of votes, second only to Khost Province, south of Paktiya (Tarzi, Amin 2005, ‘Southeastern representatives critical of Afghan president’, RFE/RL Afghanistan Report, 11 April, Vol. 4, No. 12 – Attachment 39).

A June 2005 Afghan article reported that President Hamed Karzai addressed a gathering of representatives, elders, government officials as well as the governors of Paktia, Paktika and Khost provinces in Paktia. The article concluded with the following paragraph:

Abdol Hakim Munib [phonetic], a representative of the people of Paktia Province, addressed the meeting and declared the support of the people of the province for the elected government. He pointed out the problems faced by the people in the fields of education, public health, road construction, and electricity and water supplies, and asked the government for help (‘Governor of Afghanistan's Paktia Province notes achievements’ 2005, BBC Monitoring South Asia, source: Radio Afghanistan, 30 June – Attachment 26).

In July 2005, although not mentioning Paktia province AKE intelligence states:

According to sources considered to be reliable by AKE, the south and east of the country is witnessing something of a Taliban resurgence. In particular Helmand Province was mentioned as being especially afflicted; therefore it should be expected that attacks will increase in this area. The most likely targets would be ANP [Afghan National Police] personnel and buildings, ANA [Afghan National Army] troops, and international agency vehicles (AKE Intelligence 2005, Afghanistan: AKE Bespoke Intelligence Reports – 1 July 2005, 1 July – Attachment 16).

10. With regard to Ghardez, where is it (please include map)?

Gardez district is in the province in Paktya. It adjoins the western side of Sayid Karam district. Paktya province is located south of Kabul in eastern Afghanistan on the Pakistan border (‘Afghanistan Administrative Divisions’ (undated), HIC/ProMIS – Attachment 19). An enlargement of this map more clearly shows the location Gardez and Sayid Karam districts within the province (‘Afghanistan Administrative Divisions’ (undated), HIC/ProMIS – Attachment 40).

A more detailed map of Gardez province is also attached (‘Gardez District’ 2002, AIMS, August – Attachment 41).

The city of Gardez is the capital of Paktia (‘Afghanistan: Five Afghan policemen killed in attack; Govt says Taleban fragile’ 2005, Agence France Presse, 29 June – Attachment 30).

11. Are there indications the Taliban are active in Ghardez?

Two reports of Taliban activity during 2005 in the Gardez area are:

April 2005:

Taliban fighters were killed, on the Kabul-Gardez road, in an air strike after an attempted assassination attempt on a top former military commander of the Khost province (‘Taleban fighters ‘killed in raid’’ 2005, BBC News, source: AOP Afghan News, 11 April – Attachment 42; ‘Nine Taliban fighters seized in Afghanistan’ 2005, Agence France Presse, 13 April – Attachment 43).

March 2005:

Neo-Taliban forces were thought to be active on the Khost-Gardez road (Ricks, Marc 2005, ‘Neo-Taliban escalate activity’, RFE/RL Afghanistan Report, 29 March, Vol. 4, No. 10 – Attachment 44).

See also question 5 above for recent Taliban activities in Paktia province.

12. Are there reports of retribution having being taken, and still being taken, against people (and their family members) associated with the former Najibullah government in Ghardez?

No information on this specific question was found in the sources consulted

It is of interest that Adamec notes that many of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) leadership were Ghilzais from Paktia (Adamec, Ludwig W. 2003, Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, The Scarecrow Press, Inc, 3rd ed. Lanham, p.291 – Attachment 36).

One map shows Paktia as being one of the main areas of PDPA recruitment among peasants during 1980-1989 (Giustozzi, Antonio 2000, War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan: 1978- 1992, Georgetown University Press, Washington, p.289 – Attachment 45).

Information on ex-communists in Afghanistan generally may be found in RRT Country Research 2005, Research Response AFG17441, 26 July – Attachment 46.

13. Is there any evidence of people being targeted by the Taliban generally, or in Khankhail, Saidkaram, Paktia, for having come from, or being associated with, Australia?

No information was found in the sources consulted of the Taliban targeting generally, or in Paktia, returnees from Australia or people associated with them.

Of interest is the following advice provided to the Refugee Review Tribunal by Dr. Jonathan Goodhand relating to returnees:

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr Goodhand, would you be able to comment on - some of our applicants claim that they state to the Tribunal they would be considered infidels and persecuted because they have now married a westerner. Would they be targeted by the local mullahs?

DR GOODHAND: I have spoken to colleagues about this very question and it is perhaps not a very useful response but it is actually a realistic one and that is, it all depends on the area and the local mullahs. Certainly, that scenario that you have painted is plausible and possible and I come across areas of Afghanistan, where those kind of situations have developed, and I alluded to earlier the kind of the radicalisation of Islam, which has been one of the characteristics of the conflict and how, Islam has become a banner issue that has been used and mobilised by a whole range of different groups and the Taliban were perhaps the most extreme manifestation of that.

But it is also, it has happened not only at the higher political levels but at the grass roots as well in terms of the changing role of mullahs and so, that situation is very plausible but it is also - would be inaccurate to kind of paint the picture that all mullahs would take that position. One of the people I spoke to on this has said, well actually an alternative way of looking at it would be, they would think, they would be respectful of someone coming from outside who had been successful and got some of the trappings of the west but I think it is tied up with a whole range of other things.

There is a lot of resentment around people coming back, particularly in terms of the pressure on land and resources, and so pretexts are created to point the finger at these people, and one of those pretexts may be Islam, it may be their kind of past political connections and so on, but the underlying issue could quite easily be either one around resources or a personalised kind of long running history of enmity.

THE CHAIRMAN: Sydney, do you have any further questions?

FEMALE SPEAKER: So would the situation then be the same for returnees who are perhaps more secular, who aren't as religious as they were when they left Afghanistan? Would that be an issue coming back, not visiting the mosque, perhaps drinking alcohol, having more secular views rather than religious?

DR GOODHAND: It depends, there is strong pressure to conform in Afghan society, you know, in lots of ways. So not conforming is frowned upon and could be dangerous for the person not to do so but clearly it is different for a person going back to Kabul than it is to going to rural Ghazni. In rural Ghazni it would certainly be frowned upon for somebody to kind of say that they were an atheist and to be un- Islamic in their practices.

So I think, you know, that that would be dangerous for people to go back into that kind of a context and be openly, if you like, "un-Islamic". In Kabul it would be easier for that, for somebody to kind of perhaps have a more liberal lifestyle, but certainly in rural areas it would be extremely difficult.

THE CHAIRMAN: Melbourne, any further questions? Sydney, do you have any further questions? Okay. I have got just one follow-up question, Dr Goodhand, if you can shed some light on. A lot of our applicants have been in Australia for quite a long time, so consequently we were wondering would someone who had lived in a western country and returned to Afghanistan, in particular to Ghazni, encounter discrimination or persecution because of their perceived western taint?

DR GOODHAND: There is certainly a growing animosity and resentment towards expatriate Afghans coming back and walking into kind of relatively high paying positions and taking resources. I mean, anywhere there has been a war and there are people who have stayed and there are people who have left, when people return there is always, (almost always) tensions and resentment towards those who come back.

One sees this, in particular, in Kabul, with the return of a lot of technocrats but certainly in Kabul, I think it is a big issue because of the perception that the better qualified, the English speaking, the computer trained Afghans coming back and are taking relatively high paid positions.

In Ghazni, I think that certainly there would be a much more profound question around adjustments and because the difference between the lifestyle the person would have experienced in Australia and they would come back to in rural Ghazni would be much more profound and certainly that person is likely to stand out more. I think a lot of this though, comes back to whether this person is bringing in resources or competing for resources, and then if it is around trying to reclaim land, for instance, this being used then, that would become much more of a tension inducing issue. (Goodhand, Jonathan 2005, Seminar: Afghanistan, Refugee Review Tribunal, 13 April – Attachment 47).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources: Google search engine Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Jane’s Intelligence Review STRATFOR UNHCR REFWORLD UNHCR Refugee Information Online

Databases: Public FACTIVA Reuters Business Briefing DIMIA BACIS Country Information REFINFO IRBDC Research Responses (Canada) RRT ISYS RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. RRT Library FIRST RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1 Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project 2004, Profile of Internal Displacement: Afghanistan, 25 October, p.13, 200.

2 UK Home Office 2004, Afghanistan Country Report, April, paras. 6.114-6.120.

3 Saikal, Amin 2004, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, I. B. Tauris, London, p.231. (RRT Library)

4 Rubin, Barnett R. 2002, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, Yale University Press, 2nd ed. New Haven, p.22. (RRT Library)

5 Maley, William 2002, The Afghanistan Wars, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, p.8. (RRT Library)

6 Hussain, Hamid (undated, after 2002), ‘Ethnic factor in Afghanistan’, Afghanology website. (http://www.afghanology.com/ethnicfactor.htm - Accessed 26 July 2005)

7 Griffin, Michael 2005, ‘Hard road ahead for Afghan leader’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 February. (RRT General Papers) 8 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2005, ‘Afghanistan’s future holds promise and peril’, Press Release, 21 February. (http://www.undp.org/dpa/pressrelease/releases/2005/february/pr21feb05.html# - Accessed 27 July 2005)

9 United Nations 2005, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’, General Assembly: Security Council, A/59/744 – S/2005/183, 18 March.

10 Human Rights Watch 2005, Afghanistan: Violence Surges, 24 May. (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/05/23/afghan10995.htm - Accessed 27 July)

11 STRATFOR 2005, Afghanistan: Militant Activity Escalates, 23 June.

12 Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan on Violence in Afghanistan 2005, The United Nations condemns the escalation of violence in Afghanistan, insists on renewed cooperation to bring it to an end, 25 June. (http://www.unama- afg.org/news/_statement/SRSG/2005/05jun25.htm - Accessed 28 July)

13 UK Home Office 2005, Afghanistan Country Report, April, paras. 5.95-5.112.

14 FAST (undated), Afghanistan: Semi-annual Risk Assessment: December 2004 to May 2005. (http://www.swisspeace.org/uploads/FAST/updates/FAST%20Afghanistan%201_2005.pdf – Accessed 27 July 2005)

15 ‘Fast International’ (undated), Swisspeace website. (http://www.swisspeace.org/programs/default.htm - Accessed 28 July 2005)

16 AKE Intelligence 2005, Afghanistan: AKE Bespoke Intelligence Reports – 1 July 2005, 1 July. (CISNET Afghanistan CX125452)

17 STRATFOR 2005, Afghanistan: The Insurgency continues, 1 July.

18 International Crisis Group 2005, Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?: Executive Summary and Recommendations, Asia Report No. 101, 21 July. (CISNET Afghanistan CX128306)

19 ‘Afghanistan Administrative Divisions’ (undated), HIC/ProMIS.

20 ‘Sayid Karam District’ 2002, AIMS, August.

21 ‘Sayid Karam District’ 2002, AIMS, August.

22 ‘7 policemen, 5 insurgents killed in raid on post in southern Afghanistan’ 2005, The Canadian Press, 15 July. (FACTIVA)

23 ‘Karzai inaugurates military compound in eastern Afghanistan’ 2005, BBC Monitoring South Asia, source: Radio Afghanistan, 30 June. (FACTIVA)

24 STRATFOR 2005, Afghanistan: Girding for Battle in the Spring?, 25 March. 25 ‘Taliban just won’t go away’ 2005, South Asian Media Net, 7 April. (http://www.south asianmedia.net/index_story.cfm?id=196821 &category=Frontend&Country=AFGHA NISTAN - Accessed 13 April 2005) (CISNET Afghanistan CX118613)

26 ‘Governor of Afghanistan's Paktia Province notes achievements’ 2005, BBC Monitoring South Asia, source: Radio Afghanistan, 30 June. (FACTIVA)

27 ‘Taliban claim killing two soldiers in Ghazni clash’ 2005, Pajhwok Afghan News, 25 July. (FACTIVA)

28 Esfandiari, Golnaz 2005, ‘Violence increasing in south and east’, RFE/RL Afghanistan Report, 25 July, Vol. 4, No. 21.

29 ‘Major news items in leading Afghan newspapers’ 2005, Xinhua News Agency, 13 July. (FACTIVA)

30 ‘Afghanistan: Five Afghan policemen killed in attack; Govt says Taleban fragile’ 2005, Agence France Presse, 29 June. (CISNET Afghanistan CX125149)

31 ‘Al-Qai’dah, Taleban appoint new leaders in Afghan southeast’ 2005, BBC Monitoring Alert, source Arman-e Melli, 19 May. (CISNET Afghanistan CX121733)

32 Brunnstrom, David 2005, ‘U.S Envoy Says Senior Taliban Take Up Amnesty Offer’, Reuters, source: AOP Afghan News, 14 February.

33 International Crisis Group 2005, Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?, Asia Report No. 101, 21 July, pp.18-19.

34 ‘UN warns about Afghan instability’ 2005, BBC News, 25 June. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4622167.stm - Accessed 28 July 2005)

35 ‘Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan’ 1997, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/middle_east_and_asia/Afghanistan_Eth noling_97.jpg - Accessed 2 December 1999)

36 Adamec, Ludwig W. 2003, Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, The Scarecrow Press, Inc, 3rd ed. Lanham, p.291, 298-299. (RRT Library)

37 ‘Afghanistan: Focus on security in Lowgar province’ 2005, IRIN, 13 June. (http://ww w.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=30638 &SelectRegion=Central_Asia&Selec tCountry=AFGHANISTAN - Accessed 14 June 2005) (CISNET Afghanistan CX123374)

38 ‘Afghanistan: Rebuilding Afghanistan: Weekly Activity Update for May 16 – May 20: Issue 86’ 2005, USAID, 20 May. (http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near _east/afghanistan/weeklyreports/052005_r eport.html - Accessed 10 June 2005) (CISNET Afghanistan CX123313)

39 Tarzi, Amin 2005, ‘Southeastern representatives critical of Afghan president’, RFE/RL Afghanistan Report, 11 April, Vol. 4, No. 12. 40 ‘Afghanistan Administrative Divisions’ (undated), HIC/ProMIS.

41 ‘Gardez District’ 2002, AIMS, August.

42 ‘Taleban fighters ‘killed in raid’’ 2005, BBC News, source: AOP Afghan News, 11 April.

43 ‘Nine Taliban fighters seized in Afghanistan’ 2005, Agence France Presse, 13 April. (FACTIVA)

44 Ricks, Marc 2005, ‘Neo-Taliban escalate activity’, RFE/RL Afghanistan Report, 29 March, Vol. 4, No. 10.

45 Giustozzi, Antonio 2000, War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan: 1978-1992, Georgetown University Press, Washington, p.289. (RRT Library)

46 RRT Country Research 2005, Research Response AFG17441, 26 July.

47 Goodhand, Jonathan 2005, Seminar: Afghanistan, Refugee Review Tribunal, 13 April.